The State as Social Practice: Sources, Resources and Forces in Central Asia

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Of course the responsibility for any errors or omissions in this thesis is entirely my own.
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Abstract

This thesis is about state and society relations in Central Asia. It examines statehood comparatively in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Despite having made different political, economic, and institutional choices at independence in 1991, these countries arrived at the same outcome today: an incomplete state. In framing the problem as the incomplete state, this thesis shifts the conventional emphasis away from symptoms of state weakness toward those processes that contribute to it. It highlights the fact that the state can simultaneously be both strong and weak, omnipresent and absent. It is the blurring of the line between state and non-state, public and private, legal and illegal, formal and informal which matters for a better understanding of the state. Drawing from Charles Tilly and Michael Mann, this thesis suggests that these shadow areas generate processes of interstitial emergence that may either undermine or strengthen the state. The outcome generated by such processes is dependent on the balance between state autonomy and state embeddedness. The thesis argues that the incomplete state is a result of three sets of factors—historical, external, and local—that directly or indirectly produce processes that are counter-productive to the current state-building process. Specifically, it focuses on the societal legacy of the Soviet statehood, the strategies of state-building provided by external actors, and the balance of power between rival local elites. It demonstrates how each of these sets of factors contribute to the creation or development of sites of social resistance and the chasm between the state and society in each of the three given cases. Further, it identifies three important processes. Firstly, structural changes taken for granted following the dissolution of the Soviet Union have not necessarily altered cross-border societal interdependence at the grassroots. Secondly, the strategies pursued by external actors have indirectly created isolated pockets of land, empowered community-based civil activism and facilitated informal trade. Finally, while state elites strengthened the institution of the state, they turned it into a tool for legitimizing illicit revenues rather than a means to increase its infrastructural power. States and societies in the region have become isolated from one another. These states, empowered only in the institutional sense, have become empty shells. The societies, empowered without the state, have become captives within a game of survival. It seems that the state cannot be complete without becoming social.
### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>ACTED</td>
<td>Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asia Development Bank</td>
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<td>ASSR</td>
<td>Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<td>ATC CIS</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorist Centre of the CIS</td>
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<td>BCP</td>
<td>Border Crossing Point</td>
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<td>BFC</td>
<td>Big Fergana Canal</td>
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<td>BOMCA</td>
<td>Border Management Programme in Central Asia</td>
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<td>BWA</td>
<td>Basin Water Management Association</td>
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<td>BWO</td>
<td>Basin Water Organization</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Central Asia</td>
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<td>CADAP</td>
<td>Central Asia Drug Action Plan</td>
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<td>CAPS</td>
<td>Central Asia Power System</td>
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<td>CAREC</td>
<td>Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>CARICC</td>
<td>Central Asian Regional Information Centre</td>
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<td>CASA-1000</td>
<td>Central Asia South Asia resource-sharing scheme</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>CST</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty</td>
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<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>DCA</td>
<td>Drug Control Agency</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DUMK</td>
<td>Spiritual Muslim Directorate</td>
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<td>DWR</td>
<td>Department for Water Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>EURATOM</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<td>FAST</td>
<td>Early Recognition of Tensions and Fact Findings</td>
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<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administrated Tribal Area (Pakistan)</td>
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<td>FATF</td>
<td>Financial Action Task Force</td>
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<td>FDA</td>
<td>French Agency for Development</td>
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<td>FEWER</td>
<td>Action Plan on Conflict Response (Germany)</td>
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<td>FIEZ</td>
<td>Free Industrial Economic Zone</td>
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<td>FIU</td>
<td>Financial Investigation Unit (Kyrgyzstan)</td>
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<td>GARF</td>
<td>State Archive of the Russian Federation (Moscow)</td>
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<td>GBAO</td>
<td>Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit [German Agency for International Cooperation]</td>
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<td>Gosplan</td>
<td>State Planning Commission (USSR)</td>
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<td>HPP</td>
<td>Hydro Power Plant</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>HuT</td>
<td>Hisb-ut-Tahrir</td>
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<td>I&amp;D</td>
<td>Irrigation and Distribution</td>
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<td>IBM</td>
<td>Integrated Border Management</td>
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<td>IBTA-2</td>
<td>Institution Building Technical Assistance Project</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICNL</td>
<td>International Center for Not-for-Profit Law</td>
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<td>ICWC</td>
<td>Interstate Coordinating Water Commission</td>
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<td>IDEA</td>
<td>Integrated Data for Events Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEMP</td>
<td>Ideological, Economic, Military, Political - Michael Mann's four dimensions of power</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IMU</td>
<td>Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>IRPT</td>
<td>Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan</td>
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<td>IsDB</td>
<td>Islamic Development Bank</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (AKA Daesh or ISIL)</td>
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<td>IWM</td>
<td>Integrated Water Management</td>
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<td>KEDS</td>
<td>Kansas Events Data System</td>
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<td>KfW</td>
<td>German Development Bank</td>
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<td>KGB</td>
<td>Committee for State Security (USSR)</td>
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<td>KIC</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIPS</td>
<td>Commission for the Study of the Tribal Composition of the Population of Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
<td>Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender</td>
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<td>MVD</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MVES</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (Uzbekistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Narkomnats</td>
<td>People’s Commissariat for the Affairs of the Nationalities (USSR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBT</td>
<td>National Bank of Tajikistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBU</td>
<td>National Bank for Foreign Economic Relations (Uzbekistan)</td>
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<td>NEP</td>
<td>New Economic Policy</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NKVD</td>
<td>People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (USSR)</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>PIM</td>
<td>Participatory Irrigation Management</td>
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<td>RAND</td>
<td>RAND Corporation</td>
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<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic</td>
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<td>SAC</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Credit</td>
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<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Development Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFMC</td>
<td>South Fergana Magistral Canal</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Program</td>
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<td>SNB</td>
<td>National Security Service</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>TALCO</td>
<td>Tajik Aluminum Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRACECA</td>
<td>Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>TsARII</td>
<td>Central Agency for Development, Investment and Innovation (Kyrgyzstan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICRI</td>
<td>United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute</td>
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<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPS</td>
<td>United Power System (of Central Asia)</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>UTO</td>
<td>United Tajik Opposition</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<td>WUA</td>
<td>Water Users Association</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The State as social practice: sources, resources and forces in Central Asia

Déjà vu in the city of Osh, southern Kyrgyzstan: 2 am on 11 June 2010, an irregular azan (call to prayer) sounds from a few mosques, a warning for people to take cover. It was in response to growing tensions between Uzbek and Kyrgyz, which were deteriorating since the beginning of June. On 10 June, an Uzbek crowd armed with sticks, stones and iron bars, awaited their Kyrgyz rivals at the Hotel Alai for yet another fight over perceived injustice. Police failed to prevent the outbreak of violence, and deployed military forces handed their weapons to crowds of rural Kyrgyz who had been gathering from the suburbs of Osh. As a result, up to 470 people were killed (74% Uzbek, 25% Kyrgyz, and 1% belong to other ethnic groups). 1900 people were injured. 2843 buildings were damaged. 111 000 refugees fled to Uzbekistan. 300 000 were internally displaced (KIC 2010). Despite calls from the provisional government for international intervention, both regional and international partners declined to intervene. These tensions followed the April 2010 uprising against President Bakiev, who came to power through a similar uprising in 2005. Similar events took place in 1990, when the autonomy of Osh province was being debated.

The city of Andijan, Eastern Uzbekistan, May 13, 2005: having attacked several government buildings in Andijan, gunmen organized a jailbreak and released 23 men facing charges of religious extremism. Groups joined in a mass protest on the Babur Square. At around 5 pm, government forces sealed the square and hundreds of people were killed. Human Rights Watch called it one of the biggest massacres in Asia. Uzbekistan was internationally condemned for gross violations of human rights, torture, and dictatorship (HRW 2005; ICG 2005; FH 2005). However, regional security organizations, such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization accepted the version of events presented by Uzbekistan: that the protest was
an instance of terrorism, organized by Islamist movements. Scholars noted the extremist character of the event, organized by the radical religious organizations (Babadjanov 2015).

*Dushanbe, Tajikistan:* the political history of Tajikistan, since the end of the civil war in 1997, seems to be a minefield, with a force-majeure situation every other year. The most vivid of these were the operations against extremism and drug trafficking in Rasht in 2010, following a jailbreak; in Hujand in 2010, there was a terrorist attack on a police station, for which 50 young men were incarcerated subsequently following investigations in Hujand, Istaravshan and Isfara; there was a military operation in Badakhshan 2012; 5 October 2014 preemptive action was taken against an Opposition Rally by banning social media and SMS-services, as well as the banning of the opposition Group-24 as an extremist organization by the Supreme Court; on September 4, 2015, raids were conducted on police stations in Vakhdat town, in the vicinity of Dushanbe, resulting in the death of 22 people and government operations against the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, which was held responsible for the attacks.

These events are examples of what conventional wisdom calls “failed states”, “fragile states” or “failing states”. Mass uprisings, Islamic extremism, terrorist attacks and ethnic conflicts are among conventional causes of state failure, as well as threats to democracy and international security (FSI 2015). At the same time, malign elites or despotic regimes have been seen as explanations for state failure.

The epitome of this logic is the transitology approach to the state, which dominates debates on Central Asia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Based on an assumption that the state is a result of the rationalization of social relations, this approach sets its research problem erroneously. Firstly, Central Asian states are not all the same. They have been treated as similar cases, due to their common Soviet past. However, this Soviet past itself seemed to be misunderstood. Specifically, transitology assumed a continuity of Soviet institutions, whereas each Central Asian state has made a distinct choice in their institutional setting at the outset of
independence. Secondly, it neglects that the multi-layered history of Central Asia, which made the state in Central Asia more a result of abrupt changes and social engineering rather than institutional continuity. Finally, transitology assumes that government decentralization and market liberalization are the key features of a well-functioning state.

A variation on this approach is the good governance argument, which claims that a lack of democracy, violations of human rights, and a lack of civil society may cause violence which poses a threat to the state. However, it is debatable whether it is not in fact civil society networks using human rights rhetoric instead of malign elites which resulted in social mobilization, uprisings and violence. After all, it is local actors that seemed to resolve these issues, not regional or international actors, or civil society. In order to bring some clarity on this ambiguous approach to the state, this thesis suggests reformulating the problem as one of incomplete states, generally defined as the partial presence of a state in some functional areas and territories and its partial absence in others.

This thesis has chosen three Central Asian states which challenge these premises: Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. As shown in the opening paragraphs, all three states in the second decade of sovereignty arrived at similar outcomes in the form of incomplete state-building process. These three states, however, initially chose different institutional, political, and economic paths, which were reflected in varying degrees of government centralization and institutionalization, different approaches to economic liberalization, as well as levels of openness to independent media and the externally-sponsored NGO sector, i.e. the formal civil society. These three countries can be viewed as being on a continuum from almost isolationist and highly centralized (Uzbekistan) to the extremely liberal and open (Kyrgyzstan) with Tajikistan having undergone a specific path of “shock therapy” (read: liberalization), due to the civil war that lasted between 1992 and 1997. In this light, this thesis asks: why have three states with different degrees of state centralization, market liberalization, and civil society all experienced a similar outcome?
The goal of this thesis is to identify structures and processes that may contribute to the incompleteness of the state and challenge the linear logic of the dominant transitology approach. Drawing heavily from Charles Tilly and Michael Mann, this thesis suggests that the conventional wisdom has been largely historically and societally blind. According to Michael Mann, “factionalized states are more dangerous […], than failed states” (Mann 2005, 23). Charles Tilly (1975) provides milestones to understand how the state can become factionalized or fragmented, both territorially and functionally. Finally, both scholars draw attention to history not in its linear sense, but in the sense of identifying patterns that explain state development, drawing attention to change rather than continuity in the history of the state. Departing from these points, this thesis suggests an exploration of how different state-making settings can produce similar results in different social contexts, which factors influence this. For instance, Michael Mann has demonstrated the “dark side of democracy” by showing how its civilizational mission can cause ethnic cleansing and violence; or how dense civil society networks can actually transmit radical causes and mobilize societies, rather than protect societies from manipulation by elites, as in the case of Serbs, Croats, Hutu nationalists, and Fascists in Germany (Mann 2005). Similarly, this thesis aims to explore whether state-building projects had features that have undermining effects.

Furthermore, Central Asian states seem partially to integrate illicit parts of the economy and politics within official state-building. Tilly’s notion of the “state as organized crime” will help cast light on the political economy and history of the state, both in terms of its shadows and its formal pillars. Tilly’s approach will help avoid normative considerations and clichés, such as bandits or criminals, in order to focus on their creation and shaping instead. Finally, as the case of Osh illustrates, the elites are not always malevolent. It is sometimes the case that the elites and military are paralyzed by other structural conditions which lead to their political impotence.

The thesis will examine three dimensions that may better reveal the abridged nature of the state in central Asia. Each of these dimensions can be seen as a state engineering scheme. The
dimensions are historical, external, and local: that is of the Soviet societal legacy, external actors’ strategies, and the local elites’ struggles for power. Using navigation patterns identified by Tilly and Mann, this thesis will check how the state-building efforts have actually paved the way for the incomplete state, specifically which processes were produced, which structures were set up, and what consequences were fostered by their interaction. This will be examined through focusing on the societal consequences and human meaning of each of these grand schemes, in order to demonstrate that the incomplete state is the result of these schemes, rather than an obstacle to them.

Thus, this thesis is about three different instances of the state-building process and three different states which all started independence with discrete institutional, political, and economic settings. Despite this, nearly 20 years later they have all ended up in a situation which, in the Chapter 2, we call the incomplete state. As this thesis suggests, this happened due to three sets of factors which fostered differing patterns of interaction or disruption of state-society relations. The sets of factors are the societal legacy of Soviet statehood; external actors’ strategies for organizing security, the economy, and society; and struggles for the balance of power between local elites. This thesis will examine how and where each of these sets complements and undermines one another, and, more importantly, whether they contribute to shaping or breaking of state-society relations and what form this takes.

Organization of the thesis

The framework of this study consists primarily of three sets of explanatory factors: 1) the Soviet legacy; 2) External actors; and 3) Local Elites. The three sets of factors are first outlined individually and are then structured with a focus on the transnational and national social patterns which they produced and which have persisted even though they were disrupted after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Each set corresponds to its respective empirical chapter. The goal is not a mere
description of these three sets of factors, but rather to provide an outline of the reasoning behind them, and the societal resonances which follow. As each of these dimensions demonstrates an often mutually exclusive logic, the study shows how this mismatch contributes to sites of social resistance. The analysis strikes a balance between intrastate and interstate dimensions and highlights the points where transnational and national processes merge. To achieve this, the thesis is divided into five chapters.

Chapter 1 depicts the conceptual framework, argument, and the main propositions of this thesis. It does so in three steps. First, in section 1.1 it addresses the dominant debate on the state in Central Asia. It demonstrates that a multitude of approaches narrating Central Asian state-building can be gathered under a common denominator of transitology assumptions, i.e. that the state represents a rationalization of social relations, its history is linear, and one-size-fits-all-institution-building can bring the state to the happy endpoint in the form of liberal democracy. Section 1.2 introduces peculiarities of Central Asian states which represent a conceptual challenge to the dominant debate and the dominant state theories applied to Central Asia. Specifically, it identifies within their logic four dichotomies, challenging the logic of the transitology approaches, such as strong vs. weak state, rationality vs. irrationality of societal development, historical vs. institutional contextualization of statehoods, formal vs. informal areas of organizing social order. With the goal to resolve these dichotomies, this section provides an alternative cognitive map to shed a different light on state and society in Central Asia. This map is outlined in the thesis propositions which finalize section 1.2, and arrives at the thesis argument in section 1.3. The thesis argument draws heavily on the writings of Charles Tilly and Michael Mann. Section 1.4 provides the methodological considerations of this thesis, such as comparative case study method, and case selection strategy. The methodology is based on non-efficient or non-linear causality and draws heavily on the Tilly’s call to tackle “big structures, big processes, big comparisons” in order to provide different visions of the state formation problem. For these reasons, the thesis’ main
“variables” are called sets of explanatory factors, within which one can find different correlations and patterns, the confluence of which provides an alternative explanation of the thesis’ main problem.

Chapter 2 is about the thesis’ main research problem. Having demonstrated that measuring the state by the dichotomous categories used by the dominant state-building debate is slightly misleading, for they tell us the state has failed and at the same time that it is despotic. This chapter redefines the puzzle as a problem of incomplete state, which means that in some issues the state is omnipresent, and in others it is completely absent. The chapter achieves this in two steps. First, section 2.1 shows how the three cases in focus score on leading state measuring indices, mainly the Failed State Index. Secondly, section 2.2 shows what these indicators tell us, once applied to the four identified dichotomies and how it provides better understanding of the incompleteness of the state, potentially shifting misplaced emphases to issues which are more important for state – society relations.

Chapter 3 is labeled Soviet legacy, defined here as the social legacy that emerged out of Soviet state construction. Specifically, the chapter is about cross-border socio-economic interdependence in the Fergana Valley fostered by specific resource management and state construction during the Soviet period. It addresses the roots of re-traditionalizing societal relations at the grassroots level, such as community-based water management. It does not say that community structures reemerge as the Soviet lid has finally been opened and people have consciously chosen a path which is more natural to them, as most literature presumes. Rather, it demonstrates what processes, patterns, and needs forced people to revive the pre-Soviet memories of community-based social order. The chapter achieves this goal in three steps. Firstly, section 3.1 introduces a brief overview of the pre-Soviet societal organization and patterns of social relations in order to see whether Soviet project was actually the aforementioned pressure cooker lid or whether it had been a state constructing and identity-building project. The chapter
challenges the assumption of the successful implementation of the structural reform by unfolding the internal and external restructuring of collective farms, i.e. their land (section 3.4.1) and non-land assets (3.4.2). It claims that the macro-structure of societal interdependence with regards to key resources, especially the non-land assets, has not fully taken place, especially at the community-level. To illustrate this, the case of community-level water management around the Isfara river is addressed. In sum, this chapter provides a vivid picture of societal interdependence in the Fergana Valley and the emerging structures for self-governance resulting from the social struggles to manage resources, which had previously been managed by the collective farms.

Chapter 4 addresses the second set of explanatory factors, i.e. the external actors’ strategies related to state-building in Central Asia. It focuses on how external actors have attempted to organize security, economy and society in Central Asia, with these being managed through borders, trade and resources, and the development of NGO sector, respectively. The three sections in this chapter show a paradoxical result: isolated communities, divided by now international borders, show a high potential for transnational collective action through their socio-economic links and shared identity of resistance.

Chapter 5 examines the third set of explanatory factors derived from the elites’ struggles for domination. It is organized according to the three countries in focus, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan: Tajikistan and the ruling elite’s strategy of elimination; Uzbekistan and the ruling elite’s strategy of accommodation; Kyrgyzstan and the ruling elite’s strategy of intermingling. Its goal is to understand why three different strategies led to the same outcome, i.e. incomplete state-building. It finds that the common variable was that in each of these cases, the ruling elite aimed at gaining economic resources and the state was used as the main vehicle for doing so, despite the different means employed to achieve this. It shows that in all three cases the infrastructural power of the state and its societal embeddedness was neglected, which led to the increase of its despotic power or its omnipresence in some areas, and its absence in others, such
as some territorial domains, borderlands, and ideational sectors. In Tilly’s terms, the ruling elites achieved functional centralization and territorial fragmentation, which made their state reminiscent of their medieval counterparts. In confluence with the first two sets of factors, the suggestion is that it contributed to the increase of sites of societal resistance, thereby outsourcing the state’s political and ideological power.
CHAPTER 1: Understanding state-building in Central Asia

Introduction

Central Asia provides an interesting laboratory for understanding the processes of state-building as it is difficult to distinguish at once where state ends and non-state begins in many of the region’s states. Its complex geography, with its fluid and porous borders on one hand, and wire fences and minefields on the other, challenge conventional views on territory, sovereignty, and state-society relations. Due to its multilayered history, societal interactions have become cross-border in nature and various institutional architectures have come to overlap. Altogether, this challenges nation-based visions of statehood. At the same time, as with any new states, they have been obsessed with the Westphalian notion of sovereignty, while at the same their societies reveal features of both isolation and transnationalization. Central Asian states may begin within only a small fraction of their societies and end in exile, embodied in wider migrant communities abroad. This complexity can be analytically unpacked in order to understand the tipping points of state transformation in societally diverse regions.

This complexity is unfolded here in three stages. Firstly, this chapter examines the parts of the current debate on state-building, and the main assumptions it draws upon. Secondly, it looks at the case of Central Asia and the associated state-building processes, particularly the way they pose a conceptual challenge to the dominant themes which inform the current debate. It will provide an alternative, modified cognitive map allowing for better understanding of the state and state-building in Central Asia. It will explore the proposition that state-building in CA has been shaped by three sets of powerful forces: the legacy of the past, external actors strategies, and the struggles for power among the local elites. Finally, it provides an overview of the methodology used to arrive at the empirical evidence, which is presented to support its conceptual claims.
1.1. The dominant debate: from the heartland- to the broken-state theory

"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
Who rules the World-Island commands the world"

Mackinder’s verse (1919; 1904) captured the logic of the Great Game played between the Russian and British Empires over Central Asia since the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1813 and the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, for the region was a doorstep to India. Since Mackinder’s presentation of the theory of the Geographical Pivot of History, also known as the Heartland Theory, to the Royal Geographic Society in 1904, Central Asia has been perceived as a tabula rasa, a region without political agency beyond the interests of the Great Powers. The Heartland theory gained new life in Zbigbiew Brzezinski’s *The Grand Chessboard*, which referred to Central Asia as the “Global Balkans” and focused on conditions for “American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives” in Eurasia (Brzezinski 1998). The same theory was extended further to the “The Greater Middle East”, put forward after 9/11 with the aim of creating a common civil society across the Middle East and Central Asia.

However, since the end of the Cold War, the tabula rasa assumption and primacy of this theory have been challenged. Scholars started searching for local agency or “local actorship” in Central Asia (Kavalski 2010), as well as developing the “sovereignty index” for then newly emerged states (Ghani and Lockard 2009). Both the *Finding the local* and the “*Sovereignty index*” missions operated under the overarching umbrella of the transitology or modernization approach. Their underlining assumption was that the state is a result of rationalization of social relations, where “rationalization” means liberalization and transition to democracy.

According to the *finding the local* mission, the state’s failure was explained by two main variables: (1) the Soviet-minded elites and Soviet institutional legacy (Cummings 2011) or (2) the patrimonially-minded elites and the informal governance networks (Isaaks 2014). In both cases, these two states of backwardness or two types of path dependency were seen as obstacles to the
The arguments focusing on the “Soviet-mindedness” explain the state’s incapacity to organize its authority due to the colonial or the Soviet past. Also called “neo-colonialist theories”, these works focus on explanatory variables such as the peripheral role of the new sovereignties (Fortna 2011; Burgis 2011; Suyarkulova 2011; Cumming 2011); institutional and domestic weakness (Fawcett; Lewis in Cummings 2011); the clash between indigenous culture and Western liberalization in the post-colonial period (Adams 2011); rentierism and the inherent dependency of the new sovereignties (Ostrowski 2011; Atkin 2011). Comparing the Middle East with Central Asia, these authors acknowledge the multi-layered history of Central Asia, by identifying several Imperial legacies—Ottoman, British, French, Russian, and Soviet—as the main causes of the current state weakness (Cummings and Hinnebush 2011). All of these variables have little to do with the relations between the states and societies in Central Asia, but rather with imposed templates of societal development and the resultant path dependency. While the post-colonial literature is right to highlight the fact that history matters and that the state has largely been engineered by empires dominating Central Asia at different points in time, the direct link between the so-called colonial past and the state’s failure is weak for two reasons. Firstly, the Soviet (presumably “colonial”) past was a state-making, rather than state-breaking experience. Secondly, socio-economic relations created during the Soviet period have not yet been necessarily broken. It was the Soviet institutional architecture that was broken, not its societal fabric.

The second camp in this box focused on the neo-patrimonial elite networks that make neo-patrimonial governance possible. While the previous literature discussed focused on formalization and formal state institutions, neo-patrimonialism emerged as a theory trying to unveil the informal element of the state. More precisely, it focuses on the dichotomy between the formal and the informal (Shiek and Hensell 2012; Peyrouse 2012; Radnitz 2011; McGlinchey 2011; Fumagalli 2007; Collins 2006; Shatz 2005). Even though it is seen as an alternative to transitology,
it is also largely based on the path-dependency assumption that informs transitology. Additionally, it demonstrates a degree of normativity, which it claims to challenge (McGlinchey 2011; Isaaks 2014, 230). For example, its analysis of Central Asia and post-Soviet states evolved into an analysis of regime types and ended up blaming them for “dictatorial”, “autocratic”, “authoritarian” behaviors, as well as other malaises (McGlinchey 2011; Collins 2006; Shatz 2004). Instead of understanding how these states came to organize authority, these theorists offered a new causal line: authoritarianism and patrimonialism/informality (which they use interchangeably with the term “corruption”) cause the state’s failure. Even though they claim to be based on the Weberian notion of patrimonial authority, legitimized through charisma, they misread the classics and misuse the concept by omitting the process of legitimation from the analysis (Isaaks 2014, 230).

According to Weber (1978, 1020), pre-bureaucratic patrimonial authority or domination is legitimate insofar as it is perceived to be grounded in tradition. Regions like Africa, Central Asia, the Caucasus and other ex-Soviet states were considered to be largely based on traditional social and power structures (Collins 2006; Anderson 1997; Gleason 1997; Huskey 1995; Theobald 1982; Eisenstadt 1973; Roth 1968). Based on this logic and on the observations of the early 1990s, the literature largely focused on presidents as power holders (Cummings 2002), political elites (Roy 2000); clans, clientelism, regional networks and formal (party) political elites (Geiss 2012; Lewis 2012; Ilkhamov 2007; Schatz 2005; Luong Jones 2004; Fierman 1991). Isaaks (2014) criticizes this overstretch of the Weberian concept and suggests the concept of “multiple modernities” developed by Fourie (2012), Wagner (2010), and Eisenstadt (2003).

In sum, this approach describes the state as a complex set of tribal and kinship ties and illustrates this by cases of various African states (Collins 2006). Comparing Central Asian states to some African states, it shows the complexity of the ruling networks that are presumed to reflect states’ societal fabric. However, the unresolved puzzles arising from this literature is that if these states are so “patrimonial”, i.e. socially embedded, how come they fail to govern their societies
and face societal resistance and societal radicalization at all? In other words, their answers to not shed the light on the central question of this thesis: that is, why the state-building process in Central Asia seem incomplete.

Irrespective of the seeming sense of society, this approach views power through the lens of realist indicators, such as access to resources and coercion (Ilkhamov 2007). While some of its proponents raise the issue of charismatic legitimacy as a source of power, they see it as being backed up by coercion. As a result, the cause of the state’s incapacity to rule over a given territory is seen in terms of its failure to monopolize coercion, an important indicator of which is the existence of various non-state military groups (McGlinchey 2011). However, this take reveals certain flaws of the internal validity of this approach. If weak neo-patrimonial states back up their power by coercion, how is it that these presumably authoritarian and dictatorial countries fail to establish coercive power over their entire territory? Answers to this question also remain nebulous. For instance, in the case of Uzbekistan, the ruling elite’s network is supported by military power. However, this does not prevent the emergence of new elites in the remote provinces, whose presence prevents the consolidation of political power of the center over the entire territory. In the case of Tajikistan, the ruling elite first marginalized rival elites through coercion before eliminating them entirely through direct military intervention into their power domains. Finally, if it is true that Kyrgyzstani elites are in charge of resources that allow them to mobilize sections of society, how is it that the multiplicity of enclaves in the Fergana Valley remains largely beyond the control of the center?

In sum, the existing body of literature seems to be confused as to what constitutes the dependent variable: whether it is the state or neo-liberal projects. If it is the former, then the explanation seems to be that states fail because of what they are: Soviet-minded and neo-patrimonial. If it is the latter, then the explanation seems to be that neo-liberal state-building would succeed, were the locals not so backward and primitive. If we share the assumption that
Soviet past was an ‘evil colonial past’, then these states are simply the victims of its rule. However, were this to be the case, we would fail to find the local. Furthermore, both of these approaches seem to neglect the societal organization of Central Asia and its impact on state-building.

The branch of path dependency explanations, paying more attention to societies, is represented by the so-called neo-traditionalist approach. It focuses on the indigenous social structures or communities which are, presumably, more natural expressions of social order than the state itself and, therefore, threaten the development of the modern state (Kandiyoti 2007; Atkin 1997; Akiner 2001). With this approach, path dependency is mainly defined through the empowerment of indigenous social structures as an unintended consequence of Soviet rule, which inhibited their development (Kandiyoti 2007). While this thesis also examines the role of communities, it questions the assumptions within the neo-traditionalist approach regarding the essential indigenousness of those communities and traditions. Rather, it follows the view of Clifford Geertz (1973), who highlighted that it is for social sources of power to choose the tradition among the multiplicity of their forms. Central Asia is about diversity; the question of which tradition will flourish depends on the context of existential social needs. Furthermore, presence of communities as such cannot be a sufficient and necessary variable to explain the incomplete state.

The “sovereignty index” block is based on the assumption of neo-liberal institutionalism, i.e. that impartial, neutral institutions can best provide for society. This approach is based on the so-called “1648 myth” (Heathershaw and Lambach 2008), which considers the possibility for the state to be a rational unitary actor. For this to happen, one needs a monolithic or standardized society, which is presumed to exist. This approach is less concerned with the interaction between state and society or between society and transnational processes. Instead, it assumes that the state is the only site of political power over a given territory, as expressed in the state’s sovereignty or “domestic sovereignty” (Krasner 1999).
To measure state power, this literature provides a clear-cut system based on several functions of the state: a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence; administrative control; management of public finances; investment in human capital; delineation of citizenship rights and duties; provision of infrastructure services; formation of the market; management of the state’s assets (including the environment, natural resources, and cultural assets); international relations (including entering into international contracts and public borrowing); and, finally, the rule of law (Ghani and Lockhart 2009). This “sovereignty index” is presumed to provide a better framework to compare different weak states (Ikenberry 2008). For this reason, it has been adopted by the World Bank and the United Nations to craft their state-building programs. As can be seen from the aforementioned indicators, this approach focuses on the state’s functions. The failed states approach is technocratic and functionalist, propagating the notion that “transition” may be provided by reforms, and these reforms are provided by liberal institutions. In other words, its vision of the state is rooted in the tradition of transitology, which sees the state as a vehicle for transition (and modernization) to a liberal democratic state (Lipset 1960; Rostow 1960). In practice, as we will see in Central Asia, such indicators helped establish a vast architecture for monitoring the NGO sector in compliance with these indicators. However, the capacity of these newly emerged states, still struggling to transform their histories, has not been taken into consideration. The external sponsors believed that building liberal institutions would inevitably lead to the transformation of societies into liberal actors.

To achieve this “end point” in the history of the state, proponents of failed states theory prioritize the state institutions over its societal basis or as Mann (1993) calls it - state autonomy over state embeddedness. They promote the idea of an impartial bureaucracy, which is not necessarily socially grounded, to govern society (Rotberg 2003; Zartman 1995). In contrast, what can be interpreted as signs of existing links between the state and society, such as the integration of community based practices into the ways by which societies interact with states, are seen as
indicators of state failure. For instance, for Fearon and Laitin (2004, 6), the emergence of traditional social institutions is seen as a characteristic of a failed state. For Giustozzi (2010), the emergence of an alternative social order is a challenge to the state and indicator of state failure. More classical writers interpret this as a lack of citizens’ support for the state (Migdal 1988, 56) or simply a lack of state legitimacy, which represents a main pillar of state power.

Among the explanations for why the state cannot organize its authority over a given territory, scholars point to the post-colonial legacy, multi-ethnic or religious conflicts, poverty, and socio-economic performance (Rabasa 2007). Liberal institutions, which are partially the product of external actors, are seen as the providers of transition as well as capacity to implement reforms. Path-dependency can be overcome by building a civil society (DFID 2005; WB 2003). However, this approach’s definition of civil society is limited to a neo-liberal, institutionalist interpretation, which excludes informal or parallel forms and types of civil activism. As the state is seen as an entity “replacing tribal social organization to exercise power over a given territory” (Hall and Ikenberry 1989, 18), instances of radical social activism or social radicalization, including inter-ethnic conflicts, are seen as symptoms of state failure, not causes. The process of evolving from tribal organization into a fully-fledged state is defined as the “rationalization of social relations.” However, Central Asia still reveals both tribal and “rational” forms of social organization. Alternatively, it could be seen as different kinds of rationality, just as different versions of legitimacy exist in Weberian ideas. From this angle, radical social activism can be as much representative of the societal fabric as the formal NGO sector, which is commonly presented as the legitimate form of civil society in Central Asia.

Thus, these approaches share the view that the state should be an autonomous institution, free from so-called patrimonial networks and connections (such as tribalism and kinship). State power is used interchangeably with domestic sovereignty and is defined similarly and outlined through the “sovereignty index” above. State-society relations do not seem to be the central point
of these theories, but establishing a link between the state and populace is seen as possible through organized civil society. Civil society is seen as the means to implement reforms and overcome the past (Shah 2006). However, this thesis claims that even the protagonists of formal civil society overlook the fact that society is subjected not only to those liberal and impartial state institutions which are put in place, but also to transnational processes which emanate from beyond those institutions.

1.2. Central Asia as a “conceptual challenge” to the dominant debate on the state

Central Asian states represent a conceptual challenge to the dominant state-building debate by revealing its paradoxes and dilemmas due to the mutual coexistence of traditionalism and modernity, nationalism and internationalism, state omnipresence and state absence, fragmentation and unification. Central Asian statehood is neither entirely traditional nor entirely modern: neither liberal nor dictatorial. It has its own meanings of freedom, justice, and reason. Their elites may have patrimonial features but their societies do not necessarily reflect them. Central Asia cannot be squeezed easily into any of the major categories of state making in the way they are currently perceived and promoted. Pluralist theories (Dahl 1961) or post-Marxist theories that underline the state as a space of contestation (Jessop 1990) have a point, since Central Asia is about diversity. The state is as much about contestation as it is about establishing “hegemony” (Gramsci 1971). Furthermore, seeing the state as competing projects precludes us from seeing the efforts of state elites whose goal is to unify these societies, organize their authority, and govern over a given territory (Mann 1993).

State formation in Central Asia dramatically challenges the transitology assumption on the evolution of societal relations that result in the state as organizational form, since it is a region that has been subjected to several empires across its history. The collective choices over the
course of history have been (re)negotiated or reconsidered a number of times. Specifically, the dichotomies that the Central Asian states can shed a new light on are as follows:

1. Strong vs. weak state;
2. Rationality vs. irrationality of societal development;
3. Historical vs. institutional contextualization of statehood;
4. Formal vs. informal areas of organizing social order.

More abstract points of contribution to state theories would include the view that the state is a space of contestation or ongoing negotiations vs. unification (centralization); the mutual exclusiveness of change and continuity, and the dichotomy between the domestic and international. Central Asia provides illustration for a more subtle and balanced analysis on state making.

**Strong vs. weak states**

State-making in Central Asia largely challenges the existing thinking on strong versus weak states, as Central Asian states have proved to be strong in some areas and weak in others, as well as omnipresent in some fields and absent in others (Reeves 2014; Adams 2010; Kandiyoti 2003). Central Asian states, as with all “Soviet-type states”, have been described as “omnipotent states lacking capacity to get things done” (Reeves 2014; Northrop 2004; Grant 1995). Despite habitual references to the region as “authoritarian”, it is not necessarily “overgoverned” (Starr 2011, xviii; Radnitz 2010, 28). Understanding these states through concepts of “stateness” or “hard states” (Zartman 1995, 8), which are essentially weak states resorting to violence due to their incapacity to use other methods, is also misleading due to that fact that even such coercion does not stretch across the entire territory. The last sections of each of the empirical chapters that follow in this thesis, focusing on societal consequences, demonstrate that there are areas that remain beyond the state’s authority or coercion: politically, economically, and culturally. These areas, such as
enclaves and borderlands, have certain regions with different social institutions and social identities which lay the foundation for reproducing types of social relations and social order that, in the long run, may undermine the existing state designs. In this thesis, they are seen as the sites of social resistance, over which the state has little or no power.

The assumption of strength or weakness is extended to studying elites. As Cooley (2013) demonstrated in his book “Great Games, Local Rules”, the narration of Central Asia as a “tabula rasa” by most international scholarship has been largely erroneous, as there have always been local elites and local structures of power that influenced decision-making. As he shows, the international image of Central Asia has been a stratagem utilized by local peoples to maneuver among the great powers (Cooley 2013). The new strand of scholars of the English School has been bluntly challenging the “tabula rasa” assumption (Costa Buranelli 2015; 2014). Hence, there are “places” where power is placed, and mainly these are ruling elites. However, the elites make particular choices of governing and reasoning about their choices. Once we examine relations between competing elites, their social organization, economic resources, and sources of legitimacy, the thesis of the state as the impartial bureaucracy largely advocated by transitology theories does not, in all probability, hold. This is not only because the bureaucracy has become the tool for the institutionalization of the state elites’ interests, but also because, in being technically “impartial”, the institutional architecture of the state becomes less socially embedded, i.e. develops fewer ties with social organization. In other words, the state becomes more autonomous. An extreme degree of state autonomy weakens the link between the state and society. On the one hand, the state is not a tabula rasa, but it is not an epitome of its societal composition either. It is a process and a practice that exists in parallel to other processes developing at the societal level. Hence, it seems that the state is neither a contestation space since the actors are unequal and overlapping (which is most vividly seen on the case on Kyrgyzstani elites), nor is it a hegemony. The former would imply an existing set of boundaries between the
interests of different contesting groups, whereas the latter would imply the ruling elite’s lines of reasoning and legitimation are appealing enough to establish ideational hegemony. However, none of these processes is happening in Central Asia.

**Rationality vs. irrationality**

When challenging the transitology assumption of the rationalization of social relations, anthropological studies of the state were more insightful and more successful in terms of providing new evidence. However, they slipped into another extreme, suggesting that the state is “an irrational outcome of dispersed imaginings” (Reeves 2014, 13; Aretxaga 2005c, 106; Navaro-Yashin 2002, 121; 178-179). Some authors label Central Asian states as “awkward states” (Kavalski 2010, 40). However, judging does not help understanding. While anthropologies of the state have also criticized the state-building debate for its underlying “rationality” assumptions, they in turn simply adopted assumptions of “irrationality”. The problem is not whether there is a rational or irrational way of organizing social order. Rather, it is that the meaning of rationality differs.

The argument presented in this thesis suggests that understanding Central Asian statehood may cast some light on understanding the meaning of rationality of a collective actor, such as the state or a society. Sections dealing with societal consequences within each empirical chapter demonstrate societal rationality (for the lack of better term) from three different angles. And each of these reveals that two main pillars of societal reasoning are basic and simple: the need to survive and the need for a sense of community (Mann 1993). None of these pillars seem to be provided by the current set of state builders, the ruling elites and the external actors. Patterns of socio-economic interactions are often more difficult to change than institutions. For instance, the parallel civil society that is developing in Central Asia is largely based on socio-economic conditions created during the Soviet period and practices rooted in a community-based social order, which is itself experiencing a revival due to some external actors’ projects. However, the development of
this parallel civil society shows how societies have come about as entities open to the transnational flow of ideas and processes, as well as how powerful these processes are regardless of the borders that were solidified after the acquisition of sovereignty. The social diversity highlighted in this thesis also shows that society is not a single entity, but is rather a “mosaic” of social trajectories (Sayer 1971, 346-347). Hence, the assumption of the state “ruling over” society cannot hold completely true. The power of society can be seen in the rhetoric that has been used recently by civil activists, which utilizes bounded or affective rationality, appealing to the popular desire for a sense of community. One of the societal forces that operates this rationality and provide this service is the emerging (parallel) Islamic civil society.

The resurgence of Islam, both within organized civil society as represented by Islamic NGOs and within the developing parallel civil society, suggests a certain kind of bounded rationality, i.e. the feeling of shared purpose with other Muslim societies in the world. Other groups of people based their reasoning on nationalist feelings. This connects not only concrete people of a concrete culture, but also with ancestors and the past in general. As Gullette and Heathershaw (2015) demonstrate, legitimation and accusation of the ruling circles (for example in the Kyrgyzstani 2010 revolution) are largely based on the bounded rationality, which connects state sovereignty and emotive matters (Giullette and Heathershaw 2015, 123). Hence, affective rationality — as Anderson (2006, 735) calls it—is less concerned with the bureaucratic forms of state organization, but rather with attachment to the land, state symbols, and sense of hereditary entitlement (Gullete and Heathershaw 2015; Leavitt 1996). Other scholars use the term “affective management of history” to analyze state making (Oushakine 2013, 274). These scholars provide the example of President Akaev’s fascination with the theory of Lev Gumilev on ethnogenesis and the bio-sphere of the Earth, in which he explains social change and revolutions via a particular biochemical and magnetic state of the Earth, which in turn influences social events. These events are seen as realized through “passionarii”, literally, extremely charismatic personalities who trigger
the change. This process in general is seen as responsible for formation and dissolution of nations and Empires (Gumilev 1993). Thus, bounded rationality has been used in Central Asia, both at the level of governments and by people themselves. Both nationalism and Islamization represent versions of bounded rationality.

To sum up: the discussion above has shown that the state is not necessarily a natural outcome of the rationalization of social relations. However, this does not mean that understanding the state and society through the lens of the rationality-irrationality dichotomy provides a better understanding of the societal outcomes. This is because there are always multiple rationalities, and the puzzle of collective choice and social mobilization depends on which of them will take root and under what conditions it will do so.

**Institutional vs. historical contextualization of the state**

Perhaps the important role of history for Central Asian societies can be explained by the fact that the institutional architecture of the state has not truly reflected state-society relations. As this thesis shows, even the most vital issue, security of the state, has been largely indirectly designed by external actors. In particular, this has been done by fortifying borders and influencing security narratives which have become integrated into institutional designs of the security structures in the region. The institutional contextualization of the state (Hall 1986, 11) has missed the social component. Furthermore, having been achieved through the infamous “shock therapy”, this institutional design was an attempt to break with the past, or what state theory calls “historical contextualization” of political behavior and dynamics (Hall 1986, 11). This thesis argues that historical contextualization is important. The conventional view is that the dissolution of the Soviet Union is portrayed as the great structural change, since its successors were then subjected to “shock therapy” as prescribed by the Washington Consensus. However, this “therapy” was “shocking” only in that it succeeded in severing the ties between state and society, through the
creation of socially disconnected institutional settings. As societies are not institutions and patterns of social relations are less tangible, this history has remained in situ through the continued interdependence of grassroots socio-economic relations.

A range of scholars take the view that recalling the Soviet legacy for understanding state making in Central Asia is outdated. For example, Reeves (2014) calls references to the Soviet legacy "black box explanations", i.e. explanations that do not suggest specific factors or conditions influencing an outcome. However, these claims can be reasonable if one thinks of Soviet legacy either in institutional or in normative terms, i.e. is as a catalogue of the wrongs conducted by the Soviet Union. For instance, when one says Soviet legacy, one thinks of the suppression of local identities and religions (Benningsen and Wimbusch 1986), a centralized bureaucratic machine or institutional design (Luong Jones 2004), ecological disasters caused by Soviet agriculture, such as draining of the Aral Sea, uranium tailings, and dependency on the raw materials, and Machiavellian approaches to border delimitation such as "divide-and-rule" strategies, which seeded latent conflict in the Fergana Valley in order to make the area more governable (The Economist 1998; Masell 1974; Kolarz 1964; Conquest 1962; Caroe 1954). The general flaw of these approaches is not necessarily the answers that they find, but the questions that they ask. For example, all of the above factors are used to explain the outcome of the state’s failure in Central Asia, neglecting the fact that the very architecture of the modern state, as well as nation, was brought about by the Soviet mission to civilize. Modern state-building only started with Soviet settlement projects, which turned nomadic tribes into sedentary populations.

Arguments about the “suppression of the local cultures” narrate ethnic conflicts in Central Asia as expressions of rejection of the Soviet legacy or rebellion against it, comparing them to popular rebellions in Eastern Europe prior to perestroika (Olcott 1994; Suny 1993; Rumer 1992). However, these lines of reasoning neglect the fact that ethnic conflicts or nationalist movements were not directed against the Soviet state, they were directed against competing ethnic groups;
who were rivals for resources. The ethnic conflicts in the Fergana Valley were between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz for control over land and economic assets, redistribution of wealth and its sources. A similar situation was in the South Caucasus. It had little to do with the Soviet state, for these people themselves were the Soviet state.

Soviet legacy has been equated with oppression of anything that was local. For instance, Islamic revival, radicalization, ethnic conflicts, state’s weakness have all been explained by the Soviet oppression of the local culture (Heathershaw 2008; Roy 2000). Scholars working within the framework of historical institutionalism interpret the post-Soviet institutional choices of the new states through a combination of Soviet legacy and the new strategic context created by external actors (Jones Luong 2004). Despite this, a combination of historical and external factors is seen as shaping society, rather than vice-versa.

Soviet legacy literature observes history through the lens of institutions, assuming their continuity in the post-Soviet period, and overlooking the fact that, perhaps, all that remains are the names of those institutions and a mimicry of their political functions, rather than a system that may influence social and political outcomes.

This thesis draws on the spirit of this literature by making both history and external actors matter. But, unlike these approaches, this thesis does not see them as institutional settings. It examines the patterns of cross-border social interaction and social interdependencies rooted in the Soviet statehood, as well as societal consequences of external actors’ solutions to state-building. In other words, it is the social rather than the institutional legacy that matters.

Formal vs. informal:

Since the history of the state has been the history of power, the dichotomy of formal versus informal stems from state theorists’ debates on where state power resides. Elitist theories place power within the state elites. While power to rule over society can be distributed among different
elites, sovereignty is placed in the ruling elites (Mann 1993, 48). The state is, therefore, seen as “a unitary rational actor with its own preference and interests” (Poggi 1990: 97-9, 120 - 7). Other scholars expand the notion of elites beyond the state bureaucracy and note that elites could be “leaders of large bureaucratically structured organizations, whether those organizations are corporate, nonprofit, or governmental” (Domhoff 2002). The debate at the heart of state-centric theories is about the variations of elite power as such and elite power as provided or restricted by state institutions and other structural conditions (Skocpol 1979).

A different view on formality and informality is provided by theories focusing on state making as process or a constellation of processes, such as penetration, standardization, participation and redistribution (Rokkan 1969, 66). Charles Tilly (1984) suggests that focus on large processes, such as urbanization, for example, sheds light on the interplay between the formal and informal. James Scott (1998) focuses on the process of “standardization” as one of the main process shaping the power of the state. Specifically, it is what the state can standardize that remains “formal” and governable, while non-standardized issues or areas remain “illegible”, that is almost invisible for the state and ungovernable by it (Scott 1998). Taking these two strands together, where the former tries to “place” state power and the latter tries to see what remains beyond, this thesis suggests that beyond the “illegible” areas”, there are spaces of connection, rather than contestation; of intermingling and mixing, something called “barzakh” in the anthropologist works on space (Mackenzie 2014, personal communication). The term is borrowed from Koranic verses and signifies the thin area between the parallel worlds of life and death, visible and invisible, legible and illegible. This is not to adopt the term, but to draw attention to the lack of concrete borders between the formal and informal. Managing such areas would mean either formalizing everything or learning to channel, direct and redirect processes stemming from both, and most importantly communicating with both. For example, the parallel civil society (Section 4.3.2.) and non-standard trade (Section 4.2.1) show the development of a parallel socio-
economic and civil space. These spaces cannot be considered fully informal as they have been empowered through the neo-liberal programs of external actors such as World Bank Group (Chapter 4). Furthermore, as Central Asian borderlands illustrate, transnational processes can bypass states and bind societies to reasoning beyond the state borders. This observation slightly echoes the thesis of “complex globalization theories”, the main idea of which is that both state and society are exposed to effects of globalization and transnational networks (Dicken 2003; Scholte 2000; Breslin and Higgott 2000).

Michael Mann (1993) help organize this strand of the literature by suggesting that there are transnational power networks towards which power may migrate. Power migration happens through processes of “interstitial emergence”, which occur beyond those institutions created to organize societies (Mann 1986, 16). This explains how, for example, it becomes possible that identity within geographically isolated areas such as the enclaves in the Fergana Valley is still shaped by the transnational ideas of those groups who are not represented in Central Asia in statistically significant numbers. Manuel Castells (1998) explains that transnational influence can shape “resistance identity” by those social groups who are “stigmatized or devalued by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society” (Castells 1998, 8). He also notices that such identities may create the “community of sentiment” and weaken the bond between the state and society (Castells 1998, 198).

The paradox of isolated societies being bounded through reasoning and sentiments to transnational power networks in the Fergana Valley allows this thesis to suggest that state – society relations as a “big process”, to use Tilly’s term, is a source of social power in itself. The state will have to learn how to communicate with the societies in a given territory to appeal to the bounded or affective rationality of these societies, which have been largely left to their own strategies of survival.
Main propositions of the thesis: the Heartland gets stronger wherever it is broken

Drawing on the existing debate on the state across political science, political sociology and anthropology of the state, the main propositions of this thesis are as follows. Firstly, overcoming the dichotomy of the state vs. society which implies several aspects addressed above, allows one to see the empowerment of the state as being within the bond between the state and society itself, as it provides for the bounded and affective rationality that may transform the state into a more permeating actor than it has been so far.

Secondly, all disciplines recognize the problem of state autonomy and state embeddedness, in that they wonder how impartial and detached from its society the state institutions should and can be. Complete state autonomy undermines state – society relations, as ruling elites should be able to at least legitimize themselves to their societies. As democratic elections and the provision of public services are not always the main legitimating mechanisms in these societies, other ways of legitimation need to be found. State embeddedness can be seen as one of these means of legitimation.

For example, although strongmen or informal elites may enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of society, their role may not necessarily be conducive to the enhancement of statehood. At the same time, even if some of the criminal elites are legitimate in the eyes in the society, it does not necessarily mean that they are socially embedded. It may simply mean that people, while choosing between the state and these strongmen, chose the lesser of two evils or even just a more familiar one. In its turn, the state may be institutionally well-set, especially in the eyes of external actors, but may only serve the interests of a specific segment of society, fostering a societal fragmentation that may undermine the state over time. If elites come to reflect societal organization, their functional features may become secondary to their historical rootedness and
societal embeddedness. For example, exercising the function of providing public goods does not guarantee state legitimacy (Lee 2014), for a sense of belonging and spiritual needs, which populations with bounded rationality use to reason and perceive, may override the material goods provided. In other words, if people do not feel connected to the state, none of the usual functions will be sufficient to glue state and society together.

Another variation of this problem is raised by David Lake in a special issue of the journal Governance on Governance in the areas of limited statehood (2014). Specifically, it is noted that external state-building efforts may aim for a state with high capacity and high legitimacy. However, external actors also want key institutions and political actors to reflect their policy preferences, which do not necessarily resonate with those of the societies in question (Lake 2014). In other words, even technically democratic and “good” governance may be illegitimate in the eyes of these societies, for it may fail to become societally embedded. Furthermore, due to the principle of Westphalian sovereignty, any external action contributing to state-building would be limited in scope and duration, for it implies an intervention into the internal affairs of states, even ones which are deemed to have failed (Lake 2014). As a result, these external actors often strengthen state capacity by undermining state legitimacy. Notions of state capacity and state legitimacy may often be mutually exclusive.

Thirdly, since the states examined here have been objects of “shock therapy” several times during their history, path dependency has been disrupted and transformation is not proven to be a linear transition from traditional to modern social order, it is important to focus on social patterns rather than social development. In other words, challenging path dependency does not mean negating the existence of a certain logic to the history of the state. There is an order to it, yet not in the form of a line from point A to the point B, but rather in the form of patterns, which can be manipulated and reshuffled, like a puzzle. Michael Mann (1993, ch.1) calls it “a patterned mess” or a “patterned chaos”, leaving space for both contestation and unification within the state. The
state in Central Asia represents the pieces of a broken glass of the past that can exist on equal terms in a state. What form the mosaic of these pieces will take depends on the state capacity to organize its relations with its societies. Hence, the state’s main function nowadays is not merely the provision of security and services, but rather it is this very capacity to channel and choose, provide reasons for and legitimize its choices, and, of course, provide the organizational capacity to implement them.

In general, this thesis’s framework can be seen as a mixture of a neo-Weberian approach and Marxism. From them it borrows the idea that states must be linked to their societies and must embed themselves within their societies, for there is no history without people, and there are no states without societies. However, it also suggests that an ideal “embeddedness” can never be possible, due to the fact that societies are as much of the objects of transnational forces as the states are. The states can only increase their capacity to manipulate these processes at the right moments and in the right places, which are presented here as the sites of resistance or the sites of barzakh. Thus, the state is seen here as a three-dimensional entity: subnational, national, and transnational. The state is a practice, a memory, and a vision. Managing these three dimensions can be seen as the new “functions” of the state or the indicators measuring state’s capacity to influence social outcomes or create its own history.

1.3. State as social practice

“The tracks do not exist before the direction is chosen”

(Mann 2012)

This thesis argues that a diachronic analysis of state development may reveal which practices and structures undermine rather than sustain the process of mutual constitution of state and society. It suggests that the incompleteness of state-building in Central Asia can be understood through
three sets of explanatory factors — Soviet societal legacy, external actors’ strategies, and competition between local elites — all of which contribute to the creation of sites of resistance or what Michael Mann calls “processes of interstitial emergence” (Mann 1986, 15).

The thesis draws on the definition of the state suggested by Michael Mann, which is based on his approach called “organizational materialism” (Mann 1993, 52). This approach represents a mixture of institutional statism (Tilly 1975; Skocpol 1979) and elitist theories (Poggi 1990). It focuses on patterns and factors that flow from discrete institutional settings, since each setting represents a constellation of structural conditions, allowing or precluding certain social trajectories. The main idea these authors share is that “states institutionalize present social conflicts, but institutionalized historic conflicts then exert considerable power over new conflicts” (Mann 1993, 52). It is worth noting that organizing state–society relations does not necessarily mean institutionalizing them in the conventional sense. Institutionalization and institutions are about managing stability. The organization of state-society relations here means managing change. As derived from Mann (1986) and Tilly (1975), the history of social order is not about institutionalization, it is about constant competition and (re)negotiation. In the course of social interaction, people develop new networks or revive old ones which outpace the existing level of institutionalization: “this may happen as a direct challenge to existing institutions, or it may happen unintentionally and interstitially – between their interstices and around their edges – creating new relations and institutions that have unanticipated consequences for the old” (Mann 1986, 15). Furthermore, since societies have never been “sufficiently institutionalized”, the processes of interstitial emergence continues to “challenge” institutions, according to the people’s goals (Mann 1986, 16). The importance of this idea of interstitial emergence, modified here into the idea of sites of social resistance, can be explained by the fact that these sites contain threads which may explain why similar institutional settings can produce extremely different outcomes.
The three sets of explanatory variables chosen seem to give a certain flavor of historical institutionalism to this thesis. For instance, Thelen and Steinmo identify three variables, useful for comparative historical analysis, such as past institutional legacies, external environment, and shifts in the balance of political power (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). This thesis also focuses on historical context, strategies pursued by external actors, and elite struggles as organizers of the domestic balance of power. However, there are crucial differences. Firstly, this thesis focuses on the socio-economic and societal rather than the institutional legacy of the past. Specifically, it examines the role of the natural strategies of survival, such as those organized around land, water, and trade for societal interdependence. In this regard, the thesis draws on the claim of Wittfogel in his “Oriental Despotism” (1957), that is, the idea that there are societies for which water has not only economic, but also social and spiritual meaning and, consequently, relations with regard to land and economic exchanges are organized accordingly. He calls them “hydraulic societies”. Following the water, this thesis identifies the cross-border social interactions that it demands, and redefines the term Soviet legacy as that of social interdependence which exists at the micro-level, but has macro-consequences. Secondly, in terms of external processes, this thesis is based on the assumption that the divide between the external and internal is largely blurred, that external narratives can easily become “internal” by being materialized in the form of a border, the minefield, a security apparatus, or a legal draft, as Central Asia illustrates. This interplay between material and ideational allows this thesis to show unintentionally created processes of interstitial emergence. Finally, the balance of power among the competing elites has often little to do with politics or the organization of political relations. Hence, this thesis does not look at it as an institution, but rather as a proxy for the broader structural conditions, originally both within and beyond the given countries. At the level of elites, it is often “business as usual”, i.e. the rent-seeking, disregarding the concept of public good or collective interest. No matter how intriguing it
may be, such a power balance is not quite about politics and polity. Rather, it is about pursuing private affairs by public means.

This thesis argues that the capacity to organize state and society relations depends on whether and how the bond between the state and society can be embedded within the state. The rationale is that state authority lies within the relations between the state and society, as this relationship provides the backbone of the state’s infrastructural power, or the power to organize itself on a given territory over time, without slipping into violence and coercion. To unfold this argument, it focuses on three sets of explanatory factors to depict which conditions have been embedded into the state, how this was achieved and the degree of autonomy and social embeddedness it was designed to have. State autonomy (domestically) refers to the degree of neutrality of state institutions towards different social groups over a given territory (Mann 1986). State embeddedness is understood as the state’s capacity to reflect the societal organization of its societies and follow its dynamics (Mann 1986; Aron 1950). By showing which type of society each of the three sets of factors has fostered, this thesis examines whether and how the links between the local social trajectories and transnational power networks may become deeper than those between the societies and their states. The link between interest, state, territory, and societies changes depending on the type of society promoted.

Understanding state-society relations has usually meant understanding the issues around which their relations are organized. For example, Marxists believe that economic relations structure state-society relations; Michael Mann presents a four-dimensional model of social sources of power: Ideological, Economic, Military, Political (IEMP). However, state-society relations may be structured differently at different points in time, depending on the problem, which sometimes can be political, sometimes economic, etc. (Luhmann 1997). For this reason it is the possibility of the link between state and society, and the mutual influence this link exerts, which
This thesis sees as the main source of statehood. This link is the one Tilly (1990, 103-106) describes as “direct rule”, as opposed to “indirect rule” which characterized earlier polities.

This thesis unfolds three sets of explanatory factors (Soviet legacy; external actors’ strategies; and elites struggles) in order to see inductively what structural conditions been embedded or, what links they produce and, therefore, why state-building in Central Asia remains incomplete. It demonstrates that each of the three sets of factors conducive to a particular type of society, from the many theoretical alternatives. However, not all types of society may remain within the direct social contract with the state, but may instead be a part of a transnational power network beyond the state. As a result, the state becomes incapable of channeling the processes and societal trajectories stemming from this link between society and transnational power networks. The state, as a result, stops reproducing itself. The first set of factors is that of the socio-economic legacy of the Soviet and partially pre-Soviet periods, yet not in their institutional forms, but in the form of cross-border social relations rooted in history and transforming into new forms and meanings under the current conditions. It puts the current situation of the state into a historical context to examine social patterns that have remained intact after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and which, under new structural conditions, contribute to a type of society which would not contribute to sustainability of the current state. A general characteristic derived from analysis of the Soviet project is societal interdependence. This refers to the perseverance of patterns of social interaction, including cross-border strategies of survival which are strongly tied to the basics of hydraulic societies, such as water and land (Wittfogel 1957). As this societal interdependence has not been well considered by the central state authorities, people have to rely on memories of community practices that existed before the Soviet state.

The set of factors created by external actors, although seemingly liberal, has little to do with civil society as such. In fact, the term “civil society” only appears explicitly in international strategies towards Central Asia after 9/11, e.g. in the Bush doctrine on the Greater Middle East,
which aimed to create similar types of civil society across Central Asia, Xinxiang, Afghanistan-Pakistan, and the Middle East. The EU mission was sold as “democracy promotion” to EU citizens and as empowering of sovereignty to citizens of Central Asia. However, this mission was in practice about security, borders, and even more security after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Programs such as TACIS, BOMCA, CADAP, and other OSCE projects have mainly been focusing on borders, drug trafficking, and extremism. This agenda was legitimized by the narrative of the fight against transnational threats, such as drug trafficking and extremism. Regional security organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Anti-Terrorism Center of the CIS, etc. have also reinforced this discourse. Hand in hand with the “war on terror” which has been waged since 9/11, national borders and security infrastructure, as well as sovereignties and national identities have been established in an environment of animosity, with the embedded conditions of conflict between the Central Asian states. This has had the effect of excluding the institutionalization of governing mechanisms for managing societal interdependence and shared social patterns that stem from the Soviet setting.

In terms of institution building, the external actors’ concept of the state included a high degree of neutral bureaucracy, reflecting neither the contours of the existing societies, nor their perceptions of the common good and collective interest. The type of society that resulted from this approach was twofold: the empty architecture of the NGO sector, which quickly became incorporated into the elitist field linked with the ruling elite or a mere continuation of the foreign policies of external actors, sponsoring the NGOs. In late 2000, the search for “indigenous” civil activism led sponsors to redefine civil society in communal terms (Dadabaev 2012). Based on a normative condemnation of the civilizational missions of the Russian Empire (since the late 19th century) and the 70 years of the Soviet experience as simple colonization—which is presumed to have suppressed all that was natural, indigenous, and true to the region—the external actors started promoting non-standard (informal) and community-based socio-economic practices. This
was reflected in the World Bank programs on the promotion of cross-border non-standard trade. These policies resulted in the increase of the informal economy in the Fergana Valley. While freedom to return to pre-Soviet socioeconomic organization was provided, the logistics of organizing this freedom into any sort of accountable social order was not. Paradoxically, due to liberalization, the region was pushed back to its primordial state of economic and social affairs. The external actors’ institutionalization project accounted for neither the complexity of civil society, nor for globalization that permeates grassroots social patterns, bypassing the state. Thus, the potential of transnational power networks for structuring and outsourcing of the ideological power of the state from its societies has not been taken into consideration. The types of (civil) society that appeared as a result, such as the empty NGO sector, Islamic NGOs, and the parallel civil society are described here as well.

The third set of factors, that is the organization of the state by the ruling elites, primarily includes pursuing their interests through the state’s institutions, which in turn is directly related to controlling national economic and financial assets. The means of managing local elites by the ruling elites include the strategies of elimination, accommodation, and intermingling, in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, respectively. Even where the ruling elite managed to eliminate or greatly marginalize its rivals, it fails to organize state authority over the entire territory or prevent social resistance. This thesis suggests that the main reason for this failure is that the balance between the state’s social embeddedness and the state autonomy is understood differently by the external actors and by the ruling elites. The external actors desire an impartial and neutral bureaucracy. The ruling elites use the bureaucracy to embed their interests, and not be self-reproducing and self-sustainable system, continuing itself regardless of elite change. This is especially seen on the case of Uzbekistan. It is unclear which direction the state of Uzbekistan will take, once the current ruling elite dissolves. To handle the marginal parts of their populations, ruling elites vastly use coercion or what Mann (1993) calls “despotic” power. However, the failure
to extend even coercion over the entire territory is most vividly evident in the case of Tajikistan. Despite the fact that these states are largely considered to be despotic, coercion does not diminish either social resistance or Islamic resistance in any of the three cases. On the contrary, Tajikistan is among the leading sources in Central Asia for the Islamic State to increase their supply of new recruits.¹

The three different strategies have led to the destruction of the institutions of the local elites if not the local elites themselves. This appears counter-productive for organizing state authority, because these institutions can be organized as a direct link between the central state and the grassroots. The neo-liberal candidate for this role – organized civil society (in the form of NGO sector) - has failed. Institutions of local elites, and the networks stemming from the cooperation between locals and ruling elites could make a solid ground for establishing the link between the state and society. In other words, the institution of local elites can be integrated into the state’s infrastructural power, defined as the power to permeate society without coercion, as well as allowing mechanisms for the society to influence the state (Mann 1988).

*Infrastructural power enables states to diffuse their power through* or penetrate their societies (“power through”); *the exercise of despotic power is by a state that has a degree of authoritative “power over” society. So states may be strong in either of two quite different ways. They can command anything they like of their citizens (despotic power) or they can actually get decisions implemented across their territories (infrastructural power)* (Mann 2012, 13).

The importance of state/society relations for state-building can be explained by the fact that state authority can be organized in a non-violent way through processes of institutionalization of state – society relations, which itself contributes to the state’s infrastructural power.

Analyzing the state-society conceptual couple, Poggi notes that society is possible only under the condition of the developed constitutional state: “a seriously disempowered state cannot guarantee an authentically civil society” (Poggi 2001, ch.4, 1). According to Michael Mann, “state

¹ The relationships between the Central Asian Islamist movements and the ISIS are not in the scope of this thesis, however, the recent developments show that there is an increase of connections between them.
infrastructural power derives from the social utility in any particular time and place of forms of territorial centralization, which cannot be provided by civil society groups themselves” (Mann 1988, 126). Neither can the state function without the link to its society, as it may turn into highly militarized (fascist or Stalinist regime). However, it is important to see what kind of causal relations this link may develop.

In sum, this thesis suggests examining the links between three sets of factors and the societies. It does so in two steps. First, it identifies societal consequences that stem from each of these sets of factors. Second, it examines what processes stem from the interaction among these three sets of factors, how they mutually reinforce their mistakes and whether it is the bond or the gap that they create between the state and society.

1.4. Research design and methodology

Answering the research question posed by this study requires qualitative methodology, as this accommodates richness, variation in the meanings and perceptions, as well as the dynamic nature of social patterns addressed. As discussed in the previous section, the focus on Central Asia presents a conceptual challenge to the dominant state-building debate and provides valuable insights on how its erroneous assumptions can be overcome. Since initial studies on Central Asia were designed primarily following the fall of the iron curtain, the region has been narrated in a particular way, one which did not reflect the realities, but rather the internal politics and battles of the academic debate prevalent at the time. Specifically, it was used to reproduce the biases of the democratization paradigm. Later studies have fallen into other extreme and present dichotomies no less restrictive for the better understanding both the region and the process of state making in general.

Among this study’s main goals is the overcoming of several dichotomies discussed in the previous section, it aims to control for the processes both emanating from the states and the
transnational space, and which influences both the states and their societies. Grounded in this rationale, this study is designed as comparative case study and examines three Central Asian states: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. On the one hand, these are three very different countries which can shed light on a similar outcome (that is state’s failure). On the other hand, they are all straddle a specific area in Central Asia, the Fergana Valley, which is commonly understood as an area of a latent conflict. As borders and state jurisdiction are weak in this region, it allows for the examination of the influence of transnational processes on national state making.

**Case study method: definitions, controversies, advantages**

The study of multiple cases is a frequently used method in political science (Gerring 2004, 341). The case study is defined as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring 2004, 342) or as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events, in which rigorous deductive logic is used to develop both intuitive and counterintuitive hypotheses about the dynamics of causal mechanisms” (George and Bennett 2005, 5). The main controversy of the case study approach is generalizability, or the possibility of explaining a larger universe of similar cases (Campbell and Stanley in Flyvbjerg 2006, 219). Most critiques of case study generalizability are based on assumptions of statistical methods and formal modeling, since they have similar epistemological roots. Nevertheless, they are also based on different methodological logic and different lines of reasoning (George and Bennett 2005, 6).

The generalizability of a case study depends on a range of case selection strategies. Case selection depends on the research problem and the goal of the research. The main asset of a case study approach is the possibility to keep “a spectrum of choices rather than dichotomy” (George and Bennett 2005, 31). Non-positivist scholars suggest that case studies may aim at “analytical generalizability, [...] a reasoned judgment about the extent to which the findings of one study can
be used as a guide to what might occur in another situation” (Fourie 2012, 65; Kvale 1996, 262).

The aim of this thesis is analytical generalizability or “contingent generalization” (Collier and Mahoney 1996, 56-91), which could be applied to other Central Asian countries, some post-Soviet states, as well as states with a high level of Islamic resistance and radicalization potential. Its goal is to identify generalizable historical, sociological, and political patterns, rather than independent variables which are solely responsible for an outcome. Most importantly, a case study method can “accommodate various forms of complex causality” (George and Bennett 2005, 5). A case study method, therefore, has two main advantages: 1) provision of tools for critical assessment of the dichotomies outlined in the previous section, which is particularly useful as this thesis claims to narrate Central Asia as a conceptual challenge to the existing theories; 2) accommodation of the three-dimensional causality of this thesis and allows explore a non-linear causality.

**Case selection strategies**

The cases of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were chosen as they are “least similar cases” (George and Bennett 2005, 83) and “associated with a similar outcome” (Mill’s method of agreement in George and Bennett 2005, 153), which, in this study, is the state’s incapacity to organize its authority over a given territory. Specifically, all three cases had different starts to independence by having made distinct political, institutional, and economic choices, as well as possessing different attitudes towards civil society. However, in the second decade of independence they have all exhibited signs of an incomplete state-building process. To illustrate:

**Politically:**

In terms of political management, all three countries possessed the main Montesquieu’s attribute of a democratic state: separation of powers. In the Kyrgyz Republic, people have risen twice to dismiss Presidents who were perceived as having risen to power via election fraud. In Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, neither President has left office. After the uprising of 2010, Kyrgyzstan
turned into a Parliamentary Republic, significantly limiting the powers of the President. However, this shift did not make the state more democratic or more effective.

**Institutionally:**

Tajikistan possessed almost no control over its entire territory, and the authority of the official government hardly extended outside of the capital, Dushanbe. Kyrgyzstan emphasized decentralization and strengthened local governments in its provinces. It maintained much greater control over its territory, except in parts of the South. Uzbekistan pursued methods similar to that of the Soviet state and controlled its territory through large scale surveillance networks (Pomfret 2003, 10).

On the Institutional Quality Index (measuring the extent of democracy, government effectiveness, extent of regulation, rule of law and graft\(^2\)), Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, for the period 1997-98, rank especially poorly; Kyrgyzstan performs relatively well, having scored above Kazakhstan and Russia (IMF World Outlook 2000, 155).

**Economically:**

In the first decade after independence, the three countries differed markedly in economic performance (Pomfret 2003, 11). The Kyrgyz Republic was the fastest reformer, introducing the most liberal reforms, and was the first post-Soviet state to join the WTO (Pomfret 2003). This rapid move towards a market economy earned Kyrgyzstan a reputation as an “island of democracy” in Central Asia. Uzbekistan was a more gradual reformer, completing small-scale privatization, but retaining state control over agricultural products and delaying large-scale privatization. In October 1996 it re-introduced foreign exchange controls, to slow-down market liberalization. In general, Uzbekistan was reluctant to follow the instructions of international financial institutions. Distrust of international mediation and multilateral diplomacy has been one the pillars of its diplomacy and foreign policy in general (Pomfret 2003). Tajikistan experienced a civil war and started the IMF

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\(^2\) Weder’s Institutional Quality Index in Pomfret 2003
structural reforms only after 1997. Kyrgyzstan recovered after the deep recession of perestroika in 1995-1997, before being hit by the Russian crisis in 1998. Tajikistan experienced the biggest decline in incomes and, despite some recovery in 1997; its living standards have fallen to levels associated with the least-developed countries (Pomfret 2003, 9). Uzbekistan was a puzzling case, for its “transitional recession was relatively shallow and its economic performance (measured by real GDP) has been best of all Soviet successor states. While Kyrgyzstan’s economy was opened up to the laws of the market, the Tajikistan economy destroyed by the civil war, the Uzbekistan economy was well-managed: in the sense of maintaining infrastructure, collecting taxes and keeping up expenditure on education and social security” (Pomfret 2003, 9). In terms of economic growth in 1989-2000, Uzbekistan performed at 94% (1989=100%), Kyrgyzstan at 63%, and Tajikistan at 44% (EBRD 2001, 15).

**Environment for NGOs:**

In Kyrgyzstan, the 1991, the Law on Public Associations governing NGOs was adopted. Furthermore, the Tax Code (1996) and the Civil Code (1996) were enacted, creating the most beneficial environment for NGOs in the region. For example, according to the Tax Code, NGOs enjoy some forms of preferential tax treatment. Currently, there are 14,880 registered NGOs (ICNL 2015a). Tajikistan was only able to focus on NGO freedoms after the end of the civil war. In May, 1998 Tajikistan adopted the law on Public Associations (Unions). However, notions on freedom of associations have been postponed and were not immediately or fully integrated into the Civil Code section on "Legal Entities," addressing the provisions on non-commercial legal entities. There are about 3000 registered NGOs (ICNL 2015b). Uzbekistan also postponed discussion of legislation on the NGO sector until 1998. The first Government Resolution No.543 on Non-Governmental and Non-Commercial Entities dates to 2003. A Law on guarantees of non-state non-profit organizations was issued in 2007 and amended in 2008. Reportedly, there are about 6,000 CSO (civil society
organizations (including those based on local communities) in Uzbekistan. The number of formally registered NGOs is unknown (ICNL 2015c).

In their second decade after independence, all three countries began to be reported as failing or crisis states (ICG 2001a/b/c; HRW 2005; KIC 2010; ICG 2012). Although each started differently, all three countries are now in the High Warning section of the State Fragility Index today (2015). This begs the question as to why?

As this study attempts to make “big comparisons of large processes and structures” (Tilly 1984), it is designed as “equifinality”, “multiple causality” or “inefficient causality”, the terms signifying the “problem of plurality of causes” (George and Bennett 2005, 157) meaning that “the same type of outcome can emerge in different cases via a different set of independent variables” (George and Bennett 2005, 157). As is shown in this study, while the set of causes might not necessarily differ, the sequence, combination or perceptions of them may vary, which may qualitatively change the set. However, this study still provides a degree of parsimony through identifying patterns—sociological, historical, and political—which can be seen as “sufficient and necessary” factors to condition the state’s failure, as well as providing existing variations of the perceptions of these factors.

The suggested sets of factors are examined within three dimensions: historical, strategic/external, and local/political, the Soviet legacy, external actors, and local elites. This study attempts to conduct a focused and structured comparison of cases, which deal with “general research questions of the study [...] and certain aspects of the historical cases examined” (George and Bennett 2005, 67). The general processes it focuses on include the processes of state making and social resistance to the state. In spite of the multiple overall causality, certain linear causal links are demonstrated within each of the dimensions and the critical points, where lines reverse or break are also identified. Specifically, each empirical chapter describes which form and meaning each of the dimensions took in each of the states, reveals the rationale behind them, and traces
societal consequences fostered as a result. In other words, by conducting structured and focused comparisons without offering a covering law-type of causality (Gerring 2007), it identifies precisely those gaps where political choices and social sources of power become crucial for future state making and social engineering. Comparing cases within three dimensions, this study identifies social patterns and political choices that led to the increase of societal resistance or, as it is known locally, the Islam of resistance.

**Data collection**

Data has been collected using the triangulation method, reliant on three pillars of information: secondary sources (literature), legal and other relevant documents, and interviews and focus groups. The first set of semi-structured face-to-face interviews, focus groups, and participant observations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were conducted in the course of the fieldwork between March 2012 and September 2012. The findings of the first field research resulted in a serious modification of the conceptual framework of this study which changed from the framework based on securitization theory—claiming that the “threat of radicalization” is a mere social construction—to a more pragmatic framework searching for the practical mistakes leading to radicalization which, according to the findings, appeared to be much less than a “social construction”. Follow-up research was conducted between February 2014 and October 2014.

**Conclusion**

The dominant debate on state-building in Central Asia has been lost in the misconceptions of the nature of state-society relations within Central Asia. Specifically, key pillars of the state, such as capacity and legitimacy, may be mutually exclusive; *state autonomy* without *state embeddedness* may not necessarily guarantee inclusive statehood or an extension of state authority over its entire territory; and finally, between the sets of overlapping institutions there can be areas of
interstitial emergence, which may produce societal consequences or processes which are difficult to channel or (re)direct if one continues thinking in diachronic terms, as well as excluding societal interactions from the analysis of statehood.

Revising a variety of misconceptions, this chapter has suggested focusing on three of them. First of all, prejudices against the Soviet past as colonial legacy did not let regional studies see practical continuities and interdependencies at the societal level across the region. Instead, they have mistakenly focused on institutional skeletons or institutions which retained continuity in name only. Economic devastation has been also interpreted as part of the “Soviet legacy”, i.e. the Soviet heritage, while it is in fact was the result of its dissolution. Central Asian states were created by the Soviet state as inalienable parts of a single body, which is why the hysteresis over the result of its partition, that is, over the state failure is illogical. One could have predicted such outcome. This chapter suggested focusing on the societal heritage of Soviet rule and seeing whether grassroots societal interactions across borders still persist and how they matter for the state-building process. Hence, the Soviet legacy has been chosen as the first set of explanatory factors to be tested in this thesis.

Secondly, the conventional literature on the impact of external actors tend to operate within the framework of the Heartland theory, falling into the trap of assuming Central Asia is a tabula rasa, i.e. losing sight of local agency. While this thesis agrees that external actors matter, it shows that they matter in a different way. It shows that external actors’ strategies in the region produce a set of variables which foster, often indirectly, certain societal consequences, which then undermine the state-building efforts of these external actors. The end undermines the means. This chapter has suggested focusing on External Actors as a second set of factors that contribute to the incomplete state. However, it differs from the geostrategic approach in the sense that it is based on the premise that the seeds external actors sow fall onto a ground which has been already cultivated, but the results of that cultivation had been forgotten.
Thirdly, as this chapter has shown, the authoritative literature, especially in the post-Cold War period, has taken another extreme. Concerned with finding local agency, this literature started interpreting all outcomes via patrimonial structures, tribalism, kinship, informality, irrationality of politics, etc. In general, this chapter has highlighted four dichotomies which have been derived from this line of reasoning, such as formality vs. informality; rationality vs. irrationality; historical vs. societal contextualization of the state; and weak vs. strong state. The chapter has shown that a peculiarity of the Central Asian region lies in the fact that the line between these dichotomies is blurred. It is therefore difficult to see where the state ends and the non-state begins. However, agreeing that local agency has to be found and understood, this chapter has suggested examining Local Elites as the third set of factors.
CHAPTER 2. The incomplete state: fifty shades of failure

Introduction

“While we know much about state-building, there is much we do not know, particularly about transferring strong institutions to developing countries. We know how to transfer resources, people, and technology, but well-functioning public institutions require habits of mind and operate in complex ways that resist being moved.”

(Fukuyama 2004)

The problem of the state’s failure, as applied to the Central Asian states, provides a distorted vision of reality of the state and society relations in Central Asia. The definition of a failed state is difficult to apply to these incipient states, which only realized their full sovereignty and independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It is about the mismatch between the institutional structures and the societal organization of these states, as well as the new liberal values, old social patterns, and the existential social needs that often allow for the legitimation of the illegal and the informal. In conceptual terms, it is the mismatch between state autonomy and state embeddedness, its scope and strength, its despotic and infrastructural power. If the state in Central Asia were to get this balance right, it could provide a precedent for the other regions in the world, not necessarily in terms of what institutions to transfer, but in terms of patterns and factors to consider which are crucial for state – society relations. In relying heavily on snapshot assessments of state fragility, we may register a myriad of factors that may or may not be conducive to state failure. In reality, both strength and vulnerability may spring from the same source. For the purpose of understanding why vulnerability overcomes strength, we need to consider sites of interstitial emergence where societal processes intermingle, amity becomes enmity, crime becomes survival, and religion becomes a source of revenue, for it is here where the change and rupture first emerge.

In this light, this chapter suggests reformulating the problem in a way that may more accurately reflect the complex reality. It is the problem of incomplete state-building that is being
dealt with here. The state’s strength or despotic power in Central Asia is present, but its scope or its infrastructural power does not extend over the entire territory and/or society. The state cannot channel or direct the transnational processes which permeate its societies. It does not therefore possess much influence over the outcome of state-society relations.

To simplify this complexity, this chapter proceeds in three steps. The first section maps the leading state fragility indexes that register symptoms of failure in Central Asian states. It sheds some light on the controversies and gaps within these frameworks. This section explains that in order to get different answers, we need to pose different questions, which is why it suggests reformulating the problem in a way that would better reflect the local context. The second section states the case for the incomplete state, by introducing areas of overlap between the weak and strong, formal and informal, transnational and local, criminal and legal, public and private spectrums of statehood. It begins by highlighting the complexity, but then simplifies it by operationalizing the processes of interstitial emergence through three indicators, these being transnationality, cross-sectionality, and entrysm. By providing examples to each of these indicators—such as cross-border trade for transnationality, the drug business and Islamist movements for cross-sectionality, and the infiltration of social structures by Islamist movements and organized crime networks for entrysm—it identifies the main social structures that matter for (re)organizing state-society relations, such as a mahalla and bazaar. In general, the chapter tries to explore a slightly different way of presenting the existing data on the state’s fragility, in order to pave the way for better understanding of the problem of the incomplete state.

2.1. Indicators of failure: explananda or explicantia?

The failed state is a powerful policy issue, as are its assessment frameworks. These can be divided roughly into three (partially overlapping) blocs, each according to a common denominator. These three are: functions-based frameworks, crisis/violence-based frameworks, and dynamic
frameworks. The leading functions-based frameworks currently in use include: the Fragile States Index developed by the Fund for Peace; the Freedom House assessment; Transparency International; Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch; UNODC; UNICRI; World Bank Group; USAID, the Brookings Institution and a range of independent think-tanks.

The crisis-based maps include those produced by the CIA Political Instability Task Force, the British Department for International Development (DFID), the German Government’s Action Plan on Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution, London Based Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), the LSE Center on the Crisis States Research, Conflict Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of Foreign Affairs, the International Crisis Group (ICG). The thread that links the research of these organizations focuses on violence in its different forms.

The dynamic frameworks include approaches that try to account for both the causes and the triggers of state failure, such as the Country Indicators for Foreign Policies, compiled by Carleton University. Robert Rotberg’s indicators also account for causes and suggest the dynamic approach by distinguishing between different stages of state failure, such as state collapse (as extreme version of failure), state failure, generic weakness and apparent distress, which are hallmarks of a failing state (Rotbert 2003; 2004).

The functions-based matrixes as, for example, the Fragile States’ Index offered by the Fund for Peace, provides a systematic assessment of the state’s failure, illustrating it in its diagrams and maps. A quick glance of one such map reveals that it is only North America and Western Europe that are beyond the risk of failure. The rest of the map is colored in alarmingly red colors, signifying those “threats to international security” and creating the international political economy of war (Logan and Preble 2011, 379-396). Basically it is the entire non-Western world that needs to be fixed. Despite this, it is a functionalist cognitive map, which conceals a bigger problem that needs to be fixed. Specifically, the Fragile States’ Index comprises social, economic, political and military indicators. Social indicators include demographic pressures, refugees and IDPs, group
grievances, human flight and brain drain. Economic indicators include uneven economic development poverty and economic decline. Political and military indicators include state legitimacy, public services, human rights and the rule of law, security apparatus, factionalized elites, external intervention (FSI 2015). Obviously, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan score high on this index.

Freedom House stresses the following indicators: democratic governance, civil society and democracy. Scores of the cases in focus for 2015 are as follows: Kyrgyzstan – 5.93 (decline); Tajikistan: 6.39 (decline); Uzbekistan: 6.91 (unchanged). The situation of decline or the lack of change is demonstrated by the erosion of all the constituent indicators, such as electoral process, civil society, independent media, national democratic governance, local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence, corruption, democracy score. The civil society indicator “assesses the growth of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), their organizational capacity and financial sustainability, and the legal and political environment in which they function” (FH 2015, 9). Local democratic governance, “considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities” (FH 2015, 10). As one can see, this framework has a particular idea of civil society in mind, which may be difficult to transfer to the Central Asian context. The NGO sector has been developed to a significant extent, but as is shown in chapter 4, it failed in its own organizational capacity, and faced resistance both from the state and from other sectors of (civil) society which has different values and ideas to those disseminated by the liberal NGOs.

Local democratic governance, implying a decentralization of power, is a problem highlighted by Fukuyama (2004, 1) as an artifact of the Reagan-Thatcher era. He explains that, “that agenda was critical in its time, for it was clear that the enormous growth of state sectors in the developed world in the 20th century had become economically harmful and socially stultifying” (Fukuyama 2004, 1). He also notes that the prescriptions, such as privatization, decentralization,
and deregulation have led to serious problems in both developed and developing world, as the examples of “the Enron, WorldCom and other auditing scandals or the privatization of railways in Britain or electricity in California have shown” (Fukuyama 2004, 1). Policies known as the Washington Consensus, promoted by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have provided the following results in many developing countries.

Russia went from the state that controlled all aspects of the economy and civil society to one that could not collect taxes or protect its citizens from crime. Thailand liberalized its capital markets before it had an adequate bank regulation system; the result was the collapse of its currency during the Asian crisis of 1997. Elites in sub-Saharan Africa used IMF-mandated structural adjustment programs to cut core state functions while increasing the size of the patrimonial state (Fukuyama 2004, 2).

Fukuyama (2004) highlights that these state-builders fail to see the institutional capacity of the developing states to implement liberal policies and draws attention to the notion that there is too little state these days, which is why it is necessary to reconsider the inertia of living in the Reagan-Thatcher shadow. Referring to the importance of considering the state’s scope and strength, he notices that, for example, Central Asian states managed to be strong, “in all the wrong areas: they are good at jailing journalists or political opponents, but can’t process visas of business licences in less than six months” (Fukuyama 2004, 2). Thus, it is about different types of strengths and weaknesses that constitute the “failed state”, as well as the blurred distinction between public and private, criminal and legal, formal and informal in the state system in Central Asia.

Other state failure assessment frameworks focus on the human dimension of the state, such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), and to a lesser degree Amnesty and Transparency International. Observing human rights violations in Central Asia, these organizations note the worsening rights record. For instance, the HRW World Report (2015) establishes that the government of Central Asian republics “failed to uphold and in some case further undermined their core human rights commitments” (HRW 2015, 341). Specifically, in Kyrgyzstan:
Members of parliament proposed legislation that would rank nongovernmental groups as “foreign agents” and initiated a blatantly discriminatory draft bill that would seriously restrict lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights. Activists were harassed and attacked and the rights defender Azimjon Askarov remains wrongfully imprisoned. Authorities have not held people accountable for violent courtroom attacks on defendants and their lawyers in one of the few ongoing cases related to the 2010 ethnic violence. Discrimination and violence against women and LGBT people are pervasive.

While this observation is factually correct, the context within which these events have been developing suggests that there is a problem greater than the government’s opposition to LGBT rights and “foreign agents”. Rather, it concerns interpretations of human rights and civil society, the hierarchy of preferences as to what concerns social, political, and individual rights, as well as their connection to the social order and social utility.

As for the ethnic violence of 2010, the process of identifying the organizers is ongoing. However, the views on victims and the perpetrators differ to such extent that going into that issue for the state could mean provoking further ethnic violence. This is not to claim that the problem of violation of human rights does not exist. It is to say that the government has not yet found the way to organize its relations with different social groups, having different approaches and worldviews on what constitutes justice, morality, social order, and law. Hence, the existing measurement systems of state failure do not reflect many realities in Kyrgyzstan, but rather point out that handling these realities requires a different angle on understanding the social context. The popular perceptions and reasoning on human rights in Central Asia expose a great connection to family and social order, rather than empowerment of an individual and her freedoms. In Tajikistan, the government’s human rights record is reported to be deteriorating, due to the limitations on the freedom of expression, the imprisonment of opposition leaders, and the arrests
of academic researchers\textsuperscript{3} on trumped-up espionage charges (HRW 2015, 341). Kyrgyzstan deported an ICG researcher on similar charges in 2012.\textsuperscript{4}

Uzbekistan, as the HRW reports, scored poorly on indicators such as the lack of the freedom of expression, pervasive security apparatus, limitations on the independent media and religious freedom, forced labor by both adults and children during the cotton harvest, and widespread torture in the criminal justice system with total impunity (HRW 2015, 341). The problem is that the states lack the infrastructural power to maintain order by using institutional means. Thus, the data shows that extreme stateness or despotic power is present, but infrastructural power is absent, which is why the state shifts problems it cannot solve into the field of security.

The accusations of forced labor are usually perceived through references to tradition. Part of the reason for having several children in the rural areas in Central Asia is that they can help in the agricultural activity of the family. In Kyrgyzstan, children work in the bazaars, helping parents sell the harvest that they produce. For many children, it is a way to be self-sustainable and an opportunity to earn money for school books and pocket expenses. However, what human rights indicators do show is that the state lacks capacity to engage in lawful debate with its citizens and with the representatives of the international public in explaining the traditions, perceptions, and worldviews of its citizens, without marginalizing them; this capacity requires the expanding of the state’s scope and infrastructural power.

\textsuperscript{3} The case of Alexander Sodikov, PhD student in Political Science, University of Toronto/University of Exeter. The government’s version of this event is that Sodikov did not receive a permission to conduct interviews in GBAO (Khorog). This warning was ignored by the researcher and his supervisor, who, reportedly, was in Dushanbe at that time. From 2015 on, Kyrgyzstan also intensified control over researchers. Now all foreign researchers will have to ask for an official permission to conduct interview to be issued through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Previously, similar procedures existed, but were not enforced.

\textsuperscript{4} The ICG researcher was charged on the basis of Article 299 of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, prohibiting provocation of ethnic violence, which this researcher was perceived as doing by conducting interviews on inter-ethnic violence with local strongmen and civil activists.
The crisis-based frameworks track indicators related to violence, such as inter-ethnic or religious violence, political repression, civil wars, etc. Further, these frameworks consider the very presence of multiple minorities, as well as religious and ethnic diversity as a precondition for conflict, which is why Central Asian states, considering their multi-layered history and diverse societal fabric, are automatically viewed through a lens of crisis indicators. Most of the International Crisis Group reports provide vivid examples of such analysis (ICG reports). Political violence, and its modern forms, such as extremism and terrorism are seen mainly as challenges, threats, or causes of state failure (Di John 2008, 10). These accounts include insurgency centered approaches, such as those of Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003). Crisis-based accounts have provided the springboard for the securitization debate, where, according to some parties, the Islamist revival in post-Soviet Central Asia is posited as the factor which threatens the state (Olcott 1994); and according to others, the securitization of Islam that has posed this threat (Heathershaw and Montgomery 2014)

The dynamic approach is represented mainly by assessment frameworks which track events that illustrate instability, leading to state failure. Examples of these are the World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS), Local Information Networks, Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA), Protocol of Assessment of Non-Violent Direct Action (PANDA), Virtual Research Associates (VRA), Early Recognition of Tensions and Fact Findings (FAST), Intergovernmental Authority for development (IGAD), Kansas Events Data System (KEDS), Third Side – incorporates communities and the stakeholders’ perspectives (Carleton 2010, 23). Carleton’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy enhance this approach by suggesting a formula: root (structural) causes + dynamic events.

The causal factors identified by this framework include: “background conditions that form the pre-conditions for crisis situations such as systematic political exclusion, inherent economic inequities, lack of adequate and responsive institutions, the presence of ethnic minorities, resource exhaustion, and over-dependence on international trade” (Carleton 2010, 14). According
to these indicators, Central Asian states are crisis states by default. Furthermore, this template suggests an emphasis on accelerators or events that can trigger the failure, such as system breakdown or basic changes in political causality. According to various theories, revolutions or mass protests can be considered as signs of the fragile states (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2010). Using these indicators, the case of Kyrgyzstan can be considered a failed state, given the two instances of inter-ethnic violence (in 1991 and 2010) and two revolutions (in 2005 and 2010). However, the same indicators can be used to show the state’s resilience, as the ethnic violence in 2010 was quelled in three days (which is quite efficient for a failing state), and the revolutions were viewed as signifiers of democracy in Kyrgyzstan (Laruelle 2013). Hence, violence as such is not a sufficient indicator of state weakness. Rather, it can be seen as a competition or struggle for the balance of political power or the “dark side of democracy” (Mann 2005). While these indicators are useful for identifying a problem, to consider them as causes of state weakness would depend on social context.

The general indicators used by all of the above templates, albeit to different extents and in different combinations, include state authority, capacity, and legitimacy. Authority is defined as the ability of the state to enact binding legislation; capacity refers to the power of the state to mobilize public resources; legitimacy refers to the ability of the state to generate public loyalty and acceptance of governance, through regime type, human rights and gender empowerment (Carleton 2010, 40). According to the ALC indicators, Tajikistan was among the 20 most fragile countries for 2006. The cluster includes indicators such as governance, economics, security and crime, human development, demography, environment (Carleton 2010, 40). Uzbekistan is on the list of the weak states due to the lack of the legitimacy of governance in 2006 (Carleton 2010, 41).

As explained above, all of these indicators obtain a specific flavor in Central Asian social contexts. If, in Western settings, gender empowerment means strengthening a woman’s individual rights and position in leadership (UNIFEM), in Central Asia, it may mean the legalization of
polygamy, because in this way a large number of women would feel that their rights would be more protected (Aslanova 2014, personal communication). The capacity to mobilize resources could be seen in the revolutions, the building of Rogun power station, or sustaining the cotton economy, but would be lacking when the goals do not serve the interests of the ruling elites. Furthermore, while improving infrastructure is, technically, one of the conventional indicators of state capacity, as identified, for example, by Lee (2014), the societal consequences of such infrastructure-building may diminish state legitimacy. As discussed in Chapter 4, some infrastructure-building projects require a serious degree of internal displacement of local populations, which in turn fosters further infringements of state embeddedness. In other words, whether state capacity and state legitimacy appear to be complementary or mutually exclusive for the enhancement of state authority is dependent on what societal consequences flow from any increase in state capacity in a given social context.

The USAID template measuring a country’s fragility focuses mainly on the degree of effectiveness and legitimacy. It shows that countries with both low legitimacy and high effectiveness, as well as countries with high legitimacy and low effectiveness can be considered highly vulnerable states (USAID 2005; 2007). Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan started their sovereignty with different levels of legitimacy and effectiveness, yet in their second decade of independence they all approached a point of state incompleteness.

The next set of indicators is developed by RAND corporation include “governability” and “conduciveness to terrorism”. The innovation of RAND’s approach is that it challenged the Failed States’ Indexes assumption that poor socio-economic indicators lead to terrorism (Rabasa 2007). However, by establishing a link between ungovernability and terrorist presence, RAND assumes that radical Islamism or extremism is one of the causes of state’s failure, for it challenges the state.

Ungovernability is defined as the state’s unwillingness or incapacity to perform its functions (Rabasa 2007, xv) or the situation when the structures of authority that do exist are not
related to the formal institutions of the state (Rabasa 2007, xvi). Indicators of governability include: 1) state penetration of society broken down to the state’s institutions, the prevalence of an informal economy, or social and cultural resistance to state penetration; 2) the extent to which the state has the monopoly on the use of force (illegal armed groups, criminal networks, populations with access to arms); 3) the extent to which the state controls its borders (lack of border controls); 4) whether the state is subject to the external intervention of other states (external interference) (Rabasa 2007, xvi).

The dimensions of conduciveness to terrorism, which overlap with the dimensions of ungovernability, comprise: 1) adequacy of infrastructure and operational access (transportation and communication; financial); 2) availability of sources of income; 3) favorable demographics (presence of extremist groups; supporting social norms; preexisting state of violence; presence of favorably disposed NGOs or social assistance programs open to exploitation; criminal syndicates available for hire); 4) invisibility (Rabasa 2007, xvi). While some of these indicators are present in Central Asia, it is not quite clear whether they describe the state or threats to the state. For example, informal economies, invisibility, supporting social norms, adequate infrastructure, presence of criminal networks for hiring, etc. are phenomena that have been registered in Central Asia. However, informal economies, especially non-standard trade, can be seen as the main pillar of societal survival strategies; invisibility of these activities can be related to both the restrictive government’s policies on individual entrepreneurship, like in Uzbekistan, or as incapacity of the state to organize adequate taxation system, like in the case of Kyrgyzstan. The infrastructure, such as transport routes, can be facilitated by formal external actors or bilateral institutional arrangements between the states. Even criminal networks have a dubious nature, considering that many of these strongmen represented local elites in their local domains, and became marginalized after the end of a civil war, as, for instance, in Tajikistan. Finally, decentralization and privatization
of national assets may lead to those networks conceived of as criminal gaining more access to political power.

Hence, the above measurement frameworks miss important points about the state in Central Asia: 1) most of the socio-economic indicators of failure are practically difficult to achieve, due to the lack of infrastructural capacity of the state; 2) indicators dealing with the human rights dimension do not take into consideration people’s perceptions of what constitutes their rights, some of which are rooted in tradition or custom; 3) the indicators of ungovernability and conduciveness fail to understand the local peculiarities of those dichotomies upon which they are built, i.e. to the state’s political or to the people’s social choices. However, what these indicators do is highlight the sectors which the state has not been capable of managing systematically without resorting to violence.

Existing failed states assessment frameworks tend to overlook the organizational part of state-society relations, which is crucial for both the state’s scope and strength. Furthermore, in practice, the goal of installing those functions of the state in the developing world have been rationalized through the democratization and liberalization rhetoric dealing with all issues in one-size-fits-all package, rather than on a case by case basis. As a result, the implementation of state-building policies in a concrete historical context and societal landscape make for ends that undermine their means.

Furthermore, the existing frameworks on assessment of failed states tend to be more evocative than accurate, since they connect to other security categories, such as global threat, extremism, terrorism, etc. (Heathershaw and Montgomery 2014; Logan and Preble 2011). While describing the threat to the state, this study relies on a more neutral terminology borrowed from political sociology: instead of terrorism, the term radicalization and social resistance will be used. This is not a mere terminological game, but rather an attempt to shift the research focus back to
the social rather than security dimension. In this way, this study will provide a more accurate interpretation of state-building and its challenges in Central Asia.

While the leading assessment frameworks identify symptoms well and provide a snapshot of the state, they do not help to understand why the practical meaning of these indicators in the local context differs. For instance, the state may have a significant monopoly over the legitimate (in the eyes of majority) use of violence. Yet, legitimacy may depend on the patronage structures of the ruling elite, which is visible in the case of elite intermingling in Kyrgyzstan, where the line between organized crime and the ruling elite is not always clear. State capacity, in the case of Uzbekistan, may be present due to the permeating surveillance system, and yet this may undermine rather than increase state authority in remote areas. Finally, economic growth and effectiveness may be misleading, if revenue from this economic growth is diverted into the pockets of the ruling elites. Furthermore, as with the case of Uzbekistan, that very economic growth that characterized “the Uzbek miracle” at the outset of independence, does not exclude the presence of rent-seeking, for it may work similarly to Olson’s theory of “the state as a stationary bandit”. The ruling elite, being confident in its long-term residence in power, is able to share rents and maximize economic utility (Olson 1993). The notion of authority may be partially realized in some territories and absent in others, or the state may exercise some of its functions successfully and fail (sometimes deliberately) in others.

Finally, the notion of good governance and a flourishing civil society, which has a direct link to democracy, may turn this democracy to its dark side, as Michael Mann (2005) has shown, i.e. provide conditions for a parallel civil activism which is opposed to democracy. Examples of this include ethnic nationalism and radical Islamism, both of which are present in the Central Asian states. Hence, the problem is the blurring of the public and private spheres, as well as a lack of separation of private economic goals from the common good. In such a context, the classical pillars of statehood, such as capacity, legitimacy, and authority, measured by economic growth,
effectiveness, good governance, and the lack of political violence may acquire a completely different human meaning in different social contexts. This is why the “strong/weak state” linear continuum can be misleading for those who seek better understanding of the multi-dimensional and non-linear processes influencing state-society relations. Based on this rationale, we suggest reformulating the problem as that of the incomplete state.

The term incomplete state differs from the term “ungoverned territories” developed by RAND (Rabasa 2007). This is because Central Asian states continue manage the security, economy, and society of these territories (or parts of them), even if they do so in a way different from that expected of them by external actors. Rather, this term is close to that of “limited statehood”, suggested by Krasner et.al. in the Special Issue on Governance (2014). Krasner emphasizes that “areas of limited statehood are not ungoverned spaces where anarchy and chaos prevail. The provision of collective goods and services is possible […]” (Krasner 2014, 545). This thesis echoes this approach for, unlike the previously reviewed indexes of state failure, it focuses on the incomplete state as a dependent variable caused by three sets of factors, including external actors’ strategies, and not vice a versa. In other words, conventional accounts see fragile states as the explanatory variable for the failure of external actors’ state-building efforts. This thesis reverses this logic. The incomplete state is an outcome of, not an obstacle to, various state-building efforts. Finally, in contrast to conventional approaches, which see state legitimacy, capacity and authority as three variables at the same end, this thesis puts “authority” at the end of the outcome, i.e. it is included within the dependent variable – the “incomplete state”. Legitimacy and capacity, and their interplay, are seen as part of the explanation. In other words, while discussing the three sets of explanatory factors, this thesis will control for the impact that the processes fostered by those sets of factors have on state capacity and legitimacy.
2.2. The incomplete state: operationalizing the explanandum

This section focuses on the shadow areas that signify state’s incompleteness. It outlines the processes and social structures that create the *barzakh* areas, or sites of interstitial emergence. It is the blurring between formality and the informality, the public and private spheres, and national and transnational that explains the nature of the state in Central Asia. This section shows the main points where these spheres intermingle and suggests lines of reasoning, through which the following empirical chapters will provide an interpretation of this complexity demonstrating links which shed more light on to this picture. Focusing on these shadow areas can provide a better understanding of how to create a bond between the state and society, through strengthening state infrastructural power in a way which could channel and direct societal processes (both local and transnational), rather than marginalize or securitize them. This complexity is simplified here through three indicators of state incompleteness, such as *transnationality*, *cross-sectionality*, and *entrysm*. *Transnationality* is defined here as processes beyond the state’s control which, nevertheless, influence society in a direct or indirect way. An example would be informal trade which is both informal and at the same time legitimate. *Cross-sectionality* is where a phenomenon possesses the attributes of different sectors, such as drug business, religion, or political opposition movements. *Entrysm* is defined here as the capacity of an organization or a movement to infiltrate social structures by merging with their routine practices or customs, in turn related to financial or social interactions.

2.2.1. Transnationality: crime and survival

There is a large space of informality registered by the main datasets on the state in Central Asia. According to the World Bank (2012), between 40 and 60% of the Central Asian economy is informal, and many, if not most, cross-border trade activities are not reported within foreign trade statistics (Kaminski 2012). On one hand, this situation hinders economic growth, one of the
indicators of state fragility. On the other hand, it is legitimate socially when it remains the only way of survival for parts of society. Informal trade persists due to the porous borders and unresolved territorial issues, which themselves also indicate the incompleteness of the state.

Such shadow economic practices exist due to “favorable infrastructure”, as identified by RAND (Rabasa 2007). There are routes like the M-41, the Osh hub, and a network of other transit routes, which were originally established for the purposes of economic development by formal intergovernmental agreements. Specifically, trade and transit trade routes connect Central Asia with Xinxiang, the Golden Crescent (Pakistan – Iran), and Afghanistan, through which the goods from those countries go to Russia, mostly through Kazakhstan (known as the “Northern Route” for heroin trafficking). Along these routes, there are strategic transit hubs, the biggest of which, in the Fergana Valley, is the Osh hub (Kyrgyzstan). The trade and transit trade agreements, concluded by Afghanistan with the bordering countries, create “regional highways and roads [that] lead via the Ring Road through Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan” (UNODC 2012, 69).

According to the UNODC (2012, 63), Afghan-Uzbek trade is mostly conducted either by road or by rail, via the Termez – Hairatan line, and occasionally by riverine traffic. The end points of this trade network include the Navoi International Logistics Center (ILC) and the Free Industrial Economic Zone (FIEZ). A significant part of the transit goods pass through Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan and goes further to Kazakhstan (“Korday” Border Check Point) and to Russia. Specifically, according to the UNODC (2012, 71) there are five such routes:

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5 “The Western and Central Asia transportation network consists of 16 inland waterway routes, seven roads and nine railway lines. The entire network connects 18 countries in the region, 10 of which are landlocked. Since 2002, the road infrastructure in Afghanistan has developed significantly. The Afghan Ring Road lies at the heart of the regional transport system, linking Kabul, Pol-e-Khormi, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, and Khandagar” and further through the Ring Road with Central Asia and the Northern route to the Russian Federation (UNODC 2012, 69).

6 This BCP was closed on 12 August 2015, as part of the Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the Eurasian Union.
1. Panj district → Kurgantube City → Dushanbe City → Khujand City → Isfara → Batken (Kyrgyzstan) → Osh city

2. Shurabad district → Kulyab City → Dushanbe City → Khujand City → Isfara → Batken (KG) → Osh city

3. Shughnon → Murghab → Sary Tash City (KG) → Osh city

4. Darvaz → Murghab → Sary Tash City (KG) → Osh city

5. Shurabad → Kulyab → Dushanbe → Garm → Batken → Osh city

6. Panj → Kurgantube city → Dushanbe City → Uzbekistan

As one can see, Osh city and Batken figure as the main hubs on most routes. And, as will be described later in the empirical chapters, this is the area with the greatest constellation of enclaves and disputed territories. Cities, such as Isfara, Khujand, Istaravshan, enclaves Vorukh,

\[7\] GBAO (Khorog)
Sokh, Shahimardan (addressed later in the thesis), among others, all compose the peculiar social landscape of the Fergana Valley, which is why its social, economic, and ideational landscape, as well as local power brokers, all operate on a thin line with the illicit transit trade.

Drug trafficking is the most vivid example of illicit trafficking along these routes, flowing through “informal” channels, but indirectly facilitated by formal institutions. There are a number of formal inter-governmental agreements that increase Central Asia’s role as a transit region. For example, agreements on trade between Central Asia and its neighboring regions, such as the Afghanistan-Tajikistan Joint Economic, Social, and Business Agreement, the “Afghanistan-Uzbekistan Trade Transit Agreement” (2004), the “Afghanistan-Turkmenistan Transit Agreement”, and the “Afghanistan-Kazakhstan Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation” (2004). According to the UNODC (2012), following the conclusion of the above mentioned bilateral agreements, drug seizures in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan decreased. UNODC (2012) statistical research shows that, in theory, drug seizures should have increased.

Nevertheless, informal cross-border trade represents part of the survival strategies of the local populations (Kaminski 2012) and drug trade makes up significant part of the GDP of the countries involved (ICG 2012). Hence, this blurring between formality and informality, illegal and legal practices represents a site for processes of interstitial emergence, which may lead to further outsourcing of the state’s power. The processes channeled through these sites contribute to decentralization of the state which, according to the leading assessment frameworks in Section 2.1, is a prerequisite of good governance, and therefore a legitimate state. However, within the context of developing states, this decentralization has the following consequences: 1) blurring and overlap of public and private sphere, and the shift of the official structures of power into the “occult structures” of power or control (Bayart and Ellis 1997, 42); 2) criminalization of economic

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8 This creates an interdependent logistics belt across and beyond Central Asia. For example, transit trade routes connect Central Asia to the Golden Crescent (Pakistan-Iran) with Afghanistan, the transit goods through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan flow to Russia and further. For detailed maps of logistics hubs and the transit routes, see UNODC report (2012).
activities (Leander 2003, 10); 3) dismantled institutional capacity, the state is trapped in the last report – violence or despotic power (Leander 2003, 11). Being present in Central Asia, these consequences have been fostered by different sets of factors than those suggested by the leading assessment frameworks.

2.2.2. Cross-sectionality: drugs for “hearts and minds”

The presence of radical non-state actors, or so-called “favorable demographics”, an indicator suggested by the RAND (2007) assessment framework, takes on a new twist in the context of Central Asia. An example would be the analysis of radical Islamist movements, such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. It is not the presence of these groups as such that contributes an assessment suggesting the state’s failure. It is their capacity to infiltrate societies and build upon the natural social structures which indicates their importance. The IMU is a vivid example of what is considered to be a radical religious movement, a political movement born in opposition to the President of Uzbekistan, and a drug trafficking vehicle meant to create the necessary disorder in the Fergana Valley in 1991 to facilitate the establishing of routes and mechanisms for the drug business (Karagiannis 2005; Olcott and Udalova 2000). The IMU straddles three sections: politics, crime, and religion.

While most of the academic debate is shaped by the question of whether similar types of movements represent a real or socially constructed threat to the state (Heathershaw and Montgomery 2014; Peyrouse 2012), this thesis takes their presence as one of the indicators of incomplete state-building, representing a vivid example of shadow areas maneuvering between both transnational and local practices. This thesis emphasizes that Islamist movements in Central Asia are mere instances of general social resistance. They are important not because they are radical, for social conflict is at the heart of social relations. They are important in that they are cross-sectional, i.e. both political and criminal, utilizing a “transcendent ideology” of resistance,
i.e. the capacity to influence the transformation of the existing power networks if structural conditions allow (Mann 1993). While the map of radical Islamism in Central Asia is complex, a brief example of their cross-sectionality, transnationality, and entrysm of such movements is provided below.

**IMU as a political opposition, drug dealers, and Islamist movements**

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is a continuation of a previous group known as Islam Lashkorlary (the Warriors of Islam), a sort of community police operating in Uzbekistan during the perestroika that aimed to protect entrepreneurs from racketeering and was financed through the system of ushr—i.e., voluntary public donations from private persons and mosques (Abashin 2011; Babadzhanov 2011). An active member of this group was Tohir Yuldashev, who in the 1990s, together with the former Soviet paratrooper Juma Namangani, organized the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. After the Presidential elections of 1992, state authorities started persecution of the IMU's members. At this point, Yuldashev (who was then a member of Uzbekistani political opposition) escaped with his supporters to Tajikistan and Afghanistan, where civil war was in full swing. There they established special training camps and created contacts with the Taliban and, consequently, with Al-Qaeda (Abashin 2011; ICG 2001c). The drug trade from Afghanistan became their main activity and their new source of financing. There were also connections between Juma Namangani and Mullo Abdullo in Tajikistan during the civil war. The first of the IMU's political protests against Uzbekistani government was organized in Tashkent in 1991 (Babajanov 1999). This illustrates the mixed nature of this movement.

The IMU incursions into the Batken area in the Fergana Valley in the late 1990s shifted attention from their criminal and political nature to their extremist/Islamist character. Reportedly, the IMU invasion of Southern Kyrgyzstan in the late 1990s was mainly due to the need “to escape from the prosecution of the authoritarian Uzbek government” (IMU member 1, personal
communication 2012). According to this view, concerning the use of hostages “[they] did not plan that, it was the last resort, because [they] needed a guaranteed passage through the border” (Ibidem). This information connects to what Heathershaw and Montgomery (2014) argue - that the IMU has been securitized by the government of Uzbekistan, due to the fact that a number of its members come from groups constituting the opposition to the President of Uzbekistan (Shirin Akiner 2005 quoted in Heathershaw and Montgomery 2014, 10).

A different story about the IMU is told by the officials of the Drug Control Agency (DCA) in Bishkek. According to the data, the DCA has been collecting since the beginning of the 1991, [the IMU incursions into Batken] were simply a way to double-check the situation on the ground in order to maintain existing drug trafficking routes and create new ones: “some roads are just narrow mountainous roads, with some caves equipped with all essentials for possible inhabitation. Since some of them were spotted by officials, they needed to pave new pathways. Also, some border guards have changed since the time the IMU first got involved into trafficking. So they needed to create connections with the new ones” (A senior Drug Control Agency official, personal communication 2012). Indeed, according to interviewed members of the IMU, drug trafficking is still one of the main sources of revenue of this organization: as a consequence, the IMU’s maintenance of its networks on the territory of the Fergana Valley remains of the foremost importance, since money transactions are mostly done in cash through reliable people (IMU members 1 and 2, personal communications 2012). From interviews carried out with the general population in Kyrgyzstan and in Tajikistan, it is safe to say that the IMU can rely on a large social network in the mahallas and in home-based mosques, as well as on connections with the law-enforcement officers and border-guards (respectively in Osh and Jalal-Abad in 2012, and in Hujand, Istaravshan, and Isfara in 2012). To sum up, the IMU stands on three pillars: drug networks, mutual trust networks, and local strongmen.
2.2.3. Entrysm: mutual trust networks, their stakeholders and social structures

This indicator identifies the points of infiltration of society by organized crime, including some Islamist movements. Entrysm is concerned not with quantitative indicators, such as the number of followers and sympathizers, but rather with in qualitative indicators, such as the capacity of non-state actors to infiltrate societal mutual trust networks, thereby making their social organization partially overlap with the societal organization at the grassroots. Specifically, such mutual trust networks can be infiltrated through customary community practices, such as zakyat, ashar, and ushr, signifying a voluntary charity tax, mutual help in the form of money or labor or merely organization of communally meaningful festivities or events. Grassroots social structures that can be seen as mutual trust networks in case of Central Asia include mahallas (as a social unit) and bazaars (as an economic unit).\(^9\) It is worth noting that this idea should not be understood literally, i.e. simply equating mahallas or bazaars with organized crime and the “black economy” (UNODC 2007, 54) or radical Islamism (HRW 2013). Rather, it is here to draw attention to the fact that these social units are important for organizing state-society relations, for they partially represent the spaces beyond the reach of the state’s infrastructural power, which is why their marginalization in the state-building process may lead to them connecting to non-state power networks instead. It highlights how factors that are often seen as causes of state fragility, such as radical Islam, can be seen as signs of state incompleteness. Moreover, considering the cross-sectionality of people’s survival strategies, entrysm blurs the line between legal and illegal, contributing to the creation of parallel social orders and complicating the state-building process.

To show the complex nature of these social units in Central Asia, it would be useful to explain some of the terms used: the mahalla is a social structure, a space of common memories, a community of trust, and, in part, the smallest administrative unit of the state system (Dadabaev

\(^9\) In some cases, one can also include mosques, for a mahalla is often centered on a mosque or another holy site.
Mahallas usually have sites that provide spiritual services, which can range from mosques and prayer rooms to holy sites. A bazaar or market is an economic unit, vital for trade, both formal and informal (Nasritdinov 2006). These two units have historically sustained at least the memories if not practices of trust-based customs, such as kashar (or ashar), ushr, zakyat. These three interrelated practices can be regarded as a traditional welfare system – “a means of taking care of the needy in society, and of achieving some measure of income redistribution; although in theory constituting a voluntary armsgiving, it could be assimilated to a religious tax” (Warde 2000, 144-145). Ashar (kashar) and ushr are similar concepts, more typical for Central Asia and Adat customary law. It is literally community help to a family in need. They differ from zakyat in their non-systematic character, which is dependent on the needs of the members of a community. The help is provided not necessarily in terms of money, i.e. the duty-in-kind. As such, all these customs can be seen as related to the Islamic moral economy: “the idea is to integrate the poor in the economy. Self-help and self-reliance are at the center of the system. [Unlike in the conventional banking system], rather than looking for credit-worthy customers and basing lending decisions on credit history and collateral, MFIs lend small amounts of money to people with no resources, as a means of integrating them in the productive economy” (Warde 2000, 146). Central Asian customary law was not strictly similar to Islamic law. However, since the revival of communities in the post-Soviet period and the need to become self-governed and self-organized, isolated communities, especially in the enclave zones, started reviving memories and practices of zakyat and similar micro-financing. These practices have been placed at the core of current mutual trust systems in Central Asia (Falkenburg 2013; Faith 2011). For instance, analysis of the dominant position of Uzbek communities in the bazaars in the Southern Kyrgyzstan reveals that a key role was played by a large use of zakyat and ashar, micro-financing and self-help by members of communities to one another (Uzbek businesspersons and informal leaders, personal communication 2012). Field research has shown that these practices were the main entry points
for the Islamist infiltration. Groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, are, by all reports, well-known for participating in zakyat, ashars, and organizing festivities and traditional gatherings, (such as gap, toi, ash, and chaikhanas/tea houses) as well as funerals (Taarnby 2012). Hizb-ut-Tahrir involvement in these practices was observed in all three parts of the Fergana Valley (personal fieldnotes 2012; 2014). Hence, given this infiltration of social structures by HuT, the debate about its organizational structure, which many authors use as proof of “securitization of Islam” (Heathershaw and Montgomery 2014), loses its allure in terms of understanding state-building. It is the societal organization and not the organizational structure of the Islamist movement - and the criminal networks created by them through infiltration of social structures and routines as well as people’s survival strategies and self-governance practices – which is what really matters for understanding the problem of the incomplete state in Central Asia.

The irony is that these methods are not new, having also been used by international organizations both past and present. For instance, the OSCE office in Dushanbe organizes similar festivities around the country, in order to reach out to the grassroots communities (participant observation, OSCE Tajikistan). Similarly, some of the micro-businesses in the bazaars in Osh were established with the help of HuT, local racketeers and drug barons, who are considered to be a “mafia-like grouping” by official accounts (UNODC 2009, 2012). Similarly, the Soviet NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) was required to engage in public discussions within mahallas and their public gatherings (Abramson 1998, 71). These so-called “red corners” were organized in tea- houses in order to spread Soviet propaganda among the common people (Abramson 1998, 72). The power of the community, mahalla, which characterized societal organization in Western Turkestan in the times prior to incorporation within the Russian Empire in the 1860s, was acknowledged during the Soviet period in an attempt to gradually formalize these communities, starting in 1960s. Its importance for state-building is related to the fact that this
social structure lies between grassroots civil society and state institutions.\textsuperscript{10}

There is a block of literature that conceptualized the mahalla as part of civil society (Dadabaev 2012). Others claim that it is a state institution, since it has been formalized since 1960s (Troschke 2012; Kandiyoti 2007). Some authors emphasize that, regardless of formalization, mahallas were not included within the Soviet system of governance, which is why they represent grassroots social structures which are, nevertheless, of vital importance for state-society relations and the organization of relations between private and public sectors (Dadabaev 2013; Shlapentokh 1999). Finally, social anthropologists continue to emphasise the trust-based nature of mahallas, and highlight the fact that at the level of individuals the line where the formalized mahallas ends and the moral community starts is clear-cut (Liu 2012).

In Uzbekistan, \textit{mahallas} were officially institutionalised in the 1961 law on “Mahalla Committees” by the Supreme Council of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (Dadabaev 2012). After the collapse of the Soviet Union they maintained an institutional role, to the point that in 1999 a \textit{mahalla posboni} (neighborhood watch) system was established to look out for social resistance movements in the communities. On 15 March 2013, a new law on the \textit{mahalla} committees was issued in Uzbekistan: this new regulation widens their competence to create, recognise, control, and eliminate local entrepreneurial activities. In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, \textit{mahallas}, as official administrative units, have different formal names, but the same community meaning. Indeed, according to the Law of the Local Self-Governance of Republic of Tajikistan and the similar Law of the Kyrgyz Republic, the smallest official administrative unit of local self-

\textsuperscript{10} Using mahallas structures as the basis for surveillance build on the Soviet practice of confronting social resistance movements in the 1920s. These community-based practices have been used by the Soviet authorities to confront the indigenous social resistance movements (the “basmachi”) and disseminate Soviet propaganda. For instance, the Soviet authorities created the so-called “Red Corners” in the chaikhonas, the Neighborhood Watch, and the Comrades Court. All three institutions were installed into the community routines to watch, monitor, and convert them into “responsible communists” (Memorandums of 1922, 1924, 1932, 1938). In the 1959, after the famous Khruschev’s campaign of “reevaluation of history”, additional power was granted to the mahalla. The Supreme Court of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic issues a law about “Mahalla Committees” (1961), it did not expand much the rights and roles played by “unofficial mahallas” (Dadabaev 2012, 163).
governance is the *jamoat* (territorial committee), a local community, which de facto is formed by several neighbourhood communities, *mahallas* (ICNL 2015a,b,c). In fact, however, *jamoats* in Tajikistan resemble *mahallas* in Uzbekistan. As concerns Kyrgyzstan, the term *jamoats* instead refers to a form of local self-governance which can be based on a community (a mahalla) or represent an association of several communities or an association of elected members of these communities. This administrative unit formally enjoys wider freedom as economic and social subjects, which has eased the creation of informal economies in the region, according to Art. 1 of the Law on jamaats. In all these countries *mahallas* epitomize a socialization site, whose institutional hierarchies have been organized in relation to the use of natural resources (water and land) and means of production (Dadabaev 2012). The nature of these hierarchies is not about power as coercions, but rather about the moral obligations of mutual support and respect.

The post-Soviet attempts to institutionalize *mahallas* as surveillance structures has been widely practiced in Uzbekistan, and to a lesser degree in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, in Kyrgyzstan, a solution was found to reorganize the urban space in high-rise blocks of flats without properly compensating people for their houses, and displacing some residents of *mahallas* to the more mountainous and wild areas of the borderlands. This kind of urbanization implied a series of internal displacements of the Uzbek population to the suburbs or to the mountainous areas neighbouring Osh *oblast*. This urban re-engineering intends to replace “monoethnic districts” with ethnically-mixed ones (The head of department on district committees of Osh Mayoralty, personal communication 2012; See also Liu 2012). These new city designs facilitate the creation of a surveillance system, a sort of Panopticon, but without supporting it with power infrastructures and without providing people with other means to survive. In this way, however, the state strategies have paradoxically provoked a return to more traditional ways of organizing resources and economic activities, as well as turning *mahallas* into increasingly informal networks “based on voluntary mutual aid system and customary law” (Dadabaev 2012, 154).
The number of such communities has grown in the post-Soviet period. For example, there are approximately 10,000 mahallas currently registered in Uzbekistan (Dadabaev 2013, 185). In contrast, in 1961, there were approximately 270 mahallas in Tashkent, 131 in Samarkand, 48 in Kokand (Kotler 1961, 33), 45 in Nukus, 42 in Namangan and 41 in Andijan (Kamilov 1961, 59-60). In Tajikistan, the number of official jamoats is about 401 (Ilolov and Khudoiyev 2014, Ch.11). However, these numbers include only official local self-government administrative units which are regulated by the Law on Local Self-government in Towns and Villages, which does not include “other grassroots institutions of local self-governance that are currently active, such as makhalla, micro-rayion councils, housing block committees or other village (kishlak) organizations” (Ilolov and Khudoiyev 2014). In Kyrgyzstan, the state does not think in terms of mahallas or jamoats, “for they are associated with an Uzbek social organization” (The head of department on district committees of Osh Mayoralty, personal communication 2012). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these communities have been called “district committees” (kravtal’nye komitety), and have been combined under village or town committees (aiyl okmottu), of which there are about 460 around the country (Mirzaev et al. 2012). However, these committees, especially in the south of the country, include a range of mahallas and jamoats operating both formally and informally, in the form of an NGO or local self-governance structure. Official statistics omit mahallas in an effort to standardize self-governance, but such communities remain active informally. Communities matter, for they still represent repositories of communal trust, as much ethnographic research demonstrates (Liu 2012).

Furthermore, surveys on mahallas and jamoats in Tajikistan show that communities enjoy more trust among people than central governments, international and non-governmental organizations in Central Asia. This means that people see communities as social institutions to a greater extent than the state. Surveys show that in terms of trust, people’s main points of reference are mosques, local communities, their families, and friends (Taarnby 2012). According to
the latest surveys on trust among populations, it was found that 3.6% of respondents in the Kyrgyz part of the Fergana Valley would turn to formal religious leaders among available figures or institutions that people for advice if faced with a problem. The figure for trust communities (the informal part of mahallas or jamoats) and family networks is about 36 per cent (M-Vector unpublished data, consulted in 2012). The figure for trust to a clan\textsuperscript{11} leader is 22 percent, the highest among the republics in focus (M-Vector data). A similar finding on the shifting of trust from formal institutions and leaders to closer circles of friends, families and trust communities is demonstrated by a large-scale OSCE study on radicalization in Tajikistan and a Human Rights Council study on the trust among the population (Taarnby 2012). Expert data on Uzbekistan shows a high degree of suspicion toward formal law enforcement institutions and a growing role for communities (Babadzhanov 2015).

In Kyrgyzstan, mahallas have more ambiguous meaning than in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, for official state figures tend to define them as an “Uzbek phenomenon” (The dead of department on district committees of Osh Mayoralty, personal communication 2012).\textsuperscript{12} For this reason, even though they admit the important role of these communities for social life, they give them negative emotional connotations and suggest that they should be standardised. The Mayoralty of Osh city insisted on calling them “territorial committees” and declined to provide exact numbers for them, claiming that, formally, there are 16 or 18 of territorial committees (Ibid.). However, each of these territorial units also has informal communities within formal committees, who do not report to the Mayoralty. However, it is the mutual trust networks and similar customs that make these communities important, regardless of whether they are acknowledged as such by the formal states.

\textsuperscript{11} Clan leader in this case means an informal leader of the closest community, rather than clan in its classical historical meaning. In Kyrgyzstan, clan lost its historical meaning as a category connecting to economic or political resources. It is the matter of how M-Vector researchers formulated their questions. They prefer using the category of clan, because it is simpler for the respondents to understand.

\textsuperscript{12} Many officials in Kyrgyzstan are of the same opinion.
Reportedly, the grassroots communities have multiplied in all parts of the Fergana Valley, but the central state authority does not always extend to their territories. Violence among communities as an indicator of state’s fragility is also present in Central Asia. Its famed citadel is the Fergana Valley, which is composed of a myriad of enclaves, porous borders, and disputed territories. Its population has habitually lived according to two main principles: “actual use of lands”, i.e. one could cross the border to use pastures and water freely, and the shared use of water. With the introduction of international borders between the republics, such usage of land and water started triggering tension. This is because it has been formally illegal to cross the technically international borders since 1991. The main areas for conflicts over water are the enclaves and disputed territories southwest of the towns of Batken and Isfara, specifically the Tajik jamoats of Chorkhu, Vorukh, and Surkh (surrounded by Kyrgyz territories), and the western part of Batken district in Kyrgyzstan with Aksai, Samarkanbek ad Ak-Tatyr communities. Experts call them the “hotspot areas for inter-ethnic tensions” (Passon and Temirkulov 2004, 43-44).

However, research on the negotiations that took place during the conflicts reveal that the main issues brought to the table were water, access to canals, rehabilitation of canal infrastructure, and detour routes. The outbreak of conflicts have been registered yearly or every other year since 2000\(^{13}\), with land, water, and canals, as well as attempts on remote border posts (in 2003). The necessity for the actual use of lands and water, as well as population growth, fostered the phenomenon of “creeping migration” (*polzuchaya migratsiya*). This is where people within the Tajik enclaves were gradually encroaching onto Kyrgyzstani land, by means of planting tree saplings, building temporary-cum-permanent houses, as well as buying or renting houses and land from departing residents of Kyrgyzstan (Bichsel 2009, 114; Passon and Temirkulov 2004).

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\(^{13}\) Since 2000 the border controls were severed, due to the invasion of the IMU in the Batken zone in 1999-2000
In general, there were about a dozen conflicts in this area which took place between 2000 and 2015. Some of these conflicts were resolved through inter-communal cooperation on canal rehabilitation or building detour-routes, allowing freer movement of people across the new borders (Bichsel 2009, Ch.7). The “lack of linkage between the indigenous informal institutions and the governments”, inspired a range of international organizations to establish community-empowerment and decentralization projects in the Fergana Valley (Bichsel 2009, 5). Reportedly, there were a number of successful cases where communities agreed terms without the intervention of the central governments (ACTED 2014). The literature on fragile states and conflict transformation claims that such violence leads to state failure. This thesis suggests that communities matter, but not necessarily because they “threaten violence” as such, but rather because where they are empowered and decentralized in the historically fragmented territory of the Fergana Valley, they simultaneously become sites of alternative self-governance and the sites of insterstitial emergence, channeling new stakeholders and connecting to new power-networks, some of which are outlined above. Hence, these sites, once empowered, can become either the sites of social resistance or the building-blocks of the state-society relations. Which of these directions has more chance to develop depends on how they are managed and organized and under what sets of factors.

As for the grassroots economic unit, the bazaar, its role in state-building is illustrated by the ethnic tensions in Osh, which resulted in the reshuffling of power in the Osh bazaar. This bazaar is significant because it is the biggest economic power domain in the South, where both formal and informal power holders intermingle. Before the ethnic conflict in 2010, most of the

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15 Such as: UNDP, ADB, WB, Mercy Corps, ACTED, USAID, SDA, GIZ etc. Almost all international organizations participate in the decentralization and community-empowerment projects.
places in the bazaar were occupied by Uzbeks (Nasritdinov 2006). Thereafter, the bazaar was organized differently and the previous owners lost their domains (ICG 2010). Furthermore, bazaars were also the main fora for the dissemination of radical propaganda (Epkenhans 2010). Bazaars matter for they provide the space for propaganda, economic survival, and political networking. Some scholars conceptualize them as a source of conflict in Central Asia (Temirkulov 2013). The Osh ethnic violence in 2010 was a vivid example of this. The conflict in July 2010 resulted in a redistribution of power over the main bazaar. This allows one to conclude that the bazaar is seen as an economic resource, important for nation-building, which is why control was redistributed in favor of ethnic Kyrgyz. The Editor-in-Chief of the Fifth Channel Southern division stated: “Yes, we, the Kyrgyz, were wrong in starting the physical attacks in July 2010 first, but we were right in finally doing justice to Uzbeks who did not leave us any access to bazaars in our own motherland” (Adaev 2012, personal communication). Osh bazaar and Kara-Suu bazaar are crucial for doing business in Southern Kyrgyzstan. They are also crucial hubs for re-exported Chinese goods, which were the key “economic advantage” of Kyrgyzstan vis-à-vis other Central Asian countries. Furthermore, drug deals are conducted through networks related to these bazaars. Hence, taking over the bazaars meant re-connecting the Kyrgyz with one of the main resources of the state.

However, the Fergana Valley is comprised of a myriad of enclaves, each surviving on cross-border trade. In this context, there are many more bazaars which can be considered to be sites of interstitial emergence or through which shadow trade flows. Furthermore, the exact number of enclaves is not specified, for some of the territories do not exist on official maps (Merkulova 2013). Therefore, bazaars—especially those located in the geographically remote areas and on the disputed territories of the Fergana Valley—can be seen as important economic units for organizing state and society relations. One should remember that bazaars (especially those of Osh and Kara-Suu in Kyrgyzstan) at the beginning of the 1990s were under the “protection” of racketeers who later became “criminals-in-law”, such as Bayaman, Aibek the Black and other such individuals.
Some of these individuals were elevated to the Mayoralty of Osh, such as Mayor Myrzakmatov. While their professions may have changed, their networks and desirable resources remained the same. As the violence in July 2010 illustrated, the ethnic component of these “inter-ethnic” tensions could be resolved in three days even within a weak state, as long as the resources were reshuffled in a desirable way. In Uzbekistan, the IMU movement and one of its leaders was also the offspring of a racketeering band of athletes “providing public protection” at that point of time. What all of this means is that the problem of the incomplete state remains. While names and figures have changed, shadow sites and sources of power have remained the same and need to be addressed in order to understand how to (re)organize state-society relations and determine what resources matter for statehood.

Conclusion

The conventional wisdom measures the failure of a state through violence, democracy, and chaos. The triggers of this failure vary from revolutionary protests to inter-ethnic violence. Further, the causes of conflict are rooted in ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity. Legitimacy, capacity, and authority are seen as the three main pillars of the state.

The Central Asian realities suggest that violence can be seen as a side-effect of democracy; a chaotic Parliament may be representative of its society; and revolutions, civil wars, and inter-ethnic conflicts may be used as the tools to reorganize something as basic as access to land, water, bazaars, trade routes and state institutions, all of which are perceived locally as sources of power. Many elements within the societies in the rural areas perceive criminals-in-law or warlords as legitimate figures. They may prioritize order and stability over pluralism of opinions and freedom, and they may label their governments rather than the non-state Islamist movements as extremists. This shows that legitimacy may not be tied to democracy; and capacity may not be tied to security. Rather, it is the sense of belonging and survival strategies which seem to be two main
aspects taken into consideration. It is not that there is “too much of the state” which bothers people. It is, perhaps, that there is “too little” of it which is the issue, especially when we talk about people who used to live in a socialist state during the Soviet period, when lives were planned, jobs secure, and education free. Hence, the main problem is that the state’s authority does not extend to its entire territory, at times due to the lack of legitimacy, at time to the lack of capacity. This results in a feeling of alienation and forces people to look for alternative ways of survival and alternative networks to belong to.

While the leading assessment frameworks highlight the problem of criminalization, informality, shadow economies, non-state actors, ungoverned territories as the indicators of state’s fragility, they overlook the fact that these same factors may often constitute the state’s strength in Central Asia. Both failure and strength seem to be made of the same constituent parts. For instance, it is the blurriness between the formal and informal, legal and illegal, private and public, local and transnational processes which can be used as both state-weakening and state-strengthening tools. Therefore, it is very important to see the concrete social and economic structures where these dimensions meet: as the previous chapter called them, the areas of barzakh or processes of interstitial emergence. Specifically, the focus is on two of these: the mahalla, the grassroots community of trust and the bazaar, the grassroots economic unit. Bear in mind that these areas are taken here as spaces for potential (re)connection between the state and society, not as the causes of state’s weakness as such, for it depends not on whether they are present at all, but on what we do with them. These sites of resistance indicate that the state is incomplete, but they can be turned into the sites of the state empowerment.

Having examined the barzakh areas through the lenses of three indicators, i.e. transnationality, cross-sectionality and entrysm, we have simplified the complexity around the grassroots socio-economic structures, by highlighting main stakeholders, resources, and mechanisms competing for dominance over these spaces, and therefore for the hearts and minds
of the people and the directions of the societal processes. In doing so, we have shown that these areas are vulnerable to different types of power and influence, which is why it is not these spaces as such that lead to the state’s incompleteness, but rather what powerful actors do with them, how they organize their relations with them, and the balance which is struck (if at all) between the formal and informal, legal and illegal, transnational and local. As to why, this is explained in the empirical chapters that follow.
CHAPTER 3. Follow the water: resources and state construction

Introduction

This chapter addresses the first of three elements explaining the incompleteness of the state in Central Asia. It is about a social legacy constructed by the Soviet state which persists long after the demise of the Soviet Union. This refers to cross-border social interdependence in the field of water and land management. It claims that the breakup of the Soviet state signified the rupture of state formation, as the policies of building the state have taken radically opposite directions, such as the shift from centralization to decentralization. Specifically, it shows that neo-liberal policies have in practice contributed to the empowerment of communities and creation of empty shell states without societies to fill them in.

It proceeds along the following steps. Firstly, section 3.1 provides an overview of pre-Soviet social organization and social patterns in Central Asia. In doing so, it shows that Central Asian history used to be about diversity, flux and liquidity, just as the waters that its societies had followed. Secondly, section 3.2 depicts how the new reality of nations and ethnicities under the Soviet state (1924 – 1936) was constructed, and how the existing resources were linked to the newly created categories of nationality. The creation of nations was the first step towards further sovietization and the creation of a more encompassing identity based on collective interest, manufactured through the process of collectivization, as shown in section 3.3. Collectivization was the culmination of a process of creating cross-border societal interdependence in the Fergana Valley that did not necessarily coincide with previous social relations and patterns. Section 3.4. addresses the collapse of the Soviet Union and the de-collectivization project, rationalized by the new sponsors of statehood applying templates devised with reference to the Washington Consensus. This section shows that privatization did not lead to the dismantling of social interdependence, because it failed to create the neo-liberal institution of private property.
Instead, it has fostered an unintended consequence of creating an institution of property based on communities, rather than centered on an individual. It demonstrates this by addressing the restructuring of land and water as the main assets of the societies of the Fergana Valley, shown in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, respectively. Finally, section 3.5 provides an illustration of the above mentioned claims through the case of the Isfara river.

**3.1. Pre-Societ societal organization and patterns of social relations**

In the mid-nineteenth century, the territory of present day Central Asia was divided into three polities – the Khanates of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand, roughly comprising the historic Sogdiana, Baktria, and Margiana of Alexander, fed by the waters of Oxus (Amu-Darya) and Jaxartes (Syr-Darya). These polities divided the territories now occupied by present-day Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and southern Kyrgyzstan. The plateau occupied by present day northern Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan was called Western Turkestan, a term which later referred to all of Central Asia stretching from the Kazakh-Russian border to what is now Chinese Xinxiang (Eastern Turkestan). At the risk of oversimplification, this territory can be said to comprise three Khanates which were surrounded by nomadic or semi-nomadic Kazakh and Kyrgyz tribes (See the maps below). We use the term Russian Turkestan here for this latter version that stretches from the Russo-Kazakh border to Xinxiang.

The Emirates of Bukhara and Khiva were the rivals of the infamous Kokand Khanate (1799 – 1875), which was subjected to the Russian Empire in 1868 via a Treaty in which Kokand agreed to become a Russian vassal state. In general, the Tsarist rule in Russian Turkestan lasted from 1876 – 1917. The Three Khanates – Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand, which had strained relations both towards each other and the neighboring nomad populations (Abashin 2011; Geiss 2004). Populations within these latter states were mostly sedentary or semi-sedentary.
The Khanate of Kokand was abolished in March 1876 by Tsar Alexander II, who claimed to be following and protecting “the wishes of the Kokand people to become Russian subjects” (Abashin 2011). In this way, the Kokand Khanate was incorporated into the Fergana Province of Russian Turkestan (Abashin 2011).

At the time, Russian Turkestan comprised a variety of ethnic groups or tribes, which the Soviet ethnographic commission decided later to combine into more encompassing categories of nationalities or ethnicities. However, ethnos was not seen as the key organizing principle of these polities at that time, nor was a level of national self-consciousness highly developed (Hirsch 2000). Instead, a typical Central Asian person would be the product of a diverse background (Barthold 1894). Due to the nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyles, people of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva did not define themselves in national terms: “ethnic, linguistic, religious, clan, and economic divisions often did not coincide, and people subscribed to several identities at once” (Barthold 1894).
Furthermore, as a recent work of Tajik historian Kamoluddin Abdullaev (2010) has shown, the history of Central Asia is the history of migration, which facilitated cultural diversity and social fragmentation rather than conventional accounts of nation and ethnicity.

At the grassroots, these societies were fragmented social organizations, possessing kinship, tribal, or mixed identities. The socio-economic order was based on communities, the main institutions of which were religious, that is madrassahs, mosques, and shariah courts. The basis of the economy was mainly agriculture and trade (for Bukhara and Khiva), as exercised through bazaars within the broader infrastructure of the Silk Road, and, for the Kazakh and Kirghiz nomads, pastoralism and animal husbandry. The exact data on cultural diversity of Central Asia as it was then is hard to establish, due to the absence of data by which we measure diversity today, such as ethnicity, nation, class, state boundary, etc.

There are different stories told and yet to be told. According to Geiss (2004), “ethnographic accounts differ considerably regarding the names, boundaries and peculiarities of the Central Asian “peoples” who were organized along different lines” (Geiss 2004, 13). Hirsch (2005) provides a detailed analysis of the disputes between the Russian ethnographic authorities during the process of creating the existing categories of ethnicity (Hirsch 2005, ch.3). In general, the Soviet ethnographers identified so-called “small” or “weak” narodnosti (nationalities) and “larger” and “more-developed” glavnye narodnosti (main nationalities). As the next section will show, through the politics of the “Great Break”, the Soviet authorities decided to amalgamate the small nationalities into the main ones, “first on paper and then through its land and language policies” (Hirsch 2005, 137). According to the volumes of census data published at the beginning of 1928, there were 166 nationalities; 4 subgroups, and 6 “provisional nationalities” (Hirsch 1997). However, later on the Commission for the Study of the Tribal Composition of the Population of

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16 For a comprehensive analysis of different versions of historiography and ethnography of Central Asia, see Georg Geiss (2004).
Russia (Komissiya po izucheniju plemennogo sostava naseleniya Rossii [KIPS]) “expressed their misgivings about the statistical and actual consolidation of narodnosti. In correspondence with government and party institutions, the ethnographers argued that without a complete statistical analysis of all available data it would be impossible to compose accurate ethnographic maps, which had been requested by government committees to settle border disputes” (PFR RAN f.135, op.l,d.79, l.8, quoted in Hirsch 2005, 137-138).

The evidence suggests that the nationalities which existed in the pre-Soviet period did not coincide with those of today. Furthermore, nationalities did not exist before the borders were drawn and the links between land and ethnicity had been established. For example “In Fergana communities of people called themselves “Kirgiz-Kipchak” or “Uzbek-Kipchak”, [and] until the national-territorial delimitation of Central Asia in 1924, the terms Uzbek, Kirgiz, and Kipchak typically denoted linguistic or kinship affiliations, not nationality” (Hirsh 2005, 113). In Bukhara, the ethnographers responsible for mapping Central Asian nationalities faced the problem that local people could not straightforwardly answer questions around their nationalities. The ethnographer and Turkologist, Ivan Zarubin, suggested introducing “control questions about the native language, conversational language, religion, and kinship group in order to ascertain whether they had given “correct” responses to the question about nationality: to differentiate between Iranians and Tajiks, Zarubin recommended that census takers pay attention to the religion of the subject; he noted that in Bukhara and Khorezm most Iranians are Shiites and Tajiks are Sunni” (Hirsch 2005, 112). However, defining nationality on the basis of religion was not necessarily accurate. Some scholars argue that the Three Khanates had been a space of “Islamic diversity” (Mirsaitov 2004) with kalam, that is critical Islam (Abashin 2011), being the core principle of understanding Islam. In other words, these notions have always been contested, especially by sufi and later by jadidist (reformist) Islam (Khalid 1998). Bukhara, especially, had been considered the place where Sufism has always been widespread (Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda,
That is why this thesis emphasizes the understanding of Central Asian history as one of diversity, migration, and displacement, especially in the pre-tsarist, tsarist, and the Soviet periods. Whereas it is outside of the scope of this thesis to reconcile differing historiographical accounts on Central Asia, this conflict only emphasizes that the nature of conflict in pre-Soviet Central Asia was mainly about resources, since socio-political organization was organized around water and resources, fought over by the nomadic populations and the peoples of the oasis polities comprising the Three Khanates.

The flux and diversity of the Turkestani population can be seen through its formation processes, such as migration, and dynamic community structures. The migration routes analyzed by Abdullaev (2010) and Paul Georg Geiss (2004) provide evidence for that the socio-political order of Turkestan’s societies was in constant flux, even those of the oasis states and the Three Khanates. Geiss (2004) also shows that it was based either on tribal systems (when referring to nomads) or a patrimonial one, which was also not constant since its subjects could move from the domain of one strongman to another and so on. This was especially true in the Tsarist period (i.e. the period of the Three Khanates). At the same time, it would not be accurate to describe pre-Tsarist Turkestan in the nineteenth-century as organized strictly in a tribal or non-tribal way. Geiss (2004) also notices that, due to the fact that Central Asian history is the one of frequent disruptions, it is more accurate to view pre-tsarist Turkestan in terms of community structures and their interactions, because even “tribal communal commitment was established in Central Asia in dissimilar ways. [Political communities are seen] as evolved from the communal interpenetration and changing communal commitment structures” (Geiss 2004, 2). In a semi-arid region, those who control water have the greatest power. Agricultural systems were based around the main rivers, the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya. Water also has social and spiritual meaning. Some authors see the importance of water systems being rooted in the Zoroastrian views of the centrality of water for the social order. For example, “ancient Zoroastrians offered up daily prayers to water, and people
who worked on the irrigation network and reclaimed land from the desert were held in very high esteem” (McGovern 1939 quoted in O’Hara 2000, 372). In pre-Tsarist Central Asia, water was central to the social, economic, and political organization of the settlements (Le Strange 1905). When Tsarist Russia intervened, the region still had a sophisticated irrigation system, based on communities and governed by custom.

In Central Asia, according to Barthold (1914), a century-old agricultural culture [was] based on artificial irrigation (Barthold 1914, 1). In the ancient sources about Central Asia – among them Greek, Arabic, Chinese, Turkish and Russian - there is no evidence as to when the artificial irrigation system was engineered. Bartol’d suggests that this system was created during the Greco-Bactrian period. Sogdiana was part of Greco-Bactrian Empire at the time. Information about later Central Asian history is mostly found in Chinese sources, which also note a highly developed agriculture and artificial irrigation system in the Fergana Valley. However, these sources also did not note the time of its outset (Barthold 1914, 11). During the long Persian rule of the Sasanid dynasty, the irrigation system was improved and strengthened, based on recent technological achievements in the Roman Empire. At that time, the word “rivalis” appeared in the Central Asian languages. It meant literally “the neighbor along the channel/river” (Zelinski 1903, 34).

During the period of the Kokhand Khanate, the highest water authority in the Fergana Valley was the mirab bashi who was paid in kind by the dekhhans. The Khan himself was seen as a “steward of water rights for Allah” (Barthold 1914). The smaller-scale water authorities were the mirabs and aryq amins, who were elected by the dekhhans. The system of water distribution was called peikal. The mobilization of labor and material for irrigation was done according to the

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17 The area between the grandest Central Asian rivers Amu-Daria and Syr-Daria, partially within the modern Fergana Valley

18 “The community-based irrigation system [in the Fergana Valley] consisted of big channels with 144 suv (water rights) which implied that 144 land-owners had the right to use the water. The time for which every land-owner was allowed to use the water was calculated by dividing the number of minutes in 24 hours (1440) into the number of land-owners (144). As an outcome of such calculation, theoretically, each land-owner was allocated 10 minutes of water flow into their land every day. However, in practical terms, it was very difficult to divide people into users per
system of *hashar (ashar)*, a voluntarily tax or, in lieu of money, labor contribution to the community (Barthold 1914). In effect, this was a tax which “linked benefits to duty” (O’Hara 2000, 373). At the beginning of Tsarist rule\(^\text{19}\), the Central Asian water system was left to pre-Tsarist customary management. These relations were managed according to customary law, which is why many sources conceive of property rights as being tied to religious institutions such as *madrassahs* and mosques (Geiss 2004). However, the synthesis of ancient historical sources provided in the Ethnographic Report on Turkestan by Barthold (1914) provides that:

*According to all historical sources on ancient and Medieval Central Asia, this area impressed its conquerors with a complex artificial irrigation system. However, the issue of water management was first addressed by the Arab conquerors, because of many disputes on the ground of water sharing. In spite of the fact that all relations had to be regulated by Shariah law, the books on fikh did not say a word about water management. Hence, a new book on water management, which was called “Kitab al kuni” was created by all the fakikh (the experts on religious law, some of whom were also invited from the ancient Babylon/Iraq). However, the sources do not say whether the norms of the local customary law were taken into consideration, when this book was compiled (historians Gardiki and Abu-Abdullah Horezmi in Barthold 1914, 24-25).*

This suggests that water and land were central to the social order across all layers of Central Asian history, and that such conflicts as had appeared concerned water management rather than differences in identities; first and foremost because the peoples of Turkestan possessed multiple and overlapping identities and the awareness of the link between resources and ethnicity had been absent (Hirsch 2000; Barthold 1914).

Changes to the irrigation system based on custom were introduced when the Tsarist regime decided to “end the Russian reliance on the American cotton (especially after the American Civil War, when supplies almost ceased) [as it has realized Central Asian potential in cotton

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\(^{19}\) The expansion of the Russian Empire to Central Asia started from the late 16th century, when the strongest state in the region, the Kokand Khanate fell into a crisis. These territories were later inherited by the Soviet Union, after the Soviet revolution of the 1918. For a comprehensive analysis of the crisis of the Three Khanates in Central Asia prior to the Russian expansion, see Sergey Abashin (2011).
cultivation)” (O’Hara 2000, 374). As an incentive for cotton cultivation, the Tsarist administration transferred lands to local entrepreneurs for 99-year use and introduced state subsidies for cotton cultivation (O’Hara 2000, 374). However, as cotton required large-scale land and water management systems, which were absent, this only increased competition between landlords\textsuperscript{20} (\textit{bais}); nonetheless, increased cotton cultivation had significantly reduced Russian dependency on the American cotton by the time of the Bolshevik revolution (Thurman 1997; Lipovsky 1995).

Each polity or “oasis city” represented a self-sufficient economic system. The conflicts between the landlords or the tribes were mainly organized around the axis of city vs. hinterland (i.e. the surrounding countryside). As the oasis cities possessed more coercive powers, the peripheral surrounding areas were required to pay tribute to the cities’ feudal rulers. Tributes and rivalry over access to land and water were at the center of these conflicts (Olcott 1981). The ownership of lands in Bukhara and Kokhand were linked to religious institutions, such as madrassahs and mosques. This allowed land to be used for communal purposes according to the principles of \textit{ashar}.\textsuperscript{21} This type of land ownership was called a \textit{waqf} land holding and essentially represented community-based land organization in the settled parts of the region (Barthold 1914). As religious leaders of each community held legitimate decision-making powers, land assets were perceived as safe under such an authority. Furthermore, there were also religious courts (Shariah based), to deal with irreconcilable disputes. The partial reliance on religious customs for organizing the socio-economic order in the oasis cities fostered the myth of Central Asia being a citadel of Islamic culture. This narrative of Central Asia, however, pays little attention to the social fragmentation of both social and religious life. If it was an oasis of Islam, it also was one of “Islamic diversity”, where different Islamic ideologies competed along Adam Smith’s lines of “religious competition” (Mirsaitov 2004). The map of Islamic diversity is described as being represented by

\textsuperscript{20} It was the competition which during the Soviet era would be called as the inter-tribal conflicts.

\textsuperscript{21} As described elsewhere in the thesis: the system of taxation paid either in money or in kind (depending on a family’s economic opportunities) and connected to a moral duty to contribute to the resolution of the community’s needs.
various Islamic mashabs such as Sunnism, Sufism, Wahhabism, Jadidism, etc. (Peyrouse 2007; Khalid 1998). All these groups lived mixed within different communities and belonging to a specific religious group was not necessarily tied to a set of resources (Barthold 1914). Although there was the link between the religious institutions and resource-management, these institutions did not promote a particular mashab. This link between the religious institutions and resources was not one between ethnicity and land (as after the establishment of the Soviet rule). It was there in order to create order and manage resources through constant negotiations, rather than by-default connection between the ethnic belonging and resources. The “rules” of this competition were reminiscent of Socrates and the stoics, with “critical Islam” being the cornerstone of religious education (Abashin 2011). Shariah rule and the link between religious institutions and land was a means to create a system of coercion, where the role of sanctions would be used via “moral duty” before the community (Liu 2012; Geiss 2004).

However, the nomadic populations of Turkestan were organized around customary law (Adat and ürp Adat) rather than Shariah law. Justice was provided by a tribal elder (bij/baj) and by a judge (qazi) or elders (aksakals – “white beards”, wise elders who gained most respect across communities for their personal and leadership qualities) through the reference to Adat (Bichsel 2009, 71-76; Beyer 2006, 159-160; Thurman 1999).

These insights suggest that the narrative of the region as Muslim or as “an important part of the Islamic civilization since the middle ages” under-estimates the importance of social diversity (Olcott 1981, 353). The Russian Empire left the Turkestan socio-economic system almost intact and was able to ensure the co-existence of the Muslim and Russian parts of Turkestan (Olcott 1981, 353). While these views have their rationale, it is also important to remember that Central Asia has been ruled by many different empires (Liu 2012). Even though the memories and vicinity to the Muslims of India and Afghanistan persisted, this does not make Turkestan indisputably a “Muslim civilization” to the same extent as Middle Eastern polities. Furthermore, there has been
as much negotiation between the state and religious authorities and discussion about the separation of state and religion within Islamic Empires as Christian European Empires (Barthold 1914). Hence, Islam can be seen as neither the only explanation of societal choices on the ground, nor as its only identity. Its importance, however, is significant when one thinks of the link between Shariah-rooted customs, community-based social order, and the organization of land and water. In other words, the customs provided specific patterns of socio-economic interactions, which were later restructured by the Soviet authorities. Rather than being organized around ethnic, religious, or nation-centered categories, these societies can be better described as being “hydraulic societies”, that is societies that base their social organization around water (Wittfogel 1957) through the community social structures of moral commitment or trust (Geiss 2004).

The social organization of pre-Soviet Central Asia was around tribal communities (in the case of nomads) and religious communities (in the case of the oasis cities). The main resource was access to water and lands (as mentioned above), both for the goals of agriculture (sedentary populations) and pastoralism (nomadic populations). Management and constant negotiation of water was central to the way in which the social and political hierarchy of settlements operated (Mukaddasi, Al-Biruni, Yakut in Le Strange 1905). Since water also had spiritual meaning, it played a more significant role for social organization of these communities than any other categories of segregation that became important at the later stages of history.

3.2. State-making: ethnicities, resources, nations

According to the conventional wisdom, Soviet nation-making in Central Asia represented a “divide-and-rule” strategy aimed at planting the seeds of eternal conflict into the region (The Economist 1998; Masell 1974; Conquest 1962; Caroe 1954). But, as the previous section described, the Central Asian plateau was a constellation of fragmented socio-political units that were in the constant state of conflict over land and water (Barthold 1914). This section provides an alternative
view, which argues that nation-making was instead a tactic to combine the then fragmented communities of Central Asia into a broader framework of belonging. It was about constructing identities that would alter the previous patterns of societal relations.

The process that re-engineered polities of Russian Turkestan into five national republics (or nation-states) was called national-territorial delimitation (национально-территориальное размежевание). The literal translation of this term implies a striking connection between nationalities and the territories to which they have been allocated. The idea of “nation”, defined in terms of ethnicity, common language, and connected to material resources, was alien to the nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples of Western Turkestan, for they used to define themselves in terms of their connection to their social or geographic communities. In terms of language, these were bilingual (Iranic and Turkic) tribes (Bregel 2003, 94). There was confusion over the sedentary populations, too. For instance, the most ancient sedentary population of the region, the Tajiks, were initially almost entirely forgotten, a large group of Sarts or Chagatai was confused with Uzbeks and assimilated accordingly (Bregel 2003, 94).

Initially, the first republics that emerged in formerly Russian Central Asia were not based on national principles. At first, the Tashkent Governorate-General offered a draft Constitution and proclaimed the advent of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, or ASSR (as a part of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR) in April 1918. Moscow rejected this constitution.

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22 This is why “nationality” in the Soviet terms means “ethnicity”, rather than “citizenship” as in the Western sense of the term.
23 The term “размежевание” is the closest by the meaning to the term “parceling out” rather than “delimitation” as such.
In August 1920, the Kirgiz ASSR, with its capital in Orenburg (comprising parts of present-day Northern Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and parts of Russia bordering Kazakhstan) was established, as Kazaks were confused with Kirgiz. Present-day Kyrgyzstan was first constructed as the Kara-Kirgiz Autonomous Oblast’ in 1924. In 1926, the Kirgiz ASSR was renamed the Kazakh ASSR; while the Kara-Kirgiz Autonomous Oblast’ was renamed the Kirgiz Autonomous Oblast’ and in February 1926 became the Kirgiz ASSR. In September 1924 Bukharan Soviet Socialist Republic, including parts of present-day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, became the Uzbek ASSR, with Tajikistan being incorporated within. Territories of the former Bukhara Khanate, particularly cities such as Bukhara and Samarkand, were disputed between these emergent administrative regions. The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic was separated from Uzbekistan in December 1929. At this point Bukhara and
Samarkand were left within Uzbekistan. This decision has been a source of animosity between Uzbeks and Tajiks to the present day. The Fergana Valley was also a point of disputes, but was eventually was divided between Tajik, Kirgiz, and Uzbek SSR, according to the principle of functionality. In 1936, both the Kazakh and Kirgiz Autonomous Republics were elevated to the status of Soviet Socialist Republics (Bregel 2003, 94). Borders in the region were disputed at later points, too, but essentially these borders formed the core state composition which remained to into the present. The existing Arabic script for the Persian and Turkic languages in the region was first replaced by Latin in 1929-1930, followed in 1940-1941 by a modified form of the Cyrillic alphabet (Bregel 2003, 94).

The key institutions that were responsible for this process were the People’s Commissariat for the Affairs of the Nationalities (Narkomsnats) and the State Planning Commission (Gosplan). Their initial aim was to “win the non-Russian population to the side of the bolshevik revolution” and do it in a way distinct from that of the Western colonizers, where the center exploited the periphery (Hirsch 2005, 65). The idea was to even the level of economic development of the national republics in order to then include them all into a single economic space of the socialist union.

Initially, Narkomsnats and Gosplan were two competing institutions, each promoting different approaches to nation-making. Narkomnats promoted an ethnographic approach, the main idea of which was the empowerment of regional ethnicities in order to gain support of these non-Russian populations for the Bolshevik revolution. Matching the uneven economic development of the developed peoples (of the Soviet center) and the “backward people” who were still in the “feudal era” (of the Soviet periphery) was the main justification of the expanding Soviet state.\(^\text{24}\) On the other hand, Gosplan insisted on a centralized economic plan that would encompass all the new peoples of the Soviet state (Nove 1989). A compromise was agreed to

\(^{24}\) Lenin’s program.
combine both tasks into a two-step process of social engineering: nationalization and sovietization. Hirsch (2000, 203) calls this process as “dual assimilation” (national + soviet) which implied both colonization (in the Soviet sense) and nation-building. The creation of nationalities was based on research on the Asian tribes by the Ethnographic Commission for the study of the Tribal Composition of the Population of Russia (Ethnographic Commission). Eventually, both Narkomsnats and Gosplan agreed upon the supremacy of equal economic development and creation of an overarching system which would encompass those nationalities to then make them gradually melt into a socialist union. When necessary, the process of assimilation was accompanied by the coercive displacement of groups of people (pereselenie) from their native regions to the regions remote from their homes, in order to deprive the local elites from their wealth (de-kulakization) and dismantle the pre-existing relationships of power (GARF, Moscow, f.6984, d. 1. op. 211, II, 50, 52, 76). Nationality, as a new framework of belonging, was to bring some order to these fragmented societies, to then turn them into economically interdependent units by means of collectivization, which is described in section 3.3.

The rationale behind this two-dimensional approach was the need to present the new Soviet state as different from the Western or Russian Empires, and to prevent potential peasant uprisings. The integration of the peripheral territories of the former Russian Empire was to be based on the Marxist idea of stages of human development, with the stage of nation-building coming prior to that of socialist union. In other words, this process was the “state-sponsored

25 Additionally, in April 1922, the State Colonization Research Institute (Goskolonit) was established. Its goal was to develop a philosophical basis for the Soviet colonization, as opposed to the Western colonization. The Goskolonit came up with two concepts “colonization” (kolonizatsia) and “colonial exploitation” (kolonizatorstvo). The latter term was applied to the Soviet policy and was based on the redefinition of the relationships between the colonizer and the colonized (“the local indigenous populations”, defined as the “most valuable resource of the Soviet state”). The Soviet colonization had been rationalized through the concept of pereselenie (which in practice was internal displacement of people), justified by the “better matching of the needs of the peoples” (On colonization and pereselenie see: Iamzin, Iarilov, G.Gins, Willard Sunderland).

26 Gosudarstvennyj Arhiv Rossijskoj Federatsii, State Archive of the Russian Federation, Moscow.
evolutionism”\footnote{Slezkine (1994) suggests the term “compensatory nation-building”. These concepts seem to be at the center of the historians’ debate about the nature of the Soviet empire since they reflect the views on the main question of this debate which is whether there was a clash between the Soviet empire and the incipient nationalities. The debate is divided into two main camps: first one propagates the empiral/colonial (in the Western classical sense of the term) nature of the Soviet state (See: Suny, Zaslavsky, Barkey, von Hagen); the second camp looks at the Soviet state as a double-level governance, with the category of nationality meant to unite the fragmented tribal populations and with the category of the \textit{homo sovieticus} being a supra-national frame of reference to de-nationalize the peoples at the later stages of the socialist evolution (See: Hirsch, Motyl, Armstrong.).} with the state being epiphenomenal to societal development (Hirsch 2000, 203). National-territorial delimitation created identities broader than tribal or kinship identities organized around communities or the polities similar to city-states. This created greater chances for better social standardization and human engineering. To make the new identities more appealing, these “official nationalities” were linked to the right to monopolize land and resources (Hirsch 2000, 206).

Some ethnographers of Turkestan saw the process of nationality creation, which was being pursued according to the West European historical tradition, as unnatural to the region. They believed that, in reality, it created inequality between the titular nationalities and local minorities (Barthold, 1894). Archival information from the period could be interpreted twofold. Firstly, the petitions from the villagers from to the Soviet authorities are usually interpreted as the evidence of the malevolent intention of the Soviet state to construct national identities, without proper investigation of their primordial connotations. Most of the central Asian scholars organize their arguments around this evidence. The goal of this group of scholars was to prove that the Soviet nation-making followed the “divide-and-rule” strategy in order to “seed the conflict among the Central Asian nations” (The Economist 1998; Massel\footnote{The idea of the “tactical nation states”} 1974). It is with this interpretation that these scholars explain the current problems of border delimitation and the inter-ethnic conflicts. This allows national politicians to construct their narratives of strengthening national sovereignty.

The second camp provides a more nuanced interpretation of the local petitions to Moscow, by emphasizing the link between national identity, land, water and other resources
(Hirsch 2005; 2000). However, the archival research on the petitions suggests also that the narratives could be divided into two types along the timeline between the 1920s and 1950s. In the early 1920s, the language of the petitions was less culturally flavored and lacked the usage of words “ethnicity” or “nationality”. Instead, the people said:

We found out that according to the latest delimitation of borders, the lands that we have been using for our pastoral activities in the summer have been given away to Uzbek SSR. Furthermore, on that side of the mountain, there is a river which was useful for our husbandry, too. We wonder how we are supposed to use those meadows from now on.

(Petitions from the local communities to the Commission about the use of land and water. GARF, op. P-6985, d.1. l.142)

This was one of the first petitions, written in Persian. Here, the “we” can be interpreted in many different ways, for example, as kinship or tribal identity, or both. The later letters were written in Russian or both languages. And the latter petitions suggest that the category of “ethnicity” appears more often and the letters are structured around this category (GARF. f. 3316, op. 16a, d. 189, ll, 2-3; GARF. f. 3316, op.64, d. 411, l. 9). Hirsch (2000) provides a detailed analysis of these petitions and highlights the fact that “the petitioners did not question the official assumption that “national identity” was linked to land, water, and other resources” (Hirsh 2000, 216).

However, once local elites realized that nationality provided them exclusive rights over a particular territory, they quickly adopted the language of these categories. The letters of the local strongmen to the Soviet government reveal the usage of the language (Hirsch 2000; 2005). Furthermore, since the category of nationality implied a concrete number of people, some of the letters from the local elites claim that the people they represented should not be moved to the territories of other nationalities. This was the way the then local elites were defending their social base or the social organization backing them up. Reportedly, “the titular nationalities tried to use

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29 For the petitions of Kazakhs who ended up in the territory of the Uzbek ASSR
30 For the petitions of Uzbeks who ended up in the territory of the Kazakh SSR
coercion and deception to increase the number of their nationalities to gain access to more land and resources” (Hirsch 2000, 214).

As a result, the awareness of the link between nationality and territory was raised, as well as the elites’ knowledge of how to manipulate these categories. This connection between national identity, political power, and economic resources has remained one of the key social legacies revived by the local elites in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This is not necessarily to say that this was a pure construction of nations that had happened, but “a construction of new history that establishes a “memory” shared by all socialized individuals in the collectivity” (Armstrong 1992, 3). This was a memory competing with the one of the tribal and community-based social organization, both of which would be revived in their own ways in the post-Soviet era, as discussed in chapters four and five. Other scholars interpret the Soviet state as “institutionalized multinationality” and the national-territorial delimitation as a “constitutive [rather than constraining] of the state, society, and individual”, of both “the actors” and “their interests” (Brubaker 1984, 48; Meyer 1987). The category of nationality fostered two societal consequences: the changing patterns of power relations and the new myths of their rationalization. However, nationality, even if given a particular territory, was engineered as a part of a single whole, in this case the regional economy of the Fergana Valley. Hence, not all processes and social relations resided within a nation-state, but possessed trans-border or “transnational” features.
3.3. Collectivization: social resistance and collective interest

The second step towards the socialist union was the destruction of the community-based socio-economic order, which was achieved by two means: collectivization\(^{31}\) of lands and the elimination of social resistance movements. Collectivization, as part of a strategy to enable the “Great Break”\(^{32}\), entailed the creation of an all-encompassing frame of reference, i.e. bringing all community holdings into the ownership of collective farms belonging to the state. In this way, community-based agriculture was ended. It subjected all nationalities to a common economic goal and engineered a common social order. Its main feature was that it turned administrative borders between the republics into arbitrary borders, since most processes were trans-border and most resources were shared by the single economic union. This created the legacy of social interdependence, with people connected to the collective farms (kolkhozes) or state farms (sovkhозes)\(^{33}\) in the way they were connected to their communities previously. Thus, central planning of the Soviet economy constructed interdependence across nationalities it had just created. Borrowing Tilly’s terms: it created a large structure which fosters large processes, the transnational nature of which made these nationalities interdependent.

The rationale behind dismantling community-based agriculture was utilitarian, an outcome of the prevailing soviet ideology. The landowners (bai) were perceived as enemies of the people and the elements of oppressive Tsarist rule (GARF f. 6987). Social organization in Central Asia was perceived in terms of tribe and kinship networks, which were again presented as a source of inequality, which the Soviet authorities were determined to uproot. Furthermore, community-based agriculture and the land holdings (belonging to the religious institutions) in the newly

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\(^{31}\) According to the Decree of Politburo TsK VKP(b), from 20 February 1930 (as part of the collectivization Decrees of November 1929 – December 1930).

\(^{32}\) “Velikij Perelom”: a Soviet ideological concept, introducing industrialization and collectivization to break past patterns of social relations.

\(^{33}\) Both referred to as “collectives” in the following text.
introduced New Economic Politics (NEP)\textsuperscript{34}, strengthened the peasantry. More evidence of this empowered peasantry was the social resistance that Bolsheviks faced across different regions of their expansion. In Turkestan, it was represented by the basmachi movement (1918-1931) against the Bolshevik rule.\textsuperscript{35} It emerged during the Russian empire as a prototype of organized crime networks. Later on, its social composition was enriched both by elements of the peasantry who were against collectivization and local elites who did not want to give up their power. Reportedly, the movement was a religious, Islamic movement. Often, in the literature, it is considered to be an “indigenous” prototype of the current jihadist movements, or “freedom fighters” (Ritter 1985; Olcott 1981). The movement’s leadership included traditional chiefs, the kurbashi, religious figures, mullahs or ishans\textsuperscript{36}, or bandits with popular support\textsuperscript{37}, representatives of the local elites, khans, begs, or tribal chiefs\textsuperscript{38}, or minor local notables\textsuperscript{39}, former jadidis leaders\textsuperscript{40}, or Turkish officers\textsuperscript{41} (Roy 1999, 46).

While the movement was indeed an expression of a wide resistance to the Bolsheviks, both its Islamic cause and its “indigenousness” are arguable. The reason it is cast as an Islamic movement is because it promoted itself behind the Islamic principles and defended the socio-economic organization that existed prior to the Bolshevik revolution, i.e. based on communities with the ownership rights linked to the religious institutions (Ritter 1985). However, it is crucial to remember that Turkestan was a complex composition of nomad and sedentary people, with views as wide and fragmented as Zoroastrian and Muslim, with the latter being fragmented into dozens of Islamic sects and schools (Mirsaitov 2004). For instance, the narratives of Islam at the time were

\textsuperscript{34} The idea of which was based on allowing the peasants to enrich themselves and substitution of the unbearable tax (prodrazverstka) by a much lower tax (prodnalog) which was defined before the sowing period (so that the peasants could include the tax into their calculations to increase the profit).

\textsuperscript{35} GARF, Moscow, f. 6987: On liquidation of basmachi movements

\textsuperscript{36} eg. Khal Khodja in the Fergana

\textsuperscript{37} Irgash in the Fergana Valley

\textsuperscript{38} Jomud Junaid Khan in Khorezm and part of Turkmen territories and Lokai Ibragim Beg in Gissar, Vakhsh, Dushanbe

\textsuperscript{39} Madamin Beg in Fergana

\textsuperscript{40} Zeki Velidi Togan

\textsuperscript{41} Enver Pasha
dominated by jadidism, a reformist Islamic movement which encompassed the views of *salafi* who were against nation-building and the Russian empire, and reformists who prioritized socio-economic modernization over religion, i.e. integrating Islamic lifestyles into the framework of the Russian empire (Baldauf 2001). With the advent of the Bolshevik revolution, jadidists joined both the Bolsheviks (modernization cause) and the basmachi movement (social order based on communities) (Roy 1999, 36).

The “indigenousness” of the movement or their “national roots” noted by many historians is contestable for two reasons. Firstly, the movement, in its initial stage, could only technically be called “indigenous” and was mostly a prototype of organized crime, made up of street bandits who would make a living by robbing traders (Roy 1999). Secondly, the “nationalist” character of the movement is arguable as there was little in the way of ethnic or national-consciousness in the region prior to the national-territorial delimitation as described in section 3.2. Furthermore, Islamic identity was not linked to nationality. A vivid example of this is the Muslim government of Kokand in Transoxania (November 1917 – February 1918), which, under the influence of the Jadidi interpretation of Islam, called for an “autonomous, rather than independent Turkestan and gave it a Kazakh as a president (Chokaev), suggesting that they were far from thinking in ethnic-nationalist terms” (Roy 1999, 37). Finally, at the stage of the most successful time for the basmachi, the movement was under the strong influence of pan-Turkism due to the external assistance of the Young Turks, in particular Enver Pasha⁴² and the Afghani Muslims. Both influencers were exploiting the basmachi of Central Asia for their strategic location. For the Afghani resistance movements, this was a chance to unite with the Muslims of India before and to undermine the rule of the British Empire.⁴³ For the Young Turks, this was revenge against the

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⁴² Died in 1922
⁴³ Reportedly, the Afghani and the Young Turk supports of basmachi asked for help from the British Embassy, which denied to help them for their fear of that the Muslims of India and of Turkestan could unite which would weaken the British influence in India.
Bolsheviks, who first supported them in their fight against the Kemalists and then betrayed them, as well as the chance to collect insurgent forces to oppose the new Turkish government (Sonyel 1990).

Furthermore, at different stages, some parts of the movement came to terms with the Bolsheviks or waged small wars against their rival tribes (Roy 1999, 46-49). The complexity of the social organization of the movement and pragmatism of its political choices suggest that it was the fight for the existing patterns of social order and power relations and resistance to the new patterns created by the national-territorial delimitation and, at the later stages, to collectivization. But collectivization itself largely can be seen as a means of suppressing this resistance by coercively reorganizing its societal basis. This movement contributed to the schism within the Soviet elite, which was split between defending gradual change from NEP to centralization (Bukharin) and those propagating radical change (Trotsky and Stalin). According to the latter, the peasantry had to be managed as it was seen as a potential basis for a new revolution, especially in the light of similar social resistance elsewhere in the Soviet space. NEP reached its goal and allowed the peasantry to accumulate more wealth. This contributed to the arguments of the radical camp among the Soviet elite, which had seen NEP as a tool for creating a capitalist and unequal society. As a result, collectivization was launched officially in 1929. It resulted in the centralization of agricultural planning, land and water management, as well as collective ownership of these assets. The lands linked to nationalities or communities were gradually transformed into collective farms.

44 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk modernization movement.
45 The relations between Russia and Turkey roots back to the balance of powers during the First World War, which rationalized the support of one or another Turkish government by the Russian Empire and Bolsheviks subsequently.
46 Some Russian sources highlight the role of the external capital in the formation of the basmachi movement. See for example: Zevelev et.al. 1981
47 The centralization of water management implied also the change of the courses of the rivers (GARF. f.6892. Bulletins No. 15,16,17,21). The so-called agricultural-and household zoning (raiyonirovание/division into districts) in Kara-Kyrgyz autonomous zone was comprised of the “zoning of the Commission under Gos. Plan with additions and corrections”, additional material was based on the materials of zoning of the Commission, the statistical yearbook
The interdependence constructed during the Soviet era mainly concerned the centralization of production and, related to that, economic and social practice. The change from this communal social order to a more radically centralized one was undertaken after the Bolshevik revolution, through forced collectivization and the subjection of the social order to the logic of utilitarian economic rationality. In this new system, the role of communities remained only functional, in those matters which could not be achieved through central management. Collectivization in Central Asia was a social engineering strategy that forcefully changed the practices and survival strategies of peasants across the Soviet Union into standardized social practices. It made the small farms of nomadic and semi-sedentary populations of Central Asia “give up their property in favor of the collective farms” (kolkhozes) (Lerman 2004, 26). The destruction of the small household farms in favor of the collectives is the distinguishing feature of the collectivization process in Central Asia. This is in contrast to China, where cooperative farming was based on communities of twenty to forty households (Mann 2013, 220). The communities in Central Asia lost their decision-making power. They remained only as the logistical tool for the implementation of the central plan at the grassroots level.

Collectivization in Central Asia had two functions: organizing agriculture around cotton cultivation as utilitarian logic dictated, and preventing social resistance by subjecting the peasantry to the overarching structure of collectives, without which they would not survive. In its later stages, collectivization required such processes as reorganizing water management and social welfare. In addition to the agricultural goals, the collectives were responsible for distribution of social welfare in the rural areas. Specifically, they built and maintained social infrastructure such as schools, buildings, hospitals, shops, and other public facilities. “Housing, power, water, and heat were provided in the villages by local farm enterprises, generally free of charge to the workers.

1917-1923, volumes 1 and 2, the tables of “perepis” of 1917-19120s and the tables of the preliminary results of 1917s along the Dzhetsuj area (GARF 1921 – 1927, f.6984, op.1, No. 204., No.247).
The costs of maintaining the social sphere in the village were generally absorbed into the overall production and operation costs” (Lerman 2004, 28).

As a result, the pattern of “connecting between the nationality, political power and economic resources” noted in section 3.2., was transformed into the relations between farm and peasant “mass”. To achieve this, the central government rationalized a specific type of “zoning” (rayonirovanie), mapping and unmapping the territories of the Central Asian states (GARF f. 6892, Op. I, d. 42, l. 21). This was achieved through “zoning” (rayonirovanie), which was rationalized according to their functions in the “general direction of economy” (GARF, f.6984, op.1, No. 204, No.247):

1. Irrigation
2. Direction of farming
3. Direction of field-crop cultivation
4. Direction of animal-husbandry

The fallout over this kind of mapping has been continuously re-emerging, which is why in 1954, it was decided to map the territories according to the “actual use of lands” (Protocol 1955). These two parallel processes resulted in a patchwork of fragmented societies becoming united under the umbrella of collective farming and the related resource sharing schemes; moreover, the Decree on the Actual Use of Lands created societal interactions beyond the newly parceled out national states.

Most notably the above pattern can be illustrated through the Soviet water-sharing schemes, which represents the second pillar of creating interdependence. The entire region depends on two main river systems, the Amudarya (Oxus) and Syrdarya (Jaxartes). The cotton-based economy created for Central Asia since the time of the Russian Empire dictated a radical change in managing water during the Soviet era. In 1923 the task of water management was moved from the traditional councils of elders to the government bodies or collectives to distribute water according to a central plan (O’Hara 2000, 357). Small-scale irrigation systems were
integrated into a centralized system, which supplied irrigation water over considerable distances⁴⁸ (O’Hara 2000, 375). For example, the upstream republics (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) supplied the downstream (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) countries with water. Upstream countries had lower quotas on their water than downstream countries, for cotton cultivation, which countries downstream were responsible for, was of strategic importance.

In the institutional design of this system irrigation needs and norms were calculated according to hydro-modules. Each country was divided into hydrologic regions, based on soil type and local climate, as well as different crop types. There were special brigades (for each 50-100 ha of land), who collected data on the water requirements for their specific region. This data was then passed to the farm’s hydro-technician, who compiled data for the entire farm (O’Hara 2000, 375). This data was then sent to the local (oblast) and the national (republic) offices, which then transferred the data to Tashkent “where water requirements for the whole Central Asia were collated” (O’Hara 2000, 375). Once the data was compiled, water distribution went through a three-tier system, which means the following. Firstly, various specialized agencies distributed water from grand canals into various networks. Secondly, once water passed into the secondary network, it became the remit of Regional Directorates of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Management. Third, once water arrived at the farm gate, its distribution beyond this point was the solely responsibility of the farm (O’Hara 2000, 376). Communication between the regional Ministries and agencies was rarely direct, and often the information had to go through Moscow, which would impact the timing of water distribution and lead to its inefficient use which later caused ecological disasters (Kornilov and Timoshinka 1975; Smith 1992).

For a long time, maintenance of the water infrastructure was shared between the government agencies and the workers of the collectives, such as dredging canals and ensuring the

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⁴⁸ The Kara-Kum Canal, for example, which transfers 12.9 km³ of water from Amu-Darya along its 1400 km length every year and irrigates an area of c.1 million (Hannan & O’Hara 1998).
water canals were clean. Communal maintenance continued at the local level “in many rural areas and villagers continued (and still do) to gather each year to clean and build new irrigation canals that fed small household plots” (O’Hara 2000, 376). These common practices allowed communal ties to be maintained without contradicting the centralized system. In 1960, the centralized system was developed into the United Power System (UPS) of Central Asia, located in Tashkent (Pomfret 2006, 161). Based on a barter agreement, the system’s goal was to coordinate the needs of the upstream with the downstream countries. For instance, the lack of focus on hydroelectricity generation for the population was compensated for by shipments of gas from Uzbekistan and coal from Kazakhstan (Pomfret 2006, 161). As this resource exchange was undertaken according to central planning rather than market forces, this caused serious issues once countries obtained sovereignty and started their transition to a market economy.

At the societal level, however, the main result was that the communal water management system deteriorated. As the institute of mirabs and elders was abandoned, traditional know-how was partially lost and decision-making and associated processes of their legitimation interrupted. Crops that were not required by the central plan were abandoned. And cotton could not be grown by anybody without state subsidies and demand. Therefore, peoples’ survival strategies became closely tied to this centralized system of land and water management.

3.4. De-collectivization: from collective to private property

The creation of the institution of private property is considered to be the cornerstone of privatization, with individual interest being its basic element. However, the shift from an engineered collective interest to an individual interest in realm of land and water management in the Fergana Valley has resulted in the development of a different type of institution of private property, centered on community, rather than on the individual.
The collapse of the Soviet Union is seen as having marked the end of collective agriculture as implemented through land reform and farm restructuring. The goal of these reforms was the transition from central planning to a free market and from collective to private property. In general, this process was rationalized through the logic of privatization and decentralization. In the agricultural sector, these projects were centered on the concept of “local self-governance” (Bichsel 2009). Privatization of land means that “state and collective farmland is distributed to individuals” (USAID 2003, 1). In general terms, “private refers to a form of ownership not by the state, but by individuals or groups” (Bichsel et al. 2010, 256). Specifically, the institution of private property requires an individual at the center of social organization and exclusive private ownership represents the cornerstone of democratic politics and market economies (Roy 2005; Verdery 2004; Hann 1998). Furthermore, as many scholars note, the concept of private property has ideological implications (Bichsel et al. 2010). And this shift from a socialist to a capitalist understanding of private property in the context of Central Asia acquired features of its own, due to the fact that Central Asian societies have largely been organized around land and water. Hence, changes in the property rights may imply changes in social order, for property relations are also defined as “a specific form of social and cultural relations among humans with respect to natural resources” (Bichsel 2010, 259; Humphrey and Verdery 2004; Hann 1998;).

The neo-liberal meaning of the institution of private property implies the entrepreneurial nature of peasant activities, as well as the existence of the “peasant farmer” as a concept, for “transfer of political power and delegation of authority are only possible on the ground of the peasant farmer’s conceptual existence” (Bichsel 2010, 259). For people in the Fergana Valley, these relations are more about survival than profit maximization. With the devastation of industry, the agricultural sector has continued to play a pivotal role for economies of Central Asia. Central Asia is the region with the highest proportion of agricultural population in the Community of Independent States (CIS), with 20.3 percent, amounting to 12.6 million people with more than 50
percent of the population living in rural areas (FAO 2014, 6). This illustrates the important of
agriculture not only for economic survival, but also for social order in Central Asia. The Fergana
Valley is the heart of the region’s agriculture: “comprising only about 1% of Central Asia’s
territory, it is home to about 18% of the population or about 11 million people, making it one of
the region’s most densely populated areas. More than a quarter of the populations of Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan, and more than half of the Kyrgyz Republic’s population live in the valley” (ADB
2010).

In Uzbekistan, which has the greatest amount of the arable lands, this sector still employs
44% of 15 million people active in the national workforce” (Peyrouse 2009, 5). In Tajikistan, with
only 21% of arable land, agriculture “accounts for 30% of the country’s GDP and employs more
than two-thirds (67%) of its workforce” (Peyrouse 2009, 5). In Kyrgyzstan, agriculture constitutes
32% of GDP, industry accounts for 18% and services for 49%; of about 2.7 million people active in
workforce nearly half (48 %) work in the agricultural sector (Peyrouse 2009, 5). Kyrgyzstan
possesses the smallest amount of arable land (Jones 2003, 262). Irrigated land is “limited to 10,700
square km and regional disparities in agricultural terms are extremely high. The north has 887,000
hectares of arable land, used mainly for growing wheat, but the south has less than half of that
area, only 415,000 hectares, for more than half of the population. The ratio of land per person is
0.19 hectares in the south, compared to 0.53 hectares in the north” (Peyrouse 2009, 5).

This data shows why understanding the transformations related to the organization of land
and water is crucial for understanding social patterns. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
the adoption of many of the policies associated with the Washington Consensus, privatization
became the way to reorganize the use of lands and resources. However, it has not become the

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“A Fergana Valley’s rich land and central location have attracted people for millennia. It is much a center for the
region’s agriculture as it is for its industry and cultural history. Topographically, it is an enormous depression spanning
22,000 square kilometers between the mountain ranges of the Tien Shan in the north and the Gissar-Alai in the south.
Approximately 300 km long and up to 70 km wide, it lies in eastern Uzbekistan, northern Tajikistan and the southern
Kyrgyzstan” (ADB 2010).
driver of structural reforms in Central Asian countries; at least, not in the way that many had hoped. The creation of the institution of private property has empowered communities, not individuals, and therefore, maintained the social patterns of interdependence created during the Soviet period. Despite the fact that, in general, the process of privatization is reported to be relatively successful by the USAID and the World Bank, recent case-by-case ethnographic research suggests that old social patterns related to organization of lands and water have persisted (Liu 2012; Eriksson 2006). The following sections draw on these findings by engaging with legal frameworks and social practices of restructuring of land and water in three given countries.

Lerman (2004) explains similar findings by that the process of farm restructuring has not fully undergone both external and internal restructuring. The legislation on privatization was responsible for external restructuring only. According to Lerman (2004), external restructuring constitutes the “re-registration of the collective farm in a new legal form accompanied by transfer of ownership to individuals (whether in the form of physical assets or paper certificates of entitlement)” (Lerman 2004, 135). Internal restructuring implies that “the direct responsibility for management functions should shift from central collective management to the new groups and subdivisions created through regrouping and reconfiguration” (Ibid., 136).

External restructuring has been reflected in land reforms in each of the countries, manifested in legislation concerning land reform. In general, in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan this entailed nationalization of collective lands with a variety of possibilities for leasing of this land. In Kyrgyzstan, collective lands could be privatized; however, there was moratorium on selling them, which was lifted in 2001 (Lerman 2009a; 2009b). The prevalent new form of farming appears to be the individual farm, which in practice is usually a household or family farm, a group of which could collaborate to organize a cooperative farm (Spoor 2004).

The forms of external restructuring were often simply changes of name, often “just a fashion” (Ilkhamov 1998, 546). The essence of land reform, as Lerman (2004) notes, depends also
on the internal restructuring of farms, which requires changes in property rights, as well as land and non-land asset use patterns (Lerman 2004, 61). Non-land assets include mainly water-sharing, a large part of which was conducted by the collectives. Today, this element of water distribution to agriculture is debated amongst the states themselves, on one hand, and between states and international donors, on the other. The international donors suggest the idea of community management, transferring direct responsibility for water distribution to the water users associations (Abdullaev 2010). The states remain sceptical and maintain the centralized management of the land and non-land assets of the farms (Lerman 2004). Centralized management framework influences land use patterns with “the functional subdivisions [such as general assembly of member-workers and shareholders] have only token autonomy beyond general production planning” (Lerman 2004, 137-138).

3.4.1. Land: new legal frameworks, old social patterns

Kyrgyzstan, following the World Bank blueprint for transition, was among the first Central Asian states to privatize collective farms (Spoor and Visser 2001). The following legislation on de-collectivization was implemented: the Law on Peasant Farms (Feb 1991), Law of Land Reform (Apr 1991), Land Code (June 1991), Measures for Continuing Implementation of Land and Agrarian Reform (Dec 1992), New Constitution (May 1993), Measures on Deepening Land and Agrarian Reform (Feb 1994), Referendum (June 1998), Presidential Decree on Private Land Ownership (Oct 1998), Land Code (June 1999), Lifting the Moratorium on Land Sales (March 2001). These legal instruments obliged all farms to allocate former collective lands to individual farmers. Those who did so were entitled to state subsidies for fertilizer, machinery, marketing plans, etc. (Bloch & Rasmussen 1998, 116-7). Land use rights were obtained for ninety-nine years. At the same time, a moratorium on selling land was introduced, and was lifted again in 2001 (Law on Lifting the Moratorium on Land Sales 2001). The process of land privatization has been described by
international donors as extremely successful. Reportedly, the proportion of individually owned farms increased to 75% by 2009 (Lerman and Sedik 2009; USAID 2011; World Bank 2009). However, it is important to consider that 85% of agricultural land in Kyrgyzstan is comprised of pastures, meaning that arable land accounts for the remaining 15%. Pastures have not been subjected to privatization and ownership remains with the state. However, due to the ongoing process of border delimitation, pasture lands have often remained within the scope of the disputed borders. Furthermore, land reform targets 75% of arable land for privatization, with the remaining 25% being held in a State Land Redistribution Reserve (Ministry of Agriculture and Gosregistr KG). This is a significantly small portion of the lands which have actually been privatized. Constitutionally, the private ownership of the lands was introduced only after the referendum of 1998 (Constitution 1998, Article 4, para. 2 and 3). The types of farms that have been created include both household farms, as well as the possibility of creating farming associations or organizing on a communal basis through creating a Jamaat (Law on Jamaats 1995).

The privatization of lands was a sort of wealth redistribution, which is why it was one of the factors aggravating the confrontation between Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities in Osh in 1990 (Peyrouse 2009, 5). In terms of creating the institution of private property rights, Kyrgyzstan is considered “the only country in the region that has resolutely embarked on the conversion of large Soviet farms, guaranteeing the right to private property and creating the legal conditions for an open land market” (Peyrouse 2009, 5). However, just as in the other two cases, this did not help to overcome the legacy of social interdependence in terms of land and water sharing, as the last section of this chapter shows.

Uzbekistan has chosen a model of dual-ownership of farms, with some features similar to the Chinese one, that is, the community farms existing within the system of collective farm belonging to the state (Pomfret 2000). The household farms were the intra-collective-farms, which were leased to families, workers, or groups of families (Land Law 1990).

The Land Code of April 1998 reaffirmed the exclusive state ownership of farms, which maintained a centralized management of agriculture, especially of cotton-production. However, the Law on Peasant Farms of 1992 allowed farmers to exit from collectives with their own share of land and assets. Between 1990 to 1997, family holdings accounted for less than 3% of agricultural land and collective farms continued to dominate the agricultural sector (Pomfret 2006; 2000). Between 1997 and 2007 there was an increase in the household farms from 3 to 30%, but most of them still remained within intra-collective-units (Lerman 2014, 2008). According to the USAID (2003): “in 1998, there were 1,043 kolkhozes, 444 shirkats, 288 sovkhozes, and 270 livestock-breeding joint stock companies; by 2003 there were 1,809 shirkats, most of which were created in 2000. Together with other large farm enterprises, shirkats occupy some 3.5 millions hectares of land, averaging around 1,600 ha per farm” (USAID 2003, 24).

According to the USAID (2003), the following farm forms are found in Uzbekistan: cooperatives (shirkat) and independent peasant (dekhan) farms. The latter may be organized as leasehold farms (internal leasing within the cooperative is allowed), with their owners called the “leasehold dekhs, the patriarchal based farms averaging about 15 ha. [...] that did not have to register with district government until a law of 1998, that required them to register as the means of control” (USAID 2003, 27). Besides these, there are private livestock farms and smallholder household farms (USAID 2003, 27):

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Household farms have permanent leases of land that are inheritable. They comprise about 24 percent of the rural population but only 13 percent of arable land. Their number and total land occupied have been growing rapidly from 2.5 million in 1993 to 2.9 million in 1998. They accounted for 160,000 hectares of cultivated land in 1960, 250,000 hectares in 1988, 491,000 hectares in 1993, 500,000 hectares in 1996 and 650,000 hectares in 1998. Private household farms are limited by law to 0.25 hectares of land. Private livestock farms are the most independent farms in Uzbekistan. They do not depend on collective/state farms for irrigation and other essential inputs. They occupy an average of 65 hectares and possess an average of 400 head of livestock (USAID 2003, 27).

According to this data, Uzbekistan is the most reluctant to privatize, and even those farms that are considered as being private are in practice subjected to state planning and old social patterns concerning land and water.

In social terms, the reluctance to proceed with rapid privatization like in Kyrgyzstan can be explained by the concern of the government of Uzbekistan about the fact that “privatization will lead to massive unemployment, [which has] paralyzed any reform; no non-agricultural compensatory economy seems to be developed in rural areas” (Peyrouse 2009, 5). Hence, in Uzbekistan, the agricultural sector remains largely in state hands. The farmers do not own the land they operate. However, as Trevisani (2007) shows, the notion of all-encompassing state can be challenged if one considers the unintended consequences of de-collectivization. Specifically, he identifies “local struggles and local forms of coping” that uncover “mechanisms through which new inequalities are created, [as well as] some unsuspected dynamics that create challenges and resistance to state control” (Trevisani 2007, 86). The author claims that:

[Despite centralized control] power politics never ceased to also have local expression, manifested in local struggles around the distribution of resources and in the shaping of community life. In this respect the coping and expropriation strategies adopted by the rural communities vis-à-vis the centrally set political frame should be considered as surrogate, albeit opaque and indirect, form of participation, which so far the central government contained successfully (Trevisani 2007, 86).

Similarly, Ilkhamov (2004) explains that state-society relations in Uzbekistan are “based on continuous negotiations between layers of the state” (Ilkhamov 2004, 162). Trevisani (2007) adds that these negotiations do not consider individual interests and therefore society beyond the
public governance institutions. He demonstrated this claim through his analysis of “invisible farm sponsoring” in an Uzbekistani province and the different forms of resistance developing within the seemingly stable and overarching state system. We will discuss forms of resistance in detail in Chapter 5; it is an element that suggests link between the unfinished process of decollectivization and the revival of the community-based self-governance.

Reportedly, in all three cases, “the best lands have generally been awarded to the former party elite or former directors of collective farms” (Peyrouse 2009, 5). Furthermore, as was noted in the previous section, collective farms had the function of providing social benefits, such as social and health services, observing transportation infrastructure, undertaking the collective management of expensive equipment and inputs. The new (partially) privatized institution of property rights did not include the provision of such services. This led to the reluctance of some farmers in rural areas to engage with privatization, for collective structures have been “the symbols of some minimal assistance” (Peyrouse 2009, 5).

In Tajikistan, land reform started in 1995, despite the fact that the first Presidential decree on land reform was issued in 1992. The reason for the delay was the civil war, which was partially about resources and their redistribution. The legislation on de-collectivization included: the Law on Property (Dec.1990), Land Code (Dec.1996, amended 1999), New Constitution (Nov.1994). As a result, there are two main types of farms in Tajikistan: collective dekhan farms and household farms. The former are, de facto, the Soviet era kolkhozes and sovkhozes, albeit with new names. At the outset of land reform in 1995, the household farms comprised about 6% of arable lands. By 2007, the household farms increased to 60%. Their share of the agricultural land is about 45% and the share in the arable land is about 60% (Agency for Surveying, Cartography and Land Use 2008 quoted in Asadov 2013). There has been no significant change registered since (Tajstats 2013 quoted in Asadov 2013). Similar to Uzbekistan, “farm reorganization occurs without the knowledge or understanding of the members, and farms are reorganized only by name (changed
to cooperative or joint stock company for example) but with no other changes to management or operations” (USAID 2004, 2). The farms have been “‘privatized’ with little change in the farm management structure” (USAID 2004, 2), just as in other two cases. State control over the farmer persists through several obligations that the farmers take upon themselves once they are willing to privatize. Such obligations, according to the USAID report (2004) include:

1) The necessity to take-on a portion of the debt accrued by the former or state collective farm which is often hundreds of dollars per hectare;
2) While in theory farmers have the right to establish family farms by withdrawing from the former collective farms with long-term use rights to land and some non-land property, the process is inequitable; not transparent in terms of location, quality, and size of the land plots assigned; and made expensive through the imposition of informal costs;
3) To withdraw from farm, a farmer needs permission from a number of local government officials and the Land Committee, which is difficult to obtain, due to the desire to maintain rent-seeking activity; etc. (USAID 2004, 2).

The debts of kolkhozes are repaid through local investors, known as futures companies (USAID 2003, 2). The futures are often set up by the local or the ruling elites, which makes the individual farmers vulnerable and dependent on the state in an informal way. Privatization of land in Tajikistan differed according to whether a province grew cotton or not. GBAO, a province which is highly mountainous and less agriculturally important, as well as not cotton-oriented, had the opportunity for an almost equal distribution of land (USAID 2004, 2). Individual land use rights are distributed through the land certificates. In the first quarter of 2004, only 5,665 sub-certificates (to individual families) were issued (FAO data quoted in USAID 2004, 5). The monitoring of the land use rights is granted to the jamoats (a formal administrative body at the community level). Reportedly, it is not executed properly (USAID 2004, 5).

As Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are more cotton-oriented economies, state control of farming in these cases is higher than in Kyrgyzstan. However, all cases reveal conditions conducive for community-based farming, as well as property rights tied to a household rather than individuals as well as social patterns organizing the agricultural activity tied to collective practices, rather than
individuals. It is worth noting that the Soviet farming system did not preclude communities. In fact, as mentioned in the previous section, kolkhozes (collective farms) technically belonged to communities, while sovkhozes (state farms) technically belonged to the state. Furthermore, “the concept of “local self-governance” has its origin in the Soviet law” (Bichsel 2009, 264). However, the revival of communities that privatization and decentralization has fostered does not mean the revival of the exactly the same communities embraced by the collectives, due to the fact that states are now limited by their sovereign borders. Rather, it is the revival of the community as a dynamic social space or, as Beyer (2006) puts it, “re-traditionalization” of land and water management. However, the “tradition” has been modified. And what kind of tradition will be reinvented depends on political power.

In general, all three cases reveal different levels of formal privatization, but all of them are based on the principle of re-distribution, rather than restitution. As Bichsel (2009, 264) insightfully notices: “[de-collectivization in Central Asia] did not aim to restore pre-Soviet individual or group rights to natural resources which had to be relinquished in the socialist collectivization process. Rather it took residential and professional affiliation during the last Soviet period as a baseline.” However, restoring pre-Soviet “individual rights” would be implausible, due to the fact that property rights were tied to religious institutions and communities in the Khanates of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokhand, which were mostly left intact by the governance of the Russian Empire. And for the nomad tribes of Turkestan, surrounding these three Khanates, obviously, the relationships with property had been in a constant flux. Furthermore, assuming the possibility of restitution would mean resuming the existence of the nation-states prior to the Soviet time or at least polities that could be comparable to those of the post-Soviet period. Since this is not the case in Central Asia, one cannot say that the institution of property rights was destroyed by the Soviet state. One can only say that Soviet social engineering substituted the link between land and
religious institutions (or non-religious, but governed accordingly) with the link between the ethnicity (the nationality in the Soviet sense of the term) and land.

3.4.2. Water: restructuring non-land assets – empowering communities?

The second pillar of de-collectivization is about restructuring non-land assets, the central of which is water. Post-Soviet water management faced a major challenge in the form of borders between the new sovereign states. Soviet borders were quite arbitrary and did not, in practical terms, exist as both the land and water were used according to the Law on the de-facto use of land. Soviet social practices in the Fergana Valley followed the water while post-Soviet social practices had to respect the national borders of the states. Trans-boundary management with corresponding trans-boundary mechanisms has not yet been fully developed. Since 1991, the governments of Central Asia have “scaled down the agencies that formerly controlled irrigation and drainage infrastructure” which also resulted in the lack of the frequently updated data on the amount of water in the river basins in order to adjust water distribution (Maselli et al. 2010, 256).

The management of non-land assets could be described as being exercised at two levels: the inter-state level and societal level, represented by the Interstate Coordinating Water Commission (ICWC); and the framework of participatory water management, promoted by the international donors in the form of the Water Users’ Associations. The water ministers51 of the Central Asian states signed an Agreement on Cooperation in the Management of the Use and Protection of Water Resources from Interstate Sources.

The Agreement is based on two pillars: Soviet water quotas and barter schemes. These exemplify the ongoing interdependence in terms of water usage across borders in the Fergana

51 Ministries in charge: The Water Resources Committee of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection (Kazakhstan), the Ministry of Reclamation and Water Management (Tajikistan), the Ministry of Water Management and Agriculture (Uzbekistan), the Ministry of Water Management and Agriculture (Kyrgyzstan) and the Ministry of Reclamation and Water Management (Turkmenistan).
Valley, and the states’ aspirations to strengthen their sovereignty. The clash between the societal interdependence and external sovereignty has not been fully resolved.

*The ICWC executive bodies include:*

- Secretariat;
- Basin water organization “Amudarya” (BWO “Amudarya”);
- Basin water organization “Syrdarya” (BWO “Syrdarya”);
- Scientific Information Center for water related problems (SIC) and its national branches;
- Coordination Metrological Center (CMC) and national organizations;
- Training Center (TC) and its branches

(ICWC Statute, Article 5.1)

This exemplifies the fact that the ICWC’s joint jurisdiction are the basins or the two main rivers on the first- and (partially) second-tier\(^{52}\) of the distribution.

The Agreement maintained the Soviet scheme of allocation of water, which was based on the Soviet Barter Agreements and the Quota Agreements. In general, the quotas were distributed as follows: Uzbekistan uses 51 per cent and Kazakhstan 37 per cent of water from Syr Darya whereas most Amu Darya water is consumed by Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (ICG 2002, 12). To implement the Agreement, the Interstate Coordinating Water Commission (ICWC) with the Secretariat in Khujand (Tajikistan) was established. In procedural terms, the decisions on quotas and their adjustments had to be made with the consensus of the five member states. The task of the research brigades responsible for data collection on how much water was needed for each 50-100 ha was partially transferred to the ICWC Scientific Information Center (SIC).

The SIC focused on training water officials, organizing courses and round tables, operating a database to be assessed by the member countries, rather than on collecting the field data from each of the sectors of territory, as was done during the Soviet period. Basically, the ICWC can be seen as exercising the functions of the first tier of the three-tier Soviet system of water

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\(^{52}\) Because the second-tier is already within the national jurisdictions of the states; conducted by respective local authorities.
management. It took decisions on quotas, while its “executive bodies - the Basin Water Management Association (BWA) Syr Darya and [BWA] Amu Darya – monitor their implementation”, located in Tashkent and Urgench (Uzbekistan), respectively (ICG 2002, 7). These associations have “a right to adjust the quotas up or down to as much as 15 per cent” (ICG 2002, 7). As these bodies basically work under the consensus of water ministries of each state, the conflict of interest is embedded in the institutional design of the ICWC.

The third-tier distribution network, that is the water distribution hubs, which came within the competence of the collective farms, was left “unattended by the de-collectivization process”. There are several practical issues which have spawned as a result. As there are no research brigades or hydrological specialists regularly watching the flow of water from Syr Darya and Amu Darya or monitoring the needs of each parcel of land, the distribution of water in the first two tiers is done blindly, without knowing how much water there is to distribute. This causes water excess in some cases and water deficit in others, which exacerbates the conflicts between countries (ICG 2002). Furthermore, as the decision-making is made by consensus, it often results in the “paralysis of the interests of the countries” (ICG 2002, 8). The second-tier distribution network, the staff at the BWA Syr Darya, have expressed concerns about conflicts with the local policy and tax officials, who blame them for exceeding the water quotas fixed by the ICWC. The BWA officials, however, claim that it is people who exceed the water quotas. The officials, distributing water have little to do with this (ICG 2002, 9). This shows an inconsistency between the three-tiers of the water management system.

The third-tier distribution networks were neither privatized, nor was any formal organization put in place for them to be properly managed (Abdullaev 2009, 322). The problem is that beyond the farm gates, there are now hundreds of individual farmers or water users, who are

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53 As the flow of water varies from year to year, even if it is known that on average the water flow in Amu Darya is 75 cubic kilometers and 36 – in Syr Darya.
cultivating different types of crops, requiring irrigation of differing methods and intensity. The local administration is not capable of reconciling the needs of the individual farmers fully, without creating conflicts over water scarcity (Abdullaev 2009, 323). In order to solve the problems of water distribution among the individual farmers and communities, a range of international donors started implementing programs, based on the concept of Integrated Water Management (IWM).

The difference between the concept of water management as envisaged by the ICWC and the IWM was that the latter was based on a centralized idea of management and the former on decentralized water management, supported by the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the United Nations Development Program (Maselli et al. 2010, 227). Specifically, the concept promoted by international donors was the idea of “Irrigation Management Transfer”, specifically by the Swiss Development Cooperation Organization, was to include the water users in the decision-making and water management from the tertiary canal to the main canal (Maselli et al. 2010). This idea was first opposed by the SIC ICWC, as these state agencies insisted on more centralized water distribution and the promotion of mainly technical improvements, such as infrastructure, automation of water distribution, etc. (Maselli et al. 2010). The SDC mediated the development of a joint concept of water management between the SIC ICWC and the IWMI. Ultimately, this joint concept of the IWMI still reserved an important role for the state agencies, but acknowledged the cross-border character of water management in the Fergana Valley, allowed more participatory irrigation management (PIM). This compromise approach was implemented during the mutual management of The South Fergana Canal\textsuperscript{54}, which has comprised three canals on each side of the Valley. Each state’s national water agencies, three pilot studies were initiated in 2002: Aravan-Akbur main canal (Kyrgyz part of the Valley); Khodja Bakirgan main canal (Tajik part); South Fergana Main canal (Uzbekistan) (Abdullaev 2009, 324). The management comprised a new body, called Union of Water Users, which included federation of WUAs and

\textsuperscript{54} Shared by three states; built during the Soviet period.
water users from different hydrounits (environmental NGOs, industries, urban water suppliers, etc) along the pilot canals (Abdullaev 2009, 324). An attempt was made to implement this type of the management and integrate the water users associations into the management of the Southern Fergana Canal. However, individual farmers were reluctant to participate in the Union. As the assessment surveys\textsuperscript{55} have shown, this new framework did not provide considerable improvements in the water distribution among the households (Abdullaev 2009, 328).

Hence, this architecture composed of the Water Uses’ Associations (WUAs) and the NGOs sponsoring them would be seen as the third tier of the water management system, if the direct responsibility were granted to the farm units. However, there is a resistance to participation in the WUAs because of a lack of maps, unclear land ownership and property rights have not been institutionalized. The WUAs were established in each country. In general, this has been done by delegating the responsibility to on-farm water distribution to individual farmers, but without any institutional framework accounting for competition over these water resources. In the Fergana Valley, “the WUAs were created along the South Fergana Main Canal during the last 10 years” (Molchanova 2014, 1). Recent quantitative research shows that these WUAs score between 145 and 219 on the 6 indicators of efficiency, such as water supply, technical conditions, economic conditions, social and cultural conditions, organizational and information conditions, which show quite different levels of their performance (Mochalova 2014, 1). Data from ACTED, the main NGO involved in the support of the WUAs in the Fergana Valley, illustrate that most local people conceive of water management as one of the key conditions for peaceful coexistence with the neighboring communities.\textsuperscript{56}

Kyrgyzstan was the first country to delegate rights of water distribution to individual users, initially through Village Councils. Reportedly, in 2000, the WUAs “already managed about one

\textsuperscript{55} Baseline surveys: randomly selected number of water users (60-90) within each WUA were surveyed on the existing situation of agricultural production, water use and their contribution into the operation and maintenance of the irrigation systems (Nizamedinkhodjaeva 2007).

\textsuperscript{56} See ACTED interactive maps \url{http://www.acted.org/en/world-map-acted-2014}
quarter of the total irrigated land, amounting to 232,800 ha; in 2003, 300 additional WUAs raised this figure to 450,000 ha, amounting to 40% of the total irrigated area (Maselli et al. 2010, 227; Schaarp et al. 2004). According to the Government Decree of March 1994 on “Measures to maintain and finance public irrigation infrastructure”, the Ministry of Water Resources had to transfer on-farm Irrigation and Distribution (I&D) schemes to Village Councils, remaining collective farms, and incipient farm enterprises (GR/113/1995). Gradually, these functions were transferred from Village Councils to the water users themselves (GR/284/1994). This provided incentives for the farmers to create water users associations: the first one was organized in June 1995 (GR/226/1995), the second in 1997 (GR/473/1997). Although participatory on paper, the first WUAs were in fact a continuation of centralized decision making with a few of the associated internal problems, such as a top-down system of decision making (by the Chair of the WUA), no access for farmers to an independent audit commission or access to financial accounts. In addition, while membership fees were supposed to cover the water distribution costs, water transportation costs were overlooked and not included in the calculations. Finally, the electoral and voting systems were not specified; hence, this system became a platform for more powerful stakeholders to dominate the poorer farmers (Alymbaeva 2004, 21-30). Since this framework has provoked competition for water and conflicts among communities, the Resolution (1997) improved it by encouraging the establishment of WUAs within hydraulic boundaries, rather than within administrative borders (Alymbaeva 2004). Finally, Government Resolution (35/2002) addressed the decision-making system of the WUAs to increase equality, transparency, information-sharing, and electoral processes within the associations, as well as establishing a framework of sanctions for breach of these rules (Alymbaeva 2004, 30).

The function of maintenance of social infrastructure (which used to be in the competence of the collective farms), such as the rural schools, clinics, roads, and water drinking systems was delegated to the Village Councils as well.
While the organizational performance reveals room for improvement, the infrastructural performance shows its results. For example, ACTED, with the support of USAID, and the EU, managed to support the rehabilitation of two canals in the irrigation system of the 1st May Village, in the Nookat district of the Alai region, Southern Kyrgyzstan (neighboring Batken) (USAID 2013). This village is downstream, the last on the canal, which is why it had been usually left without water. The same initiatives were involved in the rehabilitation of infrastructure in the borderlands and disputed territories between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (ACTED 2014). However, as most research shows, the infrastructure is the least of the problems of water management, with the main issue being organizational or “institutional gap” (Mochalova 2014; Alymbaeva 2004).

In Tajikistan, 93% of the total fresh water is used for agriculture and only 83% of it reaches the fields (UNEP/GRID 2002). This wasteful water use is one of the main reasons for empowering community self-governance or formation of WUAs. Furthermore, due to post-Soviet transformation, cultivated irrigated land significantly decreased and caused further economic losses. Civil war has aggravated this situation (Rabejanova 2008; Maselli 2010). Government Decree (No.281/1996) on “Fee Collection for Water Delivery Service” gave a formal start to the legal creation of the WUAs. The Water Code of Tajikistan (2000) expanded the conditions for WUA formation. Since 2004, international donors, such as USAID and Winrock International (implementation) started supporting this framework. Since 2006 the “Law on Water Users Associations” defines WUAs as non-commercial organizations. Within this legal framework, WUAs in Tajikistan are based upon hydrological boundaries, rather than administrative borders and function according to a bottom-up approach involving community-based decision-making.

In Uzbekistan, the Water Users Associations were established in 1999, by the Decree of Cabinet Ministers. Thousands of WUAs were registered within the first few months. However, they are not yet in a position to take water management responsibility at the former farm level (Abdullaev 2009, 323). As mentioned above, most WUAs were established along the South
Fergana Magistral Canal (SFMC) in the Fergana Valley, divided into 10 hydrounits, 6 of which are located in Andijan province and 4 in Fergana Province (Mochalova 2014, 3). Fergana province experiences more problems with water, similar to the provinces of Tajikistani and Kyrgyzstani parts of the Fergana Valley, located downstream of the Canals. As in the other two cases, the WUAs in Uzbekistan reveal the following problems:

1. The lack of rules and regulations and sanction systems for breaking these rules;
2. The necessity to reintegrate the institution of elders (aksakals), indigenous social structures and the kashar system;
3. The lack of transparent system of water allocation;
4. The lack of professionalism of the WUAs staff (Mochalova 2014, 7-8).

There are common problems shared by WUAs within all 3 countries and been identified by field research conducted with farmers by different scholars at different points of time. There is an absence of clear rules, water scarcity, schedule problems, lack of infrastructure and the capacity to improve and maintain existing channels (Liu 2012; Eriksson 2006; Alymbaeva 2004). In other words, the responsibility was delegated to the individual farmers and communities, but the capacity to create the institutional system and monitor the infrastructure and logistics of water management are still dependent on the decision making apparatus of the first two-tiers of the water distribution network, which depends on the decisions at national level. National boundaries do not coincide with hydraulic boundaries, and these nation states have proven to be reluctant to loosen control of their their administrative borders. And while the infrastructural problems along the main canals are being gradually addressed, the organizational issues remain intact, which is especially evident in the cases of small rivers. In fact, these projects empower communities by increasing social mobilization with regards to water management and therefore increasing potential for self-governed collective action.
3.5. Community level water management: the case of Isfara river

As it has been shown, participatory water management has not yet proven itself to be successful. The NGO sector and independent experts emphasize the necessity to empower informal leadership and indigenous knowledge at the level of the communities for better resource management (Mochalova 2014; Temirkulov 2013). Temirkulov (2013) has highlighted a wide network of informal institutions in the Fergana Valley (meetings of aksakals, ashar tax, etc.) and has suggested that they be included into the water-sharing schemes within local communities. In this way, it is hoped, transparency in water-sharing would increase for the farmers (Mochalova 2014).

While the case of the Big Fergana Canal (BFC) sheds the light on water-sharing from the most important rivers in Central Asia, as well as the first two tiers of the water-sharing scheme, there are hundreds of smaller river basins that highlight greater problems of water distribution and hydro-interdependence at the grassroots level. The case of the Isfara River is representative of this problem, as it is located in the Fergana Valley and flows through the borderlands and enclaves that are discussed in the following chapters from other societal perspectives. Following this river may shed some light on the cross-border activities along the disputed territories on the communal level, as well as the potential contribution of informal ties and communities to water governance.

The Isfara River\(^{58}\) is one of the 30 transnational tributaries to the Syr Darya, located on the western slope of the Fergana Valley. The river flows through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The source of the river is in Kyrgyzstan and flows towards Syr Darya, passing through the Tajik enclave of Vorukh, re-entering Kyrgyzstan at Batken and back again to Tajikistan’s Isfara province. At the contested border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, it gets diverted into the Toktogul reservoir\(^{59}\) (Kyrgyzstan), which has two main outflow canals. One diverts water to Batken

\(^{58}\) Average annual flow is 0,4 km³.

\(^{59}\) Constructed in 1971, began operation in 1975
district (Kyrgyzstan); the other one – back to Isfara district. On its way there are two metering water allocation stations: one is located in Tangi Vorukh (enclave Vorukh) and the other in Rovot (located at the administrative boundary of two Tajik districts, in the buffer zone between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). At Rovot, the water is allocated to Tajikistan (Kanibodom province) and Uzbekistan (Besharyk province) by means of diversion into the BFC.60 However, some of the water is utilized before this diversion (Pak et al. 2014, 232 – 234).

A recent analysis of the agreements on water-sharing along the small rivers demonstrated that these basins have been contested as far back as the 1960s and 1970s (Pak et. al 2014; Wegerich et. al. 2012b; Matveev 1988). According to the initial water-sharing protocol for the area, approved by the Kyrgyz SSR, the latter was entitled to 2% of the Isfara water, Tajikistan was entitled to 50% and Uzbekistan 48% (Protocol61 of 1946 and 1958). In 1969, the USSR Ministry of Water Resources increased Kyrgyzstan’s share to 26.7% (Matveev 1988). As these shares have been constantly contested between the parties, the solution was to build more reservoirs in the Fergana Valley during the 1960s and 1970s (Matveev 1988). To compensate for the increase of the Kyrgyzstani share in the Isfara, numerous additional pump stations62 were built. The competition was the reason for Moscow’s increased involvement in determining the annual water allocations on the Isfara. It was then decided that operations would be handed to the BWO Syr Darya (Pak et al. 2014, 240). This last development explains why community-level water management failed to develop from this point.

The Isfara River has often been a part of single package negotiations over water-sharing, which included other reservoirs and canals, such as Toktogul Reservoir and the Kanibodom Canal.

60 The Isfara is the last tributary contributing to flow in the BFC, the implication being that some of the flow of the Isfara River will re-enter Tajikistan through the BFC channel (Pak et.al 2014, 232-234).
62 In the Kirov (now Besharyk) province of the Uzbek SSR, four pump stations – Uzbekistan (completed in 1972, lift 35 m, irrigated area 250 ha) Rapkon 2 (1974), Rapkon 2 (1980) and Bahmal (1984); additional pump station in Besharyk (in 1978). In the Tajik Khanibodom district, three pump stations were constructed: Mahram (1975), Shurkul (1980), and Poymmennaya (1983) (Pak et.al.2014).
in Tajikistan. While negotiations at the state level are ongoing, at the local level the role of informal agreements increases. For example, as Tajikistan was excluded from other water-sharing packages, it started diverting water and preventing it from flowing to the Kanibodom canal. This canal feeds the BFC and, further downstream, flows to Uzbekistan. According to the field research data of Pak et al. (2014), their informants would explain this situation as follows: “[The reaction of the Uzbek side is] peaceful silence as Uzbeks do not provide our limits in the BFC – we do not complain, we do not provide their share from Isfara – they do not complain” (Pak et al. 2014). These kinds of diversions often happen without the awareness of the formal local water authorities who in principle have the ability to determine the flow (Pak et al. 2014, 240).

As the protocols on water allocation have been perceived as “irrelevant” since independence, there are agreements between district communities on water exchange. For example, Kanibodom district and Besharyk district have a gentlemen’s agreement wherein Kanibodom would discharge all the Isfara water allocation to the BFC in Besharyk. In exchange, the latter would provide an uninterrupted flow to the BFC from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan (Pak et al. 2014). While in the main agreements Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are both seen as upstream countries, by the terms of these small informal agreements, the relations of upstream and downstream are defined according to the river in the scale of a province. Hence, Tajikistan becomes a downstream country, that is, the receiver, rather than a supplier. This has made these agreements more flexible and efficient. Reportedly, “the administration at the province level in both republics was aware of the informal gentlemen’s agreements between the districts, and in a way was satisfied with their solution” (Pak et.al 2014, 238).

As the political situation around border delimitation deteriorated, the official authorities were not always able to travel and take joint measurements of water flow in this area (Wegerich 2006). As mentioned above, the main flow measuring units are located in Vorukh and Rovot (Protocol 1980a, 1980b, 2010). As chapter 4 shows, Vorukh is one of the most isolated societies of
Tajikistan, near a zone, which is reportedly considered a “citadel of extremists/IMU”, Isfara town.

Rovot itself is located in the buffer zone between the two states, the site of a minefield laid by Uzbekistan (Dadabaev 2013). Hence, the zone remains less reachable for formal authorities, while water needs remain acute and interdependence persists. The increase of gentlemen’s agreements, especially in light of international donors’ support for community-driven governance, has the potential to increase grassroots societal ties across borders.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has shown that the legacy of the Soviet Union has persisted in the aftermath of its dissolution in the form of social patterns and social interdependence across borders, which is particularly evident in social relations towards water and land. Firstly, it addressed the pre-Soviet social organization of the societies in the Three Khanates and the neighboring nomadic tribes. It has shown the lack of categories in terms of ethnicity or nationality, as well as the lack of any link between such categories and the available resources. The history of Central Asia has been the one of constant migration and displacement, which contributed to its social diversity. At the same time, this diversity has been managed through communities of commitment or trust. Secondly, it addressed Soviet policies of nationalities creation, which created a new type of actor – an ethnos connected to the land and its resources. However, creating nationalities was one of two steps taken to create a collective interest and an idea of the common good, which had been achieved by means of collectivization. Furthermore, the realization of this collective interest in the field of land and water-sharing has been undertaken across borders, which is why this legacy is called social interdependence here.

Thirdly, the chapter has shown that with the dissolution of the Soviet state, the social legacy has not dissolved, instead the projects of managing it have been changed from highly centralized ones to those based on decentralization, as promoted by international actors.
However, while these projects have addressed the rehabilitation of infrastructure, the organizational structure has not been created by joint interstate action. This resulted in a type of incomplete centralization, for the Inter-State Water Commission has been focused only on the first two-tiers of the irrigation system, leaving out the level of households, since these used to be governed by the kolkhozes.

In sum, social interdependence has persisted and communities have revived even though the state system is not based on communities and does not have links to these communities; thus creating the likelihood of increased societal resistance to modern state-building projects. The revival of self-governance based on communities is illustrated by the case of the Isfara river, which is a smaller river which runs through the Fergana Valley enclaves and the shell societies of strategically important social spaces, in which the revival of community social structures might mean connecting to transnational transcendent ideologies which support power networks different from those of the states.
CHAPTER 4. The impact of external actors on states and societies

Introduction

External actors have been a part of the Central Asian story for centuries, represented by the period of the Great Game. As a result, foreign policy analyses of Central Asia have been conducted either through the lens of the *tabula rasa* (Mackinder 1904) or the *great chessboard* (Brzezinski 1997). The English school of International Relations has challenged this paradigm by focusing on the impact of domestic factors and historical developments, the political choices of elites and regime specificities to explain the failures of external actors’ policies. However, this approach has yet to strike the subtle balance between granting these states the attributes of agency and falling into the trap of the failed state theory, which also sees threats emerging locally as the cause of transnational threats.

Since this thesis aims to reverse this causality, the chapter argues that the strategies pursued by external actors contribute to the incompleteness of the state. How exactly? This causality is drawn from Tilly’s and Mann’s propositions on the analysis of external actors’ strategies. Specifically, these external actors are providers of models of development (Tilly 1975, 604-621) and, secondly, these models can engineer certain conditions conducive to certain political outcomes (Mann 1986). This chapter argues that the very same conditions may lead to a diametrically opposite outcome given a specific geographical, social, and historical context.

According to Tilly (1975, Ch.9), the external actors’ models contain the following features: institutional solutions, modernization paths, economic development, and political or civil participation. In practice, however, institutional solutions do not mean building social institutions. Modernization may imply some form of a return to tradition or “re-traditionalization” and reliance on traditional economic practices. And civil participation may draw in radical civil activists, which may have emerged as part of a society. The fact that external actors’ models take liberal values
and the rationale of liberalization for granted make them blind to diametrically opposed realities or “side-effects” coming to fore as a result. Finally, strengthening security may appear to have more to do with strengthening the social and ideological sources of power, rather than the military.

Based on this rationale, this chapter examines the external actors’ strategies of organizing security, economy, and society. Specifically, it focuses on the engineering of borders, a common economic space, and civil society. It argues that the external actors’ strategies created conditions conducive to three important societal consequences: (1) isolated land pockets; (2) the development of informal economies and strategies of survival; (3) the identity of resistance and parallel civil societies. This argument is unfolded in three steps, corresponding to the respective sections. Step one and section 4.1 focus on the construction of security. Specifically, through an examination of the post-1991 border-reengineering programs—such as BOMCA and CADAP—it depicts the process, actors, and rationale of border-management. Borders are important for two reasons: they are the manifestation of the prevailing international narrative of transnational threats, and they are tools to carve territories and, therefore, sovereignties.

The following section continues this thread by showing how a material construct, i.e. the border, in turn contributes to the increase of the narrative of threat, supported by different international and regional organizations, including Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Anti-Terrorist Central of the CIS (ATC CIS), and the extent to which this narrative manifests within national security structures in these states. This interplay between the material structures and narratives in conjunction fosters the creation of land pockets from the constellation of enclaves in the Fergana Valley. This societal consequence is illustrated by three cases, each representing a different side of the Fergana Valley, such as that of Batken zone (Kyrgyzstan), enclaves Sokh and Shahimardan (Uzbekistan), and the enclave Vorukh (Tajikistan).
For step two, section 4.2 examines external actors’ strategies to organize the economy. It focuses on two projects: the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) and the Central Asia South Asia (CASA-1000) resource-sharing scheme. The section on CASA-1000 demonstrates how building new transmission lines connecting Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with Afghanistan and Pakistan promotes internal population displacement, thereby breaching these populations’ social patterns, routines, trust and power networks. In the absence of better conditions for displaced people and communities, these people will share the identity of resistance to the state in progress. For step three, section 4.3 examines the strategy of empowering civil society or the NGO sector, which has become a process for outsourcing power over identity creation from the state to non-state actors. Specifically, it shows how organized civil society loses its appeal vis-à-vis a parallel civil society, which possesses significant ideological power, regardless of a lack of structure or organization, due to having infiltrated pre-existing social structures and influencing the hearts and minds of young politico-religious activists.

4.1. Organizing Security

4.1.1. Border management: materializing symbolic borders and the idea of threat

The Border Management in Central Asia (BOMCA) and Central Asian Drug Action Program (CADAP) are the two main pillars of the border management framework initiated by the European Union and implemented in partnership with the UNDP. The regional headquarters of both BOMCA and CADAP are located in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, with country offices in the respective four other Central Asian countries. CADAP and BOMCA were initiated in 2001 and 2002, respectively; reportedly, as a response to “the IMU invasion” into the Fergana Valley in 1999 – 2001 (EC/99/2000, 24). In practice, implementation of BOMCA by the UNDP started in 2003. Its total budget from 2003 until 2014 amounted to over €33.5 million (UNDP 2013). Institutionally, both programs form part of the EU Foreign and Security Policy. In legal terms, both programs are based on the EU Strategy
towards Central Asia, accepted in 2002, which was renewed in the “Strategy for a new enhanced partnership with Central Asia” in June 2007. It outlines the EU’s strategic goals and the rationale behind EU policy choices towards Central Asia up to 2013 (EC/1905/2006, Art.8; EC/99/2000). In November 2013 the EU Commissioner for Development announced that EU had made available €1 billion for its Central Asian projects for the years 2014 – 2020 (EC/PR 2013). This funding will cover both bilateral and multilateral initiatives, as well as the entire package of EU-Central Asian affairs, with security and the border management being one of these.

The main goal of BOMCA was the provision of security and stability to the Fergana Valley. In practice, it was launched during a period of serious border crisis which went hand in hand with issues such as the crisis of the system of interdependent usage of resources and the economy of sufficiency established during the Soviet period. The IMU incursion was one of the incidents contributing to the complexity of the on-going state-building processes within the states in the region, which coincided with the international agenda of the post-9/11 “global war on terror” (Megoran 2012, 475). To this end, the EU Strategy paper towards Central Asia 2002-2006 integrated the international agenda of the fight against drug trafficking and the “global war on terror” among the world’s “common problems and shared challenges” (EC/99/2000, 4) The CADAP project, therefore, focuses on drug trafficking, since the main hub of the heroin trade between Afghanistan and Western Europe is located in Osh and Jalalabat (Kyrgyzstan) (EC/99/2000). Central Asia has been identified as part of the global network in the fight against transnational threats, mainly terrorism and drug trafficking. BOMCA provided logistics for these goals by means of building 52 border crossing points, 6 training centers, 14 drug profiling centers, and other facilities (UNDP 2013). During the period between 2001 and 2013, €20.7 million was allocated for the CADAP project, the official goal of which is the targeting of “demand on drug trafficking in Central Asia”, as well as “providing assistance to the drug-dependent persons” (ICD 2013). The program’s beneficiaries include border guards, customs administration, ministries of interior, health and
agriculture and phyto-sanitary, veterinary and quarantine services. To address demand and the drug addiction problem in the region, the program at its later stages started including multiple partners such as state drug control bodies, ministries of health and justice, narcological centres and treatment units in prisons and rehabilitation centres (ICD 2013).

According to the new “Strategy for a new enhanced partnership with Central Asia”, adopted by the European Council in June 2007, Central Asia has become part of the European Neighborhood Policy as a region closely related to the EU’s external relations with Russia (EU-CA Strategy 2007). This shift increased the EU’s close partnership with regional anti-drug trafficking organizations, the Central Asian Regional Information Center (CARICC), based in Almaty, as well as with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (EU-CA Strategy 2007, 29). This paper implies that a shift towards bi-lateral cooperation took place between EU member states and the Central Asian states, within the framework of the Integrated Border Management (IBM). This suggests the sharing of information on drug trafficking issues and on the associated supply chain across regional and international agencies (EU-CA Strategy 2007). The IBM approach also implies closer cooperation with other international organizations which are present in the region in order to coordinate issues related to border management, such as trade, logistics, transit, movement of people, etc. Thus, BOMCA and CADAP are currently coordinating with international partners such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), USAID and GIZ (ICD 2013).

The rationale behind the border fortification in Central Asia is presented through the paradigm of integrated border management, which implies the harmonization of border regulations across different regions through the creation of a multilateral border management system and the introduction of compatible procedures and systems within national administrations and across borders (ICD 2013; EC/99/2000). Specifically, it pursues goals such as:
1) Improvement of security, reducing smuggling and human trafficking, and facilitating the movement of people across non-EU borders, particularly along the Pan-European Transport Corridors and TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia);

2) Helping partners develop IBM strategies, align border management rules and adopt best practices in line with EU standards;

3) Enhancing multilateral cooperation and networking among partners, candidate countries and EUMS (ICD 2013).

Even though IBM has been a part of the European Commission’s strategy on external relations, it was only officially introduced in Central Asia in 2010, seven years after the initiation of BOMCA and CADAP. Hence, the concept of the IBM cannot be seen as the sole or primary rationale behind the border management framework.

Some authors point out that BOMCA and CADAP aimed to increase border security in Central Asia by combating those threats associated with the situation in Afghanistan. Referred to as “border securitization projects”, these programs have been tailored specifically to securitize three issues: extremism/terrorism, drug trafficking and the trafficking weapons and radioactive materials (Laruelle 2013, 62; Gavrilis 2009). Considering that there had been almost no external involvement in border management between 1991 and 2002 when the region was suffering its worst bloodshed, for example the civil war in Tajikistan and inter-ethnic violence in the Fergana Valley, and considering further that the trigger for establishing of such borders was the IMU invasion, the “global war on terror” could be considered the main rationale behind securitization of borders. The entire regional discourse was directed against non-traditional threats such as separatism, extremism and terrorism.
These threats were prioritized in the main agreements of regional security organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty (CST)\textsuperscript{63}, which was signed in 1992 in Kishinev (CSTO 2014). According to the Articles 2 and 4 of the Treaty, the member states maintain their security on collective basis, providing each other necessary assistance, including military. Initially, the Treaty focused on providing the conditions for the creation of national military forces. However in 1996 and 1998, due to deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan, it shifted its focus to the threat of extremism, as well as potential external threats to the regional security.\textsuperscript{64} Aiming at creating a common security complex, in 1999 the member states adopted a plan to create common coalition forces in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia (CSTO 2014). The IMU invasion of Southern Kyrgyzstan in 1999 was a test of this Treaty. Member-states, with participation of Uzbekistan, managed to work jointly against this extremist threat.

The operation directed against the IMU invasion in 1999-2001 is considered to be one of its successful military operations (CSTO 2014).\textsuperscript{65} As a result, Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of Central Asian Region were created in 2001. In parallel, the process of developing CST bodies was ongoing, transforming the Treaty into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The Agreements\textsuperscript{66} on transforming the Treaty into an international organization (CSTO) officially came into force in 2003. Changes to the main agreements were also sped up after 9/11 and reflected the wider global agenda against terrorism. The CSTO established collective military forces in 2009.

\textsuperscript{63}Initially it was called the Collective Security Treaty (the CST) signed by the governments of Armenia, Belorussia, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan in 1992 and registered by the UN Secretariat in 1995. At the later stages, in the 1992 and 1993 Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan have been joining and leaving, depending on the level of the presumed threat to sovereignty springing from this organization, dominated by the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation.

\textsuperscript{64} The Treaty came into force in 1994. In 1995, the member states adopted “Declaration of Member States of the CST”, “The Concept of collective security of Member States of the CST”, “Basic directions of deepening military cooperation”.

\textsuperscript{65} However, the operation was mainly conducted by the military forces of Uzbekistan.

\textsuperscript{66} CSTO Charter and Agreement on Legal Status of the CSTO (signed on 7 October 2002; came into force on September 18, 2003), establishment of the CSTO Standing Council, Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Council of Ministers of Defense, the Committee of Secretaries or the Security Council.
However, this has not yet been activated in practice. Basically, the CSTO is seen by the governments of its member states as the platform through which Russia promotes its foreign policy interests and through which Russia has lobbied for the establishment of military bases in northern Kyrgyzstan and, potentially, in Osh, the southern capital of Kyrgyzstan (Laruelle 2013).

Another crucial organization for the regional security has been the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the purpose of which is similar to the CSTO: to fight against non-traditional threats such as separatism, extremism, and terrorism. This has been mainly the platform for Chinese political interests, motivated by the Chinese fear of Uighur separatism in the Xinjiang province bordering the Fergana Valley. From the Chinese side, the Fergana Valley is seen as a hub of terrorism and extremism which can potentially spill over into the Xinjiang, a region which has historically exerted a significant degree of separatism (Starr 2004).

Religious extremism, terrorism, separatism and drug trafficking represent the main concerns of both organizations. For both Russia and China, these threats are of specific significance due to the situations in Chechnya and Xinjiang, respectively. We will see below how the security agenda set by these organizations, backed up by international discourse on the threat of terrorism influenced the Central Asian states’ security infrastructure. The narrative provided by these organizations at this point exemplified both the rationale behind and the context within which the border management framework developed. Simply speaking, border management endeavors did not pay much attention to the necessity of addressing the legacy of the Soviet national delimitation of 1924-1927. Neither did they consider the necessity to address the delimitation according to the “factual use of lands” (“fakticheskoe zemlepol’zovanie”) of 1955, as well as the resource-sharing schemes and economy of sufficiency prior to fortification of borders. Instead, it followed the logic of threat, without knowing exactly where this threat originated from. As shown above, each of the actors considered the IMU to be a product of their neighbor’s policies and reacted to them using the tools of defensive realpolitik directed against neighboring states.
However, the IMU is a phenomenon which originates at the societal level, as chapter 2 has shown. It would, therefore be difficult to address this phenomenon without addressing the above mentioned societal problems, rather than following the traditional logic of security, based on fear and threats.

The rationale which informed border management in the region manifested itself in the following outcomes. In 2004 BOMCA replaced the Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division, which had been observing the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan between 1991 and 2004. The responsibility for monitoring the border was split between BOMCA and the U.S forces at this time. The former became responsible for observing the eastern part of the border, along the Tajikistan’s Nagorno-Badakhshan autonomous province; the latter was responsible for the western part of the border (Gavrilis 2009). This contributed to the deterioration of relations between Tajikistan and Russia, which continues to be reflected in issues such as legislation by the Russian authorities towards Tajik labor migrants working in Russia, of which there are more than a million. The Tajik economy is, reportedly, based on two main pillars: remittances from Tajik labor migrants in Russia and drug trafficking (ICG 2009).

Most importantly, the border management strategies of the external actors meant that new border control points were built, roads created by locals in places where crossing the border was easier were dug up, and bridges demolished (Megoran 2012). These border control points appeared in the Fergana Valley, the area most susceptible to drug trafficking but also the most economically and socially interdependent area of Central Asia. The Government of Uzbekistan, sponsored by the United States, who at that time had a military base in Karshi-Khanabad (2001-2005) and had invested a great deal in the military infrastructure of Uzbekistan, mined the “chessboard borders” of the Fergana Valley and introduced a visa regime, a contravention of the visa-free zone created by the Minsk Declarations establishing the CIS in 1991 (Reeves 2014). The roads which connected the three countries and which crisscrossed their territories multiple times
due to the numerous enclaves in the area were suspended, and people from the borderlands working in factories or fields in neighboring states became jobless (Megoran 2012). Gas and electricity supplies, which became subject to market prices when the resource-sharing scheme was dismantled (as discussed in Chapter 3), failed to deliver, which affected negatively people living in the borderlands (Mezon 1999). The daily lives of people were hampered by the interruption of bus services that used to crisscross the enclaves. In fact, the EU Strategy Paper pointed to this aggravation of the economic situation and the related problems of poverty within the enclaves of Batken area (Kyrgyzstan), Vorukh (Tajikistan), Sokh and Shahimardan (Uzbekistan), which the current Strategy aimed to integrate into the “multifaceted and complex” BOMCA program (EC/99/2000, 29). Despite the later integration of social and economic problems into its “multifaceted” framework, one concrete outcome of BOMCA’s actions can be seen: the symbolic boundaries of the Soviet period, neglected due to the utilitarian logic of economy sufficiency which organized social and economic practices transnationally, materialized into a series of checkpoints, visa regimes, wire fences, and minefields. Although the EU Strategy Paper identifies the problem in inter-state relations (EC/99/2000, 29), the fact is that financial and logistical support for building the fences and closing the borders was provided by external actors through the BOMCA project.

In summary, states, external actors, and societies involved appeared to be three interdependent actors trapped between the different logics of two competing paradigms. There is the complex regional paradigm which followed the logic of dismantling the Soviet legacy, specifically the national delimitation of 1924-1927 and 1954, and dealing with the economy of sufficiency and interdependent resource-sharing schemes, as described in chapter three. In contrast, there is the international paradigm as dictated by the narrative of global war on terror and transnational threats, which fails to take into account that establishing material borders may
isolate physical territories, but do not prevent the flow of ideas perceived as radical or leading to terrorism.

4.1.2. Materialized borders: standardizing national security infrastructures

In order to understand the impact of the materialization of borders on the state power, we should begin by considering the domestic context of establishing the security structures of the states in the region. This is because the process of border materialization and the establishment of national security infrastructures coincided, which is why there has been a significant impact on the functions, institutional design, and practical peculiarities of security infrastructure by external actors. To a degree, the international security agenda has become internalized by the national security structures. For example, the goals of combating drug trafficking and terrorism, as well as establishing surveillance mechanisms to control social movements have defined the sharing of competences, functions and spheres of influence among different security structures. However, as we will see below, at a certain point these designs went beyond the control of their designers, favoring state elites but diminishing the connection between the state and society. The distribution of functions started with the sharing of control over the border, and thus access to control over drug trafficking, while neglecting those areas and populations of the Valley where continued interdependence forced common people to look for their own ways to organize their survival, routines and order.

Control over the borders appeared not only to be the means to define territorial and domestic sovereignty, but also a means to guarantee access to important avenues of political influence for the Central Asian elites, such as controlling the drug trade. However, the border as a concept ceased to have much involvement with the direction of identity creation. The hysteria surrounding control over drug trafficking and extremism was supported by regional state actors, as this was one of the types of discourse they learned to invoke to hide the “local rules” behind
the “great game”, i.e. trying to adjust to the international parlance and discourse of threat in order to acquire the profits from international financial support, while keeping the true meaning of these processes at the local level (Colley 2013).

The process of establishing the military infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan exemplifies how the international security agenda has been internalized by the national structures. Military infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan was not established until the IMU incursion into Batken in 1999. Specifically, the functions of Ministry of Interior, Law Enforcement offices, Border Guards, and the National Security Service (NSS, the former KGB) had not been delineated. The structuring of the state security infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan involved the division of functions and responsibility for maintaining control over some of the most vulnerable (and for traffickers and their clients/patrons within the establishment, most profitable) border areas. This involved a degree of inter-agency infighting which decreased the overall efficiency of the state in maintaining control over its borders whilst these issues persisted.

The process of creating the military and security infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan has undergone several stages, where the functions and responsibilities of the Interior Ministry, Border Control Service, and the NSS were the subject of power struggles among top state officials, as these were assigned and then re-assigned following rounds of top level inter-agency negotiations. These rounds of structuring and restructuring lasted until 2002, when the division of powers and areas of responsibility of each of the three security structures was finally settled. The cause for the inter-agency infighting had been the issue of controlling borders, in particular the control of drug trafficking. Each agency was keen to establish and assert control over this profitable trade for itself (Gen. Mamytov, interview 2014). BOMCA and CADAP funding directed toward supporting institutional reform had also indirectly been perceived as a source of power, and capturing this power led to internal competition between different factions within the elites.
With this background, as a response to the incursion by the IMU in 1999, Uzbekistan started laying minefields along its border with Tajikistan, as well that with Kyrgyzstan, specifically in the areas bordering the Uzbek enclaves of Sokh and Shahimardan. Uzbekistan’s rationale was to protect the population of these enclaves, because they were the easy targets for the terrorists (Dadabaev 2012). The maps of the minefields were classified as a state secret by the Uzbek government and were not disclosed to Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan for fear that they might end up in the hands of terrorists (Dadabaev 2012). As a result, about 154 people are reported to have fallen victim to landmines, 70 of whom were killed or died of their wounds (Matveev 2008).

Tajikistan, meanwhile, was perceived as one of the main sources of threat due to its ongoing civil war, its common border with Afghanistan with its large Tajik community living, and the M-41 route, which is one of the main drug trafficking routes in the world (UNODC World Drug Report 2013). Since the secular Tajik government (the Rakhmonov regime) was perceived to be “trying to get rid of its Islamists”, the IMU invasion into the Uzbekistani and Kyrgyzstani part of the Fergana Valley was seen as the intended outcome of the Rakhmonov government. At the very least, it was believed that Tajikistan was “turning a blind eye to their (IMU) operations in Eastern Tajikistan” (ICG 2001c). However, in interviews with several Tajik security officials, it was confirmed that Tajikistan’s official position has been that in fact it was Uzbekistan which had developed the covert relationship with the IMU in order to support the United Tajik Opposition and further destabilize Tajikistan (Senior security official, Ministry of Interior of Tajikistan, personal communication 2012). Kyrgyzstan also holds to the view that the IMU is a proxy for another external actor67 (Senior security official, NSS KG, personal communication 2012).

Thus, since each of the states views the IMU as the proxy of the neighboring state, the threat posed by the IMU has become the primary force behind the external actors’ fortification of borders in the region. The mutual suspicion of the three states complemented the interests of the

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67 One of the neighboring states or Afghanistan
external actors in fortifying borders. In practice, again, this fortification and the lack of inter-state cooperation led to the creation of defense infrastructure aimed at one another, regardless of the discourse directed against non-state military groups. This lack of cooperation is exemplified by the refusal of the Uzbekistani government to share the maps of its minefields with its neighbors, regardless of the human loss caused by mines, as well as the refusal to implement the EU IBM initiative in 2010 by the Uzbekistani government which suggested information sharing between the national states (Dadabaev 2012; Gavrilis 2009).

The IMU invasion triggered the internalization of the international “global war on terror” within the national security agendas and practices of the state. For example, since its formation in 2002, the CSTO was used to provide training for Central Asian officers in Russian military academies, as well as to provide on the ground training during operations such as “Rubezh” (Frontier) and “Kanal” (Channel), as well as to share both Soviet era and modern equipment (Frost 2009). Kanal is the annual “region wide drug interception operation” (Frost 2009, 174). The permanent CSTO establishments include the Anti-Terror Center of the CIS countries (the ATC CIS) in Bishkek, the Russian airbase at Kant, Kyrgyzstan and the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division in Kulyab in Tajikistan. The latter played a crucial role in ending the civil war in Tajikistan and establishing the power of the President Rakhmonov.

However, the CSTO’s mandate extends much further than anti-terror projects, to the political, military and economic security of the region (Bordiuzha 2005). Besides military equipment and the troop deployments in Central Asia, the CSTO created a joint staff and command structure: “all the CSTO military exercises are proposed and planned by the ATC in Bishkek, which is officially supervised by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) director”

68 The Soviet equipment, however, is considered the material legacy of the Soviet Union and was proportionally divided between all the successor states (according to the Minsk and Almaty Agreements).
69 Both bases are referred to by Russia as CSTO installations though both are formally registered as part of the Volga-Ural military district.
70 With the Russian airbase at Kant in Kyrgyzstan now the most effective airbase in the region with over 80 aircraft, and with over 6,000 troops of the 201st motor rifle division at Kulyab in Tajikistan.
(Gleason 2005). On a command staff level, in 2004, the dispersed CSTO staff was integrated with the Russian General Staff in order to improve efficiency of command (Wilhelmsen and Flikke 2005). Formally, the CSTO troops had been placed under the Russian command during the 2002’s South Anti-Terror exercise when the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) was established (Wilhelmsen and Flikke 2005). This potential institutional merger between the Russian security services and those of the member states was one of the main causes of the Uzbekistani retreat from the organization.

In addition to the infiltration of the regional states’ security services, the Russian FSB exerts a certain degree of control over several media companies in Kyrgyzstan. This permits Russia “to spread its propaganda and lead its informational wars against its Great Game rivals” (Lojnikov 2014, interview). State officials connected to the security services also complain about the problem of Russian omnipresence in the information realm (High-ranked officer of the NSS KG counter-espionage unit, personal communication 2014).

It is important to note that security services in Central Asia have a web of surveillance over the most important institutions in their countries. Almost every political, educational, or media institution has covert agents who work both for the respective institution and for the security service. Some of these officers can report both to the national security services and to the ATC CIS, i.e. to the Russian command. This also contributes to the degree to which different regional security services are interlinked (High-ranked officer of the NSS KG counter-espionage unit, personal communication 2014). Hence, the principles of omniscient state surveillance and fortification of borders still remain two pillars of organizing security in the region, arguably reflective of the continuing legacy of the Soviet period.

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71 Soon after its creation in 2004, the CSTO joint staff was made up of 55 officers, half of which were Russian and half from the other member states” (DuMont 2004; double-checked at the CSTO website).
In contrast to the interdependence of the national and Russian security services, surveillance has also been part of the police reforms sponsored by the OSCE. Its main idea was that of building trust between law enforcement and society. In practice, the OSCE has also played a role of an information gatherer, as well as sharing information with grassroots society about new reforms and liberal democracy. In other words, the OSCE set out to build trust between law enforcement officers and grassroots civil society based on information-sharing about transnational threats, or the so-called “awareness-raising” among the population (Taarnby 2012). However, considering that the previously mentioned policies, such as the materialization of borders, have disrupted the lives of large parts of the population, they have not succeeded in creating effective management mechanisms through establishing this type of trust. Instead, it indirectly contributed to reinforcement of a different form of trust-building, rooted in communities and their shared memories, since these have provided more suitable survival kits and self-governance strategies. Specifically, the project of trust-building between the law enforcement and civil society included within its orbit the grassroots indigenous communities, such as mahallas or jamoats, which were discussed in chapter two. The states in the region exercised a different degree of surveillance upon the mahallas, depending on each state’s perception of the threat emanating from these social structures. In practice, this resulted in the formalization of mahallas as part of the state local governance structures, which historically represented moral communities of trust (Liu 2012).

While the external actors use the inclusive approach and try to involve community activists within community policing projects, state authorities in the region establish surveillance by means of formal local government institutions, which are called “local self-government”. For example, the organization of surveillance in Uzbekistan is based on appointing elites who are loyal to the central authorities in peripheral areas and communities. Uzbekistan was the first to recognize the

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72 In this thesis, the term self-government refers only to the informal institutions, not the formal structures of the state apparatus.
role of traditional communities in managing societies. Mahallas, as the traditional moral communities were to a great extent formalized to serve the interests of the central state and became an extension of it (Troschke 2012; Kandiyoti 2007).

Consequently, this initiative resulted in sowing suspicion and distrust toward those people who cooperate with their state with the support of external actors. In other words, there was a clash between two types of the trust systems: the trust system based on shared information and the trust system based on common memories. The systems based on trust rooted in common memories appear to be more durable in the long-term (Fukuyama 2014). As several surveys have shown, after the community policing was introduced, the trust among people shifted to the families, local religious leaders, and home-based religious circles (Taarnby 2012).

The attempt of external actors to establish trust-building mechanisms between the formal authorities and traditional communities indirectly and unintentionally support the regimes’ attempts to secure their own interests. In practice, this should have facilitated centralization of the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. However, the legitimacy and loyalty of these societies instead tended to shift to different types of power networks, Islamist in this case. The concentration of coercion in the central state’s hands served to diminish the state’s ideological and political power to a great extent.
4.1.3. Societal consequences of borders: creating the “island pockets”

Cases of Batken zone, enclaves Vorukh, Sokh, and Shahimardan

“Cities will take over”

Materialized borders made the phenomenon of enclaves in the Fergana Valley more serious. Enclaves that used to house interdependent social lives have become isolated from each other by check-points, minefields and wire fences. The paradox of the materialization of borders, however, lies in the fact that a border could not prevent ideas and routine practices from flowing through it. Instead, these practices moved to a “parallel” social realm, that is, people have found other ways and means of continuing the routine practices which constitute their survival strategies.

Since the enclaves’ physical isolation hinders the extent of state authority over a particular territory, the state may not be able to influence the ideological, social, and economic development in such areas. Social relations in these areas are examined below, through the cases of enclaves

Source: Maria Merkulova (2013)

73 Margaret MacKenzie, personal communication, 2014
such as Batken zone (formally Kyrgyzstani), Sokh and Shamimardan enclaves (formally Uzbekistani surrounded mainly by the Kyrgyzstani Batken and partially by territories of Tajikistan), and Vorukh enclave (a Tajikistani “island pocket” surrounded by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). These territories are hardly accessible without having to pass through the territory of a neighboring state at least three times within a two-hour trip. Some detour routes are still under construction and are seldom accessible for the locals. Since Chapter 3 depicted social relations in these areas during the Soviet period, here we focus on the social relations after the fortification of borders, that is, in the period from 2002 to 2014.

Case 1: Batken zone (Kyrgyzstan)

Batken is the capital town of Batken oblast in southern Kyrgyzstan, surrounded by Tajik and Uzbek territory. Batken zone is not an enclave itself. However, it contains several of them and represents an area through which most cross-border movements happen. Its name from both Tajik (Persian) and Kyrgyz (Turkic) languages translates as the “confluence of winds”. Its significance proves to be the confluence of social activities of societies of three different states, the Tajik, the Kyrgyz, and the Uzbek. This province is surrounded by both Tajik and Uzbek territories and has Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek ethnic groups living side by side. Since it is on a plateau between the River Sokh in the east to the Isfara River in the west, the “water” acts as the natural border for the local people (Reeves 2014). Prior to the Soviet modernization, the area had been covered by traditional irrigation systems, composed of “concrete waterways crisscrossing this landscape, running alongside roads and fanning through a complex network of mud channels that serve as irrigation ditches (aryks) under walls and into gardens” (Reeves 2014, 41). This irrigation system existed before the expansion of the Russian Empire into Central Asia. The Tsarist irrigation authorities continued to use the traditional irrigation systems, regulated on a customary basis (Turman 1999).
However, during the Soviet era, the old irrigation systems could not serve the needs of the large collective and state farms. Due to the development of collectivization and centrally-planned agriculture, the communities of this area and of the Fergana Valley in general, received substantial financial support to introduce a grandiose new irrigation system, extending the availability of water for irrigation beyond the area of its natural watershed, such as hills and mountainous terrains (Barthold 1914). This irrigation adversely affected the eco-system of the region, but, most importantly, it crossed the politically determined boundaries between the respective republics.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, management of agriculture was again restored to the private sector. Households which were at the higher elevations in mountainous areas were moved to more “economically productive” areas in the lower-altitude zones (Reeves 2014; Ferrando 2011). These zones operate based on community support and mutual trust systems. Since the roads, canals and grazing lands were built and situated “ignoring the administrative boundary lines between the Union republics”, they continued to be used by ordinary people and therefore provide the forum for intensive social relations at the grassroots and daily movements across borders (Reeves 2014, 144; Thorez 2008).

In order to travel from the mainland of the respective states to their enclaves, one needs to cross the enclaves of the neighboring states. Batken is usually the place most frequently crossed, since this is the territory with greatest number of “backdoors” which allow people to cross the border using man-made detour routes, such as canals, and a border market (Reeves 2014). People use these “backdoors” because the materialization of borders initiated by the external actors and the formal states created the so-called “double-bind” system of border control, i.e. the checkpoints of all three states that people have to cross one after another due to the constellation of enclave pockets in this area (Comaroff and Comaroff 2005, 129 quoted in Reeves 2014). Oftentimes, to travel to a nearby village, one has to cross “no less than six different border and customs posts within a distance of around twenty kilometers” (Reeves 2014).
The proof of transnationalism of this area in terms of grassroots social interactions is trade, as realized through the traditional markets, the *bazaars*. For example, this area is close to such strategically important (for this region) markets as Aravan, Bazar-Kurgan, Naukat, Suzak, Kara-Suu and Uzgen (Malabaev 2001). All these bazaars are located in the Kyrgyzstani part of the Fergana Valley, Osh oblast, which borders Batken, which means that all goods passing through to the territories of neighboring states pass through Batken oblast in any event. Batken zone “backdoors” are the entrances through which most of the unreported economic activity is undertaken. This informal or “parallel economy” as different sources call it, is an integral part of the local socio-economic order, rather than marginal to it, since it constitutes the core of the people’s survival strategies (Thorez 2008; Rasanayagam 2002, 108-111; Seabright 2000). These “backdoors” lead to the formally nonexistent roads, unmarked by the conventional cartography (Reeves 2014). These roads are key in “the distribution of aluminum and base metals to China, Uzbek cotton for illegal processing in Osh, and Afghan opium from Tajikistan to Osh, Bishkek, and Russia” (Reeves 2014, 148). However, several of the “detour roads” have been renovated as part of a World Bank-sponsored program to assist Kyrgyzstan in becoming “transport independent” by bypassing the enclaves of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan” (World Bank 2009). This has contributed to the increase of the share of the informal trade in the local economies (Kaminski 2012).

Finally, Julien Thorez describes the enlisted bazaars as units of the global trade routes and most of them are crossing the Fergana Valley⁷⁴ (Thorez 2008). The highest number of the so-called “backdoors” is located next to the Kara-Suu market, between Osh and Batken. Although people manage to organize their small-scale trade, which is then integrated into existing global trade routes, people living in these areas tell stories of “entrapment”, complaining, for example, that they (as Tajik or Kyrgyz citizens) need visas to enter Uzbekistan, “including for the fifteen-

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⁷⁴For a thorough discussion of the phenomenon of “mondialisation par la bas” and the integration of the Fergana Valley bazaars and the grassroots trade routes into the global trade chains, see Julien Thorez, PhD Dissertation 2008.
kilometer stretch of road that passes through the Sokh enclave, administratively part of Uzbekistan” (Reeves 2014, 148).

As Reeves writes, “border” is experienced as a place of both limits and gaps: a site of barbed wire and invisible landmines, but also a place of vigorous exchange, of friendship and intimacy, a site of connections and opportunities as well as of threat” (Reeves 2014, 144). This multiplicity of meanings of the border, in geographic terms leaves the enclaves’ inhabitants to their own systems of management and order, which is why also the sources of social power get redirected towards the local leaders, rather than to the state’s authorities. As the incursion in 1999 – 2000 by the IMU demonstrated, people helped the Islamists to hide from the military authorities and wanted the state officials to explain to them why they thought these people were terrorists (Gen. Mamyrov, interview 2014). This high ranking state military official had to justify his decisions to a local religious leader and his followers. Furthermore, the general concluded that if there is one non-state power that the state should befriend, it is the local religious leaders in Batken, because people put a lot of trust in them (Gen. Mamyrov, interview 2014).

Finally, from the geographic point of view, Batken is one of the most complex peripheral areas. It is connected to Tajikistani provinces of Tavildara and Karategin, which are among the most problematic zones in Tajikistan due to their connection with the Afghan Darvaz. Secondly, Batken is connected with the Sogd province and the city of Hujand, which has been in latent opposition to the central authorities in Dushanbe (Knyazev 2012). Southern Kyrgyzstan and the northern Tajikistan therefore experience more social and economic relations with each other than with the centres of their respective states and organize an invisible area with non-standard economic activities, as the section 4.2 shall demonstrate.

75 For a rich variety of oral histories from this area, see Madeleine Reeves (2014) “Border Work”.
76 An interesting concept, best describing this place could be the one of “barzakh” which in Quaranic verses describes the state of things with unclear boundaries and borders in between legal and illegal, legible and illegible, material and ideational (Margaret McKenzie 2014; Scott 1997).
Case 2: Sokh and Shahimardan (Uzbekistan)

Examples of another type of isolation can be found in the enclaves of Sokh (nearly 60,000 residents) and Shahimardan (6,000 inhabitants), which are administered by Uzbekistan (Khamidov 2009).

The population of the enclave of Sokh identifies as Tajik. In this, they reveal their ties with the cities of northern Tajikistan (Reeves 2014). Reportedly, “the majority of local government officials are ethnic Uzbeks” and “the authorities in Tashkent have long viewed the Tajik-populated enclave with suspicion” (Khamidov 2009). In 1999-2000, this area was the first to be infiltrated by the IMU. In response, the Uzbek authorities planted landmines around these enclaves, which have since been responsible for killing “at least dozen local residents” (Khamidov 2009).

Source: Maria Merkulova (2013)
Sokh is the biggest enclave in the Fergana Valley. It is located at the river Sokh, providing its irrigation and agriculture. In order to pass from one part of territory of Kyrgyzstan to the other in Batken oblast, one has to pass through Sokh. Due to multiple conflicts over border delimitation between the states involved, this road was closed in 2013, leaving the local population without food supplies for a month (Merkulova 2013). This demonstrates the vital dependence of enclaves’ societies on their neighbors. In terms of local governance, some authors call it a “unique case” due to the fact that it has all necessary institutions of local governance (khokimyat) located in Ravan, as well as medical institutions and schools. Administratively, “it belongs to Sokhskiy raion (administrative unit of Fergana oblast of Uzbekistan) which also includes both of the North and South Sokh, which are connected by a small neck of land and create an hour-glass shape” (Merkulova 2013).

However, the Sokh valley in general also contains Kyrgyz villages such as Sogment, Charbak, and Khush’iar. They are located at the southern end of the Sokh valley. Sogment comprises 360 families, identifying themselves as Kyrgyz. Charbak has 86 families, identified as
Kyrgyz. The agricultural lands that the Sogment villagers use are located further away from the village itself, towards Batken town. Charbak is connected to Sogment through a road that initially constitutes a border and then enters into Uzbekistan. Administratively, Sogment and Charbak are part of the Kyshtut municipality of Kyrgyzstan (Bichsel 2009, Ch.2). The villagers also depend on a shared irrigation system, similar to the one on the Isfara River, as described in Chapter 3. However, the sources of water here include rivers such as Sokh or Kara Daria (originating in the Alai mountain range), Ak-Suu, and Kara-Suu. Water distribution is conducted by the residents themselves, while the pump stations are operated by the Shirkat with the support of international NGOs (Bichsel 2009, Ch.2). There are frequent tensions over the allocation of water.\footnote{On the specifics of conflicts, see Bichsel (2009), Chapter 2.} Water allocation deeper into the Sokh is even more complex and “ungoverned”. State authority in the Sokh valley is largely limited. In addition to the sense of alienation from the “mainland” due to the exclusion from formal local governance structures, the enclave has been physically isolated by the building of a barbed wire fence by the Kyrgyz authorities, in response to several border incidents in 2010 and 2013 (Ivashenko 2013).\footnote{The wire was installed on the undisputed or resolved parts of the border. The practice of building such fences along the borders has been used by both Uzbek and Kyrgyz sides.}

Shakhimardan has mainly been a tourist attraction, which has formed a part of the local survival strategy. Additionally, several Islamic sacred sites are located on its territory, which remain an attraction for pilgrims. For example, there is a local belief that the tombs of the “fourth Caliph” Ali is located here (Merkulova 2013; Khamidov 2009). It is located close to the Alay mountains (Kyrgyzstan). Administratively, it belongs to the Ferganskiy district of Uzbekistan. The only formal authorities present are the border guards and customs officers. Today, crossing the border, even for pilgrimage, is expensive, due to the multiple border checkpoints. Different sources note that there are two Shakhimardans – south and north, with the village of Qalacha (or Chon-Gara) being the south, and Djangail being the “Upper Sokh” or “northern Shahimardan”.

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Furthermore, there is a small village of Tayan, to which there is only one reference in the sources, which is located nearby southern end of Sokh. However, there are no maps showing Tayan’s presence, even as “disputable land” (Merkulova 2013).

In 2007 and 2008 the local residents organized several protests in front of the local government buildings in order to attract attention to their social and economic problems (Khamidov 2009). In terms of agriculture, the scarcity of arable land and pastures is the main problem being raised by the local people. After the materialization of international borders, the locals are no longer able to easily cross the border and use the pastures in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. Since the early 2000s, more than a dozen border clashes occurred due to the lack of arable land and pastures (Khamidov 2009).

In terms of social relations, these Uzbekistani enclaves of Sokh and Shahimardan are considered to be most complex (Knyazev 2014). Their Tajik population has been perceived as “loyal to the Islamist movements and has remained in permanent conflict both with the central authorities in Uzbekistan and with the authorities of the surrounding Kyrgyzstani lands” (Knyazev 2014). The peculiarity of the enclave’s location means that “any significant conflict may block all routes from Kyrgyzstan into Batken, which, therefore, can become isolated from the rest of the territory of Kyrgyzstan” (Knyazev 2012). The so-called loyalty of the population to the Islamists can be explained by the fact that that people have been left to organize their own social order. They do so based on the common memories from the pre-Soviet times, which was based on the mutual trust system, community lifestyles, and customary law. The Islamist movements which managed to create their settlements and befriend the local population during the 1999-2000 “invasions” help people financially, whilst reviving Islamic reasoning for doing so and justifying the new social order based on memories of customary law and partly Shariah.
Case 3. Vorukh (Tajikistan)

In Vorukh, which has an ethnic Tajik population of approximately 40,000, people lack even basic amenities such as clean running water and are forced to drink it right from the aryk. In terms of their cultural loyalties, whilst the residents say they are Tajik, they qualify this by saying that they are not Tajik in the “same way as the central Tajiks, because... [the residents of Vorukh] have more social ties with Kyrgyzstani people, they watch Kyrgyzstani TV and prefer to buy Kyrgyzstani agricultural products on the other side of the road, which represents the border between the enclaves” (author’s interview with a head of a human rights NGO in Vorukh, August, 2012). This enclave is surrounded by the Kyrgyzstani lands and is only formally a part of the Isfara region of the Sogd province (Knyazev 2012). De facto power is exercised by an ishan, a religious leader. However, there are a significant number of people loyal to Islamist groups, based in Isfara. This

Source: Maria Merkulova (2013)

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79 Where the author was based while travelling around the enclaves
80 A small-scale artificial river or irrigation channel
area is commonly considered to be a hub of terrorist activity, due to the number of the networks established there by the IMU and a number of violent events reportedly conducted by the IMU (High-ranked law enforcement officer, a senior official of Mayorality of Hujand town, and journalist based in Khujand, personal communications 2012).

Vorukh, like Shahimardan, is poorly governed by the central authorities. Whether there are any representatives from the mainland and, if so, how permanent their presence usually is, has been a puzzle to the local respondents (field notes 2012). Statistics and media reports suggest that there are some customs officers, schools, medical facilities81, banks, but no courts (Merkulova 2013). Local respondents and NGOs state that most people have to go to the territory of the neighboring Kyrgyzstan in order to receive medical help, buy cheaper food or watch TV at a neighbor’s house. Therefore, people turn to alternative sources to fill the informational void, such as davaatchy (Islamic propaganda) or some self-proclaimed mullahs (field notes 2012). Reports say that there were five cases of violence that were sent to court, but with no specification of the name or location of the actual court involved (Merkulova 2013). The need to organize leads to the creation of community-based initiatives, sometimes organized as an NGO. However, in effect these NGOs can be the living room of a private house of the NGO leader. Medical care is usually received in the bigger cities. However, one needs to be transported across borders, which is not easy for the locals (field notes). Water is used directly from the aryk (the pre-Soviet irrigation channel), directly dug into the soil and having no filters.

Vorukh neighbors Aksai village in Kyrgyzstan. Residents of Vorukh can therefore only access mainland Tajikistan by travelling through Kyrgyzstan. Vorukh and Aksai both use the same irrigation system, provided mainly by the Karavshin river (which originates in the Turkestan range), which is the main tributary for the Isfara river (Bichsel 2009, 30). The water of the Isfara River is

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81 As personally experienced as suddenly becoming sick in Vorukh I had to be urgently transported to Khujand (northern Tajikistan), which was an about 4 hours’ trip by car.
divided between three countries, each being theoretically entitled to a third of the flow. In practice, it has been shown in Chapter 3 that distribution of water from the Isfara river is dependent on negotiations between communities at the grassroots level. For instance, in Vorukh, distribution is overseen by a joint-stock company and in Aksai by two farmers’ associations (Bichsel 2009, Ch.2). Both also have first to agree with the Department of Water Resources (DWR) about the amount of water; and “the pump station is operated by employees of the Batken district DWR” (Bichsel 2009, 30-31). Hence, there are overlapping authorities over the water here, the Vorukh joint-stock company (similar to kolkhoz), the Aksai farmers associations, and the Batken DWR.

In sum, the aspects that appear to be common to the enclaves’ societies can be outlined as follows: 1) collectivist social organization; 2) reviving indigenous communities; and 3) disenchantment in the formal social order of the states (Liu 2012). Border fortification materialized the symbolic Soviet border delimitation and made collectivist social organization (resulted from collectivization) an important factor for the newly (re)emerging grassroots social orders. The devastation of the management frameworks that used to govern or direct the developments of the collectivist social organization pushed societies to look for management mechanisms in the collective memories, remaining within community lifestyles and Islam-related ideologies. As a result, people’s ethnic identities promoted by the states have become secondary to their collectivist and communal routines that composed their survival strategies. When borders were materialized largely by external pressure, the success of a universalist Islamist message—a call to unite under the banner of Islam rather than under a reductionist notion of ethnicity or nationalism—happened to best correspond to the collectivist social organization and the reviving indigenous communities left unattended in the isolated zones of enclaves.
4.2. Organizing Economies

Introduction

This section represents the second step towards the overall argument of this chapter that aims to show how external actors’ strategies limit the state’s authority over simultaneously isolated and trans-nationalizing societies in the Fergana Valley. Specifically, this section examines two economic management frameworks and their impact on the informal socio-economic relations across the borderlands (Fergana Valley, Xinjiang, FATA) – the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) and the Central Asia South Asia (CASA-1000) hydro-energy management project. These interrelated frameworks differ from a variety of other endeavors as their goals include developing “non-standard trade” across the borderlands, creating a shared resource pool and recreating the supply chains which were common in Central Asia as part of the ancient Silk Road trading route (Kaminski 2012). These goals blur the line between the formal and the informal in politics and support grassroots economic processes in order to foster development from the ground up. However, despite promising results at the state level, the societal consequences of these projects remain unaddressed and unknown due to the lack of research and data on indigenous communities and household farms (Kaminski 2012). The previous section showed how materialized borders isolated some enclaves and contributed to the sense of alienation and disenchantment with the state in parts of society. This section focuses on the social relations which result in these isolated areas regardless of border fortification. Specifically, these relations include the development of informal survival strategies, the largest part of which is informal or so-called “non-standard” trade.

This is an attempt to show what consequences the promotion of non-standard trade, under the conditions discussed in the previous chapters, may bring for societies of the Fergana

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82 The term “non-standard trade” implies cross-border trade activities [that] are not reported in the foreign trade statistics and concerns mainly domestically produced goods and some re-export. Reportedly, the value of non-standard trade is comparable to that of the standard trade in Central Asia (Kaminski 2012).
Valley. The issue is that the Fergana Valley represents a naturally informal (non-standardized) social and economic realm where both legal and illicit practices are often transmitted by the same types of institutions or social structures. For example, the institution of the *bazaar*, which is a core economic unit of a mahalla as described in Chapter 2, can be simultaneously the site of small-scale, unregistered trade in the agricultural produce of local farmers, a network for drug barons, as well as sites of infiltration by radical Islamist movements. Furthermore, the states in focus do not have a viable official revenue collection system[^83], which can be a tool for distinguishing legal from illicit revenue. This is not to suggest that all farmers associate with drug barons or radical Islamists. This is to draw attention to their common institutional platform, i.e. the bazaar, in this case. Therefore, promoting cross-border non-standard trade may in practice facilitate the informal economies and their transnational connections by providing logistics and sponsorship.

### 4.2.1. CAREC: promoting non-standard trade – supporting parallel survival strategies

Established in 1997, Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) is a project sponsored by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) with the goal of encouraging economic cooperation between Central Asian countries. The governments of ten countries supported this initiative, including: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, the People’s Republic of China, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Six multilateral institutions also provided support: the Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, Islamic Development Bank, United Nations Development Program, and World Bank (ADB 2012, 30). According to the “CAREC Strategic Framework 2020”, its main goal is to “unlock the landlocked Central Asian economies” and foster development and poverty eradication by supporting non-standard trade (ADB 2012).

[^83]: Some authors consider “corruption” being the informal revenue collection system.
The CAREC institutional framework (Table 1) comprises three sets of actors: governments, multilateral institutions, and private actors. CAREC prioritizes four areas: transport, trade facilitation, energy; and trade policy. Each of these priority areas comprises national and multilateral institution representatives (ADB 2012). Strategic direction and policy determinants are provided at the annual Ministerial Conference. ADB serves as the CAREC Secretariat. Options and overall guidance for CAREC from a regional perspective are provided by bi-annual Senior Officials’ Meetings, which report annually to the Ministerial Conference. Each CAREC country “has appointed a senior government official as CAREC national focal point to ensure effective coordination among all relevant agencies and other interested parties in matters related to regional economic cooperation” (ADB 2012). Due to its “pragmatism and result orientation”, the CAREC institutional framework represents a constellation of “time-bound” or ad-hoc structures, emerging only for certain concrete purposes (ADB 2012; Peyrouse 2012).

In general terms, it is a platform for bringing together government, multilateral, and private actors. The private actors are responsible for creating new business ties between the regions, the multilateral institutions for facilitating cooperation, and the states for accommodating contradictory legislative frameworks. In other words, this institutional setting brings together three different types of management logic: those of the state, of the multilateral international organizations, and the private actors, each pursuing their own interests. The underlying principle which is meant to tie these three sets of actors together is “country ownership” (ADB 2012, 17). However, the effectiveness of this principle can be problematic, since most of these countries are in transition. Hence, they are often perceived as having no single “national interest”, but rather they represent vehicles for the interests of the local strong men and corporate elites (Colley 2013).
The triple logic of this framework, through diminishing the accountability mechanism of this type of global governance structure, reflects the “complex actorship” which is natural for the region and the wider globalized world, where it is difficult to identify a unitary actor with a concrete foreign or national interest (Kavalski 2010). In spite of this diminishing accountability mechanism, this framework does not aim to institutionalize itself in the formal sense, rather it relies on the “sub-regional or corridor-specific projects” and keeps its own institutional framework “flexible and informal” too (ADB 2012, 18). Whether the creation of an informal institution over the informal space would make this space more “legible” and transparent remains to be seen (Scott 1998).

The process of “unlocking” the region is envisioned by establishing six transport corridors connecting the borderlands and opening their access to the Middle East, South Asia, and Europe (through Russia). These transport corridors are meant to expand trade routes. However, Central

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84 CAREC 1: Europe–East Asia (Kazakhstan – Kyrgyzstan - Xinjiang);
CAREC 2: Mediterranean–East Asia (Azerbaijan – Kazakhstan – Kyrgyzstan – Tajikistan – Uzbekistan – Xinjiang);
Asian countries specialize in commodity goods, since their industrial sectors were obliterated economically after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, whether this type of trade would help the development of Central Asia, or instead revive the extractive demand chains similar to the Soviet ones is yet to be researched. However, the energy pillar of this project, perhaps, envisions Central Asia as the supplier of hydro-energy to the neighboring regions, which is commonly (and mistakenly) perceived as being an abundant resource in the region.85

Besides improvements in logistics, the most remarkable feature of the CAREC project is its focus on the development of non-standard trade in the Fergana Valley borderlands (ADB 2012). This project covers the “cross-border trade activities [that] are not reported in the foreign trade statistics” (ADB 2012, 3). This unreported trade is operated through “non-standard” channels of the bazaars. This trade concerns mainly domestically produced goods and some which is re-exported. According to World Bank surveys, bazaars “play a major role in the local chains of production and distribution” (Kaminski 2012, 8). The surveys also found that bazaars in Central Asia meet five key requisite of effective markets: “trusting most of the people most of the time, being secure from having your property expropriated, smooth flow of information about what is available where and at what quality, curtailment of side effects on third parties, and competition at work” (McMillan 2002). Furthermore, “trust in protecting property rights and among trading partners rests more on the informal device of reputation and special connections that on the formal application of the rule of law through public institutions” (Kaminski 2012, 10).

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CAREC 3: Russian Federation–Middle East and South Asia (Afghanistan – Kazakhstan – Kyrgyzstan – Tajikistan – Uzbekistan);
CAREC 4: Russian Federation–East Asia (Mongolia – Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region - Xinjiang);
CAREC 5: East Asia–Middle East and South Asia (Afghanistan – Kyrgyzstan – Tajikistan – Xinjiang);

85 This common perception is wrong. Even local population of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the upstream countries of the rivers Oxus (Amu-Dariya) and Jaxartus (Syr-Dariya), suffer from the lack of water and electricity and related to that annual rise in tariffs. Soviet Union also managed to export tons of bread abroad, while its own population was starving to death. Similar situation is nowadays with the Russian gas, which is “cheap” for foreigners, and expensive for the locals.
Indeed, bazaars, as part of the social organization of communities, entail a great degree of intimate interaction between the local people. However, trust is based not on the information-sharing related to protection of property rights. Rather, it emerges from common memories, sentiments, and moral duties dictated by a traditional hierarchy of social relations (Fukuyama 1995). The inter-ethnic tensions in the Southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010 exemplify how one’s property can be burnt overnight if it conflicts with the social order that the politically active part of the population sees as desirable. These inter-ethnic tensions have influenced the distribution of property in such strategically important bazaars as Osh and Kara-Suu.

The bazaars that were surveyed by the World Bank team do not quite represent the entire constellation of the Central Asian borderlands bazaars. The surveys covered the following bazaars: Afghanistan—Tajikistan (three BCPs in Ishkashim, Tem, Ruzvai on the Tajik side and Sher Khan Bandar on the Afghan side); Afghanistan—Uzbekistan (BCP at Hairatan on the Afghan side); China—Kazakhstan (Korgas); China—Kyrgyzstan (Irkeshtam); Kazakhstan—Kyrgyz Republic (Kordai); Kazakhstan—Uzbekistan (Jibek-Joli); Kyrgyz Republic—Tajikistan (two BCPs in Kulundu and Ovchi-Kalachi); Tajikistan—Uzbekistan (two BCPs at Dusti and Patar) (World Bank 2012). However, the most problematic bazaars in the Fergana Valley, in Xinjiang and close to the Pakistani Tribal Belt (toward which CAREC transport and energy logistics also aims to expand) have not been included within these surveys. Furthermore, Uzbekistan, a key part of the Fergana Valley, did not take part in the surveys. These bazaars are important since they exemplify the ambiguous role of bazaars in general. Historically, they have been a symbol of Islamic cultures, existing in all Muslim regions of the world. The controversial role of the bazaar as an institution has been noted by many Muslim governors. For example, the revolutionary Iranian Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, did not see economic modernization taking place without their elimination (Lenczowski 1978).
However, the rationale for the CAREC approach lies in the general idea of decentralization and bottom-up development, relying on grassroots institutions prone to market competition. In general terms, it is rooted in the neo-liberal economic agenda of the IMF and the World Bank, the leading actors involved in restructuring the post-Soviet states from the outset. To dismantle the Soviet system, the Central Asian states were prescribed a path of liberalization by the IMF and the World Bank (Gleason 2003). Although liberalization took different modes in these three countries, the newly emerging national economies relied upon its core principles. In practice, these principles comprised the Washington Consensus templates for states “in transition to democracy” (Gore 2005). The idea was to develop free market competition which would later result in the creation of democratic institutions. Development of the free market and political decentralization were two guiding principles of the process of liberalization. Hence, the rationale of neo-liberalism was the leading one during the first decade of independence. Market liberalization did not imply the organizing of economies in institutional terms, i.e. it did not allow for (re)institutionalization or (re)standardization of the economies that had been previously organized according to the centralized (Soviet) design (Gleason 2003).

The CAREC project represents an example of an attempt at restructuring within this template. In a nutshell, it is a project of informal, decentralized management of informal trade in Central Asia. Political decentralization has diminished regional states’ infrastructural power, preventing them from permeating the grassroots social organization of their own societies. This is because the indigenous community-based social structures, which are seen to be substituting formal institutions, may foster a social order and framework of management which is efficient and viable, yet different from the one of the modern state. To date, the international community has failed to construct a workable institutional structure to govern societies with these underlying community-based types of social organization. Instead, international multilateral platforms themselves have become influenced by the non-standard processes (or the so-called informal
processes) and have become prone to informalization of their organizational settings. In other words, de-centralization worked as Michael Mann predicted, creating the system of “societal control” (that is, influence) on the formal management frameworks, rather than vice a versa (Mann 1993, 59).

The neo-liberal idea of letting market competition and natural bottom-up economic processes define the outcome contribute to conditions which lead to unintended consequences. This is because there are no processes beyond social engineering; or at least without standardized institutions these unguided processes may result in the classical Hobbesian dilemma of “undermining the ends by the same means”, i.e. turning out to be anti-liberal. Even traditions and the notion of “indigenousness” are highly subverted and subject to manipulation. Furthermore, as the other pillars of this program include development to facilitate cross-border non-standard trade, such as establishing transport links and relaxing customs obstacles, social interactions can increase across borders, inviting more intervening variables to define the outcome of this “evolution” based on competition.

Hence, in order to understand potential societal consequences of this project, it is useful to also consider the territories which are to be connected. For example, Central Asia will be more integrated into the Islamic space, i.e. more closely connected with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East. Considering the socio-cultural context of these regions, Central Asia will be opened up to the area of complex and hardly controllable territories. This is not a warning of potential conflict. On the contrary, it is simply to draw attention to the fact that opening up potential new power networks to bypass those of the states may result in the outsourcing of the states’ ideological power. These areas have already demonstrably influenced the religious picture of Central Asian societies by exchanging davaatchy, the religious propagators and pilgrims whose activity has a clear transnational outreach to mention the least (Nasrītdīnov 2006).
In practical terms, non-standard trade draws into its orbit other types of cross-border social activities (to be shown in the subsequent section), which is why these policies indirectly contribute to the transnationalization of societies at the expense of the deteriorating infrastructural power of the state. In other words, such policies contribute to creating a type of social organization largely based on subsistence farming (or peasantry), organized as a network of communities, similar to the ones seen at the outset of state formation in India, China, and the Near East (Wolf 1966). The problem is that these types of social organization have not yet found a corresponding framework of management other than centralized political power (Tilly 1975; Wolf 1966). Whether the symbiosis of political decentralization and the community-based informal social organization would result in the development of a system other than a constellation of tribal leadership over time is a challenging question to the modern theories of state formation. Whether political decentralization would allow the state to reach the grassroots of society would depend on whether the state is still a holder of the other types of power, such as ideological and political power, and whether it offers alternative institutions to compete with the informal structures of communities. Weber implied that decentralization, accompanied by creation of institutions of formal local governance, may increase the state’s despotic power over society. However, decentralization “may be a two-way street: It also enables civil society parties to control the state” (Mann 1993, 59).
4.2.2. CAREC’s societal consequences: integrating peasantry into the parallel realms of bazaar

Since non-standard trade is that trade engaged in by local individual farmers (dekhans) or household farmers in the borderlands, and the main institution it relies upon is the institution of the bazaar, the traditional market which serves as the platform by which illicit and illegal activity intersects with the activity of local businesses, this can in practice lead to two societal consequences. Firstly, local farmers can become an integral part of the non-standard economy and, secondly, the framework for managing the economy (including the multilateral platforms involving international banks, organizations, and corporations) can become more informal.

The institution of the bazaar, in the context of Central Asia, represents the operational realm for both legal and illicit activity. The line between them is difficult to draw when the state does not have a fully functional fiscal system which can unravel the operational complexity of the bazaar, since this is the institution which supports non-standard trade and is the forum for the agricultural activity of the local population. Firstly, as has been discussed in the Chapter 2, the bazaar is one of three main institutions (along with mosques and madrassahs) providing recruitment for Islamist movements and the dissemination of the Islamist social agenda. Furthermore, this is the space where religious activities intersect with drug-and human trafficking, small-scale entrepreneurship, mafia-like networks, and it is also where politicians try to engage with and expand their electoral base (Engvall 2011; Erica Marat 2006). For instance, Marat’s field research on the state-crime nexus demonstrates how the clashes between the mafia networks of key criminals occur “over the control of bazaars, gas stations, and supermarkets” (Marat 2006, 67). Bazaars are reported as one of the main venues of drug dissemination (Marat 2006, 54). Engvall, in his “State as investment market” (2011), shows how these networks are connected to formal politics by means of bribery. These networks “invest” in the protection of their businesses and access to control over drug trafficking and natural resources, such as gold and coal mines.
Additionally, there is, reportedly, competition over drug trafficking between the identifiable Russian, Afghan, Azeri, Tajik, Chechen and Kyrgyz drug mafias (Makarenko 1999). An example of this state of affairs is the situation in the southern Kyrgyzstan, in the provinces of Jalal-Abad and Osh, which were “the major transit points of [both drugs] and human trafficking to the Middle Eastern countries, Europe, and Russia” (Marat 2006, 63). It is also widely reported that the individual who was most famous as “the most charismatic” mayor of Osh was, prior to his election to office as a mayor, part of one of the most powerful organized crime networks “covering” the Osh and Kara-Suu bazaars. These bazaars, among others, were also the bases of one of the most famous southern drug barons, Aibek “the Black” (“Chernyj Aibek”), who had a wide network of supporters in Jalal-Abad.  

Traditionally, the bazaar is also an institution representing the structure for self-governance of the community. According to World Bank studies, it operates mostly according to customary laws and traditional practices. As Chapter 2 has shown, the institution of the bazaar is a part of the social organization targeted by the Islamist infiltration. The merchants are more inclined to implement the Islamic economic principles rather than the norms of liberal markets. CAREC programs are indirectly integrating a large part of the agricultural sector into the informal economy by supporting non-standard trade without a goal to formalize, standardize, and institutionalize this trade.

According to estimates of some international organizations (UN, World Bank, etc.), between 40 and 60% of the Central Asian economy is informal. This is explained by way of the multiplication of the bazaars, the number of which reached 400 in the 1990s alone (Spector 2006). In the 1990s, shuttle-trade and the bazaars provided employment for different social groups, of

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86 From the interviews with the random people in the streets and bazaars about “how do they like the mayor of their city”
87 Protecting by means of racketeering.
88 Author’s field notes. Jalal-Abad also has a district, with the most luxurious houses and gardens, called the “barons’ city”.
varying ages, genders, and professions, from medical doctors to musicians and engineers (de Tunguy 2004; Blacher 1996; Kaiser 1996). This informal trade has not only been integrated into international trade flows, but has also changed the structure of the trade system internationally (Thorez 2008). At the end of 1990, the World Bank and the IMF estimated that informal commerce represented 35% of the all exports from Uzbekistan (Barlett 2001). According to data, in that period of time, 90 million dollars entered the country officially, and 130 million unofficially (Thorez 2008; Trofimov 2001). Approximately 400,000 traders passed Urumchi (Xinjiang) in 1993 and in the second half of the 1990s, about 50,000 Central Asian commercial tourists crossed borders into China, Iran, and Turkey (Trofimov 2001; Dorian et. al. 1997). As research shows, this phenomenon is typical not only for the 1990s. In 2006 there was, officially or unofficially, transfers of goods for 10 billion dollars, regardless of the fortification of borders and the phenomenon of “enclavement” (Raballand and Andresy 2007; Thorez 2005). The large bazaars of the Fergana Valley, such as Osh, Aravan, Bazar-Kurgan, Naukat, Suzak, Kara-Suu and Uzgen have been the hubs through which 90% of the re-export from China have flowed. These have also historically been the main bazaars for local agricultural produce (Malabaev 2001). From the hub in Osh, produce would be redistributed to markets in Bishkek (especially the biggest one in Central Asia – “Dordoi” bazaar), from which it would go to Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and beyond. There are a number of official and unofficial routes passing through the Fergana Valley, connecting the Osh hub with Khorog (Pamir province of Tajikistan, bordering with Afghanistan), and connecting China with Afghanistan, via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Thorez 2008). ⁸⁹ Reportedly, in late 2000 the routes connecting the Fergana Valley with heart in Afghanistan have become the busiest of these routes (Thorez 2008; Abdelkhan 2006).

To explain the link between the merchants and the non-standard economy, it is important to illuminate their place in the state system. In simple terms, merchants are individual dekhhans

⁸⁹ For a detailed description of the routes, check-points, the number of vehicles passing each route in the 1990s and the 2000s, see Julien Thorez 2008 “Bazars et routes commerciales en Asie centrale – Transformation post-sovietique et “mondialisation par le bas”.
who sell their own agricultural products at the bazaars. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the de-collectivization process, a large number of people previously involved in agricultural activity became unemployed. As the previous sections have shown, this de-collectivization has not yet been fully undertaken on the entire territory of the Fergana Valley. This does not mean, however, that collective farms still operate according to the principles of the command economy, as they had during the Soviet period. Nevertheless, the practices that stemmed from collectivization, such as collective sharing of water, lands, and the property rights, have not been formally redefined (Liu 2012; Eriksson 2006). Furthermore, those parts of lands which were privatized were often sold at steeply reduced prices to the most entrepreneurial politicians or people close to these powerful circles. The functioning of these lands and their part within the agricultural development of the country was not of much concern of the new land owners, a lot of whom were mere ‘dead souls’ (absentee landlords), rather than private farmers. In other words, de-collectivization has not presented a new way of managing lands or organizing the agricultural sector, which is why farmers organized themselves into households and fostered the revival of traditional communities or social structures to pursue common agricultural practices.

As for the external actors and the formal states, in the 1990s they underestimated the role of agriculture for creating a new social order of the newly independent states and societies in the Fergana Valley. The following numbers convey the development of the agricultural sector since independence, but they rarely show that it has been to a large extent a matter of grassroots self-governance, rather than centrally directed policies. Therefore, the states in the region have been left with a large societal sector which they failed to standardize. This sector today is part of the so-called non-standard economy, supported by the World Bank. However, it has not yet been subject to comprehensive household research and therefore data on communities and the legal and illegal social ties across borders and economic areas is lacking.
Statistically speaking, since 1995 the quantity of farming lands has increased in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and especially in Uzbekistan, while the number of enterprises has decreased. Specifically, it was the number of household farms organized around communities that have increased. The greatest number of household farms in Central Asia can be found in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. However, in Kyrgyzstan the number of household farms has been increasing continuously. This household farming has been also driving agricultural growth since 1997 (the aftermath of the civil war). In Kyrgyzstan, the role of household farming has remained stable and significant during this period. The latest World Bank statistics (2013) shows agriculture accounts for 18% of GDP in Kyrgyzstan, 28% in Tajikistan, and 19% in Uzbekistan. It was found that households outperform all farms in terms of productivity (2006-2010). The gaps between household farms and other types of farms have been significant (Lerman and Sedik 2014).

Agricultural growth associated with “individualization of farming” (community-based farming) has become the cornerstone of post-Soviet structure, but a necessary market infrastructure for farm services has not been developed (Lerman and Sedik 2014). Since the market infrastructure for these developments has not been introduced, the individual farmers have become vulnerable to the non-state actors competing with the state. In other words, this emphasis on farmers as the driving force behind the development of a parallel social order through communal self-governance is not grounded in the classical idea of revolutionary theories that claim that the critical mass of peasantry [farmers] per se represents a risk for social mobilization and challenge the state (Berman 2003). Rather, it is necessary to highlight that the integration of the reviving traditional modes of social organization into non-standard economic processes (bordering with illicit activities) could, under the conditions of the lack of formal institutionalization of the state’s 90

90. This trend has been accompanied by the growing unemployment in other sectors of economy, which were devastated after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
infrastructural power (which could represent a competing alternative to the latter) at the grassroots level, poses a challenge for the modern state.

This situation, where an important sector of the economy like agriculture uses the same social structures (read: institutional setting) as the illicit trafficking of goods, as well as using the same informal supply chains may be seen as creating conditions conducive for unintended consequences, to say the least. Specifically, if other factors are included, the peasantry may become the driving force behind a collective action that corresponds to its social structure and the ideology, two issues to be addressed in section 4.3.

4.2.3. CASA-1000: the new Silk Road and the Soviet logistics

CASA-1000 is part of a regionalization project implemented by the World Bank, which aims to change the land-locked status of the Central Asian countries and open up their economic space. Since water has been identified as an “abundant resource” or “comparative advantage” in Central Asia, CASA would help to develop exports of water from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to nearby water-deficit countries, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. The project aims to recreate interdependence along Silk Road, allegedly interrupted and suppressed by Soviet rule (USAID 2014). Water-sharing is its first step, which implies the creation of a common resource pool between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as water suppliers, and Afghanistan and Pakistan as recipient states.

Specifically, its new water-sharing schemes suggest the connection of the power grids of southern Kyrgyzstan (Datka power grid) with northern Tajikistan\(^1\) (Khujand power station) in order to transmit hydro-energy generated by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and from there to the countries of South Asia (ADB 2012). In technical terms, the power grids to be connected are: (1) 500 kV AC line from Datka (in the Kyrgyz Republic) to Khudjand (477

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\(^1\) This is easier to do than to connect the power grids in southern Tajikistan with the northern Tajikistan, due to the enclaves and mined zones bordering Uzbekistan, in proximity of Isfara.
kilometers away, in Tajikistan), (2) 1300 megawatt AC-DC Convertor Station at Sangtuda (Tajikistan); (3) 750 kilometer High Voltage DC line from Sangtuda to Kabul (Afghanistan) to Peshawar (Pakistan); (4) 300 megawatt Convertor Station at Kabul (with import and export capability); (5) 1300 megawatt DC-AC Convertor Station at Peshawar (See map below).

In institutional terms, CASA-1000 is a multilateral framework, initiated by the governments of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, which puts in place an Inter-Governmental Council, supported by the World Bank Group, the Islamic Development Bank, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the US State Department, the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), and other donor communities (CASA-1000). In other words, this
framework comprises international banks, governments, and business investors and, therefore, a constellation of conflicting interests and different rationale for being involved in this project.

In practical terms, at its initial stages it will use power generated by stations such as Santguta I and Santguta II in Tajikistan, whose capacity is currently insufficient for long-term CASA-1000 plans. For this reason, CASA also will also require construction of larger power stations, such as Rogun in Tajikistan and Kambarata (I and II) in Kyrgyzstan. However, Kyrgyzstan is less inclined to proceed with Kambarata at present, for it is the source of heated domestic debates and serves as a seed of discord among the Kyrgyzstani elites, as well as between the Kyrgyz government and Russian investors in 2010. This confrontation was partly responsible for the coup d’État and the dismissal of President Bakiev.

Rogun, on the other hand, has been the Tajik government’s pet project regardless of the acute social and political tensions caused by this idea in the region. In brief, Rogun is located about 110 km away from Dushanbe, on the river Vakhsh, which, after confluence with the river Pyanzh, flows further into Amu-Darya and makes up to 27% of its flow (World Bank 2014a, 7). The Rogun project was first designed during the Soviet period in the 1950-1960s. The construction was first initiated in 1982 with the aim to improve the regional shared-irrigation system. Within the CASA-1000 framework, the goal of Rogun is to produce more hydro-energy for water export (Rossi and Khakimov 2014). Construction restarted in 2008, but has continually been interrupted since 2012 for a number of reasons, such as the objections raised by Uzbekistan; the retreat of the Russian Aluminum company, RusAl, one of its main investors; and, finally, the resulting initiation of the World Bank investigation of the technical, economic, social, and other aspects of the project, at the request of the Tajik government.

Uzbekistan’s objection to this project is largely on the basis of the risk of ecological disaster which might be caused by such a large construction project, as in the case of Aral Sea. Furthermore, it is concerned that people living in the lower parts of the Fergana Valley in
Uzbekistan would have a deficit of water supply. These concerns stem from the fact that the confluence of river Vakhsh and river Pyanzh flow into the Amu-Darya, making up to 27% of its flow. This is because the Amu-Darya is one of the two main rivers which create the unified Central Asian irrigation system. Hence, the construction of Rogun will have a serious impact on the amount of water flowing into the Amu-Darya and in the first-tier water distribution system, described in chapter 3. This will have a knock on effect in the amount of water in the other two tiers of water distribution and cause an even greater water deficit in the third tier, at community-level, as illustrated in the case of Isfara river, in chapter 3. Considering that Tashkent has cut Tajikistan from the Unified Power System in 2009, the political tensions between the two countries might grow. For these reasons, the World Bank:

[Recognising the serious that changes in Amu-Darya flows could have on the agricultural output, the WB] emphasized the need for close study and interrogation of the legal standing of the decades old Central Asian water sharing agreements, such as Protocol 566 of the Soviet era, and the provisions of the subsequent interstate agreements of 12 Oct 1961 (Tashkent), 18 February 1992 (Alma-Ata) that created the ICWC and its leading role in the annual water-sharing negotiations and especially 20 September 1995 (Nukus). Further agreements of 1993, 1994, 1997 created institutional frameworks to implement the earlier agreements (Rastogi and Arvis 2014, 8).

This assessment, however, does not consider issues within the ICWC framework that stem from privatization and liberalization policies from the first decade of independence, addressed in Chapter 3.

Regardless of Rogun’s obvious political risks, Tajikistan insists on its construction for the following reasons. In political terms, Rogun is seen as a potential means to turn the tables between the three countries and would provide Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with more bargaining power when it comes to Uzbekistani gas. Uzbekistan promotes construction of a net of smaller power plants rather than grand projects like Rogun in Tajikistan or Kambarata II in Kyrgyzstan. The problem is that these types of power plants would result in the higher electricity rates and less quantities of electricity being produced. Since Rogun represents a chance for Tajikistan to
diminish its energy vulnerability vis-à-vis Uzbekistan, the Tajik government insists on constructing it, despite the fact that its partner and main investor in the scheme, RusAl, pulled out following a breakdown in negotiations. To make up the shortfall, the Tajikistani government has resorted to forcing its citizens to buy shares in the scheme\textsuperscript{92} (Laruelle 2013, 231). Rogun has been presented by the government as the only possible option to overcome the current energy crisis in Tajikistan, as well as in Pakistan and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{93}

In September 2014, Tajikistan received the results of the World Bank’s techno-economic and environmental-social assessment\textsuperscript{94} proving that the risks of ecological disaster are minimal and could be managed by adopting certain parameters of the dam and the construction techniques (Coyne et Bellier 2014).\textsuperscript{95} Hence, on 27 March 2014, the project was finally approved with completion date set for 30 June 2020. The total cost is estimated at US$ 997.00 million. The agencies implementing the program include the National Transmission Companies of the stakeholder states (World Bank 2014).

On 24 April 2015, in Istanbul, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan signed the IGC Resolution, the Master agreement, the bilateral power purchase agreements between these parties, as well as the Load Agreements. Specifically, the International Development Association (IDA) provided a grant of $45 million to Tajikistan for the realization of the Rogun project (Asia-Plus 2015). This meeting confirmed that 70% of the electricity will be supplied by Tajikistan, and the remaining 30% by Kyrgyzstan. On the recipient side, Afghanistan will consume 300 MW and Pakistan 1000 MW. Furthermore, Pakistan and Tajikistan agreed to expand transmission lines to Chitral in northern areas of Pakistan in order to mitigate the energy crisis in Islamabad (Express

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\textsuperscript{92} The project needs more than 20 years of financing by its own budget.
\textsuperscript{93} Districts of the capital have electricity on the rotation basis. The rural areas suffer from the lack of electricity even more.
\textsuperscript{94} Expert investigation of the potential ecological risks was undertaken by the WB hired group of experts, including the French consortium Coyne et Bellier, Italian Electroconsult, the British company IPA, and the Swiss Poyry Energy Ltd.
\textsuperscript{95} For details see: Coyne et Bellier 2014 “Techno-economic assessment study for Rogun Hydroelectric Construction Project” (Vol 1, 2, 3), conducted for the World Bank.
Tribune 2015). On 13 June 2015, the Joint Working Group (JWG) of the CASA-1000 Project met in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Also in attendance were the main donors such as the World Bank, IsDB, USAID, IFC, DFID, and EBRD. On 9 July 2015, tender packages for the supply and installation of Multi Terminal HVDC Converter Stations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan were opened (World Bank 2014b).

4.2.4. CASA-1000 societal consequences: internal displacement and identity of resistance

Proceeding with CASA-1000 means proceeding with Rogun. This project’s societal consequences promise to be dramatic, for it implies the resettlement of the population living in the areas surrounding the river Vakhsh, flooding most of the area: 42,000 people will be internally displaced or “resettled” to other areas. Whilst the technical and economic assessment has been conducted, the data on the potential societal consequences of CASA-1000 have not been fully considered, due to the lack of data on the affected communities (Coyne et al. 2014). This displacement is reminiscent of the techniques of population displacement during Stalinist times and, therefore, can be seen as a similar social trauma, which will have a lasting effect on people’s consciousness and contribute to the development of the identity of resistance to the modern state.

This social trauma is not a mere socio-psychological problem. It has several empirical implications. First, the areas of displacement include power domains of the elites opposed to the ruling elite, which is why the displacement can be seen as a means to destroy the elites’ social basis through the destruction of existing social networks and patterns of social interaction, habit, and routine. Secondly, this displacement implies the deprivation of the communities from their usual survival strategies. Thirdly, it re-engineers the sense of belonging, as holy sites or sites of cultural heritage, which collectively function as sites of belonging, would be flooded, even if these have been promised to be “resettled”, too. The World Bank neglects the connection between the
social and geographical realm, as well as physical objects signifying memories and capturing histories. These issues are addressed below.

The Rogun dam is located in the Rasht Valley, which includes seven regions: Faizabad, Rogun, Rasht, Tavildara, Tajikabad and Djirgital. These are the main areas from which people will be displaced to other areas, such as Dangara, Tursunzade, and Rudaki. The three latter sites compose the domains of the ruling elite, where the Presidential power is under the least amount of risk.

According to the World Bank Report:

Several resettlement sites located in different areas of the country are being developed to allow self-construction of their replacement houses by resettled households. Cash compensation paid in respect of their current assets is used for this purpose. Resettlement sites are meant to provide affected households with different livelihood restoration options, including irrigated agriculture (Dangara), industrial employment (Tursunzade), and employment at Rogun HPP (several sites close to Rogun town) (World Bank 2014, 7).

Resettlement measures will be implemented by the Directorate for the Inundation Zone of the Rogun HPP, a special unit set up by GoT for this purpose (World Bank 2014, 7). Out of 42 000 people planned to be resettled, 2000 have already been resettled. World Bank (2014, 7) reports the conditions for resettlement as satisfactory, in terms of social services, such as schools and medicine. However, IMF data on the budget share of social services in Khatlon region (which includes Dangara) shows that it has been reduced to 5% in recent years (World Bank 2014a). Hence, with the increased amount of people, these social services might be provided using World Bank resettlement aid. It would go through the same channels as other foreign aid, i.e. the network of banks under the control of the ruling elite. At the local level, the problems of the displaced would be addressed by the leaders of hosting communities or the Jamoats (Rossi and Khakimov 2014). This breech of existing social networks has also been noted by the World Bank’s outsourced Poyry Consulting report, specifically the loss of land and the loss of access to communities located on different river banks. In particular, the villages on the left bank of Vakhsh
will be cut from access to bridges and roads (Zwahlen 2014a, 213). The reason is that most of these roads and bridges will be substituted with new ones, whose location would correspond to the new contours of the Valley after inundation (Zwahlen 2014a, 208).

This change of infrastructure will include the reconstruction of the M-41 route, one of the world’s most important drug trafficking routes (UNODC 2013). According to the Final Report: “overall, 36 farms, 62 km of roads, of which 3 km make up the National Road M 41 and 59 km of local district roads, will be submerged” (Zwahlen 2014a, 208). Since part of this route is located within the Garm domain, i.e. beyond the direct control of the ruling elite, its reconstruction may have an impact on restructuring control over drug trafficking, which has been ongoing since the time of the civil war. Finally, since this route connects two least governable [for the ruling elite] domains, Badakhshan and Garm, it may contribute to the extension of the power of the ruling elite to these rebellious areas. Initially, the reconstruction of this road started in 1980, together with the first stages of Rogun construction. According to the Planning and Design Institute, the entity in charge of road planning in the country, the completion of this road will repair the structures built during the Soviet period (Zwahlen 2014a, 208).

CASA and Rogun provide a useful legitimation framework for the ruling elite to destroy the social basis of these domains, through simple social and geographical re-engineering. The areas around the Vakhsh river, including the Rasht Valley (Garm), are associated with the power domains of President Akhmadov. It includes Kamarob Valley, where his rival, Mullo Abdullo, was killed in 2010. Chapter 5 shows how the rival elites of these domains have been eliminated. During the period of the “structural reforms” at the outset of independence, the World Bank provided conditions for the ruling elite to re-engineer the state elite, regardless of the power-sharing agreement. Today, the World Bank neglects how it provides the ruling elite with the tools to re-engineer local societies, rationalizing this process through a narrative based on community needs.
The extent this project will correspond to the needs of communities can be seen from the following practical implications. According to the World Bank Final Report (2014a):

*The ESIA did not consider the role of intangible parameters – such as social harmony, avoidance of protest action, food security, diversion of budget from social programs, the cost of livelihood support for resettled people and the associated problem of identification of land and jobs for them, macro-economic risks, and the potential financial burden on the people of Tajikistan, riparian sensitivity to one of the world’s highest dams upstream – when assessing alternatives from an environmental and social perspective* (World Bank 2014a, 10).

Furthermore:

*The Panel points out in particular to the cumulative effect of displacing, resettling, and rehabilitating 42,000 people: while the direct cost of resettlement is more or less proportional to the number of the people displaced, the difficulty of finding suitable agricultural land and/or jobs for a larger number of people and the related impoverishment risks will increase more than proportionally* (World Bank 2014a, 10).

The main point here is the loss of agricultural land and the deprivation of the displaced people from the access to land. Instead of land, people would be compensated in cash. However, as addressed in Chapter 3, agriculture and small trade is one of the main pillars of the survival strategies of large parts of Central Asian society. The displaced people are deprived of the agricultural plots, and their access to trade depends on intra-communal social relations which are disrupted by population displacement.

In trying to prove that there is no risk of inter-community conflict, the final assessment reports note that “host communities do not have to give up land which they cultivated so far and which will now be occupied by the new settlers [and thus] land shortage is not an issue” (Zwahlen 2014a, 214). The same assessment reports the loss of livestock, the lack of sites for livestock husbandry, along with the loss of agricultural land (Zwahlen 2014a, 217). It is not that the lack of land is an issue. It is the way that land and property rights have developed in the post-Soviet period (discussed in chapter 3) that may clash with new practices of land usage. Whilst addressing the land rights issue, the resettlement bodies make the reference to the Article 32 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan which state in essence that every citizen has a right to land and no one is entitled to deprive them from private property; and Article 13 of the Constitution that land, water, air and other resources belong to the state and that the state guarantees their usage (Constitution of RT). As for compensation for the loss of land, the experts refer to the Land and the Civil Code of the Republic of Tajikistan, which simply states that the rights for the private property of the citizens are guaranteed and citizens therefore have to be compensated (Rossi and Khakimov 2014). There follows a set of legislation regulating the specificities of these potential situations. Cash compensation is envisioned. Whether cash can substitute the social meaning of land is debatable.

Apart from being a part of their survival strategies, land can also connect people with their spiritual and cultural practices. For instance, the same WB assessment identifies the importance of the cultural heritage which is to be flooded by Rogun. The list of cultural heritage sites to be destroyed by Rogun includes graveyards, places of worship, fortresses, and other holy sites (see full list in Zwahlen 2014a, 227 – 229). Some of these places are rooted in Sufi traditions which are still very powerful in Central Asia. However, Sufi societies are quite closed. These holy sites have a special importance for the local populations. According to data from focus groups conducted by the Poyry Consulting (Zwahlen 2014) report, most people suggest that visiting holy sites has been a part of the daily routine of these communities. They believe that these places can heal and provide prosperity (Zwahlen 2014b, 117). Reportedly, while the government plans the resettlement of these places, the populations involved are not aware of this (Ibid.). As Gullette and Heathershaw (2015) have shown, Central Asian people have special relations with their predecessors and connect such ideas as statehood and sovereignty to a moral duty owed to previous generations. The appeal to spirituality and holy sites, as well as rationalizing behavior

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96 Tajik people use holy sites and graves for exercising magic that they largely believe in. The scale of this belief can be illustrated by the fact that the Government of Tajikistan amended its Criminal Code on 23 September 2015, adding
and choices on this basis have been proven to be part of social interactions and daily routine. This is why they can be considered the means of providing the sense of belonging, which will be uprooted once people are displaced.

The resettlement associated with CASA-1000 will not be limited to Tajikistan, but will also involve Pakistani and Afghanistani communities living along the new transmission lines. For instance, according to both the International Crisis Group (ICG) and the World Bank group, there are serious security risks associated with construction of the power transmission lines connecting Central Asia with South Asia. These lines would pass through the Salang Pass in Afghanistan, which represents one of the hardest territories in Afghanistan, both in environmental and social terms. There are also risks of landmines and sabotage, social unrest and protests against this construction have been identified as its main social consequences (ICG 2002, 96).

As the World Bank research group itself notices, there is a huge gap in the data on the households and the communities in the Central Asian borderlands, which hinders prognosis of the concrete societal risks (Kaminski 2012). The main concern is that construction of the transmission lines along the indicated borderlands implies internal displacement of individuals, groups, and tribes. To ameliorate the risks of social unrest, the World Bank group offers compensation to the displaced people. However, with the revival and strengthening of community based social orders in the respective borderlands, the loss of property and land signifies more than a mere loss of material wealth. It is the loss of social position within the community, access to resources, legitimacy, and, subsequently, the loss of power that this displacement signifies.

Community-based social order in the respective borderlands has embedded three types of tensions to be considered. Firstly, the clash between the central state (formal) legislation system and the (informal) system of Shariah law in the borderlands of Pakistan (especially within the tribal criminal charge against practice of magic, with punishments such as incarceration up to 7 years for those who break this law. Previously, in 2008, fines for magic activity were imposed, with administrative fines of $180. Reportedly, there were about 5,000 magicians in the country, by 2008 (http://www.prezident.tj/ru/node/9977).

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belt) and Afghanistan; in the Fergana Valley, there could be a clash between empowering customary law, the formal state legislation, and the community practices stemming from the social interdependence in the field of water-sharing. Secondly, the displacement of persons might influence the redistribution of power positions due to their deprivation from the access to land and other resources, which are often regulated by the unwritten customs to be confirmed by the witnesses who were alive at the point of redistribution of land back in the history of a respective community (Alden Wily 2012). Furthermore, the sedentary census is required for one to claim property rights over a piece of land, which is also to be confirmed by the witnesses from the respective community (Alden Wily 2012). Swapping communities would not imply swapping histories. Traditionally, even the most powerful person cannot bring his own rules to an alien manor. Thus, the clash between the community self-government systems and the central states would represent the main societal outcome provoked by this project.

Even though the societal consequences of these projects are as yet difficult to identify, there are two parallel processes that are more or less obvious. First, it is the process of empowering community-based social organization by supporting traditional social and economic institutions without aiming at their formalization or standardization. Secondly, the process of intervening into the physical terrain of these communities through building an additional grand infrastructure, on one hand, provides more economic benefits to these people; on the other hand it risks infringing the natural state of power relations within these communities. Such disposition of things may contribute to the growing social resistance potential of the communities across borders.
4.3. Organizing Societies

Introduction

The process of organizing societies in Central Asia initially was the brainchild of Western sponsors such as the European Union, the United States, the World Bank, the IMF, and a number of foundations established by various Western governments. This task required first and foremost for democracy to be promoted and for liberalization to be fostered by an NGO sector, which was to be created by local actors with the sponsorship of the these same stakeholders. This enterprise was to create a “civil society”, a concept which, paradoxically, was not specifically named as such in the initial documents related to democracy promotion in the region. Civil society was designed as a mechanism of civil control over the state, operating “outside” or “beyond” the state. The rationale behind creating the NGO sector was the general philosophy of the World Bank and the IMF which promoted the development of a participatory civil society and the decentralization of governance (Mansuri & Rao 2013).

Hence, this section argues that the formal civil society provided leverage for the creation of a parallel civil society, an alternative field of competition for defining the character of the state by championing societal processes. While this formal civil society failed to create a viable institutional infrastructure and gain legitimacy over the years, the parallel civil society, grounded within existing social organizations and structural legacies and inspired by the new ideological revival of Islamist thought, managed to promote its message through providing functions similar to those of the state as well as social benefits in a non-standard form. Specifically, it satisfies the needs of the disadvantaged part of the population with respect to education, cultural freedoms and rights, social benefits and employment. Most importantly, this parallel civil society demonstrated stronger commitment to the change of socio-political order. This argument is pursued in two steps. Section 4.3.1 aims to show how the formal civil society failed to organize beyond the patronage networks of the state. This contributed to feelings of distrust and alienation with regard
to the formal state by a large part of the population. It shows how formal civil society in three regional states came about, which actors supported their development, and the rationale they used. It highlights the weaknesses of the NGO sector, which led to the loss of legitimacy among a great part of the population in Central Asia. Finally, it shows what leverage it has afforded for the emergence of a parallel civil society.

Section 4.3.2 argues that this parallel civil society became a platform to outsource the ideological power of the state to external power networks. To demonstrate this, there is a focus on the parallel civil society within both organized and non-organized civil society. The former is represented by the Islamic NGOs. The latter is composed of social movements operating on the basis of indigenous communities, and independent Muslim activists who are involved in public debates on private platforms. Both sections attempt to trace the external connections of these types of civil society by highlighting their financial resources and ideological preferences. The latter play an important role in mapping the parallel civil society, because while a lion’s share of influential, young, educated Muslim activists do not disclose membership within any organizations, many strongly identify themselves with the Islam of resistance, and create a lively public debate across known Islamic movements and their followers. These parallel identities act as a tool for the “cartography” of non-organized civil society. An analysis of the existing narratives is used to show how ideological preferences are distributed and which power networks gain social support by providing the identity resource most favored at the time.

4.3.1. Formal civil society: institutionalization, patronage, and legitimacy

The term formal civil society here refers to the NGO sector, which is aimed at promoting democracy, the rule of law, and market reforms. The main external actors promoting civil society in Central Asia are the U.S Congress, the European Commission and the UNDP. There are other developmental platforms supported bilaterally by the Western governments, mostly by those of
the UK, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, France and Germany. The United States’ main instrument for implementing its programs is USAID. The EU relies mostly on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Bilateral agencies established by the EU governments comprise the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internazionale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the German Development Bank (KfW), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Swedish International Development Program (SIDA), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), French Agency for Development (FDA). International bank involved into this business are mainly European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), and the World Bank.

In the first decade of independence, the United States took the lead among Western countries in setting the agenda for involvement in the region, while the other agencies focused more on humanitarian aid issues. The achievement of structural change, through the promotion of a market economy, democratic governance and the rule of law through the support of political and institutional reforms were the main drivers behind allocating grants to the emerging NGOs. Reportedly, from 2002 to 2005, the US State Department supported more than 350 programs in the CIS countries with grants totalling $239 million, of which 28 per cent was allocated for establishing NGOs aimed at promoting democracy and freedom of the media, 33 per cent went toward economic reforms; 26 per cent to education, and 13 per cent to strengthening women’s leadership in these states (U.S. State Department data quoted in Laruelle 2013). The stated remits of these locally organized NGOs did not complement each other, but instead there was a degree of overlap and duplication. The result was that these NGOs wasted these investments without fostering any real improvements that would have led to structural change in their respective societies. Neither did they extend their own organizational frameworks beyond the patronage structures of the state they operated in.
Most of the focus on institution-building was provided by the EU through the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of the Independent States (TACIS) program, which came into being on the 21 January 2000 and terminated on the 31 December 2006 (EC/99/2000). This period coincided with the establishment of BOMCA. One of the main provisions of TACIS was cross-border cooperation and institution-building (COM/1997/239). Later on, via EC Regulation (EC/1638/2006), this instrument was substituted by the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument. Later on, GIZ pursued similar aims to TACIS with the difference that it also had a component of community development (Megoran 2012). According to the new EU regional strategy, $931 million in aid has been allocated for the period of 2007-2013, most of which is earmarked for security issues, drug trafficking, border fortification, focus on energy, rehabilitation of pipelines and transport routes, and closer cooperation with the grand projects of CAREC, CARICC (on drugs), CASA-1000 and the like. The concept of “civil society” as such does not appear in the frameworks of these strategies.

In terms of country results, Kyrgyzstan has been promoted as a “democracy island” in the region. The U.S. supported all actions of social protest and social resistance, organized by the so-called ‘local’ NGOs. This resulted in the unintended but popular perception of the US as a hypocritical actor employing double-standards and promoting the idea that “a conjunction between the market economy and social chaos exist” (Laruelle and Peyrous 2013, 45). The legitimacy of Western actors in the region has been undermined through various policy decisions they have made, such as support by the United States for the “color revolutions” and the choice of Uzbekistan as the main partner in the “war on terror” despite the dictatorial nature of its regime (Laruelle and Peyrous 2013). The ‘infamous Western democracy’ has become the subject of popular jokes rather than idealistic aspirations. In Tajikistan, civil society initiatives were first

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97 It is important to keep in mind that this strategy was developed in the anticipation of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.
promoted as part of the framework of Peace and Reconciliation which established power-sharing initiatives aimed at creating inclusive political platforms to encourage former combatants into formal politics. Unlike in Kyrgyzstan, the formal civil society in Tajikistan did not become the platform for protest, since peace was favored over justice.

The prerequisites for the development of civil society are considered to be the free market, privatization, individual entrepreneurship and private ownership of land – the conditions under which civil society becomes a mediator between the state and “an elusive traditional society, perceived as a liability” (Roy 2004, 2). Even though this definition is the subject of intense debate within academic literature, it does influence the way that proponents of civil society in Central Asia perceive and foster its development. In other words, the formal civil society in Central Asia can be depicted as a set of NGOs, with overlapping agendas and a discourse on human rights and failed states as the common denominator. It is a project which has been imposed from the outside, rather than a phenomenon “indigenous to the region” (Starr 1999, 27).

The organizational design of this civil society was largely detached from grassroots social organizations in the societies in the region (Roy 1999). As shown in the previous chapters, what Roy (1999) calls the “real societies of Central Asia” have been comprised of communities organized into collectives, due to the system of kolkhozes in the Soviet period, and remain largely rural in their mode of organizing labor and social order (Roy 1999). The kolkhoz as an administrative, economic and sociological entity does not have the same meaning as in the Soviet period, but the processes and interdependencies stemming from this social organization have remained. However, these conditions seem to be conducive to the development of the community-based participatory civil society as promoted by the World Bank and the IMF in the second decade of independence. Under these conditions, the focus on communities seems to be promising.
If we refer to the classic definitions of civil society, we will see that the main prerequisite or assumption for its viability is the presence of “collective interest”, justice and fairness defining the “collective action” (Habermas 1991a, b). However, what we observe in contemporary societies is the existence of parallel agendas of “collective interest”, not so much of development in terms of “poverty elimination”, but in terms of development as in creating a “new” socio-political order. Specifically, (re)emerging communities in Central Asia lie greatly at the intersection of the illicit and legal, formal and informal, as has been shown in previous sections. As communities are both isolated from their centers due to the materialized borders and prone to transnational flows beyond these centers, the empowerment of communities would not necessarily produce the type of civil society envisioned by the aforementioned external actors. The initial disposition of the NGO sector as not corresponding to the natural social organization of these societies exemplifies this.

Additionally, the governments have perceived NGOs as the continuation of Western foreign policies. In order to survive, local NGOs established “greatly personalized relations” with their donors and local elites (Roy 2005, 1009). Furthermore, considering the high unemployment rate and changing patterns of the job market immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, establishing an NGO became a promising entrepreneurial activity. Hence, NGO sector failed to organize itself as a mediating space between the grassroots societies and the states.

The NGO establishment was flooded with foreign funds offering luxurious (at that time) employment conditions for the most educated parts of the population. The first NGO entrepreneurs were representatives of the state (read: political) elites. Relatives of the high level politicians were among the first civil entrepreneurs. Information about the allocation of funds and investments has been made available primarily to people close to these political circles. Unequal access to such information provided unequal chances for people to engage in such civil entrepreneurship. A vivid example of the close cooperation between the NGO sector and the elite
networks is the one of Uzbekistan, where most funding to be allocated to the NGOs had to go through the “Forum Foundation”\(^98\), led by Gulnara Karimova, daughter of President Karimov. In Kyrgyzstan, Aidar Akaev, the son of the first President, occupied a similar role, albeit in an informal sense. After 2005, this role passed to the son of the second President, Maksim Bakiev. Maksim even managed to establish an administrative structure (within the Apparatus of the President) called “Center for Investments, Innovation and Development” (TsARII\(^99\)), the approval of which was required for all investment initiatives. However, this was more concerned with business sectors rather than that of NGOs, unless an NGO had an agenda of economic development. In Tajikistan, NGOs are tightly controlled by the family of President Rakhmonov.

The expanded system of grant allocation through the UNDP most vividly exemplifies this situation. Currently, it is a large bureaucratic machine in Central Asia with little mechanism for accountability. The lack of accountability and the impossibility of controlling the flow of financial redistribution within the bureaucratic net of its subordinate institutions affect not only the popular programs praising human rights, but also the programs that aim at attaining a tangible goal of improving living conditions. Examples of these would be the programs on biodiversity, forestry, cleaning natural water reservoirs, fishery etc.

A case from northern Kyrgyzstan illustrates how this system works, i.e. how resources leak and human conditions remain unaddressed. The system of grant allocation is a three-step-process. Firstly, the central office (UNDP) announces a thematic tender to be redistributed to the UNDP and related NGOs offices in the provinces. The managers of the provincial offices channel this information to the population. In order to apply for the tender, one has to establish a small foundation or an NGO to obtain the legal personality. Most of these people in the remote areas are rural farmers and workers, who possess neither language nor computer skills. In view of this,

\(^{98}\)Recently closed in relation to other big political scandals
\(^{99}\)Which in Russian sounds like the plural of the word “Tsar” (the King), the game of the words which was quickly picked up by the journalists and the opposition to criticize the structure, prior to the second revolution in 2010
they submit their projects to the provincial offices, the leaders of which sometimes deal with the applicants’ private correspondence themselves, having informally been authorized to do so.

After the grant has been won, leaders of the provincial NGOs channel the money to their own bank accounts and their NGOs, which they own in parallel. The official provides the report with the intention of substituting their bank accounts for the bank accounts of the winning NGO (Founder of the NGO Oi-Tal-Eco, interviews 2014). When the grant has been won, they formalize all official documentation but insert details of their own NGOs. Even where they do not do this, they channel the money to their own bank accounts. However, when submitting official reports they omit details of their own bank account and instead provide accounts of an actual NGO (usually the initial applicant), to create the impression, in official documentation at least, that the transaction is legitimate. The leader of the applicant NGO may only find out about this a year later, from a newspaper or via local gossip alleging that they pocketed the grant monies themselves instead of aiding the community or fulfilling their initial project goals. Should the leader of such an NGO try to discover the truth and seek justice, they will come up against a tight-lipped network of interconnected individuals working for the respective banks, UNDP branches and the sponsoring Embassies, none of whom will cooperate with any investigation.100

Analysis of media reports of alleged NGO corruption shows that such cases are typical throughout the region (Danilov 2010). The underlying issue is the lack of any accountability mechanisms for these NGO networks. Indeed, this type of corruption conducted through NGO

100 For example, in the case of a local NGO “Oi-Tal-Eco”, it seems impossible to break the connection between the EBRD and the UNDP provincial office, because such deals are done between “partners in crime”, who help each other out while laundering the documentation (author’s investigation of the case of the NGO in a remote Tyup region, northern Kyrgyzstan). The central UNDP office in its turn sends the complainants back to their provincial offices, where they have no voice whatsoever. The Embassies who actually sponsor one or another project also keep a diplomatic tone, promise to investigate the cases to provide an answer, which then never gets realized due to the constant change of cadres, i.e. the officers responsible for certain projects. When as a matter of last resort a complainant tries to appeal to the law enforcement bodies of the respective state, she is told that in order for the law enforcement to intervene into the financial affairs of such NGOs, they need the financial statement from the bank account of the complainant. Otherwise, the state has no right to get involved. And as described above, the bank provides false receipts and statements, since the respective officers are all mutually supportive in the matters like this. The vicious circle locks and the injustice continues.
networks and the related investment banks are very difficult to identify and/or disclose. For this reason, the Western-sponsored NGOs have developed a reputation for harboring organized crime or money laundering networks (Danilov 2010). Obviously, the more disadvantaged parts of population are disillusioned and do not perceive such networks as providers of inclusion, freedoms, rights, or justice.

Formal civil society, therefore, failed to institutionalize itself beyond the patronage networks or become a platform for social inclusion or civil participation. In delegitimizing itself, it instead provided leverage for the parallel civil society to develop. Nevertheless, the formal civil society managed to boost three types of rhetoric: (i) human and women’s rights; (ii) the rule of law; (iii) criticism of the central state as a failed state. However, in view of its de-legitimized image, these three discourses were instead appropriated by the parallel civil society, as will be shown in the section 4.3.2.

The rationale behind the creation of this formal civil society was the classic idea of democracy promotion and decentralization. Due to global events, it was divided in two stages: prior to 9/11 the focus was on decentralizing and weakening the state; and post 9/11 the focus was on security and strengthening the state (Starr 1999). However, there was incoherence in the interpretation by the leading Western actors of these central concepts. The practical implementation of these concepts depended on the concrete sponsorship of an NGO. For example, decentralization, as implied by the EU, meant decentralization of formal state institutions and creating more local governance bodies in the remote areas of the states. This could explain why the external actors’ efforts to organize societies have been widely seen as empowering elites (Kreikemeyer et. al 2007). The EU, despite its popular image as a “soft power” interested only in human rights and harmonious coexistence, started its involvement into the region with the BOMCA and TACIS projects, which had goals of border fortification and decentralization of the state (in the sense of creating institutions of state governance in the
remote areas). In other words, the EU priority initially was a focus on strengthening the state. Education and community empowerment provided the focus for the GIZ programs in between 2004 and 2007 (Bichsel 2009). The new EU-Central Asia (2007; 2013) strategy was greatly influenced by the fear of the uncertainty to come after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, which is why security and state-building have returned as the main pillars of democracy promotion.

The United States, on the other hand, promoted the empowerment of society, which in reality meant the “empowerment of an individual vis-à-vis society and the state”, i.e. private enterprise and market competition (Roy 1999). The World Bank’s definition of decentralization instead concerned local communities and the “focus on the most vulnerable” as the main agents of social participation (Mansuri and Rao 2013). It was the Amartya Sen (1999) idea of “Development and Equality” which was taken as the common denominator for the empowerment of communities and non-standard forms of economic activity (Mansuri and Rao 2013). The problem with the latter was that there has not been much research done on what “empowering communities” would be in practical terms, and what impact past legacies and the complex relationship of the elites—which has been neglected due to the perception of “Central Asia as tabula rasa”—would have on the content of the emerging civil society.

As stated above, there was an overarching rationale for the promotion of the NGO sector prior to September 11. In the eyes of Western actors, civil society was the main component of restructuring the Soviet system and bringing about social change. Its main goals were the promotion of democracy and the rule of law, through networks of free citizens, such as associations, unions, and NGOs. Its instruments allowed for other elements of state (re)building to become possible, such as privatization and liberalization. This is the dominant view within the formal NGO sector in Central Asia (Kainazarov 2014).

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101 Due to the “iron curtain”
After September 11, funds earmarked for democracy promotion were reallocated to security cooperation. EU development aid has been significantly refocused on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan through the Food Security Program and the Non-State Actor/Local Authorities Program. After September 11, the U.S. shifted its support to project-based result-oriented initiatives, rather than to those aiming at long-term structural reforms (Blank 2012). Furthermore, this situation forced the civil society to respect the margins of the state, with little regard to its authoritarian nature. In the post 9/11 period long-term programs aiming at regime or structural change have become increasingly rare.

In 2004, the doctrine of the “global war on terror” reintroduced and redefined the concept of civil society. Specifically, the G-8 summit accepted the “Greater Middle East” strategy, the main idea of which was to create similar types of civil society across Central Asia through Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, and the Middle East (Roy 2005). This is a project which “reforms the neo-conservative agenda of the exogenous regime change (by means of intervention), and promotes (“sustainability of’) social change “without confronting the existing regimes” (Roy 2005, 1005). In parallel, as mentioned earlier, the World Bank adopted the new post-1999 focus on the “most vulnerable” rather than on elite-empowerment. Hence, the approach to the creation of civil society almost completely shifted to one of community-empowerment to promote local participation. Over the past decades the World Bank has allocated almost $85 billion to local participatory development in a belief that “involving communities in at least some aspects of project design and implementation creates a closer connection between development aid and its intended beneficiaries” (Mansuri & Rao 2013, 1).
4.3.2. Parallel civil society: outsourcing ideological power

Parallel civil society is defined here as the manifestations of grassroots social activism, which can be both organized through the NGO sector and can also be non-organized, relying on the indigenous social structures of a society. It is “parallel” because it works at the intersection of illicit and legal and reflects the natural social organization of societies. It also develops the functions and the legitimacy of the formal civil society and operated in competition with it. Its resources might come both from formal and informal sources, such as official or unofficial donor money from abroad or informal trade as discussed in section 4.2. Finally, it organizes itself mostly according to revived memories of customary law, through trusted networks, and with an aspiration to build a social order based on Shariah law. Ideologically, it is attuned to Islamic ideas, not only rooted in the ancient Fergana Valley cultures, i.e. those primarily brought about by the transnational processes criss-crossing the Fergana Valley.

If one may imagine a map of these processes, this would be an area connecting Chinese/Uighur Xinjiang, the Fergana Valley in Central Asia, through Afghanistan to the Pakistani Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA), and radiating out from there to the bigger players – Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran, Qatar, and other Middle Eastern countries. Since Islam is seen as a “normative practice” in most of these areas, it is these actors that foster the main sense of belonging and identity for many independent Muslim activists in the region (Marsden 2005). This is what “community-empowerment” has become in practice.

The nature of the parallel civil society is complex. Some of its agencies may intersect with the state, criminal, and business sectors. However, for the purposes of this text, I suggest organizing them into the following categories. Firstly, there are those sponsors from the Middle East, India, Pakistan, and Turkey who finance the establishment of Islamic NGOs, charity foundations, mosque building projects, religious schools. These also provide financial support to
Muslims on the ad-hoc basis based on other financial needs. Secondly, there are the power networks of the Islamist social movements, which support movements such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat. They clearly have revisionist designs with respect to the state and social order, but they also claim to be non-violent. These social movements have largely infiltrated societies at the grassroots and their organizational structure relies on that of the communities. However, a large part of this parallel civil society comprise independent Muslim activists who do not formally belong to any movement. Their narratives exemplify how the sense of belonging and identity can shift beyond the geographic borders of a state.

### 4.3.3. Islamic NGOs: the narratives of betrayal and their sponsors

In Kyrgyzstan, the formal institutionalization of Islam coincided with the adoption of two laws: the Law on Banking Secrecy 2002 (amended in 2008, 2009) and the Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing 2006 (amended in 2009, 2012). In 2006, Kyrgyzstan joined the international anti-money laundering system, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The same year also marks the establishment of the Financial Investigation Unit under the National Security Service. Previously, these matters were overseen by the Ministry of Finance. During this same period a big scandal broke, involving officials of the State Registry Office, the body responsible for issuing national passports. A number of blank Kyrgyz passports had been issued in Bishkek and sold to a certain individuals. This was an important instance because among those individuals there are people involved in drug trafficking and extremist movements as discovered later (a former senior official of the Registry Office of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview 2014).

After the 2002, NGOs with an Islamic agenda have mushroomed. According to the law on Bank Secrecy Law, banks were no longer entitled to share information about their operations with “third parties” (which comprise all state offices, except the Financial Investigation Unit of the NSS, KG). However, between 2002 and 2006, there was no separate Unit dealing with financial
investigations, even though these were presumably handled by the NSS and the Ministry of Finance. However, none of these bodies was authorized to request disclosure of necessary information from the banks. In 2006, Kyrgyzstan created the Financial Investigation Unit, which became responsible for the investigation of financial crime and which was therefore authorized to obtain this information from the banks. However, they have to work within the framework of the international anti-money laundering system, FATF), i.e. the state structures may request the information on the origins of transactions only in cases where the amount of the transaction is higher than $10,000 (interview with a senior officer of the Financial Investigations Unit, Bishkek, 2014). Furthermore, according to the Law on NGOs (1999), state authorities are not authorized to intervene in the internal affairs of these organizations. NGOs do not have to present any financial reports to the state. In other words, according to this law, all registered NGOs, regardless of their ideological agenda, possess legal protection similar to diplomatic immunity, especially in their financial matters.

There are more than 30 officially registered Islamic NGOs (who meet the formal requirements of the State Commission on Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Justice) in Kyrgyzstan. Their stated aims can be categorized into the following: 1) charity; 2) education; 3) Muslim women’s rights; 4) Islamic medical research; 4) youth development; 5) Islamic international cooperation; 6) Islam and peace-building. In addition to this there is one privately-published newspaper “Shariah”. According to data published by the Financial Investigation Unit of the Kyrgyz Republic, the main activity supported by these NGOs is the building of mosques or namazkana (prayer rooms) by different communities (jamaats). These foundations receive support mostly from private sources in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and the other states in the Middle East (Interview with the senior FIU official, Bishkek, 2014). The peculiarity of namazkana is that their activity is not regulated or controlled by the state (SC/RA 2014).
Recently, a trend has emerged where financial support from the local entrepreneurs is sought as well. Some criminals build mosques in their communities to display their religious commitment publicly. From informal talks with some leaders of these foundations, it was noted that those NGOs promoting ideas such as women’s rights and youth development programs do not seem to have stable donors. Hence, their leaders claim that “no stable donors, no external agenda, no conditionality attached” (Interview with the leader of Mutakalim). Those organizations which are education-oriented have particular sponsors and a particular agenda, approved by the states in which they operate. Considering the law, mentioned above, if an organization is registered as an NGO it is difficult for the state to control the resources related to the so-called internal affairs of that NGO. However, the last Conceptual Framework on State-Religion Affairs included a notion that requires reporting on financial inflows of these organizations, even if it is registered as an NGO (CSPR/KG 2014).

Legally, all registered Islamic organizations must get approval from the State Commission on Religious Affairs and function according to the fatwa (a legal act) of the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of the Kyrgyz Republic (DUMK). However, this organization has been completely discredited in recent years due to its connection to corruption scandals related to hajj organizing procedures. In this way, Islamic NGOs are not significantly different from the liberal (or Western) NGO sector and are largely perceived as having “double standards” (Randomn interviews at the entrances to mosques, Bishkek 2014). In general terms, these organizations use three main themes in their rhetoric: human rights and women’s rights; the rule of law; and failed states. However, their idiosyncratic take on these can highlight the absurdity of mainstream public debates.

For instance, Islamic women’s rights’ organizations are concerned with protection of women’s rights, but only insofar as these revive the long-suppressed Muslim identity. They also campaign for the rights of so-called “unofficial wives” (Interviews with women involved in Islamist
activism, Bishkek 2014). Surprisingly, participants within the most popular “Progressive Muslim Women NGO – Mutakalim” are proponents of polygamy, because, this would mean that senior wives can be in charge of any junior wives. So-called junior wives (or unofficial affairs) also strive for the promotion of their rights, specifically their right to financial benefits to which they are entitled from a man involved, according to the Shariah law (Aslanova 2014, interview). This seemingly small detail demonstrates the irony of “women’s rights” and how issues like family-planning, patronage, justice, and social order in the region are perceived. Most importantly, it demonstrates how the cause of human rights has metamorphosed within the local context.

In a recent interview with the news agency “24kg”, Jamal Frontbek kyzy, the leader of the Mutakalim movement and Kadyr Malikov, the leading expert on Islam in Central Asia, openly stated that the time had come to create Shariah courts and implement Shariah law (Malikov, 2014). Even though this idea now officially emanates from “moderate” proponents of the Islamization of the state, banned movements such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, salafiya etc. promote the same ideas. One of the indicators officially used just two years ago by the State Commission on Religious Affairs to distinguish extremist propaganda from a religious rhetoric is whether the creation of an Islamic state based on the Shariah law was promoted (SC/RA/KG 2014; SC/RA/KG 2012; SC/RA/TJK 2012).

In addition to those NGOs with concrete secular or religious agendas, there is an NGO which aims to create common ground for so-called secular-religious dialogue in Central Asia. This NGO is called “Search for Common Ground” (SCG), and is sponsored by the EU and the UNDP. Its aim is to conduct research on radicalization and Islamization in Central Asia. However, the main “experts” invited to conduct this research set the research agenda in such a way that it is sympathetic to the very idea of creating a state based on Shariah law. This is reflected in the

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102 http://www.knews.kg/society/56073_v_kyrgyzstane_nazrela_neobhodimost_sozdaniya_shariatskih_sudov_schitaet_ekspert/
103 During the author’s fieldwork in 2012
104 For example, Dr. Kadyr Malikov has been working as a principal advisor to the Ministry of Interior, National Security Services, Drug Control Agency, and other state institutions on the matters of Islam and Islamic governance.
publications and seminars they produce. The Round Tables and conferences organized by this NGO have gathered mainly theologians and religious clerks who openly oppose secularism both within higher education and in secondary schools. Debates are held mainly in the national language and are organized around statements like the one below:

*Let us once and for all cease this Soviet occupation which is still going on by means of education. We do not need to study other cultures in our schools. We have seen that such education only disseminates ideas alien to the Kyrgyz people and the genuinely Kyrgyz traditions. We need to teach them Islam and its different forms. Islam only can save us from the evils of corruption and moral degradation which we face now.*

(A religious clerk teaching at a madrassah in Bishkek, Speech at the Round Table organized by the SCG, Bishkek, June 2014).

In addition to mainstream narratives, some Islamic NGOs provide certain social benefits to the population. For example, the World Association of Youth, headed by Said Bayumi, an Egyptian businessman, has built 22 schools and 250 mosques in Kyrgyzstan (SC/RA/KG 2014). Another foundation, the Aga-Khan foundation, promotes a social agenda similar to that of the welfare state. Its component aims are: 1) economic development (i.e. the building of Islamic financial institutions), 2) cultural development (the fulfillment of the spiritual needs if the people), 3) rural development (establishing civil society in rural areas), and 4) social development (education). This foundation has established a network of Universities, one of which is situated in Kyrgyzstan. The Central Asian University aims to conduct research and teaching on such areas of development as agriculture, rural development, and urban planning.

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan exert severe control over any NGOs, especially those with an Islamist agenda. NGOs in these countries face many obstacles in registering their activity. Uzbekistani Islam is fully controlled by the national Spiritual Directorate of Muslims (DUMK). Furthermore, there is an elaborate surveillance system within mahallas and their internal gatherings. The state is developing a modern Islam which is state-sponsored and controlled, and bans non-state instances of Islamist activity. However, this does not prevent Islamists from
creating wide underground networks. In providing substitutes for the social functions of the states, they make themselves attractive to the common people. Additionally, they supply those activities which create a so-called sense of life or meaningful lifestyle, as opposed to the modern state. The Tajik government refuses to register such organizations. Their reasons for doing so are explained in terms of anti-terrorism and anti-extremism However, the threat is much more complex, since the religious landscape is itself complex.

4.3.4. The civil “underground”: the narratives of resistance and their sponsors

“The new moon is the clock which shows when the Holy Ramadan is over. All Muslim people across the globe have oriented themselves by the moon, not by a phone call from Saudi Arabia.”
(An interview excerpt)

This seemingly metaphoric use of a Koranic verse triggered an open distrust between the salafis and the representatives of other Islamic movements in Bishkek in August 2014. The issue related to the fact that Kyrgyzstani Muslims were waiting for the new moon to appear which would signify the end of the Holy Ramadan. Due to the laws of nature, the moon reaches its different phases according to the geographic altitude and latitude of the land over which it is seen. For this reason Saudi Arabia finished Ramadan a day or two earlier than Kyrgyzstan. While most of the Kyrgyzstani Muslims kept on fasting, salafis openly boycotted the fast. Their reason for doing so was that they had received an important call to this effect from Saudi Arabia (Salafi movement member, interview, Bishkek 2014). Although this conflict did not result in serious public consequences, the adherents of different Islamic movements started discussing their differences more seriously. In addition to differences in rituals (which most of modern young believers do not believe to be crucial), most discussion centered on the socio-political order and the state as the epitome of that social order. Questions like “What should the state look like?” seem to be things that particularly unite and divide the educated, young\textsuperscript{105} and observant Muslim in Central Asia.

\textsuperscript{105}Some of my interviewees possess Master degrees in Human Rights from France, Belgium, and Germany.
Change in the social and political order, the disenchantment toward the state and the myth of political Islam as willed by the Prophet Muhammed to the entire Islamic Ummah comprise the leitmotif of these narratives of resistance. Hence, the crucial feature of the civil “underground” is that it provides a platform for resistance, in this case the “Islam of resistance.”

The term “resistance” itself is becoming largely reconsidered by the members of Islamic movements due to the influence of the Islamic State. Traditionally, resistance would be seen as something which opposes a concrete regime. Today, however, these movements “think bigger” and aim at changing the systems both within their native lands and beyond: “You might think, this is naïve and utopian, but is not it true that the state itself is nothing more than a myth; is it not true that all we achieve in life is a product of our fantasy and imagination?!” (An independent Muslim activist, interview, Bishkek 2014).

Drawing a map of the civil underground is difficult due to the fact that there is heated debate about which movements are legal and which ones are illicit. I include here only those which, by most accounts, represent resistance movements. They are Salafiya, supported by Saudi Arabia and Syria, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (allegedly supported by Saudi Arabia) and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (connected to the Afghani Taliban). However, the debate on political order is joined by Tablighi Jamaat, Ahmadiya and Fethulla Gülen movement. These are banned in the three countries, too, but they are perceived as elitist projects, rather than grassroots social movements.

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106 I owe this term to Maureen Pritchard.
107 Interviews with members of the “underground” who do not belong to any movement, socialized in most of them, and prefer to organize the one of their own, Bishkek, September 2014.
108 This interviewee holds an MA in Human Rights from a German University.
109 Rooted in the British Indian tradition, currently associated with Pakistan, and has its Headquarters in London. Due to that its members recognize MirzaGulam Ahmad, a Messiah or Mahdi, it is not very popular among the young people, because there cannot be any Prophet except Muhammad. Due to the same reasons, they are not permitted to perform hajj, by Saudi law.
110 Fethula Gülen movement is associated with Turkish/Western elitist project, which is banned in Uzbekistan for its involvement into the support to Afghani Taliban and creating opposition to the Turkish President Erdogan, who banned this movement due to his conviction in its relation to the Western security services. Its method is establishing private schools and Universities to create alternative to the madrassahs education. This is not included into the grassroots “underground”, because it is a movement unsupported by the common people. Rather, it has followers...
In terms of their tangible resources, two of the safest types of informal transactions are identified. The first is where payment goes from the external sponsors directly to the bank accounts of a recipient group or organization. The second is where cash is brought under the pretext of cash flow within a small business here and there, via flights through offshore zones, such as, for example, United Arab Emirates. This cash is distributed by reliable persons within “mutual trust networks” (described in the second chapter) to remote provinces and border areas. Examples of the first type of transaction were demonstrated by the cases of several madrassahs in Bishkek, where payments were made in small amounts (below the $10.000 legal quota to qualify for the Law on Banking Secrecy mentioned above) numerous times. This process involves using shadow (accounting) books by an accountant, who is not registered as an official employee. The accountant works remotely, from home (A “distant accountant” of a madrassah, interview, Bishkek 2014). In this way, the madrassahs, which are formally required to report to the State Commission on Religious Affairs, do not report this person. Furthermore, prior to the adoption of the new Concept on Religious Affairs (2014), these madrassahs were not obliged to provide any financial reports to the state. My interviewee works like this for a couple of madrassahs and confirms that large sums of money are being transacted, which is also reflected in this person’s salary. This person is also paid also for their discretion. The main donors include Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia. However, Saudi money is known for being transferred through the UAE, which is why the money coming from the UAE is usually suspected to be the Saudi money. Furthermore, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are two partners in business, both of which are perceived by the non-salafis groups as being tightly connected to the West (HuT member 4, interview, Bishkek, 2014).
The second type of transaction involves bringing cash personally in flights from Dubai. Due to the fact that the UAE is an offshore zone, one is allowed to bring up to $1 million in cash (“Fly Dubai” officers, interview, Bishkek 2014). The persons, reported as those suspected in this business, fly to Dubai and back several times a year (“Fly Dubai” information, 2014). These money transactions are not therefore officially completed through mosques or formal NGOs, but rather through personal networks.

Another source of income, as reported by official sources, is one arising from actual participation in the Syrian civil war. For instance, the ICG (2015) reports that, according to the Western sources, between 2000 and 4000 persons from Central Asia went to Syria to take part in the war (ICG 2015, 3). According to figures provided by the Ministry of the Interior on the Kyrgyz Republic, these number between 60 and 100 (High ranked officer of the Ministry of Interior, interview 2014). The same report states that the IMU in Syria comprises a separate faction to the Islamic State. However, this is at odds with reports from independent Muslim activists, who report that the IMU fights on the side of the Islamic State. There are, therefore, two types of warrior in Syria: those fighting to overthrow Assad’s regime, whose main motivation is money; and those joining the IS to continue “living in a truly Islamic state” (Sympathizers of the IS, interview, Bishkek 2014). This distinction between reasons people fight in Syria also provides an analytical distinction between the types of Jihads: the first of which is for regime change and the second of which is for building an Islamic state.

Comparing the ICG data with the data collected through interviews with members and sympathizers of these movements, a slightly different narrative emerges. The recruitment process, which the ICG depicts as one conducted through mosques and namazkana (prayer room), does not in reality happen in quite the way they describe. Even though the daily prayer mosques and namazkana are the places least controlled by the state authorities, there is a widening sense of distrust towards these places among young Muslim activists. They avoid involving themselves in
critical discussions in these places. “We only pray and go”, they say. The debates happen mostly in the closed gatherings and groupings outside of any institution. It happens through social media networks and mutual trust networks. According to many respondents, mosques have lost the trust of these activists. In relation to this, some of the interviewees quote the verse from Koran which says that: “The time will come when the demon will be everywhere, even in the mosques and that a believer should not trust anybody except his own heart” (an independent Muslim activist, interview, Bishkek 2014).

It seems also that the most quoted (by the Muslim activists) flaw within the ICG report (2015) is that it does not draw a distinction between the sides those recruited to fight in Syria align themselves with, and this what Jihad they participate in.

The reported people who went to Syria are in reality fighting for salafis against Assad government. This is the type of jihad which has been widespread among Muslims for all these decades of “global war on terror”. It uses the methods of partisan war and does not have a strong agenda to promote political Islam. The example of “Muslim Brotherhood shows that this jihad has been done merely against a particular regime, the fight which thereafter dissolved and did not bring any fruitful results for the Muslim Ummah. What distinguishes Islamic State from the other organizations previously proclaiming Jihad, including Al Qaeda is that the IS pursues the goal of changing the system and the political order of the respective states. In this light, Islamic State is the most successful type of Islamic movement since the time of the Ottoman Empire. It is a successful attempt to build a political order almost from scratch.

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111 According to the latest quantitative studies on trust among population across Southern Kyrgyzstan, formal religious leaders score only 36 per cent among those figures or institutions people would turn to a piece of advice once faced a problem (M-Vector fieldwork data, 2012). The similar finding on shifting of trust from the formal institutions and formal leaders to the closer circles of friends and families is supported by the OSCE (2012) study on radicalization in Tajikistan and the Human Rights Council (2010) study in Tajikistan on the trust among the population (“Who do you trust more in the state?). Secondary data from Uzbekistani scholars show the high degree of suspicion towards the formal institutions, too. Additionally, in Kyrgyzstan, among the values that the government should address, 93 per cent of respondents name “upholding of religious values” and 73 per cent consider that different religious groups “get along in our country well somewhat well”; 23 per cent – for a party that represents moderate Islamic views; 23 per cent – part that represents jihadist form of Islam is somewhat inappropriate and 57 – very inappropriate; 84.3 per cent considers themselves Muslim (M-Vector, 2012). Quantitative research on Hizb-ut-Tahrir shows that among the reasons of support to this group, people enlist such as: “Positive view is explained by that this group: 1) promotes good values – 10.5 per cent; 2) promotes Muslim rights – 16.2 per cent; 3) performs charity work – 19 per cent; 4) provides social services and aid – 21.4 per cent; 5) helped a neighbor or a friend – 22.3 per cent; 6) helped them or their family 27.5 per cent; 7) its leaders are legitimate religious authority – 27.8 per cent; 8) involved in government or professional groups – 28.6 per cent; 9) fights against non-Muslims – 46.1 per cent; 10) trying to establish a true Islamic state – 59.6 per cent (M-Vector 2012). Despite that many authors find that the influence of Hizb-ut-Tahrir has been diminishing, the population’s awareness of this organization and its cause is the highest in this region (Malikov 2010). The matter is that even if people do not officially enter the organization, they are being engaged through the popular activities that this organization has organized and the ideas that it disseminated.
(Notes of the talk of a “Keynote speaker” from a discussion in a gathering with other “independent Muslim activists”, Bishkek, 2014)

These are the reasons why many believers can relate to the Islamic State. They want a change of social order, not merely the overthrow of Assad’s regime. As rightly noted by the ICG (2015), the followers do not fit a typical profile. It attracts people of different sociological characteristics. The Islamic State however, is already gaining respect among many independent believers, because it promises more than just a Jihad against a regime. It is an attempt to build a new state, the Islamic state, with an ambition to make it similar to the Ottoman Empire. IMU has already announced itself as joining the organization (Lemon 2015). The same happened with some part of the Afghan Taliban (ICG 2015). Hizb-ut-Tahrir members do not express any desire to join. However, its job in “preparing the societal ground for the political phase of Islamization” as prescribed by Nabhanni, has been done well. Hence, sympathizes of the Islamic State distinguish between the jihadists movements operating previously and the Jihad of the Islamic State, which aims at the third state of building the Islamic State, the political one. Or so the narrative goes. In other words, the frame of reference for “underground” believers is gradually changing from those of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Tablighi Jamaat113, and even the IMU, because these movements “have proven their impotence to bring about change of political order” (Interviews with independent Muslim activists who used to be drawn to Islam through the Tablighi or Hizb-ut-Tahrir davaatchy, religious propagators, but then left the organization for reasons of their weak political position, Bishkek, September 2014).

The other group involved in disseminating these ideas and organizing spontaneous or often systematic underground cells is the one comprised of returnees from graduate programs abroad. According to the field data, most people are aware of such graduate programs at the Al-Azhar University, Egypt, The Islamic University in Medina, Saudi Arabia and The Islamic School in Najaf, 112 As described in the second section, there are three stages of creating an Islamic state: educational, social, political. Hizb-ut-Tahrir was aiming at the social stage. 113 The movement Tablighi Jamaat is banned in Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan (Esenamanova 2014).
Iraq. Some report that “sometimes these people come door-to-door and offer a free education abroad, which, under the conditions of severe unemployment, sounds like a good opportunity” (A returnee of a graduate program in Saudi Arabia, interview, Istaravshan 2012). One such cell, the members of which were condemned for membership of the IMU by the state authorities in 2010 in Istaravshan (Tajikistan), was organized by a graduate of the Islamic University in Medina. According to his prisoner’s notebooks, he was never a member of the IMU, but was disseminating ideas of “pure Islam”, which were close to those of the salafis, and his lectures were also attended by some IMU members, which is why the state made the connection (The prisoner’s notebooks, Istaravshan 2012). From the pictures attached to the notebook, one could conclude that the mashab he was a member of was salafi: in the picture he was dressed in the traditional salafi clothes and his wife was dressed in a burka, completely covering herself. This same person also gave lectures to other Muslims in Isfara and Hujand, where, at almost the same time, there was a terrorist attack on a police station, reportedly by 50 members of the IMU (A journalist, former UTO member, interview, Hujand 2012).

To sum up, this parallel civil society\textsuperscript{114} demonstrates one common feature: its shared tendency toward political Islam, which would help in changing social and political order. However, this cannot be ascribed to concrete Islamic movements currently operating in the area, but rather reflects the general constellation of narratives. In practical terms, parallel civil society offers three important services that the state and the formal civil society attached to it failed to offer: 1) wider

\textsuperscript{114}The map of Islamic thoughts in Central Asia cannot be considered full without referring to the local religious influentials, such as imam Hindustani (1892-1989), who has inspired both political Islamic movements and those who strive against involvement of Islam into politics (Babadzhanov, Muminov, Olcott 2004). Hindustani was one of the first leaders, who even in the Soviet time was allowed to undertake diplomatic missions to Saudi Arabia, whose activity is defined by his strive with the salafis and djadidi movements (the reformist Islamist movements). Hindustani is arguably considered the inspirer of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (Babadjanov et al. 2004). Other authors depict the religious picture of Central Asia through current Muslim influentials, such as Hoja Turajon-zoda in Tajikistan, who used to fight on the side of the United Tajik Oppositions, and whose cross-sectional ties – with business, state elites, and the former warlords – are used to describe the meaning of modern Islam in Tajikistan (See: Epkenhans 2011). However, since these personalities have been closely related to the state elites and in many ways influenced the political situation in the respective states, seeing them as part of the “parallel civil society” would, perhaps, be inaccurate. Furthermore, young independent believers, as they call themselves, who are among most of my interviewees, rarely know the names of the presumably “genuinely Central Asian” Muslim figures.
access to (religious) education; 2) the creation of a more just legal system, based on the Shariah law, and 3) the provision of cultural and social needs of the population with no ethnic or national discrimination.

The goals of this civil society seem to be as coherent and ideologically grounded as the goals of formal civil society. The main difference, however, is that the parallel civil society aims to institutionalize its efforts around a center, which would be religion, its routine and legal practices. While the formal civil society tried at first to work within the framework of decentralization and, later, within the framework of security and the strengthening of the state; the informal, parallel civil society addresses the more immediate needs of the common people, grounding their institutions in the natural community networks. This is not to claim that the Islamic civil society has the potential to create necessarily the so-called global Khalifate (Friedrichs 2013). Rather, it is to say that the Islamic movements in Central Asia managed to institutionalize themselves by (i) infiltrating the traditional social structures, (ii) building modern NGOs and (iii) supporting themselves through a theoretically benign ideology of Islam which seems to provide the main good aspired – the change of socio-political order.

Conclusion

We have seen that post-Soviet state-building in Central Asia has largely been influenced by external actors’ models for (re)engineering security, economy, and society. The first step toward organizing security was the materialization of the arbitrary borders drawn during the Soviet period, as shown in chapter three. Conflicts over ethnicity and nationality that those borders implied, due to having created artificial ethnic constructs, did not materialize during the Soviet period. The reason is that in practice these borders were administrative internal borders, and resources were shared on the basis of actual necessities and practices within the region.

115 The fear around which most of the public debates are organized
Consequently, the post-1991 border delimitation and fortification has in fact materialized conflicts created by these artificial constructs by preserving them and increasing their value vis-à-vis the real socio-economic practices of interdependence, which underpinned the rationale of the Soviet rule.

In other words, post-Soviet border management appeared to be twofold. On the one hand, projects, such as BOMCA and CADAP can be seen as responses to IMU incursions and the mutual suspicions of regional states towards one another, as well as individual national sovereignty concerns. On the other hand, the fortification of borders—as seen in the increase of check-points, military personnel, and minefields—took no account of existing cross-border interdependence, and so backfired at the societal level. Specifically, the constellation of enclaves in the Fergana Valley, whose populations have been using pastures and water by moving freely across borders, now turned into a constellation of isolated land pockets, which hindered both the freedom of movement at the grassroots level, as well as the extension of the state authority over these land pockets. As a result, the projects resulted in: (1) materialization of the structural conditions of conflict embedded into the Soviet maps of border delimitation in the region and conserved this Soviet heritage; (2) an increase of the territorial fragmentation of the Fergana Valley and isolation of significant parts of the societies from their mainland states.

However, the need to survive by means of cross-border activities was not tackled. Socio-economic interdependence persisted. Moreover, it has been picked up and developed through two other projects, addressed in section 4.2, i.e. CAREC and CASA-1000. The goal of the former was to “unlock the land-locked” Central Asian economies across the borderlands, by supporting cross-border non-standard trade and relying on the institution of the bazaar as the region’s most natural economic institution. However, these projects did not consider that the realm of a bazaar is a site of intermingling between the informal and formal, legal and illegal processes and actors, interests and practices. Therefore, by supporting non-standard trade without thought to who the
actors or their interests are, the CAREC program has indirectly supported the development of shadow and informal economies in the Fergana Valley, which, appropriately, perfectly corresponds to the rationale of liberalization which underpins these projects. Informal trade was already a part of the post-Soviet survival strategies of these populations, but investing in it would mean investing into processes that lie beyond the control of both the states and the formal international institutions.

CASA-1000 aims to connect Central Asia and South Asia as parts of a common socio-economic space. Its benevolent aims to reduce the water deficit in Afghanistan and Pakistan imply grand constructions such as the Rogun dam and Transmission lines connecting Central Asian with South Asia. This will foster two important consequences: (1) “resettlement” or internal displacement of a large number of people, and (2) change in the water flows of Amu-Darya river, the main artery of the unified regional irrigation system, installed during the Soviet time. Considering the issues in this field at all three tiers of water distribution, especially in the third tier, this construction will contribute to the increase of cases like that of Isfara river, when water-sharing at the community level becomes informally organized and self-governed. But most importantly, the displacement of the populations fosters a breach of existing social organization and the sense of belonging. Being compensated in cash for the loss of property, the displaced people will have perfect conditions for developing an identity of resistance to the state. This becomes especially acute when one thinks that in the case of Tajikistan, the displacement is from the Rasht Valley, which, along with Badakhshan, is one of the two least reachable sites for the ruling elites’ domains; as well as important stretch of the M-41 route. Additionally, displacements within Afghanistan and Pakistan will also be happening in societally complex areas, including the Salang pass.

Finally, the organizing of society was conducted through establishing the NGO sector. As shown in section 4.3 the liberal NGO sector has failed to organize itself outside of the
patronage structures of the states. Having succeeded in disseminating the discourse of human rights, gender equality, and the freedom of social choices, the liberal NGO sector provided tools for a parallel civil society sector to promote similar claims but to differing ends. For instance, officially registered Islamic NGOs use the same propaganda tools as the liberal sector, but they target a much more complex and vulnerable social audience, which is developing a strong identity of social resistance, mostly for reasons which are different from Islamic thought as such. However, in practice, considering the other sets of conditions, this resistance is directed against the state and is still in the search of its “Center”. In general, an implication of these strategies can be that formal civil society has become an instrument of the international security agenda and, simultaneously, a part of the elite patronage networks which guarantee political survival in these states. In other words, although the liberal means of formal civil society have undermined its own democratic goals, it has indirectly empowered a parallel civil society, i.e. the society grounded on (i) the legacy of collectivization and community-based practices (ii) culture of protest and, (iii) the ideology of the reformist Islam.

Therefore, the external actors’ strategies of organizing security, the economy, and society demonstrate a paradoxical result: on the one hand, they have contributed to the territorial fragmentation and isolation of parts of societies; on the other hand, they contributed to the trans-nationalization of these societies by creating conditions for their inclusion into the cross-border informal economic processes and developing the “transcendent ideologies”. This means that the possibility of a trans-nationalization of the identity of resistance, just like the possibility of a trans-nationalization of informal economic processes does not seem completely unrealistic, regardless of the fortified borders, walls, and fences.
CHAPTER 5. When elites meet: struggle for power and its social meaning

Introduction

This chapter examines the struggle between competing elites and its impact on social change and the organization of political authority over the entire territory of the fledgling central Asian states. It explores the extent to which and under what conditions the struggle for power among elites contributes to structuring the state as a neutral political authority and all-encompassing social system which accommodates the diversity of interests within Central Asian societies. Specifically, it compares elite struggles in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, by examining the strategies used by ruling elites to handle rivals. These strategies include: elimination, accommodation, and intermingling, in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, respectively. The aim is to understand why these three different strategies for balancing political power led to similar outcomes in the form of an incomplete state-building process; that is, failing to make the state a central social institution or establish its political authority over the entire territory.

The chapter is divided into three sections, proceeding in three steps. Firstly, it maps competing elites and then it describes the identified strategies and their rationale. Finally, it suggests why none of these strategies led to the emergence of a dominant political authority, capable of extending its infrastructural power over the entire territory. Specifically, it entertains the hypothesis that, in the three cases, elites are striving for power over a specific group, which would then eliminate or accommodate others, or intermingle with them. Power is a relational concept, and so is the state. That is why the actions of the elites have been perceived to be those of a rival group rather than of the state. In other words, this chapter claims that competing elites see the state as a resource for the realization elite-specific goals, rather than a common collective interest. Elites have found it difficult to become dominant, often seeking out to control the state as a means to prop or cover up their illicit activity, such as drug trafficking, the re-export shuttle
trade, selling national resources such as water, illegal distribution of foreign aid, and other sources of illicit revenue for it provides quick money. This is what Tilly described as the “State as organized crime”.

This chapter shows how the struggle for power among elites in the three cases contributed to the state’s fragmentation in terms of territoriality and, at the same time, its centralization in terms of functionality. This situation revives the medieval role of the state, as will become clearer below. Tilly (1975) argues that historical state formation is a movement from largely fragmented societies to a centralized polity. An economy based on agriculture provided major landlords with the power to compete for political influence, resulting in the need for central authorities to engage in struggles, negotiations, and coalitions with regional groupings of landowners (Tilly 1975, 28). Similarly, in Central Asia agriculture remains the main pillar of the economy. As Chapter 3 has shown, the peasantry had been organized into collectives during the Soviet period, and an alternative form of organization, which would address their resultant social interdependence, was not found in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution. Instead, efforts by external actors have facilitated a return to community-based agricultural management and informal trade, which results in greater societal fragmentation, as shown in chapter 3. Such societal fragmentation is not conducive for the development of stable elite networks that could spread their influence over concrete geographical domains, thereby remaining socially representative of a certain set of social interests. Thus, despite the fact that external actors promote liberalization and decentralization, their actions result in territorial decentralization and isolation, as shown in Chapter 4.

Samuel Finer (in Tilly 1975, 87) identifies two types of decentralization: territorial and functional. He compares medieval and contemporary territoriality and functionality within the state. In the medieval state, territoriality is differentiated, and functionality is consolidated; while in contemporary states, territoriality is consolidated and functionality is differentiated. In Central Asia, we see that decentralization makes the state territoriality fragmented, as shown in Chapter
4, while functionality is consolidated, albeit by means of increasing despotic state power. Hence, the Chapter explores whether in reality, decentralization as sponsored by external actors revives feudal practices of land and water management, hindering the development any institutions of elite power balance that could serve as a link between grassroots societies and the state, as happened in European state formation.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the infrastructural power of the state is about structuring the relations between the state and society and their mutual influence. According to Mann (1986), when this mutual influence is not present, state power becomes despotic and the state system does not work without violent coercion. But in the context of Central Asia, even coercion might not work. As in the case of Tajikistan, civil war did not create states, and none of the involved elites managed to extend their domination over the entire territory of the state, not even by “conquest”. In other words, when territorial fragmentation increases, especially in the form of extremely small subunits (such as community-based self-governance structures as shown in Chapters 3 and 4), the result may be that neither a centralized unitary system within a formal state, nor its military capacity, may influence the political outcomes. When societies are so fragmented, elites are too small to either conquer or negotiate. The process of “decentralization” in Central Asia may become a process of re-traditionalization. However, this is not a return to any “tradition” which would undermine the all-encompassing claims to political authority of the state. If there were a tradition perceived as socially and culturally universal, the process would be easier. Ironically, those elites who are in a position to respond to societal needs under these conditions are the newly incipient religious elites, who obtained their “symbolic capital” abroad and who have little to do with local traditions.

The chapter focuses on each country and addresses the following three issues within each of them to conduct a structured and focused comparison: 1) mapping the competing elites and their role in governance in terms of territoriality and functionality; 2) the ruling elites’ strategies
for a balance of power; 3) their societal consequences or social meaning. The section on Tajikistan and their strategy of elimination highlights the deliberate marginalization of rival elites, as well as their sources of influence, such as drug trafficking, religious activity, and participation in the civil war. However, marginalization in practice implies securitization and elimination of rivals, with the goal of appropriating illicit sources of power, thereby grounding the state in illicit sources of statehood. This section shows how the regime uses the state as a tool for appropriating important economic resources for its own purposes, thereby hindering the extension of political authority over the entire territory and its societal development.

The section on Uzbekistan and its strategy of accommodation shows how the state can involve itself in constant bargaining over the access to its institutional resources, vital for economic and social activities. By leaving room for maneuver to rival elites in exchange for their loyalty, the state elite monopolizes the military and law enforcement sector as its exclusive source of power. However, it shows that total surveillance organized through almost omnipresent military and security structures still does not penetrate large parts of society.

The section on Kyrgyzstan and the process of intermingling of elites shows that an ad-hoc purposeful approach to politics does not lead to consolidation of political authority either. Kyrgyzstan went from strengthening the institutions of the state through a system of checks and balances, trying different types of social change such as elections, negotiations, and social protests. However, the elites, once swapped, have not pursued their agenda further to establish a general political authority.

Some precision on the use of the term “elite” is necessary here. Classically, a power elite is defined as a group of individuals with the ability to affect change and transform environments. Since this chapter addresses the question—“why can’t the elites obtain control over the main political outcome, that is the state”—the definition of elites adopted here has to be more contingent and broad. In Central Asia, elites are neither “custodians of the state”, i.e. the products
of a specific type of socialization that provides them with symbolic power and other relevant resources (Eymeri 2001), nor are they political professionals, treating politics as a “vocation and profession” as Weber describes. Rather, they represent a “dominant class” or circle, which possesses logistics for domination of national decision-making. This circle cannot strictly be called a “class” in the Marxist sense of the term, as many of these people come from extremely diverse socio-economic backgrounds; nor can they be seen through the lens of the Bourdieu’s concepts of “habitus” or “symbolic capital”, for the majority of them have either faked their symbolic capital (such as education, for example) or have acquired their economic resources in a dubious way, during the time of perestroika, when a strategically important economic asset could be obtained for a dollar and higher education diplomas could be bought. However, under certain conditions these groups can still mobilize parts of societies for mass social protests (Uzbekistan), coup d’état (Kyrgyzstan), or civil war (Tajikistan).

For these reasons, the approach closest to describing the elites in Central Asia is that of Raymond Aron, whose “categories dirigeantes” provide an analytical lens to understand political developments in their contexts, rather than as a whole (Aron 1965). This approach implies attention being given to the social basis of the elites, not in Marxist terms, but rather in any terms relevant for a particular social context, as long as they reflect the functions of the dominant circles, the organization of power, and the relationship between power and society (Aron 1950). In other words, in the context of Central Asia, ruling elites are those with most control over the state institutions, and the “local” elites are those who can mobilize societies. In this light, the ruling elite will be used interchangeably with the state elite or the regime, and the concept “rival elites” will comprise the range of local elites and elites possessing other sources of power, such as cultural, religious, or financial, regardless of the geographical location.
5.1. Tajikistan: the strategy of elimination

Introduction

The post-Soviet history of the balance of power between elites in Tajikistan starts with the Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord, signed between Emomali Rakhmonov, the President of Tajikistan, and Said Abdullo Nuri, the leader of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), on 27 June 1997 in Moscow under the auspices of the United Nations (A/52/219 1997). Concluding the civil war that had been waged between 1992 and 1997, the power-sharing agreement has erroneously been characterized as a compromise between democratic and Islamic political forces in Tajikistan’s state-building. Official discourse neglects the fact that during the civil war both democratic and Islamic forces were embraced by the United Tajik Opposition, which had initially challenged the old Communist elite. A brief overview of the composition of these forces explains why.

This section shows that the power-sharing agreement created a lasting map of the political elites of Tajikistan, defining their spheres of influence and structuring future conflicts between them. Since the Agreement, the political elite of Tajikistan has been associated with President Rahmonov, whereas the opposition is represented mainly by the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) headed by Muhiddin Kabiri (since 2006, after the death of Nuri). In general terms, due to the power-sharing agreement, former UTO commanders were appointed to positions in national security and law enforcement structures within the state, at both national and local levels. In other words, the UTO elite has gained significant control over the military sources of statehood, while the ruling elite control the economic resources. This situation hindered the state’s ability to centralize control over the legitimate use of violence. The two most important sources of state power, that is military and economic, were subjected to elites rather than the generalized political authority of the state. Attempts by the ruling elite to gain control over other
sources of power increased its despotic power but destroyed its infrastructural power. The fragmented territories were subject to influence only by means of military intervention.

This claim is unfolded in three steps. First, a brief examination into the socio-political movements that comprised the UTO and the ruling elite shows that the confrontation was not between the secular and religious elites, since all these movements advocated modernization and development. Rather, it has been the struggle over the state *per se*, for the state had been seen as a resource that allowed for redistribution of the various sources of income and influence. Secondly, it shows that the power-sharing agreement structured relations between elites in such a way that the UTO has gained control over military resources and the ruling elite over economic resources. Hence, the conflict has become about two important sources of statehood that found themselves on different sides of the barricades: military and economic. However, as the logistics of power, i.e. the state, remained in the hands of the ruling elite, these were used by the ruling elite to start eliminating its rivals, both politically and physically, with the aim to monopolize all sources of statehood. This was done within the context of overlapping international narratives of fighting terrorism, structural/institutional reforms as conditions for the World Bank and the IMF loans. These allowed the ruling elite to infringe the power-sharing agreement without formally violating its obligations. These institutional reforms allowed the ruling elite to gain control over the main financial and economic revenues instead of restructuring their collection, purpose, or administration. Not only did this context allow the state to be turned into a vehicle for the interests of a small fraction of society, but it also precluded the development of conditions conducive for territorial consolidation and functional political differentiation.
5.1.1. The map of the competing elites and the power-sharing

Democrats and Islamists as modernizers

The United Tajik Opposition (the UTO) comprised a myriad of socio-political movements that all sought the democratization of Tajikistan, albeit through differing visions of what this would look like. The largest socio-political movements of the UTO were the following: the Islamic Revival Party, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the Rastokezh (Revival) movement, and La’li Badakhshan (HRW 1993, 20). The Democratic Party of Tajikistan and Rastokezh (21 June 1991) and La’li Badakhshan (30 May 1991) were officially registered by the Ministry of Justice of Tajikistan in 1991. Both of them were composed predominantly of secular urban intellectuals (Nourzhanov 2013; Kilavuz 2007; Olimova 2004). The Islamic Revival Party was refused registration on the grounds that it was considered to be a branch of the All-Union Party of the Islamic Revival.

A brief look into the social movements extant at perestroika illustrates the democratic and modernizing motives of the movements which came to comprise the UTO. The four large movements mentioned previously themselves comprised a myriad of social protest movements which had started appearing since 1989. Specifically, in 1989 social movements such as the People’s Front “Vahdat” (the Unity) in Ura-Tyube province, an assisting group in Chkalovsk (Leninabad/currently Hujand province), “Oshkoro” (Openness) in Kulyab (Khatlon province) were established. These movements were considered illegal as they were refused registration by the then Communist elite. In the first half of September 1989 a people’s movement, “Ehei Hujand” (The Revival of Hujand), was established by the democratically inclined representatives of the city-intelligentsia. The programs of all these movements included changes to the socio-political system as well as cultural and economic transformations in the country. In May 1990, another socio-political movement, “Humanistic Union”, was established in Leninabad (Hujand), which comprised four socio-political movements and three national associations. This movement was chaired by a professor at the Polytechnic University of Hujand, Djumaboi Niyozov. On 10 August 1990, the
Democratic Party of Tajikistan was established, made up mostly of Hujandi intelligentsia and chaired by Shomdon Yusuf, professor of philosophy of the University of Hujand. The chairpersons were representatives of cultural elites, distinguished engineering scientists, etc. while the national composition of the Party was diverse. The Democratic Party established the first democratic newspaper “Adolat” (Justice), with Imomnazar Holnazarov as the Editor-in-Chief. In October 1990, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan was established, initially as a regional affiliation of the All-Union Islamic Renaissance Party. The first chair was a religious and spiritual authority, Muhammadsharif Himmatzoda (Niyozov 2015).

In the beginning of 1991, socio-political organizations such as La’li Badakhshan, Nosir Hisrov and Vatan were established. Most of them were led by representatives of cultural elites or intelligentsia from their respective regions. La’li Badakhshan was initially chaired by a professor from the Pedagogical Institute, Atabek Amirbekov (Niyozov 2015). Since most of these movements were denied official registration, they were considered illegal and were proscribed by the neo-communist elite, which at the time was trying to preserve the power of the Communist Party. In order to gain some political force, some of these movements were reorganized under the umbrella of the four big movements comprising the UTO.

During the civil war Emomali Rahmonov was brought to power as a neutral figure by Russian and Uzbek diplomacy. After the accession of President Rahmonov, the struggle between these elites started being characterized as a confrontation between a modernizing/democratizing elite, led by President Rahmonov, and a traditionalizing/Islamicizing elite, led by Nuri and his successor, Kabiri. In fact, both of these elites sought a secular and democratic Tajikistan, with the values of Islam as a unifying and socially bounding force (Kabiri, interview 2012). In this light, the power-sharing agreement appeared to be understood as being between secular and religious values, between democratic forces and political Islam. Mediated by the UN, the Agreement prescribed power-sharing between the parties and defined the new status-quo between them.
According to its formula, decision-making on key issues of the national government could not be unilateral or dominated by a single party or group (A/52/219 1997; S/1997/410 1997).

The main protocols contained by the General Agreement were the Political and the Military protocols that outlined further details of the Agreement’s implementation. According to the Protocol on guarantees of implementation of the General Agreement on Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan (signed in Tehran on 28 May 1997), 30 per cent of posts in the executive power structures and 25 per cent of seats in the Central Electoral Commission were reserved for the representatives of the Opposition (UTO) (S/1997/410 1997, para.1). According to the Military Protocol: “The reintegration, disarmament and disbandment of the armed units of the United Tajik Opposition as well as the reform of the governmental power structures of the Republic of Tajikistan shall be carried out” (S/1997/209 1997, Part I, Art.1).

The national ratification of this Agreement was achieved through the Law on Amnesty for the Political Confrontation during the Civil War 1997, which established an amnesty for the civil war crimes, except for crimes established by the following articles of the Criminal Code of Tajikistan: Article 63 on terrorist activity; Article 74 on banditry; Article 76 on contraband; Art. 96 – stealing of the state and public property in especially grand quantities; Art. 104 and 105 – murder; Art. 121 – rape; Art. 240 – illegal creation, buying, keeping, transportation, sending, or selling of narcotics; Art. 240 – stealing drugs; Art. 241 – illegal sowing and growing of narcotic plants. These articles, especially those on terrorism and drug trafficking, retain a degree of room for maneuver for the ruling elite when dealing with political opponents (CCRT 1998).

The UTO elite and military sources of power

As a result of the power-sharing agreement, thirteen representatives of the UTO initially joined the government in 1998. The 30 per cent of positions reserved under the agreement included national security services, including border control and law-enforcement structures. However,
according to the Report of the UN Secretary General on the situation in Tajikistan, this did not include positions at regional or local levels (S/1998/374 1998). Specifically, the main destinations of UTO appointments were the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, and Tajik border forces. The initial appointees included: the first Deputy Leader of the UTO Khoji Akbar Turazhonzoda (appointed as the deputy Prime Minister); the Democratic Party’s Abdunabi Sattorzoda (appointed as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs); Davlat Usmonov, another prominent IRPT member (appointed as a Minister of the Economy) was disseminating the ideas of opposition, which is why was soon replaced; Khudoyberdi Kholiqnazarov (appointed Minister of Labour and Employment); Davlatbek Maqsudov, who was given the post of Minister of Land Reclamation and Water Resources (BBC 1998).

Most former generals, however, were appointed to the offices within law enforcement and security structures in the years between 1998 and 2000. Rahim Karimov was appointed Chairman of the Customs Committee; and Ayub Aliyev was to chair the Government Committee on Safety in Industry and Mining. In 1999, Ghayrat Sarhadovich Adhamov was appointed the first deputy Minister of Defence of Tajikistan (BBC 1999a, BBC 1999b). Mirzo Ziyoev, a prominent member of the IRPT and a head of the UTO forces, who fought under the commandment of Juma Namangani (one of the later IMU founders) was appointed for the Ministry of Emergency Situations. The position of Defence Minister was to remain vacant (S/1998/1029 1998). Mirzo Ziyoev’s continued friendship with Namangani put the IRPT under suspicion of ties with the IMU, something they were later always accused of by the government (ICG 2001a, 6). According to the IRPT leader, Kabiri, this friendship could not be considered as proof that IRPT had further ties with the IMU, for the latter accused the IRPT of being too moderate in its approach to Islam, and they considered its political compromise with Rahmonov to be a betrayal (Kabiri, interview 2012). Some of the former generals, who were appointed to offices within the structures of the Ministry of Interior, in September 2015 were accused of taking part in the coup d’état, as for instance of General
Abduhallim Nazarzoda (Stanradar 2015). Other prominent UTO commanders appointed to the national security structures were the following: In 1999 - Saidsho Shamolov and Qurbon Cholov, appointed to the offices of the border defense committee; Sulaymanov Cholov (Qurbon’s brother) appointed deputy chairman of Dushanbe’s Customs Committee. By November 1999, there were 14 UTO appointments to district and city level posts (S/1999/1127 1999).

However, in general, the government was reluctant to appoint former UTO commanders to the local positions in their native domains. The regional or local positions given to some were mostly in Khatlon region or around Dushanbe, as these were easier for the ruling elite to control.

However, some commanders took positions in the regional structures of the Ministry of Interior. Some examples of this were Shokh Iskandarov, from Khoit in Rasht district was appointed deputy chief of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Rasht Valley, in charge of a stretch of the Tajik-Kyrgyz border; Habib Sanginov - Deputy Minister of the Interior, and a member of National Reconciliation Commission; the influential UTO commander Akhmadov, who held the ruling elite at arm’s length and was appointed a colonel and head of the local department of the anti-organised crime directorate (UBOP116) in the Rasht Valley. Also appointed to the regional Ministry of Interior were power-brokers from GBAO, Tolib Ayombekov, Imumnozar Imumnozarov and Mahmodbakir Mahmodbakirov.117

At the time of power-sharing, the IRPT power base has reportedly remained largely regional (ICG 2001a, 7). Its main electorate was in the provinces of Gharm and Karategin, while to date, the influence of the IRPT had grown in the North, in Soghd Province, in towns, such as Isfara, Istaravshan, Hujand, and the enclaves of Vorukh and Chorkhu, as well as in Pendjikent, Macha, and Ura-Tyube (Tajikistani part of the Fergana Valley) (IRPTdata 2012). This is a significant number of supporters, considering that Soghd province comprises about 30.5 % of the population, and

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116 A unit that in most former Soviet countries is viewed as an elite police organization
117 The level of control exerted by these figures meant that to visit Rasht for research purposes, for example, it was advisable to obtain the (informal) permission of Col. Akhmadov; to visit GBAO, formal visas are required (ICG 2011, 2-5).
Khatlon in the South a further 35.1 %. In contrast, 9.2 % lives in Dushanbe and 3.4 % in GBAO (UNDP 2000, 17). Furthermore, most of the Tajik migrants in Russia are support the Opposition to the Rahmonov government (Kabiri, interview 2012).

Though the power-sharing results seemed to be accommodating for the former UTO fighters, not all of them accepted the Accord. Some of the warlords returned to their domains, where they enjoy the support of local power structures, or to Afghanistan. Among those who did so were Mullo Abdullo (Gharm, Darband, Afghanistan), Ali Bedaki (Afghanistan), Rakhmon Sanginov (Tavildara), Mansur Muakkalov (Tavildara).

The ruling elite and economic resources

The ruling elite today is mainly composed of the so-called Southern or Kulyabi elite, as opposed to the Northern elite of Soghd province, centered on the main city of Hujand (former Leninabad). Hujand was designed during the Soviet period as an industrial city and is considered the site of the industrial elites and intelligentsia. Kulyabi elites were largely disadvantaged during the Soviet period, for the region mostly grew fruit and produced wine, forms of agriculture not strategically important to the Soviet state. This segregation of Tajikistani elites was also largely due to the Soviet subsidies plan, which distributed subsidies according to the Soviet goals, such as cotton cultivation and industrial capacity. For example, between 1937 and 1944, Soviet state funds were allocated as follows: Leninabad (Hujand) province received 7,838,400 rubles; GBAO – 680,000; Kurgan-Teppe – 525,900, Kulyab 64, 900, Gharm – 24,100 rubles (Markowitz 2013, 37). In 1988 the Kurgan-Teppe oblast’ and Kulyab oblast’ were merged into the Khatlon oblast’ with the center in Kurgan-Tyube. In 1991 these provinces were administratively separated again, but returned to the 1988 status-quo in 1992. However, the Kulyabi elites were reportedly cooperating with the Hujandi elites in the North, providing their security, being hired for military functions (ICG
The sub-districts of Kulyab, Dangara and Farkhar are native to the President Rahmonov, which is why they are considered being under the special protection of the President.

After the power-sharing agreement (post-2000), the Kulyabi elites have become largely responsible for financial control and property relations in the country. For example, the former chairman of the State Committee on Property (Goskomimushestvo), Matlub Davlatov was appointed as a chairman of the Financial Control Unit. One of his successors was another relative of the President, Sherali Gulov. Another prominent representative of the Kulyabi elite, Salim Yakubov, held different high positions in Dushanbe, including Minister of the Interior and the Chairman of the Tax Committee until he spoiled his relationships with the President (ICG 2001a, 13).

The main economic resources of the country are also in the hands of the ruling elite. This means that the ruling elite retains control over the cotton industry (cotton financing – 14 % of the GDP; cotton trade – 11 % of GDP), foreign aid, the energy sector, the aluminum export trade (40 – 50 % of GDP), the drug trade. The drug trade’s share of the economy is approaching that of Afghanistan - 30 % of GDP – and is second main budget revenue, after migrants’ remittances 118 (Nakaya 2009, 265; ICG 2009b, Paoli; et al. 2007). Usually, any attempt to monopolize access and consolidate the management of these resources is interpreted as part and parcel of the centralization of power (Dudoignon 2004).

The cotton industry has been pivotal for the Tajik economy, as was planned during the Soviet period. After independence, countries in the region have chosen to stick to these Soviet economic dependencies, since they provided stability. Devastated at the outset of sovereignty, the cotton industry was revitalized in the aftermath of the civil war through World Bank loans (Meyer et al. 2004). Functioning within the framework of privatization, these loans targeted private Tajik

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118 By estimates of international organizations, about 1.5 million Tajiks work abroad; of which 85 % in Russia; the general population of Tajikistan is about 7.5 million people. According to IMF, 40 % of the GDP is made up of migrant remittances
companies involved in the local-level cotton growing operations. These companies received World Bank aid through Tajikistan’s Agro Invest Bank, which redistributed funds alongside provincial and district governments (Meyer et al. 2004). However, the devastation of the cotton industry was only in formal terms. The shadow practice of selling cotton through the black market, through trans-border cooperation with similar groups in Uzbekistan and southern Kyrgyzstan, did not cease (a local businessman, involved in cotton and tobacco deals, interview 2012).

By the end of the civil war, there were five major companies involved in cotton production in Tajikistan. Three-quarters of the industry was dominated by two companies – Khima and the Somoni 21st Century – owned by the head of the National Bank and President Rakhmonov’s brother-in-law, respectively (Nakaya 2009). Cotton financing comprised 90% of all agricultural lending in Tajikistan (Meyer et al. 2004). Formally, these investments were guaranteed by the National Bank of Tajikistan (NBT) (Meyer et al. 2004). In 2007, the NBT’s accounts revealed that IMF funds and other foreign aid were leaked “to cover the losses incurred by Agro Invest Bank since 2001 – totaling $220 million - that have been linked to lending to cotton enterprises as far back as 1996” (Markowitz 2013, 85; Dzalaeva 2007). Two main links to note here: first, the lending which the Agro Invest Bank now has to recover is directly related to the lending which used for the shadow cotton trade which flourishing during perestroika and the civil war; secondly, the key institutions in the loans distribution chain were organized as part of the economic resources of the ruling elite. The management of the cotton industry and investment in this industry illustrate that not only has the cotton industry itself been monopolized by the ruling elite through the net of these banks, but also the foreign aid market linked to it.

The energy sector comprises another economic resource of the ruling elite in Tajikistan. According to data compiled by the Asian Development Bank (2009), the energy sector accounted for 4.7% of GDP, as well as [electricity] providing input for two main exported goods of Tajikistan, cotton and aluminum. These two industries, in their turn, account for 80% of total export earnings
(ABD 2009). For example, the Tajik Aluminum Company (TALCO) runs the biggest aluminum plant in Central Asia, consuming about 40% of the energy produced in the country (Melikyan and Slay 2011; Cain 2011). In order to keep the prices of aluminum competitive on the world market, the government subsidizes the company’s energy expenses, that is TALCO pays for electricity at a price much lower than market rates. Despite the fact that the plant makes up one third of the GDP of the country, most of the profits from this company get offshored to the British Virgin Islands, and do not contribute to the budget of the company and the country (Yakobi 2013). The financial matters of the company remain opaque. TALCO relies on the financing from Orienbank, owned by Rahmonov’s son-in-law (Nakaya 2009, 259). Reportedly, its profits remain “the personal profits” of the ruling elite, for there were several changes in the company’s management, including the recent appointment of the President’s son-in-law, Hasan Assullozoda, as the Head of the company, and he is the main person responsible for the offshore operations of the company (Thrilling 2014).

Due to the fact that a large percentage of its water is used for industry and irrigation-intensive cotton cultivation, Tajikistan experiences water shortage. To address this water deficit, the government of Tajikistan is attempting to develop the Rogun project designed during the Soviet period, and addressed in detail in chapter 4. Management of Rogun is organized through the government-owned Barki Tochik Corporation (ABD 2009). Since the ruling elite wants to keep the control of this sector in its hands, it prevents foreign investments. The rationale is that attracting foreign investment into Rogun power-station would mean sharing energy sector decision-making with neighboring countries, especially Uzbekistan, for the Central Asian energy system is interdependent. As addressed in chapter 3, the CA energy system, as designed by the Soviet planners, was managed by a regional transmission operator in Tashkent and referred to as

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119 Paradoxically, the region which is characterized as water rich experiences serious water shortages, caused by number of factors, including a devastated irrigation system with numerous leaks, wasted water and unsustainable water use, etc.
the Central Asian Power System (CAPS).\textsuperscript{120} Hence, opening up the energy sector to foreign capital would mean shared decision-making over grand projects like Rogun and Santguta. Apart from the fact that Uzbekistan would veto any construction of grand projects\textsuperscript{121} like Rogun, the government would lose the source of direct revenues from the people, collected for the construction of Rogun by obliging the population to (“voluntarily”) buy the shares of the project. The ruling elite sees Rogun as the solution to the water deficit both in Tajikistan and beyond, for example through trading water for oil with Iran (Pannier 2014).

The next economic resource was the drug trade. As mentioned above, it was the main resource for financing warfare by the UTO. With the emergence of the state, this resource has been expropriated by the state elite in two seemingly mutually exclusive ways. On the one hand, the state declared war on drugs, thereby becoming a recipient of foreign investment in this field within the framework on the war against transnational threats. These investments have become a source of state revenue and a useful pretext for clamping down on Islam and warlords when needed. On the other hand, drug trafficking itself has become part of the ruling elites’ wealth. According to the ICG data (ICG 2009b), it was estimated that if the drug trade were to cease, the economy of Tajikistan would take three weeks to collapse. While these numbers show only that Tajikistan’s economy depends on drug trafficking, the economy, in its turn, is controlled by the ruling elite, which seems to use the state as a vehicle for laundering illicit finances.

Reportedly, at the beginning of the 2000s, drugs comprised 30 to 50 % of the Tajik economy (ICG 2001a, 19). The UN has identified six drug routes from Afghanistan, two of which run through Tajikistan: one from Kunduz in northern Afghanistan to Khatlon province; the other from Badakhshan (Afghanistan) to GBAO (Tajikistan) (UNODC 2012). As mentioned above, Kulyab is part of the Khatlon province, hence it is easier for the Kulyabi elites to have control of these

\textsuperscript{120} See chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{121} Similar projects during the Soviet period caused the extinction of the Aral Sea.
drug routes. Badakhshan was a more complicated route for the ruling elite to control, for, as mentioned previously, some influential UTO commanders still remained informally in charge of their domains.

The war on drugs as the source of foreign aid was at its peak in the aftermath of the civil war. In this context, in 1999, in cooperation with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Tajikistan established the Drug Control Agency (DCA) (Markowitz 2013, 85). In 2003, of all drug seizures coming out of Afghanistan, approximately 90 per cent was seized by Tajikistan. Reportedly, this allowed the ruling elite to gain more external aid for drug trafficking, strengthen its position, and drop the level of drug seizure in the following years. Drug seizures declined from 5,600 kilograms in 2003 to 1,132 kilograms in 2009 (UNODC 2010). There has also been a decline in drug-related crimes, from 1,949 cases in 2001 to 631 cases in 2006 (UNODC 2009). The ruling elite monopolized the access to drug trafficking and maintained alternative smuggling routes (Markowitz 2013, 86; Lewis 2010).

5.1.2. The strategy of elimination and its rationale

By 1999-2000 the Power-sharing Agreement was reported as implemented as 54 UTO members were appointed to state offices, resulting in the National Reconciliation Commission monitoring the implementation of the power-sharing agreement being disbanded. Once President Rakhmonov won the elections, he started removing opposition members from the executive branch and from sectors providing most financial revenues (Nakaya 2009, 271). By 2006 the only UTO member in senior government position was Mirzo Ziyoev (Emergency situations minister), who was soon dismissed and killed in 2009.

The strategy of elimination here is defined as a gradual dismissal of the UTO members from government positions and their subsequent assassination. This has been conducted in two stages: during the structural/institutional reforms which occurred between 2000 and 2006, and in the
following period to date, when the most influential commanders have been marginalized, outlawed and often killed under various circumstances.

There were two main forms of legitimation for such actions by the ruling elite: World Bank conditionality on structural reform funds and the international narrative on the war against terror. At the national level, this strategy was outlined in Protocol 32-20 (Protocol 32-20 2011). Structural reform, as designed by the World Bank, the IMF and foreign contracted consultancies, implied a restructuring of the extensive “Soviet” bureaucratic system of the state. In 1999, for the purposes of the Institution Building Technical Assistance Project (IBTA-2), the World Bank offered the Tajik government a credit of US$6.7 million, in tandem with a US$50 million structural adjustment credit (SAC-2). The reform was aimed at restructuring public administration, budget management, and large-scale state enterprises (World Bank 1994; ADB 1999).

Between 1999 and 2004 several ministries and committees were reorganized and downsized, primarily in 2001 and 2002. During this process, many quota-based UTO appointees were dismissed. For instance, “the Ministry of Labour and Employment and the Ministry of Social Security were combined into the Ministry of State Revenue and Tax collection in 2002, resulting in the dismissal of two UTO appointees (chair of customs committee and his deputy). For the newly created Ministry of State Revenues and Tax collection, Rahmon appointed his long-serving technocrat, Gulomjon Boboyev, who was formerly state advisor on economic policy (1990-1996) and first deputy minister of finance (1996-2001)” (Nakaya 2009, 264).

The ruling elite secured the key positions controlling the main financial revenues of the country by pursuing this strategy of using structural adjustment programs as a way to marginalize rivals. Furthermore, some new overlapping agencies were created (World Bank 2005), like, for example, the Agency for Financial Control (AFC) in 2001, reporting directly to the president. Its purview included control over the administration of national and local budgets, loans and grants, and humanitarian aid received by the government. The AFC also had a monitoring and
investigating mandate with respect to the use of state property and enterprises of all kinds. As such, the creation of the AFC gave President Rahmon comprehensive control of both state and private finances at all levels (Nakaya 2009, 265). Matlub Davlatov, Rahmon’s relative and chair of the state property committee (responsible for privatization of national property) from 1994 to 2001, became the chair of the AFC. As mentioned in the previous section, the President also appointed Sherali Gulov, his nephew-in-law and former chair of Dangara district (Rakhmon’s hometown) in Kulyab to succeed Davlatov as chair of the state property committee (Nakaya 2009, 265). The body responsible for the appointments was the office of the presidential administration, and in particular, the state advisor on personnel policy (World Bank 2005). The negotiations on the structural reforms between the World Bank and the government of Tajikistan were tense and in the second round of reform revisions (2005), the World Bank linked SAC-2 conditionality with the completion of public administration and finance reform under IBTA-2. The linkage with SAC-2 made the government endorse the public reform first, which in practice resulted in the dismissal of the UTO appointees.

As mentioned in the previous section, not all UTO commanders agreed on the conditions of the Peace Agreement. Some of these commanders were reportedly involved in drug trafficking. The parallel international narrative on combating drugs and terrorism provided the pretext for the elimination of the former warlords (Lewis 2010; Gavrilis 2008). These figures, within the realities of their local domains, were considered the elites, personalities with charisma to follow and look up for security and help (Nourzhanov 2005). However, official state discourse labeled them as warlords, Islamists, drug barons, and so on.

Hence, in the aftermath of the Presidential elections in 1999, several UTO appointees were arrested for drug trafficking. For instance, in 1999 Saidsho Shamolov, Qurbon Cholov, who held the offices of the border defence committee, as well as Sulaymanov Cholov (Qurbon’s brother and
deputy chairman of Dushanbe’s Customs Committee) were incarcerated\textsuperscript{122} (ICG 2004, 2). Other influential warlords, on whose goodwill the President was dependent, Suhrob Qosymov and Mirzo Ziyoev, were dismissed in 2006 (Nourzhanov 2005).\textsuperscript{123} In 2007, the President dismissed Shokh Iskandarov, from Khoit in Rasht district, a colonel of the border guards, in charge of a stretch of the Tajik-Kyrgyz border (ICG 2011, 2). Senior government officials, such as Tajikistan’s ambassador and trade representative to Kazakhstan, a deputy minister of defense and the former minister of interior, Yakub Salimov, were arrested for their alleged involvement in the drug trade (Markowitz 2013, 86). Likewise, border control officials reportedly were receiving rents from the drug trade (Markowitz 2013; Marat 2006; Lubin 2003). Some authors argue that profits from drug trafficking were the reason for the reluctance of the Tajikistan’s government to implement stricter border controls that would prevent the flow of drugs (Gavrilis 2008). Habib Sanginov, former UTO commander, later Deputy Minister of the Interior, and a member of National Reconciliation Commission – was allegedly involved in drug trafficking (ICG 2001a, 19).

The culmination of elimination, military interventions into the main regions in the drug trafficking chain, started with the infamous jail break and the subsequent intervention of government’s forces to the Rasht Valley (Gharm). As Jirgatal-Gharm has been considered one of the most important drug distributing areas and Gharm-Tavildara reportedly contained heroin-producing laboratories, there was a military intervention into these regions in 2008 (ICG 2001b, 4). The Rasht area had been under influence of Mirzo Akhmadov, who managed to keep the official government “at arm’s length” (ICG 2011, 2). The attempt to kill Ahmadov resulted in the death of the paramilitary police (OMON) national commander, Oleg Zakharchenko and

\textsuperscript{122} The usual reasons for conviction comprised extortion, kidnapping, marrying a minor, and polygamy.

\textsuperscript{123} Mirzo Ziyoev returned to Tavildara (a valley south of Rasht).
subsequent personal apologies for “not knowing anything about this initiative” by the President to Col. Akhmadov over the phone (ICG 2011, 2).  

In 2009 the government organized an operation against narco-trafficking in response to the invasion of the IMU headed by Mullo Abdullo in the Rasht Valley, another influential warlord who did not believe in the power-sharing agreement and moved to Afghanistan. During that operation, Mirzo Ziyoev was killed (for his reported cooperation with Mullo Abdullo) (ICG 2011, 4). On August 10, 2010, 46 participants of the IMU invasion were sentenced to between 10 years and life in prison. Two days later, 25 prisoners staged a jailbreak (ICG 2011, 5). Later in 2011, Col. Akhmadov was closely involved in the destruction of the group led by Ali Bedaki and Mullo Abdullo (ICG 2011, 8). As a result of his cooperation with the government, Col. Akhmadov maintained his position as powerbroker in Rasht and Shokh Iskandarov was appointed deputy chief of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Rasht Valley (Avesta 2011).

The most remote domain has remained the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO/Khorog), which alone comprises 40 percent of the territory of Tajikistan. The elimination of GBAO’s warlords was achieved by the government in military operations in 2012 and 2014. The pretext for these operations was based on rhetoric of the fight against transnational crime and drug trafficking. Whatever the actual rationale, the fact is that two influential warlords and former UTO commanders were killed: Tolib Ayombekov and Imumnozar Imumnozarov (Taarnby 2012; Ozodagon 2012). Furthermore, in 2014 some leaders of informal youth associations were detained, which resulted in popular protests, during which two persons were killed and six injured (FerganaNews 2015). This event was also followed by allegations against another influential warlord of GBAO – Mahmodbakir Mahmodbakirov (Ozodinews 2014). GBAO has always been a

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124 Thereafter President Rakhmonov called Akhmadov saying that he did not know about the attack (ICG 2011, 3).
125 As noticed earlier, it has the longest border with Afghanistan, and is a decisive point at the infamous M-41 drug trafficking route.
region for which any tourist had to obtain a special visa but in spring 2015, the central government closed the access to GBAO for any foreign citizens.

The international narrative of the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking was incorporated within national instruments for dealing with the rival elites, the most vivid example of which is Protocol 32-20 signed on 24 November 2011 by several representatives of the ruling elite. The main goal of the protocol was to strengthen control over religious institutions to prevent Islamist radicalization and extremism (Protocol 32-20, para.1). It also outlined tasks for representatives of the executive branch to allow fulfilling this goal. The officials responsible for exercising these tasks were from the “Dangara clan” or the ruling elite. Representatives of the Ministry of Interior were not invited to the meeting, as the Ministry was not considered to be loyal to the President. Within the framework of the fight against extremism, the Protocol assigns special attention to the IRPT, in that it specifically organizes a special monitoring of the IRPT’s activity, its financial resources, and its leaders. It also enlists all their members and creates incentives for them to leave the party (Protocol 32-20, para.2). In implementing this monitoring, local officials are required to use the resources of business circles. In other words, private entrepreneurs were supposed to contribute money and information to the fight against Islamism. This can be seen as a type of tax on businesses, a ‘tax for the fight against extremism’. Para.7 of the Protocol prescribes the constant military preparedness of special forces. The IRPT sees this protocol as an official attempt to marginalize the political party as part of the extremist network in Central Asia (Kabiri, interview 2012). After signing this protocol, the government’s actions against the former warlords and the leaders of the IRPT started being more obvious.

It is important to note that by 2010, IRPT had secured only 2 seats in Parliament and was already under serious political pressure. International organizations such as International Alert attempted to create a platform for dialogue between the government and the opposition. However, representatives of the ruling elite did not show up to meetings organized by the NGO.
Further, the “dialogue” happened only among the IRPT members, independent experts, and the international organizations (Alert 2012). Since 2014, the pressure applied against the IRPT started being quite significant. The government has been using all measures, outlined in the Protocol 32-20 to discredit them.

On 4 September 2015, a clash took place between the government and the forces of the deputy minister of Defence, Abduhallim Nazarzoda, who, reportedly, with a group of 135 armed followers, attacked a number of state structures and then vanished in the mountains. A military operation to neutralize these rebels lasted about two weeks. The government reported the situation as a coup attempt and claims that Gen. Nazarzoda acted under the direct order of the IRPT leader, Kabiri. The alternative version of the events is that the situation was fabricated by the ruling elite itself, for these events coincided with the official meeting in Dushanbe of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), one of the goals of which is to defend the constitutional order of its members against such rebellions. The Secretary-General of the CSTO, Nikolai Borduzha, did not define these actions as an attempt of coup d’état, but rather as a clash between two different forces that emerged from the civil war and which are still in the process of sharing influence. He stated that it can be seen as activity of forces who did not admit the “loss of power in their country” after the civil war, meaning the UTO. He also used this context to mention the ISIS and its influence in Central Asia (Ozodinews 2015). However, as a result, since 4 September 2015, a new wave of political repression against the IRPT has started. Thirteen members of the IRPT’s political council were arrested, and its leader left the country.

Another opposition movement, “Group 24”, has been denounced as being “extremist” and its members arrested. The leader of this movement, Umaralli Kuvvatov was killed on March 5, 2015 in Istanbul, reportedly, by the security services of Tajiksitan. The leader of a youth movement “Youth for the Revival of Tajikistan”, Maksut Ibragimov, was extradited from Russia in January
2015 and incarcerated. Other opposition leaders in exile are now resisting extradition from Russia (Process 2015).

The presumed presence of ISIS along the Afghanistani-Tajikistani border gives the government extra arguments in outlawing and harassing opposition leaders, specifically those within the IRPT. The reasons centered around memories of UTO connections with Afghanistani warlords and their popular support among the large Tajik communities in Afghanistan and the attempt to organize political Islam within the framework of a secular state.

Thus, since 2000 to date the ruling elite managed to gain direct control over Tajikistan’s economic resources, her main financial revenues and marginalize its political rivals. Whether securitization let the ruling elite gain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force is debatable. The state increased its despotic power by weakening its infrastructural power. It managed to silence its people through hardship and memories of the civil war. Yet, this does not mean that the state extended its political authority over its entire territory. It tries to secure CSTO attention now by military means. Even though infrastructural power is “the ability to tax, maintain order, regulate society, and generally govern their societies” (Mann 1993), revenue collection has been conducted through the appropriation of the main sectors of the economy and directly controlling the business and banking sectors. Rather than creating a socio-political order, the ruling elite creates a manageable disorder, except in those sectors it directly controls. Furthermore, the link between revenue collection and the state budget is weak.

There are other types of taxes which seemingly leave the provincial governments some room to maneuver, as these revenues can be administered and partially distributed locally. For instance, in 2009 the provincial governments’ sources of financing included taxes, such as enterprise profit tax, property tax on enterprises, personal income tax, land tax, tax on small businesses, a unified tax for producers of agricultural products, etc. (USAID 2009, 6). And still these functions are administered at the national level, but their implementation is shared with the sub-
national governments. Juxtaposing this list with the list of direct revenue collection by the ruling elite and the structural embeddedness of the economic control exercised by it, it is possible to see that the competences over these revenues do not provide the local level governments with enough economic powers to collect their revenues and compose their own local budgets. However, issues of acute social importance, such as social care, water and waste management remain the responsibility\textsuperscript{126} of the subnational governments (USAID 2009, 9). De facto functional centralization is added to by de jure centralization. For example, according to the Public Finance Management Strategy adopted by Decree 542 in September 2008, the role of central ministries in the budget process is increased (USAID 2009, 12). Considering that this sharing of responsibilities is conducted within an overarching system of direct revenue collection from the state’s major economic sectors by the ruling elite, there should be no doubt about the centralized functionality of the state.

The link between these revenues and budget maintenance is not obvious. Revenues from strategic industries, such as aluminum/TALCO, cotton and energy sectors, are sent offshore. The agricultural sector is managed in a similar way by imposing the “Plan”, which benefits a small fraction of people. The energy sector lets the government tax its citizens for the construction of Rogun dam, a project that will not serve their interests, but rather the interests of the ruling elite to export more water to Iran and Afghanistan. And even the least materialistic fight, the one against Islamism, is conducted through \textit{de facto} taxing entrepreneurs and directing money toward an obscure goal, with little relation to the state budget. Drug trafficking is another revenue-collection source, one that also yields additional revenues in the form of foreign aid for fighting narco-trafficking. The foreign aid in this area, as well as IMF and the World Bank loans and grants

\textsuperscript{126} It is very difficult to accomplish this by means of provincial level logistics, because some parts of this territory were assigned for the chemical waste during the Soviet period. There is still a huge radiation zone between Hujand and Isfara cities. Whereas during the Soviet period these sites were properly maintained, today these fields lack even a simple fence to prevent animals crossing them. With the climate change it becomes even more difficult to control the consequences of the poor maintenance.
for structural reforms are channeled through the national banking system, which is again a vehicle of the ruling elite.

For these reasons, the state has been failing to centralize its political authority over a given territory. Since most of the state management system seems to benefit the Dangara clan/Kulyabi elite, the military actions of 2012, 2014, and 2015 have been popularly perceived as an intervention of one elite into the domain of another, rather than the state trying to establish a socio-political order. In other words, the direct control over the financial and economic sectors of the country has little to do with channeling the economic sources of power to the state in order to further use it to extend its political authority. Instead of connecting Tajikistan’s fragmented territories through an organized fiscal system, as part of local and state budgets, control over the fragmented territories has been exercised by the extensive use of the military power from the start through to the present. The elimination of rival elites, the closure of the IRPT, as the last symbol of the former UTO influence, does not signify the end of social resistance. It signifies its shift abroad or extension beyond the territory of Tajikistan, especially when one thinks that 10% of the entire population already works abroad. Thus, the state is falling back into the medieval type of statehood, identified by Finer (1975), i.e. with centralized functionality and decentralized territoriality.

5.2 Uzbekistan: the strategy of accommodation

Introduction

Historically, the map of elites in Uzbekistan corresponded to the geographical regions of the country itself: Fergana, Samarkand, Bukhara, Djizak, Kashkadarya, Surhandarya, Tashkent, and Khorezm. Elites within these regions have been enmeshed within their regional societal histories. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan was the only case of the three being examined here that did not destroy the historical elites. Instead it involved them in the bargaining over state
formation. Schematically, this bargaining could be described as being between state and local elites. The ruling elite has monopolized the state’s military and institutional power, thereby guaranteeing its continuity and its grasp over the lion’s share of economy. In the post-Soviet history of Uzbekistan, the state or the ruling elite has been represented by the President and his supporters, while the local elites’ fabric is slightly more complex. The local elites or in this case regional elites are less intertwined with one another than in neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, due to greater state control. Often, the local elites are part of the “regional opposition” which includes a range of alternative agendas, from criminal to Islamic (Babajanov 2005).

The strategy of accommodation, as adopted by President Karimov, is defined here as negotiating spheres of influence with regional elites to try accommodating their interests on a regional basis, as well as ensuring a constant rotation or personnel or cadres to prevent the interests of any rival elites from taking root within state institutions. However, we will explore whether the power over institutions is a necessary and sufficient conditions for consolidation of political authority. In practice, the outcome of the ruling elite strategies of managing rival elites in Uzbekistan is twofold. On the one hand, the state elite managed to centralize the existing patronage structures under the hierarchical structure of the state. On the other hand, the issues left to the free-will of local elites in exchange for their loyalty to the state are grounded in past legacies and in the present processes of privatization, which may happen beyond state control. It shows that these processes give farmers, which largely compose the rural elites some space for maneuvering by shifting their activities to the informal area. Specifically, the sponsors of the farming enterprises, which used to be the representatives of the local elites, are now de facto invisible, as they do not register their activity under their own name. Hence, by too much centralization, the state elite blinds itself, as it subordinates the spaces that are “legible”, and deprives itself from the capacity to see the spaces that are “illegible” by official standards (Scott 1997).
5.2.1 The state as a bargain: elites and their spheres of influence

The ruling elite’s power-logistics

The state elites represented by Islam Karimov, can be described as originating from the Samarkand-Bukhara-Jizzak-Tashkent regions. Karimov is originally from Samarkand, but his initial legitimacy stems from his neutral position within the constellation of elites, rather than from his origins as such. Upon rising to power, he faced the strong patronage structures of local elites, created and strengthened during the period of Shafar Rashidov, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan between 1959 and 1983. Rashidov was the first leader to institutionalize patronage and make it an inalienable element of the Soviet government in Uzbekistan (Ilkhamov 2004, 174). The central Soviet authorities had to rely on these local elites in order to keep the remote peripheries under control. In essence, the arrangement between the central Soviet authorities and the local elites implied little interference in the local selection of personnel in order to secure cadre stability and the distribution of resources within provinces (Rigby 1979). After gaining official control over local resources, the regional elites could strengthen their control of unofficial and illicit distribution channels, which they had previously established in various sectors, such as trade, communal services, and housing construction. It was at this time that shadow economic activities became a significant part of the political economy of the local elites. In practice, elite figures with unofficial influence in shadow structures relied on elite figures with official positions within the state for political and legal protection for the conversion of public economic resources into private ones (Ilkhamov 2004, 177). Karimov’s neutrality within these processes gained him the trust of different elite circles in 1989 in the middle of perestroika, when he was elected the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (Fjæstad 2012).

127 During the Soviet period, Islam Karimov was not involved in the infamous “Cotton Scandal”. It was Shafar Rashidov, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, who managed to organize the local patronage networks to falsify the cotton production in order to divert most Soviet subsidies to Uzbekistan.
Despite his personal detachment from the regional elites, Islam Karimov had to rely on them to secure his rise to power at the outset of independence. That was the point at which he applied the strategy of accommodation in order to both secure his rise to power and to consolidate it. The two main elite structures which he relied upon were the ones headed by Ismail Djurabekov, the minister of Water Management and, like President Karimov, a native of Samarkand province, and the Tashkent city elites, headed by Shukrullo Mirsaidov, the mayor of Tashkent. In return for his support, Mirsaidov and Djurabekov were appointed prime minister and deputy prime-minister, respectively, with the latter “controlling the agricultural and water management sector” (Ilkhamov 2004, 178). To prevent the alienation of the remainder of the Tashkent elite, in 1991, Karimov orchestrated a confrontation with the Mirsaidov-led elites. This strategy won him the support of the rest of the Tashkent elite. After winning the Presidential elections, Karimov pressured Mirsaidov from the political arena to strengthen his ties with the rest of the Tashkent elite, part of which was against Mirsaidov (Ilkhamov 2004, 179).

The influence of Tashkent elite was later consolidated through key appointments to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MVES) and the National Bank for Foreign Economic Relations (NBU). These two institutions oversaw two large sources of revenue for the state: the control of export and import through the issuing of requisite licenses, and the distribution of international loans (Ilkhamov 2004). Considering that the key exports were cotton and fuel, the key strategic constituents of the country’s economy, the Tashkent elite was able to gain considerable control of economic resources. Over time, Islam Karimov continued to distance himself from the regional elites of Samarkand (Fjæstad 2012). He has sought to accommodate the local elites without letting them institutionalize their power within the state structures, at least not without his consent. Where there was a threat of interests that would oppose his vision of the state being institutionalized, he rotated the cadres. To date, President Karimov has been reelected.
to office five times\textsuperscript{128} as a member of the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, which in 2008 was transformed into the Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan.

The strategy of accommodation in Uzbekistan was conducted as follows. Firstly, the state elite monopolized the military sector. Secondly, it made the levers of coercive power one of the main pillars of the structure of patronage in the country, i.e. any patronage-based decisions would go through a figure related to the security or law-enforcement structures, which in their turn are directly connected to the President. If, in the minor areas of economy, state elites left some room for maneuver to the local elites, control over the strategically important resources, such as cotton and energy has remained in the hands of the state elites. This is because rent-seeking opportunities in these two fields would require the coercive power (Markowitz 2013). The military sector in Uzbekistan consists of the Ministry of Interior and the National Security Service. Their ministers are appointed directly by the President (Markowitz 2013). The former has been the cornerstone of the President’s power in Uzbekistan. Unlike other state ministries, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) has been immune\textsuperscript{129} to cadre rotations, due to the fact that they provided the backbone of Karimov’s power and secured the smooth transition from Communism (Faizi 2003). For 14 years, until January 5, 2006, the office of the minister of internal affairs was occupied by a figure loyal to the President, Zakir Almanov.

The main rival to the MVD institution is the SNB (the successor to the regional KGB), which, along with the Prosecutor’s Office and the military divisions deployed on Uzbek territory, used to be under the direct control of Moscow (Ilkhamov 2006). The influence of the Minister of Internal Affairs extended to the “control over Uzbek business structure and large-scale fund-raising activities (i.e. bribery) and, reportedly, drug trafficking” (Ilkhamov 2006). SNB also possessed tools of coercion and large economic resources (Ilkhamov 2006). Subsequently, both of these structures

\textsuperscript{128} The latest Presidential elections were held on April 29, 2015.
\textsuperscript{129} Karimov consider crime to be a form of civil dissent, not only a challenge to social tranquility (Ilkhamov 2006).
have established themselves as decisive links in the chain of patronage structures which had a grasp over significant parts of economy and other powerful governmental structures (Markowitz 2013). Specifically, “the MVD controlled the Customs Committee and some local governments, while SNB ruled over the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Border Guard, and, to a certain extent, the Uzbek Army” (Ilkhamov 2006). President Karimov has directly encouraged this competition “in order to create an internal system of checks-and-balances” (Ilkhamov 2006).

Among the primary goals of these two agencies, authors highlight: 1) fighting the regime’s enemies and 2) guaranteeing their survival in the post-Karimov era, pursued by the MVD and the SNB, respectively. To achieve these goals, both agencies “sought their own constituencies within the country’s political opposition” (Ilkhamov 2006). The Minister of Internal Affairs, Bakhodir Matlyubov (the former chairman of the State’s Customs Committee), together with other key political figures composing the state elite (such as Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoev and Central Bank Chairman Fayzulla Mulladjanov) control the distribution of foreign investment going through the center (Fjaestad 2012; Ilkhamov 2006).

The local elites and their room for maneuver

Local elites can be depicted as including official regional authorities, appointed directly by the President, former chiefs of the collectives (kolkhoz bosses), and newly emergent regional strongmen who covertly invest in and control household farms despite not being the registered owners, so as to control cross-border trade (Trevisani 2007). In spite of the fact that these strongmen are not necessarily rooted in these regions’ societal histories, they possess the potential to bridge the formal and informal economies. In addition to these, there are religious leaders who, at the time of perestroika, would have represented the forces of opposition. For this reason they are treated as political rivals rather than as the spiritual leaders.
However, not all of these elites made it to organizing themselves as the legitimate opposition. The first organized opposition started developing at the beginning of the 1990s and was organized under the umbrella of the Birlik movement, which comprised semi-criminal groups and movements united on a regional basis. Such groups included “Surkarsh” (from Surhadar’ya and Kashkadar’ya provinces), “FAN”, from Fergana, Andijan, and Namangan provinces and the “Erk” party under the leadership of Muhammad Solih, from Khorezm (Knyazev 2005). Some authors underscore the criminal element of the organized opposition, relying on the fact that Fergana, Andijan and Namandan are statistically among the regions demonstrating the highest rates of drug trafficking, along with Surhadar’ya and Kashkadar’ya (Knyazev 2005). Another wing of the opposition comprised radical movements and groups, such as “Adolat”, “Odamijli va insonparvarlik”, “Islom lashkarlari”, “Nur” and “Tovba”. Adherents of these groups took part in the Tajikistani civil war on the side of the United Tajik Opposition, training in the camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which made the core of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). A third facet of the opposition is composed of akramits (also called as “ljmonchilar”, “Akramija”, “Halifatchilar”). The founder of Akramiya is Akrom Yuldashev, who was, at the same time, a member of one of the cells of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Babajanov 2005). The social organization of the opposition is reported as being composed of a group of the old elite whose interests contradict those of the ruling elite and who rely on the “marginal parts” of the population. These groups have also had close connections with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which, as described in chapter 2, represent the most radical opposition to the government of Islam Karimov (Babadjanov 1999).

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130 He gained his 12,4 percent, mainly due to the support of the electorate of the Khorezm province, where he, originally, is from (Knyazev, website).
131 Knyazev underlines the connections between the leaders of these parties with the military groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan. For example, the first deputy of Tohir Yuldash and his brother-in-law Dilshod Hojiev, who are controlling the financial issues, live in the town of Bannu. The leader of the military wing is Mohammah Ayub (whose original name is Ulugbek Hojiev). These figures are all originally coming from the Namangan province and other parts of the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan.
132 Knyazev calls them “neofits”, because they share the above stated characteristics and the lack of the concrete political program that would address the current societal problems and the steps of their resolution.
The next wing of the opposition is represented by those elements of civil society concerned with human rights, such as the “Society of human rights in Uzbekistan”, chaired by Abdumannob Pulatov and supported by American sponsorship (Knyazev 2005). The opposition coalition “Serkuesh Uzbekistonim” (“Sun coalition”), with the support of this organization, was created before the Andijan events in 2005. Reportedly, the goal of this coalition is not to organize a color revolution, but to initiate a constructive dialogue with the ruling elite in order to work together towards economic and political reforms (Knyazev 2005).

As a part of his accommodation strategy, Islam Karimov left the distribution of credit to local agricultural enterprises to the local elites at the beginning of his rule (Markowitz 2013). The control over cross-border trade, bazaars, household farms, and (autonomous) regional fiscal policies was also left to the local elites (Markowitz 2013; Trevisani 2007). This allowed regional (or rural) elites to gain control over the informal economic processes. This is different from Tajikistan, where ruling elite took control of economic resources, but left to the rival elites coercive power.

The importance of regional elites and the necessity of incorporating their interests within the political debate was demonstrated by the Andijan protests in 2005, which resulted from the dismissal of an influential local leader, the general fatigue of the monopolization of the state institutions by the President, as well as the prohibition from choosing what to cultivate on household farms (Trevisani 2007; Markowitz 2013). The Andijan protest was a turning point. (A. Ilkhamov 2006). As a result, Islam Karimov implemented the establishment of a bi-cameral Parliament\(^\text{133}\), with the Senate comprised of the representatives of the regions (six from each region; with 16 appointed directly by the President), and the lower Chamber, to which the members would be elected through direct elections (UzParliament 2015).

The opposition party “Erk” made it to the parliament and has become more visible due to its leader Absamad Mallaev, who has supported an alliance with the movement “Birlik halk

\(^{133}\) The law about its establishment was issued in 2001.
harakati” (new name of “Birlik”). However, this party has not yet achieved any influence vis-à-vis the ruling elite. After the creation of the bi-cameral Parliament in 2005, none of these parties is presently represented in Parliament. Reportedly, none of the parties included in the Parliament represent a viable alternative to the President’s power. The only significant opponent President Karimov has had to face was Muhammad Solih, one of the founders of “Birlik” movement and the “Erk” party in 1989. In 1991 he gained 12% of the votes at the Presidential elections. The reported falsification of results provoked a students’ demonstration, the participants of which were executed (Fahritdinov 2002, Lansford 2015). In protest, Muhammad Solih gave up his mandate and went into exile in Turkey. Despite his exile, the activities of the Erk party are still continuing.135

Today, there are five parties in the Parliament: pro-presidential Liberal-Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (52 posts), The “Milij Tiklanish” party (36 posts), Peoples Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (27 posts), Social-Democratic Party “Adolat” (20 posts), and Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan (15 posts) (MFA 2014). In anticipation of the Presidential elections to be held on March, 29, 2015, the social-democratic party “Adolat” and the NDPU proclaimed itself a parliamentary opposition. The Parliamentary majority or the so-called “Democratic Forces Bloc” is comprised of Milij Tiklanysh and the Liberal Democratic Party (UzParliament 2015). Thus the regional elites achieved political leverage for their interests. Considering that they have a better grasp on informal economic activities, this leverage could become a means to institutionalize that influence. The strategy of accommodation includes only those local elites who are not motivated

134 Originating from one of the most famous aristocratic circles of Khorezm. His father was Muhammad Amin (Madamin-Bek) himself. Muhammad Salih, a prominent poet of Uzbekistan, whose poetry is based on the Rumi tradition and metaphysical and mystical thinking of Sufism. He was the first to translate Kafka and French poets of the 20s century into Uzbek.

135 For example, in 2009 by the initiative of Salih a coalition of the opposition forces of Uzbekistan has been established. It consists of “Union of the 13 of May”, Erk party, organization “Andijan: Justice and Renaissance” and “Tayanch” (Opora/the Basis). On 28 May, 2011, this platform transformed into the People’s Movement of Uzbekistan, which has comprised eight organizations, representing different social group, including moderate Muslim communities. Salih has been elected as the Chairman of the People’s Movement of Uzbekistan by the majority of the delegates. In 2012, the second meeting of the PMU proclaimed M.Solih as its leader, again.
by a strong Islamic cause. The idea of the secular Uzbekistan defines those elites which are permitted to remain in play and those which are banished from the levers of state power. As a result of the strategy of accommodation, coercive capacity has been monopolized by state elites and revenue collection placed in the hand of local elites.

5.2.2. Surveillance: how to centralize power without destroying existing patronage structures

Centralization of power in Uzbekistan has mainly been organized via an emphasis on military and economic sources of power. The ideological sphere has remained centralized, with any ideological debate limited within the boundaries of the central idea of the secular state and strict separation of religion from the state. The political sphere has remained the only arena for competition, albeit under conditions of overarching state surveillance. Economic power as such has been achieved, not so much through the monopolization of the strategic areas of the economy, but rather through shaping the economy in such way that its survival depends on the state. Specifically, the economy is primarily based on the twin pillars of cotton and energy as the main sources of revenue. Rent-seeking from these resources are impossible without the involvement of patronage structures, in which law enforcement agencies are heavily involved. Additional sources of revenue, such as foreign investment, had been captured by means of diffuse surveillance which permeates the banking system.

In short, the centralization of power by the state elite could be depicted as follows: 1) the exclusion of any opposition with radically different ideas of the state beyond that which is conforms to a relatively homogenous field of bargaining (i.e. strict separation of religion from the state); 2) frequent rotation of cadres; 3) making the coercive apparatus part of the patronage structures, and so providing support for itself through military power; 4) surveillance of the banking system and money transactions as a means to divert investments to particular sectors of
economy; 5) regulating informal social structures, such as mahallas, thus partially controlling social life, private spaces, and social order. It is worth noting, however, that the underlying trend was not for the state elite to destroy the patronage structures of the local elites. Instead, it sought to turn the military or coercive power available to it into an integral part of its patronage. While the political and the societal spheres have been up for negotiation, the state has been monopolized from the outset. Support for this monopoly was provided by key law enforcement institutions: the Ministry of Interior and on the later stages, the National Security Services (the former KGB). Monopolization of the state allowed for continuity of the President’s power, while coercion allowed for surveillance of the existing patronage structures.

In the course of his rule, President Karimov has sought to accommodate the interests of regional elites, without allowing them to build a power base within the state. To do so, he has ensured a constant turnover of personnel (Fjæstad 2012). In the remote regions, the institutional infrastructure of the state has not been developed, which makes recourse to the decision-making apparatus in Tashkent unavoidable in deals concerning strategic national economic resources. For example, deals involving cotton or energy, licensing for small businesses and investment gaining have to go through Tashkent. In this way, any accommodation must be conducted in such a way that representatives of regional elites would be directly or indirectly under state surveillance. The centralization of power in Uzbekistan has therefore led to the establishing of a degree of surveillance in strategic areas of state management.

The exclusion of the opposition began in 1992, when President Karimov won the presidential elections, defeating the charismatic leader of the Birlik movement and Erk party, Muhammad Solih. Since 1991, Birlik, Erk and Akromiya provided the bulk of the Islamist opposition to President Karimov’s rise to power. As a result, President Karimov started controlling the activity of these parties. Specifically, Birlik and Erk were banned in Uzbekistan. In doing so, President Karimov defined the limits of political debate within the state. One could compete politically, but
only within certain ideological boundaries that would benefit the state elites. This limited the bargaining potential of the local elites.

At the same time, President Karimov loosened economic controls, allowing for rent-seeking opportunities for the regional elites, as well as allowing them relative freedom to decide their fiscal policies, as these had remained relatively autonomous until 1997 (Ilkhamov 2004). However, in the late 1990s new economic reforms introduced more state control in the economy. For instance, a newly created Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (in 1994) was assigned the task of import controls, which, by 1997, had overturned earlier concessions which had “granted de facto control over cross-border trade to provincial government” (Markowitz 2013, 104). Furthermore, where the distribution of foreign investment at the local level was previously executed by the local elites, since the late 1990s new credit schemes were introduced. The distribution of credit to local agricultural enterprises was now conducted through the Tashkent office, instead of through regional branches (Markowitz 2013, 104). Extending credit to small and medium-sized enterprises now has to go through the Uzbekistan’s Business-Foundation136 (Markowitz 2013, 104).

The most important aspects of the strategy of accommodation, such as autonomous fiscal policies were also reduced in 1997. However, when, in 1997, regional voices started raising concerns and the state elite feared resistance from regional elites, it was decided that the state’s subsidies to regional budgets would be cut to half of the amount of 1996137 (Markowitz 2013, 105). These reforms reportedly led to two outcomes. Firstly, they ensured that the gatekeepers of any rent-seeking opportunities would centrally appointed governors, accountable directly to the President (Markowitz 2013, 105). A further, unintended outcome appeared to be that local elites were incentivized to seek out “alternative strategies of rent seeking” (Markowitz 2013, 104).

136 “Averaging 130 projects per region and totaling an annual 4.68 billion so’m ($5 million) by 2003— was also centralized through central offices” (Markowitz 2013, 104).
137 It went from 26.6 percent in 1996 to 13 percent in 1997 and 1998.
The frequent rotation of cadres is another tool designed to make the regional elites more accountable to the center. For instance, between 1995 and 2003 there was a series of dismissals of provincial governors for mismanagement and corruption. These dismissals resulted from “investigations of the shortcomings in agricultural production in the regions” conducted by the First Deputy Prime Minister and the head of the country’s Agro-Industrial Complex, Ismail Jorobekov (Markowitz 2013, 105).

Steps towards centralization have been undertaken on the organizational or institutional side. For example, prosecutors’ offices are usually the means for providing rent-seeking opportunities to the local elites. Prosecutors (Prokuratura) are one of several state bodies “directly under the president (as chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers), along with ministries of Interior, Defense, Justice, National Security, Foreign Affairs, and the Border Protection Committee. Second-tier ministries and committees within the state are directly managed by the prime minister” (Markowitz 2013, 108). Thus, the center has been always concerned with balancing the growing powers of governors (Markowitz 2013, 109).

As has been already highlighted in previous chapters, the de-collectivization process has not fully taken place in Central Asia. In part this allowed the state elite to maintain a type of economy that would need a centralized state to guarantee its survival. As described in chapter 3, although household farms had been created, they did not displace the collective farms. The peculiarity of management of these two types of farms in parallel has provided space for the development of shadow economies. The existing local elites, who received revenues from cotton, as well as wider agrarian sector, controlled the local distribution of subsidies, land and water in this sector. In this way, they profited from partially untangled collective farms (Pomfret 2000, 271; 2000a). The local elites controlling this at the beginning of the 1990s were represented mainly by the former kolkhoz chiefs who, regardless of their current official positions, maintained a large

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138 Chapter 3 provides numbers on how in practice increased after the de-collectivization process.
grasp over the kolkhoz lands. In order to control this situation, the state elite granted oversight of these issues to local governors appointed directly by the President. In theory, the local governors would represent a link between the state elite and the farmers (Tilly 1975). This link dissolves in the complex constellation of the variety of farms, which were not integrated into the overarching agricultural management system. As described in chapter 3, in the post-Soviet period the number of kolkhozes increased from 971 in 1991 to 1,374 in 1996.\(^{139}\) Furthermore, other economic forms of agricultural management, such as shirkats (cooperatives), private livestock farms, joint-stock companies, rental enterprises and agrfirms have been established. Hence, agricultural management comprised a variety of non-state organizations, the “political economical nature [of which seems] rather undefinable” (Ilkhamov 1998, 540). This situation provided room for maneuver under the seemingly overarching state surveillance, which is described in section 5.2.3 as the space of contestation of the state. Since the new types of agricultural management foster new types of strongmen, who have a closer link to the farmers than either regional or state elites. Hence, despite making them a cornerstone of agriculture and economy, the link between the state and the local elites, and thus with the farmers, has not been established as it has in the Chinese case, which relied on the community and household farms in their agricultural management.

However, the collectives still matter, since the household farms depend on them for the distribution of water, which has been a crucial means of leverage over leasehold farms in a region defined largely by water shortages. Furthermore, the decisions over what is to be produced, the distribution of subsidies, fertilizers, and marketing outputs remain at the discretion of collectives’ administrators who do not possess a direct connection to the newly organized leasehold or household farms (Pomfret 2000). This exemplifies why the regional governors, who hold the main competences over the farms, still do not possess a direct connection to the farmers, and thus do

\(^{139}\) Due to the transformation of sovkhozes into kolkhozes; the different between them is that sovkhozes were funded directly from the state budget and their output had to entirely go to the state; kolkhozes were non-budgetary enterprises had the right to sell their output or at least its surplus at the local bazaars.
not always influence their survival strategies and informal economic practices. They do not therefore represent a viable link in state–society relations.

The link between the state and the society exists, rather, in a classic top-down manner, through the “dependence on a major crop” (cotton), which the state pushes to be cultivated as it comprises its major export good (Pomfret 2000, 272). Cotton cultivation is the major area which demonstrates how tightly knit the state and regional elites, the central banks and law enforcement agencies are. Cotton is the so-called “unlootable resource”, since it is difficult to transfer into cash and rents in a way which bypasses the authority of the patronage structures (Markowitz 2013; Pomfret 2000). Specifically, the decision of what is going to be cultivated, in what amount and in which regions, comes from the state. Further, the state-controlled banking system acts as a monitor, since:

By law purchases of seeds, fertilizer, machinery, fuel, and other inputs must be through bank transfer, and revenue from agricultural sales must be deposited in a bank and can only be used for approved purposes. Depositors’ right of withdrawal in cash is circumscribed by centrally determined limits and local practice. The banks do not serve their depositors, but serve the state in checking that funds are used appropriately. There is no confidentiality or security. Indeed, bank account information is routinely supplied to local officials seeking information about a farmer’s activities, and taxes may be deducted directly from bank accounts (Pomfret 2000, 272-273).

The “dependency” of the state on this kind of economy is exemplified by the amount of revenues collected from the cotton sector. For example in 1993, the cotton sector provided a sixth of government revenue140 (World Bank 1996). In subsequent years, this percentage was even larger in 1994 and the first half of 1995 “when world cotton prices increased faster than domestic prices in dollar terms” (Pomfret 2000, 276). While the cotton price was sensitive to changes in exchange rates, and therefore went up and down, the resultant trend was the decline in the cotton farmers’ share of the world price, due to the “continuing increase in the black market premium on dollars in 1997 and 1998” (Pomfret 2000, 276). However, in order to fill in this gap in revenues, the state

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140 “The net tax on farmers from the state-order-system-sum subsidies amounted to $367” (Pomfret 2000, 276).
elite adopted more punitive taxation and cut subsidies, which caused a long-run loss of sales and encouragement of illegal economic activities (Pomfret 2000, 277). Eventually, cotton revenue collection was organized through the Selkhozfond of the Ministry of Finance, a “non-transparent entity accountable only to the narrow circle within the leadership” (Muradov and Ilkhamov 2014, 9). Reportedly, “in 2012 the government’s profit from the sale of cotton was almost $264 million, when calculated using the artificially-low official exchange rate; or over $641 million at the most realistic black market rate” (Muradov and Ilkhamov 2014, 9).

In this way the omnipresent surveillance state proves its might when it comes to making sure that none of the stakeholders engaging with the state are able to implement their visions of the state, economy and society. The patronage structures are not destroyed, but are rather embraced in order to preserve the “human factor” of politics, making politics more submissive to the state elite. However, in structural terms, the “human factor” steps in and fosters processes that shift to the space of the informal. This shift to the field of informal may not necessarily be an elite-creating factor, but it is definitely a source of new processes which go beyond the links the state builds up with its societies. The weakness of the omnipresent surveillance state lies in the fact that it sees what it is able to see. The processes that develop in the shadows are beyond its sight and thus its control.

5.2.3. What if the Panopticon had corners: emerging elites or the shift of resistance

The snapshots of mass protests, the phenomenon of the “absentee landlordism”, and the diverting of survival strategies into the informal economic realm can be seen as the types of resistance to the centralization of power. The first snapshot of social mobilization against the state elite was registered in Andijan in 2005. This event was internationally condemned as “the Andijan massacre”. Subsequent interpretations thereof emphasize the ideological/religious component and condemn the non-democratic governance of one of those “stans’ dictators”. It exemplified the
influence the local elites possess in mobilizing societies (HRW 2005). Religious and democratic sentiments aside, Andijan demonstrated that the local elites are a multi-dimensional category, with a developing layer of the so-called “unruly elite”, the patrons or strongmen who are in practice businessmen, doing business out of agriculture through the cross-border trade.141 As Babadzhanov records, the protest was organized by the members of the Akromiya group, characterized by a mish-mash of quasi-Islamic radical rhetoric with pragmatic business and, at times, illicit interests (Babadjanov 2005). On the day of the protest, a group of protesters released prisoners and seized weapons belonging to police officers at the cost of the those officers’ lives142 (Babadjanov 2005). The events had been preceded by month-long protests against the arrests of the twenty-three local businessmen for their connection to Akromiya.143 On May 12, the protesters took over several police stations, a military garrison, attacked the National Security Service Headquarters in Andijan, and stormed the prison releasing about five hundred prisoners (Markowitz 2013). Heavily armed themselves, the protesters moved to the Babur square with the slogans “Allah Akbar” in an attempt to attract public participation (Babadjanov 2005). At this point, the government used military force against the demonstrators.

The Andijan events threw a spotlight on what has developing in the societal shadows. The economic and fiscal reforms and centralization of import and export control which shifted the bargaining framework was meant to shift the bargaining power to the side of the state elite. The latter attempted to extend control over the area of the informal economy as well. Specifically, restrictions concerning cross-border trade through the bazaars, which comprised the key sector of the informal economy were exercised in the following steps: 1) the government introduced the restrictions against shuttle trade and in May 2002 levied excessively high tariffs on consumer

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141 At the early 1990s it would be shuttle-traders or dealers of cotton smuggling across the borders. Today, these are the investors of the leasehold independent farms.

142 The fact silenced by the internationals, as “the servants of the dictator” might be less of a human being than those committing crimes behind the veil of religious slogans.

143 Extremist religious group, aiming to overthrow the state elite in order to implement the idea of the Islamic state.
imports (reached 90 percent); 2) in December 2002, smaller enterprises engaging in wholesale import trade were outlawed; 3) in 2003, stalls at major bazaars were auctioned at prohibitively high rates for small shuttle traders; and 4) in November 2004, a law was passed requiring traders to use cash registers and put their earnings in bank accounts (Markowitz 2013, 101; Radnitz 2010; Lewis 2008). As described above, the banking system is one of the cornerstones of surveillance, and so it was perceived by the public as an intrusion into the private sphere. These restrictive laws were the same across all provinces. Since these laws made all traders more vulnerable to tax officials, police, and state prosecutors, they generated popular discontent among local traders and prominent businessmen in the bazaars in every region of Uzbekistan (Markowitz 2013).

Another explanation suggests that the lack of economic liberalization is the reason for the diversion of economic activity to the informal social structures and informal trade (Radnitz 2010; Lewis 2008). Others explain it in terms of the competition for power within the local administration itself and among the local clans and groups with diverse regional identities (Collins 2006; McGlinchey 2005; Schatz 2004; Jones Luong 2002). Finally, some scholars see this event as the result of competition for access to state resources by different “government-linked business enterprises” (rather than broad-based societal support) or “unchecked rent seeking”, emphasizing that de facto control over cross-border trade belonged to the provincial governments at least until 1996 (Markowitz 2013, 104; Lewis 2008). Thus, before centralization took place by diverting control to the Ministry of Economic Relations, the system of rent-reeking (and the new strongmen that emerged as a result) and informal practices had already developed. And since the main function of the surveillance inbuilt into the state’s infrastructural power was the channeling of rent-seeking, it was this rent-seeking that became institutionalized, rather than the authority of the state as a political, ideological, and institutional entity. In societal terms, the informal strategies of survival have, de facto, become organized in parallel to the state. Hence, the rapid change of the governmental strategy has threatened the very bargaining powers of the regional
and local elites. To balance this, however, the state elite established the bi-cameral parliament, with a Senate consisting of the representatives of the regional elites (Ilkhamov 2004).

What one can see is that in the early 1990s the state elite created favorable conditions for institutionalization of rent-seeking and for the creation of informal economic practices. Cross-border trade through the bazaars became the principal domain of the local elites and the newly emerging strongmen, with their societies making the bazaar the main unit of their survival strategy, and cross-border trade their main practice. Starting in 1996, this dark corner was (partially) withdrawn from the purview of the regional and local elites, thus violating the relations established between their societal domains. This contributed to growing social resistance. However, this coincided with growing support for “non-standard cross-border trade” supported by the World Bank programs, as discussed in chapter 4. This meant that the informal sector gained additional sponsors, beyond the state elite or even the official regional elites, thus possibly constituting the space of societal resistance to the central state. Contrary to the authorized explanations of social protests in Uzbekistan, it is not “the lack of economic liberalization that caused the uprisings” (Radnitz 2010; Lewis 2008), but exactly the liberalization and the unruly local elites which mediate informal economic practices that contribute to the fragmentation of societies and therefore their unruliness by the central states.

How exactly, under such strict surveillance, does the phenomenon of informal trade become such a significant part of local survival strategies as to define the relations between local elites and their domains? The answer lies in the nature of the farming system, the parallel existence of many forms of farming as mentioned above and the fact that the state has established a Panopticon to control the elites. However, in the process of doing so, the meanings and hidden forms of what can be seen through its lens has been changing. As a result, the state itself has become a hostage of its own panopticism. Specifically, the problem is that the state preserved the cotton-based economy to make the economy more controllable. It embedded
surveillance into all structures of patronage, missing the moment when it became counterproductive to do so.

The complex constellation of agricultural management provides opportunities for the private sector to intrude into the sector of collective farms and proves that the existing patronage structures provide the opportunities for the development of the informal private sector do not fit into this system of surveillance (Ilkhamov 1998). The surplus sold at the local markets, the bazaars, made these units less controllable by the formal elites, at both state and regional level. Rather, they have been shifting into the domains of the entrepreneurs, due to the fact that the most amount of money resides in the pockets of those who control the bazaars, not in the local budget (direct and indirect taxes on products sold at the local markets) (Ilkhamov 1998, 553).

In addition to these factors, the societal fabric of rural Uzbekistan is not homogenous. The independent farmers, in principle, have a right to define what they would like to cultivate if they do not use state subsidies. Trevisani (2007) identifies the phenomenon of hidden farm sponsoring, which is officially illegal. However, since the only way to use nationalized land (the form in which de-collectivization took place in Uzbekistan) was leasing the land from the state, any land transactions must be “officially channeled through the district heads” and the money transfers are monitored fully by the banks as described above (Trevisani 2007, 94). The process of hidden farm sponsoring, which allows farmers to circumvent these restrictions, therefore takes the following form. The subleasing and selling of land to a third person can be achieved via a sharecropping agreement or “sold unofficially to the tillers” on mutually profitable terms (Trevisani 2007, 94). In practice, “the farmer enterprises are officially registered by individuals but always run as joint enterprise of the extended family, involving several households” (Trevisani 2007, 94). This allows newcomers to agriculture who are rich with capital to invest their money through informal deals on profitable land cropping schemes (Trevisani 2007, 96). This “absentee landlordism” means that the investors who prefer to stay unregistered outsource the management of the farm to local
workers on the basis of the share-cropping agreement (Trevisani 2007, 96). This trend is seen as the intrusion of privatization into the complex agricultural system in Uzbekistan (Ilkhamov 2004). Hence, the farm management is replaced by an indirect control over the means of production through the “hidden farm sponsoring” (Trevisani 2007, 97).\footnote{For detailed analysis of the hidden farm sponsoring and influence through which on the farming strategies and planning, see Trevisani (2007) and his research on Khorezm and rice cultivation, when the ban of rice cultivation in favor of cotton cultivation resulted in the mass protests against the formal regional authorities.}

This process is considered by some scholars as the one leading to emergence of the “new farmers” and the “new elites”, who coming from other sectors seeking to invest money, “through informal deals on profitable land cropping schemes” (Trevisani 2007, 96; Ilkhamov 2004). Since such deals are “officially registered by individuals but always run as joint enterprise of the extended family, involving several households” (Trevisani 2007, 94), this trend contributed to the general expansion of the parallel economy in the regions, and, therefore, the new local elites and the conditions conducive for the alternative sub-systems of governance.

In sum, Uzbekistani strategy of accommodation implied relying on patronage structures, rather than destroying them. However, marrying the military element with the political created the imbalance in the bargaining power and lead to silencing of the grassroots societal processes.

5.3 Kyrgyzstan and intermingling of elites: from a state of enlightenment to the shadow state

Introduction

The ruling elite in Kyrgyzstan changed three times during the independence period: in the early 1990s, in 2005, and in 2010. These events correspond to three changes of political power in the country, that is the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the coup d’état in 2005 that displaced President Askar Akaev, and the coup d’état in 2010 resulting in the displacement of President Kurmanbek Bakiev. All three ruling elites that emerged with these changes have adopted the strategy of intermingling, which is defined here as a pragmatic approach to politics, where elites
gather on an ad-hoc basis to address the interests of a certain elite group and then reshuffle themselves for another ad-hoc goal; the goals may vary from business through to personal ones (Mirsaitov, interview 2014).

Between 1991 and 2000, competition was between the two branches: the executive and the legislative, or between the Presidential vector of political development and Parliament. Due to the fact that the South was underrepresented in politics, this struggle was largely interpreted as the one between North and South. Viewed from this perspective, the Northern elite was seen as being represented by President Akaev whereas the Southern elite was represented by President Bakiev, even though on both sides there was no consensus among the constituent groupings of interests. An intermediate President, who ruled between 2010 and 2011, Rosa Otunbaeva, did not fit into this geographical interpretation since she was a symbol of the technocratic Soviet elite. For most of her career she served at the state diplomatic service. She was the only President who left office due to peaceful democratic elections in 2011, which resulted in the Presidency of Almazbek Atambaev. While Otunbaeva and Atambaev are the most recent presidents of the country, the struggle that primarily shaped the patterns of interaction among the competing elites was that of 2005 and 2010.

These patterns took the following forms. The division between the legal and the illegal power brokers blurred, and the *criminals-in-law*, defined as individuals commonly known for having conducted fraud, illicit trafficking, or murder, but who had managed to launder their assets or become useful for the elites in terms of access to these illicit revenues, can significantly influence politics; mass social protests were manipulated to put pressure on a particular President; places like prisons, squares, and bazaars have become as important in shaping politics as the Parliament and the Government; Courts retained little independence; and most importantly the state per se was treated as an “investment market” (Engvall 2011), sought as a resource to multiply the economic benefits of a particular group. Yet, in Kyrgyzstan, the state has not been
subjected to a single elite group and a small fraction of a society it represents, for the elites behave in a “predatory way” (Radnitz 2010), almost abandoning their supporters after having mobilized them to achieve their specific goals.

5.3.1. Price of multiculturalism in the age of nationalism: an Enlightened President and the Legendary Parliament

“Patriotism is slavery. A patriot lives against Reason and Consciousness. Instead of following his free will and free spirit, he serves the rulers - power-seeking, corrupt, and self-interested. He does so, regardless of the direct link between patriotism and war. It is unreasonable to build the modern states on patriotism.” (Lev Tolstoj 1900)

At the outset of independence, the map of the Kyrgyzstani elites was comprised of the political professionals from the Soviet era, who continued their political paths as the members of the so-called Legendary Parliament145 (the Jorogku Kenesh or the Highest Council). The Parliament consisted of 350 members who were elected through direct elections and lasted from 1990 until 1994. Legendary it is for it had to deal with creation of the legal and political order of a newly arranged state, draft the Constitution and the norms to live up to. The most prominent members of the Parliament included Tekebaev, Madumarov, Bakir-uulu, whose political parties146 had a great impact on the Kyrgyzstani politics to date, though in different ways (Nogoibaeva 2007, 102).

Whether the legendary parliament could be said to have included local elites is arguable. These were also political professionals, albeit mostly representing the interests of the Northern region of the country. The key point of contention was the balance between the three branches of power on the one hand and the powers of the President on the other.

The parliamentarians claimed that the power of the executive branch was stronger than that of the legislature, whereas the judiciary was quite dependent on the President. The legendary

145 The reason for this name is that the Parliament secured the transition from the Soviet to the democratic rule and has adopted the main laws and declarations of the sovereign state.

parliament was relatively representative and therefore chaotic. Another issue was that the parliament, or Highest Council (Jogorku Kenesh), was, at the beginning, a continuation of the communist regime in Kyrgyzstan. Despite the democratic movements and the establishment of independence in the early 1990s, the political influence de facto still remained in the hands of the Communists and the First Secretary of the Communist Party, Absamat Masaliev. This is why President Akaev tried to consolidate political power mostly within the executive branch. The rationale was that this would also allow direct accountability of this branch to the president, as well as provide the President more bargaining powers vis-à-vis the Parliament (ICG 2004). The formalization of these powers was achieved through several referendums that were held in the 1990s.

The social organization of the democratic movement which brought Askar Akaev to power included various interest groups gathered in Parliament, all of whom sought to change the old communist elites. Askar Akaev, the then President of the National Academy of Science had neither belonged to the political elite, nor was a member of the Communist Party, which made him an attractive neutral figure for the presidential office. The Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, which comprised all opposition movements and groups which emerged between 1988 and 1990, supported Akaev’s candidacy. The social organization of this movement comprised students and youth in general, as well as informal societies of workers, academics and artistic intelligentsia from the major cities147 of Kyrgyzstan.

The Parliament’s neo-communist or nationalist rationale concerning new societal development was balanced by the President’s program on cultural diversity. The program included ideas aiming at societal consolidation of multi-ethnic Kyrgyzstani society, such as the ideas of “Kyrgyzstan – our common home”, “Kyrgyzstan – the country of national diversity”, and “Kyrgyzstan – an island of democracy”. The context against which these ideas were tested

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147 Bishkek, Karakol (North) and Osh (South)
included the inter-ethnic conflict between Uzbek and Kyrgyz in Osh and Jalal-Abad in 1991, the sporadic conflicts in Bishkek aiming at expropriation of lands around the capital city, and (re)appropriation of natural resources. These events took place before the first presidential elections in 1991.

This violence was not so much about any kind of inter-ethnic hatred, but rather recognition that the momentum of change provided an opportunity to redistribute property, lands, water and access to small trade in the bazaars. Since the latter was mostly dominated by the Uzbek communities, and Kyrgyz small entrepreneurs had little access to trading at the bazaars without paying tributes to local strongmen, this was seen as a chance to restore justice. Furthermore, in both the north and south of the country there was a popular desire for land for on which to build housing. The proclamations relating to privatization and de-collectivization of lands made people think that the time for land expropriation had come. Since kolkhozes were proclaimed as closed, a mass movement towards urbanization started. In Osh, the Uzbek movement “Adolat” and the Kyrgyz “Osh Aimagy” were organized (McGlinchey 2011, 76). On both sides, there was fear of losing their land. For the Uzbeks, it was land they historically had been working. For the Kyrgyz moving from the rural to the urban areas, it was the chance to finally regain the right to land from which they felt being deprived. But in the urban areas, the land was claimed mainly for purposes of housing construction. This laid the ground for the ongoing “Uzbek problem”, presented essentially as a risk of separation of the Fergana Valley, since the “Adolat” movement sought autonomous status for the province of Osh within the Kyrgyz Republic, which at that time included also Jalal-Abad (McGlinchey 2011). In Bishkek, similar land claims were organized into the “Ashar” movement, under the leadership of Zheksheev Zhypar, who tried to pursue similar goals. However, this movement allegedly sought land expropriation for “social housing” rather than individual purposes (Fergananews 2010). These are just snapshots of the complexity of the social
organization of the opposition Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, which supported the candidacy of Askar Akaev, having seen his program as most inclusive.

Once in office in 1991, President Akaev had to face the parliament, which was considered to be truly representative of the people (Nogoibaeva 2007). However, the first parliament of the new republic was filled with groups pursuing goals that would violate the rights of other groups within a multicultural society, which Kyrgyzstan was at that time. Strengthening the parliament would mean making those social issues more acute and result in politics being organized around those issues. The specter of civil war, such as in neighboring Tajikistan, was also a strong factor behind the political choices of the ruling elite. Thus, contrary to the prevalent view of blaming a “dictator”, the consolidation of political power under the executive branch was in practice a shifting of political priorities from the matters of land expropriation to more civil issues of the rule of law, education and the creation of the civil rather than ethnicity based culture. These disagreements reached their peak after the referendum, which approved the presidential version of the new Constitution on 5 May 1993 and in 1994 the Parliament dissolved. The Constitution strengthened the accountability of local governments to the executive branch. It was the prerogative of the president and the prime-minister to appoint governors, albeit with the consent or at the request of the parliament. However, the last word remained with the President.

The method of consolidation of political power by the executive pursued by President Akaev had structural consequences for the economy, institutional setting and society. At the later stages, the strengthening of ruling elite role in the economy was recreated through the arrests of leading businessmen and expropriation of their businesses (ICG 2004, 28).\(^{148}\) The institutions of the state, both at the national and local levels were under the President’s control through the direct appointments of officials to almost all positions of influence, “from regional governor to the university rector” (ICG 2004, 28).

\(^{148}\) Example: Daniyar Usenov
The security sector at that time was not well developed. However, it was a useful tool for pursuing the infamous “war of compromising evidence”, a favorite tool of the Kyrgyzstani politicians. Furthermore, the police themselves were perceived not as a part of the state, but as a part of the criminal world (ICG 2004, 29). The Western-sponsored NGO sector was balanced by the pro-government Association of NGOs, led by Toktaiym Umetalieva, created, reportedly, as a “government spoiler in relation to civil society” (ICG 2004, 31). The media sector and the Central Election Committee have also been reported as “dependent” on the President (ICG 2004, 29). Reportedly, all political appointees were chosen from the Northern elite, which traditionally dominated political affairs in the country, for these were mostly industrial and highly educated elites. In the South, elites were mostly those related to trade and agriculture. For this reason, a participatory framework has been missing (ICG 2004).

As evidence for this take on the situation, analysts point to the protests in Aksy (part of Jalal-Abad province), which stemmed from the sentencing of a supposedly popular representative of the southern elite, Azimbek Beknazarov, and the closing of a few opposition newspapers in January 2002 (Abenova 2011). The Aksy events resulted in shots being fired, with people falling victim to gunshot wounds, and romanticizing the participants of the protest as well as deputy Beknazarov. However, there is little reference within international analyses to the fact that he was one of the few nationalists who did not abstain from publicly proclaimed hatred towards the large minorities living in the south. His constituency would be elements of the Kyrgyz majority, predominantly from the rural areas, who felt unfairly ‘deprived of their native lands’ by the Uzbeks. This propaganda was based on the widespread view that “the Uzbeks are better off” and that they “abused the hospitality of the Kyrgyz land” by monopolizing trade and agriculture, a myth proven wrong statistically (Steiner and Esenaliev 2011). What started from perestroika

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149 ICG 2004, Page 3 – description of the protest dynamics (st. from Kerben and shooting)
150 As for the second large minority, the Russians: those should merely “go to Russia”.
was used by Beknazarov and his followers for their electoral campaigns. It was during his time in the prosecutor’s office that corruption in the judiciary reached its peak (ICG 2002).

Since perestroika there was an accompanying process of internal migration from the mountainous areas to the urban areas. This resulted in land seizures fueled by rhetoric of hate towards the “colonizers and monopolizers”. President Akaev faced the difficult choice of whether to prioritize a more centralized power system within which he could set the agenda, or let the situation flow with the new societal demands, which were often expressions of nationalist hatred. While the nationalist rhetoric was advanced under the guise of patriotism, Akaev based his politics on ideas such as multiculturalism, democratic security, societally, and multivector policy, internationally. However, these ideas did not seem to be ingrained within the multiple realities of Kyrgyzstani society, part of which was highly educated, and part of which was poor but aspirational, moving from the remote mountainous regions to the cities and towns for better access to education and jobs.

The “heroism” of Azimbek Beknazarov and the deaths of several protesters resonated within the media and human rights NGOs, and radicalized the opposition (ICG 2002). As a result, President Akaev dismissed his then Prime Minister, Kurmanbek Bakiev, the Minister of Interior, who were accused of escalating the violence in the Aksy protests, which led to resignation of the whole government. Azimbek Beknazarov, a popular deputy, was arrested (ICG 2002). A political crisis ensued. Bakiev joined the opposition as a leader of the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan. President Akaev was forced into a new coalition government which would also include opposition members. On the one hand, President Akaev was harshly criticized for not allowing representatives of the southern elite to be in the government (even though the Prime Minister was a southerner). On the other hand, the same critics leveled the accusation that, in most cases,

151 Since, during the Soviet period, the composition of the ruling circles disproportionately disfavored the native Kyrgyz, which is why in the post-Soviet period nationalist rhetoric of some of the local elites became popular.

152 Multi-vector foreign policy implied developing foreign affairs with both along the NATO-vector and the CIS/Russia vector, as well as the Muslim world.
political parties were “vehicles of individual political figures”, representing their personal interests, rather than those of their regions or societal groups (ICG 2002, 14; Nogoibaeva 2007).

As a compromise, the new post-Aksy strategy devised in 2002 was based on the idea of human rights. A new slogan was devised: “Kyrgyzstan is a country of human rights”. Four new laws submitted to the parliament by the President aimed to promote human rights and freedoms (ICG 2002, 22). These laws comprised the new Democratic Code requiring the establishment of a Council of Democratic Security, on a par with the Security Council, the office of ombudsman, the Law on the Fight Against Extremism, and the Law on Amnesty of the People Involved in the Aksy Event (ICG 2002).

In the meantime, as shown in chapter 4, the years between 1998 and 2000 were marked by the formation of the HuT movement and the IMU invasion of Kyrgyzstan, the restructuring of law enforcement, and border discussions between the three states. In this light, the leaked information on secret border agreements with China (in 1996-1999), in which 10,000 hectares of land were transferred to China, contributed to public discontent. The sensitivity of the border issue was also reflected in the fact that in 2001 the parliament voted down a memorandum signed between the Uzbek and Kyrgyz prime ministers on the exchange of lands (ICG 2001, iv).

In the final stages of his presidency, President Akaev issued several laws which would decentralize governance by creating laws favoring communities and citizens’ associations. At the same time, there was an attempt to subject the legislative branch to the state elite. Once the parliamentary elections resulted in the victory of the pro-presidential party “Alga, Kyrgyzstan”, the popular uprisings swept the country, from one province to the next. On March 24 all these

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153 The Law on Jamoats, which allowed people to create free associations on the cause of their choice, as well as compromises with the opposition and parliament, exemplify this tendency.

154 This was achieved by conducting a referendum which changed the election system from majoritarian to the proportional with a high registration threshold. In this way, only parties with significant number of members have more chances to gain places in the parliament. This new system allowed the pro-presidential party “Alga, Kyrgyzstan!” to win the elections in 2005. Since the daughter of the President, Bermet Akaeva, acted as a consultant to the party, this situation was presented as Akaev’s way to spread influence within parliament. Whether these were fraudulent elections (ICG 2005a) or simply a matter of gerrymandering is arguable.
groups, each supporting their own parliamentarians, joined together on Ala-Too square in Bishkek and deposed President Akaev. Kurmanbek Bakiev was elected as the new President in July 2005 (ICG 2005a). This sequence of misunderstandings turned the tables: the southern elite became the ruling elite. Most of the Northern elites, especially intelligentsia, chose to either form an opposition or leave the country.

5.3.2. A Revolutionary: “Southern” elite without the South

The new ruling elite, as well as the new government, was comprised of the members of the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan. Kurmanbek Bakiev was elected President, Felix Kulov acted as the Prime Minister, Boljurova and Madumarov – as deputy prime ministers, Roza Otunbaeva as foreign minister, Pronenko – as minister of labor and social security, and Beknazarov as prosecutor general (ICG 2005a, 10). Since the Northern intelligentsia was largely in exile, it is difficult to map who, at that point, made up the local elite with the exception of those businessmen and criminals who used this opportunity to legalize their status and shift to mass politics, as will be seen. Interestingly, the sites of competition locally again turned out to be bazaars (including those described in chapters 2 and 4), natural resources and unused land, which had not completely undergone the de-collectivization process (see chapter 3). A new power structure emerged from the cooperation agreement between the two significant parties in Parliament, the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan, headed by Bakiev, and the Ata-Jurt Party, established in 2004 by Roza Otunbaeva together with deputies Dooronbek Sadyrbaev, Adahan Madumarov, and Omurbek Tekebaev (ICG 2005a, 2). The political agendas of the two groups remained different.

In practice, democratic change manifested itself in the form of property expropriation. Besides the Cabinet, the new ruling elite comprised both politicians and those who aspired to the political stage, for example the criminals-in-law. Being aware of this intermingling and the fact that parliament was the gate for these aspirational criminals to enter mass politics, President Akaev
sought to keep state decision-making more or less unitary by keeping power within the executive. Bakiev took the risky step of bringing this intermingling to state institutions. His presidency, which lasted until 2010, followed two main patterns: the (re)establishment of property expropriation as justice and further centralization of power through redesigning state institutions. The former involved the redistribution of ownership of bazaars, natural resources, and land seizure; the latter involved the strengthening presidential apparatus and its direct control over all revenue-collection and the government at all levels.

The integration of both legal and illegal power-brokers into state politics guaranteed neither social support, nor the resolution of the structural problems that hindered Akaev’s rule, and this continues to undermine government even now. Rather, his rule redistributed wealth between the elites and then tried to restructure the state’s institutions to maintain this wealth distribution, at the expense of basic social needs. This is when the South was lost, and that is why President Bakiev did not find much social support in the South once he moved there after the coup d’etat and tried to mobilize society for a “counter-revolution.”

**Sites of intermingling**

**Site 1: Bazaars and national resources**

The property which was addressed was mainly that of President Akaev’s family. The then Prosecutor General, Azimbek Beknazarov, was responsible for the “return to the people” of property acquired illegally (ICG 2005a, 4). A commission formed to investigate those cases, chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov, identified over 100 enterprises of which Akaev’s family had some control (ICG 2005a, 4). Reportedly, this was the way in which the new ruling elite attempted to dismantle the old patronage structures (ICG 2005a, 4). “Righting past wrongs”, paradoxically, did not address the structural issues of privatization. However, the property cases that were addressed first included that of the Karasuu bazaar, the Karakeche Coal Mines and land
seizure in the Bishkek suburbs. At first glance, the first case was related to the traders in the Fergana Valley, and so had a potential to improve their lives as trade constituted people’s survival strategies as shown in chapter 4. The case of the Karakeche Coal Mines had the potential to simplify the distribution of coal in nearby communities that depended on that resource. Instead of doing so, the new owner, Nurlan Motuev, redistributed coal in such a way that provoked inter-communal conflict with the neighboring communities. Finally, the redistribution of land was presented as an attempt to right the wrongs of de-collectivization, as described in chapter 3. However this turned into a land grab, often of private property belonging to people living in the suburbs of Bishkek. Hence, the practice somehow always reversed the logic of poetics legitimizing the manifestations of fairness. The businesses in the country run by former President Akaev’s family or friends simply shifted to Maksim Bakiev.

The Karasuu market, described in chapter 4 as one of the biggest wholesale markets in the Fergana Valley, one of the main redistribution hubs of the Chinese goods by the shuttle traders, became the target of redistribution between the criminals-in-law. The societal impact of this market has been addressed in the section on societal consequences of the chapter 4. Its meaning at the national level has to do with the re-export chain, within which Kyrgyzstan is a key link. The issue of re-export has become one of the arguments against the Eurasian Union initiative. If the Eurasian Union succeeds, Kyrgyzstan will lose its competitive advantage for the re-exporting of Chinese goods. The consequences for those who “cover” the market would be very serious. The struggle for influence over the management of the market in September 2005 involved Azimbek Beknazarov, allegedly a supporter of Bayaman Erkinbaev, a businessman and parliamentarian from Jalalabad. He is also alleged to be a prominent drug baron and criminal-in-law (ICG 2005a, 5). The conflict as such was between Ekrinbaev and a rival businessman, Abdalim Junusov, who

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155 Bearing in mind that the problem with the supplies of the Uzbek gas has been unresolved, coal remained almost the only way for people to warm their houses in the winter, in the southern Kyrgyzstan.

156 The favored son of President Bakiev.
challenged Erkinbaev’s control of the Kara-su bazaar with the support of popular protests by the traders. They complained about the high rents and poor management of the market by Erkinbaev. Tensions between the two groups resulted in the assassination of Junusov. For obvious reasons, suspicions fell on Erkinbaev, and the same protesters demanded the resignation of Beknazarov for his negligent handling of the situation and failure to bring criminal charges against Erkinbaev (ICG 2005a, 5). Shortly after, on 21 September, Bayaman Erkinbaev was also shot and killed. This was one of a series of parliamentary assassinations. Fearing assassination, parliamentarians passed a law allowing MPs to carry arms. They also initiated the establishment of a commission, headed by Felix Kulov, to fight organized crime. The state seems to have become the platform for resolution of disputes between organized criminals, as the latter comprised part of the local elites. Organized crime gained a degree of access to the parliament through such figures.

The third means by which the injustices of Akaev’s regime were to be addressed was the expropriation of the Karakeche Coal Mines, which provides over half of the all coal mined in Kyrgyzstan (ICG 2005a, 7). After the revolution of 2005, the largest mine (Beshsary) was expropriated by Nurlan Motuev, a journalist, human rights activist and a strong supporter of the revolution (ICG 2005a, 7). Reportedly, after expropriating the Beshsary mine, Motuev proclaimed

157 9 June, 200-300 traders were protesting against the high rents and demanding Erkinbaev to give up control of the market. This situation resulted in violence between the traders, the supporters of Junusov and the supporters of Erkinbaev on June 13. In July, another part of traders organized support for Erkinbaev and asked the self-dismissal of Junusov instead. On 5 September, before the courts hearings of this matter, Junusov was shot dead at his home in Karasuu (ICG 2005, 5).

158 Bayaman Erkinbaev acquired control over the bazaars through the Kyrgyz Trade Association (Kyrgyz sooda birimdigi), which his sister was a director of. The Kyrgyz Trade Association bought the shares of the bazaar from the Consumer Union of Osh province. The Consumer Unions (potrebsuyuz) are holdovers from the Soviet time, serving as “intermediary organization between the production and sale of the consumer goods” (ICG 2005, 5). In the end, the state “nationalized” the Bayaman’s share in the Kara-Suu market (the rest of the shares has remained private).

159 Even though it is fashionable to blame President Bakiev for the assassination of parliamentarians, the complex relations between the local elites themselves, a part of which are criminals-in-law/parliamentarians, might provide compelling evidence to doubt the allegations.

160 The commission has then never taken place considering the past imprisonment of Felix Kulov and the interconnections of the prison’s world with the world of politics in Kyrgyzstan, such body may have become an instrument of vengeance in the hands of an influential and respected figure in the criminal world.

161 Four of five mines are privately owned, and one Akulak is largely owned by the state-run Kyrgyzkomur company.

162 Formerly owned by a businessman and an MP (reportedly Akaev’s ally) Kamchybek Joldyshbaev
himself a director, gained control over the access roads to all five mines, and soon after requested that all five mines be organized under one company under his control (ICG 2005a, 7-8). Unsurprisingly, he started favoring Jumgal province (of which he is a native) with a better quality coal for free, while selling low quality coal to the neighboring community of Kochkor for high prices (ICG 2005a, 8). None of the government’s attempts to normalise the situation in Kara-Keche have been successful: the efforts of both Prime Minister Kulov and an old friend of Motuev, Tursunbek Akun, the Head of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights have failed (ICG 2005a, 8).

Site 2: Camp 31 and the Parliament

Finally, the biggest site of intermingling of elite is the prison system, which has strong links to the parliament. It has become a common knowledge in Kyrgyzstan that incarceration does not mean deprivation of political influence. On the contrary, prison networks may be an effective means to increase one’s political influence. A vivid example of this is the connection revealed by the situation in the Camp 31\(^{163}\) between the five following figures: a parliamentarian and the chair of the Committee of Defence, Security, Law Enforcement and Information Policy, Tynychbek Akmatbaev; his brother, a criminal-in-law Rysbek Akmatbaev; the prosecutor general Azimbek Beknazarov, Prime Minister Felix Kulov, and the Chechen\(^{164}\) criminal figure Aziz Batukaev, a rival of Rysbek Akmatbaev.

The March revolution allowed all the “oppressed and humiliated” to speak up. Prisoners took the opportunity to do so. The so-called prison crisis led to a number of prison uprisings, during which a parliamentarian, Tynychbek Akmatbaev, was murdered during his negotiations with the rebellious prisoners in Camp 31. This prison was notable for hosting the infamous Aziz

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\(^{163}\) A prison in the Moldovanovka village, famous for its prominent inmates, situated 20 kilometers from Bishkek

\(^{164}\) When the police officers discuss the figure of Rysbek, they express respect for that he did not allow the Chechen, Russian, and Kazakh mafias to take over the country.
Batukaev\textsuperscript{165} (ICG 2005b, 13). Whether it was caused by “deteriorating prisons’ conditions”, as was reported, or was an orchestrated act to help the new state elites to remove figures who were too influential and unpredictable from its sphere of influence is arguable (ICG 2005b). However, what is known is that Mr. Akmatbaev, Mr. Rysbek’s proxy in parliament, was eliminated. In the end, the uprising was settled after negotiations between the prisoners and Prime Minister Kulov at the request of Aziz Batukaev (ICG 2005b).\textsuperscript{166}

Prior to this event, Rysbek Akmatbaev\textsuperscript{167} was temporary pardoned to meet the prosecutor general, Beknazarov\textsuperscript{168} (ICG 2005b, 13). Inspired by this possible amnesty, Rysbek used the time to “improve his image and cultivate links with the new elite” by organizing a festival of traditional games at the Issyk-Kul lake (ICG 2005b, 13). The event was attended by President Bakiev, some of his ministers, including deputy Prime Minister Madumarov and a few parliamentarians. Since the events at Camp 31 happened just as Rysbek was seeking to be pardoned, he took the murder of his brother as a personal offense, orchestrated by Kulov himself. This resulted in another protest in Ala-Too square on October 22, in support of Rysbek, demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister. To oppose Rysbek, a protest in support of Kulov was organized and the parliament, which was asked to consider Kulov’s resignation, did not gather a quorum on the appointed dates, October 23-24. Parliament did not find enough political will to face the problem. Reactions from the parliamentarians and ministers were sympathetic to Rysbek, as he had just lost his brother. The police kept a low profile. President Bakiev maintained a silence on the issue. On the other hand, the NGO sector and U.S. ambassador asked the President to support the Prime Minister to prevent organized crime imposing their will upon the state (ICG 2005b, 14).

\textsuperscript{165} This happened on 20 October
\textsuperscript{166} The prison was surrounded by the security forces to prevent the escapes, as the regular personnel went on a strike and refused entering the prison.
\textsuperscript{167} Who had been on the run as the lead suspect in a triple murder
\textsuperscript{168} Rysbek was under a trial schedule for 20 October, which the prosecutor general could not undertake due to his dismissal in September for his alleged support to the criminal-in-law, Erkinbaev during the uprisings at the Karasuubazaar, described above
Ala-Too Square again became the place of politics, uniting protesters’ with various, often private, agendas. The protests were joined by groups from the provinces, organized by Nurlan Motuev, the hero of Karakeche coal mines and Topchubek Turgunaliev, a relative of Akmatbaev and human rights activist calling for the disbanding of parliament. Other voices, unrelated to the Camp 31 issue, used the chance to protest, such as the nationalists calling for the development of the Kyrgyz language organized by Marat Imanaliev and March revolutionaries demanding land as a reward (ICG 2005b, 15). The NGO sector attempted to persuade the President to take action against organized crime. The President established a parliamentary commission investigating the murder of T. Akmatbaev, led by an influential Osh parliamentarian, Alisher Sobirov. The commission found that the murder was due to a private tension between Rysbek and Aziz Batukaev. Tensions slowly dissipated. Rysbek restated his belief in that the murder was arranged between the Prime Minister and Batukaev. He gave up the public protest, but promised to exercise vengeance (ICG 2005b). Prime Minster Kulov, in his speech to Parliament, noted that the underlying problem was that the law enforcement agencies were intertwined with the criminals. Felix Kulov resigned from the office of Prime Minister in 2006.

In light of the events described above, the disadvantaged parliamentarians started forming new opposition movements and arrangements. Former enemies allied against the growing power of President Bakiev. In the meantime, Rysbek, was murdered shortly after, as he exited a mosque after the prayer (ICG 2005b). The criminal element of the competition for places within the new ruling elite shifted back into the shadows.

Until the presidential elections in 2009, President Bakiev chose to keep a low profile. He engaged in several struggles with Parliament over the powers of the various branches of state. He organized peoples’ Kurultai, an analogy of the Greek Agora, being considered today a traditional democratic mechanism that gathers both the formal and informal local leaders. The struggles with Parliament included three changes of the Constitution and ongoing arguments over constitutional
and judicial reform. However, most politics happened behind the scenes. The true centralization of power by President Bakiev can be defined as a submission of the key state institutions to the presidential clique. While parliament and other bodies apparently maintained their powers, the plan was that in practice the gate keepers would be figures loyal to the president. The security services were controlled by the brother of the President. However, the controversial and ambitious figure of Maxim Bakiev, the son of the President, disunited both the family and the country. Despite this, Maxim was the ideological driver of all the subsequent institutional changes, leading to a specific mode of centralization of power, i.e. extreme and direct control of most sectors of the state.

**Institutions: a legitimation tool for the monopoly over military and economic resources**

There were two main pillars to Bakiev’s elite logic. First, he who owns economy owns the state. Second, the presidency should be protected by the military, in order to avoid Akaev’s mistake of not being able to disperse the crowd in 2005 (ICG 2010).

With his accession to power, President Bakiev focused on economic reforms, which in practice turned into the appropriation of the main national economic assets by the ruling elite. The scheme was crafted by Maxim Bakiev, the President’s son, whom he considered an entrepreneurial genius. The scheme was simple: total control of all business projects in the country, by covering them through the setting up of a puppet owner, who would formally head a company, while it would *de facto* belong to Maxim. The apogee of this privatization of economic assets was in 2010, after the Presidential elections. Puppet companies controlled by Maxim took control of the privatized and most profitable part of the energy distribution system, *Severelektro* (which serves Bishkek and most parts of Northern Kyrgyzstan) and *Kyrgyz-telecom* (ICG 2010). *Severelektro* was officially bought by a small company called Chakan, run by Alexei Shirshov, who was also Chairman of the board of Dastan, a torpedo plant in Northern Kyrgyzstan. *Kyrgyz-telecom*
was privatized through the MNG Group, discussed below. Having privatized the areas of communication and electricity supply, the ruling elite then increased tariffs for electricity and cell phones, resulting in the mass reaction we witnessed in April 2010.

In terms of military power, Bakiev’s regime sought to monopolize this sector, too. It was achieved in two steps: appointing figures loyal to the President in key positions, and restructuring the military forces. For instance, the State Security Service (SNB) was headed by Janysh Bakiev, one of the President’s brothers, and the Ministry of Interior was headed by Moldomusa Kongantiev, a representative of the Southern elite, loyal to the President. The restructuring process started with two key bodies. Firstly, the National Guard, “Kyrgyzstan’s elite military force has been merged with Janysh’s State Security Service to form a new and significantly larger presidential guard known as Arstan "The Tiger" (RFE/RL 2010). Special force Alfa, usually conducting counter-terrorism and other extreme operations, also reported in to the SNB. Finally, one of the most important bodies for drug control, which possessed a high degree of integrity and independence, the Drug Control Agency, was abolished. The result was that “drug interdiction was handed to the Ministry of Interior” (ICG 2010, 8). Reportedly, this decision “followed some serious drug seizures [i.e. DCA was getting too close to the ruling elite’s sources of income] (ICG 2010, 8).

Hence, unlike the cases of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz case, under Bakiev’s regime, represents an attempt to monopolize all power resources in the hand of the ruling elite. To legitimate the total control of the key sources of income and influence in the country, Maxim Bakiev suggested new institutional reforms, which resulted in the connection of the ruling elite to the class of global financial intermediaries.

In other words, as the previous section demonstrated, while the public was busy demanding constitutional reforms, a much more significant (re)institutionalization happened informally at the heart of the presidential apparatus. The institutional reform was meant to turn Kyrgyzstan into a so-called consultative democracy. In general, it resulted in the direct
subordination of all state institutions to the Presidential Administration. Parliament would remain separate, with a status of a consultative body. This idea began to be implemented after the presidential elections in 2009, which put President Bakiev into office for his second term.

In essence, the idea was to consolidate money, politics and military force within the presidential cliques. The implementation of this idea comprised three major steps. First, it restructured the presidential administration and made the ministers themselves dependent on the will of an obscure clique comprised of a Secretariat and a new Central Agency for Development, Investment and Innovation (TsARII). The former was responsible for the elaboration of political strategy and monitoring the implementation of presidential decisions at all levels. The latter was responsible for managing all major financial flows, including aid.

The public perception was that this step was intended to prepare the ground for Maxim as a successor to his father. As for “the social organization” of the aforementioned institutions, the key figures are figures loyal to the President’s son, Maxim Bakiev, who himself was appointed a director of TsARII in November 2009. The TsARII monopolized access to privatized industries and foreign investment projects.

The Secretariat gained the power to be involved, at least as observer, in all decision-making processes, including the appointments of officials of all branches power at different levels. State bodies had to submit reports to the head of the Secretariat, an organ which had no professional stuff to deal with these reports. The head of the Secretariat was Oksana Malevannaya. Considering her limited professional qualifications, her immense influence over decision-making concerning the re-institutionalization of the executive branch has been almost inexplicable. The Secretariat and TsARII worked on a par. Staff for the Secretariat were selected by Malevannaya.

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169 In Russian, TsARII is co-sounded with the word “Tsari” as plural form of the word “Tsar” (i.e. the monarch).

170 A journalist, with no dignified except her infamous love story with Medet Sadyrkulov, who is by popular perception was one of the country’s strongest strategist, and whose written drafts, plans, and ideas she inherited.

171 Rumor has it that she had access to all strategies of her partner written for Kyrgyzstan for many years ahead, which she later used in her career moves. President Bakiev himself has never expressed much admiration towards Malevannaya, explaining his trust as “if my son trusts her, I can trust her too”.

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herself, from people loyal to her, former colleagues and employees from the journalistic field (Lojnikov, 5th Channel Editor-in-Chief, interview 2014).

The key figure behind Maxim was his consultant, Evgeny Gurevich, a U.S. citizen. Gurevich acted as a management consultant for a number of international financial institutions. He was a suspect in one of the biggest frauds in Italian national history, related to money laundering with several Italian companies involved, such as Fastweb and Telecom Italia (Knyazev 2010). Reportedly, Gurevich established and managed several companies in different countries throughout the world, including such companies as Planetarium Srl and Global Phone Network Srl, through which he was successful in helping a number of Western firms to launder money. Among the banks involved in these schemes there were Bank Austria Creditanstalt (currently, UniCredit Bank Austria), Raiffeisen Zentralbank, as well as Austrian division of the Anglo Irish Bank (Le Monde 2007). With Gurevich’s guidance, Maxim created a number of similar phantom companies in Kyrgyzstan. The biggest vehicle for Maxim’s personal ambitions was MGN Asset Management, which “in September 2009 had won tender to manage the government’s Development Fund” with Evgeny Gurevitch at its head (ICG 2010, 7). Gurevitch is a vivid representative of what Folkman (2007) defines as the “financial intermediary elite”. He has even been permitted access by Oksana Malevannaya to those meetings within the presidential apparatus which are usually open to natives only after a security check by the SNB (Officials of the Administration of the President Bakiev, interview 2009). This evidence suggests that TsARII may be just another machine for money-laundering in Kyrgyzstan (Knyazev 2010).

All these changes fostered mass discontent against the state elite. The trigger for the new uprising was the raising of household electricity, heating and cell phone charges from 1 January

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172 Oksana Malevannaya used to work briefly as a director of the pro-presidential Fifth Channel by Maxim’s appointment. The mission of the Channel was creation of the positive image of the President.

173 Among his other posts are: President of the Virage Consulting Ltd in the U.S. between 2001 and 2007; Director of the “AsiaUniversalBank” (2006-2009), a commercial bank, located in the Kyrgyz Republic. Other managerial roles were: Vice President of the Investment Bank of Africa, Executive Director of New York’s “Gamma Square Partners” and Director of the “GSN Tech LLC” (for details see: Knyazev 2010 “Kyrgyz Zeitnote with an Italian flavor”)
2010. According to the government Decree of 12 November 2009, the tariffs on electricity were to double, and those for heating were to increase 5 to 10 times starting from 1 July 2010. The cell phone charges were to significantly increase starting from 1 February 2010. As all cell phone companies were monopolized by Maxim, the peoples’ patience reached its limits. The raising of tariffs happened within the context of a wider energy and food crisis. The country experienced a very cold winter with electricity shortages and the consequent lack of heating. It was widely held that the energy crisis was caused by the fact that electricity from the Toktogul reservoir, the key water reservoir in the country, was sold for market prices above the export norm to its neighbors, which caused the water level in Toktogul to fall below the norm. As such, popular dissatisfaction increased. In other words, this institutional “reform” marginalized not only the rival elites, but also the ruling elites themselves, who were beyond the close circle of Maxim Bakiev. It aimed at creating a strong power-vertical, which is impossible to build by destroying the state’s main pillars. At the same time, it made the state revenues become part of the fraudulent global financial schemes. This illustrates how elements of revenue collection which is are not linked to the state budget and state expenditures do not help to extend the infrastructural capacity of the state.

The rude violation of the basic Weberian principles has demonstrated its effect. Two viable parts of the state’s infrastructural power have been destroyed: the state institutions and the elite structures that could connect the state with its societies. Opposition in the meantime created a Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the People’s Kurultai (assembly) to coordinate protests. The opposition members of CEC would later become the next ruling elite.

174 Electricity was given to different districts in once in a row, according to a schedule
175 Additional factor was that Bakiev tried to play the U.S. and Russia against each other, promising the Russians to close the U.S. base in exchange for Russian aid. Meanwhile, securing Russian aid package was a way to manipulate the U.S. into more favorable leasing conditions for the Manas Airbase. Since the Russians “never formally linked the financial package with Manas’s closure”, the Kyrgyz neither returned the Russian money, nor closed the U.S. base (for details, see ICG KG 2010)
The covert economic schemes of Maxim led to the situation where after 2010 it was difficult to redistribute those assets which were so-called “Bakiev’s assets”, for the legal owners were various companies and entrepreneurs, most of whom maintained their assets and, allegedly, remained connected to Maxim. This situation suggests that the intermingling of elites continues, and that this includes those who were dismissed previously. At least, clarity on Bakiev’s wealth redistribution is not yet before the general public.

5.3.3. All-representant: a ragtag Parliament as a move towards a shadow state

The term elite “became one of the most general – and, therefore, one of the most meaningless – terms” in social sciences (John Scott 2008, 27)

A third period of state consolidation in Kyrgyzstan started on 7 April 2010 as a provisional government, with Roza Otunbaeva taking office as its head. President Bakiev flew to his native south at this point. This was the third period of chaos that politicians were faced with. A decisive factor in the direction of power consolidation was fear. Fearful that President Bakiev could mobilize southern elites against the North and provoke civil war, the government had to come up with a new image of the “Other” that would unite the Kyrgyz nation (Mirsaitov, interview 2014). The usual scapegoat for this exercise was “the Uzbek question”, which the country had faced in 1991. Clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz broke out between 11 and 14 June 2010. “Uzbeks”, as an image of threat, epitomized another other threat developing in the country, such as the Islamist threat or separatism. However, the evidence collected by the International Inquiry Commission (KIC), headed by Kimu Kiljunen, suggests that the attacks on the Uzbek population during those events were well organized and planned. The military observed the violence and did not intervene if the victims were on the Uzbek side (KIC 2010). The violence stopped suspiciously

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176 As allegedly, “all Islamists are Uzbeks”.
177 Even though Uzbeks never expressed the wish to be separated into an independent state or join Uzbekistan. To the contrary, Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks underline the big difference between them and the Uzbeks in Uzbekistan.
quickly, in just three days, and only, surprisingly, through the actions of the local administration. When, in 1991, the south faced a similar situation, the central Soviet authorities had to intervene and remain there for six months. This evidence also suggests that the event was well-orchestrated (KIC 2010). The International Inquiry Commission put the responsibility on the provisional government. As a result of this conclusion, Kimu Kiljunen was denounced as a persona non grata, as this finding contradicted the results of the parliamentary inquiry, which put the blame on the Uzbek communities, former President Bakiev, and other unidentifiable “third forces” or the “fifth column” (ICG 2010).

Besides the human losses, this situation seemed to put more pressure on former President Bakiev to leave the country. Russian media sources started suggesting that Kyrgyzstan was on the verge of civil war and Kurmanbek Bakiev would be to blame. Since the departure of the former president, the provisional government gained more freedom in pursuing its policies. Human rights and other activists started developing new projects for national consolidation, peace and unity. Indeed, the perception of threat helped raise the level of national pride and shift attention from other political issues. The desire for stability overtook the desire for justice. National consolidation, to a certain extent, and the provisional government was accepted.

At the same time, the violence showed who is who and in which domain. The mayor of Osh, Melis Myrzakmatov was hailed as a national hero for being capable of appeasing the population within three days. Talks with local Kyrgyz people showed that they were almost euphoric in their admiration of the mayor, who finally “showed these blunt Uzbeks their place” (Adaev, 5th Channel Editor-in-Chief, Southern division, interview 2012). Even the most dispassionate analysis of the events by the Kyrgyz people would go along the lines: “We admit that it was us who started the physical violence this time. However, we have been conditioned to do so, because these Uzbeks have grown too blunt in our own land. They took our jobs, monopolized trade and agriculture” (Adaev, interview 2012). The link between sovereignty and national identity was also visible in
official narratives of sovereignty (Gullete and Heathershaw 2015). Mayor Myrzakmatov published a book where he made the case for Kyrgyz being “the state-forming national grouping” and that with the help of “patriotic youth,” Kyrgyzstan has a chance to survive (ICG 2012, 6).

While the local southern elites were gaining support through nationalist sentiments, the provisional government was disunited and unable to influence the situation. The ICG (2012) found that the responsibility for the bloodshed was mostly due to the local leader, Melis Myrzakmatov. To diminish his power, the provisional government tried to persuade the mayor to resign. This attempt, however, resulted in the street demonstrations in Osh, supporting the mayor and demanding the resignation of the provisional government’s president, Roza Otunbaeva. The result was that the mayor remained in place. As has been shown in the other chapters, the mayor of Osh is the key political link in the network of racketeers who evolved into the criminals-in-law, involved in cross-border trade and control of bazaars. These networks duly supported the Mayor, as did Kyrgyz from the Alay region, where they consider themselves the best warriors among all other Kyrgyz tribes. These Kyrgyz started coming down to the cities and demanding land and shelter. The violence against Uzbeks was a convenient pretext for the creation of internal displacement, shaking the traditional networks of influence in the bazaars and justifying the new urbanization project. As part of this, Uzbeks were to be displaced to remote areas in the suburbs of Osh or “compensated” for any damage by apartments in newly built blocks in Osh, which were Chinese direct investments. In the meantime, in Bishkek, the government conducted a referendum and adopted a new Constitution which turned Kyrgyzstan into a parliamentary democracy. Hence, Kyrgyzstan has witnessed a degree of state fragmentation, with strengthened local elites, both in their criminal and semi-criminal manifestations. Under these conditions, the country turned into a parliamentary republic, with proportional representation. The symbol of past revolutions, the White House, was swapped with the building of the Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh).

178 27 June 2010
As one can see, the struggle among competing elites was not so much about different visions of structuring the state, but simply about appropriation of economic resources. Attempts at restructuring the state, based on the Washington Consensus and implemented during the period of President Akaev, contributed to territorial fragmentation rather than the functional decentralization. The Legal framework inspired by the Washington Consensus inspired the National Strategy on Decentralization approved by the Presidential Decree No 381 of December 17, 2001 (INTRAC 2011). It included several laws such as the Law on Local Self-Government and Local State Administration (2002), the Law on Financial and Economic Basis of Local Self-Government (2003), and the Law on Jamaats (2005), Law on Municipal Property (2002), Law on Municipal Service (2004) (INTRAC 2011). This legislation sought to regulate relationships between the central government and local governments, even though local governments remained directly accountable to the President. President Bakiev’s state restructuring abolished provincial governments, making the city governments report directly to the Presidential administration (Maxim/Malevannaya tandem). Consequently, the functionality of the state, in this case, has been largely centralized, not to a fraction of society as represented by the ruling elite, but to a fraction of the Presidential administration, responsible for revenue collection in a broader sense. At present, the 2010 Constitution restored the initial status-quo, but subjected the local governments to the Prime Minister, to lessen the powers of the President. Additionally, the post-2010 period promises to be a period of serious structural reforms of all spheres of the state. The results are yet to be seen.

**Conclusion**

Having addressed three different strategies of the emergence of a single political authority from complex elite struggles, this chapter has discovered certain patterns. The ruling elites in all three
cases have focused on military and economic sources of power, seeing the state as the dominant institutional resource to channel these two sources of power in their direction. In other words, the relations that have been organized by means of the state were in one way or another related to the economic or security sectors. Each state has done it in a different way, but each of them had a similar focus.

Tajikistan, at first, was forced to conduct power-sharing, with the result that the ruling elite captured the economic resources of the state, and the opposition gained access to the security and law enforcement apparatus. While initially striking a balance between the economic and military poles for a short time, the ruling elite was able to use conditions created by the IMF and the World Bank requirements to implement rapid reform of the public sector to dismiss UTO appointees from key positions. A short time later, the international discourse of threat with regards to terrorism, Islamism, and drug trafficking provided a pretext for the government to eliminate some of their rivals using the processes of military intervention in domains associated with the UTO elites and the drug trade, such as Rasht and Badakhshan. Consequently, while the ruling elite in Tajikistan technically managed to capture economic, military, and institutional (i.e. formal state structures) power of the state, this did not allow it establish political authority over the entire territory. The state did not function to meet societal needs. It functioned to meet the needs of a small fraction of this society, that is the Kulyabi elite. In response, societal resistance shifted abroad. The opposition elites are in exile and the 10 per cent of the Tajik population which works abroad has hard feelings towards President Rahmonov’s government.

Uzbekistan, and its strategy of accommodation, was different in certain regards. First, the state elite tried to accommodate the interests of the regional elites. Secondly, President Karimov focused more on military sources of power. However, he organized this in such way that it provided the cover needed to retain the necessary degree of control over strategic sites of economic power, mainly cotton. Finally, the government loosened conditions to allow for rent-
seeking by local elites, but prevented them from being significantly represented in state institutions, especially in the center. In this case, the larger space for maneuvering for the regions contributed to territorial fragmentation, which also prevented the extension of political authority over the entire territory. The strategy of accommodation did not destroy the historical patronage structures, but brought them under surveillance from security personnel installed across layers of government. This made the elites look for other ways of conducting their activity. A phenomenon of “proxy landlordism”—that is, *de facto* owning the land without legally registering as an owner—has contributed to the extension of the informal economy or unregulated shadow areas. These create conditions conducive for the development of the new elites or the shift of societal resistance to the sector of informal economy.

In Kyrgyzstan the elites focused mostly on the state as a power resource, specifically on the chair of the President. Business, criminal, rent-seeking, and other private interests made the elites cooperate and intermingle with these interests on an *ad-hoc* basis until a goal of a given interest group is achieved, whereupon the tables turn. The intermingling of competing elites in Kyrgyzstan has not proven useful for state formation, in either functional or territorial terms. Kyrgyz politicians seem to be the greatest Weberians of Central Asia, as they put all their hope in the bureaucratic apparatus and tried to redesign the state institutions mainly to fit their own interests, rather than solve structural problems. Despite the fact that the Kyrgyz case initially exposed a much clear division into two main regions, the South and the North (that are also geographically divided by a mountain range), it has been shown that once an elite becomes the ruling elite, it abandons the interests of its social basis, even if that could have been its main link to the societies. Only in the case of Tajikistan the ruling elite has remained strongly connected to its clan. Both President Karimov and the Kyrgyzstani Presidents, once in power, tried to focus on the state as their main power-basis, rather than their regional roots.
This complex picture of the diverse ways to organize the state exposes one real danger. The common variable this chapter has found is that in all three cases, the state has been perceived as an empowering institution, as the resource of power per se rather than a system or a space accommodating the diversity of interests. Yet, the failure to compete the state-building process suggests that formal institutions are not a sufficient condition for state-building, even if one links them to their social basis, such as clan and region as in the case of Tajikistan. Monopolizing the state as an institution does not mean creating a political authority over a given territory, channeling the directions of social change, shaping ideological preferences of the people or possessing much influence over political outcome in the long term. In other words, possessing the state does not mean knowing how the state would look like in ten years.
CONCLUSION: Keeping it social

The Puzzle: practice and concepts

This study has focused comparatively on modern state-building in three Central Asian states: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The puzzle that motivated this thesis was rooted both in practices and theories of the state. Empirically, it was puzzling why three cases that were initially different institutionally, politically, and economically faced a similar problem: an incomplete state. At the outset of independence, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these three countries chose three different forms of state transformation. Uzbekistan opted for centralization and economic self-sufficiency, Kyrgyzstan chose market liberalization, decentralization and democratization, and Tajikistan had a conflict over power and resources from 1992 through to 1997. In the first decade of independence, Uzbekistan experienced the so-called Uzbek miracle, i.e. economic growth without market liberalization; it was the most politically strong and stable country in Central Asia, aiming at regional leadership alongside Kazakhstan. Tajikistan managed to end the civil war with a Peace Accord, which created a precedent for power sharing between the secular and Islamic political forces. Kyrgyzstan was the first country which liberalized its economy, earning an international reputation for being “an island of democracy” in Central Asia. Its first revolution in 2005 was perceived internationally as a sign of democracy (Laruelle & Peyrouse 2012). However, the post-9/11 war on terror resulted in a change of international interpretation of the events happening in Central Asia. The Kyrgyz revolutions (2005 and 2010) became indicators of state failure; Uzbekistan’s direction towards political stability was interpreted as violations of human rights and security. The same was true for Tajikistan as the structural reforms led to the government to start persecuting and eliminating the Islamic opposition. Looking for the reasons why this came to be, we appealed to theoretical literature, which complicated the puzzle.
In conceptual terms, the state in Central Asia has conventionally been interpreted through the lens of the *Heartland* theory, originating in Mackinder’s writings on geopolitics and geo-strategy. The categories of *tabula rasa*, *the great chessboard*, and *the Greater Middle East* have characterized thoughts and deeds towards Central Asia (Brzezinski 1998). This interpretation was rooted in the history of imperial competition over India and access to it between the British and the Russian Empires. Later, during the Cold War, Central Asia was the gateway to Afghanistan, one of the theaters of Soviet-American competition. The puzzle that arises from theories based on MacKinder is how one explains the variation between the Central Asian countries if they were a mere *tabula rasa*, constructed fully by the *Great Powers*?

An answer seemed to emerge in the post-Cold War period, when scholars started looking for a new understanding of Central Asia by shifting the focus to the local context, indigenous identities, and democratic development. Based on the assumption that the state represented the linear rationalization of social relations, the transitology approach explained state failure via the colonial legacy, the “*homo sovieticus*” mentality, informal, or patrimonial, structures of governance, and the revival of radical Islam. The impact of civilization and state formation which flows from Central Asia’s multi-layered history, as well as that of intervening Empires and the incapacity of tribal elites to (de)mobilize tribal societies, not to mention the mysterious elevation of Islam as the indigenous identity of this diverse region, have all been neglected.

Instead, this thesis has shown that there can be no dominating culture in such a diverse social reality; Islamic civil society was as much an object of social engineering as liberal civil society, and there are significant variations in the neo-patrimonial structures of the three states. Additionally, these factors would not matter unless they are connected to economic resources and promoted by politics. Finally, the thesis has shown that the formal end of the Soviet History was not the end of its story, for social relations created under the Soviet statehood continued. The onset of
democracy did not coincide with the onset of liberation, for when given freedom people often chose another type of prison.

**The Argument: three sets of factors and state-society relations**

Central Asia has presented a challenge to the dominant interpretations of the state, both in practical and conceptual terms. The post-Cold War fashion to condemn the Soviet past made the dominant interpretations of Central Asia societally-blind. The fashion to “return to the real tradition”, paradoxically, made them historically-blind, for there is no history of Central Asia without the history of Empires. We were told that tribes, clans, religion, and other types of prisons constitute the true past: the unique, the indigenous, the Central Asian. On the contrary, this thesis has emphasized that Central Asia has been first and foremost about diversity, subtlety and a blurring of the usual borders between the internal and external, private and public, legitimate and illegitimate, formal and informal. Consolidation of state authority or creation of an encompassing social institution providing a sense of belonging and the common good does not seem to be possible without embracing this diversity and interdependence.

This thesis has pursued this premise by shifting the focus to a simple proposition: state-society relations matter. The state cannot be complete without a viable, functioning, and organized bond between it and society, for it is society where change originates. And it is micro-processes that may foster macro-results. It brings the reader back to the basics of what the state means as a social institution in a diverse region with a multi-layered, non-linear history. Furthermore, it is not only the presence of conditions conducive to a viable state that matter, but also how these conditions transform when mutually conflated, whether they supplement one another or undermine each other’s efforts, whether they promote a meaning of power and
collective good which resonates with that of grassroots societal actors, and these narratives shape their material expressions.

Specifically, this thesis has argued that the incomplete state is a result of three sets of factors, generated by three dimensions of state creation: historical, external and international, and that of the local struggles for power. These dimensions were operationalized here as legacy of the Soviet statehood, External actors’ strategies, and Local elites games, with the first defined as social interdependence; the second – as the projects or strategies of organizing security, economy, and society in the region; and the third – as the struggle among rival elites, the ruling elite and the regional elites. The thesis has showed that each of these sets of factors produced processes which, in conjunction with the other two, produced a counter-productive and self-undermining effect, resulting in the incomplete state. Specifically, each of these sets led to two main unintended consequences: (1) the destruction of the state’s infrastructural power, i.e. the capacity to engage in mutually constitutive relations with their societies; (2) the creation of sites of social resistance and isolating parts of territories, i.e. exacerbating territorial fragmentation. This claim was unfolded in three steps.

The first set of factors, called herein the Soviet legacy, has challenged the institutional take on the Soviet state and demonstrated that this Soviet legacy is about societal interdependence due to three reasons: (1) the modes of organization of land, water, and peoples in the Soviet state; (2) the peculiarities of nation creation and collectivization in Central Asia during the Soviet period; and (3) the subsequent privatization following the Soviet dissolution which, contrary to international reports praising “successful privatization”, has shown that land assets have been partially restructured and non-land assets have remained largely unchanged. Due to these factors, social interdependence at the grassroots and across borders has persisted to the present. Cross-border societal interdependence has fit poorly into post-Soviet nation-building. It was like fitting a square peg in a round hole (Chapter 3).
The second set of factors, called external actors, has examined their three main vectors: firstly, the projects to organize security, which was achieved mainly through establishing borders and their justification through ideas of transnational threat; secondly, the projects that aimed to (re)organize economies and create bottom-up conditions for the neo-liberal reforms; thirdly, the projects aiming to (re)organize societies and create an NGO sector which was equated with the participatory civil society and empowerment of communities. Together, all of this aimed to create bottom-up conditions to promote neo-liberal democracy. However, remaining oblivious to historical contingencies, power constellations, and the blurring between the criminal and legal, and public and private sectors, not to mention the social organization of the communities, these projects resulted in unintended consequences, such as isolated land pockets, increased informal socio-economic practices, and the development of a parallel civil society, which represents sites of social resistance (Chapter 4).

The third set of factors stems from the struggles between the ruling and the local elites. Comparative analysis of these struggles in three different cases highlighted the differences of these three cases and identified common features that contribute to understanding of the incomplete state. This set of factors is also not completely discrete from the previous set, for the ruling elites have been largely empowered by the external actors. This set has shown that it is not that the elite struggles hinder the completeness of the state, but rather it is the destruction of the local elites as an institution which may have connected state elites to grassroots societies is what hinders the completeness of the state. As Tilly (1975) and Mann (1986) suggest, the institution of landlords (in the case of Western Europe) or local elites can be made part of the state’s infrastructural power, for they are closer to the grassroots societal organization. In other words, the institution of local elites may have provided the state’s societal embeddedness (Chapter 5).

All these sets of factors taken together paint the following picture: (1) communities have been isolated, empowered to develop self-governance structures and reliant on their own
alternative non-standard (read: informal) survival strategies, due to the external actors’ efforts to create bottom-up conditions for neo-liberal democracy; (2) the ruling elites have been empowered through grants tied to structural reforms from external actors, such reforms and grants being manipulated in a way which allowed the ruling elites justify the marginalization of the local elites; (3) having fostered the development of an unintended parallel civil society and having destroyed the institution of the local elites, the state-builders contributed to the development of sites of social resistance and an identity of resistance across borders, around which the walls of empty “nation-states” were built. What lies at the bottom of these walls cannot really be seen while sitting on top.

Key findings and synopsis

The key propositions of this thesis can be outlined as follows.

1. The dominant indices on failed states provide useful toolkits for taking a snapshot and capturing the symptoms of state weakness, such as capacity, legitimacy, and authority, as measured by economic growth, good governance, and political violence. However, these indexes, as well as the conceptual accounts reliant on them, measure states according to four main dichotomies: formal vs. informal; strong vs. weak; rational vs. irrational, and historical vs. institutional understandings of statehoods. As Chapters 1 (from the conceptual point of view) and Chapter 2 (from the practical point of view) have shown, the states in Central Asia have proven to be both strong and weak, omnipotent and absent, formal and informal, rational and irrational, historical and institutional creatures in different sectors of governance.

2. This thesis offered to simplify the complexity of the shadow areas through three indicators: transnationality, cross-sectionality, entrysm. Chapter 2 provided examples to each of these indicators, such as cross-border trade, Islamist movements and organized crime networks, and the grassroots social structures or communities of trust, such as the mahalla (as a social unit) and the
*bazaar* (as an economic unit). These three examples showed how the formal and informal, public and private, legal and illegal, national and transnational intersect and do not fit into the four conventional dichotomies, creating the problem of the incomplete state.

While the central theme of the argument is outlined in the previous section, the key findings in terms of the processes of interstitial emergence are as follows.

**In terms of history or the legacy of the Soviet statehood**

Two key findings were crystallized as characterizing features of the post-Soviet state-building: 1) community-empowerment and 2) the community-centered institution of “private” property, underlined by the single pattern of societal interdependence. The Great Break, the Structural Reforms and Shock Therapy are all big terms, based on the assumption that change has actually taken place. However, they misunderstand its form and social meaning, which this thesis reveals by following the water, a phenomenon crucial for social order, survival, and the sense of belonging in the Fergana Valley. In following the water, we identified historical patterns that shed a different light on the conventional understanding of change and continuity in the post-Soviet Central Asia. These patterns can be roughly summarized as follows.

Firstly, pre-Soviet societal organization was based on semi-nomadic and nomadic lifestyles, where water and land had economic, social, and spiritual meaning. Their management was based on custom. Societies were fragmented and showed no coherent collective identities, such as ethnicity or nation. Secondly, nation-building in its modern sense, i.e. connecting the categories of ethnicity, economic and political resources, was undertaken by the Soviet state, utilizing tactics of national-territorial delimitation. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the national-territorial delimitation had a unifying rather than “divide-and-rule” effect, thereby altering previous patterns of social relations. Thirdly, the new nations were integrated into the Soviet state by means of creating a collective interest through the process of collectivization. Cross-border usage of pastoral
lands and water were regulated by the notion of the actual use of land. It implied cross-border social interactions, regardless of administrative borders. The Soviet system of water-sharing was a three-tier distribution system: regional, national, collectives’ based. Water to communities was distributed by collective farms. Hence, communities were not destroyed, but neither were they the main units of distribution of the collective good. This basic observation, and its consequent impact on post-Soviet state-building, has been largely neglected).

The conventional interpretation is that the great change came with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the process of de-collectivization and privatization. However, the thesis has found that structural change has not happened in the form that was envisioned. Specifically, the de-collectivization process that implies the shift from collective to private property has taken on an interesting twist by creating the conditions for an institution of community-property by means of restructuring both tangible and non-tangible farms’ assets (has not been yet fully undertaken. Non-land assets, such as water and the infrastructure related to it, as well as the social welfare functions exercised previously by the authority of the collective farms, have remained neglected. The third-tier distribution networks that were managed behind the gates of the collective farms have been left intact. This forced communities to revive and re-organize their self-governance structures. Being in line with the neo-liberal spirit of empowering grassroots participation, these communities have started receiving help from the World Bank group and related NGOs.

In empowering communities, the neo-liberal programs have fostered two processes: firstly, hindering the development of the institution of private property and reviving memories of custom-based self-governance structures. Something that was thought of as the institution of private property has been in reality the property of a community, a household, or a composition of households, with the land certificates granted to the head of the household, i.e. a man. The relations around this property would then further be regulated by the community or a fraction of it, rather than as an individually-centered institution of private property. The problem is that there
is a gap between a conceptual and legal persona of a community and that of private property rights. Hence, it would not be a stretch to say that community-empowerment in terms of self-governance and grassroots water management and community-empowerment in terms of institutionalization of private property rights can produce interesting legal twists which would undermine both the neo-liberal goals of privatization and the goals of consolidating the state as the center of politics in a given polity.

In other words, the result was the continuation and intensification of societal interdependence in terms of water, reviving traditional memories and practices, thereby re-traditionalizing communities. The only innovation is the institutional dismantling of the collective farms, without providing an equally efficient alternative to manage societal interdependence.

_In terms of external actors_

The organization of security in Central Asia started with a line in the sand, a border, which was arbitrary during the Soviet period and which became material, expressed in the form of border check points, visa regimes, and minefields in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This line produced adversarial relations at the inter-state level, isolated certain enclaves in the Fergana Valley, but, paradoxically, has not hindered interdependence, for water cannot be walled. Borders crystallised narratives of threat, which then flowed smoothly from the into the security infrastructures of the newly sovereign states. While, in principle, borders are institutions that can shape territory and sovereignty, they created hindrances to sovereignty, for they hindered the extension of the political authority of the state over its entire territory by creating isolated land pockets. Such land pockets are illustrated in this thesis by three case studies of enclave zones Vorukh and Chorkhu (Tajikistan), Sokh and Shahimardan (Uzbekistan), Batken zone (Kyrgyzstan),
which turn the state into empty shells or walls around the isolated land pockets of fragmented societies and territories.

The next pillar of the external dimension is that of organizing economies. Justified by the creation of conditions for the bottom-up development of neo-liberalism, the World Bank group provided financial and logistical support for cross-border non-standard trade through its CAREC program, by supporting the informal/traditional market institution, the *bazaar*. While realizing the potential of the bazaar as part of people’s survival strategies, the World Bank neglected the integration of this unit into other societal processes taking place in Central Asia. Having highlighted other processes which go through the bazaars as one of the sites for the processes of interstitial emergence, this thesis has shown how this external influence can increase the potential of social resistance.

The CAREC project aligns closely with the CASA-1000 project, which has similar goals as CAREC in terms of development of trade and infrastructure, but which is also complimented by the idea of creating a common resource pool between Central Asia and South Asia. Justified through narratives of linking the land-locked region of Central Asia to the sea, this project contributes to the increase of social resistance for two reasons. It implies construction of grand power-stations such as Rogun, which will result in the internal displacement of a large part of the population of Tajikistan. Coincidentally, the areas of displacement are those regions where the local strongmen or opposition leaders still retain a degree of influence. Having displaced their populations, the government will destroy their social organization and power constellations, thereby increasing identities of resistance. The World Bank and its liberalization rhetoric is *de-facto* justifying this.

In organizing society, external actors aimed to establish a formal NGO sector. Due to ongoing parallel processes of destroying societal organization through internal displacement while promoting the ideas of the NGO sector, that is freedom, human rights, and emancipation, this rhetoric in practice has empowered the same rhetoric on the side of Islamic NGOs and
(underground) radical civil activists whose views on the state and society are very different from the views of the external actors. Narratives of emancipation, in practice, became narratives of betrayal and the narratives of resistance, contributing to the outsourcing of state ideological power and creating different kinds of civil society.

Considering the societal consequences of each of these pillars, the possibility of a trans-nationalization of the identity of resistance, just like the possibility of a trans-nationalization of informal economic processes, does not seem completely unrealistic, regardless of the fortified borders, walls, and fences. Hence, external actors only intensified the legacies of the past, sponsoring the revival of the alternative social structures and ideologies, increasing the power of the societal, and yet for state failure, they blamed it conventionally on the wrong institutional design as seen in Chapter 2. Having crystallized the power of the societal, it was necessary to understand “who rules”, what agency, institutions or mechanisms of channeling those societal processes, whether such agency exists and in what form. For this reason, Chapter 5 has focused on the struggle between the competing elites.

In terms of local struggles among the competing elites

A comparative study of the struggles for power between the ruling elite and the local elites—defined as those groups sufficiently powerful to mobilize parts of societies regardless of their sources of legitimacy or geographical location—has shown that, despite differences, the common aspect was that the ruling elites have perceived the state itself as a resource of power. Their struggles were not so much about sources of social power, but rather for the state as a vehicle for pursuing private interests by public means. Further narratives on authoritarianism have confused societies who also became enmeshed in condemnation of state elites for usurpation of national economic assets, while the problem appeared to be much more trivial: the struggle for economic
resources was limited only to those resources that provided the “mad money”, rather than keeping the tools of government in the hands of the ruling elite, such as fiscal policy. Revenue-collection *a la* Central Asia appeared to be collection of revenues from drug trafficking, privatization, remnants of Soviet-time industries, rather than generation of wealth or creation of a fiscal policy that could connect the state and societies. None of the ruling elites focused on the taxation system as the system of creating and sharing of the common good. This implies that the economic resources of the state were narrowed to the mad money, often from illicit activities.

For these reasons, the redistribution of wealth that had its origins in illicit economic sources has neither changed the socio-economic situation for the better, nor contributed to the legitimacy of the new elites. It was not necessarily the elite that was perceived as illegitimate, it was its sources of power, the origins of which are not a mystery for the public. The most illustrative case for this observation was Kyrgyzstan and its revolutionary experience. The ruling elites have deprived themselves from the sources of power which could bring about legitimacy, capacity, and authority. Instead, they have chosen to fight for resources through marginalization, surveillance, or purposeful usage of rival elites, thereby strengthening rival fiefdoms, towards which their authority would not extend.

Hence, the state as a gradual process of consolidation and centralization of power (Tilly 1975) has not been developing. Rather, it was the centralization of economic resources which do not contribute to the creation of infrastructural capacity of the state. This happened in conjunction with territorial fragmentation due to the marginalization of rival elites and their domains of power, fueling sites of social resistance in different ways: in Tajikistan – it was the shifting of social resistance to exile; in Uzbekistan – it is the cherishing of an invisible or absentee landlordism which creates the new “invisible” strongmen; and in Kyrgyzstan, it is the intermingling of strongmen of both criminal and legal background, thereby making the state an instrument for
achieving personal goals which are far from common, societal or political. It is turning the countries into fragmented polities without politics.

Finally, having started as a study of the securitization of Islam and having shifted to state-society focus. Due to this shift, the thesis arrived at findings which have shown the idea that Islamic radicalization and ethnic tensions are just one of many examples of larger processes and structures constituting social resistance. Although the so-called Islamic revival has been conventionally conceptualized as one of the threats to the state, one could see that Islam has been present in all three cases to differing extents and in such diverse forms that considering Islam as a cause of the incomplete state would require serious theological research in order to reflect its full social, political, economic, and human meaning.

Social resistance has little to do with Islam as such. It concerns the basic organization of social relations and social order. For several reasons, this thesis has focused on three different case studies – Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Despite their differences, these three countries have trisected the infamous Fergana Valley, a region framed as a potential “Balkans of Central Asia.” Conventional wisdom will immediately identify the Fergana Valley as one of the “obvious causes” of the incomplete state due to its “dangerous diversity.” Having emphasized the premise that Central Asia is essentially about diversity, this thesis has challenged the view, embedded in the Fragile States Indexes, which conceives of ethnic and religious diversity as preconditions for violence resulting in state failure.

Additionally, the Fergana Valley has commonly been considered the citadel of Islamic culture in Central Asia. However, this thesis found more important processes occurring in three main dimensions: local (grassroots/community-level), national (states), and transnational (across borders and borderlands). The common factor of the Fergana Valley has allowed a focus on the most basic patterns of social interaction and their simplest human meaning. The patterns found
challenge the main assumptions of transitology theory, both the institutions-based variant on measuring the state and the crisis-based assessment of state-building.

Therefore, arguably, yet confidently enough, one of the broader implications of this thesis is that neither Islam-based nor ethnicity-based explanations of the incomplete state can provide a comprehensive vision of the state and society relations in the present era. This highlights the paradoxical dualism of trans-nationalization and re-traditionalization. Hence, the ever provocative question of “bringing the state back in” is still waiting for counter-intuitive solutions.

**So what? Broader implications and concluding thoughts**

*I was always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious, and sacrifice and the expression in vain. We had heard them ... and had read them ... now for a long time. There were many words that you could not stand to hear and finally only the names of places had dignity. Abstract words such as glory, honor, courage or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates.*

*(Ernest Hemingway)*

The thesis wanted you to follow the water and return to the basics of the social conflict which is called the state, in order to understand what factors and (mis)perceptions prevent a clear vision of state-society relations. It has examined the social and human meaning of the categories and concepts fashioned to make sense of the state in Central Asia and found that the same institutional settings can foster diametrically opposite outcomes under different societal contexts. In general, it arrived at the classical Hobbesian dilemma where the liberal means undermine liberal ends.

In particular, its findings may suggest reconsidering the following rules of thumb for engineering bottom-up conditions for the development of the neo-liberal state:

1) Creating neutral bureaucracies and institutions
2) Decentralization of the state
3) Creation of civil society through the NGO sector
4) Privatization and development of non-standard trade
On bureaucracies and institutions

Institutions that are societally and historically-blind can make the state empty and turn it into a tool for pursuing private interests, rather than a social institution channeling the directions of processes of interstitial emergence. In Central Asia, state institutions have been interpreted and constructed as neutral bureaucracies, which turned them into the means for acquisition of economic resources and illicit financial revenues. Neutral bureaucracies that do not reflect societal organization pose a risk of usurpation of the state by a small fraction of a society, through the ruling elite. Normative considerations apart, this creates the risk that when the ruling elite tries to extend state authority to other territorial domains, it fails to do so, regardless of whether it uses institutional or coercive means. People in the domains different from those under the control of the ruling elite perceive such interventions as those of the rival elite, rather than as those of the state authorities. Hence, modern state engineering confuses neutral bureaucracy with state autonomy. The neutral state in societal terms—that is accommodating the diversity of social conflicts and interests—can be seen as possessing the state autonomy; but the state which is neutral due to being bureaucratic and is detached from the process of mutually constituting the state and social conflicts is an empty shell state.

On decentralization of the state

Tilly (1975) argues that historical state formation is a movement from largely fragmented societies to a centralized polity. Modern state engineering, on the contrary, promotes decentralization. As the case of Central Asia suggests, decentralization may often result in re-traditionalization, criminalization, and territorial fragmentation. Strengthening communities may have two opposite results: the empowerment of participatory civil society or the empowerment of social resistance
or, at least, identities of resistance. For example, community-based practices in Central Asia are rooted in memories which have little to do with the state. It may have more to do with the practices of sharing, decision-making, and ideologies during the nomadic and semi-nomadic periods. Once revived, they may undermine the goals of the modern state. Tilly (1975) suggests that such societies may lead to a type of the state different from that of the modern state. Yet, the exact type of state would remain unforeseen and therefore, unmanageable. Under such circumstances, talking about the state as a result of the rationalization of social relations, as well as measuring state’s failure in terms of informal economies, levels of crime or radicalization becomes meaningless. Furthermore, in reviving communities we revive memories of religious practices that have regulated social relations, but memories have a tendency to become twisted and mutate over time. It is difficult to say now which tradition represents a true Central Asian tradition and has thus to be revived. As a result, communities become vulnerable to transcendent ideologies of Islam which resonate with the general spirit of social resistance and memories of customary-based types of social relations.

Finally, as we have seen, empowering communities in Central Asia would mean empowering isolated pockets of territories that do not have a sense of belonging to the central state they formally belong to. Therefore, this kind of decentralization, in practice, turns into territorial fragmentation, while in terms of functions the state remains centralized. As Tilly (1975) warned us, territorial fragmentation and functional centralization are attributes of the medieval, rather than the modern state. These findings suggest that decentralization may again lead to the re-traditionalization of social relations in diverse regions with multi-layered histories. It is an engineered re-traditionalization, not a natural one, for a tradition is never autonomous from the “modern” institutions or social interactions, within which it is found.
In conjunction with these conditions, the NGO sector or the formal civil society which has been shaped by the external actors’ projects may be seen as possessing more the qualities of a market than a social or cultural space. Grassroots civil activists developed a parallel civil society in their turn, demonstrating transformations that lie beyond the types of civil society imagined by neo-liberal state-building, but they emphasized an ideological and educational component, i.e. Islam and Islamic education. Being perceived as less “corrupt” than the formal education, Islamic education has attracted many followers.

As the main processes which influenced the creation of formal civil society was the process of market liberalization and the supporting of informal trade, it is legitimate to recall the Hegelian/ Marxian vision of civil society (Poggi 2001). In practice, both the NGO sector and communal civil society have been supported by external actors not as cultural, ideational, or social phenomena, but rather as units of a market. Considering the parts of these units which received more finance, one can say that it was these societies’ utilitarian value which was promoted, which is an economic view. However, since utility was derived from communities, the market becomes connected to localized systems of self-governance and developed into a type of civil society, classically called “Ständestaat” or, in later versions, - “städtische Gesellschaft” (Poggi 2001), literally - the state of the estates. Considering the findings of Chapter 5, when the struggle among rival elites fostered the creation of local elite “Fiefdoms”, one could see formal civil society as a factor contributing to the ständische Gesellschaft. Again, this represents an addition to societal and territorial fragmentation, which is not conducive to the completeness of the state.

It is not news that neo-liberal narratives may give rise to a conservative civil society. In Central Asia, the parallel civil society which has been developing emphasizes categories of justice, education, and spiritual needs, by means of an Islamic cause. This method appeals to the general
level of social resistance developing within society. In theory, a transcendent ideology may influence the direction of processes of interstitial emergence (Mann 1993). This may imply that through this method, an emergent parallel civil society managed to disseminate the ideology of Islam, which possesses features of the transcendent ideology. Furthermore, since this ideology is transnational, it would not be a stretch to imply that this process can increase the potential for transnational collective action and give birth to a new collective interest or a transnational collective actor. Although debatable, the idea of a transnational collective actor based on these sets of factors may be worth further inquiries.

_On privatization and the non-standard trade_

It is wrong to say that privatization or liberalization has failed in Central Asia. On the contrary, it succeeded, albeit in a different form. The implementation of privatization in Central Asia created communal rather than individual private property. It is a form of corporate private property, based on re-traditionalized communities and patriarchal systems, since the head of the household (read: a man) has primary rights. Secondly, the pursuit of liberalization through supporting non-standard trade in Central Asia simply strengthened the dependency on non-standard trade in Fergana Valley populations. This represents a survival strategy, in the absence of better alternatives, rather than a choice based on a luxury dilemma.

Since cross-border non-standard trade is more developed in the Fergana Valley, the neo-liberal policies which support it condition local populations to use this type of economic activity and therefore create a political economy, which will always be balanced between criminal and legal. In practice, supporting non-standard trade means supporting a division of labor between north and south, thereby exacerbating the inequality of conditions between these people.
This factor, together with the “functional” centralization addressed above leads in practice to a tyranny of private (corporate) interest over both state and individual. Hence, this kind of liberalization strengthens neither the state, nor the free man. Finally, the highlighted constellation of factors juxtaposed with the existing historically preconditioned societal interdependence, as underlined in Chapter 3, may, contrary to the conventional wisdom, foster not inter-communal or inter-state conflicts, but rather a form of “informal regionalization” or *regionalization par la bas.* Necessary factors for that kind of regionalization, such as informal survival strategies resulting in parallel economies, re-traditionalizing social structures, transcendent ideologies, and parallel civil activism (read: social mobilization potential) are present. Once hearts and minds are ready, an emergence of a new, not fully foreseen social order would only need to organize its logistics and find a political trigger.

**Questions for Further Research**

*Think polity with politics: questioning capacity, legitimacy, and authority*

If society matters, we have to map it correctly. The first steps in doing so could be reconsidering the outcome of the state-building process. The state is complete when it is a polity making politics, not when it is a group doing business. We have seen here that thinking in terms of the state as an institution may lead to the state turning into a vehicle for the ruling elites or into a massive, bureaucratic money-laundering machine. We need to explore whether thinking in terms of political authority may help to design better polities and a state as a social experience. If so, then we have to reconsider capacity, legitimacy, and authority as the three pillars of the state. It is the interplay between capacity and legitimacy that will create a certain type of political authority. Instances where capacity and legitimacy appear to be mutually exclusive, due to the conditions, factors, or attributes that scholars attach to them, is something which is to be explored more.
deeply. For instance, inspired by Michal Mann, this thesis found that societal embeddedness rather than state functional capacity can provide state legitimacy.

At the same time, if society is permeated by patrimonial government structures, one may need to consider the balance between state autonomy and state embeddedness. We suggest that revisiting the notion of capacity may cast some light on this balance. For example, capacity-building may in practice turn into increasing the state’s despotic power. However, we need a democratic, i.e. inclusive polity with a prospering society and free people. To accommodate the rich variety of the meanings of democracy across cultures, the research needs to focus on the striking, practical difference between sources of power and sources of capacity, for they are not the same.

**Sources of power: why economic resources do not equal economic power?**

As Chapter 5 has shown, elites have sequestered most if not all of the available economic resources. While this may have provided them with extra income and some influence, it has not provided them with economic power. No matter how the elites tend to think in Machiavellian terms, politics in itself is not a dirty business. It may be if we make it so. Neither vast riches nor access to the state has provided the elites with political authority. The missing element is simple: better fiscal policies and context-based mechanisms of infrastructural power. The Roman or Ottoman Empires were not ruled by money. Once their leaders thought they were, their polities collapsed. It is the infrastructural power that kept things together. Whether this should be achieved through empowering of civil society, community-based governance, institutions of local elites, or of a culture of negotiation among the social actors is a question to be answered for each particular context, with the aid of broad ethnographic data.
Society is diverse: so what with the Nation-state then?

However, in imagining a polity which has been created through an inclusive state-building process, the question arises whether the category of nation-state may provide enough room for it. Communitarian political theory would insist on that the nation-state is inclusive by definition, for it is based on the notion of citizenship, rather than ethnicity. However, for empirical reasons the nation-state does imply dominance of a titular nationality, since for the nation-state to function - economic and political resources must be bound to a given ethnic group. Whether a non-nation based membership in a polity is utopian or the road toward a self-eroding corporate culture is another question to be addressed.

Westphalian Sovereignty: what will we make of it without the Nation-state?

Finally, revisiting the notion of the nation-state while finding the way to organize political authority at home may have implications for how we think about international relations. Nation-states still constitute the main units of international relations, as well as preserving the notion of anarchy as the international order. Westphalian sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention would seem to be shaken without this unit. But would they really? Does non-intervention really need the nation-state? Or it would the peculiarities of international law and actorship in the international community need to be reconsidered, as well as the nature of anarchy and, certainly, what we make of it?
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Participant observations:

44. HuT one of the Jalal-Abad’s cells (women). Participant observation. Spring 2012.
48. Non-standardized interviews with random people at the entrances to mosques in Bishkek, Osh, Kara-Suu, Hujand, and Istaravshan, spring – summer 2012.
51. Round Table organized by “Search for Common Ground”, where a number of religious clerks were expressing their visions on the future of the state in Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, June 2014.

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