Questioning Muslim Identity: A Critical Analysis of the Discourse on Muslim Integration

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A mia mamma
che mi ha dato il coraggio di seguire il mio cuore e le mie intuizioni

A mio padre
che mi ha insegnato a difendere i più deboli
To my mum,
who gave me the courage to follow my hearth and my intuition

To my dad,
who taught me to fight against any injustices
Abstract

The continuing difficulty of integrating Muslims, especially immigrants, into the European nations, has led many ruling political leaders to question the merits of multiculturalism and simultaneously to promote integration through the strengthening and inculcation in the Muslim of a more general set of political values. This thesis aims to examine how these national debates are interconnected and how they attempt to frame a common discourse on integration of Muslims.

In order to analyse this debate, I have selected three national debates in France, Germany and the UK and applied a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in order to compare similarities and the degree of convergence within the European public sphere. The analysis has sought to identify convergence by looking into the shared strategies of discourse through which civic integration is articulated, depending on the cultural and political particularities of each national context.

The most significant finding to emerge from this study is that Muslims are asked to accept integration with their host countries, through a normative construction of collective identity that cuts across the different national discourses of Europe. These discursive constructions are based on similar definitions of the national values that belong to the European identity and, perhaps more crucially, those that do not belong. Accordingly, the normative and cultural assumptions that underlie various national discourses on civic integration are, in fact, based on European universalism, redefined at the national level.

At the same time, this debate on integration systematically excludes the important economic and social problems of Muslim newcomers. Specifically, the discourse on civic integration avoids reference to any welfare program that attempts to produce economic security and social solidarity; Muslims become exclusively responsible for their own integration and civic integration is reduced to only their ability to internalise dominant values.

Keywords: Muslims, Immigration, Identity, Integration, Political Speech, European Public Sphere, Discourse Analysis
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Chapter 1: Context, Background, and the Importance of the Thesis

In November 2009, Switzerland voted in Europe's first referendum on Islam to add a provision to their Federal Constitution that bans the construction of new minarets. Despite the criticism from the government and the churches in Switzerland, the proponents of the referendum argued that the prohibition of minarets would preserve Switzerland’s legal and political order because minarets are a symbol of a “religious-political force” that reflects an “attempt” to impose an “undemocratic hegemony” over non-Islamic people (Fraudiger, 2009: 1).

What happened in Switzerland was not merely a temporary cyclic eruption of anti-immigrant sentiment that is randomly present in Europe (Westin, 2003; Merkl & Weinberg, 2003), but rather a symptom of a general cultural and social insecurity of a large part of Swiss voters (Mayer, 2011: 12) towards immigration, and above all, an expression of the problems of co-existence between the Swiss majority and its Muslim minority (Christmann & Danaci, 2012: 154-155; Jackson Preece, 2005).

Muslim requests for political recognition of their diversity have questioned an established sense of borders and loyalties to the cultural traditions and values of the dominant majority (Koopmans, 2005: 142). In addition, the increasing visibility of a Muslim presence has fundamentally challenged the very myth of national homogeneity (Kivisto 2001; Kymlicka 2004) as Muslims often depend on identities (Aitchison et al 2007: 26) which are not included within the cultural confines of national societies. The outcome of the Swiss referendum thus represented a larger crisis for Europe’s collective self and political representation. Tariq Ramadan, in an article in The Guardian, underscored how this uncertainty pushes Europeans to ask themselves: “What are our roots?” “Who are we?” "What will our future look like?" (2009: 30).

In the aftermath of the referendum, political leaders across Europe have simultaneously debated how Muslims should make more vigorous efforts to participate in European society to confirm their loyalty to national communities and to avoid future conflict within religious and cultural traditions (Eliott & Turner
2012: 86, Mavelli 2012: 140). For example, French former President Nicolas Sarkozy [see appendix A, 2009: line 27] defended the Swiss vote, because it did not discriminate against freedom of religious practice or freedom of conscience. Specifically, Sarkozy claimed that the visibility and the open religious profession of Muslims are often considered disturbing or incompatible with the main traditions of Europe [44].

According to Sarkozy, it is understandable for European people to worry about their national identity and demand that Muslims accept the historical values of the nation-states where they now live. As a consequence of this assumption, Sarkozy proclaimed in the French Parliament that the burqua was “not welcome in France” and proposed a ban on the wearing of the integral veil, as wearing it “runs counter to [a] women's dignity” (Sarzozy, 2009: 5). Simultaneously, different European countries have called for a ban on the wearing of the burqa and the niqab (Schattle, 2012:110) and in the case of France and Belgium, their Parliaments voted on specific laws that target this Muslim clothing (Traynor, 2010).

These difficulties relating to the accommodation of Muslims into European society have also led many policy-makers to question the actual merits of multiculturalism and to support a very explicit rejection of specific cultural differences. The view has become part of the political agenda for many leaders across Europe. In October 2010, German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, claimed that Germany’s attempts to create a multicultural society have completely failed [see Appendix B, Merkel 2010: paragraph 31]. She also argued that those who do not accept Christian values do not have a place in Germany (AFP, 2010).

In February 2011, British Prime Minister David Cameron echoed Angela Merkel in a speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy by claiming “state multiculturalism” has failed [see appendix C, Cameron 2011: paragraph 8]. He added that the State must oppose, rather than accommodate, the non-violent Muslim groups that are indifferent to British values such as democracy, the rule of law, equal rights for race, sex or sexuality [16]. A week after Cameron’s speech, Sarkozy, speaking on a French television program, directly quoted Merkel and Cameron, remarking that “multiculturalism is a failure” (AFP, 2011). What seems to have
emerged is a new political consensus among European leaders that supports the integration of Islam, but also demands the political and social conformity of Muslims with European cultural values.

Nonetheless, this new emergent political consensus does not seem to be aimed at creating policies that fight the conditions of “social exclusion”, but rather at pushing Muslim immigrants to want to be more integrated into European society (Mavelli, 2012: 139). Conversely, the attempt to conform Islam to European values and the request for political belonging raise normative questions about the nature of citizenship and the practical political limits of these discourses on integration. In fact, a continuing emphasis on the need to integrate immigrants could confirm a political vision, in which cultural diversity is seen as a threat rather than a potential opportunity for Europe.

The first section of this chapter reviews the present literature on the debate of Islam in Western societies, especially focusing on the anxiety expressed toward Islam and Muslims, generally defined as “Islamophobia”. The discussion assesses how the anxiety for Islam can be politically manipulated with the intent to objectify a collective fear of social disunity and produce a loss of cohesion. Thus, the debate on integration can be seen as a discursive structure that organises the complexity of social relationships between minority and majority. In particular, community cohesion can be considered as a normative discourse aimed at defining what values and identities belong to that community and perhaps more crucially, those that do not belong.

Section Two focuses on the gaps and controversies in the literature that have investigated the existence of a common discourse on integration that goes beyond national models and philosophies of integration. Specifically, many theoretical and empirical studies have confirmed a convergence toward a universalistic discourse about admission and integration, which have presented multiculturalism as divisive and illiberal. The implication for Muslims is that integration is conceived only through the universal norms of the hosting community and Muslim identity can exist, therefore, only if it corresponds to the normative identity of the majority. However, these studies fail to distinguish how, at the base of the convergence
towards civic integration, there is an interactive process of communication across Europe. This is why, in addition to the political background that explains the institutional processes by which civic integration policies are created and maintained, it is necessary to identify the interactive discursive process through which political actors recontextualise, disseminate, deliberate and legitimise “civic integration” following a specific communicative logic of transnational convergence.

In Section Three, the aims, research questions and hypotheses of the present research project are formulated and evaluated. The main assumption is that the debate on Muslim integration is developed through an interactive discursive process between the national and transnational political spheres in which norms are debated and accommodated within a national political context. The analysis of convergence offers an understanding of the connections the European public sphere establishes between countries and how simultaneous debates on integration might have a critical impact on how the national public sphere recontextualises transnational discourses on migration and integration, and how these relationships contribute to the construction of a shared normative discourse about integration.

Section Four offers a summary of the research methodology. Here the analytical framework is based on a comparative analysis of three national case studies based on major institutional statements by governmental actors, which are then considered a point of entry for reconstructing the public debate on Muslim integration. Specifically, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is the methodology selected to analyse these statements, their articulations and interconnections within the public debate. This reconstruction of the public debate allows the establishment of what national factors were central in the convergence and recontextualisation of discourses on Muslim integration and European identity.

Section Five explains my personal interest in this research topic and the attempt to emphasise self-reflexivity, thus revealing my own position in the research process. Finally, Section Six offers an overview of the thesis structure, wherein each chapter is summarised.
1. A Critical Review of the Literature on the Debate on Islamophobia, Securitization and Integration of Muslims

Following 9/11, the Muslim presence in Europe has been increasingly perceived in political debate as hostile to European culture and traditions. In addition, the media have reinforced in public opinion the view of Muslims as being hostile to Western societies (Care 2002; EUMC 2002; Allievi 2006) through the coverage of different controversies concerning extremist violence, such as the Madrid and London bombings, the killing of Theo van Gogh and the protests that followed the printing of the cartoons of Mohammed in the Danish Daily *Jullands Posten* and its reprinting.

Generally, this collective anxiety toward Islam and Muslims has been defined as “Islamophobia”. As evident from the suffix “–phobia”, Islamophobia is a fear or hatred of Islam and Muslims. Despite the fact that the term is now popular in empirical research (*inter alia* Hamada, 2000; Suleiman, 1999; Ghareeb, 1983, 1984; Said 1987, 1997; Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2002; Geisser 2003; Fekete 2004, Werbner 2005), there are problems with its theoretical utility since it is unclear whether such a fear can be attributed to religious, political, social and ethnic intolerance, as the related elements in many cases become inextricably intertwined.

According to Cesari, the concept of Islamophobia is unreliable because the term is often inaccurately associated to more varied phenomena which can range “from xenophobia to anti-terrorism” (2006: 4). Maussen similarly avoids the basic concept of Islamophobia and argues that “the term Islamophobia groups together all kinds of different forms of discourse, speech and acts”. However, these discourses do “all emanate from an identical ideological core, which is a basic irrational fear (or a phobia) of Islam” (2006: 101-103). Halliday further explains that what makes the term problematic is that Islamophobia implies an homogenous view\(^1\) of Islam. The assertion of a “unitary identity” for all Muslims is an erroneous simplification because it ignores the extremely variegated cultural and social reality within Muslim

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\(^1\) According to *The Runnymede Report* (Conway, 1997) the first perception that references Islamophobia is that Islam is seen as “undifferentiated, static and monolithic as intolerant of internal pluralism and deliberation” (1997: 5)
societies (1999: 893). Furthermore, Halliday (1999: 893) wonders whether Islamophobia is due to social problems related to Muslim integration or actual cultural conflict with the religion of Islam.

However, Miles and Brown (2003) respond to this scepticism over the validity of a unique concept to consider different forms of anxiety towards Islam or Muslims by arguing that the reality of different “Islamophobias” does not overturn the general concept of Islamophobia, just as the existence of different forms of racism does not invalidate the concept of racism. In this way, Miles and Brown (2003: 164) recognise the specificity of the concept of Islamophobia, because Muslims, in contrast to other minorities, are represented as an amalgam of different elements, including nationality, religion and politics.

Several studies have also tried to unpack the concept of Islamophobia by focusing on the multiplicity of discourses that reproduce political anxiety toward Muslims by stressing the social dimension of the fear, which targets Muslims as immigrants rather than Islam as a religion. As consequence, many scholars prefer using other terms than Islamophobia, such as “fear of Muslims”, “anti-Muslimism” or “Muslimphobia” (Halliday 1999, Modood 2002, Vertovec 2002 and Erdenir 2010). This field of inquiry has also produced numerous studies that have focused on the distinctive aspects of how Muslim representations are perceived as being incompatible with European values and Western traditions (among them Hamada, 2000; Suleiman, 1999; Ghareeb, 1983, 1984; Said 1987, 1997; Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2002; Geisser 2003; Fekete 2004, Werbner 2005; Cesari, 2006).

Various authors have also examined the representations of Muslims in national media by underlining the discriminatory nature of many journalistic reports (Poole 2002; Allen 2005; Saaed, 2008; Ahmed 1993). In addition, other research has underscored how coverage, through international broadcasters, has complicated the legitimacy of Muslim identity (Saeed, 2007: 444; Poole & Richardson 2006; Zelizer & Allan 2002). Although there is empirical evidence about the fact that the media have played a specific role in popularising Islamophobia, most of these studies lack a detailed analysis of the effects of these misrepresentations on the political debate
and ignored some of the main questions in the literature on immigration and ethnic minorities.

In the specific case of Europe, the visibility of Islam has grown greater with the increasing establishment of Muslim immigrant communities in European countries (Göle, 2009). Today, Muslims are indeed the largest immigrant group in most of Western Europe, and this trend does not appear likely to change in the coming years (Leiken, 2012: 104). Consequently, European societies are facing an increasing level of cultural ‘differences’ due to the growing intensity of migrations from Muslim countries (Meer: 2010). Thus, veils at schools, *burqas* in the streets, mosques in cities and minarets are the manifest visibility of Muslims’ diversity (Göle, 2002: 173).

At the same time, when a dominant group perceives a challenge to its own position as “occupiers of the centre of national space” and culture (Ghassan Hage 1998: 19) the Other becomes a source of anxiety. For this reason, Kymlicka describes the recent anxiety towards Muslims, which has been manifested in Europe, as a “deeper and persisting … anxiety about the other” and “a nostalgia for a time when everyone was assumed to share thick bonds of common history and identity” (2007: 124). In this way, Islamophobia can be considered as a traditional process of self-defence that any homogenous society develops when it feels threatened by a minority perceived as incompatible with its own values, norms, and beliefs.

The concept of *heterophobia* (*Heteros* – ‘the other’ in Ancient Greek) enlarges the discomfort for anyone who does not share specific traits (i.e. cultural, religious, political, or racial) that characterise the dominant group (Taguieff, 2001). In this sense, it is necessary to understand how and why this discomfort for the Other may be perceived as a danger to the stability and cohesion of a particular dominant group’s way of life. In other words, when the Other is confronted within the most established values and traditions of a community, it will become an increasing source of conflict or what Giddens labels as “ontological insecurity” (1984: 63).
Specifically, Fenton has identified three factors that may transform diversity into conflict. The first of these is when a dominant majority perceives a loss of internal power and reacts to secure its status, the second concerns the erosion of state sovereignty as a result of increasing regional or global movements, and the third involves the collapse of state authority or institutions (Fenton 2004: 189). Accordingly, conflicting differences are seen not as an issue that matters to democratic debate and negotiation in the public sphere, but rather as a question of national security, in which the government can decide to reduce the “democratic process” to protect the state (Kymlicka, 2007: 589; 2010: 106). This development is best explained by the theory of securitisation (Fekete, 2004; Coskun, 2012) developed by the Copenhagen School during the 1990s.

In the securitization model, security is understood as a discursive process in which actors construct issues as threats to safety. Thus, the contemporary security environment is profoundly related to the politicization of a question as threat through a “discursive process” that moves a particular issue beyond the realm of ordinary politics to that of emergency politics where extraordinary measures are justified (Buzan and Weaver 2003: 491). As a consequence security politics is not just about underlining pre-existing threats; but is also a discursive “activity that makes certain issues visible as a threat” (Coskun 2010: 81). Within this context, “security refers to a concept that is more about how a society or any group of people” (Coskun 2010: 81) come to describe, or not describe, something as a menace. Securitization is thus about the process by which fear is ‘constructed’ through a political discourse.

In this manner, securitisation legitimises the state in its role of protecting the community from external threats (Huysmans 1997; Bigo 2002; Boswell 2007). Under conditions of securitisation, ethnic minorities can be marginalised or severely disciplined through strict regulation of their civil and political rights. So securitisation then, erodes both the political space for minorities and the democratic space (Vertovec 1319-24: 2011). In other words, securitisation justifies the state enacting a range of policies to regulate and control minorities as well as immigrant groups that otherwise could not be considered legitimate (Buzan et al. 1993: 24).
In the case of Islam, the concept of securitisation is applied when political actors or policymakers propose exceptional actions against Islam or Muslims, because public opinion perceives them as a threat to collective belonging even when there is little or no evidence of any real menace (Kymlicka 2009: 126). The Muslim threat can thus be used to legitimate political action which might not otherwise appear as reasonable.

However, Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998) distinguish securitizing moves, in which an actor discursively presents something as an existential threat, from successful securitization policies; the latter will only exist if and when public opinion accepts the securitizing move (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, 1998: 25). Moreover, securitisation practices based on exclusionary policies would normally be rejected at an institutional level, because it would run into liberal democratic constitutions (Joppke, 2005: 49) and European anti-discriminatory policies (Schain 2009: 97).

This contradiction between liberal protection for minorities and enactment of security policies echoes the “diversity dilemma” mentioned by Jackson-Preece in Minority Rights (2005: 3). Namely, diversity can contradict the principles that legitimise a political community (Jackson-Preece 2005: 5). In fact, diversity promotes a “variety” and “freedom” of “values, beliefs and identities,” while political belonging requires homogeneity, social cohesion, common values and beliefs (Jackson-Preece 2005: 6).

Diversity can also be “politically manipulated” when “social complexity is assumed to require a correspondingly increased degree of conformity” (Jackson-Preece, 2004: 140). In this manner, the “diversity dilemma” can be seen as a dispute over how much difference is acceptable in the name of integration. It can also be argued that the attempt to resolve the diversity dilemma is an attempt to resolve the contradiction between an imaginary self-collective (Anderson, 1994) and the collective identity of other minorities, such as Islam.

Therefore, the diversity dilemma consolidates categories of collective identification and mobilises political support in defence of social and political
cohesion within a community. In this way, the specific content of the diversity dilemma is contingent and reflects prevailing normative constructions of community including both who does and, crucially also, who does not belong. As a consequence, integration requires a profound work of authorship, whereby the dominant community rewrites and reinforces its own identity in order to regulate a minority.

An example of this process of authorship is the politicisation of European identity (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009), which has become an important discursive element of the European public debate in reaction to Muslim presence and Islamic visibility. Specifically, one of the most radical cases of re-indentification is the rhetorical appeal of conservative politicians to a European identity based on a supposed Judeo-Christian tradition. Stefano Allievi defines it as “reactive identity” (2006: 37), in other words, an ethnocentric process of self-identification, which works as the reaction to Muslim threatening identities.

At the same time, Kundani (2012: 160) goes further and underlines that it is not only conservative discourse on integration that stresses static identity as a cultural basis of Western society to counter-pose a Muslim collective identity. Liberal discourse also repurposes the same mechanism of marking out Muslims, when it emphasises the legacy of Enlightenment: “secularism, individualism and freedom of expression” as key characteristics of European identity (Kundani 2012: 160).

Self-collective identification – through a definition of the relationship to the self/other – points to the critical role that a political community, and the different traits and values they are seen to embody, has in realising and concretising the image of a community wherein diversity is perceived as a source of anxiety (Wodak 2005: 203 and Jackson-Preece, 2004: 140). The implication of this process of collective self-identification of the dominant group is that minorities will ‘feel crucially left out [when] the majority understand the polity as an expression of their nation, or agreed purpose, whatever it may be’ (Taylor, 2001: 123). According to Walzer (1997: 25) it is in fact “a single dominant group” that “organises the common life in a way that reflects its own authority and culture”.

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The main essential aspect of processing the integration of the Other is based on the rejection of “the old discourse of racial purity and race in favour of one based on cultural differences” (Silverman, 1999: 44). In other words, racism evolves into a “cultural differentiation” (Triandafyllidou, 2001: 61) and refers to a national community with specific characteristics, occurring when that national group positions itself at the top of an imagined hierarchy of cultures (Anderson, 2006 [1983]: 154). For this reason, different authors have coined the term “new racism” to describe a discrimination based on cultural hierarchies rather than biological differences like the more typical and well-defined racism of the traditional modern era (Balibar & Wallerstein 1991; Bauman 1989; Gilroy 2002; Taguieff, 2001 and Hall, 2001).

This cultural differentiation has practical implications for the debate on civic integration. Many of the advocates for social cohesion and civic integration do not use traditional racist arguments. Rather, their main anxiety is, as a consequence of mass immigration, European societies “have become too diverse” to sustain the social cohesion that underpins a heterogeneous community (Messina, 2007: 49). Accordingly, public concerns about policies that allow mass immigrant flows and settlements, as immigration has created an uncertain gap between collective national identity and cultural or ethnic diversity (Sackmann et al 2003: 27).

Owing to this development, the presence of Islam raises concern within European public debate as cultural and religious diversity is seen as hostile to the values and traditions shared by Europeans (Hutton, 2007; Hansen, 2006; Toynbee, 2005); specifically, public consternation is more evident when Muslims demand political recognition of their diversity. Moreover, the media everyday amplify in public debate the perception that some “Muslim practices such as forced marriages, female genital mutilations” and so on (Meer et al 2010: 19) are spreading across Europe due to the excessive tolerance and relativism introduced by multicultural policies.

As a consequence, the underlying assumption of the security concern with Muslims – Islam is inherently conflictual with Western values – is not based on an
exclusionary political process, but runs through the liberal justification and legitimisation of the process of civic integration (Joppke 2007; Muller 2007; Kundan, 2012). Civic integration refers to those state policies aimed at promoting integration through the strengthening and inculcation of a set of civic duties, such as social cohesion and cultural homogeneity (Mouritsen, 2009: 24).

According to the advocates of civic integration, Muslim groups are encouraged by multicultural approaches to close themselves off from mainstream society (Flood et al, 2012: 145). Also in the recent debate promoted by European political leaders, multiculturalism is blamed as source of all problems related to the lack of integration among immigrants. Specifically, multiculturalism is depicted as leading Muslims to develop an unwillingness to participate in social and political life, which certainly brings self-exclusion and the development of urban ghettos (AlSayyad & Castells 2002: 142). However, multicultural diversity does not encourage “men to beat their wives, parents to abuse their children, and communities to erupt in racial violence” (Philips, 2009: 45). Multiculturalism criticises homogeneous and mono-cultural national communities, supports the rights of minorities to maintain their cultural specificity and addresses those inequalities that can be experienced in the process of integration by promoting social equality (Castles, 2000: 5).

At the same time, the rejection of multiculturalism does not imply that it is impossible to integrate Muslims due to incompatibility with European values. On the contrary, the opponents of multiculturalism tend to emphasise the state’s ability to shape Muslim immigrants, who can be guided through civic integration towards forms of identity more appropriate to the European societies (Geddes 2003: 116). Thus, integration is used to suggest that the development of immigrant cohesion requires the assimilation of a set of liberal-democratic values as the core of the political community (Schmitt, 2007). Integration policies thus rest on a form of “equal opportunity” for those immigrants who accept liberal-democratic values as well as the promotion of citizenship through civic duties (Joppke, 2007; Holmes, 2000).
The state is thus actively promoting that kind of subjectivity that a liberal society requires. The discourse of a state-led production of a Muslim civic identity is reproduced in various policies: “values tests and oaths of allegiance for would-be migrants and citizens, the recruitment of moderate Muslims as state-sponsored role models and community leaders, state training program for imams and exams, formal and informal restrictions on the expression of extremist views,” and so and so forth (Mulcahy, 2011: 191).

The current policy debate on Islam integration is not driven by an attempt to exclude Muslims, but rather by a normative assumption that it is possible to integrate Muslims through the imposition of those universal values, norms and cultural attributes that are shared by Europeans. Thus, the debate on integration can be seen as a discursive structure that organises the complexity of social relationships between minority and majority. According to Horner and Weber (2011: 142), the difference between colonial and the late modern system of integration is that the latter is no longer based on the absolute exercise of power, but on the results of a test supposedly providing an “objective” or “scientific” basis for the decision. Nowadays, the “good ones” are those who successfully pass the test on civic duties, whereas the “bad ones” are those who fail (Horner and Weber 2011: 142). In this manner, it is possible to find some resonance with scientific racism in this codification by European states of a set of universal values as the basis of civic integration.

This attempt to integrate Muslim immigrants through the imposition of liberal values reveals an ambiguous attempt to homogenise cultural differences, which raises questions about the normative nature and the practical political limits of these policies (Esposito & Kalin 2010:7; Kostakopoulou, 2010: 79). The continuous prerogative to integrate immigrants could reveal an extreme attempt to realise a culturally homogenous society (Nachmani 2010: 246), in which Muslims are identified as subjects to assimilate according to the values and norms of the majority (Joppke 2010: 139).

To summarise the main point of this review: numerous empirical studies have paid close attention to the collective anxiety that shapes public debate on Islam.
There is considerable common understanding found in the literature regarding how the media have stereotyped and viewed Muslims as hostile to liberal traditions and values. In addition, the fear of Islam has penetrated an ensemble of social and collective discourses based on the identification of Muslims as an Other.

This fear of Muslims has deep implications for the public debate on Muslim integration, because it represents diversity as an issue threatening the social cohesion of a particular community. Thus public concern has enabled the dominant majority to mobilise a discourse of integration around a set of universal values, norms and cultural attributes shared by Europeans. Debate on Muslim integration is therefore conceived through the ability of states to promote a set of civic policies in which Muslim immigrants can be integrated only through the assimilation of a normative identity that is more appropriate to the European ethos (White 2009).

2. Controversy and Gaps in the Study of the European Public Debate on Integration of Muslims

Traditionally, the academic literature on migration and minorities has considered the topic of integration bound to the main characteristics of the national community, which can be defined by the territorial, ethnic, or cultural markers of the nation-state (Faist 2000; Bauböck 2003; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003; Wimmer 2007; Jackson-Preece 2005). Indeed, each state considers in a different way which rights should be granted to which groups according to the national “philosophy of integration” (Favel 2001). What remains to be demonstrated is whether and how the European public debate on Muslims, despite national differences, is converging towards a common discourse of civic integration.

There are several national factors, which could exclude a European transnational convergence on the Muslim integration debate. Firstly, national, cultural and historical contexts within Europe remain very different. For example, European countries have significant differences in terms of prejudice or engagement toward Islam “depending on the colonial histories, the geographical location, and the
composition of the immigrant community” (Halliday 2002: 125). For this reason, many comparative studies on integration are highly doubtful about a process of convergence within Europe (Bauböck et al., 2006), as the decisive institution in regulating and managing migration remains the nation-state. The nation-state continues to define the rules based on which non-natives are allowed to move to a country and gain access to employment and citizenship status.

For this reason, Favell is critical of the view that European political system will eventually “challenge the predominance of the nation state in policy making on immigration and integration” (2001: 242). In fact, there is no supranational authority higher than a state itself to decide on immigration or integration policies. The EU institutions have no formal competences concerning the very core of state sovereignty (Maatsch, 2011: 150). For example, neither the European Commission nor the Council of Europe can exercise more than a limited influence over national legal provisions on citizenship, immigration and integration policies and the existing norms are also not legally binding.

At the same time, the national differences in policy integration can become an unexpected source for transnational convergence. For example, in France and Germany, naturalisation was the product of the different models of citizenship (Brubaker, 1992), with the jus soli in France (citizenship by birth) and jus sanguinis in Germany (citizenship by blood) respectively. Nonetheless, the debate on these divergent models generated a de facto normative consideration (Farrell 2003:8), which pushed German policy makers to reform the “nationality law” by making it easier for children born from non-German parents to be naturalised as German citizens, while in the same period, the United Kingdom and France restricted the possibilities to naturalise at birth, the children of immigrants.

Many studies have focused on a convergence toward a common discourse on integration that goes beyond national models and philosophies of integration. Specifically, some authors describe how national legislations on citizenship and naturalisation are becoming more similar (Archibugi 2003, 2009; Beck 2005: 230). On a more critical level, Müller also confirms a convergence toward a universalistic
discourse about admission and integration, which presents multiculturalism as divisive and illiberal (Müller, 2007: 379, 381).

At the same time, Joppke (2007) makes a persuasive case that, in Western Europe, traditional policies of national integration are losing relevance today through the emergence of two conflicting types of liberalism: Rawlsian liberalism (Rawls, 1999), emphasising equality and individual rights, and repressive liberalism, which demands the immigrants’ political conformity with European norms (Joppke, 2007: 1-2). Moreover, Joppke develops the argument further by adopting a neoliberal governance as the theoretical reference to explain convergence in integration policies. In his words, "civic integration" is shaped by the neoliberal tenet to coerce "individuals, as well as communities they are part of, to release their self-producing and -regulating capacities, as an alternative to redistribution and public welfare that fiscally diminished states can no longer deliver" (Joppke, 2007: 16).

Certainly, Joppke and Müller recognise a hegemonic attempt to shape integration policies through a set of norms, whilst also providing a crucial framework to understand the balance of interests involved in “civic integration” policies. However, they fail to distinguish the discursive process that legitimises such arguments on integration. In other words, they do not recognise that, at the base of the convergence towards civic integration, there is an interactive process of communication across Europe. This is why, in addition to the political background that explains the institutional processes by which civic integration policies are created and maintained, it is necessary to identify the discursive process through which political actors recontextualise, disseminate, deliberate and legitimise a discourse on civic integration, following a specific communicative logic (Schmidt, 2008).

In an interesting analysis of the Danish public debate on Muslim immigration, Mouritsen (2006: 73) notes how the institutional debate has been characterised by a politicisation of European common values and culture, predicated on discourses that present cultural homogeneity, in terms of it being a political and functional necessity for Denmark to guarantee the continuity of the nation in a
transnational system. Thus, the national particularism that immigrants and ethnic minorities are asked to accept in Denmark are local versions of an imagined normative Europe, characterised by abstract universalism, state neutrality in matters of religion, and individual and gender equality (Bertossi, 2010: 52). Therefore, the interactive processes of communication and coordination across Europe recontextualise norms and values into the Danish political sphere.

This transnational process is more helpful in explaining the discursive convergence on integration than traditional institutional analysis which is pitched between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism (Corner, 2010: 11). These two broad approaches are concerned with the relative agency of states and institutions in the European public sphere, and their concern is with the transfer of policy-making beyond the State to the EU level. Neo-functionalist schools of thought have sought to understand whether European integration has been driven by the preferences of national governments (Wiener & Diez 2009: 45); whereas intergovernmentalism focuses on European institutions as being the dominant actors responsible for pushing the European process of integration (Wiener & Diez: 2009: 67).

An alternative paradigm in the literature is concerned with a constructionist approach that focuses on the ability of language to frame the terms of debate, thereby creating a discursive context in which social identities and political institutions emerge (Risse, 2009: 147). To some extent, this approach follows the argument of structure and agency: culture and identity are important parts of the context in which actors are situated. Thus, culture and identity become core factors in understanding discourses on policies (Hudson 1998; Hopf 2002). Social identities indeed consist of the constitutive norms and rules that define the social group and its membership, its goals and social purposes, as well as the collective worldviews shared by the group. Collective identities convey a sense of an imagined community (Anderson 1994 [1983]), usually based on social discourses about a common fate, a common history or a common culture (Fonderman 2006: 24; Irving Lichbach & Zuckerman 1997: 47).

This paradigm implies a collective identity in which civic integration defines the process of identification with a political structure through a set of rights, rules
and institutions. Therefore, the debate on the integration of Islam is a challenging opportunity to observe whether and to what extent discourses on European identity, integration to European civic values and the emergence of a European public sphere are closely correlated (Risse 2010). The merit of this approach is its focus on the formation and constitution of normative discourses on collective identities, rather than, on the impact of these discourses.

To sum up, the gap to address in the literature is how the debate on Muslim integration is developed through a transnational process of convergence in which norms are debated and then accommodated within the national political context (Wodak 2005: 368). Accordingly, the level of convergence invites us to conceptualise more fully the connections that the European public sphere establishes between national countries and how simultaneous debates on integration might have a critical impact on how national public spheres recontextualise a common discourse on Muslims despite divergent national models of integration. Moreover it is crucial to acknowledge the sources of common influence and the motives that go with it. Therefore, the question is not only whether or not states adopt a common policy on civic integration, but also how and why a transnational process of the dissemination of discourses might support this recontextualisation.

3. Aims, Research Questions and Hypotheses

The present research project proposes to analyse various European public debates on Islam and identify them within specific national dynamics, as well as to reveal how national and governmental actors have used a European discursive framework as a tool for formulating, elaborating, defending and implementing civic integration.

This approach looks for an explanation which is not purely based on a traditional analysis of the institutional processes of policy making, but identifies the discursive processes through which political actors recontextualise, disseminate, deliberate and legitimise a discourse of civic integration following a specific communicative logic (Schmidt, 2008).
Therefore this thesis examines the political debate that has emerged across Europe in response to the problems concerning the integration of Muslims. The debate on integration is investigated to understand how the effects of civic integration discourse tend to strengthen an *us vs. them* construction based on the assumption that the ‘Muslim Other’ constitutes a problem that *we* have to find a solution for (Honer and Weber, 2010: 142; Wodak 2008:295). At the same time, the thesis also explores the intersections between discourses on national identity and Europe as a collective representation of a shared community. Specifically, the aim is to explore critically in which ways the discourse of integration is positioned between 1) the process leading to social cohesion on the level of the individual nation-state (Honer and Weber, 2010: 142) and 2) the acceptance of normative assumptions regarding the political and cultural nature of European identity (Risse, 2010).

To this end, the thesis aims at responding on the one hand to a specific expectation among scholars in European studies that the old national models of integration (see Favel 2003 and Bertossi 2010) are giving way to a normative convergence across Europe, and on the other hand, to a recent debate in media and communication studies which observes the transnationalisation of the public sphere (Eriksen 2005; Trenz, 2005) as part of a general process of mediated convergence through new networks of communication (Triandafyllidou et al 2009).

This twofold standpoint facilitates an interdisciplinary approach to the study of political discourse without being constrained to the field of discourse studies. It also opens up the fields of political science and comparative politics to the discursive study of transnational processes of communication. In fact, a potential convergence in the level of debate, at which discourses are reproduced, is important as an indication of whether a convergence towards a normative discourse, which defines the process of integration of Muslims across Europe, is actively taking place.

Taking this point of departure and moving forward, there are two central sets of questions to answer:
First, what kind of convergence can be observed in comparing national public debates on Muslim integration after the Swiss referendum? How is this convergence on integration of Islam constituted at the national level? Furthermore, in order to better understand the role of transnational convergence, the question raised by Jacquot (2008: 21) can be repurposed: How do national governmental actors use the tools and resources offered by the process of European transnationalisation to help them in the national debates they are engaged in (legitimisation, power increase, hegemonic relations, etc.)?

Second, what are the communicative practices and discursive dynamics, which confer the legitimacy to public debate? What arguments are advanced? How are these arguments structured, linked and then recontextualised along different national levels? What themes are discussed under a common discursive regime? Why are the politics of identity reproduced in the discursive regime of integration (definitions of Europe, the relevance of values, and in particular, the construction of and reference to those values)? This last question will also involve consideration over how much difference can be acceptable in the name of European identity. For example, to what extent should political Islam be allowed into a project of integration?

Research Hypothesis 1 (RH1) focuses on an interactive and horizontal convergence, in which national differences cannot disappear from national histories and ideological distinctiveness, but common norms could converge toward a common discursive space. In particular, it can be argued that the horizontal diffusion of discourse on integration has influenced national debates. Thus, the convergence towards civic integration is explained as an interactive process of communication among national governmental players who are the central actors of a process of creation, implementation and recontextualisation of national discourses on civic integration.

The possibility for a horizontal diffusion of norms is likely to be reinforced by the increasing interconnection of different national public spheres, which enables communicative links and exchanges between polities across national borders. In particular, horizontal convergence is likely to be reinforced by the increasing
interdependence created by the mediation of transnational networks like newswires and social media. For this reason, this transnational debate could be identified as a site or forum that facilitates and encourages norm and policy diffusion, which may subsequently lead to some level of convergence (Whitman 2010; Mjuller 2007).

At the same time, the assumption of a transnationalisation of the public debate implies the existence of a shared understanding across European countries. As a consequence, it is central to investigate when and how a discourse on integration has entered into the national policy agenda and how this discourse is structured, linked and then recontextualised along different national public spheres.

Research Hypothesis 2 (RH2) assumes that the current debate on integration share a common discourse on a universal idea of a European community of values, which is recontextualised along national identities and also along particular national political interests. In other words, the politicisation of national identity could be predicated on an attempt to create a shared common sense of European moral community.

Therefore I hypothesize that the discourse of integration is developed through a common elaboration of national values within a common discourse on Europe and its collective identity made by a universal idea that all Europeans belong to a single moral and political community. For example, Europe can be registered as an imagined collective we (for example, ‘European communal’ or ‘Western Civilization’). While, the Other can be seen as non-European and non-secular. In this manner, the specific usage of European identity becomes a symbolic and discursive resource for social and political cohesion (Risse and Sikkink 1999; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005:8.) However, the normative assumptions that underlie this convergence are redefined at the national level as a national particularism through a specific political interest of the ruling elite. In this way, what becomes relevant is the strategic use that elites make of the concept of ‘European values’ in order to advance and legitimise civic integration of the Muslim Other.

As a consequence, this European discourse and its national evolution, is investigated through three trajectory, in order to verify to what extent: 1) the
normative politics of identity sheds light on the contentious and contradictory discourse of integration and its limits to consider Muslim diversity as part of the European self; 2) the debate on integration of Muslims is a central characteristic of the process of governmentality (Foucault 1991; Pennycook 1998; Milani 2009) and 3) whether the frequent appeals to integration from governmental leaders can hide social and economic rationalities which provide the real background for framing this debate on identity and power (Horner, 2009; Horner and Weber, 2011).

To summarise, this project aims to look into the cross-national convergence of the debate on integration and seeks to reveal shared strategies of discourse through which Muslim integration is articulated, depending on the cultural and political particularities of their national contexts. At the same time, I assume that this horizontal convergence within European debate on integration refers to a discourse on European common values and traditions, which is redefined at the national level through the specific political interest of the dominant political group.

4. Synopsis of the Research Method

The purpose of this synopsis is to give an overview of the methodological approach, which is applied in the empirical analysis. The empirical analysis aims to look into the putative transnational convergence of the debate on integration and to explore how discourse on Muslim integration is articulated across Europe and whether or not it reflects the cultural and political particularities of national public spheres. In doing so, the research design provides a comparative analysis of national debates to investigate to what extent a discursive process of convergence is emerging towards Muslim integration in order to understand how networks and dialogic relationships develop between merely different national “spheres” (Eriksen 2005; Trenz, 2005) and how these relationships contribute to the construction of a shared normative discourse about integration.

Here, discourse is defined as a particular way of talking about, understanding and acting in the public sphere. Thus, by using the term discourse, I indicate that both a multiplicity of meanings (semiosis) and social practice reproduce, legitimise
and operationalise a discourse through the public sphere (Fairclough, 2003: 19). The social practice helps explain also the convergence of a discourse and the way in which is redefined across Europe.

Discourses serve specific political interests and power relations. What is interesting in the specific case of Muslim integration is to observe along with the content of the discourse and its form, how the discourse operates not just to define political strategic interests, but also to develop a consensus for the necessity and appropriateness of policy change (Wodak & Meyer, 2009: 99). Therefore, the analytical task of discourse is not focused on the construction of a negative view of Islam but rather on a normative construction of common identity based on the universal values, standards and cultural attributes of the majority developed through discursive practice (Eriksen 2005: 2).

In addition, discursive practice may also explain what potential political effects a discourse creates through the language use of the political elite (van Dijk 1993). Specifically, Schmidt suggests that social practices are the institutional “processes through which meaning is coordinated among political elites and policy choices” (Schmidt, 2008: 311). Transnational convergence is the coordinative communication method among policy actors connected in an “epistemic community” (Haas 1992) that is in a transnational public sphere based on common normative ideas about a common policy project. Thus the discourse on integration serves not just to represent a specific idea of collective identity but also to coordinates norms and values across the public sphere.

To analyse this public debate on civic integration, its discursive articulations, interconnections and its convergence, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is applied. CDA is an established methodology in the social sciences and one that is valued for offering effective tools to systematically explore discursive practices in broader social and political structures (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999; Fairclough, Jessop, & Sayer 2004; Fairclough 2001). Moreover, the interdiscursive nature of the debate allows me to use CDA to illustrate in detail the differences between national and transnational public debates and the relationships between discursive practices and larger social processes embedded in the public sphere.
Specifically, the focus for RH1 is on how these discourses are actually undertaken and covered across Europe. The aim here is to verify the level of convergence in the debate on integration, instead of focusing only on “the diffusion of coherent and persuasive discourse”, so that process of convergence points to the “more complex and selective” process “through which discourses interact” (Lynggaard 2012: 10) in the public sphere. This realisation will, in turn, lead to a clearer analysis of how different national discourses draw inter-textually on one another offering similarity in terms of their discursive strategies across Europe.

At the same time, in order to assess the type of potential discursive influence the European public sphere may exercise on national public debates, the analytical framework does not focus on the extent to which national debates are influenced by a top-down relationship, but instead are influenced by a horizontal relationship in which national governmental actors have been using discourse on civic integration as a rhetorical device for their own political strategy within the dynamic of national debate. Following this line of thinking, the expectation is that this civic integration discourse is probably rarely “adopted in national contexts in their entirety, but rather ‘bits and pieces’ are selectively incorporated into existing national discourses” (Lynggaard, 2012:97).

Further, the focus for RH2 rests on the construction and representation of the European identity and how this collective identification is actually linked to the debate on integration. At the heart of this analytical step lies a focus on textual practice and the ways texts develop common assumptions that all Europeans belong to a single moral and political community that should transcend state boundaries and national identities. However, the different constructions of European identity resonate with national and even local discourses in different ways and do not lead to homogeneity and a single unified European identity (Risse, 2010: 7.)

The first step of this research design is the definition of the comparative framework. Specifically, I have decided to select three national case studies: UK, France and Germany, which are commonly seen as having divergent models and philosophies of policy integration (Favell, 2001, Joppke, 2005), as well as different
approaches to European integration (Wiener and Diez, 2009). At the same time, these three countries have faced the same difficulties of integrating Muslim immigrants, which have recently led their political leaders to debate simultaneously: 1) the failure of multiculturalism and 2) how to promote better integration through the strengthening and inculcating of a more general set of civic duties related to a collective European identity.

As a consequence, the discourse analysis is aimed at revealing any normative construction, which attaches values to political action and serves to legitimate policies of integration (Schmidt 2008). Specifically, normative constructions clarify how a discourse recontextualises a set of values and norms embedded in the public sphere, and if this recontextualisation is an effect of an emerging discourse introduced through the convergence of the European debate.

The second step of the analysis is the reconstruction of the national public debate on Muslim integration. Each case study will be based on a national nodal point, which is considered the point of entry for reconstructing the various discourses present in the policy debate on Muslims’ integration. Thus a nodal point is a master text, which offers a privileged point of entry into the elite’s language and allows for the reconstruction of a government’s strategy about the development of new immigration practices and policies.

Moreover this analysis of the nodal point will allow a clearer understanding of the discursive practice, how the nodal point links to other discourses, the rules according to which these discourses are tied together and how they are re-inscribed into the political debate (Diez, 2005: 628). To investigate and assess this transnational public debate, the primary criteria for the selection of the nodal points are the following:

1. Time Frame: 15 months after the Swiss ban on minarets;
2. Sources: Political statements by top political leaders (Head of Government or Head of State)
3. Dissemination: European relevance;
I have selected this specific time frame because it represents a “moment of crisis” (Fairclough, 1992: 230), which pressed European politicians to debate openly how to integrate Islam and Muslim immigrants in order to avoid conflict with the values and traditions of Europeans. Therefore this moment of crisis has made “more visible and apparent” (Marston 2000: 353) any condition of power in this public debate.

Relevant to data collection, I analyse political texts as a specific genre and I select different sub-genres like editorials and speeches. My interest is not in those texts delivered by opinion makers or extremist politicians, but rather, in those delivered by national governmental actors – who represent a decision-making elite (Haas, 1992; Cross 2012). This governmental elite has the political authority both to constrain and enable policy choices. However, even though authority is given by an institutional role, what is relevant for this analysis is how national governmental actors articulate their political agenda through political debate in order to be considered both relevant and legitimate. This perspective implies that the elite’s discourses on civic integration may have real influence in the process of decision-making as well as on public agenda formulation.

Regarding the dissemination across Europe, I intend to study only those statements that have raised strong controversy as the more contentious a political statement becomes, the more media coverage that occurs across Europe. Therefore, statements had to be highly disseminated through European broadsheets, news agencies and TV broadcasts and simultaneously debated by European public opinion.

The following are the three cases studies and their entry point to the national public debate on the integration of Muslims in the aftermath of the Swiss ban on minarets.

In Case Study 1(Chapter 4), the French public debate is reconstructed around the nodal point of Sarkozy’s editorial published in the Le Monde newspaper on 8 December 2009. In this article, Sarkozy defended the Swiss vote and calls upon
Muslims to refrain from provocative attitudes, but also urges them not to forget that Europe has Christian values as its foundation.

Case Study 2 (Chapter 5) investigates the public debate generated by Merkel during the Young Christian Democrats Convention. The German Chancellor did not merely state that Germany’s attempt to create a multicultural society had "utterly failed." At the same time, Merkel pointed to successful examples of civil integration programs that integrated new immigrants. Merkel also claimed it was a necessity to defend “German Identity” as a major justification by asking for more social cohesion.

In Case Study 3 (Chapter 6), the analysis examines the debate caused by Cameron delivered on the occasion of the Munich Security Council. The British Prime Minister delivered a provocative speech on the failings of state multiculturalism by suggesting that Britain can produce a “muscular” integration by imposing liberal values codified within British identity. Moreover, this nodal point offers the opportunity to analyse how Islam can be constructed to become a security issue in Europe.

In conclusion, my analytical framework focuses on a comparative analysis of three national case studies, based on major institutional statements by governmental actors, which are then considered a point of entry for reconstructing the public debate on Muslim integration. Specifically, I have selected Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is selected to analyse these statements, their articulations, and interconnections within the public debate. This reconstruction of the public debate will allow the establishment of which national factors were central in the convergence and recontextualisation of discourses on Muslim integration and European identity.

5. Personal Interest in the Topic

Much of the inspiration for this project has arisen from my own experience as an immigrant and a member of a minority group. Like many students, I became
interested during university study in contextualising my life within broader social and theoretical paradigms to make better sense of it. In doing so, my personal interest is only incidentally about Islam, and is focussed primarily on the relationship between minorities and the majority.

This thesis is thus more an account and an exploration of the limits and problems that relate to the formation of political debate in Europe at large on issues such as the tolerance and respect for cultural differences and how the rejection of these issues occurs. My concern is to understand precisely why the Other is still such an issue today in Europe. Specifically, why is a different identity perceived as a menace and at what point does this fear become the primary source for a concrete, supported political program that aims at limiting or even normalising the diversity of a minority?

I am convinced that European public debate on Islam is an important example that reveals that not only is the tolerance of diversity always under siege, but also how the fear of the Other continues to dominate the lexicon of the political debate. As Christopher Caldwell wrote to attack multicultural integration: “If you understand how immigration, Islam and native European culture interact in any Western European country, you can predict roughly how they will interact in any other” (2009: 19). Consequently, what is relevant in my work is to explore and understand the complexity of the debate and its process on the integration of Islam, but as Jackson-Preece argues, when homogeneity is fully accepted as the ideal basis of political organisation, the freedom of minority groups becomes all the more precarious (2005: 8).

I began this research project in New York in late 2005, when public opinion was already shaped by world-shaking events that directly involved Muslims after 9/11, the attack on Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq and the bombings in Madrid and London. In that year, I still remember reading a shocking interview with the Italian journalist, Oriana Fallacci, in the Wall Street Journal: “Europe is no longer Europe, it is 'Eurabia,' a colony of Islam, where the Islamic invasion does not proceed only in a physical sense, but also in a mental and cultural sense. Servility to the invaders has poisoned democracy, with obvious consequences for the freedom of
thought, and for the concept itself of liberty" (Wall Street Journal, Varadarajan, 2005: 7).

That interview was nothing new, as in 2001, during the aftermath of the global anxiety about terrorism, Fallacci attacked Islam from the front page of the most important Italian daily newspaper on the basis of an easy equation and a dangerous one: All Arabs are Muslim, all Muslims are Islamists, all Islamists are terrorists; thus the Arab-Muslim civilization, which is embedded in religious fanaticism, is the major enemy of Western civilization whose superiority does not need to be proven any longer. It was a deliberate case of anti-Islamic upsurge, based on the same processes of stigmatisation and dehumanisation that characterised many ideologies of the twentieth century.

However, what was worse in terms of this re-emergence of intolerance was how the media quickly echoed the many public calls for discrimination against all Muslims in many Western countries. In this context of growing media concern, some opinion-makers have presented Europe as a socially weak society and predicted that Europe was condemned to become an Islamic colony called “Eurabia.” According to Carr (2006: 4), the worst case of the “Islamicisation” prophecy describes the Europe of the future as a place where “Christians and Jews will become the oppressed minorities in a sea of Islam.” Thus, what began as a bizarre conspiracy theory soaked by dangerous political fantasies has become intellectually respectable through the media making visible the discourses elaborated by an elite of intellectuals and well-known newspaper columnists (see Ye’or, 2001; Lewis, 1995, 2003; Fallacci, 2006; Huntington, 1996).

In the aftermath of 9/11 and the Madrid and London bombings, Europe faced a threshold in its radicalisation against Islam. A fear of Muslims and resentment toward them increased to an extremely alarming level. What was initially only the aggressive prejudice of a circle of journalists, scholars and religious leaders became the widespread opinion of many Europeans.

Today, almost ten years after Fallacci’s pamphlet, the situation has changed but paradoxically Fallacci was right in writing that Europe was changing. The post-
war goal of a European political and social community based on tolerance and multicultural policies is steadily dissolving. Perhaps the presence of Muslims in Europe will be normalised, but it is not clear yet how this process of integration of Muslim diversity is operating and what effects it will have on the relationship between the majority and minorities at large.

The integration of immigrants is a source of constant controversy as the rise of xenophobic parties across Europe can attest. There is anxiety about national culture being diluted and changing the current way of life; increased perceptions of a burden on national social systems; ideas of value incompatibility between Islam and European society. But these controversies are also fed by frequent political appeals from public authorities to renounce the road to multiculturalism, in favour of a more homogenous collective identity based on common values of a long idolised Christian and Western culture.

Therefore, what is more fascinating in this context is not observing unscrupulous opinion makers and populist politicians, but rather scrutinising national leaders, such as Merkel, Sarkozy and Cameron, who have chosen to talk of integration through generic appeals to security, integration and an idealised European identity.

My interest in this project is not hinged on describing this public debate on Islam as merely a process of misrepresentation. In fact, arguing once more that dominant elite excludes a marginalised group does not make an original contribution to research. For this reason, I have focussed on a critical analysis of the integration debate to examine how the civic integration discourse aims at regulating and controlling those groups which are considered hostile to society because they do not respect traditional values of the majority.

**Overview of the Thesis Structure**

Chapter 1 has introduced the problems surrounding the assimilation of Islam in Europe and the aims of the research project. Chapter 2 begins with some
conceptual clarifications about integration, collective identity and public sphere. It also offers the chapter offers a theoretical approach to explaining transnational convergence as an interactive process of communication among national governmental players, who are central actors of a process of production and recontextualisation of discourses on civic integration. In Chapter 3, the research design is explained. The analytical framework is based on a comparative analysis of three national case studies based on major institutional statements by governmental actors, which are then considered a point of entry for reconstructing the public debate on Muslim integration. Specifically, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is selected to analyse the nodal points, their articulations and interconnections within the public debate. In Chapter 4, the first case study focuses on the French debate and aims at investigating how discourse on Muslim integration is articulated, depending on the cultural and political particularities of the French model of integration. In Chapter 5, the second case investigates the German public debate; specifically, analysis focuses on how this debate is characterised by 1) a political and cultural rationale that focuses on the “crisis of multiculturalism;” 2) a necessity to redefine German identity in a more cohesive way through an epistemological shift in the definition of a German national identity. In Chapter 6, the third case looks at the British debate, which focuses on the failings of multicultural integration and promotes a new model of integration calling for a policy of "muscular liberalism" in order to guarantee that Muslims respect those values that characterize the national British identity such as democracy, equality before the law and human rights. In Chapter 7, the conclusion provides a comparative analysis of national debates to reflect on the extent to which a discursive process of convergence is emerging towards Muslim integration and how these relationships arguably contribute to the construction of a shared normative discourse about integration across Europe.
Chapter 2: The Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of the European Public Debate

Chapter Overview

In chapter 1, I underline how in the aftermath of the Swiss vote on the Minarets, political leaders across Europe simultaneously debated on how Muslims should make more vigorous efforts to participate in European society, confirming their loyalty to national communities and working to avoid future conflict within a European identity characterised by specific religious, political and cultural traditions. Kundani (2012: 160) observes how current debate on integration is accompanied both by the conservative discourse of cultural identity and by a liberal discourse of superior values. In particular, the conservative discourse emphasises a “Judeo-Christian civilization” as the core of European identity, while the “liberal discourse of integration” is based on the Enlightenment legacy of “secularism, individualism and freedom of expression” (Kundani 2012: 156) as main features of European identity. In this way, in both discourses, European identity becomes drawn into a particular universal codification of values counter-posed to Islam.

In this regard, the aim of this chapter is to clarify those concepts related to integration that will be taken up in the empirical investigation. The chapter proceeds through the following steps. It starts with some conceptual clarifications of the notion of integration. Second, it presents a brief overview of how civic integration is connected to the process of identity formation in Europe. The close association between the principles of integration and identity makes it possible to observe how identity is constructed through political discourse. Third, the chapter offers some relevant clarification about the concepts of collective identity, in addition to European and national identities. Fourth, the chapter presents a conceptual explanation of the European public sphere and explores how this transnational arena is central in the process of the renegotiation of national identities. Fifth, the last
section concludes with a theoretical approach to the analysis of the convergence of the discourse on integration within the European Public Sphere.

1. Defining Civic Integration

Civic integration refers to specific state programs aimed at promoting integration within immigrants through the strengthening and inculcation of a set of civic values, cohesion, homogeneity and culture (Mouritsen, 2009: 24). Instead multicultural integration promotes a large diversity of values, beliefs and identities as legitimate or even desirable within the nation. However the multicultural approach does not only suggest respect for the role of ethnic communities but also implies a “two-way process of adaptation” concerning changes in “values, norms and behaviour” for both immigrants and members of the hosting society (Castles et al., 2002: 115). Accordingly, civic integration is assumed as a one-way process in which “migrants are expected to integrate into the existing culture and society without any reciprocal accommodation” (Lacroix, 2010: 8). In fact civic integration policies require newcomers will assimilate specific cultural and political characteristics in order to fit in with a national identity and become part of the economic and social structure of the receiving society.

The main stake of civic integration centres, therefore, on how historical notions of the nation can be adapted to include new, culturally distinct immigrants and, conversely, how these immigrants must change or adapt to become integrated in the nation (Joppke, 2003; Mouritsen, 2006; Favell, 2005). Thus, an important challenge to integration is the close relationship between discourse linked to integration and the long-standing social imaginary of nation building (Anderson, 1994), which forms the basis of national identity and provides the background for policymaking. As a consequence, the concept of integration is bound to the core values of the nation-state-society and the immigrant settlement process (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003; Favell, 2001; Kamboureli, 1996; Schiller et al., 1999) and requires them to accept the collective identity and cultural values of the nation.
Many states influenced by nationalism have been profoundly devoted to adopting “a single, homogeneous identity with a shared sense of history, values and traditions” (Smith 2010: 127). Therefore integration of minorities can contradict the principles that legitimise a national community because it undermines the building of a cohesive political community with a uniform cultural identity (Jackson-Preece, 1998, 2006). Recognition of diversity, especially of politically organized ethno-cultural groups, can be perceived as a serious menace to national unity as it could destabilize the social and political unity realised after a historic process of political struggles (Kymlica 1995: 9; Jackson-Preece 1998: 109).

The tension between integration and national identity echoes the “diversity dilemma” (Jackson-Preece, 2005: 3), namely, should a State require belonging or rather recognise a freedom to diversity? On one hand, integration is manifested as being more diverse, and on the other, national states need uniformity. Thus the collision of these two terms, “diversity” and “uniformity” (Jackson-Preece 2005: 5) is at the basis of the debate on integration. Moreover, integration can be securitized in order to protect the community from the threat of diversity and justifies a range of policies to control and assimilate national minorities and immigrant groups.

In this manner, the debate on Muslim integration can be seen as a dispute over how much difference is acceptable and safe within the European society. Unlike multicultural integration, civic integration presupposes homogeneity and seeks to maintain social cohesion through a common identity and related values and beliefs (Jackson-Preece 2005: 6). It would be wrong to argue that civic integration aims at promoting the exclusion of immigrants. As long as states need immigrant workers for economic reasons (Coleman, 1992; Peel, 2005), governments will keep promoting policies of civic integration in order to make immigrants accept hosting traditions and values. Integration is thus conceived only if contained within the norms of the hosting community and Muslim subjectivity exists only as a projection of the normative identity of the majority.

In recent years, the debate on civic integration has been prominent in both public debate and high-level policy formulation across Europe. As a consequence, some authors have described how national legislations on citizenship and
naturalisation are becoming more similar and in some cases, more liberal (Archibugi 2003, 2009; Beck 2005: 230; Hansen and Weil, 2001; Weil, 2001; Howard, 2005).

On a more critical level, Müller has confirmed a convergence toward a universalistic discourse about admission and integration, which, however, presents multiculturalism as divisive and illiberal (Müller, 2007: 379, 381) and criticises the concept of “ethnic self-definitions, ethnic definitions of citizenship and ethnic priority immigration” (Müller, 2007: 379, 381).

As regards Muslim integration in Europe, it is not clear whether or how the debate across Europe, despite national differences, is supported by a common discursive space in which diverse national actors have enacted and reproduced a common discourse on Islam and the integration of Muslims. There are several national factors, which could exclude convergence on Muslim integration. Firstly, national cultural and historical contexts within Europe remain very different. For this reason, many comparative studies on integration are doubtful about convergence within Europe (Bauböck et al., 2006) as the decisive institution in regulating and managing migration remains the nation-state, which defines the rules based on which non-natives can move to a country and gain access to employment and citizenship status.

Furthermore, the transnational process of communication and interaction beyond the confines of national territories have challenged the rationale of a Europe neatly divided into exclusive political communities and the myth of the congruence of a certain territory and an ethnically or culturally identifiable nation (Marcussen et al, 1999; Checkel & Katzeinstein, 2009). Therefore, a potential convergence in the level of debate could be highly significant because it would indicate a cross-national process of negotiation, influence and recontextualisation of a normative discourse on civic integration, which reinforces a process of collective European self-identification and rejects those arguments in the literature according to which a European demos is not only empirically non-existent but also theoretically impossible (Kielmansegg 1996; Scharpf 1999; for a critique see also Risse & Grabowsky 2008 and Risse, 2010).
The study of the debate on integration is important because it reveals prevailing normative constructions of community including both who belongs and crucially also who does not belong. For this reason, in the next sections it is functional to offer a brief overview of how civic integration is connected to the process of identity formation in Europe and how the concept of European identity is linked to the emergence of a European public sphere, in which national identities are renegotiated and revised.

2. Civic identity and Identity Formation in Europe

I already underlined how present public debate on Islamic integration has been characterised in two instances by a common European civilization and culture, which emphasise Europe's cultural heritage, a common history, and grounding in a Judeo-Christian culture (Kundani, 2012). These claims, based on an “organic link between present values and a shared past,” aim at creating a common identification, which may confer “legitimacy and social cohesion on the European project” (Mavelli, 2012: 101). However, in reproducing these claims in public debate on Islam, a problem of a different order is created, as European identity becomes defined by a particular universal codification of political values. In this context, Europe becomes constructed as an exclusionary entity that is only open to native Europeans and hostile to foreigners, immigrants and particularly to Islam.

In sharp contrast to the liberal and tolerant image of Europe that the European Union likes to convey, it is possible to observe a different vision of collective identity implied in the concept of “Fortress Europe” (Checkel and Katzenstein 2008), namely the process of borders security adopted by the EU against illegal immigration. However, the fortification of Europe is not “confined to the realm of external relations” but depends on the problems which always dominated Europe's relationship with the Other, which is “intricately linked up with the question of what it is to be European, and which cultural requirements are necessary to attain that status” (Neumann and Welsh 1991: 347).
The discourse of Fortress Europe is noticeable in a European-wide concern with regards to the flow of extra-EU immigrants and the Islamic presence in Europe. This concern leads indeed to the observation of the European difficulties regarding immigrant integration and the diverse national and ambiguous interpretations of what European identity actually means (Christiansen et al 1999: 541).

In this context, the process of formulating a discourse of European identity is particularly remarkable because there are two distinctive relationships at work, which challenge conventional conceptions of collective identity. First, European identity does not coincide with a national identity, but rather it can coexist only as a sum of national identities. Second, in contrast to national identities, which are based upon a national imaginary (Anderson, 1983), European identity is defined by a common identification with a distinct civic and political entity (Habermas 1996). Thus, European identity can be defined as resting upon shared political or civic values, rather than in common culture, history and language.

A complex web of political, moral and legal discourses shape the formation of a European identity. An example is the recurrent claim to a European identity that is often defined by a belief in liberal and democratic rules, which are developed and shared by European nations and within the EU. The European identity founds thus is distinctiveness in a “civic identity” with a commitment to a common concern with morality, civic perspective and political values (Muller 2006: 287). However, European identity is not simply a shared set of cultural values but become a normative political discourse aimed at defining the European collective self.

This political discourse on European identity does not imply that national identities are replaced by a new identity. Rather, these national differences are interpreted in the light of European universalism that have been realised as basic rights and constitutional norms (Muller, 2007). In this manner, European citizens are solicited to reflect upon their particular values in the name of shared universal values (Muller 2006: 287). This process also involves that immigrants have to support these European values even when they find themselves opposed to them.
The tension that animates debate on integration and the inclusion of immigrants in Europe is created by the emergence of a “post-conventional” European identity, which operates according to the moral nature of universal laws, which defines the European post-national community. Habermas “constitutional patriotism” (1996) presupposes that universal norms “codified in the constitution of a post-national community” like Europe may generate a sense of identification and belonging which goes beyond “conventional forms of loyalty based on ethnic origins, national culture or religious tradition” (Mavelli, 2012: 98).

At the same time, this universal validity of post-conventional identity that the political community attributes to the modern European social imaginary (Taylor, 2004; Calhoon, 2003) can create a dangerous moral superiority (Mavelli: 2012: 98), which goes beyond the limits of Habermas’ theory of constitutional patriotism (1996). Constitutional patriotism, in its original formulation, was never intended as a particularly “inclusive form of membership” but rather a form of “political attachment” to the community (Muller 2006: 293).

According to Habermas, constitutional patriotism cannot take form in “social practices” or become “the driving force” for “creating an association of free and equal persons until they are situated in the historical context of a nation of citizens in a way that they link up with those citizens’ motives and attitudes” (Habermas, 1996: 499). Thus, Habermas never supports a universal blanket of rules to promote the integration of the Other. In Habermas’s view, the subject to be integrated is the national subject, who “guided by the universal principles of reason and rationality, can transcend the divisiveness and the exclusion” caused by national forms of loyalty (Mavelli 2012:96).

A sense of attachment is thus formed through the general character of society that emerges from a collective learning process that “make collective reflection and contestation possible” (Muller 2006: 287) as a constant project of defining civic identity and not aiming to assimilate the Other. But as Mavelli (2012: 12) underlines, European identity has been principally shaped by a secular model of reason and rationality that promotes a set of common commitments based on the
recognition and respect of universal values, and in this way European civic identity can be only conflicting with some tenets of Islam.

European civic identity reveals fundamental problems also as a normative ambition. Its comprehensive rules rest on the superiority of a universal morality which arguably prevents self-reflection that every encounter with the Other should accompany, whilst at the same time, this universal codification leaves a sense of apprehension about values and identities that this civic Europe should accommodate. In fact, the “self-referentiality” that distinguishes the process of creation of a civic identity is based on the reproduction of a “non-negotiable and non-questionable” Western European ideal, which raises “doubts about the transformative potential enacted by the European project, particularly considering the possibility of a cosmopolitan Europe capable of embracing diversity” (Mavelli, 2012: 107).

What happens is that, on the one hand, a discourse of civic European identity aims to impose a model of universal inclusion beyond the national, cultural and religious particularistic specificities. On the other hand, unlike Habermas’s constitutional patriotism, this universal attempt to transcend differences postulates Europe in a dimension of exceptionality, which excludes the Muslim Other (Mavelli 2012: 116), unless the Muslim accepts to assimilate those values embedded in the European civic identity. Accordingly, attention should be given to how European societies describe their own traditions and values and how these claims are advanced in the public sphere to support the necessity to implement new policies “dealing with admission and integration” (Muller, 2007: 287).

In this manner, an analysis of the discourse on integration could clarify from a critical perspective, how a discourse on European civic identity might be conceived as a desirable and normative kind of collective identity to regulate the Muslim Other. I suggest that discourse on civic integration explains the questions of civic rights and duties, and the specific values associated with European identity adopted and promoted by national states through public debate. In this respect, collective identity is an essential analytical category to understand discourses and political strategies of civic integration. However, before discussing such an
analytical framework, it is necessary to clarify some of the assumptions in discourse about collective identity and its formation in the public sphere.

3. Collective Identity: Conceptual Clarifications

The concept of collective identity applied in this theoretical framework draws on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979). This theory was originally developed in psychology as an attempt to unify an individualistic approach and an interactionist approach to social cognition and behaviour (Haslam, 2001; Postmes & Branscombe, 2010). The main assumption is that people divide their social world into them/us based on a process of social grouping also known as in-groups (us) and out-groups (them) (Stangor, 2000: 12; Carter et al 2012: 634). Moreover, Tajfel proposes that groups, which people belong to are an important source of self-esteem.

As a consequence, social identity theory explains how people are driven to enhance their self-image by keeping or developing a positive sense of social identity with their in-group discriminating against the out-group (Reid & Giles, 2008; Burke & Stets 2000: 226). The desire for a positive social identity is explained through the manifestation of three different strategies, namely individual mobility, social competition and social creativity. In each case, these strategies result from an intergroup struggle for power, prestige and status (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001) developed through positive strategies aimed to strengthen the legitimacy and stability of in-groups versus out-groups (McAndrew & Milenkovic, 2002). Thus, the process of identity formation of a political community assumes both an in-group and an out-group.

Social identity theory can also explain a wide range of political processes based on different collective identifications and it is very useful to explain prejudice, discrimination and those circumstances under which social groups move from social solidarity to overt conflict. Notable examples include the use of the political identity approach as a basis for understanding nationalism (Calhoun, 2001: 15) and the process of European integration (Neumann, 1996; 2001).
The construction of collective identity can be directly developed through a political discourse aimed at defining membership, or indirectly through the use of political symbols (Marcussen et al, 1999: 615). Castells explains that those “who constructs collective identity … largely determines the symbolic content of this identity, and it is meaning for whose identifying with it or placing themselves outside of it” (Castells, 1997: 7). However, when realistic or symbolic threats undermine the process of positive social identification, inter-group anxiety plays a significant role in creating prejudice and fear. Thus, in order to resolve positive social identity, the group at risk actives a mechanism of ethnocentrism (Burke & Stets 2000: 232).

This line of thought can be clearly seen in the process of securitization (Williams 2003, 518), where as a process of threat construction is based on a symbiotic relation between securitization and the formation of collective political identities (Coskun 2012: 39). In this sense, the process of securitization aims at underlining the existence of the Other as a threat. It is impossible to speak of the security of a community without recognizing a source of threat (Wæver 1997, 353). Conversely, in the absence of the Other we cannot speak about security (Coskun 2012: 39). Therefore, the process of securitization requires the construction of an enemy-other (Fierke 2007:112) in order to consolidate the stability and security of a society.

According to Bruter (2005: 12) there are two different perspectives to describe the process of collective identification. The first is based on a cultural perspective and analyses political identity and the sense of belonging that an individual citizen feels towards a political group. The features of the group can be defined by culture, social similarities, values, religion, ethics or even ethnicity. In this way, cultural identification refers to the semiotic system used to legitimise and justify social norms and values and acts as the framework for orientating the members of the community. Specifically, Eder and Giesen argue “Europe is also a symbolic space where projections and memories, the collective experiences and identifications of the people of Europe are represented” (2001: 245). In this way, the process of cultural identification is a process of adaptation around conceptions of Europe and what it means to be European.
The second perspective implies a civic perspective in which political identity defines the process of identification with a political structure through a set of rights, rules and institutions. Thus, a civic-identity emphasises the difference between in-groups and out-groups. However, according to Bruter (2005: 13), civic identity is not aimed at exclusionary processes. The Other is present as a difference, but this difference is not regarded as inferior.

Civic identity is an important theoretical and analytical concept to study any political identity, but it is particularly relevant in the case of Europe because identification within the state or political system is primarily measured by the civic component, as the diversity of cultural features within Europe cannot be unifying in a single collective identity. For this reason, Habermas’s approach to constitutional patriotism and civic identity formation are central to the debate over Muslim integration. In fact, any political consensus that favours discourse on civic identity has important consequences for the public debate on Islam and its implementation in civic integration policies.

However, it is unlikely to assume a process of European identity formation without presupposing a European public sphere in which is possible to observe the process of identification with a set of rights, rules and institutions. The public sphere is the communicative arena in which the community is identified as a political entity. The members of the community can, through a public sphere, identify themselves on the basis of what forms their “imagined community” (Anderson 1983). Thus, the formation of a European civic identity and the emergence of a European public sphere are closely related (Risse, 2010). For this reason, after having clarified the concept of collective identity, it is necessary to clarify the concept of the European public sphere and how it reinforces the process of civic self-identification.
Theoretical discussion on the characteristics of the public sphere is generally developed by referring to features of national identity such as language, territory and political authority. Habermas (1989 [1962]: 24–39) implicitly supposes a national public sphere is contained by a national state, or in Fraser’s words a “Westphalian state” (1989: 60–70). Therefore, a public sphere presumes a specific national political imaginary, which bounds a “political community with its own territorial state” (Fraser, 2007: 8). Thus, the public sphere appears to be restricted to a distinctive space (Trenz, 2008: 273) in which political and social issues are debated, but only with reference to specific national features included within linguistic and geographical boundaries.

Today, the increased number of transnational networks of communication associated with globalisation (Fraser 2007: 8) have questioned the national dimension of the public sphere and led to a reconsideration of the concept within a transnational frame (Conway & Singh, 2009). Accordingly, the public sphere has been used to understand the potential of those transnational debates that are now emerging beyond the national territorial state.

Habermas himself, responding to numerous criticisms made about The Structural Transformation (Habermas, 1996; 1998; 2001), revised his notion of national sphere and considered a globalised post-national public sphere made up of numerous simultaneous debating publics that are less burdened by the constraints of national identities. More in detail, Fraser points out that the contemporary public sphere is increasingly transnational because the constitutive elements of communication are no longer directed towards the national public. Thus, the debates and opinions generated by “dispersed interlocutors” no longer represent the common interest and the general motivation of any national demos (Fraser 2007: 19).

Different scholars have drawn attention to the emergence of a common public sphere, which animates the current national public debates within and between European states (Bee & Bozzini 2010, Risse 2004, van de Steeg 2004, Diez
& Medrano 2003). The relevance of this scholarship is to understand whether the public sphere is shifting from the national arena to new institutional venues at a supranational level.

Conversely, other authors have presented a more pessimistic opinion on the emergence of a transnational public sphere (Schlesinger 1999; Pérez-Díaz 1998; Grimm 1995; Offw 2003; Risse 2003) by underlining the gap between the idealisations of a European public sphere and the prevailing communicative practices in those cultures that are still based on national characterisations. These authors point out that public debate in Europe is still considered a very nationalistic process because 1) national media tend to stay contained within national or linguistic audiences; 2) news is still tied to national interests in terms of international events; and 3) there is no specific European public sphere because Europe lacks a singular, common identity.

Although, much of this literature on the transnational public sphere is still embryonic and more efforts have emerged to provide a more comprehensive analysis, different studies have shown the existence of a multitude of communication networks covering European themes simultaneously (Van de Steeg 2002, Trenz & Eder 2004) despite the fact that Europeans do not speak a common language and common European-wide media does not exist. Here the concept of ‘network’ occupies a central position because it refers to the interaction between different national media, institutions, and social actors (Trenz & Eder 2004). In fact, according to Eder and Kantner, as long as the media communicates “the same issues at the same time using the same criteria of relevance” (2000: 315), there is indeed a common public sphere that may be shared by Europeans.

A European public sphere can be thus formed through the dissemination of media networks as long as the same topics are discussed simultaneously within all different national media (Risse 2002: 4). Although, at the most basic empirical level, this last conceptualisation follows Habermas’ notion of a public sphere as being “a theatre in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk” (Fraser, 1990: 57), citizens do not need to become fully engaged in a direct discursive exchange within this transnational environment. Therefore this
approach refers to a conceptualisation of the transnational public sphere as a realm of shared understanding and common identification, rather than an open arena for public deliberation (Marx Ferree et al. 2002: 290-291).

As a consequence, a European public sphere is a social construct in the sense that it emerges in the process through which Europeans engage one another and debate issues of common European concern across borders. For this reason, Risse, following Eder and Kanter (2000: 315), claims that it is possible to observe a process of the Europeanisation of public spheres when the same “themes are debated, at the same time, at similar levels of attention across national public spheres” (Risse 2010: 11).

However Risse finds empirical evidence that controversial debates have more chance of being interpreted through more “similar frames of reference, meaning structures across national public spheres” and media (Risse 2010: 127). This line of thought implies that public debate on European issues leads to collective identification processes and creates a community of communication rather than pre-assuming it as a requisite. Therefore, debating European issues of common concern actually forms a community of communication.

The role of citizens as necessary active agents in the debate is not central in the definition of a European public sphere; rather their agency is seen as part of a more abstract process of identity formation. The concept of a European public sphere implies the formation of a “community of communication” that “presupposes some degree of collective identification” with a European perspective (Risse 2010: 157). The European Public Sphere becomes, in this way, both a communicative community that emerges through public debate beyond national borders and the communicative arena in which identities develop and gain significance for citizens.

The European civic identity is thus linked to the process of the Europeanisation of public spheres. The existence of a shared European public sphere is, in fact, the necessary condition for the formation of a European civic identity (Risse 2010), in which national identities are constantly reconstructed in interaction with the surrounding out-groups, through the mediation of cultural and political
discourse of Europe. Thus, it can be assumed that not only a European public sphere emerging, but that a collective European identity is being constructed in the course of controversial debate about European issues of common concern to Europeans (Risse: 2010: 11).

Particularly, the debate on the integration of Islam is a challenging example to observe the political construction of a European identity in an interactive process of negotiation, influence and national recontextualisation of a normative discourse on civic identity. As a consequence, the study of the transnationalisation of European national public spheres is a useful approach to observe the interaction among communicative networks, but also a valid approach to study the construction of new boundaries between the external and the internal, including the definition of a common Other within Europe (Delanty and Rumford 2005).

To summarise, the emergence of a European public sphere through the Europeanisation of national public debates both presupposes and leads to a transnational network of communication (Van de Steeg 2002, Trenz & Eder 2004), which reinforces the process of collective European self-identification (Risse 2010). The theoretical and empirical implications that arise from this conceptualisation of the European public sphere are particularly salient in seeking to understand how Muslim integration is debated as a common European concern.

5. Transnational Convergence as Recontextualization and Hegemonic Process

An important challenge to the public debate on integration is the close relationship between the discourse linked to integration and the long-standing social imaginary of nation building (Anderson, 1994) that forms the basis of national identity and provides the background for policy making. As a consequence, the concept of integration is bound to the core values of the nation-state-society and the immigrant settlement process (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003; Favell, 2001; Kamboureli, 1996; Schiller et al., 1999) requires an acceptance of the collective identity and cultural values of the nation. For this reason, many authors are still
doubtful about a convergence within Europe as the decisive institution in regulating and managing migration remains a national prerogative, which defines the rules based on which non-natives can move to a country and gain access to employment and citizenship (Bauböck et al., 2006).

The increasing complexity of political relations in Europe, the transfer of competences up to intergovernmental arenas in which decision-making is shared with other European polities sets important challenges for national public spheres, which have until now, interacted through a transnational European dimension (Maatsch, 2011). For this reason, the degree of debate convergence could reveal the connections that the European public sphere establishes between countries and how simultaneous debates on integration might have a critical impact on how national public spheres recontextualise transnational discourses on migration and integration. It is, however, crucial to acknowledge the sources of common influence and their motives.

Therefore, the question is not only whether or not states adopt common norms on civic integration, but also how and why a transnational discourse is supported by a process of recontextualisation (Farclough, 2003: 222). Recontextualisation is a process that extracts a discourse from its original context in order to introduce it into another context. Since the political implications of a discourse depend on its context, recontextualisation implies also a change of purpose and of the communicative process (Schmidt 2008: 305).

In the forms that transnational public spheres may take, there are two general trajectories that correspond to different forms of recontextualization: vertical convergence, between the national polity and European-supranational levels, and horizontal convergence between different national polities in Europe (Koopmans & Erbe 2004). The extent of convergence along these two trajectories indicates the degree of openness or closure of a national public sphere, up to EU level (vertical) or across to other European countries (horizontal). In this way, the analysis of these two forms of convergence provides insight into the degree, form and shape of the emerging European public sphere (Paraskevopoulos, 2001).
Most scholars assume a top-down approach in their empirical studies, whereby norms are disseminated from above and member states either resist or comply therewith (Checkel, 1999, 2001; Dell’Olio, 2005). In this manner, only the implementation of supranational rules and norms are identified as the source of convergence. This vertical approach can become problematic, as it implies that domestic policy change is solely attributed to international actors, processes and institutions (Busch and Jörgens 2005).

Limited attention has been paid to horizontal convergence, defined as norm diffusion and interaction from one public sphere to another. Paradoxically, horizontal processes of convergence are purely transnational, when compared to the vertical variants, because they build direct communicative links and exchanges between polities across national borders. Moreover, horizontal convergence is likely to be reinforced by the increasing interdependence of national public spheres when they “face [the] same challenge and come up with the same conclusion without coordinating it with each other” (Maatsch, 2011: 150).

An example of horizontal convergence of debate can be found during the cartoons affair in 2006, when the European press largely agreed on the necessity to defend press independence and freedom of opinion against Muslim protests (Triandafyllidou, Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2010: 266). In this manner, these authors have challenged a differentiation of the public sphere on a purely national basis by arguing that a common discourse has become visible when Islam was represented as conflicting with a homogenous representation of common values. A similar case is the transnational coverage of the 2009 Swiss referendum on minaret construction. Specifically, Göle (2010) has noted how “the debate on the minarets in particular and the visibility of Islam in general, generates transnational dynamics and assemblages of disparate elements.”

As a consequence, the role of the national political sphere cannot be ignored in the study of a transnational debate. However, “cross-national policy convergence” (Knill 2011) could be merely the result of similar solutions adopted by different countries to “parallel problem” pressure such as immigration, securitisation, integration, citizenship (Bennett 1991: 231). For this reason, it is important to
compare each national public debate in order to consider to what extent convergence is a real process of communication characterised by the same causal relationship, which enables a “communicative exchange” aimed at sharing the same political discourse (Radaelli and Bulmer 2004:7).

To understand, therefore, the recent debate on the integration of Muslims, it seems to be particularly useful to refer to the horizontal links between national spheres. First of all, the state remains central in regulating and managing many aspects of citizenship and immigrant integration, often justifying policies and actions in terms of national priorities and sensibilities and defining the boundaries of the in-group, and who is in and who is out (Neumann 1996). The state also remains, in fact, the primary institutional apparatus for legitimising national discourse on identity, through systems of education, law, finance, territorial control and so on.

Second, Trenz notes (2008: 274), the national public sphere remains the central focus in the global arena “for the re-interpretation of issues” concerning transnational processes “within contextualised systems of meaning and particular cultures.” In fact, through the efforts of the media, global debates, such as the “war on terrorism”, are re-scaled (Fairclough, 2010: 80) into national debates. In this manner, the process of the re-interpretation of an international debate produces two simultaneous effects for the national public sphere: 1) the ability of a transnational debate to shape and lead a national discussion and 2) the agency of the national public sphere in re-scaling and re-contextualising transnational discourses.

This approach has several advantages. First, it does not take for granted vertical pressure in various national states. Looking specifically at the national level allows better to capture the specificity of each national case and to see if, when and how a transnational debate has entered into the national political agenda (Triandafyllidou, Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2010). Secondly, it does not assume a priori, that Europe has had an effect on national debate on integration. The research is designed in such a way that space for various options is left to empirical study, which may show that European resources should be counted alongside many other constraints at work at a national level.
The major risk connected to this horizontal trajectory is to concentrate on national public debate and to lose sight of the more general picture of the evolution of the supranational debate within Europe. To counter this pitfall, it will be important to trace the most relevant national discursive developments and see if any link with the debate at the European level can be found.

This theoretical model does not assume that supranational institutions, and specifically the EU, should not be considered among the many determinants of national debate. However, it seems simplistic to assume at the outset of a study that the EU or other international actors are the most likely source of policy convergence. What this means is that rather than focusing only on a vertical convergence, horizontal convergence points to the more informed processes of recontextualization through which discourses interact through across national contexts, what we also may call “interdiscursive” context (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 45-46).

Following this line of thinking, the “expectation would be that transnational discourses are probably rarely adopted in national contexts in their entirety, but rather “bits and pieces” are selectively incorporated into existing national discourses” (Lynggaard, 2012 :97). A growing intergovernmental discursive collaboration within the European public sphere in terms of recontextualization and interdiscursivity can explain the patterns of convergence.

In this process of the recontextualisation of any transnational discourse, the role of the national political sphere cannot be undervalued in invoking issues of cohesion, belonging, membership of the polity and the nation (Hansen and Weil, 2001; Favel, 2003). Yet, at the same time, this approach further implies the emergence of a European public sphere as the discursive arena for disseminating and recontextualization a shared understanding. The process of re-contextualisation and the interdiscursivity of discourse can then be “operationalised in terms of the reciprocal resonance of public communication” between the various national public spheres (Trenz 2005: 176) and can be used to illustrate the specific role of the European Public Sphere in transnationalising a discourse.
The logic grounded in transnational convergence originates in the basic social dynamics of hegemony. On a more specific level, Gramsci's definition of hegemony provides critical reflection on a strategy used to legitimate and reproduce discourses (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 24). Gramsci’s concept of hegemony also helps map out the social forces that underlie the dynamics of power and cause any emerging consensus to be hard to challenge in a transnational context (Robinson, 2005). As a consequence, the concept of hegemony can help researchers investigate the structure of discourse through its embodied narratives and realise the different discourses that shape the public sphere.

The concept of hegemony also shows the changes in the process by which the political elite deals with the problematisation of a political discourse on identity that might otherwise normally be naturalised and therefore, more difficult to notice. Specifically, elites can be considered an “epistemic community” (Haas 1992), which reproduce and organise discourses on identity and help neutralise the different alternatives giving shape to a prevailing hegemony (van Dijk 1993, 255). Thus, when an elite authorises only a specific set of discourses on Islam within the public sphere, the risk is that any opposition voices will be marginalised. As a result, the efforts of elites are not only aimed at developing and spreading hegemonic discourse, but also at shrinking non-elite agency, which can make the political consciousness oppositional. For this very reason, it is important to analyse how elites actually assemble their discourses in the public sphere and which particular interests mark and direct their distinct purposes.

Gramsci’s theorisation of hegemony provides valuable insight into how convergence reformulates the public debate, especially when reproducing discourses that go beyond the accepted national public spheres. For example, the more the discourse on European civic identity is consensual and stable, the more elites can use them for strategic purposes. This is why, national policymakers often use the phrase "European values and traditions” to justify civic integration and legitimise political decisions at home and give them the appearance of unavoidability.

Therefore, the discursive production of European civic identity is not pre-established, but rather reflects the evolution of understanding shared by political
elites implicated in this institutional debate, mainly ruling politicians (Christiansen et al 2001: 14). Ruling elites across Europe, it follows, invoke different elements of European collective identity depending on the specific context. Indeed, the appeal to the civic integration of Muslims depends on the distinctive interpretation each nation can extract from the discourse on ‘European identity’ (Marcussen et al 2001: 14; Risse, 2010).

Furthermore, horizontal convergence does not assume a top-down convergence between the supranational and national debate, indeed the national sphere maintains its agency and capacity to recontextualise transnational discourses. Second, the transnationalisation of the debate implies the existence of a discursive arena for disseminating a shared understanding across European countries and allows the specificity of each national case to be captured and investigated as to when and how a discourse on integration has entered into the national policy agenda. Third, horizontal convergence posits that domestic political factors are key catalysts in any national discursive shift.

The possibility for horizontal diffusion of norms is likely to be reinforced by the increasing interconnection of different national public spheres within the European public sphere, which enables communicative links and exchanges between polities across national borders. For this reason the European public sphere could be identified as a site or forum which facilitates and encourages norms and policy diffusion, which is thought to subsequently lead to some level of convergence (Paraskevopoulos, 2001). The possibility for horizontal European transnational debates to emerge are likely to be reinforced by the increasing interdependence created by the mediation of transnational networks like newswires and social media.

Finally, I will use the European public sphere as an analytical category to understand the degree of convergence towards norms and values in public discourses on civic integration. It is important to examine the relationship between the public sphere and the ruling elite by focusing on how elite discourses reformulate the public debate, rather than on why citizens develop their own individual opinions and thus, a different consensus. This articulation between elites and convergence can offer a new understanding of how social discourse actually
shapes the public debate on Islam. In this manner, it is possible to integrate hegemonic theory with the concept of convergence and elaborate on how they interact reciprocally through the discursive work of elites.

The Theoretical Framework in Brief

In this theoretical chapter my aim was to clarify concepts that will be taken up in the empirical investigation.

First, I introduced some conceptual clarifications of the notion of civic integration as a one-way process in which immigrants are expected to embrace a set of civic duties, which require the assimilation of common values through social cohesion and cultural homogeneity (Mouritsen, 2009: 24; Lacroix, 2010: 8). This civic version of integration challenges the right to diversity, the free choice of immigrants and presupposes an asymmetrical relationship between the agency of the majority and minorities.

Second, I presented a brief overview of how civic integration is connected to the process of identity formation in Europe. The concept of European civic identity plays a key role in the process of redefining European self-identification. Moreover, the close association between the concepts of identity and integration lead to interesting questions about how European civic identity might be regarded as a desirable and normative kind of collective identity to regulate the Muslim Other. Thus, civic identity can be institutionalised as a common discourse; at the same time this discourse presents an exclusionary dimension based on the claims of cultural/civilisational appropriation.

Third, I offered some relevant clarification about the concepts of collective identity. The close association between the principles of ‘integration’ and ‘identity’ makes it possible to observe how identity is constructed through political discourse. Discourses on civic integration explore the questions of civic duties and the specific political values, such as liberalism, associated with European identity adopted and promoted by national states through public debate.
Fourth, I explained the conceptual relevance of the European public sphere to explore the transnational debate on integration and how debate is central to the process of renegotiating national identities. I have underlined how the Europeanisation of national public debates is leading to a transnational network of communication (Van de Steeg 2002, Trenz & Eder 2004), which reinforces the process of collective European self-identification (Risse 2010). Thus, it can be stated that not only is a European public sphere emerging, but there is some evidence regarding a collective European identity being constructed in the course of controversial debates about European issues of common concern to Europeans (Risse: 2010: 11).

Fifth, I emphasised the fact that this debate on integration across Europe, despite national differences, is supported by a common discursive space in which diverse national actors have enacted and reproduced a common discourse on Islam and the integration of Muslims. Thus, I draw on a theoretical approach based on the model of horizontal convergence to apply an analysis of the transnational debate on integration. The level of convergence invites an analysis of the connections that the European public sphere establishes between national countries and how simultaneous debates on integration might have a critical impact on how national public spheres recontextualise transnational discourses on migration and integration.

Further, investigation should examine the relationship between the public sphere and the ruling elite by focusing on how elite discourses reformulate the public debate, rather than how citizens develop their own individual opinions and thus, a different consensus. This articulation between elites and convergence can offer a more complete understanding of how social discourse actually shapes the public debate on Islam. In this manner, it is possible to integrate hegemonic theory with the concept of convergence and elaborate how they interact reciprocally through the discursive work of elites.

In this respect, the next chapter will frame the methodology to assess how political debate has emerged across Europe in response to the problems concerning the integration of Muslims. Specifically, the aim is to critically explore in what ways
the discourse of integration is positioned between 1) the process to obtain the necessary social cohesion at the level of the nation-state and 2) the acceptance of normative assumptions regarding the civic nature of European identity. In this manner, the analytical framework will aim at understanding how discourse tends to strengthen an *us vs. them* construction based on the assumption that Muslim Others constitute a problem that *we* have to find a solution for. At the same time, it will also be central to investigate and compare intersections between discourses on national identity and on Europe as collective representations of a shared community; both discourses represent the normative framework in which the Muslim Other has to fit into.
Chapter 3: Outline of the Methodology, Social and Political Analysis of the Discourse

Chapter Overview

This chapter aims at defining a methodology to investigate the transnational convergence of the debate on integration and to reveal the shared strategies of discourse through which Muslim integration is articulated, depending on the cultural and political particularities of their national contexts. In doing so, the research design is based on a comparative analysis of national debates to verify the extent to which a discursive process of convergence is emerging towards Muslim integration in order to understand how networks and dialogic relationships develop between different national public spheres and how these relationships contribute to the construction of a shared normative discourse about integration.

In chapter 1, I assume that the European debate on integration, despite national differences, is supported by a horizontal convergence in which diverse national actors have enacted and reproduced a common discourse on Islam and the integration of Muslims. Thus, the assumption that underlies this transnational convergence is that discourse on integration refers to a common European identity based on shared values and traditions that are redefined at the national level through the specific political interest of the dominant political group. In other words, it is assumed that the current debate on integration shares a common discourse on the universal idea of a European moral community, which is recontextualised along national identities and also along particular national political interests.

In chapter 2, I clarify the theoretical framework by explaining the conceptual relevance of the European public sphere to explore the transnational debate on integration and how debate is central in the process of renegotiating national identities. The concept of convergence invites us to analyse the connections that the European public sphere establishes between national contexts and how simultaneous debates on integration might have a critical impact on how national public spheres
recontextualise transnational discourses on migration and integration through the discursive work of elites. This articulation between elites and convergence can offer a more complete understanding of how social discourses actually shape the public debate on Islam. In this manner, it is possible to integrate hegemonic theory with the concept of convergence and elaborate how they interact reciprocally. As a consequence, my investigation examines the relationship between the public sphere and the ruling elite by focusing on how elite discourses reformulate public debate, rather than on how citizens develop their own individual opinions and thus a different consensus.

In section 1 of this chapter, I offer an overview of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), its strengths and its limits, and I explain why this method is useful to answer my research. In section 2, the key concepts discussed in the earlier theoretical framework are reintroduced, together with a detailed view of the contributions that CDA can make to the development of this research design. In section 3, I discuss the specifics of the research design, specifically why I have opted for a comparative framework based on national case studies. I also introduce the analytical category of nodal point, which corresponds to the entry level for the reconstruction of public debate. Then I present the criteria applied to the selection of case studies and nodal points. Lastly, I present the full comparative framework, which consists of three national public debates: France, Germany and the UK. In section 4, I explain the process of analysis, which is based on a three-dimensional model elaborated by Fairclough (1992): discursive practice, textual practice and socio-cultural explanation. Finally, I summarise the research design in a conclusive overview of the chapter.

1. Overview of the Method: Critical Discourse Analysis

My thesis focuses on the level of transnational convergence to investigate how simultaneous debates on integration might have a critical impact on how national public spheres recontextualise transnational discourses on migration and integration. For these reasons, an analysis of discourse seems the best method to investigate the specificity of this debate.
From a conceptual viewpoint, discourse is defined as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1995: 44). In this way, discourse is not only shaped by the semiotic elements of a social event, but also by its non-semiotic conditions. Thus, what is interesting to observe in the semiotic content of the discourse is how discourse serves to define actors’ strategic interests or normative values and also to present the inevitability and pertinence of a given policy change. For example, the analysis of discourse on civic integration may help to establish a dialectical relationship in order to explain what possible political effects discourse creates in reproducing stereotypes, norms or values.

The way in which I use discourse as analytical category does not focus on a strictly Habermasian deliberative approach based on arguing and reason-giving within the public debate on civic integration, but more broadly as 1) a process of meaning production allowing for certain interpretations of integration while excluding others and 2) as a social practice through which integration establishes and maintains political relationships (Fairclough, 1993). Moreover, an analysis of discourse can also clarify from a comparative perspective, how discourse on civic integration might be conceived as a desirable and normative kind of discursive strategy through different national contexts and according to different national interests.

As a consequence of this conceptualisation, I selected Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) because it aims at investigating the relationships between discourse, power and the influential role that language plays in the emanation of power and legitimising social inequalities. Instead, traditional Discourse Analysis (DA) often ignores the social relations and practices of language by focusing only on text and disregarding how meaning is conditioned by social structures (Fairclough, Jessop & Sayer 2002: 4).

Specifically, CDA recognises language as one of the crucial spheres of human activity and an important element of inquiry for achieving social and political
understanding (Gramsci 1996: 378-9). Through Gramsci’s conceptualization of language, it can be developed an extensive theory of the role of public sphere in the production of discourses through which elites persuade citizens to consent to hegemony even when it works against their interests. This is the very reason why CDA is inclined to analyse language critically (Meyer & Wodak 2002: 10). According to Wodak, “critical” has to be understood as an attempt to reveal the social forces that underlie a discursive regime (Wodak, 2001: 9) or in other words, the exercise of power and the relations between different social groups (Howarth et al, 2000: 3-4).

CDA can also be considered as a highly normative form of social inquiry and philosophical investigation “aimed at demonstrating what is problematic with a text and discourse based on an emancipative standpoint” (Van Dijk, 1993: 352). For this reason, Luke suggests the role of the CDA practitioner is to take exact steps as a “Gramscian transformative intellectual in the task[s] of unveiling, countering and consciousness-raising” around dominant discourses (Luke, 2002: 106). In this manner, CDA points to Habermas’ conceptualisation of language as a “medium of domination and social force, as it serves to legitimise the accepted relations of organised power” (Habermas, 1967: 259). As a ‘social critical theory’, CDA has the goal of showing relations and causes that are hidden and highlight their structural inequalities by promoting further questions of social justice and increasing a general consciousness about the manipulation of the political process of decision-making.

The main characteristic of CDA is to study discourse as processes of signification, which are dialectically interconnected with elements of social practices related to non-semiotic elements (Fairclough, 2003: 19-20) such as economic systems, social relations and institutions. This point explains why this method focuses on interdisciplinary research in order to understand how language functions in organising and transmitting knowledge, in establishing social institutions and in implementing power across social contexts (Meyer & Wodak: 2002: 11).

In my analysis I refer to a more specific orientation of CDA, the Dialectical-Relational Approach (DRA), which focuses on the analysis of the extra-discursive domain. DRA addresses the question of the particular significance of the dialectical
relations between other social elements, in the processes that are under investigation. To put it another way, DRA traces the social, political and economic relations, which inform the constituting discursive practice. The advantage of this approach is that it will provide precise epistemic descriptions of the social life and on-going specific changes, by focusing on languages and on the relations of discursive production.

According to Fairclough (in Meyer and Woodak, 2007: 162), DRA is defined by two elements: 1) a dialectical relationship between structure and agency; and 2) a dialectical view between discourse and other elements of social practice. This dialectical relationship means that the link between language and society is reciprocal. On the one hand, language is shaped by society, and on the other hand, society is shaped by language. As a consequence, discourses “embed,” “translate” and “condense” (Fairclough 2006: 18) economic and political relations into relatively stable structures of meaning that reflect and reproduce these relations. Clearly, this dialectical approach reflects the influence of structuralism on social theory, such as political economy and social conflict illustrated in the Marxist tradition (see Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999, Fairclough 2003, Fairclough, Jessop & Sayer 2002)

However, such relations are not strictly causal but imply a dialectical relationship between discourse (as a broadly semiotic category) and the institution or social structure that frames it (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258). Therefore, CDA is an interpretative and normative method (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Wodak, 1996, 2001; Van Dijk, 1993), which means that CDA goes beyond mere textual analysis to offer open and dynamic interpretations and explanations of the social practices. In this manner, CDA rejects positivist conceptions of knowledge based on scientific laws or empirical generalisations (Howarth et al, 2000: 7). Inevitably, considerable criticism has been raised toward the validity and objectives of CDA analysis.

The main point of critique is based on methodological considerations: Wetherell (2001) disapproves of CDA as a valid scientific practice for its lack of “objectivity.” Many scholars have argued that CDA does not apply a critical stand
on its own analytical process (Toolan, 1997). Widdowson (1998: 137), for example, criticises CDA analysts of “a kind of ad hoc bricolage which takes from theory whatever concept comes usefully to hand”. Additionally, Widdowson (1998: 150) argues that some CDA studies tend to support the validity of arguments through appeals to “moral conscience” and “social justice” rather than through reliable empirical evidence. Similar objections to the CDA paradigm have been made by Schegloff (1997), who studied the possibility of partiality in linguistic analysis based on critical and political approaches, while Maussen (2006: 102) criticised CDA because researchers often analyse their texts by seeking illustrations, which confirm the hypotheses developed in their theoretical frameworks.

Several arguments have been made in response to these criticisms. First, with regard to the objectivity of CDA, I am aware of the fact that this methodology has raised considerable criticism. I relate my epistemological position to a Gramscian standpoint. According to Gramsci, scientific objectivity and its universal validity, which are present in positivist social sciences, are “common sense” or in other words, a hegemonic consensus that is inherited by a semi-religious view of a human subjectivity separates from non-human (natural or divined created) objectivity (Gramsci 1975: 1437). Therefore, for Gramsci, objectivity always means the ‘human subjectivity’ and cannot correspond to the sense of positivist objectivity.

This does not mean that Gramsci is against the practice of science or does not believe the knowledge it produces. The above arguments pertain to the understanding of how social sciences operate in society to justify power relations and hegemony. From a sociological perspective, a researcher is always “socialised members of a speech community” and knowledge is always investigated through the subjectivity of the researcher (Chilton 2004: 59). Therefore, what becomes methodologically relevant it is not an idealistic assumption of objectivity but how to translate the researcher subjectivity into objectivity.

For this reason, objectivity in social sciences requires declaring the stand of the researcher, such as a commitment to emancipation, and also acknowledges how any interpretation of results is obviously constructed from and based on its particular position. As a consequence, “CDA, like other critical social sciences, needs to be
reflexive and self-critical about its own institutional position and all that goes with it” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 9). Accordingly, only a fully scrupulous documentation of the analyst’s position in the analytical process can contribute to an advanced process of the analysis (Bauer & Gaskell 2004: 348).

Second, concerning the role of reliability, Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 259) emphasise that CDA applies the same criteria of “careful, rigorous and systematic analysis” as any other hermeneutic and empirical approach within social sciences. Certainly, discourse analysts can sample text and analyse linguistic features selectively to validate their own hypotheses, but this limit concerns any form of empirical investigation, whether qualitative or quantitative; the adoption of a specific methodology is in fact no guarantee of research quality (Bauer & Gaskell, 2004: 384). Instead, the reliability and the validity of any findings depend on the logic and quality of the research design. Therefore, a detailed description of the method applied - including the selection of sources, the representativeness of the sample, and the rigorous systematization used for analysis of that data - can avoid possible distortions via a self-validation of findings.

For this reason, it will be central as part of my analysis, to elaborate my explicit epistemic standpoint by placing my assumptions, questions and results in a dialectical tension with my data, and elaborate them through reflexivity (Bauer & Gaskel 2004: 348) and self-criticism (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 9). In this manner, the value of CDA lies, therefore, in being able to integrate both the critical and the reflexive points of view that are involved in social sciences and knowledge production.

To sum up, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is an interpretative method, which views language as a field of inquiry in critical-social research and focuses on the production of political relationships of power through discursive practices. For my purpose, CDA will be useful to understand how discourses on identity and integration work toward particular political interests around the public debate on Islam. Moreover, CDA is a critical social theory, which can allow me to analyse how new discourses on integration emerge and how rules, norms and practices are established. As a consequence, the analytical task is not focused only on the
semiotic analysis of the negative view of Islam, but also on the analysis of a normative attempt to reproduce a discourse on European identity based on universal values, standards and cultural attributes of the majority.

2. The Research Design

The purpose of this research design is to examine in detail how the ruling elite produce and recontextualise discourse about civic integration and thereby, persuasively contributing to the legitimisation of a specific consensus on Islam, in and through the European public sphere. In order to analyse this debate across Europe, two key points referring to my two research questions have been formulated to offer a general view of the contributions CDA can make to the development of the research questions elaborated in chapter 1.

The first research question (H1) focuses on the transnational convergence of the debate, or in other words, how different national discourses draw inter-textually on one another offering similarity in terms of their discursive strategies and then carrying on similar conversations across Europe. Specifically, the emphasis is on understanding how discourses on integration are actually undertaken and covered across Europe. Thus, convergent discourse on civic integration is not only observable through the characteristics of the specific national sphere, but is also likely to be taken up and connected by public debate regarding ongoing communication in other national public spheres. National public debate on integration is thus reconfigured under the influence of transnational interconnections within the European public sphere. This point implies that the influence the European Public Sphere exercises on national public debates is not based on a vertical convergence, through a top-down dynamic between the EU institutions and state members, but rather a horizontal convergence across national public spheres.

This realisation, in turn, leads to a clearer analysis of the logic of horizontal convergence among governmental actors and how they contribute to the discursive construction, deliberation and legitimisation of norms concerning integration. Specifically, how a ruling political elite produces certain discursive regimes of
inclusion and exclusion indicates how they become part of the new political consensus, so that discourse appears as if naturally evolving at national and transnational levels. In fact, once hegemony is established domestically, it may expand via an elite, beyond a particular social order and move outward on a transnational scale throughout the European public sphere.

Following this line of thinking, it is plausible to expect the existence of not one discourse, but several discursive regimes, even though they all could have similar representations, attitudes and arguments. In doing so, public debate reveals universalising discourses that transform the European public debate in an implicit political order are not clearly visible because they are so embedded in national public spheres (Triandafyllidou, Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2010). Precisely, the process of recontextualisation and the inter-discursivity of discourse can then be “operationalized in terms of the reciprocal resonance of the public communication” between the various national public spheres (Trenz 2005: 176).

For these reasons, the research design needs to identify commonalities by looking into the convergent strategies of discourse through which “civic integration” is articulated differently and uniquely, depending on the cultural and political particularities of their national contexts. Thus, the expectation is that transnational discourses are not recontextualised in national contexts in their entirety, but rather inter-discursively, meaning that only some parts of the discourse are selectively incorporated into existing national discourses (Lynggaard, 2012 :97).

The second research question rests on the content of the representation of European identity and how these discourses and their values are actually linked to this debate. Therefore, empirical attention will be paid to the existence of specific discourses on integration associated with the universal idea that all Europeans belong to a single moral and political community based on common values and traditions, which transcend state boundaries or national identities. In so far as the process of identification involves the constitutive effects of discourse, the articulation of specific values as universal should be seen as a dialectical process in which discourses are inculcated into identities (Fairclough, 2003: 49).
The politicisation of common European values are predicated upon an attempt to create a shared common sense of European civic identity; the discourse of integration is developed thus through a parallel elaboration of national values within a common discourse on Europe and its collective identity made by a universal idea that all Europeans belong to a single moral and political community. For example, Europe can be registered as an imagined collective we (for example, ‘European communal’ or ‘the Western civilization’), while the Others can be seen as non-European and non-secular. In this manner, the specific usage of European identity becomes a symbolic resource for social and political cohesion (Risse and Sikkink 1999; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005:8).

However, the normative assumptions that underlie this universal convergence of values are redefined at the national level as national particularisms through the specific political interests of national political elite. Specifically, convergent communication is the domain of ruling political elites connected in a transnational debate on the basis of shared normative ideas about a common policy project on integration. In other words, it is assumed that the current debate on integration will share a common discourse on the universal idea of a European community of values, which is recontextualised along national identities and also along particular political national interests.

This European discourse and, and its national evolution, includes three critical considerations: 1) this normative politics of identity sheds light on the contentious and contradictory discourse of integration and its limits to consider Muslim diversity as part of the European self; 2) the debate on the integration of Muslims is a crucial part of the process of governmentality (Foucault 1991; Pennycook 1998; Milani 2009) and 3) the frequent appeals to integration from ruling leaders could hide dominant social and economic rationalities, which provide the real background for framing this debate on identity and power (Horner, 2009; Horner and Weber, 2011).

This approach also allows a clear analysis of how discourse on civic identity can be established through a universal European particularism (Georgiou, 2005:486) and will offer a critical view on the limits of “universal articulations”
Therefore, the discourse on civic integration serves not just to represent a specific idea of collective identity, but also to coordinate norms and values across the European public sphere. These attempts, aimed at universalising the values that define the reproduction of civic integration, are thus useful in identifying how the European public sphere is constructed and reproduced.

In order to clarify how the research design respects the quality criteria of public accountability (Bauer & Gaskel 2004: 348), the next sections will offer an overview of why I have opted for an analysis based on case studies and how I selected each case study. I subsequently introduce the analytical category of the nodal point as the entry level for reconstructing the public debate criteria for selecting each nodal point; finally I sum up the complete comparative framework which consists of the three case studies, consisting of three national public debates and three nodal points.

The Case Studies: differences and commonalities

The research design investigates how the discourse on integration is disseminated through the European public sphere (Trenz, 2005; Eriksen, 2006). As a consequence, the present research design proposes a comparative investigation of the debate on the integration of Muslims using three national cases: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. This comparison between the various public debates will allow for the disentanglement of similarities in these discourses relative to policies on immigration, multiculturalism and civic integration. These similarities may then be explained in terms of convergence among national public spheres.

As a whole, France, Germany and the United Kingdom are particularly relevant as subjects for this comparison, given their status as the highest immigrant-receiving countries in Europe (Lacroix, 2010: 3). Moreover, the specificity of their national debates on immigration has been shaped by a number of factors, the most important of which include their respective histories with immigration, national political structures (Favell, 2005) and shifting perceptions of immigration (Chabel
Briefly, French republicanism considers individuals as the only subject entitled of rights and rejects any form of distinction on ethnic or racial lines. The French model of integration is based on the following premises 1) integration of individuals rather than groups and 3) integration implies rights and duties in accord with the republican and secular French traditions (Jennings, 2000).

In Germany, the integration of immigrants is linked to the problem of the definition of national identity (Joppke, 1995: 95). As consequence, after the experience of Second World War, politicians have avoided speaking in negative terms of a culturally mixed society, aware of the legacy of racist aberrations under Nazism. After reunification, “concepts of political identity and national culture underwent significant redefinition”, this process is still ongoing and affecting the definition of ‘foreigners’ in Germany (Stehle, 2012: 168).

The British model of integration reflects the experience of a multiracial empire and its consequent racial problems (Hansen, 2000). According to Bertossi, British integration policies “came out of the imperial legacy and postcolonial immigration” and have been defined by “an approach based on the importance of minority groups and [...] placed an emphasis on integration, not as a process of acculturation to the nation and civic values,” and on “fighting racial discrimination” by offering “social and political influence to members of ethno-cultural minorities” (2007: 4).

Despite these national differences, the immigrant policies of these countries have been increasingly liberal in recent years by granting easier access to citizenship and the implementation of anti-discrimination measures (Lacroix, 2010: 13). Moreover, these countries, on different levels, refer to the EU to improve the management and control of immigration, especially with respect to asylum seekers and refugees (Lacroix, 2010: 5; Koff 2008: 22).

As a consequence, the present research design proposes a comparative investigation of the debate on the integration of Muslims. Specifically, the aim is to
provide a comparison of the dialectical relations found through the reconstruction of the three national public debates. The first step of the empirical analysis is thus a reconstruction of each national public debate on Muslim integration starting from a nodal point that presents a coherent political program (Diez, 1999; Laclau and Mouffle, 1985). Each nodal point will correspond to a specific ‘political text’ which has been proposed as the entry level of the public debate analysis.

**Criteria for Selection of the Nodal Points**

Each national case study focuses on a nodal point (Laclau & Mouffé, 1985), which is considered the point of entry of the public debate. The utility of Laclau and Mouffe's concept is to emphasise the main textual reference that draws different discourses into a coherent frame, from which it is possible to reconstruct the various discourses present in the national political debate. In other words, the nodal point allows for a clearer understanding of the interactive logic of the public debate, how the discourses link to one another, and the rules according to which discourses are tied together and how they are recontextualised into the political debate (Diez, 1999; Fairclough, 1993).

Therefore, a nodal point is not a closed system, but rather an open system of inter-connected discourses that allow for the possibility of reconstructing a public debate. For this reason, a nodal point cannot be a text that has been ignored by the public opinion or irrelevant for political debate. In this research design, the nodal points must be representative of the process and the actual way in which the political elite deals with the problematisation of the integration of Muslims.

Consequently, nodal points are intended to guide public debate on the broader questions of the integration of Muslims in Europe, whether in the form of (1) a mobilised form of community cohesion based on a reactive identity process (in-group); (2) revealing justification strategies for including Muslims within the community; (3) encouraging Muslims to make more strenuous efforts to adopt European values.
In addition, nodal points have to be fully representative of respective government positions and are an integral part of a political program about the development of new immigration practices and policies. Thus, they have the shared functions of indicating a government’s thinking and desire to influence popular thinking, of promoting similar concepts, and of dealing with a common wish to promote economic growth in the face of a shrinking workforce and increasing challenges from globalisation (Jung 1996). In detail, the applied criteria are:

1. Time Frame: After the Swiss ban on Minarets;
2. Genre: Political statements

At Point 1, the timeframe defines a major limitation for the selection of the debate concerning Islam. The timeframe runs from December 2009 to March 2011, a very short time period when compared to the longevity of the public debate on Islam. Nonetheless, the Swiss referendum represents a moment of political crisis that moved beyond the borders of Switzerland to address the multi-faceted issue of Islam in Europe. According to Fairclough, a moment of crisis occurs when “social practices, which under normal conditions are hidden, became visibly exposed, as communication becomes further problematized” (Fairclough, 1992: 230). Thus, during any “crisis”, it is more possible to observe new social and political conditions struggling for hegemony (Fairclough, 2005: 55) that under normal conditions would be difficult to observe (Fairclough, 1992: 230). Thus, the referendum became a unique “moment of crisis,” which urged European politicians to debate openly how to assimilate Muslim immigrants and Islamic culture in order to avoid conflict with the values and traditions of Europeans.

At Point 2, the genre I selected is the political statement. Three aspects characterise this genre: 1) it is related to the field of politics; 2) it includes different sub-genres and modalities (written, such as an article or an interview published in a newspaper, or oral such as a speech or a radio interview; 3) it has to be considered as an expression of views and not an official institutional act. For example, a political speech given during a conference is not an institutional text because it lacks the prescriptive power of a law; it only has the authoritative power to address political debate and decision-making. Thus, these political statements can influence public

Moreover, what characterises this specific type of genre is the authoritative authorship. The author has to be a top political leader with key institutional roles in national and international affairs. For this reason, only Heads of State or Prime Ministers were considered because they hold the legitimacy of political power and are the major representatives of national sovereignty. Secondly, the author has to be recognised by public opinion across Europe. Briefly, the author has to have the political authority to shape the legislative process and the capacity to interact with transnational debate and political consensus for their political agenda across Europe.

A second aspect to characterise the genre is controversy. I will consider those statements that raise strong controversy both in national public debates and European public debate. According to Risse, a “transnational sphere transcending national perspectives is being created through social practice and contestation” (2010: 152). Indeed, the European public sphere emerges in the process in which public debates controversial issues. The more people debate, the more they engage each other in political debate and the more they “actually create political communities” in which they can identify themselves (Risse 2010: 152).

Authority and controversy are thus both essential conditions for the emergence of a European public debate. The more authoritative and contentious a political statement becomes, the more media coverage occurs across Europe. In this specific case, statements had to be highly disseminated through European broadsheets, news agencies and TV broadcasts and simultaneously debated by public opinion throughout the social media by the European audience. Thus, I have included in the corpus only those texts that had transnational media coverage.

Briefly, a nodal point is a relevant text considered the point of entry for investigating each national case. Specifically, the analysis of a nodal point will allow the reconstruction of the public debate about the integration of Islam. For this reason, I defined two main criteria to select a nodal point: one is related to the time and as specified, in the aftermath of the Swiss Referendum, which represents a
moment of crisis, in which top political leaders had to debate openly the problem of the integration of Islam. The second criterion is the genre. Here, I specified political statements from authorities because they are texts (written or oral) aimed at orienting political controversy and public debate.

**The comparative framework**

The final comparative framework consists of the three different national case studies, representing three nodal points and their surrounding public debates, which have been analysed to reconstruct the European debate on Islam integration.

In Case Study 1, (Chapter 4), the articulation of the debate on the integration of Islam in the aftermath of the Swiss ban on minarets is reconstructed by focusing on Sarkozy’s editorial published in *Le Monde* and The Guardian. In this article, the Former French President launched a common public debate aimed at giving political form to the ways in which “national identity” can be defined and supported through the support for liberal and civic integration, rather than the exclusion of Islam. Through this debate and despite national and European criticism, Sarkozy was able to create a powerful political consensus within the European public sphere, which urged for many months, the discussion of the political agenda regarding Islam, giving even greater visibility to Sarkozy’s speeches, ideas and thoughts about Islam and specifically the Burqa ban across the rest of Europe.

**Nodal Point:** ‘Respecter ceux qui arrivent, respecter ceux qui accueillent’
[Respecting those who arrive, respecting those who host]

*Text, December 9, 2009 published by Le Monde and The Guardian*

Sampling and Coding: Whole text – 1400 words

In Case Study 2, (Chapter 5), the debate generated by Merkel during the Young Christian Democrats Convention is investigated. The German Chancellor did not merely state that Germany’s attempt to create a multicultural society had "utterly failed." At the same time, Merkel pointed to successful examples of civil integration programs that integrated new immigrants. Merkel also claimed a necessity to defend
“German Identity” as a major justification for asking for more social cohesion. Moreover, she addressed the issue of Islam belonging to Christian Germany. It is important to analyse if the debate on Islam has generated a “return” to a discourse on national religious identity or is simply a secular attempt to redefine and transcend the German representation of an ideal citizenship.

Nodal Point: ‘Multikulti has failed, utterly failed’
Merkel’s Speech at the conference of “Junge Union Deutschlands” (CDU), Potsdam – Transcript, Oct 16, 2010

Sampling and Coding: The whole transcript counts 8000 words but different parts were not directly relevant to the debate on Islam, thus only the section on multiculturalism (2000 words) was sampled, which includes also the part that was highly disseminated by both the broadcast networks and YouTube. The rest of the transcript has been coded through a general summary of arguments and themes. Despite the fact that not all of the parts of a text were relevant, coding was strategic to understand the context and the assumptions that were made to support the civic integration of Islam.

In Case Study 3, (Chapter 6), the debate generated by Cameron at the meeting of the Munich Security Council is examined. The aim here is to analyse how Islam can be constructed to become a security issue in Europe. The British Prime Minister delivered a provocative speech on the failings of state multiculturalism by echoing German Chancellor Merkel. However, Cameron did not reject immigrant integration; he appears to have suggested that Britain can produce a “muscular” integration by imposing liberal values codified within British identity.

Nodal Point: ‘Multiculturalism has failed’
Speech given at the Munich Security Conference
Video and Transcript, February 5, 2011
Sampling and Coding: Whole text - 2600 words

Having defined the case studies, it is necessary to present the procedure to apply the reconstruction of the public debate on civic integration and the analysis of the discourse nodal point.
3. The Data Analysis

In identifying “discourse simultaneously as text, discursive practice and social practice,” Fairclough (2003: 21) claims that CDA cannot be reduced to a simple analysis of text, but must focuses on the process of production and interpretation. The analytical usefulness of CDA (Fairclough, 1992, 2003; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997) is thus to offer an examination of the condition of production of texts and their political implications as the “relationship between text and social structures is an indirect one, mediated by discourse and social context” (Fairclough, 2003: 21).

The description of the textual features should thus be combined to two more dimensions of analysis: 1) interpretation, which focuses on the “relationship between text and interaction”; and 2) explanation, which focuses on “the relationship between interaction and sociocultural contexts” (Fairclough, 2001: 21). These three levels of analysis form Fairclough’s three-dimensional model (Fairclough, 2001), one of the most common analytical strategies adopted in CDA, because it systematically explores the relationship between text and its social context. This model can be described as follows:

- Description is the level of analysis for the formal features of the text;
- Interpretation concerns the text as a creation of a social process;
- Explanation explores the relationship between the social context, the production of text, and the reading of its potential political effects.

In discourse theory, these three dimensions inevitably overlap (Fairclough 1992: 231). For example, an analysis of the data could begin with some sense of the social and political context that the discourse is embedded in by problematising the boundaries of the text and also defining the implicit or explicit relations that this discourse has to other discourses. This approach implies that the analysis should start by including social and political concepts that lie outside the pure categories of textual analysis. Beginning with the description of the traditional characteristics of a
text would not be particularly productive for an analysis aimed at examining the social implication of a text. In this manner, the analysis of text can undertake the following progression:

- Interpretation of discursive practice, which focuses on the social and political conditions of the text, and identifies the intertextuality and interdiscursivity of the discourse;
- Description of textual practice, which examines the textual strategies, by focusing on the process of justification, Othering and legitimisation;
- Explanation of the socio-political context, which illustrates the implications and the political consequences of the discourse on civic integration.

In his last works, Fairclough has reformulated this framework by developing a new analytical model based on Bhaskar’s explanatory critique (see Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough 2010), which places more emphasises on the dialectical structure of the discourse. However, the three dimensional model is more explicit in framing the relation between discourse and social context, because it is based on more understandable conceptualisation of the semiotic, discursive and social levels.

In the next section, these three stages are further described by providing a set of sub-categories to apply to the empirical investigation.

*Interpretation of Discursive Practice*

The first step of the empirical analysis is the reconstruction of the discursive context related to the debate on Muslim integration. Starting from a nodal point, the analysis evaluates the conditions and practices involved in the enactment and reproduction of the discourses developed in the debate. Specifically, the analysis pays close attention to interdiscursive and intertextual analysis so as to offer a bigger picture of the text in terms of how it mutually relates to other texts and
discourses held in the public sphere and how these other texts and discourses are actually interconnected to the nodal point.

*Interdiscursivity*: The objective is to specify how the nodal point under analysis is established and co-articulated with other local or transnational discourses on nationalism, immigration, secularism, etc.

*Intertextual Chain*: The objective here is to analyse how the nodal point is disseminated, operationalised and contested by entering into a series of other text types. Specifically, the aim is to prove that the nodal point transcends national perspectives through social practice and contestation (Risse 2010: 152). The more contentious a political statement becomes, the more media coverage occurs across Europe.

Interdiscursivity and intertextual chain are explained through an analysis of the process of dissemination, contestation and operationalization.

**Dissemination:**
- How is the nodal point disseminated by major international news agencies across Europe (here APF and Reuters because they are the largest operators in Europe)? The aim is to investigate whether a nodal point has a European relevance and which arguments were disseminated through the European Public Sphere.

**Contestation:**
- How is a discourse brought into dialogue with and contested by the process known as strategic struggle? The goal here is to show to what degree the nodal point has been challenged. Any discourse debated in public is always opposed to a greater or lesser extent, and the lack of contestation can reveal a very high level of hegemonic influence or the marginality of the discourse in the public sphere.

**Operationalisation:**
• Is the nodal point translated into concrete policies and institutional arrangements? This step is important, as it can verify to what extent institutions have been able to implement the nodal point into a concrete policy without resistance and contestation.

Textual Practice: Othering and Legitimation

This level of analysis is aimed at analysing particular textual strategies used in the nodal point. Specifically, textual practice examines the aspects of discourse practice through the understanding of the meanings of texts.

In order to assess these textual strategies, I have considered some microtextual features that can be useful for evaluating what type of political effects is possibly evoked through coherent textual property. This list does not need to be exhaustive (for a more complete model see Fairclough, 1989: 110-2), but rather it is an outline of possible directions to undertake and investigate further such as:

• keywords
• clusters (a series of words related to each other in meaning)
• oppositions (e.g. negative/positive; near/distant; familiar/alien)
• use of key symbols, slogans, stereotypes;
• patterns of identification and solidarity;
• the specific use of personal pronouns (I, we, you, object: us, them);

Regarding the language source, I have privileged English because there was a necessity to use a homogenous linguistic corpus for comparative purposes. Thus, when the text was only partially available in English, a full translation was included in the corpus for analysis. Of course, this choice can be easily criticised or considered partial as some textual strategies can be missed in the course of any translation, but the aim of the textual analysis is to focus on the relation between text and social structure, rather than simply prioritising the microtextual effects of political rhetoric.
In this manner, the textual features reveal a political lexicon, which then becomes a useful empirical terrain to explore and interpret throughout the dialectical tension that occurs between the actual text and its social context. The analytical model focuses on the potential political effects of the textual practice through the assessment of the processes of othering and the legitimation strategies on which the text is based and can be interpreted.

**Othering:** Civic integration is an active form of regulation and the drawing of boundaries between identities, and thus, discourse on integration presupposes a set of collective identities, social relations, cultural values inculcated in discourses aimed at justifying the necessity of Muslims’ integration. Indeed, Othering is about distance and keeping the ‘different’ a stage apart, and preserving the Self as a constructed difference between identities. Here I have identified three sub-categories to apply to the analysis (Diez 2005: 628):

- **What Makes "Us" So Special?**
  - Representation of the European Self as superior. In this version of ‘othering’, the In-Group is constructed as having superior values to those of the other.

- **Where Do “We” End?**
  - Representation of Muslim identity as violating universal principles. This is a stronger variation of the previous strategy. Here, however, the standards of the self are not simply seen as superior, but universally valid, with the consequence that the Other should be convinced or otherwise brought to accept the principles of the self.

- **Are They a Menace for Our Security?**
  - Representation of Muslim identity as an existential threat (‘securitisation’). Muslim’s values are turned into a security threat.

In this way, the process of othering involves the construction of the Other through those textual features that emphasise social identities and collective values.
This textual strategy of construction and definition of identities are thus central to the development of legitimation strategies.

Legitimation: the aim is to identify and research different strategies of legitimation through references to how a particular social structuring of discourse can become universal and part of the legitimising system that sustains the implementation of policies to integrate Muslims. In detail, the dimension of universalising the particular is relevant to four legitimisation strategies:

- Legitimisation of universal values through culture (identity, history, religion),
- Legitimisation of universal values through procedure (participation, democracy, efficiency)
- Legitimisation of universal values through “standardisation” (political belonging, social standards, economic standards)
- Legitimisation of universal values through membership (insiders vs. outsiders)

Therefore, an analysis of legitimation strategies aims at revealing any textual construction, which attaches values to political action and serves to legitimate policies of integration. In particular, it is the use of features related to a European identity in order to advance and legitimise civic integration and its relations with the Other. Thus, the goal is to find those attempts to universalise some of the values embedded in a broader social, cultural, and political European framework, in which the relations between different social identities are defined as elements of the reproduction of civic integration.

Explanation of the Socio-Cultural Practice

Central to this level of analysis are the social and political implications of the discursive structure. Specifically, the discourse on civic integration includes three critical considerations elaborated in Chapter 1 and 2: a) the limits to consider Muslim diversity as part of the European self; 2) civic integration as a process of
governmentality (Foucault 1991) and 3) the elite’s attempt to hide social and economic disparities as explanation for the lack of integration (Joppke 2007). As a consequence, I have defined three key sub-categories to analyse:

- **Normative:** As discursive strategy, integration can be normative and enclose prejudices and limits affirmation from going beyond what is prescribed as “correct” identity. Thus, can civic integration be considered as a normative discourse providing universal norms to belong to a common community (European, Western, National)?

- **Moral right:** Integration can assume a moral right on behalf of the local resident majority to determine the limits and obligations of other identities because civic integration is associated with the universal idea that all Europeans belong to a single moral and political community that should transcend state boundaries or national identities.

- **Hegemonic relations:** Integration presupposes an effective power determining the acceptable and unequal relation between self and other. Thus, analysis will refer to how the hegemonic discourse on Islam is established as a universal particular in the debate through a) a discussion of the universal values attached to the dominant political community and b) the potential effects of such hegemonic relation to hide the different causes of the lack of integration such as social inequalities.

The last part of the analysis will clarify how discourse on civic integration recontextualises a deeper core of values and norms embedded in the national public sphere and if this recontextualisation is an effect of emerging discourses introduced through the European public sphere. Thus it will be explored how the discourse on civic integration converges with national and even local discourses on national identity or lead to one unified European identity (Risse, 2010: 7). This approach will also allow a clear analysis of how a discourse on civic integration can be established through a universal particularism (Georgiou, 2005) and will offer a critical view on the limits of “universal articulations” (Chouliaraki, 2010: 97).
The Research Design in Brief

In this chapter, I propose a comparative investigation of the European public debate on the integration of Muslims based on three national cases. In order to analyse these debates and their discursive articulations, I select Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the methodology to be used, as it systematically explores discursive relationships among the broader contexts of social and political structures embedded in the public sphere.

The first goal of the present analytical framework is a reconstruction of each national public debate starting from a nodal point. A nodal point corresponds to a specific political text, which is considered a point of entry for reconstructing the broader public debate on Islam. The second objective is to investigate the transnational convergence among national public spheres. Indeed, the aim of this step is not merely an attempt to describe how the European public sphere works, but rather to draw on evidence that tentatively shows a degree of political convergence toward a universalistic discourse regarding the obligations that Muslims have to accept in order to be accepted in hosting communities.

By focusing on convergence, the third goal aims also to examine in detail, how the ruling elite speaks about Europe and its identity and thereby, persuasively contributing to the creation of a consensus on civic integration among European public opinion at large. Given their political role, the ruling elite have special means to define a concise and legitimate reproduction of a discourse on Islam, especially through discursive construction. Second, it seems important to understand how discourse on civic integration gains the power to reshape national state policies through the discursive work of the ruling elite.

What is central in this research design is thus to underline how transnational debate can affect the national public spheres through mutual observation between international political actors and national spheres. In addition, the transnational convergence of this debate also allows us to illustrate in detail, the differences
between national and transnational public debate and how the discourses on European identity and its current values might be recontextualised into national debates along different national political interests.

In conclusion, in Section 1 of this chapter, I explained why I choose CDA for my research design and evaluated the specific questions concerning the issues of validity and reliability of this method. In section 2, I re-introduced the research questions and discussed how CDA can offer an analytical contribution to develop my analysis. In Section 3, I discussed the specifics of the research design and how I developed the comparative framework based on national case studies. In section 4, I described the analytical process, which is based on a three-dimensional model elaborated by Fairclough (1992): discursive practice, textual practice and socio-cultural explanation.

In the following chapter, the present research design is applied to the first case: the French public debate on Islamic integration. In particular, Chapter 4 aims at reconstructing the French debate by focusing on Sarkozy’s article published in the Le Monde newspaper, in which the former French President defended the Swiss vote and argues for the necessity of a debate on national identity in order to protect the “Republican” values of France.
Chapter 4: French National Identity and Integration

Chapter Overview

This chapter offers an account of the public debate on integration that was instigated by former French President Nicholas Sarkozy after the Swiss constitutional referendum, which voted to ban the construction of new minarets in November 2009. The debate is reconstructed by taking as a nodal point Sarkozy’s editorial published in the *Le Monde* newspaper on 8 December 2009. In this article, Sarkozy defends the Swiss vote and calls upon Muslims to refrain from provocative attitudes, and urges them not to forget that Europe has Christian values at its foundation. For this reason, Sarkozy suggests that Muslims should carry out their religious practices in a modest manner in order to avoid any conflict with the identity held by the majority of Europeans.

Sarkozy's intervention came not only in response to concerns about the Swiss referendum, but as a consequence of the broader debate over French national identity. Since the beginning of his Presidential mandate, Sarkozy promoted a public debate to discuss the features of French identity. Specifically, he encouraged a debate on national identity that was defined by three discursive strategies: 1) the pervasiveness of Republican principles of undifferentiated citizenship; 2) the French concept of secularism, *Laïcité*; and 3) the consequent rejection of any public recognition of ethnic, religious and cultural identities as antithetical to French national identity (Laborde, 2008: 8; Ichijo, 2011: 39).

These characteristics of national identity are also reflected in the French model to the integration of immigrants, which is generally recognised as one of the most assimilationists in Europe (Joppke, 2007). In principle, the French model recognises: 1) integration in accordance with the secularism of the state; 2) the subject to integrate is individual rather than collective, and 3) integration presupposes rights and duties (Bertossi 2007: 26). Therefore, the French state does not accept any ethnic or race difference with immigrants and public support is granted only for “individual merit and advancement” (Schain, 2010). Thus the
The republican model can be considered to be opposed to the multicultural model of integration and implies that ethno-religious groups are not entitled to any “special privileges in public policy, nor are they granted special protection” (Prugl & Thiel, 2001: 42).

The present chapter looks into the French public debate on integration in order to reveal the extent which discourse on Muslim integration depends, depending on the cultural and political particularities of the French context. The assumption that underlies the French public debate on integration is that discourse on civic integration refers to a common European identity based on shared values and traditions but which is redefined at the national level through the specific political interest of the dominant political group. Therefore empirical attention is paid to explore critically in what ways the debate is positioned between 1) the process leading to social cohesion on the level of the individual nation-state and 2) the acceptance of normative assumptions regarding the political and cultural nature of European identity.

The analysis is structured in four sections: i) the first section is an overview of the contemporary political debate around the integration of ethnic and cultural diversity within French society; ii) the second section focuses on the reconstruction of the discourses related to the French debate on Muslim integration and evaluates the discursive practice involved in the enactment of the debate; iii) the third section is concerned with the textual strategy found in the nodal point; iv) the last section offers an explanation of socio-cultural practice and specifically moves to examine how discourse on civic integration recontextualises a deeper core of values and norms embedded in the national public sphere and if this recontextualisation is an effect of emerging discourses introduced through the European public sphere.

1. The Political Context of the Debate

This section places Sarkozy’s editorial within the context of the French contemporary debate on integration. It aims to identify which political controversies have fuelled and transformed the perception of the Muslim community as a
‘problematic’ minority and main source of division in French public opinion nowadays.

The debate sums up the main problems of immigration in France and captures the critical points of the French integration model. Integration is an individual and not a communitarian process; France thus does not recognize immigrants in structured communities because such institutionalization would pose a threat to the unity of the Nation. Furthermore, citizenship remains the key aspect of the process of integration of immigrants into the French Nation (Sala Pala and Simon 2007: 3).

Since the 1980’s, the debate has developed from: 1) a request for security and public order after the urban riots that had disrupted French urban life; 2) the radicalisation of Muslim identity as also an effect of urban segregation and 3) the problems relating to the accommodation of Islamic religious needs. In all these controversies, the French state always reacted and reaffirmed the principle of the Republican and secular identity of the French nation (Prugl & Thiel, 2011: 44-45).

Concerning the issue of domestic security, urban riots exploded in the 1980’s and continued sporadically for more than two decades as a consequence of the urban segregation of immigrants (Wacquant 2007: 19). Unquestionably, the social and urban exclusion of Muslims is particularly apparent in suburban areas, the so-called banlieues. In these areas, Muslim communities suffer a higher rate of unemployment than non-Muslims with the same level of education. Moreover, Muslims are generally forced into “less-skilled employment categories, which are usually unstable and poorly paid” (Dancigyer, 2010: 269). This general frustration over the lack of concrete opportunities became evident in 2005 when violent confrontations (Emerson 2009 : 6) between youths and the police took place in several suburbs surrounding France's major cities after the accidental death of two youths of Malian and Tunisian descent in the Parisian suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois.

Certainly, these riots did not have any religious character. The disappointment of the ‘second generation’ living in the banlieue [suburbs] highlighted the inequality of treatment, and the feeling that their community was
marginalised by the State (Kokoref 2009: 147.) At the same time, the breakdown of public order in suburban areas offered the opportunity for unscrupulous politicians to manipulate the public opinion’s concern over security and immigration for electoral gain. At the 2002 Presidential Elections, Jean Marie Le Pen – the leader of the radical right wing party Fronte Nationale - scored a surprise electoral result with a xenophobic and anti-Muslim agenda, coming in 2nd place behind President Chirac. The result was shocking not only for France but also for Europe, and it was the beginning of a radicalisation of discourse on immigration. As consequence, the right-wing government elected in 2003 approved the strict anti-immigration policies sponsored by Sarkozy as Interior Minister.

During the 2005 riots, Sarkozy as Minister of Interior gained notable visibility (Winter 2008: 271) when he referred to the rioters as racaille [scum]. This term in French is more pejorative than the translation to "scum" in English- it characterises an entire group of people as subhuman, inherently evil and criminal, and in effect, useless. Sarkozy used the riots as an excuse to launch his own political response to social distress from suburban areas for a militarization of the banlieu to prevent urban crime and terrorism. The potential exploitation of public order offered Sarkozy an opportunity to encourage a national debate about what it means to be French and the erosion of national identity and culture. As a consequence, Sarkozy based his Presidential electoral campaign in 2007 on both the issues of urban security and the negative perceptions of the integration problems of Muslims to gain an electoral consensus.

At the same time, for many Muslims, the appropriate response to urban marginalisation, which is a mix between ethnic discrimination and economic reality, “was to form their own associations based on their common identity” of Muslims (Mayan, 2007: 5). The creation of this “imagined community” (Anderson, 1998) of “ethno-familial culture shaped by Islam” (Mayan, 2007: 5) makes the reality of these closed realities acceptable and even desirable, as these suburbs are subsequently perceived as Muslim enclaves. Moreover, this self-segregation reinforces the Muslim population's identification with traditional practices and makes Islam a political mobilising force: “Forming a community becomes one way
to define a collective identity that is a basis for action and public self-assertion” (Kastoryano, 2006).

Concerning the accommodation of Muslims’ religious needs, the first controversy was raised during the construction of mosques with governmental funding. The idea of building a grand mosque in Lyon was first broached in 1980 and prompted a heated debate (Mayan, 2008; Bowen, 2007: 68), because Islam was seen as a foreign religion and inclined to fanaticism. In addition, the government’s intention to use public funding was strongly rejected by opponents because it violated the principles of separation between religion and the State. In this debate, Le Pen's National Front gained a large consensus by fiercely opposing the project (Tlemçani, 1997: 33). However, in 1981 during the Presidential campaign, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing assured the voters that public funds would be available for the realisation of the Mosque (Haine 2000: 217).

After many attempts to obtain permission for the construction were repeatedly blocked by local opposition, the Mosque of Lyon was officially inaugurated in 1994. During the speech at the inauguration, the Minister of the Interior, Charles Pasqua, praised efforts to build a moderate Islam compatible with the French Republican tradition (Hargreaves 1995, 206–208.) Despite the institutional openness, this strategy of intermediation revealed an attempt to control the influence of religious intermediaries to enhance social control among young immigrants and French citizens of Islamic heritage (Prugl & Thiel, 2011: 44).

As a consequence of this approach, in 1990, the Socialist Minister of the Interior, Pierre Joxe, invited representatives of Islamic organisations to form a Conseil de Reflexion sur l'Avenir de l’Islam en France [Deliberative Council on the Future of Islam in France], an institutional body of French Muslims aimed at representing Muslim groups and organisations in dialogue with the State. Indeed, a representative institution comparable to those of Catholics, Protestants and Jews (Hargreaves 2007: 107). However, it was only in 2003, that the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman [French Council of the Muslim Faith] was finally created by Sarkozy, who was then minister of the Interior (Joppke 2009: 203).
Another discussion related to the accommodation of religious needs was the controversy over the Islamic scarf (hijab). French political elites and public opinion have always favoured forbidding Muslim women from wearing a veil in public, because the veil represents how Islam oppresses women, while also being a symbol of belonging to the Muslim community on French territory. In fact, women who wear the veil display their religious and community affiliation by challenging the national unity goal assumed by French Republicanism. As a consequence, the veil and burqua are examples of difficulties the French have had in integrating Islamic culture through a strict application of French universalism.

Public debate surrounding this issue exploded in October 1989, when three female students in a secondary school in Creil, a Paris suburb, were suspended for refusing to remove their scarves in class. Despite the fact that the Conseil d'État (Council of State) ruled in November 1989 that the scarf was compatible with the secular tradition of the public schools (Klaussen, 2005: 174), President Chirac supported a law banning the use of any visible signs of religious affiliation in order to preserve French secularism in public schools. The law, sometimes referred to as "the veil law", was approved by the French Parliament in March 2004 and forbade the wearing of any religious symbol, including the Islamic veil, the Jewish kippah and “large” Christian crosses (Wallach Scott, 2010: 1; Joppke, 2009: 45).

Although the law’s affect only Muslims, its legislative consequences have mainly targeted female students practicing the Islamic faith. It is also important to consider that in France there is a large number non-public faith schools funded by the French state, in which it is possible to wear religious symbols. However, until 2009, over 8,000 faith schools (Catholic and Jewish) only two of these were Muslim (Nixey, 2009).

The last act of the veil war was in June 2009, when Sarkozy as President was addressing both houses of Parliament [Congrès] in a special session at Versailles. On that occasion he condemned the burqa, an extreme “a sign of subjugation and debasement” that was “not welcome.” One day after a speech to both houses, a Parliamentary commission, led by Communist M.P., André Gerin, was created to investigate “the practice of wearing the burqa and the nigab by certain Muslim
women…on the national territory”, with the aim to “better understand the problem and to find ways to fight against this affront to individual liberties.” After six months of deliberation and testimony from 180 experts (Assemblée Nationale 2009b), what became known as the “Burqa Commission” stated that the "wearing of the full veil is a challenge to our republic. This [practice of wearing a full veil] is unacceptable" (BBC News, 2010) and recommended a “general and absolute prohibition of the integral veil in public space” (Assemblée Nationale 2010: 187). As a consequence, the National Assembly in July 2010 passed a law that prohibited la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public [the dissimulation of the face in public space] (Assemblée Nationale 2010b: 9, 11).

The political contextualization of the contemporary French public debate on integration reveals three different major points, which have framed the public opinion’s concern towards Islam: 1) Muslim immigrants segregation in suburban areas as a potential serious political and social problem; 2) the radicalisation of Muslim identity in those Muslims from suburban areas; 3) Islam as a religion opposed to French values of secularism (Mosque construction; Veils at schools). These three dimensions of the debate have helped fuel anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant resentment in national public opinion due to a general concern from the population of the risk of the "Islamisation" of French society.

2. Interpretation of Discursive Practice

This section analyses the discursive practice related to Sarkozy’s editorial, which represents the nodal point of the debate. It looks at the communicative process of the text, in other words, the immediate conditions of social reproduction of Sarkozy’s editorial rather than its political context. Therefore, this section offers a ‘bigger picture’ of the text in terms of how it mutually relates to other discourses held in the public debate and how the Sarkozy’s editorial was disseminated across the European public sphere through other texts. Two analytical levels are utilised: 1) interdiscursivity and 2) intertextual chain.
Interdiscursivity

The main objective of the interdiscursive analysis is to specify how the nodal point under analysis is established and co-articulated with other local or transnational discourses on nationalism, immigration, secularism etc. This analytical level is aimed at investigating how Sarkozy’s speech is established in a specific discursive context and how it can be articulated with other discourses through recontextualization.

Specifically, in his contribution to *Le Monde* Sarkozy attempts to offer a definition of what it means to be French, while calling for full respect towards Muslim integration. An increased concern for immigration issues, which have been underlined above, may have helped renew a traditional French discourse on integration and the nation-state that asserted three discursive strategies: 1) the discourse of Republicanism which assumes the principle of undifferentiated citizenship; 2) the rejection of any form of diversity considered antithetical to the discourse of French universalism (Bertossi, 2007: 27); and 3) the discourse of secularism.

First, the tension in Sarkozy’s editorial between the discourse on Republican citizenship and the discourse on pluralism has been most apparent during the so-called “debate on national identity” (Ichijo, 2011: 40) which was aimed at discussing whether immigration was indeed slumping France's social and cultural identity. However, this debate on national identity was quite innovative for French public life, because, for decades, the commitment of French political elites to a universal Republican conception of citizenship excluded discussion of any form of identity-based instance in the political process as well in the public sphere (Blatt, 1997: 41).

This importance of discourse of Republicanism in French debate explains why pluralism remains difficult to achieve in French society and creates a strong limitation on the expression of any cultural diversity. In fact, French Republicanism assumes the population living within the national boundaries can be defined only by legal-political criteria (Mathy 2001: 23); thus the existence of any racial, ethnic, or
linguistic minority is not recognised because all citizens are formally part of the nation. Conversely, the risk of ‘communitarianism’, or in other words the existence of structured ethnic communities is considered as a major threat to the values of the ‘Republic’. In this way, the discourse of communitarianism is used to condemn the disruption of the French republican model and to reject any claim about discriminations and racism posed by minorities (Sala Pala and Simon 2007: 4).

Second, the tension in Sarkozy’s editorial between national universalism and diversity accounts for the difficult accommodation of the cultural pluralism related to immigration in recent decades and to the presence of a large Muslim community. In fact, diversity and pluralism clash with the core aspects of the French imagined community (Duchesne 2005): its universalistic aspirations (Schnapper 1994), its nostalgic belief in a unique historical identity (Ichijo, 2011: 41) and its national unity (Sudlow, 2012: 169).

The French discourse of universalism is based on the idea that the French nation is imbued with Enlightenment values and unique in regards to an exceptional past born out of the French revolution. According to Wallach Scott (2004), the debate about French universalism is not confined to small academic circles but it has always been at the very centre of the political debate from the Parliament to the pages of daily newspapers. Thus, French universalism is not just a mantra but rather a hegemonic philosophical concept that has not been challenged by any one because of a “mythologized reiteration of the principles of the 1789 revolution” (2004: 32).

Third, French secularism, laïcité, strictly calls for 1) a rigid separation between state and religion (similar to Jefferson’s wall), and 2) an absence of any religious expression in the public sphere. However, the principle of Laïcité, which permits state neutrality, has been interpreted as a containment of religion through the restriction of religion in to the private sphere (Casanova, 1994: 35). At the same time, Sarkozy rejects a traditional concept of secularisation in which religion is considered as a matter for the private sphere only and claims instead that religion should play a positive role in the public sphere.
Specifically, Sarkozy explains his interpretation of Laïcité in his own book published in October 2004, titled *La République, les religions, l’espérance*. Within it, he describes his wish to create an “open and serene” secularism, in which each person can live out his own vision of hope and participate in building a democratic society. But this requires, however, a return to an active rather than passive secularism (Sarkozy, 2005). Therefore, Sarkozy could be defined as a reformer of the strict tradition of French secularism because he recognizes a public role for religions and a positive influence on the society.

Sarkozy’s reasoning is based on the argument that religions are the *keepers of ethos* that are necessary to maintain liberal values. In his Swiss referendum intervention, Sarkozy underlines how secularism “is not the rejection of religion, but [a] respect for all faiths” [line 40] and recalls that when he was Minister of Interior, he created the French Council of the Muslim Faith [line 41] putting Islam on the same level as the other “major religions” [line 42]. This line of thinking was exposed also during Pope Benedict XVI’s visit to France, when Sarkozy said that it was "legitimate for democracy and respectful of secularism to have a dialogue with religions" (Donaido, 2008).

Sarkozy’s discourse on “positive secularism” re-contextualizes those arguments elaborated by Habermas (2010) in a definition of post-secularism as an attempt to reconceive the significance of both religion and the secular in the context of contemporary politics. According to Sarkozy, the “old conception of state secularism must evolve because the State cannot remain indifferent to the public role of religion” (2005: 185). His discourse for a different secularism has an important consequence in terms of reintroducing the classic debate on ‘faith and reason’ and in readdressing relations between religion and the State without, however, challenging the secularised nature of French political institutions.

Therefore, Sarkozy’s attempt is not to neglect Muslims and their role in French society as advocated by the radical right. However, there is a caveat, namely Islam integration must submit to the universalism of the French social and civic contract. In his words, Sarkozy writes he will do “everything to ensure that French Muslims enjoy the same rights as all other citizens” and specifies that anything that
could be regarded as a challenge to French collective identity will halt the creation of a “French Islam” that will share the national “social and civic contract” [53-54]. This standpoint means that Islam can have a public role in French society, but it has to renounce those traditions that do not fit the universalism of French Republicanism.

Sarkozy declares also that Islam does not need to undermine “its core beliefs” in order to be considered as French [51-54]. At the same time, he also declares that all Muslim immigrants should integrate into French community and respect its cultural traditions and values, which he expressly defines as having “Christian” roots and “Republican values” [49-50]. This is a very particular conceptualisation of national identity, since the French nation has always been populated by non-Christian minorities such as Jews, and recently Muslims, coming from the nation’s colonies.

In brief, the intertwined discourses of French Laïcité and Republicanism are related to the consolidation of French universalism. This discursive framework also explains the normative assumptions that underlie the context of Islam integration, namely that national unity is more important than the manifestation of any particular minority’s expression of identity, culture or religion (Sudlow 2012: 169). The key features of French integration can thus be summarised as follows: 1) The permanent tension between universalism and a sense of unity within the conception of the nation, 2) The persistent influence of French secularism, 3) the central role of the state, its supremacy over civil society and its unifying mission, and 4) – as a consequence of this mission – France’s difficult relationship with pluralism.

*Intertextual Chain*

The objective here is to analyse how the nodal point is disseminated, contested and eventually operationalised by entering into a series of other text types and transcending national perspectives through social practice and contestation (Risse 2010: 152).
First of all, it is very important to underline that Sarkozy's editorial came not only in answer to the concern about the Swiss referendum and French opposition to the construction of Mosques, but also in the midst of a broader debate over French national identity that was launched by his government in October 2009 (Marquand, 2009). This debate was aimed at discussing two central questions: "what it means to be French today" and “what immigration contributes to French national identity” (Cosgrove, 2010).

Regarding dissemination in the European Public Sphere, Sarkozy delivered his reaction to the recent Swiss referendum through an editorial firstly published on 8 December 2009, by Le Monde, a traditionally leftist newspaper. The same article was translated in to English and published the day after by The Guardian with the title “France and the Swiss minaret vote” (Sarkozy, 2009) in the Comment is Free section.

In addition, all the major news agencies covered the opinion delivered through the newswires. In the case of the news agency AFP, in the newswire “Sarkozy warns against religious 'ostentation' after Swiss vote” of the 8 December (AFP 2010), the parts of the editorial selected and then quoted referred to:

- "Christians, Jews, Muslims, [and] all believers regardless of their faith, must refrain from ostentation and provocation and ... practice their religion in humble discretion".
- “The President was wading into an increasingly tense debate over national identity that has zeroed in on immigration fears in France”.
- “The necessity to combat discrimination and ensure that Muslims can feel like full-fledged citizens of France; however, ‘anything that could appear as a challenge’ to France's Christian roots and Republican values would lead to “failure" in the drive to promote a form of moderate Islam in France”.

Since the AFP, which is the largest News Agency across Europe, could be said to have overemphasised certain points because it is based in France, I have also included an analysis of a newswire from the German Deutsche Presse-Agentur:
• “Christian, Jew, or Muslim,... each one must guard against all ostentation and all provocation and [be] aware of the good fortune to be able to live in a free land, practise his religion with humble discretion”;
• “The vote banning the minaret was a simplistic reaction to a complex problem”.
• “The minaret ban was approved because the Swiss people felt the effects of globalization were threatening their identity”.
• “Sarkozy called for the establishment of a national identity and the creation of a social melting pot”.
• "The national identity is the antidote to tribalism and clannishness."
• "The melting pot is the will to live together. Clannishness is the choice to live separately."

Here is interesting evidence of the role that newswires can have in potentially creating in selecting and disseminating topics through the European Public Sphere. All the major newspapers covered the excerpts delivered via the newswires. Thus, it is possible to find a large number of comments and editorials published by the European press that covered specific passages of the editorial. For example, the European press accentuated the degree to which Sarkozy had called on Muslim practitioners to avoid "ostentation" and "provocation" for fear of upsetting the Christian majority. Moreover, both agencies reported Sarkozy’s concern regarding the question of national identity as the solution to promote social cohesion in Europe, especially in France.

Concerning contestation, media commentators generally criticised Sarkozy for his dangerously simplistic views on the issue of minarets and Muslim integration and also denounced Sarkozy’s call to debate national identity as risking to degeneration into a populist dispute on immigration to gain support within the far right electorate (Traynor, 2007). Immigration activists have also accused Sarkozy of promote anti-immigrant sentiment for electoral reasons in order to secure the right-wing vote at a moment when immigration is frightening the French public opinion. As a consequence of this high level of criticism, the opposition, led by the Socialist
Party, refused to participate in the public debate to avoid political manipulation. It also denounced Sarkozy for provoking fear after starting a controversy simply to divert the public from the country’s economic problems in a time of deep social crisis (Crumley, 2010).

It is interesting to recall the contradictions present within the French Government. The former foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, said at the time that the minaret ban was "intolerant," "prejudiced," and amounted to "religious oppression" (France24, 2009). Sarkozy instead declared understanding for Switzerland's controversial vote to ban the construction of Muslim minarets. Certainly, the French President was the first political leader in Europe to offer a detailed view on the referendum that the Swiss government had itself criticised as discriminatory and probably incompatible with EU policies.

Sarkozy also faced an internal dispute. Some prominent politicians from the conservative area, such as the former Prime Minister, Alain Juppé, doubted the appropriateness and even the utility of this debate. It was the common opinion of many political leaders allied to Sarkozy that the French Centre Right should preserve its own mainstream values rather than move toward the extremes of Front National. Also, some exponents of the government argued that the idea of a debate on national identity was not proper and would not work politically (Reuters, 2011).

Despite the criticism, Sarkozy’s political agenda on Islam obtained a large visibility through the media in France and across Europe, thus that European public sphere has been called on for different months to discuss his speeches, ideas and thoughts about integration of Muslims.

At the level of operationalisation, the Burqa Law became a demonstration of Sarkozy’s intention to promote the integration of Islam in France through a strong regulation of Islam by expelling the integral veil from the ambit of religion. In fact, Sarkozy argued that “the problem of the burqa is not a religious problem; it is a problem of the liberty and dignity of women. The burqa is not a religious symbol” (Carvajal, 2009).
Certainly, the integral veil is a practice for only a small minority within Islam; however, a liberal state would typically reserve the right to define religious issues to those who practice a religion. In addition, although the intent is to protect women from oppression by their male relatives and cultural traditions, the ban may inadvertently exclude a lot of women “who wear [the] nikab with utter conviction, [whether] right or wrong, as part and parcel of their religion” (Brahin El Guabli 2011), thus submitting them to an insensitive and normative Republicanism.

Many commentators share the view that the intertwined debate on Muslim integration and national identity did not have any important impact on the law-making process (Crumley, 2010), besides the ban on the burqa. However, the effectiveness of Sarkozy’s political consensus is shown in the decision of the Socialist Party to avoid expressing any real opposition to the approval of the law on the integral veil. Officially, the Socialist Party opposed the wearing of the Burqa, but was "not favourable" in regard to a legal ban (BBC News, 2010b; CNN, 2010). However, after months of debate, during the vote by 116 Socialist senators, 46 voted for the ban, and the remainder did not participate. Only one right-wing senator voted alone against the law (BBC news, 2010c).

After the approval of the Burqa law, on 11 February, 2011, Sarkozy attempted to re-launch the debate on national identity by setting a deadline for a final decision on what role religion should play in France: "We need to formalise our position on the role of religions in France once and for all, and I want this to be achieved in 2011" (Todd, 2011). In the same interview, he joined Merkel and Cameron’s attack on multiculturalism: "If you come to France, you accept to melt into a single community, which is the national community, and if you do not want to accept that, you cannot be welcome in France" (AFP, 2011). This is a key point in Sarkozy’s discursive strategy as it confirms both the role of Islam in a secular France and the failure of multiculturalism.

In summary, his article on the Swiss referendum shows how Sarkozy was able to re-contextualise the discourse on Muslim visibility as a concrete political opportunity that let him develop and communicate a more specific political agenda...
on integration. Moreover, Sarkozy, despite criticism, was still able to create a strong consensus within French and European public opinion about issues of national identity and the civic integration of Islam. Sarkozy was also able to develop a political consensus within the European public sphere, which was urged overall several months to discuss the political agenda regarding Islam, giving even greater visibility to Sarkozy’s speeches, ideas and thoughts about Islam and specifically the *Burqa* ban across the rest of Europe.

3. Textual Practice: Othering and Legitimisation

This section examines the textual aspects of discourse practice. Textual features can be a useful empirical terrain to explore and interpret throughout the dialectical tension that occurs between the actual text and its social context. The analytical model proposed in this section offers a general overview about the textual features, and a second stage that focuses on the political effects of that textual practice, through an assessment of the Othering and legitimation strategies on which the text is based and can thus be interpreted.

At the general level, this textual analysis is conducted on an English translation of Sarkozy’s editorial, which appeared in *Le Monde* and translated into English by *The Guardian* on 9 December 2009 [Appendix 4.1]. As a consequence, some micro-textual features are lost in the present analysis, due to translation. However, this analysis is not aimed at investigating linguistic features, but rather to understand the arguments and the logic behind the French discourse on integration as presented by Sarkozy in his editorial.

The text shows elements of style and enunciation that mark the rhetorical articulation of a political speech. It is possible, thus, to identify the genre of the political speech despite the fact that the contribution was a written editorial. For example, Sarkozy favours short words and phrases over long phrases, and each sentence averages 10/12 words, both in the original French version and the English translation. In the text, there are no connectors between sentences, and the use of subordination is rare. This strategy is unusual in a written text since subordinate
relationships between sentences are necessary to establish more complex relationship between arguments. Thus, Sarkozy’s editorial prefers the immediacy of coordinated connections and avoids any subordination between sentences.

In addition, a vivid and descriptive language, typical of the political speech, characterizes the wording of the text. Words like “convictions”, “beliefs”, “astonishing”, and “unhappiness” from the two opening paragraphs are a small sample of the tone that the author wants to evoke. In doing so, Sarkozy prefers creating a cause-and-effect relationship through emotional and personal meaning; for this reason words are chosen for their emotional emphasis in order to point to readers’ feelings rather than to structured arguments, which are more typical in a written text.

In order to explore the role of identities, I focus on the construction of the Other through those textual strategies that emphasise social identities and collective values. The construction and definition of identities and it is indispensable to support the development of any legitimisation strategy of the discourse of civic integration. It is in that sense, for example, that Sarkozy advocates that people’s fear of losing their identity cannot be ignored or undervalued [31-32]. In his view, the Swiss people felt their identity was being threatened by immigration [32-33].

In Sarkozy’s editorial, it is also possible to observe how the textual practice affects the manner in which the Other is articulated as someone who is separated. The Other is based on the identification and recognition of its own symbolic identity in the identity of an-Other. Sarkozy writes: “I also want to tell them [Muslims] that in our country” [49]. In another sentence, he wishes “the creation of the kind of French Islam that … shares our social and civic contract” [54]. Here, the author establishes a concrete separation between “us” and the present Islam, which he calls on to share the French social contract.

The collective identity of the in-group is based on the expression of a “we” identification referring to all the French people. These constitute the public space in which the enunciation operates. It is the sense of "we" at the beginning of the speech or the reference to "the Republic", which is in and of itself performative, in that it is
the manner used whereby the speech establishes actors and confers identity and political status, as opposed to simply addressing those who do not belong to France. Sarkozy does not speak directly to Muslims: “I want also to tell them that in our country” [49]; rather, he is talking to the French people, saying that Muslims have to assume their own identity, but he also refers to “our country,” implying the country belongs to the French people.

A confirmation of this claim is Line 35, which reads: “National identity is the antidote to tribalism and sectarianism”. Here “national identity” evokes the value of nationalism as a secular characterisation of both self-determination and respect of the individual and personality. At the same time, “tribalism” and “sectarianism” evoke the negative values of backwardness and are attributed to Muslim communities. Tactically, these negative characteristics are opposed to a “national identity” to give more prestige to the supposed European secular values of tolerance and rationality recalled by Sarkozy.

Sarkozy proposes a one-sided European heritage, which drawn from the values of the Enlightenment and is characterised by universal values of reason and tolerance as opposed to Islam as an Other with different values. In claiming European values are “welcoming” and “tolerant” [29-30] Sarkozy absolves any responsibility of Europeans in contemporary history. Colonialism and the more recent instances of ethnic cleansing including the holocaust cannot be defined as a manifestation of the welcoming and tolerant character of Europeans (Mazower 2009; Judt 2008).

By observing the use of the plural subject “we” as the French and the references to Europe, it is possible to note how Sarkozy develops a specific relationship between Europe and France. Europe and Islam are described as two separate essences that can be resolved only through the belonging of Islam to Enlightenment, democracy and Republicanism, in other words, those features characterising French national identity. In this way, Sarkozy transfers the vision of the Republican French universalism toward the whole Europe. In Sarkozy’s words, Europe is an enlarged in-group projection of French national identity through the vision of a ‘French’ Europe.
This view is further confirmed when Sarkozy recalls that the majority of French, along with the Irish and Dutch, “rejected a Europe they felt was becoming more and more indifferent to them” [18-19], in the case of the referendum on the European constitution in 2005. The European collective identity is seen as composed of different national identities as confirmed by the several references to them. At the same time, Sarkozy recognises that France holds a central role in the European political sphere, when he claims: “we had to change Europe” [19] and “Only then was France able to lead the fight to change Europe” [22.] Sarkozy’s understanding of Europe is thus based on an attempt to establish French influence in the domains of European politics and culture.

In order to explore the process of legitimisation, this analysis focuses on those strategies adopted in Sarkozy’s editorial that support the development of political legitimization of civic integration. Its aim is to identify and research how textual features can become universal and part of the legitimising system that sustains the implementation of policies to integrate Muslims.

In different passages, Sarkozy evokes stereotypes and prejudices toward the very concept of ‘Muslim’ through the use of several textual devices. He writes that “we do not respect people by forcing them” – which is already an interesting construction based on the classical dichotomy of Us vs. Them analysed above – “to practice their religion in cellars or warehouses”. Also, surprisingly, he argues that respect for Muslims and all newcomers means “endorsing the equality of men and women, Laïcité, and the separation of the temporal from the spiritual,” which strongly limits at homogenization of cultures and belonging rather than simply choosing to respect newcomers.

This textual analysis reveals also a legitimisation strategy based on standardisation. In a key paragraph, Sarkozy calls on Muslims to avoid “anything that could be regarded as [a] challenge to” [51] French values. A rejection of French cultural and political roots will “scupper” or damage [52] the integration of Islam into French society. Actually, Sarkozy is even more explicit. He posits the impossibility of any “creation of the kind of French Islam” [52]. Thus, according to
Sarkozy, political belonging requires not only integration, but also the creation of a specific national version of Islam. This implies that in its current form, Islam cannot be part of France, and for this reason, Islam must modify itself, so it can belong to and join the presumed French identity as Sarkozy defines that identity in his discussion.

The text also deploys legitimisation as strategy through membership, which defines the criteria used in recognising membership for outsiders. Thus, in order to gain French membership, Muslims have to recognise and accept the French “social and civic contract” [54]. It is not enough simply to recognise the political and cultural roots of France. Muslims must share and practice the rules of French society without asking for any special accommodation. According to Sarkozy, these indefeasible rights are: 1) “the equality of men and women”, 2) Laïcité (secularism) and 3) the separation of the temporal from the spiritual [45-48].

The concept of responsibility is also mentioned repeatedly by the reference to Laïcité, which is defined as the necessity to “practice religion discreetly” [57]. Here “discretely” means in a private way, without creating any conflict with other groups, a point that exemplifies Sarkozy’s view on the role of religion in the public sphere. As I underscore above, Sarkozy criticises the privatisation of religion and supports a more “positive” role of religions in the public sphere; however, he seems to conclude that faith must be practiced without challenging the sensibilities of French people. In other words, the rights of religious minorities do not and must not override or change the secular identity that the French majority accepts culturally.

Furthermore, Sarkozy appeals to his people’s emotion in order to legitimate his perspective. For example, “violence” and “visceral contempt” are associated to the behaviour of those members of elite, who refuse to listen to what “comes from the people” [8]. He also states that when the elite becomes “deaf to the people – indifferent to their problems, feelings, and aspirations – we feed populism” [8-10]. Here, “feeling” and “aspirations”, according to Sarkozy, describe the correct spirit of people as opposed to the lack of empathy evident in the opinion of the elite.
Sarkozy chooses words that give emotional emphasis to arguments, in doing so, this text creates a cause-and-effect relationship through emotional and personal meaning. This strategy is also developed in Line 12, where Sarkozy asks “How can we be surprised by the success of extremists when we ignore the unhappiness of voters?”; thus reducing the problem of the referendum to a basic question that lies within the dichotomy of “happiness/unhappiness” within people, implying that being discontent is a matter of unhappiness rather than a social problem. Again, in Line 22, Sarkozy writes that “Instead of vilifying the Swiss, we would do better to ask ourselves what their vote revealed”. The use of “vilifying” typifies the point of view that Sarkozy’s approach to those elites who criticised the Swiss vote.

Sarkozy legitimises also his political standpoint by reference to the feelings of “the people” [8] and argues that politicians’ incapacity to connect with the people will “feed populism” [10]. At the same time, Sarkozy’s appeal to people’s feelings is per se a populist strategy, in fact populism defines a view supporting “the rights and powers of the common people in their struggle with the privileged elite” (Norton et al, 2010: 612).

To summarize the main points of this textual analysis, Sarkozy’s editorial shows elements of style and enunciation that are typical of a political speech despite the fact that the contribution was written for publication in a newspaper. In this editorial, Sarkozy calls on Muslims to accept the designated political and cultural identity of France. In overviewing the characteristics of French national identity, Sarkozy defines Islam as a historical Other through a two-fold process, which defines Europe and Islam as two separate essences that can be resolved only through the belonging of Islam to France. However, Sarkozy does not preclude anyone from being integrated into or being part of the defined French society if they simply are willing to accept the mutual sharing of already defined French values.

This attempt to legitimize integration, through a universal discourse on French identity, highlights a few normative ambivalences. For example, what happens when Islam does challenge French values? And why should Islam, which is a transnational religion, become a national religion? And can it? Or should it? The
next analytical stage will try to outline the limits of this normative discourse on French identity and the integration of Muslims.

4. Explanation: Socio-cultural Practice

This section explores the social and political implications of the French discourse of civic integration and focuses on two critical considerations: 1) normative ambivalence in the French politics of identity and its unwillingness to consider Muslim diversity as part of the French self and 2) any hidden social and economic rationality underlying the relation between identity and power.

The French discourse addresses, in a political context, the ways in which national identity can be used to support, rather than deny, the integration of Muslims, via the adoption of liberal and civic values that are inherent in it. However, Sarkozy’s appeal to unity and cohesion is based on a discursive strategy aimed at devaluing Muslim immigrants as Other, not for their different ethnicity, but for those of their intrinsic cultural differences that might clash with French liberal values. Accordingly, Sarkozy promotes a specific integration that is aimed at underlining the Muslim immigrants’ responsibilities toward France and its political community.

A main argument in Sarkozy’s speech is that Muslims should embrace the French “national identity” for their own best interests. For this reason, Sarkozy calls on Muslims to respect the French social and civil contract. In his words, “national identity” is the only antidote against “sectarism” and “tribalism” [35], and once again, he discusses the creation of a “French Islam” that “shares our social and civic contract” [53-54]. Thus, Sarkozy’s discourse is aimed at promoting the recognition of Islam as a full member of French society through common rules and mutual duties that will still protect the French national identity.

Sarkozy redefines integration as a specific political discourse that does not accept mutual recognition, but instead recognises only one definition of integration within the French political system and the French community. This political
discourse implies that Muslims can be integrated only if they agree to create a French Islam, thereby renouncing any of their political and cultural characteristics that can be deemed to contrast with or oppose French identity. It is therefore self-evident that such integration is likely to generate a substantial level of exclusion for those that do not want to change their inner values.

The very language of Sarkozy’s model of integration is based on normative assumptions regarding the political and cultural nature of French republicanism and secularism. Sarkozy recalls that the most important aspect of French national identity is based on the principle of Laïcité, or in his words, “the separation of the spiritual and the secular,” which, according to Republicanism, is the only cultural-behavioural filter against fanaticism [46]. Thus the secular-liberal state, according to Sarkozy, should incorporate religious and cultural characteristics into the very foundation of its social contract; at the same time, Muslims must publicly recognise French identity while the civic contract has to deliberately exclude any other identity that might challenge French values, which are basically “Republican” and “deeply marked by a Christian civilization” [49-50]. Thus, Sarkozy conceptualises republican and Christian religious values as a universal discourse and assumes the homogeneity of these values as a given national characteristic. Is France in fact secular? Sarkozy seems to think that it is only partially so and that the country is instead the product of a compromise between “Christian civilization” and republican political values. The importance of “Christianity” in Sarkozy’s view raises the question whether France is indeed truly secular or what precisely the French term Laïcité implies.

These two knotted discourses of Laïcité and Republicanism are also grounded on the historical French perception in which the manifestation of public neutrality is more important than the manifestation of collective or individual expressions based on identity, culture or religion. Confirmation of this interpretation can be found in Sarkozy’s claim that religion must be practiced “discretely” and must avoid undue “provocations” [55-56]. However, these ‘recommendations’ on how to manage religious practice are framed by a secular discourse which defines an entirely inflexible separation between the public and private spheres which inevitably clashes with the traditionalism of some Muslim
newcomers. In addition, the assumption that Muslims groups have some distinctive religious customs ignores the natural process of cultural adaptation and mixing to which minorities are exposed and thus reinforces the perception that Muslims are the Other. The effect of this view, in turn, reproduces a hierarchy of acceptable and unacceptable cultures and religions. By determining who can and who cannot be included, civic integration presupposes an unequal relation between France and Islam, which can then be explained as the need of Muslim immigrants to adopt ‘advanced’ French democratic and secular values.

While the French idea of secularism confers equal dignity on all religions [40], Sarkozy downplays, in some instances, those religious and cultural distinctions peculiar to Islam, disregarding that these distinctions are central to the essence of that faith. This definition of secularism serves to exclude newcomers who do not share the features of French national identity. In fact, Sarkozy declares that he will “do everything to ensure that French Muslims enjoy the same rights as all other citizens. I will fight all forms of discrimination” [47-48] but anything that could challenge Republican values will damage the creation of a “French Islam” [51-52]. In other words, Sarkozy’s discourse is not sympathetic towards public recognition of the Islamic faith, but only towards the creation of a specific national version of Islam. This concept of “French Islam” is problematic because it assumes implicitly that the present Islam is not French and indeed is alien to French society and values. Consequently, this discourse implies that France should implement only partially the liberal principle of religious freedom and deny the secular notion of neutrality, selectively accepting Islam only when it belongs to France.

Therefore, the emphasis on universal values as the core of the requirement integration assumes a character that is aimed at enforcing those newcomers who do not have internalised French values. These secular and republican values thereby become restrictive norms that are opposed to the Other and are used strategically to instrumentally regulate and subordinate Islam. Thus Sarkozy’s model of integration is sympathetic toward the public recognition of diversity, but only when that recognition is central to the ongoing preservation of a pre-determined political and civic cohesion.
A second major implication in this discourse is that implies cohesion but at the same time hides economic and social problems experienced by Muslims. Sarkozy refers to the problem of self-segregation among Muslims in France, what he calls “separatism” and “tribalism” [35], but he does not focuses on the economic causes of this social problem. Both the suburban segregation and religious radicalisation of Muslims in France have been linked at least in part to social exclusion and economic disparity (Mayan, 2007). For many Muslims, the appropriate response to such social exclusion, which is a mix between economic inequalities and ethnic discrimination, is to “form their own associations based on their common identity in Islam” (Mayan, 2007: 5).

By hiding social inequality, Sarkozy’s discourse effectively presents social marginalisation and poverty as acceptable conditions of modern life. As consequence, French civic integration does not address Muslims’ social and economic needs, but rather, it is concerned with changing religious inner values and cultural character through the assimilation of those values that are peculiar to French identity. Muslims must be held individually accountable and morally responsible to the French political community, while social inequality remains only more or less implied. This is a product of an internal ambivalence towards neoliberalism that is more concerned with obligations than with basic rights and social equality (Plant 2009, Turner 2008, Wacquant 2008). This form of neoliberal civic integration is therefore founded, on the one hand, on the acceptance of a political discourse promoting uniform civic values to produce a normative homogenisation of cultures; on the other hand this discourse embodies a denial of any economic and social inequality.

To sum up, the increased concern manifest within the French public debate about Muslim immigration issues has reintroduced a traditional French discourse on the nation-state that asserts two discursive strategies: 1) the persuasiveness of French Republicanism and Secularism; and 2) the rejection of any public recognition of ethnic and cultural identities as antithetical to universalism. Thus, 3) the normative and cultural assumptions that underlie the context of this discourse on Islamic integration are “particular and universal at the same time”; particular in terms of being a feature of the ‘us’ as French national identity and universal as part of “a liberal and democratic civilisation”. At the same time, the French model of
civic integration promises to take into account the broader responsibilities of Muslims to the political community, while effectively excluding social and economic integration.

**Chapter Summary**

Taking as a nodal point Sarkozy’s editorial published in the *Le Monde* newspaper on 8 December 2009, the analysis developed in this chapter offers a reconstruction of the French public debate on integration in the aftermath of the Swiss national referendum.

Sarkozy understands that the vote prohibiting the minaret was a response to a more multifaceted problem than religious freedom. In his view, Europeans’ anxiety over losing their national identities cannot be ignored [31-32]. However Sarkozy's editorial came not only in answer to the concern about the Swiss referendum but in the midst of a broader debate over French national identity that was launched by his government in October 2009 (Marquand, 2009). This debate was aimed at discussing two central questions: “what it means to be French today” and “what immigration contributes to French national identity” (Cosgrove, 2010).

There are three key observations that come out of the Critical Discourse Analysis of this debate. First, the French discourse of civic integration is presented as a one-way process that is based on the acceptance of the French universalism. Although the ideology of Republicanism does confer equal dignity on all religions, it also tends to downplay, and in some instances to ignore, religious and political distinctions that are peculiar to Islam, no matter how important to the essence of the faith and its practice. For this reason, Sarkozy’s attempt may be promoting an exclusive rather than inclusive integration, one that is aimed at reinforcing group boundaries rather than promoting full social cohesion.

Second, the French discourse on civic integration is based on universal and already accepted normative assumptions for the political and cultural nature of French identity. Thus, Sarkozy argues that people need cultural homogeneity, while
isolationism and self-segregation should be rejected because they are threatening the national identity of French society. At the same time, the most important aspect of this discourse on integration lies in its potential for discrimination by limiting the affirmation of any other form of diversity that could possibly undermine social cohesion and also by producing inflexible hierarchies for identifying acceptable and unacceptable cultures and religions. Sarkozy demonstrates this limitation currently through the request to Muslim immigrants to adopt only advanced French democratic and secular customs.

Third, the French discourse of civic integration tends to deny inequalities based on social disparities alone. In particular, Sarkozy calls for a fight against discrimination towards Muslims, but he does not mention the economic and social problems of immigrants nor include them in the process of civic integration. These are issues that may lie at the root of some of the current social distress. Sarkozy either hides or ignores the reality of social and economic divisions and promotes instead the singular and, for him, moral idea of Muslim responsibility that he believes is due to French liberal values.

The next chapter reconstructs the public debate on Islamic integration through an investigation of Merkel’s speech during the Young Christian Democrats convention in 2009. In this speech, the German Chancellor states that Germany’s effort to create a multicultural society has "utterly failed," and claims the necessity of defending “Christian Identity” as a major justification for asking for more social cohesion.
Chapter 5: Who Belongs to the German National Community?

Chapter Overview

This chapter offers an account of the controversy raised during the speech delivered by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel on 16 October 2010, when she addressed a meeting of the youth organisation of her conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party at Potsdam. In her speech, Merkel stated that efforts to build a multicultural society in Germany had "utterly failed" [24] and stated: "The concept that we are now living side by side and are happy about it does not work"[25]. Notably, Merkel’s speech not only supported the failure of Multikulti but expanded the view that Muslim immigrants are expected to integrate into German culture, Leitkultur and adopt its values.

Merkel’s speech should be considered one of the more important on immigration given by a Head of government in Germany in recent years. In fact, more German’s political leaders has underscored quite so firmly in any political speech the philosophy that immigrants have a duty to integrate into their new country if they want to live in that country and to integrate successfully. An open criticism of immigration and multiculturalism has long been unthinkable in Germany where, careful of the legacy of racial discrimination that resulted in the Holocaust, politicians have avoided speaking in negative terms of a culturally mixed society (Kolb 2008: 5).

Indeed the post-war period, any high-level discussion of the role of immigrants and Islam in Germany has always been likely to address only the margins of the political debate in order to avoid any cause for further controversy. After reunification and especially since the end of the nineties, there has been a upward debate within German society on the proper level of immigration, especially regarding Muslims, the effects of immigration, and the degree to which Islam can actually be integrated successfully into Germany (Pautz 2005). Simultaneously, political debate has also focused on defining the key characteristics of German
national identity. As a consequence, the concept of *Leitkultur*, the leading German culture, has entered the political debate through conservatives who want to define German national identity in a very restrictive way (Pautz 2004: 4).

This chapter therefore explores which assumptions are the bases of Merkel’s stance against multiculturalism and how she tries to define the only correct way for integrating Islam and rejects any recognition of other perspectives on integration. Accordingly, the CDA analysis investigates how Merkel’s speech justifies arguments and policies toward the civic integration of immigrants and how the German discourse on civic integration presents 1) a political and cultural rationale that focuses on the “crisis of multiculturalism;” 2) a necessity to redefine German identity in a more cohesive way through an epistemological shift in the definition of a German “leading culture” [*leitkulture*] and 3) an instrumental economic rationale to immigrant integration focusing on both the financial crisis and the need for more limited welfare assistance.

The chapter is divided into four analytical parts. The first part deals with a contextualisation of Merkel’s speech and the place of that speech in the general debate on integration that took place before the speech and has continued following it. The second part focuses on the reconstruction of the discourses relating to the German debate on Muslim integration. Starting from Merkel’s speech (as the nodal point), the analysis evaluates the discursive practices involved in the enactment of the debate. The fourth part is an analysis of the textual features and political effects. The last part discusses socio-cultural practice and examines specifically how the discourse on civic integration recontextualises a deeper core of values and norms embedded in the national public sphere and questions whether this recontextualisation is an outcome of emerging discourses introduced throughout the European public sphere.

1. The Political Context of the Debate

This section places Merkel’s speech within the context of the contemporary German debate on integration, and aims to identify which political controversies
have fuelled the public opinion anxiety about a more ethnically diverse society and the perception of the Muslim community as a ‘problematic’ minority, which cannot or do not want to participate in German society.

In Western Germany, after World War II, “the concepts of nation, belonging and citizenship” were still “determined by the idea of an ethnically homogenous community” as a basis for state organisation “defined by descent, a common culture and history” (Miera 2007: 3). This restrictive approach to national identity, despite its racist aberrations under Nazism, was prolonged by the outcome of the division of Germany (Joppke, 1995: 98) and the consequent German diaspora. West Germany was conceived as the homeland of all Germans and for this reason prioritised only the immigration of co-ethnics (Kolb 2008: 5).

Citizenship was recognized through the “principle of descent”, namely *ius sanguinis* (Brubaker 1994) and naturalisation of immigrants were complex and discretionary that acquiring the German nationality was considered an exceptionality (Miera 2007: 3). Instead opening “the national community to foreigners would have posed the risk” of redefining national identity and of weakening the German responsibility to its “dispersed and repressed co-ethnics in the East” (Joppke 1999: 63). According to Article 116 of the Basic Law (the West German Constitution) automatic citizenship was assigned to ethnic German refugees who fled from the communist East. Thus only migrants with German ethnicity [*Aussiedler*] could be fully admitted into the national community (Miera 2007: 3).

The public debate on immigration was characterised by the rejection to consider Germany as a country of immigrants. Immigrants were called ‘foreigners’ [*Australänder*] or ‘guest workers’ [*Gastarbeiter*], mirroring “the general view that they did not belong to German society, and would leave the country” (Miera 2007: 4). The massive recruitment of “guest-workers in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s did not challenge this concept as foreigner workers were regarded as residing temporarily in Germany” (Bös 2002) and “immigration policies focused almost absolutely on control and return of migrants” (Schönwälder 2001).
The Foreigner Law did not grant any permanent residence to migrant workers, thus establishing both a guest-worker regime and the priority of the German state interests over the right to the integration of migrants (Joppke, 1999: 98). In fact, conceiving the Federal Republic as a country of immigration and integrating multiple minorities in the national body would have contradicted the “Basic Law's conception of a provisional state geared toward the recovery of national unity” (Hailbronner 1983: 2113).

Only after the reunification, the public debate openly considered Germany to be a country of immigrants and a new vision about ethnic and cultural diversity was established based on the incontrovertible evidence that immigration was an avoidable reality. The debate pivoted on two main arguments which shaped the discussion in favour of immigration: 1) the evidence regarding the long-term settlement of immigrants and their families and 2) the need for highly qualified labourers (Miera 2007: 5). However, in this debate two different political strands were opposed: the leftist coalition asking for a European “intercultural togetherness”, and the conservative opposition calling for a national “ethno-pluralism” (Stehle, 2012: 168). Accordingly, the green-red viewpoint implied that Germany’s integration into Europe could offer a solution to problems concerning immigration: “by integrating Germany into Europe and developing a ‘European identity’, a more worldly, unified and democratic Germany could emerge.” Instead, the conservative stance “was influenced by traditional right-wing ideas of cultural, ethnic and religious identity and difference” (Stehle, 2012: 168).

Between 1998 and 2005, the new Green-Social Democratic government took pro-active steps to frame the immigration and integration debate. In 2000, the leftist coalition revised the citizenship law by implementing the principle of *ius solis*. Accordingly, children of foreigner immigrants can obtain German citizenship if one parent has been legally resident in Germany for eight years (Miera 2007: 5). Second, the green-red government facilitated immigration for high-skilled and self-employed migrants through the Immigration Act (2005), which allows permanent settlement for labour migrants and promotes additional measures to integrate legal immigrants in Germany (Miera 2007: 5).
From the late nineties, Germany has also been more accepting and eager than other European countries to include and meet the cultural and religious needs of its Muslim population (Soper & Fetzer: 2005: 935). During the Green-Red alliance, the Federal state funded Islamic cultural organisations, authorised Islamic schools (Doomernik 1995; Hasanein 2001) and reformed the nationality law, which was based on the principle of *ius sanguine*, by making easier for children born from non-German parents to be naturalised as German citizens (Farrell 2003:8).

The green-red approach to multicultural integration rapidly changed when the Christian Democratic Union led by Merkel won the elections in 2005 and 2007. In May 2006, after intense debates on separatism and ethnic violence, Merkel's cabinet adopted a policy of “civic integration" in her political agenda to govern immigration policy and control residency permits. Its focus was on requiring attendance at civic integration courses and making the passing of a standard language test a prerequisite for immigrating to Germany (Jopke, 2007: 14).

In the same period, an increasing number of debates have taken place in the German public sphere, which revolved around the question of whether German identity is challenged by the multicultural character of German society (Ichijo, 2011: 77). As a consequence, the concepts of “political identity and national culture” (Stehle, 2012: 168) were redefined as a political answer to public opinion that is increasingly anxious about a more ethnically diverse society. In this context “the debate about nation, inclusion/exclusion and belonging intensified” (Miera 2007: 5).

Specifically, the debate moved toward the attempt to define the *Leitkultur*, namely the “dominant” or “leading culture” (Franken & Loobuyck, 2011: 155). The *Leitkultur* term entered the political debate officially in the fall of 2000, when the former chairman of the CDU party, Friedrich Merz, called on non-nationals living in Germany to fully adopt the country's "mature, liberal *Leitkultur*" (quoted in Mittelman 2010: 62). Merz's appeal to the homogenisation of immigrants to German society raised concern, even within his own party, but after a few years the concept become an acceptable one in the present political debate.
Thus the debate over German identity has led to a broad discussion on Muslim integration and the place of Islam. The question of integrating Muslims also involved the Left; Thilo Sarrazin, an economist and member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) denounced in a book (2010) the failure of multiculturalism and the failure of Germany's post-war immigration policy. In particular, he described immigrants, especially Arabs and Turks, as reluctant to integration and argued that: “No other religion in Europe makes so many demands. No immigrant group other than Muslims is so strongly connected to claims on the welfare state and crime” (Sarazin 2010b). As a consequence of his assumptions, Sarazin advocates restrictive immigration policies in Germany and across Europe to limit Muslims’ presence, as Muslim immigrants cost the society more than they can generate in added economic value (Sarazin, 2010b). Despite the large criticism, he obtained a great consensus in a large part of the German population including Social Democrats (The Independent, 2011).

This dispute over Sarazin’s theses inspired the former German president, Christian Wulff (Christian Democratic Union - CDU), to dampen the debate by stating that Islam was part of Germany. Specifically, on October 4, 2010, during the speech on the anniversary of German unification, Wulff affirmed in front of the Parliament, that not only Christianity and Judaism, but “Islam also belongs in Germany” (Reuters, 2010b). His speech received major applause in the Bundestag, and “yet just a few days later, many on the conservative side of German politics and society” appeared to be very unsettled by it (Spiegel Online, 2010, 2011).

Shortly after Wulff’s speech, different conservative leaders firmly reacted against the thesis that Islam can be considered part of German nation. For example, the General Secretary of the CDU, Herman Gröhe, or the Christian Democratic Union Bavarian Governor, Horst Seehofer, who both stressed the importance of preserving the German Leitkultur (Spiegel Online 2010b, 2010c). Also, Merkel did not escape the opportunity to refer to the Leitkultur. In November 2009, one month after the Potsdam speech, at the CDU Annual Conference in Karlsruhe, she recalled the "Christian view of mankind" but also the Germans’ “Judeo-Christian tradition” [christlich-jüdischen Leitkultur], specifically declaring that Germany needs more
public discussion "about the values that guide us and about our Judeo-Christian tradition" (Merkel, 2010b: 27).

In this context, the Judeo-Christian Leitkultur postulated by German Christian Democratic leaders seems aimed at excluding Islamic cultural heritage from the processes of real integration. Certainly, references to Christian roots are standard in the Christian Democratic Party, but these references to religious identity have become more frequent in the general political debate at the same time that the discussion over Islam and integration has become more divisive and seem explicitly based on the assumption that Islamic culture cannot be integrated into European culture.

To sum up, three questions emerge in the review of the political debate on German identity and after reunification, the public debate on integration: First, dealing with the past after 1945; Second, defining new German national self-conception after reunification; Third, the role of non-Germans in contemporary German society, specifically whether Islam belongs to Germany and how it can be integrated.

2. Interpretation of Discursive Practice

The first step of the empirical analysis is the reconstruction of the discourses related to the debate on Muslim integration. Starting from Merkel’s speech addressed on 16\textsuperscript{th} October 2009 as the nodal point, the analysis evaluates the conditions and practices involved in the enactment and reproduction of the discourses developed in the debate. Specifically, I will pay close attention to interdiscursive and intertextual analysis so as to offer a bigger picture of the text in terms of how it mutually relates to other discourses held in the public sphere and how other discourses are interconnected to the nodal point.

*Interdiscursivity*
This analytical level is aimed at investigating how Merkel’s speech is established in a specific discursive context and how it can be articulated with other discourses through interdiscursivity. The objective is to specify how the nodal point under analysis is established and co-articulated with other local or transnational discourses. Specifically, Merkel’s perspective on immigrants’ integration revolves around a firm critique of multiculturalism and a detailed definition of the features that characterise German identity.

In Merkel’s speech, immigration is seen as an undeniable emergent social problem. Broadly speaking, Merkel attempts to recontextualise in the German public debate a quite common discourse against multiculturalism by depicting multicultural policies as a failure, as they have encouraged ethnic minorities to close themselves off from mainstream society. For example, Merkel claims that there are large numbers of immigrant descendants often viewed today as a major problem in certain urban areas: “In Frankfurt am Main, two-thirds of the children under five years old have migrant backgrounds” [30] and “twice as many of them have never graduated from any school” [31] or “never finished any vocational education”.

Thus, according to Merkel, multiculturalism has led to the development of ethnic ghettos, which has brought a lack of willingness to participate in wider social or political life. At the same time, the discourse on civic integration is recalled to overcome the ineffectiveness of multicultural policies through a social project aimed at assimilating within immigrants, the liberal values that identify German, European and Western societies. In this way, the pessimism towards multiculturalism in Merkel’s discourse is based on the opportunity of solving these supposed ‘clashes’ between Muslim and German identities not through traditional democratic practices of negotiation; rather, it is through a process of assimilating those values which define the German Constitution.

The discourse on the failure of multiculturalism can be seen as an essential response to avoid a conflict between a separatist Muslim community and the liberal values at the core of contemporary Germany, such as freedom of speech, secularism, gender equality and anti-totalitarianism. This discourse recalls Habermas’ concept of constitutional patriotism (1990, 1998) by advocating universal, liberal-democratic
values as the core of the German Constitution [27, 32]. As a consequence, integration is predominantly referred to the “basic norms and values as formulated in the constitution, equal rights for men and women, human rights, secularism, a certain knowledge of the history of our country which would then lead to the rejection of anti-Semitism” (Lofink 2005: 84). At the same time, these aspects are strategically opposed “towards Muslim migrants who are accused of lacking these attributes” (Miera 2007: 10).

Second, the denunciation of multiculturalism failure is strictly connected to the vision of national identity and conceptualization of German leading culture. Following German re-unification, concepts of “political identity and national culture” experienced significant redefinition (Stehle, 2012: 168) along with the necessity to “re-establish a ‘normal’ German national consciousness cleared of the memory of the Holocaust” (Pautz 2004: 41). This normal consciousness began to take root in the early 1980’s and continued after the reunification (Williams, Bishopa & Wighta 1996: 215-216) with the emergence of the Leitkultur discourse as the substitute for the disqualified discourse on nationhood.

The Leitkultur discourse was first introduced in 1998 by the German-Arab sociologist, Bassam Tibi as a cosmopolitan discourse based on the ideals of the European Enlightenment - of the precedence of reason over religious revelation and dogma, and based on human rights including freedom of religion that resulted in a society funded on pluralism and reciprocal tolerance (2001: xvi). Thus, according to Pautz (2004), the discourse of Leitkultur is instrumental to full German “normalisation” through the undertaking of a two-fold discourse, the goal of which is to put the Holocaust into full historical perspective and thus consign it to a closed chapter of German history. The Leitkultur discourse can be also related to the discourse on “constitutional patriotism” (Habermas 1996). Namely, constitutional patriotism presupposes that universal principles recontextualised in the “constitution of a community” might develop identification and belonging which go beyond “conventional forms of loyalty based on ethnic origins, national culture or religious tradition” (Mavelli, 2012: 98).
At the same time, the discourse that underlines Merkel’s assumptions on Leitkultur is not based on the emergence of a post-ethnic German society, but defines German and European identity as “strongly influenced by the Christian-Jewish heritage” [29.]. As noted by Habermas (2010), the “arrogant appropriation of Judaism” is an incredible “disregard of the fate the Jews suffered in Germany” and also a “relapse into an ethnic understanding” of German culture, which is a dangerous challenge to the liberal constitution as it is based on a distinction between “us” and the foreigners. This attempt is very evident when Leitkultur is defined by religion through citing the Judeo-Christian tradition rather than simply German culture. As a consequence, it can be argued that the discourse on a Judeo-Christian Leitkultur defines a monocultural German society as opposed to a newcomer culture. In doing so, this particular discourse on Leitkultur draws distinct boundary lines between nationals and Islam with the national body, and excludes Muslims from public life if they do not agree to assimilate the values of the majority.

To sum up, three discourses emerge from Merkel’s speech: First, the discourse on the failure of multiculturalism reveals a political assumption that there is only one correct method to integrate Islam and rejects any recognition of other integration perspectives. Second, integration as a discourse implies a liberal civic identity defined by a liberal contract that couples rights to duties. Third, the leading aspects of German identity are defined through its own historical national specificity which universalises the particular values, rules and norms of a European civilisation influenced by Christian-Jewish heritage.

*Intertextual Chain*

The objective here is to analyse how the nodal point is disseminated, contested and eventually operationalised by entering into a series of other text types and transcending national perspectives through social practice and contestation (Risse 2010: 152).

First of all, it should be noted that Merkel’s speech in Potsdam became very popular in Germany, and also across Europe for the controversy it generated and the
massive comments and editorials published, but also for a short 2 minute video that covered only a small passage of the broader speech that was almost 40 minutes long. Thus, media dissemination of the speech was only partial and done in snippets and based on only one excerpt, where Merkel firmly attacked multiculturalism for being an utter failure.

Secondly, the full transcript of the speech is not available, and it has never been translated into other languages (see the full transcript and translation provided here in the appendix to this chapter). As a consequence, Merkel’s speech can be a significant case study of a highly mediated event in political communication, which gained enormous popularity across Europe and beyond, through broadcasters, the new media and the press. Indeed, there are three ways to view and study the Merkel speech:

1. A full video on the website of the Young CDU Organization, but available only in German with no transcription;
2. A small clip distributed throughout the international TV networks and social media, i.e. YouTube;
3. The journalistic coverage offered by the press;

There are several different clips available online, which have different lengths, generally between 50 and 80 seconds. All the videos I was able to access always included the same passage from minute 45 of the integral video: "At the start of the [19]60s we invited the guest-workers to Germany. We kidded ourselves for a while that they wouldn't stay, that one day they'd go home. That isn't what happened. And of course the tendency was to say: let's be 'multikulti' and live next to each other and enjoy being together, [but] this concept has failed, failed utterly."

As a consequence, the dissemination in the European public sphere remained a main focus based on only this short statement, and many of the ensuing articles in the European press were mostly based on that one small passage from Merkel’s speech, which was taken out of context because of the sensationalism of some of her claims and thus perhaps undervaluing or ignoring the nuances and complexities of Merkel’s stated arguments. For example, the news agency AFP, in the newswire
“Merkel says German multi-cultural society has failed” of 16 October 2010, referred to and quoted only the following parts of the speech:

- "'Multikulti', the concept that ‘we are now living side by side and are happy about it’ does not work”.
- “‘This approach has failed, totally’ she said, adding that immigrants should integrate and adopt Germany's culture and values”.
- “‘We feel tied to Christian values. Those who don't accept them don't have a place here,’ said the chancellor”.
- "'Subsidising immigrants’ isn't sufficient, Germany has the right to ‘make demands’ on them, she added, such as mastering the language of Goethe and abandoning practices, such as forced marriages”.
- “‘While saying that the Government needed to encourage the training of Muslim clerics in Germany, Merkel said ‘Islam is part of Germany’, echoing the recent comments of Wulff, a liberal voice in the party”.
- “‘While warning against ‘immigration that weighs down on our social system’, Merkel said Germany needed specialists from overseas to keep the pace of its economic development going forward”.

Here is interesting evidence of the role that newswires can have in selecting and disseminating topics through the European Public Sphere. Merkel explicitly remarked in Potsdam that Muslim immigrants should assimilate, integrate their cultural practices and work to adopt Germany's culture and values; however, the AFP reported only the following statement: "We feel attached to the Christian concept of mankind, which is what defines us. Anyone who doesn't accept that [statement] is in the wrong place here” (AFP, 2010). This quotation - reported by many of the newspapers across Europe - does not appear in the original speech given in Potsdam on 16 October 2010 [Appendix 2]. According to the Deutsche Welle, the statement was actually delivered the day before at another regional conference2 of the CDU in Berlin (Schrade/DW, 2010). Indeed, the quotes do remain original, although certainly, the misattribution is unprofessional. However, the replication

2 “Wir fühlen uns dem christlichen Menschenbild verbunden. Das ist das, was uns ausmacht.” Wer das nicht akzeptiere, "der ist bei uns fehl am Platz". (Schrade/DW, 2010).
that this error had across Europe proves once again, the extent of power newswire agencies have in framing public debate across Europe.

Concerning the process of contestation, Merkel’s arguments have been questioned by the parties of the opposition (social-democratic SPD, the Green Party and the Die-Link – Leftist party), which reject the very concept of German Leitkultur. These parties in fact defended integration as being opposed to the assimilation of immigrants. Forcing immigrants to assimilate at any price would, according to Green Party leader, Cem Özdemir, deny the reality that Germany is already a multicultural society (Giglio, 2010) and that multicultural policies cannot be dead, because these policies never existed in the first place. The leftist daily, Die Tageszeitung, on the other hand, pointed out how the German abbreviation for multiculturalism, Multikulti, has become merely a “puppet for conservative politicians to batter a group when they crave applause.” Indeed, Merkel is only using “empty clichés” to distract from the real economic problems of Germany and remains silent on urgent and controversial issues like how immigration is to be regulated (Taz, 2010).

The business community, through the Financial Times Deutschland attacked Merkel for trivialising the problem of immigration: “Despite the fact that some conservative politicians keep claiming they are against uncontrolled immigration, in reality, immigration has long been limited. Moreover, the newspaper added that after the economic crisis more Turkish people were leaving Germany than arriving (FTD, 2010). As a consequence, "The use of such rhetoric can be explained -- but it cannot be excused" and since Seehofer and Merkel are both in government, they both should prove to be more serious about these issues and not “only thinking about how their comments will go down in the local [area]” (FTD, 2010). Thus, the Financial Times conceivably represents an oppositional voice that is more concerned with the fact that the German economy and industry need workers from abroad.

Therefore Merkel’s speech has been openly contested by both liberal (politicians and journalists) and business elites, although for different reasons. In fact, the former are more willing to create a German multicultural society and the latter is more concerned about guaranteeing a constant flow of foreigner workers for
German industry. At the same time, these two elites were not able to convince public opinion of their own arguments and, as a consequence, the general public has always perceived any voice which is pro-immigration as elitist.

Regarding the process of operationalization, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany makes it difficult to implement common policies within different Lander as the constitution does not allow for a centralised policy to override the autonomy of single German states. Thus a large amount of political power is decentralised and respects the different sensibilities concerning minorities. In addition, it can be argued that Germany post-WWII history has understandably created a greater sensibility toward any policy that is targeting minorities, as well as concern regarding Germany’s strong constitutional framework that will not allow this type of discrimination. Therefore, despite a very tough public debate, most of the policy attempts implemented by the federal and local governments cannot be considered as aimed at targeting the Muslim population or its religious tradition.

However, a partial process of operationalization can be found in the recontextualization of the Leitkultur discourse in the official program documents of the CDU. For example, on November 16, 2010, the CDU passed at the 23th Annual Party Conference a resolution titled “Future Responsibility” [Parteitages der CDU Deutschlands Verantwortung Zukunft] in which it stressed that German culture is based on the "Christian-Jewish tradition, ancient and Enlightenment philosophy and the nation's historical experience" (CDU, 2010: 2) The resolution also states that "Our country benefits from immigrants who live and work here. But Germany does not benefit from a minority that refuses to integrate, does not want to learn our language, and denies participation and advancement to their children. … We expect that those who come here will respect and recognise our cultural identity" (CDU 2010: 2). This resolution explicitly marginalises Islam, as it underlines the fact that Islam is not part of German roots and is viewed as an immigrant religion belonging to those who do not want to integrate into German culture.

Such a strong emphasis on the Judeo-Christian tradition of German identity can be also found in a resolution approved in November 2011 at the 24th Annual Party Conference of the CDU. Titled “A Strong Europe – A Bright Future for
Germany”, the resolution says “Europe is a community of values. This holds true despite all the diversity and differences that exist between its various Member States”, yet European identity is “unified by our common roots of Greek philosophy, Roman law, Christianity and Judaism, along with the liberal spirit of the Enlightenment” (CDU 2011:4). Indeed, this document reconfirms the concept elaborated a year earlier, but in using a rescaled perspective, it universalises the concept of a leading cultural identity in the national discourse, which does exclude Islam, but unifies the other different traditions of philosophical thought.

In this manner, it can be firmly argued that Merkel’s speech is part of a general debate on immigration, which has not yet established a concrete political goal to change the legislation on immigration, but rather a mode to organise ways of thinking and talking about the integration of immigrants into Germany. In other words, the political debate is more focused in defining a shared consensus toward Islam than approving specific laws and policies. At the same time, this political agenda risks reinforcing a problematic perception of integration, as Muslims are automatically seen as opposed to those specific values identified in the German Leitkultur.

In brief, the analysis of the intertextual chain has underlined how the debate on integration has not changed the basis of German policies radically, but it has certainly fomented a greater negative atmosphere regarding immigrants and ethnic minorities, particularly Muslims. In fact, the inimical political debate toward Muslim immigration has certainly amplified the anxiety of public opinion creating a widespread backlash against Muslim immigrants, which has encouraged mainstream politicians to introduce in the public debate populist arguments against immigration and criticism of multicultural policies.

3. Textual Practice: Othering and Legitimisation

This section examines the textual aspects of discourse practice through a clearer understanding of the meanings of text. The analytical model proposed in the present section puts forward a general overview about the textual features, and a
second stage that focuses on the political effects of that textual practice through an assessment of the Othering and legitimation strategies on which the text is based and can thus be interpreted.

First of all, the textual analysis was conducted on an English translation of the Merkel speech. As underscored already, this analysis is not aimed at investigating linguistic features of the German language, but rather to understand the arguments and the logic behind the German discourse on integration as presented by Merkel in her speech. In doing so, I offer a transcript of the speech fully translated in English [Appendix 2]. This text is the corpus of the analysis for the present chapter. As a consequence, some micro-textual features are lost in the present analysis, due to the translation. In addition, the complexity of the German language, such as its preference for composed words, cannot be translated into English. For this reason, the analysis of this speech pays more attention to the features of the text that are most relevant in any macro-analysis, rather than an absolute microanalysis of the text.

The style of this political statement is a traditional public speech addressed to a Party Convention. This type of communication fulfils a ritual function of any party; it tends to be mainly celebrative in its overall communicative purpose. As a consequence, the speech shows highly conventionalised features, which characterise a speech delivered at party conventions. For example, the speech begins with a traditional greeting “Dear friends of the Young Union [Junge Union]” [1] and a closure of “heartfelt thanks” [34]. Successively, the first paragraph is based on personal anecdotes, which is a classical rhetorical strategy aimed at obtaining the attention of the audience. In succession, the speech is arranged in coherent thematic sections of different lengths, but the speaker maintains sentences that are short and precise, to allow listeners to easily follow the logic of the arguments. Also, the speech flow from paragraph to paragraph is clear and consequential, thus avoiding confusion of the position supported by Merkel.

Merkel follows a very strong argumentative logic in outlining a rigid chain of themes. Such a hierarchy of themes defines the communication space in which the speech is staged and performed through use of a precisely defined argumentative
logic. The speech can thus be divided into nine thematic segments: 1) greetings and introduction [1]; 2) a contextualisation of the role of the CDU in German history from the Cold War to the present [2-3], which has a celebrative function; 3) a contextualisation of present and future problems for Germany [5-7]; 4) an analysis of the role of Germany in Europe [8-10]; 5) the explanation of what the central mission is for an industrial country [11-15] and 6) how the welfare state has to be reconsidered [16-24].

In the middle of the speech, there is a break of some seconds, which is also a rhetorical device to regain the attention of the audience, before Merkel introduces a second opening 7) in which [25-28] she celebrates again the Party, by recalling the historical leaders, their role after reunification and the leading principles of equalities shared by all Christian Democrats. In section 8, she recalls the German President’s statement about the role of Islam in Germany and moves to the problem of immigrant integration and multicultural policies [29-33].

When looking at the length of these thematic sections, the clusters concerning the Welfare state [16-24] and immigration [29-33] are certainly the largest, with 8 paragraphs for the welfare section and 5 paragraphs for the section on immigration. These two sections are not only consecutive, but also linked through a short digression [25-28] in which Merkel declares both the political agenda of her government as a necessity to assure Germany a future and a role in the World [25] in accordance with the Christian values of the CDU [26, 28]. In the conclusion [34], Merkel ends her speech by challenging the audience regarding the importance of taking action according to their Christian Democratic values, which lead the CDU party.

Concerning the Othering, the aim herein is to examine the construction of the Other through those textual features that emphasise social identities and collective values. First of all, it is interesting to note how Merkel does not speak directly to Muslims or immigrants. For example, in the sentence: “Because the ones who we want to integrate, those are the ones who need examples to follow” [31], the “We” is opposed to the “ones”. The "We" is clearly the German people, which have the role to integrate the “ones”. However, the “ones” is not clearly identified through any
ethnic or religious group, it represents an abstract Other. In this way, Merkel is more prudent than Sarkozy in addressing the Muslims. She prefers talking of the “ones” who Germany has to integrate [31.] However in the speech, there are many elements that clarify that this Other is made up of Muslim immigrants, especially when she claims that immigrants have to assume secular values and traditions [30].

Moreover, Merkel refers quite often to a Christian identity. However, this speech was delivered to a convention of a party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which from its very name, also declares its own Christian roots. These references can be considered as coherent with the political space in which the speech was given. As a consequence, when Merkel mentions a “Christian image of human beings” [26] or the “Christian Democratic understanding of people” [28], her attempt is not actually aimed at excluding those who are not Christian. Instead, she seems to be referring to the CDU political tradition, which does try to apply Christian values to public policy decisions.

Merkel, in fact, recognises that “Islam is a part of Germany” [29]. Indeed, she agrees with German President Wulff, who had said that Islam belonged in Germany. In doing so, Merkel recognises that “we” have also received various different contributions from the “Arabic territory” [29] like “algebra and astronomy” [29]. At the same time, she believes “that our culture is strongly influenced by the Christian-Jewish heritage” [29]. In this way, she reinforces the dynamic of Self and Other by defining the Self as being deeply tied to Judeo-Christian legacy and the Other through highly stereotypical assumptions on Muslims. Specifically, Merkel does not make any specific distinction within Islam [29] between Mediterranean, Arab or Turkish, as for her, these distinctions in culture or religion or both are not relevant, because all are opposed to the concept of German Leitkulture. In other words, Merkel is more interested in offering an essentialist definition of Muslims as a non-European Other.

This last consideration is especially important because it reveals how Merkel tries to establish a discursive strategy based on the “positive self- and negative Other-presentation” (Woodak, 2007: 333). As a consequence, when Merkel speaks of a "Christian culture" in the country, she seeks also to create differentiation by
conferring identity and political status on Christian Germans and opposes it for those who do not have Christian values. However, she clearly abuses some religious concepts, in fact, what Merkel herself understands as “Christendom” [29] or the "Christian image of human beings" [26], is not very clear from her remarks. Nor is it evident to what extent, she believes that Christian values are compatible with Jewish ones.

As Habermas (2010) correctly denounced, the discourse on “Judeo-Christian” is a political attempt to recontextualise the old, formerly defamed, anti-Semitic discourses in order to stigmatise a new minority, namely, the Muslims. Indeed, any appeal to Judeo-Christian traditions is manipulative and instrumental, because it wants to exploit the Jewish question against Islam, and to make Muslims incompatible with German Leitkultur and central for a society based on the construction of “in- and out-groups” (Woodak, 2007: 333).

To sum up, through the process of Othering, Merkel tries to establish a collective identity through the use of “We” to identify all those people who recognise the Christian roots of Germany. In this case, the use of “We” establishes common values between the speaker and the audience and opposed to the “Other”. It is the sense of "We" as German people and a reference to Leitkultur, which is in and of itself, a performativity, that is based on the “positive self- and the negative Other-presentation” (Woodak, 2007: 333).

The legitimisation strategy focuses on how the text provides the political legitimisation for the social discourse. In Merkel’s speech, one can identify a process of cultural legitimisation through reference to a common identity and heritage, which identifies Germans and Europeans. Here, the discourse of Leitkultur is the “particular”, which legitimises the universal values of German culture through identity, history and religion to create a definition of the boundary between insiders and outsiders. In this way, Merkel defines the requirements for the integration of immigrants through an expression of universal values that are essential for the continuation of the German social and political order.
Certainly, Merkel adopts a willing perspective when she claims that it would be nice to “live happily side by side, and be happy to be living with each other” [31]. But Germany, like the rest of Western Europe, is broadly secular, believes in gender and social equality, and does allow dissent and ideological irreverence. Islam, on the other hand, is widely interpreted as prescribing a precise society based on religious precepts, preaches gender inequality, and endorses hierarchy, absolutism, and asceticism. German society cannot let its values be undermined by importing an aggressive and assertive culture that is very different and also bent on changing its own.

Merkel implies that Muslim culture is lead by intense religious and social control. Because of the substantial differences between Western and Muslim culture, it is supposed as a common sense to see Muslims as hostile to integration. Merkel refers [32] to the fact that some of the cultural specificities of certain Muslim immigrants are opposed to human rights and freedoms. Thus integration, according to Merkel, requires that those immigrants must accept those rights as the equality of women, recognize freedom of speech and sexuality, and that democratic and secular institutions come before any religious statements, or anything the Muslim religious leaders could claim.

Therefore, Merkel legitimises integration through a strategy of legal standardisation. She argues the problem of integration is not based on the practice of religion, but rather on the respect for the rule of law. ". it's important in regard to Islam that the values represented by Islam correspond with our Constitution" [32]. She also adds it is “important to say that girls must go on school trips, participate in physical education; as for forced marriages we want nothing to do with that; it's incompatible with our legislation” [32.] Indeed, Merkel firmly reminds Germans do not allow forced marriages or other aspects of religious life that are against their constitution.

As a consequence, Muslim integration in German society should be regulated because sexism is both symptomatic of broader Islamic practices, which are opposed to liberal law. Therefore, by underlining the problematic nature of integration thorough an assumed incapacity of Muslims to relate to sexual egalitarian rules,
Merkel claims that integration requires vigilance and regulation, which are then, essential, since Muslims are manifestly unable to integrate themselves into European civilisation without a superior civilising hand.

At the same time, the Leitkulturdebatte can also be explained as the attempt to re-establish a German identity within a wider European context (Pautz 2005), thus allowing Germany to reconstruct an acceptable German national consciousness. For example, Merkel claims the goal of Germany is to promote the image of an open and tolerant country present in Europe. She also adds the importance of Europe for Germany: “our coexistence in Europe... Europe is our present and our future” [8]. Furthermore, she asks “Is Germany still European?” and answers “of course” [9]. She also admits how “the unifying of Europe has helped us [Germany]” [32]. In this way, Merkel seeks to establish a national identity and consciousness within the ongoing European debate over the roots of European civilisation. Therefore, it is legitimate to argue that German concepts of Europe exceeded the different unification plans resulting from certain political and economic perspectives on Europe, in that they envisioned that – however it was designed – Europe would be strictly in line with the vision of a new order in Germany (Ichijo, 2011: 65).

A last aspect of the legitimisation of integration is based on an economic rationale, which assumes the need of integration in order to preserve German economic development [5]. In her speech, Merkel recalls the history of contemporary German immigration and specifically Turkish immigration, when she states “we are a country that, that at the beginning of the 1960's brought guest workers to Germany—and now they live with us” [30]. Specifically, after WWII, Germany accepted immigrants to fill the lack of labour, due to the nation’s war dead. Initially, immigrants were from Europe, yet afterwards, Germany had to open its borders also to Turks and others to satisfy the demand for workers.

Merkel also underlines the mistakes that Germany committed in those years: “We have been lying to ourselves for quite some time now; we said to ourselves that they’re not going to stay, that at some point they would go away, but that is not the reality” [32]. In fact, the so-called guest workers [Gastarbeiter], under the so-called "rotation clause" were supposed to go back home after a period of two years, but
that “clause was removed from the German-Turkish treaty in 1964 due to pressure from German industrials” who were concerned with the cost of constantly training new labourers (Hamarneh & Thielmann 2008: 512; Akgündüz 2008: 102). The consequence was that many guest worker immigrants, especially of Turkish origin, never left Germany and through the right of family reunification, remained to live in Germany with their relatives and build their lives there.

Merkel admits indeed that these immigrants will likely stay and more will continue to arrive in Germany, as “immigration is an irreversible process especially because Germany needs immigration for supporting its economy and its manufacturing industry” [32] and the “amount of people with a migration background among the younger population is increasing, not decreasing” [30]. Therefore, Merkel suggests that there is a certain moral right for Germany to ask for and expect more integration from this group, claiming, “These are the social problems of the future, that's why integration is so important” [31]. Thus, Merkel rejects any anti-immigration discourse. The right solution would not be to block immigration, as she clearly recognises the “economic” importance of immigration, which is central for Germany in a globalised world [5]. Yet, Merkel demands more effort from Muslim immigrants to integrate themselves in German society and have them accept the values that characterise German cultural identity [Leitkultur].

According to Merkel, the lack of integration regarding immigration involves the risk of immigrants becoming socially isolated because there are large chances to live with the German ‘Other’ in a ‘parallel society’, where German cultural norms might become faraway [30]. Indeed, Merkel exploits the discourse of security when talking of the urban segregation of immigrants when she says that in those areas, youngsters break the law 6, 8, or 9 times before going to court [33] or when she claims that police officers “can't enter” these segregated areas where immigrants live [33]. For these reasons, Merkel sees education, career and the ability to assimilate the values shared by Germans as the key to economic and social success for preserving German social security and economic welfare.

To sum up, Merkel argues for a legitimisation of civic integration through the universalisation of a the Leitkultur discourse on German national identity. In this
way, integration is legitimated by Germany’s cultural, political and economic values. At the same time, this legitimisation is often premised upon a fear of Islam due to the incompatibility of some Muslim practices with the German legal system. Therefore, vigilance and regulation are essential, since Muslims are manifestly unable to integrate themselves into European civilisation. Finally, Merkel’s legitimisation of integration also has an economic instrumental function, which is to guarantee Germany’s social security. Thus, civic integration is not focused only on removing differences to preserve the *Leitkultur*, but also on integrating immigrants into a profitable market.

**4. Explanation: Socio-cultural Practice**

The goal of analysing the social practice is to underline the social and political implications of the discursive structure under analysis. Specifically, the analysis will focus on three critical considerations: 1) the normative ambivalence in the German politics of identity and its limits to consider Muslim diversity as part of the European self; 2) the debate on integration of Muslims as a central part of the process of regulation of immigration and 3) any hidden social and economic rationality underlining the relation between identity and power.

The *leitkultur* discourse defines a very specific idea of German identity and withdraws from any engagement with the Other, which is perceived as a disruptive element that fractures the original and preferred sense of German identity as a German nation. Thus, when *Leitkultur* is recontextualised into the discourse on civic integration, it becomes a normative prescription of what a civic identity is and restrains any possible affirmation of the non-German. The subsequent debate on how Muslims can be integrated, presupposes the ability of the ruling political elite to define which Muslim values are acceptable and compatible with the German national identity and which are not. As a consequence, discourse on civic integration as it defines which German values and traditions Muslims have to adopt, reproduces the same prejudices and limits that are enclosed in the *leitkultur* concept.
The fallacy in this normative approach is that the discourse about German identity has become hegemonic, despite the fact that it is “neither clear how to define non-Germans or immigrants, nor what constitutes the values and commonalities of German, European or western culture” (Stehle 2012: 170). Leitkultur remains described almost exclusively by a vague idea of European history in which the Holocaust is completely forgotten and instead is invented as an imagined identity based on Judaic-Christian common roots. Therefore, in this way, Leitkultur becomes a discourse that is only able to define non-European immigrants through their loyalty to abstract values.

Merkel claims to refuse an exclusionary discourse in which it is impossible to integrate Muslim immigrants. At the same time, she firmly rejects any multicultural policy that allows foreigner cultures to remain separate so as to “retain their identities and avoid otherwise inevitable cultural conflicts” (Pautz 2005: 41). For this reason, Merkel claims there is a need for civic integration of immigrants: “Integration is a central theme” [30] and “the ones who we want to integrate … are the ones who need examples to follow” [30]. This process of integration is not, therefore, focused on excluding the Other or creating separated cultures; rather, it is based on the classical ideology of a preference for an assimilation of the Other in a dominant culture, or in Merkel’s words: “These are the social problems of the future; that's why integration is so important” [31]. Therefore, civic integration is not exclusive, and these policies are not meant to expel immigrants from Germany, but rather to direct them very clearly to accept the values of the dominant culture in order to become integrated.

To be more precise, Merkel’s discourse on civic integration takes into account, immigrants’ broader responsibilities to the political community rather than immigrants’ actual needs: “Each individual is important for us, each individual, that is our goal, will get a chance in our country” [27] or “you will be supported when you are in a situation of need but we also have a demand for you that each of you, who can, contributes to society” [22]. Here one recognises the classical tenets of neoliberal ideology, which promote a moral idea of individual responsibility, wherein everyone must be held individually accountable. Indeed, Merkel adopts
integration as an individual responsibility towards the collective political community.

German discourse of civic integration has the ambition to force Muslim immigrants to be consonantly free with constitutional principles. At the same time, both the autonomy of the individual and the universality of liberal principles become more a myth for those immigrants who have dissonant identities with the German national culture [Leitkultur]. In fact, the politicisation of the German national culture reduces those immigrants who want to express a different cultural identity like Muslims to a political problem, that divest liberal democratic institutions of any association with minorities and implies a normative solution aimed at changing the inner values of immigrants. That is also the reason why Merkel calls for a rejection of multiculturalism. In fact integration is invoked as a liberal democratic principle but yet, the national cultural domain, a domain that comprises a German identity based on an ethnic-religious characterisation, defines it.

Merkel’s imposition of a specific national-cultural discourse of civic integration presumes a specific character of hegemony in which newcomers must then assimilate those liberal values and cultural traditions of the German majority. As a consequence of this view, the only legitimate interventions in a policy for integration are those attached to the assimilation of German values, as there is no room for negotiating universal, liberal-democratic values. Such a process can be definitely framed as being what Joppke calls “repressive liberalism”, which means that instead of being nationalist, “the exclusionary impulse is often couched in the language of liberalism in terms of the notion that the liberal state is for liberal people only” (Joppke, 2007: 45).

Furthermore, the intense pressure on immigrants to integrate into German society can be also linked to the discourse on social security and the subsequent abandonment of welfare policies. German integration is, in fact, based on the promotion of individual responsibility, wherein Muslims must be held individually and morally accountable to the German leading community, while social inequality remains more or less only implied. Along this same line of analysis, another interesting point is how Merkel refers to the global economic crisis, the problem of
public debt, the necessity for European countries to contain those debts, and the increased necessity to reduce welfare security [7-9]. Thus, this neoliberal view is also recontextualised into the discourse on civic integration, when Merkel never takes into account social inequality and welfare cuts to explain the problems related to immigration, and the lack of integration of some Muslim immigrants.

As a consequence, this discourse on civic integration assumes not only the moral duty on behalf of the dominant cultural majority to determine the limits and obligations of Muslim immigrants, but also an obligation of immigrants to contribute to the German economy while also accepting social injustice. Multiculturalism is thus considered a failure because, in providing social rights, it weakens both individual responsibility and the market-regulative functions. In fact, multicultural policies, according to Merkel, do not enforce the acceptance of good citizenship by immigrants and also does not encourage them to have full consideration of their responsibilities to the economic welfare of the nation [31].

However, the German discourse of civic integration does not simply assume cultural, political and social practices of immigrants can be constrained into an economic rationality (Brown 2003); rather it institutionalises those practices aimed at rewarding those who assimilate liberal values. This contradiction between respect for cultural diversity and support for a mono-cultural society points to the “diversity dilemma” mentioned by Jackson-Preece (2005: 3-5), namely the principles of belonging and uniformity that legitimate a political community always conflict with the freedom of a minority to diversity. Precisely, the collision of values, such as “freedom” and “belonging”, create the presence of the Other as a potential source of insecurity and conflict. As consequence, an assimilation of designated values is necessary to avoid undue cultural conflict and religious fanaticism and maintain a stable political environment that will guarantee the desired economic progress Germany wants. Indeed, civic integration as defined by Merkel, carries an educational policy which, when deployed as a form of governmentality, reaches specificity and establishes a cultural difference for immigrants.

To summarise, in this analysis of the socio-cultural practice of discourse, it was possible to find out how the German discourse on civic integration is entangled
with two discursive strategies aimed at politicizing the national identity and providing an economic rationality to the need for a civic identity. As a result, only the assimilation of civic values is considered central to effective integration and the support for welfare policies that fully guarantee real social integration can be easily rejected because does not bring a specific contribution to economically advance the nation.

**Chapter Summary**

Taking as a nodal point the speech that Chancellor Merkel offered at a meeting of the youth organisation of her conservative party in Potsdam in October 2010, the analysis developed in this chapter offers a reconstruction of the German public debate on integration after Merkel’s claim that any attempt to build a multicultural society in Germany had "utterly failed"[24].

Central to this debate is the conceptualisation of the German national identity. The discourse on the leading aspect of German culture [*Leitkultur*] is an explicit attempt to universalise the acceptable values, rules and norms of the German majority through a definition of cultural and religious identity. Thus the *Leitkultur* discourse excludes Muslim immigrants from public life if they do not agree to assimilate to the values of the majority. At the same time, the discourse on the failure of multiculturalism reveals a political assumption that there is only one correct way to integrate Islam and rejects any recognition of other integration perspectives.

The key observations resulting from a Critical Discourse Analysis of the German public debate make several contributions to the current literature on civic integration.

First, the *Leitkultur* becomes an inflexible cultural-national framework, in which civic integration presupposes the effective power of the dominant religious/ethnic group and its right to determine which criteria are compatible or appropriate within the German national culture. As such, it is a real paradox that a
public discourse on civic integration aimed at asking for more unity and cohesion of immigrants, especially Muslims, is supported by a rigid definition of national identity that stands in the way of including that Other.

Second, the civic integration discourse reveals the normative, economic instrumentalism of integration. The immigrant has to participate effectively in economic, social and cultural life of the hosting community. Thus, the aim of integration is to create a civic worker rather than a political citizen. Immigrants have to give priority to their responsibilities towards the economic welfare of the national community. Thus, in Merkel’s words, integration becomes more concerned with the expected obligations of immigrants, rather than their rights and eventual social equality in their new country.

Third, looking at the discursive practice, it can be firmly argued that Merkel’s speech is part of a general debate on immigration which, while not yet established a concrete political change of the legislation on immigration, is an initial step to organise ways of thinking and talking about the integration of immigrants into Germany. In other words, the public debate is more interested in defining a general political agenda toward Islam than approving specific laws and policies. This is not to say that the widespread backlash against Muslim immigrants has had no impact, other than a criticism of multicultural policies. Certainly, the German discourse on civic integration does seek to discriminate against those Muslim immigrants who are not educated or do not become more secular.

In the next chapter, the third and last case study analyses the debate generated by the British Prime Minister on the occasion of the 2010 Munich Security Council, when David Cameron delivered a provocative speech on the failings of state multiculturalism. The aim here is to examine not only how Cameron echoes Merkel’s speech, but also how he suggests that Britain has to integrate Muslim people through a “muscular” integration based on imposing liberal values codified in the British national identity.
Chapter 6: British Muslims Must Embrace Liberal Values

Chapter Overview

A few months after Merkel’s controversial statement that multicultural society in Germany had “utterly failed” [Appendix 2], David Cameron gave a speech on 5 February 2011 [Appendix 3] at the International Security Policy Conference held in Munich to attack multicultural policies on the basis that these policies encourage different cultures to accept self-marginalisation. According to Cameron, many young British Muslims are drawn to Islamist extremism because they feel separated and unaligned. As a consequence, Britain should promote a feeling of belonging in society through a national identity rather than passively tolerating or encouraging Muslims to live apart.

This speech is treated here as a nodal point of the British public debate on the civic integration of Muslims because it magnifies the discourses underlining the recent shift in the British approach to integration. The traditional British model of integration was considered pluralist because it was established on the importance of minority groups and stressed importance “on integration, not as a process of acculturation to the nation and civic values, but as a programme of equal access to the rights of British society, which itself recognised multiculturalism as a social and political goal” (Bertossi 2007: 4). At the same time, the emergence of different controversies related to immigration, Muslim segregation and extremism has provoked a radical shift in the approach to integration, which has turned away from a pluralist model in favour of a more civic approach to integration which stresses the relevance of common national civic values as a requirement for integration.

This shift is evident in Cameron when he recontextualises in the British public sphere the anti-multiculturalist discourse which was already promoted in Germany by Merkel and in France by Sarkozy. Cameron argues that multicultural policies are responsible for creating “separateness” rather than an encouragement of immigrant participation in society [8]. Moreover, Cameron is concerned that the
marginalisation of Muslims creates a fertile terrain for extremism, as radical Islamists can find new supporters within disaffected Muslim youth. For this reason, Cameron claims that multicultural policies should be replaced with a new policy aimed at imposing British values within the Muslim population in the UK.

Cameron therefore argues that multiculturalism should be replaced with a set of policies that promote a stronger and shared national identity. Specifically, he states that a “tolerant society” is passive and neutral to values [and] for this reason, it cannot integrate immigrants, but rather leaves them alone [16], while a “muscular” liberal society should encourage “active participation in society” in order to achieve integration through “true cohesion” [17]. Consequently, Cameron calls for a policy of “muscular liberalism” [16] to guarantee that Muslims respect national British “core values” such as democracy, equality before the law and human rights. In this manner, Cameron’s discourse on civic integration argues for an explicit emphasis to be placed on the need for Muslims to adopt liberal values.

This chapter has four parts. The first part aims at offering a historical and political contextualisation of the debate. The second part focuses on the reconstruction of the discourses related to the British debate on Muslim integration. Starting from Cameron’s speech (as the nodal point), the analysis evaluates the discursive practices involved in the enactment of the debate. The third part is concerned with the textual strategies found in the nodal point. The last part offers an explanation of socio-cultural practices and specifically moves to examine how discourse on civic integration recontextualises a deeper core of values and norms embedded in the national public sphere, and if this recontextualisation is an effect of emerging discourses introduced through the European public sphere.

1. The Political Context of the Debate

In the present section, I review the evolution and arguments of the public debate on immigration in order to contextualise which controversies have put the British pluralist approach to integration into crisis.
In legal terms, the traditional British model of integration implied that everyone born in British territories was recognised as having "British subjecthood" within the allegiance of the Crown (Hansen, 1999: 69). Thus, the *jus solis* granted British nationality to anyone born in the United Kingdom or one of the Crown colonies. The historical reasons of the British model can be identified by the fact that as an empire, Britain did not experience the same pressures that led “other countries to a rigorous definition of their nationality” in order to restrict the movement of individuals, especially traders or colonisers (The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 1973: 139).

Secondly, as a monarchy, nationality and migration laws were based on “allegiance to the Crown”, rather than an attachment to “descent from a particular stock” or “a particular territory” (The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 1973: 139). For these reasons, the British model has been always considered as antithetical to the French Republican model (Favel, 2001: 4), which is based on a strong political definition of individual citizenship as a source of national unity.

Throughout the 1960s, the criteria of nationality and citizenship were still codified in the British Nationality Act of 1948 and “post-war migrants who arrived in the United Kingdom as ‘British subjects’ have been recognised as ethnic and racial minorities requiring state support and differential treatment to overcome barriers in their exercise of citizenship” (Meer and Modood 2009: 479). Furthermore, the government wanted to integrate minorities “into the labour market and other key arenas of British society” (Meer and Modood 2009: 479) through several Race-Relations Acts by promoting equality of opportunity (Lester, 1998).

The British approach to integration was based on a political compromise between the Conservative and Labour parties’ on immigration legislation (Schain 2010)c, as an approach to a normalisation of race relations through the implementation of antidiscrimination policies (Bleich 2003). In the words of the Labour home secretary Roy Jenkins, Britain set out to create “cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance”. Specifically, he defined integration “not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal
opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual
tolerance” (Cashmore 2005: 45).

From the end of the 1960s, the speeches of Enoch Powell, a conservative
MP, had become very popular in large part due to conservative public opinion,
which also included traditional Labour supporters within the working-class (Hansen
2000: 172). In two of his most famous speeches “There is a Sense of Hopeless”
(1968) and the “Rivers of Blood” (1968b), Powell attacked the British Nationality
Law, which allowed any citizen of the Commonwealth to flee to the United
Kingdom.

Specifically, Powell addressed his criticism towards the government’s
decision to accept Indian and Pakistani refugees from Kenya and Uganda and
predicted violent racial conflicts in the near future as a consequence of this
continuing influx of immigrants. Moreover, Powell, in the “Rivers of Blood”
(1968b) addressed a radical critique of the Race Relations Act 1968, which he found
immoral and offensive as granting the possibility to “immigrant communities” to
“organise” and “consolidate their members, to agitate and campaign against their
fellow-citizens, and to overawe and dominate the rest with the legal weapons”
(1968b).

As a result of increasing public concern for immigration, the Immigration
Act 1971, increased controls on immigration and restricted the right of British
subjects from the Commonwealth to migrate to the UK (Herbert, 2008: 16).
Specifically, only British subjects with sufficiently strong links to the United
Kingdom had the right of residence. Afterwards, Thatcher’s government politicised
the discourse on national identity and the public opinion’s concern for immigration.
Thus, the reform of the Nationality Law in 1981 gave up the imperial tradition of
loyalty to the Crown and partially abandoned the jus soli (Hansen 2000: 208).

The first major event that raised concern in public opinion about Muslims
was the controversy created by the publication of The Satanic Verses in 1988
(Parekh 2002: 295). After the publication of Salman Rushdie’s novel, the Muslim
community felt that “as citizens they [were no less] entitled to equality of treatment
and respect for their customs and religion than either the Christian majority denominations or other religious minorities” (Meer and Modood 2007: 5). Thus the Rushdie affair revealed the lack of political achievability and public understanding faced by Muslim communities in the UK.

As a result, Muslims contested existing policies on integration and asked for real accommodation of their religious and cultural specificity by the State (Meer 2010: 75). Conversely, the fact that Muslims did not want to assimilate British values if integration required surrendering their religious heritage, raised concern in public opinion, which became more and more sceptical about the effectiveness of the existing model of integration. In this way, the Rushdie’s Affair became a turning point for Islamic presence in Britain because it underlined the lack of understanding and, specially, the lack of sympathy towards Muslims’ political visibility.

A second event that highlighted the crisis of integration policies was certainly the ethnically-motivated riots in 2001 and the impact they had on public opinion (Bagguley and Hussain, 2008: 1). Although the causes of the riots were based on the deep-rooted segregation of South Asian-Muslim communities, which authorities had failed to address for generations (Ritchie Report, 2011), the media “denounced the refusal of members of ethnic minorities to adhere to British identity” and public opinion perceived the problem of integration as “a lack of loyalty and civic responsibility” of Muslims (Shani 2008: 107).

In response to public concern, the New Labour government, under Tony Blair, began to focus on policies based on community cohesion (Somerville 2007: 55), which were aimed at talking about the need to value difference, while emphasising a ‘common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities’ (Wetherell et al., 2009: 3). Thus, the Government elaborated a new agenda of integration – which focused on an active citizenship based on common values, national identity, and civic identity.

The public’s perception of Islam completely deteriorated after the terrorist attacks of 7th July 2005. In fact, although the British multicultural model of integration has been always considered more advanced compared to the mono-
cultural models of France or Germany, it was second-generation immigrants in a multicultural Britain who perpetrated the bombings in London. As a consequence, much of the public concern was oriented towards a reconsideration of multiculturalism, which was held responsible for Islamic separateness and related to a growing radicalised Muslim youth.

In a speech following the 7/7 attacks, Blair argued that the origin of extremism was not "superficial but deep" and could be found "in the extremist minority that now, in every European city, preach hatred of the West and our way of life" (2005). Under his guidance, the Blair government drafted an anti-terror strategy titled “Prevent Strategy”, which sought to counter extremism by controlling and regulating Muslim organisations (Coolsaet, 2011: 225). At the same time, the Labour government “devoted greater attention to what has often been phrased as a ‘hearts and minds’ approach to Muslim communities”, by enrolling “Muslim individuals and community organizations in their efforts to prevent radicalisation and promote voices of mainstream Islam amongst the Muslim youth” (McGhee, 2008: 71).

Gordon Brown, who succeeded Blair as Prime Minister, shared the same line of thought on integration also. Specifically, Labour under Brown’s leadership, tried to establish specific conservative credentials with an attack on immigration and multiculturalism (Alleyne 2011: 101), so as to divert attention from the economic crisis. The aim was to gain an electoral consensus on the assumption that people would demand action on immigration above all other issues. In a famous speech delivered during the celebration of 300 year Union between England and Scotland in 2007, Brown defined “British identity” through the shared values and common interests that characterise Britain institutions. He argued that multiculturalism failed to emphasise what ties the country together; thus, according to him, multiculturalism became “an excuse for justifying separateness” and a “tolerance of – and all too often a defence of – even greater exclusivity” (Brown, 2007).

In brief, the review of the historical British public debate on integration after WWII to the present reveals three different issues, which frame public concern towards multicultural integration and shifted from a pluralist model to a civic
approach to national integration: Firstly, an “uncontrolled” flow of immigrants from Commonwealth countries that brought Britain to reconsider a complete revision to the Nationality Law; Secondly, the Muslims’ request for accommodating religious and cultural ‘difference’ after the Rushdie Affair, which increased the scepticism of public opinion toward multicultural integration; Thirdly, the ethnic conflicts during the 2001 riots, which reinforced the view of Muslims’ lack of loyalty and civic responsibility; and finally, in the post-9/11 context, the increased concern for terrorism and securitisation of the relationship with Muslim communities.

2. Interpretation of Discursive Practice

This section looks at the immediate communicative processes of Cameron’s speech, in other words, the conditions of social reproduction found in the text. It offers two levels of analysis, namely, interdiscursivity and the intertextual chain. Across these two levels, the analysis pays close attention to interdiscursive and intertextual analysis, so as to offer a bigger picture of the text in terms of how it mutually relates to other discourses held in the public sphere and how other discourses actually framed Cameron’s intervention.

Interdiscursivity

The objective is to specify how the nodal point under analysis is established and co-articulated with other local or transnational discourses on nationalism, immigration, secularism, etc. Thus this analytical level is aimed at investigating how Cameron’s speech is established in a specific discursive context and how it can be articulated with other discourses through interdiscursivity.

In his speech, Cameron attacks multiculturalism for destabilising and accentuating both exclusion and radicalism within immigrant groups. According to Cameron, multicultural policies cause urban segregation, which causes some disaffected youth to reject the interpretation of a moderate Islam and to adopt a more radical interpretation. In this way, it is possible to identify a set of three discourses to which Cameron draws to in his speech.
First, Cameron agrees with the discourse that emerged from previous speeches by Merkel and Sarkozy that multiculturalism is a failure, because it encourages different ethnic groups (especially Muslims) to close themselves off from mainstream society. The recontextualization of the discourse that Muslims are a self-segregated minority can be located in the thesis of ‘parallel lives’ (Philips 2006: 27) that was developed in the public inquiry on 2001 riots (Bagguley and Hussain, 2008), which accused Muslim communities with self-segregating and “adopting isolationist practices under a pretence of multiculturalism” (Meer and Moodod 2009: 481).

Second, Cameron recontextualises the discourse of securitisation of ethnic relations by linking multiculturalism and the anti-terrorism agendas. Specifically, multiculturalism is seen as leading to the development of an unwillingness to participate in wider social or political life, a lack of identification with British ‘norms’ and ‘values’ and, in some frequent cases, the emergence of extremist religious groups who are intent on terrorising citizens and political establishments.

Third, by rejecting multiculturalism Cameron promotes a discourse on civic integration, which emphasises community cohesion and a participative conception of citizenship, which requires a common vision and sense of belonging for all communities living in the UK. This community cohesion is thus based on moral virtue and a civic identity based on national values. Specifically, Cameron calls for a policy of "muscular liberalism" [16] to guarantee that Muslims respect national British values such as democracy, equality before the law and human rights [4, 5]. In this manner, Cameron’s discourse on civic integration argued for an explicit emphasis to be placed on the need for Muslims to adopt liberal values. However, this specific discourse on civic integration recalls more the tenets embedded in Republican discourse, rather than those from a liberal discourse, in which individuals have equal opportunities and diversity is supposed to be seen as a positive value.
Finally, by focusing on civic integration and social cohesion, Cameron recalls his social conservative discourse on the Big Society. In detail, the Big Society’s discourse offers a political foundation for the social transformation of British society, based on a transfer of the moral centre of society from the government to the civic sphere through an application of four priorities: 1) more power to communities; 2) volunteerism and participation to community; (3) transferring power from the central to local governments; and 4) support of charities and social enterprises (Bochel 2011: 15). Thus the Big Society discourse is based on the necessity to make civil society self-responsible for its own welfare and security (Heppell and Seawright 2012: 25). This discourse implies that all aspects of cultural and political integration of Muslims can be reduced to inducing self-responsibility for their community, rather than waiting for the support of State multicultural policies.

To sum up, Cameron’s speech in Munich could be articulated around three different discourses: 1) multicultural policies have failed to promote integration, as British society has become too tolerant, less secure and more vulnerable to Islamic extremism; 2) securitisation as a strategy to tackle the home-grown causes of extremism, through 3) a “muscular liberalism” involved in guaranteeing that Muslims respect national British core values such as democracy, equality and respect of the law [4, 5]. Finally, Cameron’s speech recontextualises in his speech the discourse on Big Society, which focuses on the duties of Muslims to contribute their part to integration.

*Intertextual Chain*

The goal here is to analyse how the nodal point is disseminated, contested and operationalised by entering into a series of other text, which can also transcend the national debate. Indeed, the analysis of the intertextual chain shows articulations of the nodal point and the dynamics of the public sphere in reproducing and contesting the discourses generated by the nodal point.

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3 This discourse was introduced by Cameron during the Conservative Party Conference on 8 October 2009 and became a key concept of the Conservative Manifesto in 2010
Cameron’s speech revived the public debate about civic integration across Europe, specifically the remarks on multiculturalism were highly discussed. Inevitably, the press underscored how Cameron’s speech echoed the controversial comments made by Merkel a few months earlier in Potsdam, when she defined multiculturalism as a failure, saying Germany had not dedicated adequate attention to the civic integration of immigrants. Similarly to the process of dissemination of Merkel’s speech, Cameron’s statement also gained enormous popularity through broadcasters, the new media, and the press, becoming a significant example of a highly mediated event in the realm of modern political communication.

As regards the process of dissemination in the European press, all the major newspapers covered the excerpts delivered via the newswires. Thus, it is possible to find a large number of comments and editorials published by the European press that covered only certain passages of the speech. Some of the most common are those delivered through the news agency AFP, in its newswire “British PM calls multiculturalism a failure” on 5 February 2011, which referred to and quoted the following parts of the speech:

- "If we are to defeat this threat, I believe it's time to turn the page on the failed policies of the past,"
- "under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream"
- "All this leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless. And the search for something to belong to and believe in can lead them to this extremist ideology."
- "A lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and much more active, muscular liberalism."
- "A passively tolerant society says to its citizens: as long as you obey the law, we will leave you alone. It stands neutral between different values."
- "A genuinely liberal country does much more. It believes in certain values and actively promotes them."

The newswire also used two indirect quotes that referred Cameron’s speech:
Prime Minister David Cameron condemned his country's long-standing policy of multiculturalism as a failure, saying it was partly to blame for fostering Islamist extremism.

Cameron said many young British Muslims were drawn to violent ideology because they found no strong collective identity in Britain.

Contrary to what happened in regard to Merkel’s speech, on this occasion the dissemination through the European press was not limited to the sensationalism of the statement on multiculturalism, but offered a more complete evaluation of the speech. It is possible to argue that in this case, because Cameron gave his speech during an international event and that his speech was in English and available on the PM’s website, this facilitated the recontextualization of that speech and generated a more elaborate understanding of its complexities and political implications than what occurred following Merkel’s speech.

It is possible to observe how the social media, as well as in Merkel’s case, took the speech out of context and focused only on the most controversial statements on multiculturalism undervaluing and ignoring the nuances and complexities of other claims. There are several video extracts available online of different lengths, generally lasting between two and three minutes, all of which include Cameron’s attack on multiculturalism: “Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We’ve even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values” [8]. In this way, it is possible to observe how the new media tend on one hand to increase levels of intertextuality through an exponential dissemination of the same extracts; on the other hand they reduce the level of interdiscursivity by focusing only on a specific discourse on multiculturalism.

Regarding contestation, Cameron’s speech did not produce any political objection from the Labour Party. Apparently only Sadiq Khan, the Justice Secretary of the “Shadow Cabinet”, blamed the Prime Minister for writing “propaganda for
the EDL” (Lyons, 2011), but he was subsequently criticised by his own party colleagues. The silence of the Labour leader, Ed Miliband, was very significant in terms of the permanence of Labour’s mistakes on immigration and Islam during their years in power. Only two weeks after Cameron gave his speech, Ed Miliband’s point of view appeared on 25 February 2011.

In an interview given to Muslim News, a British monthly newspaper, Miliband was asked to comment on Cameron’s remarks that “Muslims are not integrated enough” and that they “don’t feel British.” He replied, “I don’t doubt David Cameron’s good intentions… You have to be so careful in your language so that it doesn’t look like you are typecasting members of one community in a particular way and that was why people felt unhappy about his speech” (Muslim News, 2011) Thus, according to Ed Miliband, the problem was not political, but rather related to a possible opportunity to formulate these concepts in specific words. Certainly, the leader of the Labour party did not point to what was troublesome about Cameron's one-dimensional and controversial speech. Miliband also completely ignored any understanding of what the social causes of extremism are and how they should be tackled.

The only mainstream politician who openly criticised Cameron’s speech was Nick Clegg, the Deputy Prime Minister and British Liberal Democrat leader. Clegg’s judgment of multiculturalism’s problems was analogous to Cameron's: “Where multiculturalism is held to mean more segregation, [for] other communities leading parallel lives, it is clearly wrong.” Yet Clegg disagreed on the complete renunciation of multiculturalism: “For me, multiculturalism has to be seen as a process by which people respect and communicate with each other, rather than build walls between each other. Welcoming diversity but resisting division: that's the kind of multiculturalism of an open, confident society” (Clegg 2011). Notably, Clegg argued that “economic insecurity” could be a “greater incentive” to produce radical “extremism”. Furthermore, he declared he was sceptical about a prevention strategy based on the ban of extremist groups and the marginalisation of nonviolent extremists; in his view “smart engagement means being extremely careful about decisions to proscribe individual organisations” (Clegg 2011).
Cameron’s remarks enraged Muslim British organisations. First, Muslim groups attributed to Cameron, the will to place an unfair responsibility on minority communities about integration, while he failed – in their view - to stress how the majority could help Muslims feel more welcome in Britain (Wintour 2011). This last point is quite central to criticism of the social policies developed by the Tories’ cabinet. Bunting, for instance, remarked how Cameron’s “nostalgia for a strong national collective identity, and a sense of shared values” is highly improbable in a country in which “all kinds of collective identities have been weakened or abandoned” and “institutions that expressed and inculcated a sense of nationhood are in decline, whether [they be] political parties, trade unions or Christian churches” (Bunting 2011). In addition, many columnists underscored how such an attack against multiculturalism was a mere attempt to distract public opinion from the government’s unpopularity for making massive budget cuts. For example, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown in the Independent clearly stated: “Muslims and migrants are being used to distract people from the planned chaos implemented by this unpopular coalition” (2011).

Concerning the process of operationalisation, Cameron explicitly criticised the previous government for focusing too narrowly on terrorism and violent extremism and failing to be sufficiently “muscular” in standing up for British liberal values [16]. For this reason, Cameron suggested a new government approach to extremism through a revision of the Prevent Strategy elaborated on by the Labour government. However, despite the rhetoric, Cameron’s measures were part of the general political debate on Islamic extremism, already established under Labour in 2007 via a concrete political agenda to change the legislation on counter-terrorism.

The new Prevent strategy was presented on 7 June 2011 and according to the Home Office website (2011), the plan is largely based on 1) responding to the ideological challenge of Islamism and those who promote it; 2) preventing people from being drawn into terrorism; and 3) monitoring extremism and radicalisation within institutions and organisations. Therefore, the new security policy does reflect the Prime Minister's February 2011 speech in Munich in which he created a link between non-violent Islamic extremism and terrorism. As a consequence, this prevention strategy commits the Government to broadening its counter-terrorist
efforts to include a new public enemy, the “nonviolent extremist”, who is a Muslim, “who may reject violence, but who [does] accept various parts of the extremist worldview” [4].

As part of the new Prevent strategy, the policy explicitly claims that dealing “with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values” (Home Office 2011: 12). In a specific section on “Higher and Further education” (Home Office 2011: 74), the government asks universities to monitor those “people who may be drawn into extremism and terrorism” (2011: 78) and to protect students “from the consequences of their becoming involved in terrorism, and take reasonable steps to minimise this risk” (2011: 79). There is also a section on the Internet that proposes to limit “access to harmful content online in … schools, public libraries and other public buildings” (2011: 80) and “remove unlawful and harmful content from the [I]nternet” (2011: 80). The new Prevent Strategy has also extended its reach to include the NHS. Doctors, nurses, and other medical staff will be asked to identify those patients at risk of being drawn into radicalisation.

Paradoxically, this “muscular” approach to extremist prevention has created a challenge for traditional liberalism, as it has the potential to undermine those values that Cameron defines as liberal and would likely defend. It is understandable that public funding would be used not for radical groups, but it is totalitarian to delegate to universities and Internet providers, the power to take action actively against groups or individuals who "do not support our core values" (Home Office 2011: 12). Moreover, it is not clear how doctors, teachers or Internet providers would be able to detect and evaluate what is "unlawful" or “harmful” (Home Office 2011: 77), and clearly a matter of political evaluation and potentially an extremely divisive designation.

To sum up, Cameron’s speech was largely disseminated across Europe confirming an interest in the European public sphere for this political statement. However, the process of dissemination through newswires and social media focused more on how Cameron echoed Merkel in stating multiculturalism as a failure, reinforcing, in this way, the theses of those who advocate a civic approach to
integration. Instead, in the national public sphere, Cameron was able to re-contextualise discourses on civic integration and domestic prevention of Islamic extremism into a concrete political agenda based on the revision of the Prevent Strategy plan. Despite the criticism coming from the Liberal party, Muslim community and some columnists about the willingness to refuse multicultural policies and the attempt to securitise Muslim relationships, Cameron’s speech did gain a large consensus, confirmed by 1) the decision of the Labour Party to avoid dealing with any real opposition to the attack on multiculturalism; and 2) the Liberal party’s approval of the prevention strategy based on the key points announced by Cameron in Munich.

3. Textual Practice: Othering and Legitimisation

This section examines the textual aspects of discourse practice through a clearer understanding of the meanings of text. The analytical model proposed in the present section proposes a general overview about the textual features, and a second stage that focuses on the political effects of that textual practice, through an assessment of the Othering and legitimisation strategies on which the text is based and can thus be interpreted.

The present textual analysis was conducted on the transcript delivered by the Prime Minister’s press office [Appendix 3]. The style of this political statement is that of a public speech addressed to an international forum during a plenary session. It is characterised by a charismatic speaker who generally detains political authority and a competent audience composed of experts and diplomats. However, some style features of the speech seem to be more coherent in terms of domestic political communication. For example, the speech tends to be mainly celebrative in its overall communicative purpose and is characterised by a rhetorical articulation that fulfils a typical ritual function of similar political speeches offered to partisan conventions, rather than one delivered to an international conference. Also, the vocabulary includes plain language and basic words, avoiding any technical jargon that is often seen in speeches intended for an international audience. Moreover, in the text, there are important keywords that have very strong political connotations for a British
audience, for example, “British values”, “collective identity”, “national identity” and “local identity.”

In addition, in the opening part of the speech, Cameron positions himself by his use of the singular pronoun “I”: “Today I want to focus my remarks on terrorism…” [1]. In this way, he states and delivers his own identity through use of “I” but then in Line 3 he moves to the use of “We”, which stands for the British nation: “We are dealing with our budget deficit” [1] or “We will still have the fourth largest military defence budget in the world” [1]. In this way, Cameron is not just addressing those in his immediate audience, but also addressing all Britons by establishing a common identity between him and them. It is this sense of the plural "we" at the beginning of his speech, which in and of itself is a performativity in the manner often used when a speaker addresses distant actors and confers identity and political status on them.

At the level of Othering, the textual analysis focuses on the manner in which a speaker defines himself and expresses contrasting identities. An interesting feature defining the definition of the in-group identity can be observed when Cameron changes the register of subjectivity, so that the “we” may stand also for the international community: “We must ban preachers of hate from coming to our countries” [12]. The use of “we” also establishes a common identity with its international listeners and recognises in them a specific political authority which Cameron calls upon to act: “We must ban” [12].

At the same time, Cameron does not articulate the Other as traditional Islam, but rather an Islamic extremism, because that segment rejects liberal values and promotes separation. It is in that sense, then, that Cameron states in Britain and Europe “some young men find it hard to identify with the traditional Islam practiced at home by their parents, whose customs can seem staid when transplanted to modern Western countries” [8]. As a representative of a specific ideology, the Islamist is regarded as having a fundamentally different and opposing British identity.
Moreover, Cameron distinguishes the difference between Islam and Islamism by saying that “Islamist extremism and Islam are not the same thing” [4]. Indeed Islam is a peaceful religion [4] and “Western values and Islam can be entirely compatible” [5]. An example comes from “the streets of Tunis and Cairo”, when people demanded “the universal right to free elections and democracy” [5]. Therefore, Cameron is not concerned with those Muslims who integrate into the political community and accept the same liberal values.

Therefore, it is possible to observe here how the enemy of a liberal society is not an Other that is defined by a culture or a religion; the enemy is rather an extremist ideology and its supporters. In his speech, Cameron does not focus on negative social or cultural differences, deviances or threats attributed to these extremists, but rather on ideology. In fact, Islamist extremism is an ideology [4] based on “a distortion of Islam” [12]. Thus, the main risk for the British community is the risk created by those “groups and organisations” as directed by charismatic leaders who “promote separatism by encouraging Muslims to define themselves solely in terms of their religion” [10]. This “ideology of extremism” and “separatism” indeed “can engender a sense of community, a substitute for what the wider society has failed to supply” [10]. As a consequence, Cameron seems more concerned not with terrorists, but rather those “non-violent extremists” who preach Islamist ideology without practicing violence, or in his words, those terrorists who “were initially influenced by what some have called ‘non-violent extremists’ and then took those radical beliefs to the next level by embracing violence” [11]. Thus, the Other is not Islam, but rather the non-violent extremists who indoctrinate young Muslims who feel apart and unaligned.

From the beginning of his speech, Cameron makes it quite clear that “liberal values” [4] of freedom and tolerance are essential in order to define British society. Specifically, he refers to those values as “Western” [5] and indeed embedded in “Western democracy” [4]. In addition, liberal values are expressed and persuasively conveyed by Cameron so as to contrast British society with Islamic extremism. He defines Islamists as a people who refuse liberal values and universal human rights [4, 5]. In particular, Cameron also defines a set of normative points to discuss whether Muslims and their organization can be considered part of the political realm
when they are fully accepting “universal human rights – including rights for women and people of other faiths”, in the “equality of all before the law”, in “democracy and the right of people to elect their own government” and experience “integration” [12].

According to Cameron, the concept of “identity” reflects the deep dilemmas that are inherent in the discourse of multiculturalism and its failure to achieve social cohesion [17]. Yet rather than seeking to deal with the cultural challenge offered by Muslim identities, Cameron attacks multiculturalism for destabilising and accentuating both exclusion and radicalism within immigrant groups. Consequently, Cameron adopts the concept of British identity based on Western and liberal values [4, 8], as he claims "It’s that identity, that feeling of belonging in our countries, that I believe is the key to achieving true cohesion” [17].

At the level of legitimisation, the analysis focuses on the strategies of legitimisation through references to authority or power. Precisely, the aim is to identify how the text provides a particular social structuring of discourse to become universal and thus a part of the legitimising system that sustains the relationships of power.

The key problem for the British Prime Minister comes from those segregated communities that reject traditional Islam to support radical Islamism. Specifically, Cameron points to multiculturalism, which “encourages different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream” [8]. Thus, according to him, tolerance has allowed “segregated communities [to behave] in ways that run completely counter to our [British, Western and liberal] values” [8]. He argues for “a genuinely liberal country … [and] believes in certain values and actively promotes them” [16], and therefore, “passive tolerance”, which “stands neutral between different values” [16] and has to be completely rejected to achieve “true cohesion” [17]. However, this “true cohesion” does not imply any form of cultural mediation; it is only a political act that implies to Muslims that they belong to and have a British identity.
The menace of failed multiculturalism is used to legitimise a project of political assimilation of British identity through a discursive strategy that aims at universalising cultural and political values as both uniform and necessary for integration into British society: "We have even tolerated segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values" [8]. This last point also reveals how much political belonging is central to Cameron’s approach to integration. In Cameron’s words, “we must build stronger societies and stronger identities at home” [16], but “we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and a much more active, muscular liberalism” [16]. Specifically, a passive “tolerant society” does not integrate citizens, but rather leaves them alone [16], while a “muscular” liberal society should encourage “meaningful and active participation in society” in order to achieve integration through “true cohesion” [17]. In this way, the dimension of universalization of a particular form of liberalism, defined as “muscular”, is the main strategy Cameron uses to legitimise his discourse on civic integration.

As a consequence, Cameron's discourse on civic integration is presented as a solution to the problem of identity decline in UK society. Cameron blames Britain, on the one hand because British society has become a passive and tolerant community. On the other hand, he recognises that Britain is accountable for the failure, because it has “failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong.” [8]. As a consequence, British society has to promote a national identity and a feeling of belonging in society, rather than tolerate or “encouraging people to live apart” [17].

In this manner, Cameron legitimises integration through participation in society, “by shifting the balance of power away from the state and towards the people” [17]. Here it is possible to recognise the tenet of the discourse of ‘Big Society,’ which is also confirmed by the belief that a “common purpose can be formed as people come together and work together in their neighbourhoods” [17] through an active engagement of immigrants, in Cameron’s own words, civic involvement “will also help build stronger pride in local identity” [17].

Moreover, Cameron specifies precisely how this active participation can be promoted. He suggests: “making sure that immigrants speak the language of their
new home and ensuring that people are educated in the elements of a common culture and curriculum” [17]. He also proposes “introducing National Citizen Service”, a programme for kids “from different backgrounds to live and work together” [17]. On the other hand, linguistic, educational and even civil service policies, can be developed to create uniformity, rather than only recognising legitimate cultural differences, and the policies can be aimed at enforcing assumptions, if not the realities of similarity within British identity.

Cameron also develops a European perspective to legitimate the necessity to take action against Islamic extremism: “We will not defeat terrorism simply by the action we take outside our borders” [3]. Here “we” and “our borders” refer to the European community as it is confirmed in the following: “Europe needs to wake up to what is happening in our own countries” [3.] This strategy also confirms his interest to prove that other international leaders are legitimate partners in the debate on security and integration. Specifically, he shows an interest in partner speeches by remarking: “as Angela [Merkel] has said the security aspects of our response…” [3.] In this way, despite the fact that Cameron delivers a statement that concentrates more on domestic policy rather than foreign policy, he projects Britain into a transnational political debate by focusing on a common strategy for integration and security to adopt across Europe.

To summarise the approach to textual strategy, it can be said that Cameron tries to universalise a particular concept of British identity as based on its liberal values. This strategy is central to the process of Othering, which identifies Islamist extremists as the Other, because of their opposition to social cohesion of the British community. At the same time, Cameron’s legitimisation of integration as community cohesion has a politically instrumental function, which is to guarantee British security and stability through political procedures aimed at increasing participation and uniformity through ongoing and specific linguistic, educational and civil service policies.

4. Explanation: Socio-cultural Practice
The goal of the present analysis is to underline the social and political implications of the discursive structure under analysis. Specifically, the analysis focuses on three critical considerations: 1) the normative ambivalence in the British politics of identity and its limits to consider Muslim diversity as part of the British self; 2) the debate on integration of Muslims as a main part of the process of immigrant regulation and 3) any hidden social and economic rationality underlining the relation between identity and power.

In his speech, Cameron expresses a concern about extremism in the UK based on the “ideology” of Islamism [4], which he believes both disaffects and radicalises Islamic youth. His viewpoint is that multicultural policies are responsible for creating separateness rather than encouraging participation [8], and for this reason, he argues that multicultural policies should be replaced with a “muscular liberalism” [16] that will promote effective integration. As a consequence, Cameron’s demand for community cohesion focuses on the definition of what it means for British identity [8], based only on liberal values [4]. In this way, Cameron appeals to a national identity to realise integration and social cohesion legitimisation reveals an attempt to assume an unquestioned and inevitable reality of those Muslims who refuse political belonging and disrupt social cohesion. This discourse raises three questions about the political nature and the practical limits of the proposed model for integration.

First, giving political form to the ways in which the integration of Islam can be considered acceptable and compatible with more dominant values plays the normative process. Cameron’s discourse universalises the cultural and political values viewed as uniform and necessary for a Muslim to have to be able to belong to a British identity. Instead, the Islamist is regarded as having fundamentally different and opposing liberal values as a representative of a specific extremist ideology. Consequently, this view has deep implications for the definition of integration. In fact, Cameron defends the British tradition of liberalism and then determines the limits and obligations of Muslims through a definition of nonviolent Islamic extremism. The nonviolent extremist is someone who does not belong or accept these liberal values and takes on radical beliefs, but without engaging in actual violent or terrorist acts.
Although, Cameron repeats the word “ideology” 11 times to denote Islamic extremism, he never defines his own idea of cohesion and integration as being ideological, even when he claims that Britain must adopt a policy of "muscular liberalism" to enforce the core values of the nation within the immigrant community [16]. Therefore, this attempt to define “ideological extremism” as a threat helps to recontextualise the construction of a discursive construction of in- and out-groups (Woodak, 2007: 333). Therefore, a positive and non-ideological self-perception is used to reinforce the in-group, while a negative and ideological position is projected toward the out-group so as to sustain existing attitudes and also form new negative attitudes.

These questions are thus essential and show the risk of arbitrariness embedded in this asymmetrical hierarchical relationship of power, in which Cameron’s government wants to decide who is a threat to democracy or not. Certainly, Cameron’s discourse is contradictory with its basic liberal assumption when targeting non-violent extremism. Liberal democracies have a historical tradition of discussing “how to prevent illiberal and undemocratic forces from abusing the rights and powers that liberal democracy extends to all” (Kymlicka 2010: 116). In fact, British liberals have never banned either the Communist or Republican parties, although these groups do want to abolish British institutions, such as the Parliament or the Monarchy.

As Kymlicka puts it, democratic liberalism “gives free speech [also] to those who would refuse free speech to others” (2010: 159). In this way, a constant vigilance against any political form of extremism cannot be based on the suppression of basic liberal principles for some. In fact, democratic liberalism is based on the assumption that governments cannot interfere in the life of individuals outside of guaranteeing that all citizens are protected from the control of others. Instead, Cameron’s discourse on security and extremist prevention is based on the assumption that the political authority should be the arbiter over who is democratic and who is not.
Second, Cameron’s integration assumes a moral right to determine the limits and obligations of Islam on behalf of the local resident majority and is premised by a fear of extremism and terrorism. For this reason, the security-based approach embedded in the discourse of “muscular liberalism” aims to impose a British identity as a solution to violent extremism. However, in practical terms, this discourse justifies only the implementation of measures to regulate Muslim extremism through both homogenisation and political integration. This contradiction between respect for minorities and an enactment of security, points to the “diversity dilemma” mentioned by Jackson-Preece (2005), namely, the principles that legitimate a political community may conflict with the freedom of minorities to refuse both belonging and uniformity. Precisely, the collision of values, such as “freedom” and “belonging”, creates the presence of the Other as a potential source of insecurity and conflict (Jackson-Preece 2005: 3-5).

Certainly, Cameron claims legitimacy of the State in terms of its authority and obligation to protect its citizens from any threat (Edelman 1977: 4-5; Jackson-Preece 2005, 2006) that can disrupt political stability. At the same time, muscular liberalism is a form of withdrawal from any engagement with some Muslim communities where Islamism is seen as central to a certain vision of the political sphere. Moreover, proposing a form of cultural homogenisation of a particular minority ignores the fact that cultural/religious differences cannot be resolved by only the obligation of a national identity. It is quite doubtful that such a proposal can be effective to reduce tension and prevent violence, as relations between the State and radical Muslim extremists are not viewed as related to the deliberative function of the public sphere, but as a question related to state security (Kymlicka 2011: 44).

Cameron’s discourse strategy appears to be justifying a policy that is aimed at preventing nonviolent actions through the negation of liberal values like freedom of speech for a specific target group. Thus, when the government only claims the right to limit democratic debate and negotiation to protect itself, political mobilisation may be banned as a form of extremism, and even if Muslim “demands can be voiced, they will be rejected by the larger society and the State” in the name of the discourse for prevention of extremism (Kymlicka 2007: 589). Overall, organisations and groups that advance claims against the State can only be
considered disloyal. Consequently, the process of securitisation and especially its re-contextualisation in the discourse of extremism prevention has deep implications for the public sphere, because Islam, or at least its more radical parts, is represented as threatening the identity of a hegemonic community and undermining its political and cultural model (Buzan et al. 1998).

This normative approach reveals an instrument in the configuration of a political order that self-defines its own criteria to accept or exclude political diversity. Clearly, any organisation that does not reject extremism will be marginalised on the basis of its political ideology. Thus, the discourse works through the exclusion of those cultural and political differences that are considered unacceptable by the political authority through the use of the specific normative framework. However, such a discourse implies a lot of ambiguities, for example, what is the legal difference between “radical extremists” and “nonviolent” ones [11]? Is someone who supports the implementation of Sharia law automatically a “nonviolent extremist” because that person rejects liberal values? As a consequence, both the discourses on prevention of Islamic extremism and the integration of Muslims are based on the same process of uniformisation of political belonging and an explicit emphasis on the need for Muslims to adopt liberal values, wherein relations between the State and Muslims would be a matter of state security and not a matter of normal democratic debate and negotiation (Kymlicka, 2007).

Cameron firmly rejects the concept that poverty and social injustice cannot be considered to be the basis for integration failure, as “many of those found guilty of terrorist offences in the UK and elsewhere have been graduates and often, middle class” [6]. Yet, the recent study *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections* (Simcox, Stuart, & Ahmed 2010) contradicts Cameron’s argument, as reported by the Home Office’s *Prevention Strategy* (2011: 25), data shows that “just under one third of the total for whom information on education was available had attended university or a higher education institute.” Indeed, Cameron commits the mistake of misrepresenting Islamists, instead of examining the variegate social and class reality of those people who decide to follow Islamic radicalism.
In this manner, Cameron intentionally refuses to take into account the fact that Muslims live disproportionately in the most deprived urban areas in poor housing where they receive only a basic education and are discriminated against in employment [7]. According to him poverty is only a contributory factor to terrorism, instead “one important reason” why “so young Muslims” are inclined to support terrorism is “a question of identity” [7]. Thus, Cameron excludes any other counter-argument to explain social exclusion such as urban segregation, low social mobility or institutional discrimination, which can well be the root cause of the manifestations of extremism. In this manner, Cameron’s discourse on civic integration excludes any social integration based on social justice and undertakes identity as causal explanation of radicalism.

In this way, Muslims become exclusively responsible for their own integration, while their citizenship is reduced to only their own ability to internalise dominant liberal values. This discourse of civic integration presupposes a neoliberal political model that does not address immigrant social and economic needs, but rather is concerned with changing their inner values and character and rejects legitimate national social welfare systems that produce economic security and social solidarity.

Referring to this point, this civic integration discourse recontextualises the neo-liberal model of governance through the creation of self-responsible and active individuals. In fact, the Big Society assumes that all aspects of cultural and political integration of Muslims can be reduced to self-responsibility, which develops institutional practices and rewards for those who assimilate the pre-conceived liberal values. Conversely, the government is not retained or deemed responsible for offering effective programs to integrate Muslims or have them feel more welcome in Britain. This view also means there is a need to reverse the trend toward public-sector employment, and reduce public expenditures for multicultural policies.

To summarise, it is possible to see how Cameron’s discourse on integration is not only limited by a political frame, the British identity, which is disciplined through “muscular liberalism” [15], a strict form of normativity that explicitly rejects any form of tolerance towards non-dominant values. This normative
discourse becomes a disciplinary regime that imposes assimilation of liberal values as a necessary means for avoiding undue cultural conflict and religious fanaticism and thus maintaining a stable political environment that also guarantees the desired integration of Muslims. As a result, only the uncritical assimilation of liberal values is considered to be central to integration policies, while welfare and multicultural policies are firmly rejected.

Chapter Summary

Taking as the entry point Cameron’s speech on the prevention of Islamic extremism given at the International Security Policy Conference in Munich in February of 2011, the analysis developed in this chapter offers a reconstruction of the public debate on Muslim integration and evaluates the political conditions and the social practices involved in the enactment of the discourses around this debate.

The British debate on Muslim integration recontextualises a discourse on security that is aimed at the implementation of measures to regulate Islamic extremism through both homogenisation and political integration, but without precise policies for contrasting social exclusion. Accordingly, Muslims become exclusively responsible for their own integration, while their citizenship is dependent upon their ability to internalise dominant liberal values and nothing more.

There are three key observations that come out of the Critical Discourse Analysis of the British public debate. First, the aim of this “muscular liberal” discourse on civic integration is to combat radicalism and separatism. According to Cameron, prevention should be addressed toward those “non-violent extremists” who preach Islamist ideology without practicing violence, as they can offer a separated community a workable “substitute for what the wider society has failed to supply” [10]. However, the re-contextualisation of this discourse as a policy of extremist prevention can have important outcomes in the political sphere, because when a radical minority is depicted as the intruder into a homogenous community, then diversity is understood to be a force that only subverts the security of social cohesion.
Second, it is necessary to underscore here that discourse on the failure of multiculturalism reveals a normative assumption, namely, that there is only one correct way to integrate Islam and this rejects any recognition of other integration perspectives. Thus, Cameron's approach to civic integration is presented as a solution to the problem of identity decline in UK society, which he blames on a passive and tolerant society. According to Cameron, identity stands for a feeling of belonging that he believes is “the key to achieving true cohesion” [17]. However, this “true cohesion” does not imply any form of cultural mediation; it is only a political act that implies for Muslims that they belong to and have a British identity. As such, it is a real paradox that a public discourse on civic integration aimed at asking for more unity and cohesion of immigrants, especially Muslims, is supported by a rigid definition of national identity that stands in the way of including the very Other they seek to integrate.

Third, the British discourse of civic integration refuses to take into account the cultural and economic inequalities that Muslims disproportionately face. The model of integration promoted by Cameron firmly rejects the argument that poverty and social injustice are at the root of separatism and extremism. Indeed, the discourse of civic integration assumes a specific neoliberal model for society, also outlined in Cameron’s manifesto for the “Big Society,” or in other words, based on a transfer of welfare security from the State to local communities. In this way, the State would be obliged to renounce the promotion of social equality through the support of welfare programs, including multicultural policies.

Furthermore the classical principles of neoliberal discourse are evident in the attempt to promote individual responsibility, wherein Muslims must be held individually accountable and morally responsible to the British community, even while social inequalities remain only more or less implied. In this way, exceptions can be dispensed to Muslim immigrants who then have to embrace secularism, gender equality and Western liberal values. Thus, in Cameron’s words, integration is more concerned with the obligations that are expected of immigrants, rather than their rights and eventual movement toward full social equality.
In the next chapter, I will provide a comparative analysis of these national debates to verify to what extent a discursive process of convergence is emerging towards Islamic integration and how these relationships contribute to the construction of a shared normative discourse about integration across Europe.
Chapter 7: The Transnational Discourse of Civic Integration

Chapter Overview

This analysis of the European public debate on Muslim integration examines specific debates on the subject in France, Germany and the UK. Each of these was based on a nodal point, namely a ‘master’ text, which offers a privileged point of entry for reconstructing the national public debate. To analyse these nodal points, their articulations and interconnections, I applied a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to explore the relationships between discursive practices and the broader social structures and political processes embedded in the public sphere.

This analysis of the national debates allows a clearer understanding of the discursive practice: how the nodal points link to discourses, the rules according to which these discourses are tied together, and how they are re-inscribed into a broader political debate. Moreover, discourse analysis facilitates the comparison of convergent national debates through the analysis of re-contextualisation and the inter-discursivity of civic integration discourse in a transnational context. Here, in brief, I outline the three cases studies and the main characteristics that define each national public debate on integration.

Chapter 4 reconstructs the French public debate by taking as the nodal point, Sarkozy’s editorial published in the Le Monde newspaper on 8 December 2009. In this article, Sarkozy defends the Swiss vote and calls upon Muslims to refrain from provocative attitudes, but also urges them not to forget that Europe has Christian values as its foundation. Sarkozy's intervention came not only in response to concerns about the Swiss referendum, but also as a result of the broader debate over French national identity, which was aimed at creating political consensus within French society on the issues of national identity and the integration of Islam.
In the discourse analysis I underline how the language of French discourse on civic integration is based on universal and already established normative assumptions for the political and cultural nature of French identity. Accordingly, French discourse on civic integration calls for Muslim immigrants to adopt French democratic, reflective and secular customs as universal values. Although French discourse on civic integration does not aim at excluding Muslims from French society, it does preclude the possibility of accommodating different cultural needs that are not compatible with French national identity.

At the same time, the French discourse on civic integration tends to deny the existence inequality in terms of social and economic difference, despite the fact that social injustice lies at the root of the current suburban segregation problems of the Muslim population. The French discourse on civic integration therefore ignores the reality of social and economic conditions faced by Muslims, while promoting the moral responsibility of Muslims to assimilate themselves in the national community by accepting those values defining the French national identity.

In chapter 5, the German public debate is analysed by taking as the nodal point the speech delivered by the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel on 16 October 2010. This speech generated significant controversy in Germany and across Europe, as evidenced by the high number of comments and editorials published as a result. Merkel’s speech claimed that multicultural policies of integration have been a complete failure and demanded more effort from Muslim immigrants to integrate themselves into German society and to accept the values that characterise German cultural identity [Leitkultur].

The discourse analysis of the German debate underlines how the discourse on civic integration is characterised by a necessity to redefine national identity in a more cohesive way through the attempt to universalise the particular values, rules and norms of a European civilization, influenced by a Judeo-Christian heritage. As a consequence, it can be argued that the discourse of Leitkultur defines a monocultural German society as opposed to other newcomer cultures. The discourse on Leitkultur draws distinct boundary lines between nationals and Muslims with the national
body, and excludes Muslims from public life if they do not agree to assimilate the values of the majority.

The analysis also draws attention to the normative and economic features of this discourse on integration. Integration implies that the immigrant has to participate in economic and social life of the hosting community. Thus, immigrants must give priority to their responsibilities towards the economic welfare of the national community. According to Merkel, integration becomes more concerned with the expected obligations of immigrants, rather than their rights and eventual social equality in their new country.

Chapter 6 takes as the nodal point Cameron’s speech on the prevention of Islamic extremism, given at the International Security Policy Conference in Munich in February of 2011. In a conscious echo of Merkel, Cameron argues that multicultural state policies have passively tolerated and encouraged British Muslims to live apart, thus pushing many young Muslims to embrace Islamism. Instead, the State should promote a feeling of belonging in a common society, through a national identity, and not be an accomplice of those non-violent Muslim groups that stay ambiguous on those liberal values that characterize British national identity. The definition of the leading aspect of British identity is, thus, a precise attempt to universalise the acceptable values, rules and norms of the British majority. In this way, the universalization of a particular liberalism, defined as “muscular”, is the main discourse to legitimise integration. Yet, that definition excludes Muslims from public life, if they do not agree to assimilate and accept the values of the majority.

This discourse on civic integration also magnifies the recent shift in British public debate on integration. In fact, the British model of integration has turned away from a pluralist approach, which had stressed the role of integration, not as a process of assimilation to the nation and civic values, but as a policy of access to social rights, in favour of a more civic model of integration, which places the importance on shared values as a key element of integration (Bertossi 2007: 4).
Each of the three national case studies reveals the existence of parallel national discourses, each with its distinct articulation of a politics of civil integration. However, it is not clear whether and how this debate across Europe, despite its national differences, is supported by a common discursive space in which national actors have enacted and reproduced a common discourse on Islam and the integration of Muslims. In this last chapter, I seek to identify commonalities in the national public debates by looking into the shared strategies of discourse through which civic integration is articulated, depending on the cultural and political particularities of national contexts.

Starting from this point of departure, I take a step back from the individual national cases examined for this project, to compare the different European debates on the civic integration of Islam and the extent to which these debates can be considered as having transnational convergence. The assumption is that the European public debate on Islam has become engaged, not simply in parallel single debates, but also embroiled in a shared discourse on civic integration. As consequence, I use the European public sphere as analytical category to define the degree of convergence of the national public spheres towards a common discourse.

This chapter is developed in five sections. In the first section, I offer a comparative analysis of national debates to verify the extent to which a discursive process of convergence is emerging and to understand how mutual intertextual chains develop between merely different national public spheres. In the second section, my goal is to compare the national debates on Muslim integration in order to observe the extent to which they converge towards a normative discourse, which is articulated depending on the cultural and political particularities of the national context. In the third section, I compare the socio-political implications of the discourse and I analyse the consequences of its dissemination across the European public sphere. In the fourth section, I provide a final assessment of the theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions of this project as well as the significance and value of the study. In the fifth part, I review some limitations of the study and possible avenues for future research. Finally, I close with final remarks on the full project.
1. The Transnational Convergence in the Debate

In the chapter 1 the review of the controversies surrounding the debate on Muslim integration underlines how European countries still have different models of integration for immigrants (Favel 1998, Brubaker, 1992) and significant differences in terms of prejudice or engagement toward Muslims (Halliday 2002: 125). Numerous studies have also paid close attention to how integration of minorities or immigrants is constitutively bound to a national community, defined by the territorial, ethnic, or cultural markers of a nation-state (Faist 2000; Bauböck 2003; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003; Wimmer 2007; Jackson-Preece 2005).

Some researchers have also focused on the emergence of a political convergence toward a universalistic discourse about citizenship and admission that goes beyond national models and philosophies of integration (Müller, 2007, Kymlicka 2007, Archibugi 2003, 2009, Joppke, 2007). These authors provided a very effective explanation of the institutional processes by which civic integration policies are created and maintained, however they do not emphasize the discursive process that legitimises such arguments on integration. Specifically, they do not recognise that, at the base of the convergence towards civic integration, there is an interactive process of communication among European polities.

Consequently, chapter 1 raises questions about the actual existence of a transnational convergence of national discourses on Muslim integration supported via a European public sphere. In the initial research question, I ask whether and how national public debates on Muslim integration in Europe are supported by a common discursive space that diverse national actors have used for formulating, elaborating, defending and implementing civic integration.

In stating the Research Hypothesis 1 (chapter 1), I make the assumption that this political convergence of debate was based on an interactive process of negotiation, influence and national recontextualisation of a normative discourse on civic integration. I therefore expect that the convergence towards civic integration can be explained through the European transnationalization of the public sphere as
an interactive process of communication among national ruling political leaders, who remains central actors of a process of creation, implementation and recontextualisation of discourses on civic integration.

In developing the theoretical framework for the analysis of this transnational public debate (Chapter 2), I identify the European public sphere as a site or forum that facilitates and encourages the dissemination of discourses (Trenz 2005: 176; Diez, 2005: 628), which is thought to lead subsequently to a level of political convergence (Whitman 2010; Muller 2007). Therefore, I assume that the degree of transnational convergence of a discourse reveals the connections that the European public sphere establishes between national countries (Triandafyllidou et al 2009) and how simultaneous debates might have a critical impact on how national public spheres recontextualise transnational discourses on migration and integration (Müller, 2007: 379, 381).

In the discourse analysis, my first step is to reconstruct the discoursive context related to the debate on Muslim integration. Starting from a nodal point, the analysis evaluates the conditions and practices involved in the enactment and reproduction of the discourse of civic integration of Muslims in the national public sphere. It then explores how the nodal points are disseminated, operationalised and contested through the European public sphere. By looking at interdiscursivity and intertextual chain, the analysis explains how national nodal points are mutually related to the same texts and discourses held in the public sphere and how these other texts and discourses are actually interconnected to each other.

In this manner, I observe how the transnational convergence of civic integration discourse confirms an increasing interconnection among national public debates within the European public sphere, which enables horizontal links and exchanges between polities across national borders. Furthermore, I identify four common aspects that can support the argument that a horizontal convergence actually exists.

Firstly, the discourse analysis shows how multiple strategies are chosen and then adapted by the ruling elite in order to re-contextualise their speeches across a
range of European public opinion: a) sharing of discourses across national public spheres; b) expressing interest in discourses generated in other European countries; c) treating political actors in other countries as legitimate partners; d) using a European perspective to define and evaluate immigration integration. These discursive strategies show how ruling political elites relate to discourse dissemination and on what scale, and how their discourses are recontextualised for the different national spheres.

A second common aspect is found in the role of transnational media channels, especially newswire agencies, in creating political consensus within European public opinion. Sarkozy, Merkel and Cameron’s statements were disseminated widely across Europe, confirming an interest in the European public sphere for these political statements. Thus, transnational media coverage urged European public opinion to discuss the political agenda promoted by the ruling elite regarding Muslim integration. Certainly, it can be claimed that horizontal convergence is reinforced by the interdependence of European media networks. However, this process of dissemination through the European public sphere focuses more on the most controversial statements on multiculturalism, while undervaluing and ignoring the nuances and complexities of other claims.

A third common aspect of the transnational convergence is that more each discourse on civic integration converges across national public spheres, the more it is perceived as stable and consensual in the public opinion because the mutual discursive reference among public spheres limits the force and effect of any oppositional voice. The media tend on the one hand to increase levels of intertextuality through an exponential dissemination of controversial statements, while on the other hand they reduce the level of interdiscursivity by focusing only on multiculturalism and reinforcing only those positions raised by those who advocate an assimilationist approach to integration.

For example, in Germany, voices for pro-immigration are often perceived as elitist positions and thus are not always effective is convincing mainstream public opinion of the value of their counter-arguments in defence of multiculturalism. In this context, Merkel’s arguments could find considerable support from the German
public. In the UK, despite criticism from the Liberal party, Muslim community and some columnists, Cameron’s speech was widely supported and allowed him to re-contextualise discourses on civic integration and domestic prevention of Islamic extremism without the concrete opposition of the Labour Party. In France, the principles of the 1789 revolution are so pervasive that public opinion tends to refuse any communitarian form of integration as disruptive of the French Republican model. This explains why both Socialist and Conservative Parties voted in favour of the integral veil ban, despite the two parties’ different political stances on Sarkozy’s political agenda of national identity.

The discourse on civic integration has thus remained almost uncontested within public opinion as the media tend to place more emphasis on controversial positions that argue for a strict regulation of immigrants and Muslims. At the same time, the transnational dynamic of communication across the European public sphere tends to reinforce the process of marginalization of Muslim voices as only statements by influential political leaders are generally disseminated across transnational networks. The more authoritative and contentious a political statement that is given by a recognized political leader in Europe, the more media coverage this generates across nations. In this manner, horizontal convergence seems very effective in consolidating civic integration as a hegemonic discourse, because it is established as a universal tenet and entails a reduction of confrontation between the majority and the Muslim minority.

A common fourth aspect is that horizontal convergence does not produce the same change national policies on integration in each nation. In fact, different policy solutions have been applied so far, for example Germany and the UK have introduced values tests and pledges of allegiance for immigrants. However Germany has funded state training programs for imams and exams, while the UK introduced restrictions on the expression of radical views. Likewise, France has opted for the involvement of moderate Muslim organization in national councils but at the same time approved a complete ban of the integral veil. Therefore, this horizontal convergence is more effective in defining a general approach toward Islam, Muslims and immigration, rather than approving common laws and policies.
In conclusion, this comparison of the national public spheres emphasises the connections that the European public sphere establishes between national countries and how simultaneous debates impact on how national public spheres recontextualise transnational discourses on migration and integration. It can be claimed, therefore, that horizontal convergence, through communicative exchange within the public sphere, organises a shared way of thinking and talking. Horizontal convergence supports this discursive exchange about the justifications for measures to regulate integration, but national spheres maintain their agency and capacity to implement legislation on the integration of Muslims.

2. Towards a Common Discourse on Civic Integration?

The literature review in Chapter 1 emphasises that the concept of European identity has become a discursive resource for social and political cohesion (Risse and Sikkink 1999; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005:8) in several controversies in European public debates. Consequently, I raise the question about how the debate on the integration of Muslims has reinforced a process of collective European self-identification (Risse 2010; Kundani 2012). In Research Hypothesis 2, I assume that the European debate on integration shares a common discourse on the universal idea of European community, based on a common identity defined by a shared culture, but redefined at the national level through specific political interests of the ruling elite.

In developing the theoretical framework (Chapter 2), I observe how in contrast to national identities, which are based upon a national imagination (Anderson, 1983), European identity is defined by a common bond (White 2009) with a distinct civic and political entity (Habermas 1996). In particular, I note that the use of European identity in the political debate on integration reinforces a discourse on the Other, based on the Us vs. Them construction (Delanty and Rumford 2005; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Mavelli 2012), which assumes that the Muslim-Other constitutes a problem for which We have to find a solution (Honer and Weber, 2010: 142; Wodak 2008:295) through polices predicated upon a commitment to a common European concern with civic duty and political values.
In conducting the discourse analysis, I investigate how the discourse on civic integration refers to specific values associated with a European identity, and how these values are adopted and promoted through three national public debates. Furthermore, through the analysis of the textual practice, I observe, how through the process of Othering, Muslims are represented as a single monolithic block, rather than as a collection of very diverse groups unified only in a single religious belief that they practice and often interpret in quite different ways. Conversely, I observe how Europe is always claimed as a collective "we" across national borders (for example, "European culture" or "the European civilization"). Therefore, the discourse on civic integration is not simply a shared set of cultural national features, but a normative political discourse aimed at defining the border between identities and justifying the assimilation of those values that Muslims are lacking.

I identify four inter-discursive features, which show that the discourse on civic integration is developed through a common elaboration of values within a shared discourse on Europe and its collective identity, made by a universal idea that all Europeans belong to a single moral and political community:

1. national discourses are principally shaped by a secular model of politics that promotes a system of mutual commitment, based on the recognition of and belonging to a European civic identity;
2. these discourses are normative and aimed at integrating into public life, only those Muslims who agree to assimilate the national values of the majority;
3. these discourses are based on appeals to social unity and cohesion, but imply that Muslim immigrants are the Other as the group’s intrinsic cultural difference that may clash with liberal values shared by Europeans.
4. national discourses on civic integration aim at asking for more unity and cohesion of immigrants, especially Muslims, through a rigid definition of national identity that stands in the way of including that very Other;
The European public debate on Muslim integration is thus conceived through a discourse aimed at promoting a set of civic policies in which the Muslim immigrant can be integrated only through the assimilation of a normative identity that is more appropriate to the European ethos (White, 2009). Accordingly, it can be claimed that the normative and cultural assumptions that underlie this transnational discourse of civic integration is based on a common sense of European moral community, although further redefined at the national level. In other words, this politicisation of common values is recontextualised along national public spheres and also along particular national political interests. This confirms Mouritsen’s thesis (2006) developed in observing the Danish debate on integration, namely that Muslim immigrants are asked to accept local versions of an imagined normative Europe, which defines the process of identification with a political structure through a set of rights, rules and institutions.

Therefore it can be confirmed that current policy debate on Islam integration is not driven by an attempt to exclude Muslims, but rather by a normative discourse that it is possible to integrate Muslims through the imposition of those universal values, norms and cultural attributes shared by Europeans. However, the implicit limit of this normative discourse is to be principally shaped by a secular model of reason and rationality that promotes a system of “communal commitments” based on the recognition of and obedience to shared values (Mavelli 2012: 12).

This normative approach, which aims at organising the complexity of social relationships between immigrant minorities and majority, risks creating different categories of immigrants: the “good” migrants are the same as us and deserve to be integrated, while the “bad” migrants are so different from us that they cannot be integrated (Horner and Weber 2011). This ambivalence thus challenges the right to diversity and the free choice of immigrants through an asymmetrical relationship between the agency of the majority and minorities.

Thus the most questionable aspect of the discourse of civic integration is not based on an absolute exercise of discrimination which would be incompatible with the legal constitutional framework of the nation and of the EU, but on a form of control which requires immigrants to prove to have assimilated liberal values
through “objective” tests on their civic duties (Horner and Weber 2011: 142). The European obsession with testing the values of immigrants evokes scientific racism that maintains it is possible to assess whether immigrants will be good citizens through a series of challenging questions on their inner beliefs. The elite’s reluctance to explore the modifiability and diverseness of the European ethos is partly responsible for the quasi-eugenic role that the discourse of civic integration plays, guiding immigrants toward a determined identity more appropriate for them.

As a consequence, a project of integration concerned with obtaining Muslims’ conformity can only be conflictual as it does not leave any room to accommodate specific cultural aspects (Kymlicka 2010: 99) that are perceived as contrasting to European political and cultural norms. For this reason, Anne Phillips, in *Multiculturalism without Culture* (2008), proposes to return to a model of integration that can recognize diversity, but in which individual rights must remain at the core of integration. In this manner, Philips argues for an approach that can reinforce individual rights to equal citizenship for all members of multicultural societies. However, this goal requires that ‘cultures’ and ‘minorities’ have to be assumed in a flexible way – as ‘minorities’ are neither stable nor static social groups nor are ‘cultures’ a concrete and unchangeable concept.

There is a second critical consideration that emerges from this comparative analysis: a common denial of any social and economic disparity faced by Muslims. Specifically, the nodal points do not offer any explanation for the causes of unrest and violence of some Muslim groups in Europe. Self-segregation in France, Germany and the UK could certainly be explained because Muslim minorities remain part of an alienated underclass, which is not integrated into the economic and social system that underpins national communities.

In my analysis of the French nodal point, I underline that Sarkozy calls for a fight against discrimination toward Muslims (2010, line: 48), but without mentioning the economic and social problems immigrants have or including them in that same process of civil integration. By hiding structural inequalities, Sarkozy ignores the reality of those disparities that lie at the root of some of the current social distress experienced by French Muslims in suburban areas (Mayan, 2007). In this
way, the French discourse on civic integration aims at taking into account Muslim immigrants’ responsibilities toward France and its political community rather than their real social needs.

By analysing the German nodal point, I note that Merkel refers to the lack of integration of some Muslim immigrants (Merkel 2010: para. 32-33) but she never takes into account, the effectiveness of welfare programs to avoid marginalisation of immigrants or urban segregation. Merkel explicitly states that immigrants must integrate into the national society without counting on welfare policies (2011: para. 31-32). Thus Muslim immigrants are held individually accountable to guarantee the desired economic progress Germany wants. Accordingly, the German discourse of civic integration promotes the individual responsibility of immigrants towards the economic and social progress in Germany without any further costs to the social welfare.

In the study of the British nodal point, Cameron promotes a muscular liberal model of integration (2011: para. 11) to prevent radicalism and terrorism among Muslims. Cultural and political integration of Muslims is thus reduced to the development of a security agenda based on the control of Islamism and the certitude that liberal values are effectively assimilated by Muslim groups. Conversely, the British discourse on civic integration excludes any social integration based on the intervention of the State based on the elimination of social and economic inequality (2001: para. 7).

The common ground between national discourses on civic integration is thus to firmly reject the need for legitimate national social welfare systems to produce economic security and social solidarity. This provides support to a view that is prevalent in the literature (Muller, 2007; Joppke 2007), namely an emphasis on a neoliberal peculiarity of civic integration as a process more concerned with obligations for minorities rather than with basic rights and social equality (Plant 2009, Turner 2008, Wacquant 2008). In particular, Joppke argues that civic integration policies are shaped by the neoliberal tenet to coerce individuals, as well as communities of which they are part, “to release their self-producing and -regulating capacities, as an alternative to redistribution and public welfare that
fiscally diminished states can no longer deliver" (Joppke, 2007: 16). Accordingly, the discourse of civic integration is actively aimed at producing the kinds of subjects that a productive system of a liberal society requires.

To summarize, the comparison reveals how the national discourses on integration are based on a European identity predicated upon a commitment to a common concern with civic perspective and political values. Therefore, despite the fact that national discourses on civic integration are based on the cultural and political specificity of the national public sphere, these national discourses share a common assumption on Europe as moral community, which defines what values belong to that community and, perhaps more crucially, those that do not belong. Furthermore, the discourse on civic integration assumes a neoliberal connotation as it tends to disregard social justice and promote a rationality based on the individual responsibility of the Muslim to integrate themselves without any welfare support from the State. As a consequence, the discourse on civic integration of Muslims becomes concerned only with an expected loyalty to a normative system of liberal norms and values, rather than focusing on equality and social justice.

3. The Socio-Political Implications of Civic Integration

In contextualising the public debate on Muslims’ integration (Chapter 1), I describe how European societies are facing an increasing level of cultural difference due to the growing intensity of migration from Muslim countries (Meer, 2010; Göle, 2009). The presence and visibility of Muslim diversity has fundamentally challenged the very myth of national homogeneity (Kivisto 2001; Kymlicka 2004) as Muslims often depend on identities (Aitchison et al 2007: 26) that are not included within the cultural confines of European societies. Muslims’ requests for political recognition of cultural diversity have also questioned an established sense of borders and loyalties within the traditions and symbols of the national communities in Europe (Koopmans, 2005: 142).

The recognition of Muslim diversity echoes the “diversity dilemma” mentioned by Jackson-Preece in Minority Rights (2005: 3). As explained in Chapter
2, diversity always contradicts the principles that legitimise a political community because, on the one hand, freedom is manifested as diversity, yet on the other, belonging creates uniformity; thus the collision of these two terms, “freedom” and “belonging,” destabilises the basis of community cohesion (Jackson-Preece 2005: 5). In fact, freedom necessitates a diversity of choices and indeed promotes a variety of values, traditions and narratives, while belonging requires, and indeed maintains, social cohesion to preserve a common identity, related values and beliefs (Jackson-Preece 2005: 6).

In the specific case of the European debate on integration, the recognition of Muslim diversity can be seen as an attempt to resolve the “diversity dilemma” (Jackson-Preece 2005) through a discursive work of the ruling elite. For this reason, I highlight how many of the alleged problems with Muslim diversity are traced back to multicultural policies. The ruling elite has depicted multiculturalism as a failure because it creates separatism and discourages Muslims in considering their responsibilities to the political community.

According to Sarkozy, Merkel and Cameron, Muslim groups have been encouraged by multicultural policies to segregate themselves and to live separate lives apart from mainstream society (Merkel, 2010; Sarkozy, 2010; Cameron, 2011). Muslim diversity is thus identified as a source of political and social insecurity as well as a serious obstacle to the realisation of an ideal integrated and civic community, which in the most extreme cases can lead to radical violence and terrorism. In particular, it is possible to identify a simultaneous recontextualisation of the discourse on “parallel lives” (Philips 2006: 27), which accuses Muslim communities of carrying out practices of self-segregation and social isolationisms under the banner of multiculturalism.

In the analysis of the British debate, I explain how Cameron’s speech points to a counter-terrorism agenda, which is constantly being re-played by both the Labour and Conservative governments to justify a range of policies to control extremism. But according to Cameron, the root of extremism has to be found in multicultural policies, which have caused urban segregation and have pushed disaffected youth to reject the interpretation of a moderate Islam and to adopt a more
radical interpretation (Cameron, 2011: para. 8). Also, in Germany and France, the debate on the integration of Muslims has been related to the issue of public order and urban segregation. In her speech Merkel attacks multiculturalism by exploiting the discourse of security when talking of the urban segregation of Muslim immigrants and crime (Merkel, 2010: para. 33). In the same way, Sarkozy exploits public’s concern for public order in the suburbs to encourage a national debate about integration and national identity as an “antidote to tribalism and sectarianism” of Muslims (Sarkozy, 2010: lines 33-35).

It is necessary to understand how and why multiculturalism has been framed as a danger to the security and cohesion of the community in the three cases under investigation. The ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ comes at a time of increased sensitivity towards security as a result of the terrorist events of 9/11 and those of Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 (Mishra 2008), and thus, international terrorism has led to an increasing securitization of migration policies (Meinhof and Triandafyllidou 2006: 11, see also Cesari 2006; Jackson-Preece 2006).

In this context of securitisation, multicultural models of immigrant integration and the accommodation of the Muslim minority have been questioned under the pressure of the media which have increasingly linked Islam with violence, separatism and anti-Western values (Halliday 2002; Flood et al 2010). However, several empirical studies prove that Muslims have started becoming an integral part of European societies and embracing national identities and liberal values. These findings contrast with the ruling elite’s assumption that Muslim immigrants want to remain distinct from the rest of society and the subsequent implication that Muslims have to accept those values of the countries in which they live.

The 2007 Gallup World Poll (Nyri, 2007) in a specific survey on Muslims in Europe suggests that Muslim residents identify strongly with the country in which they live. Data reveals that in France, Germany and the UK, Muslims have the same degree of loyalty to the country in which they live as the national population. Thus the survey suggests that while religion remains an important part of Muslim identity, it does not imply any weaker sense of national identity. This result is also confirmed by a study on eleven cities in seven European countries conducted by the Open
Society Institute. The *Muslims in Europe* report (OSI, 2010) indicates that Muslims and non-Muslims recognise “similar values as important to the country” in which they live; moreover, “these values correspond to those that are identified as core European values, such as respect for the law, freedom of expression and equality of opportunity” (OSI 2010: 69). The specific report on *Muslims in London* also reveals that Muslims have a higher rate of trust in political institutions compared with the non-Muslim respondents. Approximately 49 per cent of Muslims described trust in the national Parliament, compared with just over 35 per cent of non-Muslims (OSI, 2012: 22).

Therefore findings prove that Muslims in Europe have a “political sense of belonging” and “attachment to the city and country where they live” (OSI, 2010: 23). At the same time, Muslim “religious identity” does not reveal any significant impact on respondents’ acceptance of liberal values (OSI 2010: 76). Further evidence that Muslims’ level of religiosity does not influence their level of political trust comes from the European Social Survey, the German Social Survey (ALLBUS), the Home Office Citizenship Survey (HOCS) and Statistics Netherlands. Data analysis suggests a positive orientation to political institutions among Muslims, in contrast to non-Muslims (Jackson and Doerschler 2012a, 2012b). Conversely, Muslims experience significant greater rates of unemployment and poverty than the general population; while “those who are employed are often in marginal and low-paid jobs” or at higher chance of unemployment (OSI, 2010: 24).

As a consequence, it can be claimed that it is not the lack of adoption of European values by Muslim immigrants and their descendants to bring social isolationism or segregation, but rather the social inequalities that Muslims face across Europe. This point confirms, once again, that the discourse on civic integration has a clear neoliberal connotation as it tends to disregard social justice and promote a discourse of integration based only on the self-responsibility towards civic duties.

To conclude, these three public debates demonstrate how the presence of Muslims in Europe have been framed as a security concern by blaming multicultural policies as both a leading cause of Muslim self-segregation as well as an obstacle to the lack of integration. However, surveys prove that Muslims are already an integral part of European societies and embrace national identities and liberal values at the
same degree as locals. At the same time, social inequalities are a more real risk that could undermine integration as Muslims face higher social and economic inequalities than the general population. Thus, rather than encouraging Muslims to share their distinctive customs, the present debate on integration reinforces stereotypes on Muslims and ignores the process of cultural adaptation and mixing which Muslims are already experiencing in Europe.

4. The Theoretical and Methodological Contributions of this Comparative Research

The goal of this thesis is to provide a considered response on the one hand to a recent debate in media and communication and European studies which observes the Europeanisation of the public sphere (Eriksen 2005; Trenz, 2005, Triandafyllidou et al 2010) as part of a general process of transnational communication (Fraser, 2007; Conway & Singh, 2009), and on the other hand, respond to a specific expectation among scholars in political science that the old national models of integration of immigrants across Europe (Favel 2003 and Bertossi 2010) are giving way to a neoliberal discourse of civic integration (Joppke 2007, Muller 2007).

The findings from this study offer two major contributions to the literature quoted above. First, my thesis provides evidence that the national public sphere remains central to the legitimization of many aspects of immigrant integration in terms of national priorities and sensibilities (Bertossi 2010). This is despite the fact that the increased number of transnational networks of communication associated with globalisation (Fraser 2007) and the process of European integration (Eriksen 2005) have questioned the national dimension of the public sphere and led to a reconsideration of the concept beyond the national territorial state (Risse 2010).

This apparent contradiction is explained by an observation of the discursive work of national ruling elites. This reveals that that the discourse of civic identity reflects the evolution of the understanding shared by the national political elites implicated in this transnational debate. Namely, ruling elites across Europe invoke
different elements of European collective identity depending on the specific national context. Thus the discourse of civic integration of Muslims depends on the distinctive interpretation each national ruling elite can extract from the discourse on European identity (Marcussen et al 2001: 14; Risse, 2010).

Moreover, through discourse analysis I observe how the process of recontextualisation and rescaling of the transnational discourse of civic integration enables horizontal links and exchanges between polities across national borders which lead to a transnational convergence towards a common discourse on the integration of Muslims. However, the national debate remains central in legitimizing the many aspects of citizenship and immigrant policies. Consequently, transnational convergence did not limit the agency of the State; on the contrary, the national sphere has maintained the national capacity to rescale and recontextualise the transnational discourse of civic integration.

The second contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate how the process of transnational convergence in the debate on Muslim integration reinforces the construction of new boundaries between the in-group and the out-group through the definition of the new Other (Delanty and Rumford 2005). Specifically, the different national debates on civic integration reinforce a discourse on the Other, based on the Self vs. Them construction, which assumes that the Muslim constitutes a problem that We have to find a solution for (Honer and Weber, 2010: 142; Wodak 2008:295) through a “one way process” of integration in which Muslims are “expected to integrate into the existing society without any reciprocal accommodation” (Lacroix, 2010: 8).

Accordingly, the transnationalisation of national public spheres (Van de Steeg 2002, Trenz & Eder 2004) supports a process of collective self-identification that is based on the acceptance of normative assumptions regarding the political and cultural nature of European identity (Risse, 2010). Thus, similarly to traditional discourses on nationalism, the European identity becomes a discursive resource for social and political cohesion (Risse and Sikkink 1999; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005:8) based on the relationship between the identification with a
distinct civic and political entity at the European level and with national political discourses on integration.

The strategic use of a qualitative methodology, based on a Critical Discourse Analysis and in combination with a comparative framework illustrates in detail a) the degree of transnational convergence between national discourses on civic integration and b) the intersections between discourses on national identity and Europe as collective representation of a shared community represent the cultural space that the Muslim Other must fit into.

Specifically, discourse analysis allows me to identify the prevailing discursive strategies adopted by the national ruling elites to recontextualise the specific features of the European identity through a specific definition of ‘European values’ and ‘European culture’ used to advocate or deny recognition for Muslim diversity. For this reason, this methodology is extremely helpful to reveal the way in which the ruling elite organises the complexity of political relationships between the Muslim minority and national majorities.

The discourse analysis also allows a verification of whether and how these national discourses can be described as a neoliberal model of integration. My goal is thus to bring further evidence to an emergent trend in the literature (Muller, 2007; Joppke 2007), which emphasizes the neoliberal ambivalence of civic integration as a process concerning individual responsibility to integrate, while excluding any effective inclusion based on social justice (Plant 2009, Turner 2008, Wacquant 2008).

The analysis presents evidence that the discourse of civic integration firmly rejects a model of integration based on economic security and social solidarity through the national welfare systems, while imposes on Muslims the obligation to adopt a collective identity that reflects European traditions and culture. Therefore it can be claimed that the discourse of civic integration assumes aspects of neoliberalism and governmentality as Muslims are considered exclusively responsible for their own integration, and citizenship is dependent on their ability to internalise the liberal values that characterize the European identity.
To summarize, my thesis contributes towards bringing greater empirical evidence to the study on transnational processes of communication (Eriksen 2005; Trenz, 2005, Triandafyllidou et al 2010) and it explains transnational convergence by investigating two opposing phenomena: 1) the ability of a transnational discourse of civic integration to shape and lead national debates on integration of Muslims and 2) the agency of the national ruling elite in re-scaling and re-contextualising this transnational discourse in the national public sphere. Transnational convergence thereby invites us to analyse connections that a transnational discursive space, such as the European public sphere, can establish between national countries and how and why national public spheres recontextualise at the same time a common discourse on civic integration, which is replacing the old national models of the integration of immigrants (Favel 2003).

5. Limitations of the Study and Future Research Directions

A number of caveats need to be noted regarding the present study. First, the horizontal approach to convergence among national public spheres concentrates mainly on national public debate and risks losing sight of the more general picture of the evolution of the supranational debate within Europe. In addition, the research design posits that domestic political factors are the real explanations for the process of recontextualization and rescaling of the discourse on civic integration. As a consequence, in my empirical analysis I reconstruct the development of the national discursive examining the intertextual and interdiscoursive level in order to find links with the debate at the European level. However, my research design model does not consider supranational actors, such as the EU, among the many determinants of national debate. For these reasons, further analysis might usefully check if supranational institutions are relevant for the process of convergence and also the mutual influence on the public debate over integration coming from European and national institutions.

Second, the horizontal approach also excludes a bottom-up process of convergence. In the case of the Swiss ban on minarets, Muslims have appealed to
European institutions to stop the implementation of that vote (Christmann and Dannaci 2012). The same process happened after the French ban on the full veil, when Muslim groups appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (Rosen 2004: 147). Thus, it might be worth addressing a further question in future research to explore how transnational convergence can be realised through Muslim political practices to pursue their rights and freedoms (Anagnostou and Psychogiopoulou 2009) through the support of European institutions. The European public sphere may thus open institutional space for minorities and provide for alternative dimensions for inclusion. As a consequence, a further study could assess those bottom-up processes of communication in which Muslims engage political activity against any attempt to exclude their diversity or claim their political subjectivity to obtain the recognition of their diversity.

Third, one of the implicit limits in this research design the assumption that a nodal point is an entry level, which allows a reconstruction of the public debate via intertextuality and interdiscursivity. Each national case study is thus based on one nodal point where the political ruling elite raised the question of the integration of Muslims, rather than of all immigrant groups. The research design therefore could be applied to a larger corpus, in order to verify the existence of a more general transnational discourse about integration of ethnic and cultural diversity based on the assimilation of culture and values to minorities. Accordingly, it could be interesting to work on a larger research project that is aimed at understanding what forms of diversity are still perceived as a destabilising issue for community cohesion in Europe, rather than as a general contribution to pluralism.

Fourth, the research design has taken for granted the role of the English in the transnational public sphere without offering a critical perspective on the role of national languages on the dissemination of political discourses. That same linguistic limitation was also present in the choice to use only English translations in the analysis of nodal points. Although any methodological choice of this type can be easily criticised, the research design requires a homogenous linguistic corpus for the most effective comparison. As I argue in chapter 3, the aim of the methodology adapted for this thesis is to focus on the relation between text and social structure, rather than simply prioritising the micro-textual features. A further study could
certainly tackle the methodological complexity of developing a homogenous corpus in different linguistic contexts and offer a review of previous empirical works that adapted a transnational comparative framework.

Fifth, the analysis of the debate does not consider the role of public opinion and to what extent multiculturalism is perceived by the public as a real problem in need of a political solution. Notably, recent studies have questioned this disjuncture between public opinion and public debate and suggested that political actors are highly sensitive to public opinion pressure (Lahav 2004b; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Mulcahy, 2010), and for this reason, governments are keen to implement civic integration policies in order to ‘neutralise’ ethnic and cultural diversity brought by immigration.

Future research could investigate the public’s concern regarding diversity through a multi-dimensional methodological approach which would give additional analytical leverage to the present thesis. For example, I could consider a) content analysis of newspapers, tabloids and regional newspapers to explore the role of the media in the process of recontextualization; b) analysis of national public opinion surveys on and c) in-depth interviews with ordinary citizens. This multi-dimensional methodology would facilitate an interdisciplinary approach toward the study of political debate without being constrained to the field of discourse analysis.

Fifth, the debate on integration can also be further analysed through examining alternative causes such as the ideological orientation of governments. All the three nodal points taken in analysis were given by conservative political leaders. Therefore, further research could be done through in-depth interviews to public decision makers in order to explore to what extent the role of ideologies and political memberships are relevant in developing a particular viewpoint in the elite debate on Muslim integration.

Finally, I plan to extend my PhD work beyond this specific debate on Muslims to a more specific debate on the admission and integration of immigrants in the aftermath of the recent European financial crisis. Indeed rather than looking at Muslims integration, I would like to analyse those attempts to present multicultural
integration as both divisive and undermining of political and social cohesion as a consequence of the restrictions related to the fiscal crisis and the difficulty in maintaining generous welfare programs for the whole population. My aim is thus to produce fresh empirical work by assessing both the efficacy and the implications that austerity programs have for the understanding of political debate in the full area of integration at both national and supranational levels.

**Concluding Remarks**

This thesis focuses on how the European public sphere has recently hosted a focused debate on the integration of Muslims, one that reflects a mainly European concern toward imparting national culture and values to newcomers. My goal is to assess shared strategies of discourse through which civic integration is articulated, depending on the cultural and political particularities of each national context. Starting from this point, I draw on a theoretical approach based on the model of horizontal convergence, to apply to this comparative analysis. I then reconstruct through a critical discourse analysis, the political debate that has emerged across Europe in response to the problems concerning the integration of Muslims and secondly, I identify those commonalities in national debates by looking into the shared strategies through which the civic integration discourse is articulated, depending on the cultural and political particularities of national contexts.

The evidence from this study suggests the discourse of civic integration is based on a strong conviction that Muslim integration can be realised through the promotion of those liberal values necessary to avoid cultural conflict and maintain social cohesion. However, such a discourse appears problematic because it tends to overstate the degree to which liberal values are universal in Europe. Second, civic integration is often reinforced with a normative paradigm that seeks to secure the identity of the national majority, regardless of the social and cultural needs of newcomers.

In the reality of an increasingly multicultural and diverse Europe – where immigration plays a much larger role than in the near past – such an insistence on
identity or culture, even an insistence on universal rights, risks being socially and culturally divisive rather than unifying, as it can potentially reinforce perceptions of minorities as an eternal Other (Kymlicka, 2010:99). As Withe noted, how we define the European *demos* is an ideological matter (2008: 115), and is bound up in a broader question of how the Other comes to be represented. Moreover, the attempt to create a civic identity based on the reproduction of “non-negotiable and non-questionable” European values raises “doubts about the transformative potential enacted by the European project, particularly considering the possibility of a cosmopolitan Europe capable of embracing diversity” (Mavelli, 2012: 107).

There are a number of important considerations that need to be made here regarding the process of integration in Europe of Muslims and in general of immigrants. Sociological surveys show that Muslims have started becoming an integral part of European societies and embracing national identities and liberal values. Certainly, this process is not without resistance on the part of a small minority but will continue if integration takes a “two-way process of adaptation” concerning changes in “values, norms and behaviour” for both immigrants and members of the hosting society (Castles et al., 2002: 115). Therefore, the realisation of a new model of integration and citizenship for Muslims is a significant challenge for European countries, which must combine the reasonable regulation of migratory flows with a view of an approach that grants Muslims political status and social equality. While the assumption that integration is primarily or solely about cultural and symbolic politics depends on a total misunderstanding of any advancements that immigrants are doing to be an integral part of Europe (Kymlica 2010: 102).

What is necessary is a dialogue between the majority and the newcomers. But this is possible only if integration policies recognise that the specificity of Europe is based on a culture of tolerance and respect for diversity and not on a universal civilisation to impose to minorities. Therefore, Europeans should approach Muslims with respect and a willingness to listen and learn. Central to this is the construction of an inclusive European public sphere in which Muslims can make proposals and raise objections, to bargain and have representation beyond and independently of their belonging to any national identity or state.
Appendix 1: Nicolas Sarkozy, "Respecter ceux qui arrivent, respecter ceux qui accueillent"

France and Swiss minaret vote
guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 9 December 2010

[1] The Swiss referendum vote against the construction of new minarets raises many legitimate issues. Can one really be expected to answer yes or no to such a complex question, as the Swiss were asked to do? This is a problem that should really be resolved on a case by case basis, respecting everyone's convictions and beliefs.

[6] But the reaction in some French political and media circles has been astonishing. Behind the violence of their positions lies a visceral contempt for everything that comes from the people. When we become deaf to the people – indifferent to their problems, feelings and aspirations – we feed populism. This distrust of the people always ends badly. How can we be surprised by the success of extremists when we ignore the unhappiness of voters?

[13] What happened reminds me of the way the rejection of the European constitution in 2005 was received. To reconcile the France that voted yes with the one that voted no, one had to try to understand what the French meant by the no vote. We had to admit that a majority of French – like a majority of Irish and Dutch – had consciously rejected a Europe they felt was becoming more and more indifferent to them.

[19] Since we could not change the people, we had to change Europe. The France that said no began to be reconciled with the one that said yes from the moment when, instead of judging, we sought to understand. Only then was France able to lead the fight to change Europe. Instead of vilifying the Swiss, we would do better to ask ourselves what their vote revealed. Why did Switzerland, a country with a long tradition of openness, hospitality and tolerance, express itself with such hostility? And how would the French have answered the same question?

[27] The Swiss vote has nothing to do with religious freedom or freedom of conscience. No one, in Switzerland or anywhere else, questions these fundamental freedoms. Europeans are welcoming and tolerant: it is in their nature and culture. But they do not want their way of life to be undermined, and the feeling that one's identity is being lost can cause deep unhappiness. The more open the world – the greater the traffic of ideas, people, capital and goods – the more we need anchors and benchmarks, and the more we need to feel that we are not alone. National identity is the antidote to tribalism and sectarianism.

[36] Respecting new arrivals means allowing them to pray in decent places of
worship. We do not respect people by forcing them to practise their
religion in cellars or warehouses. We do not respect our own values
by accepting such a situation. Laïcité (secularism) is not the rejection
of religion, but respect for all faiths. When I was interior minister, I created
the French Council of the Muslim Faith so that Islam was put on an
equal footing with the other major religions.

Respecting those who welcome you means trying not to offend them: it
means respecting their values, beliefs, laws, traditions, and making – at
least in part – your own. It means endorsing the equality of men and
women, laïcité, and the separation of the temporal from the spiritual.
I will do everything to ensure that French Muslims enjoy the same
rights as all other citizens. I will fight all forms of discrimination.

But I also want to tell them that in our country, where Christian
civilisation has left a lasting mark, where republican values are part of
our national identity, anything that could be regarded as a challenge to
those values would scupper the creation of the kind of French Islam that,
without undermining any of its core beliefs, shares our social and civic
contract.

Whatever our beliefs, we must avoid provoking others and must realise
how lucky we are to inhabit a free country. We must practice religion
discreetly – not through any lack of faith, but out of fraternal respect
for those whose beliefs we do not share, but with whom we want to live.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/dec/09/france-swiss-
minaret-vote-muslims

This is an edited and translated extract from an article that appeared in Le
Monde, 9th December 2009

http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2009/12/08/m-sarkozy-respecter-ceux-
qui-arrivent-respecter-ceux-qui-accueillent_1277422_3232.html
Appendix 2: Merkel’s speech at the “Junge Union” Conference

Potsdam, 16 October, 2010

Dear Philipp Missfelder, dear friends of the Junge Union.

[1] This year I am here. Last year there wasn’t a website which was blocked by the Konrad-Adenauer-House, either. I reread everything that was being circulated, and I think it’s good that today, here in Potsdam, in Babelsberg, we can talk about what the responsibilities of our times are, how we can engage in policy-making for the people. And I believe it’s worth looking back again at the last 20 years. Back then the German parliamentary session could not have been held in Babelsberg—or perhaps it could have. And a few days ago, when we were very near here, in Berlin with Helmut Kohl for 14 days, we thought about the unity party convention of the Christian Democratic Union, about this incredible time in which suddenly something had started to move that the vast majority in Germany had already given up hope in. Namely, that the Cold War had ended, that Germans were united again and that the Christian Democratic Union could, as well as the CSU, say: It was worth it to stick to our ideals, it was worth it to stand for German unity. Even though it was a goal that didn’t look realistic for many years, it was right to stick to this goal, because, dear friends, values must be protected even if they aren’t attainable at the time.

[2] And for those of you who were still relatively young at the time, or even younger, these are probably just stories

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[1] Dieses Jahr bin ich hier. Es wurde letztes Jahr auch keine Internetseite vom Konrad Adenauer Haus aus gesperrt. Ich habe es nochmal nachgelesen, was da alles so im Umlauf war, und ich glaube, dass es gut ist, dass wir heute hier in Potsdam in Babelsberg miteinander darüber sprechen können, was die Aufgaben unserer Tage sind. Wie wir Politik für die Menschen machen können und es lohnt sich glaube ich nochmal 20 Jahre zurück zu blicken. Da wäre ein Deutschlandtag nicht in Babelsberg abhaltbar gewesen oder doch gerade schon. Und wir haben vor wenigen Tagen, 14 Tagen mit Helmut Kohl, ganz nah hier in Berlin noch mal an den Vereinigungsparteitag der Christlich Demokratischen Union gedacht. An diese unglaubliche Zeit, in der plötzlich etwas in Bewegung kam, was die allermeisten in Deutschland ja schon gar nicht mehr geglaubt hatten. Nämlich: dass der kalte Krieg zu Ende war, dass die Mauer gefallen ist, dass die Deutschen wieder vereint waren und dass die Christlich Demokratische Union sagen konnte, genauso wie die CSU, es hat gelohnt, an Idealen festzuhalten, es hat sich gelohnt für die Deutsche Einheit einzustehen. Auch wenn es ein Ziel war, was viele viele Jahre als nicht realistisch aussah, so war es richtig an diesem Ziel festzuhalten, weil man Werte verteidigen muss, auch wenn sie noch nicht erreichbar sind liebe Freunde.

[2] Und für Sie, die Sie damals noch relativ jung oder ganz klein waren, ist das ja inzwischen Erzählung aus der Geschichte.

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4 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WaEg8aM4fcc
about history. But history, that’s the foundation on which we build and from which we take the responsibilities of our time. That is why German unity is a success story and that is why we can be proud that we had German unity with Helmut Kohl as Chancellor. And that’s why it was good that back then a Christian-Liberal Coalition was ruling. There’s no doubt that if Lafontaine had said that back then, who knows, dear friends, if I’d be standing here today?

[3] And now, since last year, we have again the possibility to engage in policy-making in a Christian-Liberal Coalition. Philip Missfelder has indicated what he expects. I think these expectations of our party’s youth organisations are absolutely legitimate. We are living in a time when many things have to be decided. Two years ago a fundamental financial and economic crisis began. A crisis that taught us a lesson, a lesson that is also of great importance for us as Christian Democrats: namely, this crisis has taught us that freedom is essential, which we also saw in 1989/90. Freedom is the prerequisite for democracy, but freedom is not arbitrary. Freedom as we understand it is not a freedom of something but a freedom to something. A freedom to take responsibility.

[4] What we accomplished with the end of the Cold War, defeating the dictatorship, socialism, communism, could turn out to be just as reprehensible if we have freedoms that know no more responsibilities. And in the financial markets that kind of freedom has been prevailing. That is why the financial markets must be regulated. The financial markets and also the stakeholders there, the products there—for such things we also have a responsibility. Market excesses should never happen. That is the lesson of the international financial crisis. All this is a confirmation of what has made


Germany so strong over the last 60 years, namely the social market economy of a responsible, free, economic order.

[5] The global economic crisis that resulted from the financial crisis has been profound. That’s the situation that we, in the year 2010, have before us. You who are sitting here today will, in the next 20 years want to build our country in whichever sector you choose. And so the questions arise: What are our tasks? What do they mean? First, what I say to you is this: We have to think about what the situation will be in the world after this crisis. As I have always said: We in Germany want to come out of this crisis stronger than we were when we entered it. Secondly: during such a crisis the deck of cards will be reshuffled. That's exactly what we are experiencing now. We have strong Asian markets. China, for instance, has become a lively, challenging competitor. And we can't simply say: We don’t like that. We have to stand up to the competition if we want to preserve our prosperity.

[6] The second challenge that lies before us concerns the change in our society’s age demographic. Happily people are getting older and we have more medical options, but there are fewer young people in our country. In 1990 the average age was 35, today it is 42 and in 2030 it will be 58. This is the reality. Regarding this, nothing more will change. Now is the question: What political power has the opportunity and the courage and can make the decisions that will lead us to the right answer to this challenge? I think we all agree: We don't want to have lived only in the past in prosperity, security and freedom; we want this just as much for future generations. That is the task we have to accomplish. That is why our Christian-

Finanzkrise. Das alles ist eine Bestätigung dessen, was Deutschland seit 60 Jahren stark macht, nämlich der sozialen Marktwirtschaft, einer verantworteten, freiheitlichen Wirtschaftsordnung.


Liberal Coalition has as its mission setting the right course for Germany for the next 10 to 20 years. As part of this we’ll need to anticipate some very unpleasant findings.

[7] Since the last big coalition—not the one from 2005-2009 but from the late 60's—federal politics has been accustomed to spending more than it has brought in. This has led to a huge mountain of debt, which we all have to deal with now. And if we do not want your generation and your children to have no opportunity whatsoever to shape their future, we must drastically change course. That’s why it was right that the CDU/CSU was the driving force in incorporating the debt ceiling into the Constitution and in saying: We must stop living on credit. We cannot continuously draw cheques on the future. We have to make do with what we have.

[8] When the left so often debates what justice is in our time, then I say: The biggest injustice is simply living day to day and not caring about the future. We are partners in justice when we reduce our debts and finally start making realistic financial policies. That has a different meaning with our coexistence in Europe. Europe is our present and our future, which has in the context of Europe once again a totally different meaning. We have experienced it before, what happens in such a crisis, when countries haven’t got solid finances and nobody believes anymore that someday they’ll pay back their debts. That was the case with Greece, and later also the rescue of the whole euro. And look—you can speculate as much as you like whether we acted too soon or too late, I had a very strong opinion and I’m not going
einig: Wir wollen nicht nur, dass wir in der Vergangenheit im Wohlstand gelebt haben und in Sicherheit und Frieden, wir wollen, das für die künftigen Generationen genau so. Das ist unsere Aufgabe, die wir erfüllen. Deshalb hat unsere christlich-liberale Koalition die Aufgabe, die Weichen für Deutschland für die nächsten 10 und 20 Jahre richtig zu stellen. Da muss man mit sehr unangenehmen Befunden rechnen.


[8] Wenn so oft von der linken Seite darüber diskutiert wird, was denn Gerechtigkeit in unserer Zeit ist, dann sage ich: das Ungerechteste ist, einfach in den Tag hinein zu leben und sich nicht um die Zukunft zu kümmern. Wir sind Gerechtigkeitspartner, wenn wir Schulden abbauen und endlich realistische Finanzpolitik machen. Das ganze hat in unserem Zusammenleben in Europa, Europa ist unsere Gegenwart und unsere Zukunft, das hat im Kontext mit Europa noch einmal eine ganz andere Bedeutung. Wir haben es früher erlebt, was passiert in einer solchen Krise, wenn einige Länder überhaupt keine soliden Finanzen mehr haben und niemand mehr daran glaubt, dass sie ihre Schulden eines Tages zurück zahlen. Das war der Fall Griechenland; später noch die Rettung des gesamten Euro.
to depart from it now or in the future. When we have a strong euro, then isn’t time to say: ‘Now we need a little solidarity.’ No, the prerequisite for solidarity in Europe is that each and every country does its homework. That’s what we were expecting from Greece.

[9] And in connection to this the much talked about topic has been: Is Germany still European? Do we still feel responsible for the heritage of Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl? I say: Of course! If we had gone through this economic crisis without the euro, we would have had a very, very difficult time. We would have had to constantly rely on currencies. But I also say, to defend the legacy of Helmut Kohl and Konrad Adenauer, the precondition is that we are committed to a reasonably stable culture in Europe. That is the basis for a common currency and it must not be doubted. But precisely because of that it is necessary that we set a good example. Because if we don't do our homework others will not accept the demands that we make.

[10] Solid financial policies are a prerequisite for justice in our country. We must ask ourselves: What do we want to be in 10 years? In 20 years? I think we are doing the right thing if we say, Germany should be an industrial country! An industrial country! This also means that we establish a sensible energy policy. An energy policy that is not dominated by desires and ideologies but an energy policy that is oriented toward the future, that says: Yes, we want to reach the age of renewable energy, but that at the same time says: We...
want to keep our jobs, we want affordable electricity and we want to guarantee the security of the energy supplies in our country. These are the three points on which we’re focusing our energy plan. Therefore a full commitment to renewable energies is needed.

[11] But I can’t charge blindly forward and make this happen tomorrow. I need bridges that lead me into this age of renewable energies and that, at the same time, allow people to continue living in prosperity. This is exactly what we are doing. That’s why we say that, to a certain extent, we’ll need to extend the lifespan of the nuclear power plants. And we’ll still need to use coal as an energy source for a certain period of time. These bridges will take us more quickly, not more slowly, to the age of renewable energies. In addition, I say that whoever wants to establish renewable energy sources in Germany must also be willing to build new infrastructure. We will need hundreds of kilometres of new power lines. High-voltage power lines.

[12] And, dear friends, if one is in favour of wind energy or solar energy but wherever a powerline is to be installed suddenly joins the citizens’ initiative, that just doesn’t make sense! That is why it will be very important to talk with the people at this point about how we will implement change. We can be happy that we were all born in a country where there are already electrical lines and the railroads tracks have already been laid. Otherwise it would be quite difficult to know whether we would still manage to enforce electrification and railway building.

Energien erreichen, die aber gleichzeitig sagt: wir wollen unsere Arbeitsplätze halten, wir wollen Strom bezahlbar lassen und wir wollen die Versorgungssicherheit in unserem Lande garantieren. Das sind die drei Punkte, an denen wir unser Energiekonzept ausrichten. Deshalb ein uneingeschränktes Bekenntnis zu den erneuerbaren Energien.


[12] Und, liebe Freunde, wenn das so aussieht, dass man zwar für die Windenergie, die Sonnenenergie ist, aber überall, wo 'ne Leitung verlegt werden soll, ist man Mitglied der Bürgerinitiative, dann geht das nicht zusammen! Deshalb wird es ganz wichtig sein, an dieser Stelle mit den Menschen darüber zu sprechen, wie wir Veränderungen durchsetzen. Wir können ja froh sein, dass wir alle in einem Land geboren wurden, wo es schon elektrische Leitungen gab und Bahnscihien schon fertig waren. Ansonsten hätten wir es ja ganz schwer, ob wir es noch schaffen würden, die Elektrifizierung und die Eisenbahnifizierung durchzusetzen, steht im Raum.
But we are also making a contribution in our generation to modernisation and change, whether through road construction and railway projects, as indeed they are represented here, or whether through new high-voltage power lines or broadband connections. All of this is our task, otherwise we will lose touch with the future. And now I say quite clearly: I believe that the road project, which is also a European project, from Paris to Bratislava, through Hungary and on to Turkey, is a really important one for Europe. And I think we all have grounds for advocating for Stuttgart 21. But—and people are smiling in the second row because I said “but”—I’m saying merely that the railway is still not finished. And herein lies the task: you, we, are sitting here with this enthusiasm for these projects, and with this enthusiasm we have to go to the people and convince them.

Politics functions today and this is something beautiful. It can no longer be the case in Germany, after the successful unification that one can decree by order of the mufti that something will now be done a certain way. Rather the people expect from us—and rightly so—that we talk with them about our projects. And you can see from the ‘western runway’ construction project, for example, that we learned something. When you ask Roland Koch or anyone else in Hesse what was done to implement the new runway project at the airport, there were endless discussions. And that’s why it’s our task now to make it clear that there are many who are also for Stuttgart 21 and who aren’t afraid to bring into discussions those who have doubts today and try and convince them. That is the task we have today in the modern world.

The central task, if we want to be an
industrial country, is surely to talk about how it looks in the job market. When I became the Federal Chancellor five years ago the situation in the winter of 2005 was such that a large German magazine opened with the correspondingly large letters: “5 Million Unemployed! Mrs. Merkel, They Are Now Yours!” Well, I still found them to be Schröder's fault but now they were mine. And, dear friends, today, five years later, we are at 3 million! That is our success. Our success. It is not only our success. Medium and large companies, trade unions, employers all worked together. But without reasonable framework requirements it could not have been accomplished.

[16] Let me add, also in light of our changing age demographics, that every year there are now 200,000 more people retiring than there are young people entering the job market. It is now time to fight for each and everyone so that they can receive employment. Three million unemployed is too many and jobs for all must remain the goal of our politics. Even if this isn’t feasible tomorrow and perhaps not the day after tomorrow, it must be done! We know that we have 2 million long-term unemployed. That is too much! In the federal budget we spend €40 billion on long-term unemployment, the local governments spend another €10 billion. Imagine if we could manage to find a job for half of the 2.2 million people.

[17] Therefore, and I state this quite clearly, we will not rest until we have tried to give everyone an opportunity through training and reintegration. We cannot give in to the faint cry asking us to allow increased immigration again until we have made every effort to qualify our own people and give them a chance. Among these 2.2 million we have 700,000 single mothers because of the


lack of childcare. Indeed, Ursula von der Leyen did the right thing as Federal Minister for Family Affairs when she put the emphasis on childcare.

[18] And 1.3 million of those 2.2 million are people over the age of 50. Let me tell you one more thing: If we don't start thinking differently as a whole society, from the company policies to the trade unions, and say that people over 50 must have a chance in our job market, that they don’t belong to the ‘scrap heap’, so to speak, and are no longer employable, if we can't treat older and more experienced people differently, judge them differently, then we will as a society fail. This is not a humane society!

[19] Therefore, our task is as follows: of course people at an advanced age (when someone such as myself who is 56 talks about an advanced age at 50, it’s funny, but that’s the way it is)—in any case, if these people are not given the chance and the hope of also having a job when they pass 60 then the debate about raising the retirement age to 67 becomes, of course, quite difficult. When we see how the life expectancy is increasing then it’s clear that there are, indeed, no reasonable alternatives to the decision we have taken to extend the working life.

[20] I ask you sincerely in your discussions with the young members of the Green Party and the SPD to keep putting pressure on these pain points. What is being done time and again in the SPD under Mr. Gabriel’s leadership, counter to what Franz Müntefering was doing, has nothing, qualifizieren und ihnen eine Chance zu geben. Und bei diesen 2,2 Mill. haben wir etwa 700 000 alleinerziehende Mütter. Da mangelt es an Kinderbetreuung. Deshalb hat Ursula von der Leyen es richtig gemacht, dass sie als Familienministerin einen Schwerpunkt auf Kinderbetreuung gesetzt hat.

[18] Und 1.3 Millionen von den 2.2 Mill. sind Menschen, die über 50 sind. Jetzt sage ich Ihnen ein Weiteres: wenn wir nicht ein gesamtgesellschaftliches Umdenken von der Politik über die Unternehmen bis hin zu den Gewerkschaften bekommen, die sagen, Menschen über 50 müssen eine Chance auf unserem Arbeitsmarkt haben, die gehören nicht sozusagen als ‘Altes Eisen’ benannt und nicht mehr als nicht vermittelbar. Wenn wir das nicht schaffen, dass wir mit denen, die älter sind, mit denen, die Erfahrung haben, anders umgehen, sie anders einzuschätzen, dann werden wir als Gesellschaft scheitern. Das ist doch keine menschliche Gesellschaft!


[20] Ich bitte Sie ganz herzlich, auch in Ihren Gesprächen mit den Jungen aus der Grünen Partei und auch der SPD, legen Sie den Finger immer wieder in die Wunden. Was dort in der SPD immer wieder gemacht wird, unter Führung von Herrn Gabriel, gegen das, was Franz Müntefering gemacht
absolutely nothing to do with future- or reality-politics. But the precondition is also that we make it a norm for one to still be employable at 50 after losing one’s job.

[21] And, dear friends, now that we have recalculated the Hartz IV reforms, I believe herein lies another social debate of great importance: when children today are writing down as their career aspiration ‘Hartz IV’ something has gone wrong in our society. Hartz IV, long-term unemployment, that is an expression for rapid minimum subsistence income, that is an expression of our understanding of society: we say that those in need, who need the solidarity of the community, will also get it.

[22] But the task remains—this is the true sense of encouraging and challenging people—that long-term unemployment is not a life destiny, rather one must do everything possible to get out of it. And therefore it was right, regarding the Hartz IV reforms and the minimum subsistence income, to say, We’re taking the alcohol and cigarettes away because it must be worth it to them to earn some money themselves and be a part of society’s working life. In other words, when we do this we say to people: We will support you in an emergency situation, but we also have a task for you, everyone of you who can contribute something to society must do this as well. This discussion has to be held with the utmost determination.

[23] Besides the retirement pensions we need to also be concerned with the future of our healthcare system. This, I tell you, is the most difficult subject in all developed industrial societies. Take a look at other countries, how they’re battling over the
I want to say one more thing about our health care reform because most people like hearing the details on this topic. What we are doing is of great important, a decisive turning point, and it is the following: For 60 years we have linked the costs for health care to labour costs. We are now in a situation where we are saying, and this must be told to the people: if we don't want a two-tiered health system then health care expenses will have to increase. People are getting older, the medical possibilities are getting better, but under no circumstances does health care get cheaper. Efficiencies can be improved and all but on the whole it will get more expensive. When it does get more expensive and when the international competition for work gets stronger, if I don't want a two-tiered health system I can no longer couple the rising cost of health care to labour costs. That is what we have decided. The deeper meaning of this decoupling—and since nobody should be overextending themselves we’re, of course, going to put a ceiling on the amount and say: whoever can’t pay it themselves will be supported, but no longer through the solidarity of the contribution system and ever-growing costs but rather through the solidarity of the taxpayers. Among them, the 10% highest earning pay 50% of the income tax. That is more justice, not less justice. And that’s one thing we have to aggressively make clear in debates with the Social Democrats and the Greens. I'm saying it now, loud and clear, because I'm aware of the complexities around the health care discussions even in our ranks. All of it is important: doctors’ fees and hospital equipment, etc. Particularly important, however, is that we tell the people that we care about an equitable, sustainable health care system.
[25] Dear friends, these all are the decisions we have to make, which are currently on the table and that will set the course for Germany. That's why since autumn I've been talking about decisions. Maybe there is no final answer yet as to how, in the next 10 to 20 years, we want to live with one another. That's why it is also our job to affirm, again and again, how we see ourselves, our country and our role in the world.

[26] And again I recall the year 1989. Actually, something extraordinary happened in the former GDR—people who couldn't speak their opinions publicly for 40 years were suddenly on the streets, saying: We are the people! And since then we have been one nation! And all of us sitting here today, we are a part of this one nation and we must also say how we imagine coexisting in this nation for the next several decades. First I'll say that we are members of the CDU, the CSU or we stand near them. Before we talk about others we should first talk about us and what has always distinguished us. That's why we call ourselves Christian Democrats or Christian Socialists. This is the Christian view of man.

[27] And if we are truly honest, then we should perhaps talk once again about what this means. Because many people in our country no longer know this as they did 50 or 60 years ago. And since many people don't express it at all anymore because many around us don't believe anymore, or hardly believe, they go to church only at Christmas.


[27] Und, wenn wir mal ganz ehrlich sind, dann sollten wir vielleicht einmal mehr darüber sprechen, was das bedeutet. Weil viele Menschen in unserem Lande das nicht mehr so gut wissen, wie sie es vielleicht vor 50 und 60 Jahren wussten. Und weil viele Menschen es auch gar nicht mehr aussprechen, weil viele um uns herum gar
This means that only those who are self-aware can talk confidently to others about their identity. That is our priority. And, not surprisingly, it is written in our Constitution: Human dignity is inviolable. Every single person is important to us, every single person in our country, this is our mission, gets his chance.

[28] We talk in our policy program about equal opportunity and from this experience we give every person an opportunity to develop in our society. What so affected us as we all sat in front of our televisions following the rescue of the 33 coalminers in Chile, was that there was a country that did not give up on a single person. After 17 days they were still saying: No, we will continue looking. They found them and they saved them, and for every single man they did everything humanly possible so that he could return into daylight. That is what it means to protect the dignity of a person in an exemplary way. And so it is that each person in our society is entrusted to us. That is our Christian Democratic understanding of man.

[29] Our president Christian Wulff recently said the right thing when he said that our culture is strongly influence by the Christian-Jewish heritage. That Christianity belongs to us and that Judaism belongs to us. From this a large part of our tradition developed. And I would remind you that we received algebra and astronomy in the 10th century from the people of the Arab region—this was so much about blessings we received from other places. But he also said that Islam is also a part of Germany. It is part of Germany, and this is evident not
only in the footballer Özil.

[30] Dear friends, the question now is how we handle this issue. Integration is a central theme among the younger people of our country because the number of people with immigrant backgrounds among the younger population is increasing, not decreasing. In Frankfurt am Main, two out of three kids under the age of five have immigrant backgrounds. And we are a country that at the beginning of the 60’s brought guest workers to Germany—and now they live with us. We have been lying to ourselves for quite some time now. We said to ourselves that they’re not going to stay, at that some point they would go away. But that is not the reality.

[31] And naturally the initial approach here was to say: Now we’ll create a multicultural society and live side by side, content with each other. This approach has failed, absolutely failed and that’s why I decided, when I became the Federal Chancellor, to bring the theme of integration into the Chancellor's office, because it’s one of the most important themes of our society. There are successful examples and I think we have to start right now talking about what has been successful elsewhere. Because precisely those whom we want to integrate, they need role models. And then there are many things that have not yet succeeded. We were the ones after all who said: Yes, these people will stay with us. They have contributed to our prosperity, so they must have their share. It is not acceptable that twice as many of them have never had any schooling. It is unacceptable that nowadays we have twice as many that have not finished any vocational training. That makes us the social problems of the future, that's why integration is so important and that's why, above all, those who wish to be a part of our society must not only comply with our laws, must not only commit to the

Und der ist Teil Deutschlands. Das sieht man nicht nur am Fußballspieler Özil.


[31] Und natürlich war der Ansatz hier zu sagen: Jetzt machen wir hier mal Multikulti und leben so nebeneinander her und freuen uns über einander. Dieser Ansatz ist gescheitert, absolut gescheitert. Und deshalb haben habe ich mich entschlossen, als ich Bundeskanzlerin wurde, das Thema Integration ins Kanzleramt zu holen, weil es eines der großen Themen unserer Gesellschaft ist. Und da gibt es gelungene Beispiele und ich glaube wir müssen in der jetzigen Zeit darauf aufpassen, dass wir auch mal über das, was gescheht ist reden. Weil gerade die, die wir integrieren wollen, die brauchen Vorbilder. Und dann gibt es vieles, was auch noch nicht gelungen ist. Und wir waren doch die dann gesagt haben: Jawoll, diese Menschen werden bei uns bleiben. Sie haben zu unserem Wohlstand beigetragen, sie müssen ihr Teil haben. Es nicht geht an, dass doppelt so viele von ihnen keinen Schulabschluss haben, es geht nicht an, dass wir heute doppelt so viele keinen Berufsabschluss haben. Das macht uns die sozialen Probleme der Zukunft und deshalb ist Integration so wichtig und deshalb heißt es vor allen Dingen, das diejenigen, die teilhaben wollen an unserer Gesellschaft
constitution, but they must above all, learn our language. Learn our language and know our language—that must be of utmost importance. And that will require a lot of effort from us yet.

[32] It’s true that language tests were first held in states governed by the CDU/CSU. It is important that students who go to school at least understand their teacher, otherwise they can’t be expected to follow the curriculum. It is important and right that we direct our efforts towards obtaining vocational qualifications. And it is absolutely right and important to say that girls must go on school trips, participate in physical education; as for forced marriages we want nothing to do with that; it’s incompatible with our legislation. But, on the other hand, there has to be openness on our side, too. We have always been a country open to the world. The unifying of Europe has helped us. We are known throughout the world as a country that was the world champion in exports and is still one of the leading export nations. Of course we don’t need the kind of immigration that burdens our social system, it’s not about that, but we will need an immigration of specialists because, unfortunately, there aren’t many young Germans or immigrant children choosing subjects like natural science engineering. We definitely don’t want to be seen as a country that shuns someone who doesn’t immediately speak German or grew up with German as their mother tongue, and make them feel unwelcome here. That would harm our country to a major extent, companies would go elsewhere because they wouldn’t be able to find any more jobs with us. It’s safe to say that the challenge of the immigration issue is one of the main tasks for the near future but it’s also safe to say that we are a country that gives people a chance—this must always be the Germany’s trademark.

What has always been the strength of the CDU/CSU is its politics of measure and middle. From this arises the legitimacy to also challenge that which we are, on the other hand, supporting. And this challenge has certainly been too timid in many areas in the past. But I’ll tell you: this challenge is very concrete. A country that challenges cannot allow a youngster to break the law six, eight or nine times before proceeding to court. A country that challenges has to make sure that the police have access to every part of our country. Places where the police don’t dare to enter simply cannot exist. When I say this I’m referring not only to people with an immigrant background. When in Berlin, on the eve of May 1st in Kreuzberg, the police declare that the CDU aren’t allowed to set up a stand to advertise their principles, this is as wrong as when police officers can’t enter certain towns.

If we in this spirit as I have just presented to you, with an idea of our society of tomorrow, go with the right decisions in these matters in the next few months, then I say to you: we have all it takes to convince the people. And so, in conclusion, my request: When I open the newspaper I sometimes get rather nervous. We are not in a laboratory for theoretical physics; we are five months away from crucial state elections. Helmut Kohl has always told us one thing: “The expression ‘election campaign’ consists of ‘election’ and ‘fight.’” And what I expect, it’s not that we’ll have a theoretical discussion about this and that, no matter how, when or what the outcome of the election is. Rather, I expect each and every member of the CDU/CSU to fight for the next time. But to say, we are a land, that the people in our land have a chance, this must also always be the hallmark of Germany.

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their beliefs and to convince people. That we go out and we say, We can do it because we have the right ideas for Germany. We want to make it happen because it’s our future that’s at stake. When we go out with this statement, when we are taking care of not only ourselves but also the people, then we have all the opportunities. Despair is really not a good counsellor, nor is fear. Rather, let’s go straight to the point, straight to the people we must convince. We have a lot to do and, it’s true, we have been fighting too much. But now the task until March and until next year is to fight, work, and advertise—everyone altogether. Heartfelt thanks!

Ausgang passiert, sondern ich erwarte von jedem einzelnen in der Union, dass er für seine Überzeugungen kämpft, dass er die Menschen überzeugt. Dass wir rausgehen, dass wir sagen wir können das schaffen, weil wir die richtigen Konzepte für Deutschland haben. Wir wollen das schaffen, weil wir - weil es um unsere Zukunft geht. Wenn wir mit diesem Ansatz nach draußen gehen, wenn wir uns nicht um uns selbst kümmern, sondern auf die anderen zugehen, dann haben wir alle Chancen. Und Verzagtheit ist wirklich kein guter Ratgeber, Angst schon gar nicht, sondern ran an die Sache, ran an die Menschen, die wir überzeu gen müssen. Da haben wir viel zu tun, da haben wir uns zuviel gestritten, aber jetzt heißt die Aufgabe bis zum März und zum nächsten Jahr kämpfen, arbeiten, werben und alle miteinander. Herzlichen Dank!
Appendix 3: Cameron’s Speech at Munich Security Conference

Munich, Saturday 5 February 2011

[1] Today I want to focus my remarks on terrorism, but first let me address one point. Some have suggested that by holding a strategic defence and security review, Britain is somehow retreating from an activist role in the world. That is the opposite of the truth. Yes, we are dealing with our budget deficit, but we are also making sure our defences are strong. Britain will continue to meet the NATO 2% target for defence spending. We will still have the fourth largest military defence budget in the world. At the same time, we are putting that money to better use, focusing on conflict prevention and building a much more flexible army. That is not retreat; it is hard headed.

[2] Every decision we take has three aims in mind. First, to continue to support the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Second, to reinforce our actual military capability. As Chancellor Merkel’s government is showing right here in Germany, what matters is not bureaucracy, which frankly Europe needs a lot less of, but the political will to build military capability that we need as nations and allies, that we can deliver in the field. Third, we want to make sure that Britain is protected from the new and various threats that we face. That is why we are investing in a national cyber security programme that I know William Hague talked about yesterday, and we are sharpening our readiness to act on counter-proliferation.

[3] But the biggest threat that we face comes from terrorist attacks, some of which are, sadly, carried out by our own citizens. It is important to stress that terrorism is not linked exclusively to any one religion or ethnic group. My country, the United Kingdom, still faces threats from dissident republicans in Northern Ireland. Anarchist attacks have occurred recently in Greece and in Italy, and of course, yourselves in Germany were long scarred by terrorism from the Red Army Faction. Nevertheless, we should acknowledge that this threat comes in Europe overwhelmingly from young men who follow a completely perverse, warped interpretation of Islam, and who are prepared to blow themselves up and kill their fellow citizens. Last week at Davos I rang the alarm bell for the urgent need for Europe to recover its economic dynamism, and today, though the subject is complex, my message on security is equally stark. We will not defeat terrorism simply by the action we take outside our borders. Europe needs to wake up to what is happening in our own countries. Of course, that means strengthening, as Angela has said, the security aspects of our response, on tracing plots, on stopping them, on counter-surveillance and intelligence gathering.

[4] But this is just part of the answer. We have got to get to the root of the problem, and we need to be absolutely clear on where the origins of where these terrorist attacks lie. That is the existence of an ideology, Islamist extremism. We should be equally clear what we mean by this term, and we must distinguish it from Islam. Islam is a religion observed peacefully and devoutly by over a billion people. Islamist extremism is a political ideology supported by a minority. At the furthest end are those who back terrorism to promote their ultimate goal: an entire Islamist
realm, governed by an interpretation of Sharia. Move along the spectrum, and you
find people who may reject violence, but who accept various parts of the extremist
worldview, including real hostility towards Western democracy and liberal values.
It is vital that we make this distinction between religion on the one hand, and
political ideology on the other. Time and again, people equate the two. They think
whether someone is an extremist is dependent on how much they observe their
religion. So, they talk about moderate Muslims as if all devout Muslims must be
extremist. This is profoundly wrong. Someone can be a devout Muslim and not be
an extremist. We need to be clear: Islamist extremism and Islam are not the same
thing.

[5] This highlights, I think, a significant problem when discussing the terrorist threat
that we face. There is so much muddled thinking about this whole issue. On the
one hand, those on the hard right ignore this distinction between Islam and Islamist
extremism, and just say that Islam and the West are irreconcilable – that there is a
clash of civilizations. So, it follows: we should cut ourselves off from this religion,
whether that is through forced repatriation, favoured by some fascists, or the
banning of new mosques, as is suggested in some parts of Europe. These people
fuel Islamophobia, and I completely reject their argument. If they want an example
of how Western values and Islam can be entirely compatible, they should look at
what’s happened in the past few weeks on the streets of Tunis and Cairo: hundreds
of thousands of people demanding the universal right to free elections and
democracy.

[6] The point is this: the ideology of extremism is the problem; Islam emphatically
is not. Picking a fight with the latter will do nothing to help us to confront the
former. On the other hand, there are those on the soft left who also ignore this
distinction. They lump all Muslims together, compiling a list of grievances, and
argue that if only governments addressed these grievances, the terrorism would stop.
So, they point to the poverty that so many Muslims live in and say, ‘Get rid of this
injustice and the terrorism will end.’ But this ignores the fact that many of those
found guilty of terrorist offences in the UK and elsewhere have been graduates and
often middle class. They point to grievances about Western foreign policy and say,
‘Stop riding roughshod over Muslim countries and the terrorism will end.’ But there
are many people, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, who are angry about Western
foreign policy, but who don’t resort to acts of terrorism. They also point to the
profusion of unelected leaders across the Middle East and say, ‘Stop propping these
people up and you will stop creating the conditions for extremism to flourish.’ But
this raises the question: if it’s the lack of democracy that is the problem, why are
there so many extremists in free and open societies?

[7] Now, I’m not saying that these issues of poverty and grievance about foreign
policy are not important. Yes, of course we must tackle them. Of course we must
tackle poverty. Yes, we must resolve the sources of tension, not least in Palestine,
and yes, we should be on the side of openness and political reform in the Middle
East. On Egypt, our position should be clear. We want to see the transition to a
more broadly-based government, with the proper building blocks of a free and
democratic society. I simply don’t accept that there is somehow a dead end choice
between a security state on the one hand, and an Islamist one on the other. But let us
not fool ourselves. These are just contributory factors. Even if we sorted out all of
the problems that I have mentioned, there would still be this terrorism. I believe the root lies in the existence of this extremist ideology. I would argue an important reason so many young Muslims are drawn to it comes down to a question of identity.

[8] What I am about to say is drawn from the British experience, but I believe there are general lessons for us all. In the UK, some young men find it hard to identify with the traditional Islam practiced at home by their parents, whose customs can seem staid when transplanted to modern Western countries. But these young men also find it hard to identify with Britain too, because we have allowed the weakening of our collective identity. Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We’ve even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values.

[9] So, when a white person holds objectionable views, racist views for instance, we rightly condemn them. But when equally unacceptable views or practices come from someone who isn’t white, we’ve been too cautious frankly – frankly, even fearful – to stand up to them. The failure, for instance, of some to confront the horrors of forced marriage, the practice where some young girls are bullied and sometimes taken abroad to marry someone when they don’t want to, is a case in point. This hands-off tolerance has only served to reinforce the sense that not enough is shared. And this all leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless. And the search for something to belong to and something to believe in can lead them to this extremist ideology. Now for sure, they don’t turn into terrorists overnight, but what we see – and what we see in so many European countries – is a process of radicalisation.

[10] Internet chatrooms are virtual meeting places where attitudes are shared, strengthened and validated. In some mosques, preachers of hate can sow misinformation about the plight of Muslims elsewhere. In our communities, groups and organisations led by young, dynamic leaders promote separatism by encouraging Muslims to define themselves solely in terms of their religion. All these interactions can engender a sense of community, a substitute for what the wider society has failed to supply. Now, you might say, as long as they’re not hurting anyone, what is the problem with all this?

[11] Well, I’ll tell you why. As evidence emerges about the backgrounds of those convicted of terrorist offences, it is clear that many of them were initially influenced by what some have called ‘non-violent extremists’, and they then took those radical beliefs to the next level by embracing violence. And I say this is an indictment of our approach to these issues in the past. And if we are to defeat this threat, I believe it is time to turn the page on the failed policies of the past. So first, instead of ignoring this extremist ideology, we – as governments and as societies – have got to confront it, in all its forms. And second, instead of encouraging people to live apart, we need a clear sense of shared national identity that is open to everyone.

[12] Let me briefly take each in turn. First, confronting and undermining this ideology. Whether they are violent in their means or not, we must make it
impossible for the extremists to succeed. Now, for governments, there are some obvious ways we can do this. We must ban preachers of hate from coming to our countries. We must also proscribe organisations that incite terrorism against people at home and abroad. Governments must also be shrewder in dealing with those that, while not violent, are in some cases part of the problem. We need to think much harder about who it’s in the public interest to work with. Some organisations that seek to present themselves as a gateway to the Muslim community are showered with public money despite doing little to combat extremism. As others have observed, this is like turning to a right-wing fascist party to fight a violent white supremacist movement. So we should properly judge these organisations: do they believe in universal human rights – including for women and people of other faiths? Do they believe in equality of all before the law? Do they believe in democracy and the right of people to elect their own government? Do they encourage integration or separation? These are the sorts of questions we need to ask. Fail these tests and the presumption should be not to engage with organisations – so, no public money, no sharing of platforms with ministers at home.

[13] At the same time, we must stop these groups from reaching people in publicly-funded institutions like universities or even, in the British case, prisons. Now, some say, this is not compatible with free speech and intellectual inquiry. Well, I say, would you take the same view if these were right-wing extremists recruiting on our campuses? Would you advocate inaction if Christian fundamentalists who believed that Muslims are the enemy were leading prayer groups in our prisons? And to those who say these non-violent extremists are actually helping to keep young, vulnerable men away from violence, I say nonsense.

[14] Would you allow the far right groups a share of public funds if they promise to help you lure young white men away from fascist terrorism? Of course not. But, at root, challenging this ideology means exposing its ideas for what they are, and that is completely unjustifiable. We need to argue that terrorism is wrong in all circumstances. We need to argue that prophecies of a global war of religion pitting Muslims against the rest of the world are nonsense.

[15] Now, governments cannot do this alone. The extremism we face is a distortion of Islam, so these arguments, in part, must be made by those within Islam. So let us give voice to those followers of Islam in our own countries – the vast, often unheard majority – who despise the extremists and their worldview. Let us engage groups that share our aspirations.

[16] Now, second, we must build stronger societies and stronger identities at home. Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and a much more active, muscular liberalism. A passively tolerant society says to its citizens, as long as you obey the law we will just leave you alone. It stands neutral between different values. But I believe a genuinely liberal country does much more; it believes in certain values and actively promotes them. Freedom of speech, freedom of worship, democracy, the rule of law, equal rights regardless of race, sex or sexuality. It says to its citizens, this is what defines us as a society: to belong here is to believe in these things. Now, each of us in our own countries, I believe, must be unambiguous and hard-nosed about this defence of our liberty.
[17] There are practical things that we can do as well. That includes making sure that immigrants speak the language of their new home and ensuring that people are educated in the elements of a common culture and curriculum. Back home, we’re introducing National Citizen Service: a two-month programme for sixteen-year-olds from different backgrounds to live and work together. I also believe we should encourage meaningful and active participation in society, by shifting the balance of power away from the state and towards the people. That way, common purpose can be formed as people come together and work together in their neighbourhoods. It will also help build stronger pride in local identity, so people feel free to say, ‘Yes, I am a Muslim, I am a Hindu, I am Christian, but I am also a Londoner or a Berliner too’. It’s that identity, that feeling of belonging in our countries, that I believe is the key to achieving true cohesion.

[18] So, let me end with this. This terrorism is completely indiscriminate and has been thrust upon us. It cannot be ignored or contained; we have to confront it with confidence – confront the ideology that drives it by defeating the ideas that warp so many young minds at their root, and confront the issues of identity that sustain it by standing for a much broader and generous vision of citizenship in our countries. Now, none of this will be easy. We will need stamina, patience and endurance, and it won’t happen at all if we act alone. This ideology crosses not just our continent but all continents, and we are all in this together. At stake are not just lives, it is our way of life. That is why this is a challenge we cannot avoid; it is one we must rise to and overcome. Thank you.

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