AL-‘EIZARIYAH AND THE WALL: FROM THE QUASI-CAPITAL OF PALESTINE TO AN ARAB GHETTO

The Impact of the Separation Wall on the Social Capital of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank

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AL-'EIZARIYAH AND THE WALL: FROM THE QUASI-CAPITAL OF PALESTINE TO AN ARAB GHETTO

The Impact of the Separation Wall on the Social Capital of the Palestinians

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A Thesis Presented in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor in Local Development and Global Dynamics

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I dedicate this work to my father who believed in me and helped me complete some things in life and start others all over again. Without his encouragement, love and support my personal struggle through life would have been many folds harder. To my son and daughter who have been the light of my life. To Rula Jebreal, Mr. and Mrs. Landau, without whose emotional and financial support I would not have managed to reach this point. To my family and friends who supported me all the way up to here, this includes old and new friends spread in many places, that hosted me throughout Italy, and especially to Maurizio, whose support was always reassuring and comforting.

To my people and Palestine that suffer but never give up
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ABSTRACT

This doctoral thesis is about the study of the social capital, its effects on the local
development and on the socio-economic resilience of the Palestinians trapped, socially,
politically, and economically, in the East Jerusalem's al-‘Eizariyah area. The transformation
of al-‘Eizariyah since 2002 through the Israeli encroachment on Palestinian land by
instrumental use of the Separation Wall policies were analyzed and re-stated through the
lenses of the sociological theory and concepts. Based on the accounts of life stories and
interviews with various members of the al-‘Eizariyah's former and current community and
through the visual data of the changes in al-‘Eizariyah and the areas adjacent to the
Separation Wall an analysis of the Palestinian coping and survival strategies was
undertaken. The thesis demonstrates how the reality of al-‘Eizariyah was changed
dramatically in the last two decades despite and in the opposite direction of the Oslo
Accords of 1993. To be sure, al-‘Eizariyah, which is located two miles east of Jerusalem, had
expanded to adjust to the economic boom of the early post-Oslo years coupled with the
political expectations of it being part of the future Palestinian capital. This was disrupted by
the failure of the Oslo Accords, and the construction of the Israeli Separation Wall in 2002,
which served as an instrument of intimidation and harassment to make Palestinians leave
Jerusalem, as this thesis demonstrates. The Wall did not only cut off al-‘Eizariyah from the
main road that used to connect East Jerusalem to Jericho. The Wall's more sinister and
long-term damage has been in the physical and psychological isolation of al-‘Eizariyah and
in preventing its residents from being fully integrated in the economic, social, cultural, and
political life of the East Jerusalem and of the West Bank. This two-sided effect of the
Separation Wall started when most of the people who used to work in East Jerusalem and
Israel lost their Jobs, students could no longer study in Jerusalem and had to change
schools; the sick no longer could use the healthcare facilities, etc. Former residents of al-
‘Eizariyah could no longer do any of these basic necessities neither their shopping and
entertainment in Jerusalem freely without being humiliated with denial of access to Jerusalem based on the persons’ ability to present a Blue ID at the checkpoint, the only ID that is recognized by the Israeli regime. While some social capital forms helped in coping with the difficulties caused by this new reality it was the difference in the pre- and post-Wall situations that were examined in order to understand the impact of the adversity represented by the Wall on the social capital of the Palestinians. The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the implications of the construction of the Wall on the socio-economic life of al-‘Eizariyah residents and to study the Israel-Palestine conflict from sociological lens using a case study setting and qualitative analysis approach. This thesis demonstrates positive impact of the Wall on social capital types by where the bonding social capital became stronger yet the trend got reversed. At the community level, the challenges were too large to be handled only by bonding social capital. Therefore, there is a combined effort between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the local civil society associations and the private sector to overcome problems related to education, health care services, trade and labor in addition to social security caused by the Wall. It was found that bridging social capital and linking social capital were strongly present after the Wall was completed. Although civil society associations are strongly present in al-‘Eizariyah but because the Palestinian society is structured along patrimonial, familial, clannish, tribal and contradictory geographical cleavages, most of these associations work in a way that transformed the intended outcome of bridging social capital to some kind of bonding social capital as the beneficiaries and the participants are mostly from their family, clan members, or those who belong to the same political party, and not the community as a whole. However, observations and the empirical evidence show that bonding is stronger than bridging social capital. The social fragmentation caused by several social forces such as the local-stranger relationship, between the locals of al-‘Eizariyah and the displaced residents, prevented efficient cooperation in solving community problems. Lack of the sense of belonging is not only because the locals always express superiority over the displaced, but also because the displaced themselves do not
want to lose their rooted original identity, especially the refugees who settled in the town after the 1948 war. This had a great overall impact on the unity of the Palestinian society especially that ‘the refugees’ communities constitute approximately 42 percent of the total population of the West Bank.

The future challenge of the Palestinians in areas such as al-‘Eizariyah is to find ways of detecting defragmentation and manipulation policies and develop strategies that would prevent defragmentation of the Palestinians being orchestrated by the Israeli Wall policies and that only become apparent with a time lapse when it can be too late.

Key Words: The Wall, the Oslo Accords, Jerusalem, al-‘Eizariyah, social capital, local development, socio-economic resilience.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Close family ties play a crucial role in coping with political turbulence, the Israeli occupation, and the socio-economic situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Social capital provides a safety-net for improving people's chances and the quality of day-to-day survival, especially after Israel constructed the Wall to separate Israel and East Jerusalem from the West Bank. The social capital index that was compiled in 2007, and has been the basis of the majority of the social capital studies in Palestine, referred only to the existence of the Wall in the rural northern and southern parts of the West Bank, as the Wall had only been completed at the time of the social capital index compilation. The Study stated that the construction of the Wall had prevented access to agricultural land. Consequently, the family became a strategy for protection while solidarity between the extended family increased.

Another study that used the same survey data found that bonding is stronger than bridging social capital, and suggested that the reasons for this can be traced to the peculiar context of Palestinian society. These conclusions raised some important questions. For example, about status of Palestinian social capital after the Wall has been completed. Also questions such as what is the impact of the Wall on social capital in urban settings and what are the characteristics of Palestinian society that make its context peculiar so that a certain type of social capital is dominant? This research examines the impact of the Wall on Palestinian social capital dynamics in urban areas, using East Jerusalem and its neighborhood al-‘Eizariyah (Bethany) as a case study. The research used the life story method to collect personal data and in-depth interviews with key informants to collect community level data. This qualitative approach used in this research and the added value to social capital studies in Palestine, forms the difference in the method, which helps unearth through the in-depth analyses the forces within Palestinian society that determine the types and the strength of social ties. While most previous studies declare that social capital is relatively strong, it is notable that there are many social problems that could be solved by social capital forces.
Therefore, this research highlights the barriers to collective action that prevent social capital from reaching its ultimate goal such as the local/stranger relationships, traditions, politics and gender inequality that are embedded in the Palestinian society.

The case study method was chosen to study the relevance of the Palestinian conflict via sociological analysis of social capital; the case of al-'Eizariyah was selected not only because of its importance as it was seen to be part of "East Jerusalem", the future capital of the Palestinian state. Also it was chosen because of its demographics. Al-'Eizariyah's residents represent a cross-section of Palestinian social stratification, and they also share the different types of identification cards (Blue and Green ID cards), which define and control the Palestinians' mobility, i.e. who can inter East Jerusalem and Israel and who cannot. And the third reasoning for the selection of this case study was due to the fact that in addition to the privilege being born and having studied in East Jerusalem, I lived parts of my life in al-'Eizariyah and also abroad. Thus, I am playing the role of both an insider and outsider ethnographer in a way that has enriched the research methods' abilities to explore and collect relevant information and give insightful data analyses. Al-'Eizariyah (Bethany) is one of East Jerusalem’s eastern neighborhoods located on the historic route between Jerusalem-Jericho, two miles from Jerusalem. The reality of al-'Eizariyah has changed dramatically in the last two decades. In the first period, after the Oslo Accords (1993), al-'Eizariyah expanded to adjust to the new economic boom, coupled with the political expectations of being part of East Jerusalem, the future capital of the State of Palestine. Governmental associations, Palestinian banks and other economic institutions found an alternative to East Jerusalem in al-'Eizariyah, as the Palestinian Authority was not allowed to function in East Jerusalem. Al-'Eizariyah's resident numbers doubled during this period as many Palestinians came from different parts of the West Bank and settled down there. They joined a local population who were already a combination of historic locals (from the town itself), refugees who had settled there after the establishment of Israel and the war of 1948.
and the Jerusalemites\textsuperscript{1} who had tried to avoid the housing crisis in Jerusalem. All of this socio-economic growth has been disrupted by the failure of the Oslo Accords and the construction of the Wall that has disconnected the town from its center and historic capital. East Jerusalem is in a unique situation; when Israel took control of the West Bank and East Jerusalem following the 1967 war, the West Bank remained under military occupation while Israel annexed East Jerusalem and its nearest suburbs. They became part of Israel but without granting their residents equal Israeli citizenship (Kimhi, 2006). Instead, the roughly 66,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites were given “Permanent Residence” cards which allowed them to work in Israel, enjoy health insurance and have social welfare benefits as provided to all Israeli residents (B’Tselem, 2006). Until the Wall was built, there was a residential continuum across the Palestinian neighborhoods and suburbs of East Jerusalem (Amir, 2011). Although there are major differences in the legal status of the residents, the distinction between these towns, villages and neighborhoods that were “in” or “out” of Jerusalem was purely artificial: the social fabric of the residents did not correspond to this distinction. There are many instances where members of the same family have different civil statuses. Some hold Israeli residency (Blue ID) and others have a West Bank identification card (Green ID). Differences in civil status did influence entitlement to services and benefits, but these differences did not split the families themselves (Ibid). Although some family members and other West Bank Green ID card holders were formally forbidden from entering the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem during the closure policy from March 1993, “...this restriction was not enforced as a general rule. The construction of the Wall, however, provided the means for implementing this restriction” (Amir, 2011: 773). Even in its early phases, the Wall was just an obstacle that held back the flow of people and goods. People managed to find ways to get through and past it; either by squeezing themselves through its distant openings, or by climbing to the other side using large boulders as ladders. However in 2009 almost all of these passages or methods to get to the other side were brought to a

\textsuperscript{1} The term ‘Jerusalemite’ refers to the Palestinians of East Jerusalem.
halt, entry to East Jerusalem was restricted to checkpoints only (Ibid). The Wall has completely isolated al-‘Eizariyah and prevented its residents from entering East Jerusalem, with some exceptions; those who have an Israeli identity card (Blue ID) or a Palestinian identity card (Green ID) with an Israeli issued permit. They can cross to Jerusalem through only two controlled entrances (checkpoints); one pedestrian only and one for Israeli registered vehicles. Most of the residents who used to work in East Jerusalem and Israel have lost their jobs. Children who used to study in Jerusalem had to change schools; this is also applicable for health care, shopping and entertainment, in addition to the rupture of the social interaction between the communities on both sides of the Wall. The hardships that people face on a daily basis, because of the Wall, created a mass migration and dozens of al-‘Eizariyah’s houses stand empty because most of the Jerusalemites moved back to East Jerusalem, despite poor living conditions, due to their concern of the possibility of losing their Israeli residency status. Others, who decided to stay, found themselves obliged to rent an additional house or apartment in East Jerusalem to prove that they live in the city and as such, protect themselves from Israel revoking their blue ID cards. The town also suffers from a high residential density coupled with few green spaces and a general sense of chaos; rubbish and other eyesores on the sidewalks at the main entrance to al-‘Eizariyah, unlicensed vehicles for public transportation, unpaved side-streets and unorganized, poorly designed and unfinished high-rise buildings. The research investigation shows that this is attributed to al-‘Eizariyah systematic loss of land over the years by Israel who has confiscated the town’s extensive surplus land and “green belt” in order to establish and then expand the settlement of Ma’ali Adommim. In addition to the categorization of al-‘Eizariyah as Area B in its center, it is also categorized as Area C at its eastern and western entrances and the areas surrounding them. These categorizations follow the stipulations of the Oslo Accords (1993). This means that some 27,000 of the town’s inhabitants are without National Security Forces, because the Palestinian police located in Area A where the Palestinian Authority has full civil and security control cannot interfere in Area B before getting the
approval of the Joint Security Coordination Office (Israel). This usually takes up to forty-eight hours to be convened, and of course, this is useless when dealing with cases of emergency. The town can rarely expand in Area C because it is under full Israeli control. The limited space and the absence of law and order have had a major impact on the security and local development. The implications of these obstacles, in addition to an actual imprisonment inside the Wall, became the main cornerstone of the inhabitants’ decision-making process; where to build a house, where to study, where to work and even who to marry. These implications influence al-‘Eizariyah residents’ survival strategies, while having the Israeli oppression as their constant backdrop. Looking into this case study in such circumstances, this research seeks to understand the impact of the Wall on the Palestinians’ social capital in terms of the main changes; what kinds of Palestinian social capital have been strengthened or weakened and why? What are the barriers to collective action, and what is the impact of the Wall on local development and socio-economic resilience? The thesis is organized into six chapters, starting from the Introduction Chapter which presents the thesis according to the sequence of thesis chapters. Following the introduction; Chapter Two presents, in detail, the research context and research problem and questions:

The Research Context and Research Questions Chapter

The first part of Chapter Two looks into the historical, geopolitical and socio-economic factors that shaped the context. This is done in the belief of the importance in understanding the different components that have a role in determining the context. Therefore, a short historical review of the most important political events was necessary to connect the contemporary research problem with its roots and to better understand the behavior and attitudes of studied individuals and communities. This section starts from the exodus and displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and their loss of land in 1948 following the establishment of Israel, to the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip in 1967, including the particular status of East Jerusalem. Then a section about the non-violent
uprising; the “first Intifada” in 1987, and the Oslo Accords in 1993, which led to the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The chapter displays the reasons that led to the main research problem, that is, the construction of the Wall. Then, a section concentrates on the segment of the Wall that separates East Jerusalem and Israel from the West Bank; its length and its route that severs the main roads between Palestinian areas plus other considerations. The chapter also tackles one of the most important political events affecting Palestinian contemporary history; the Hamas-Fatah conflict. The problem started after Hamas’ legislative victory in 2006 which led, a year later, to a physical split. Since then the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been governed by two different governments, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, while the West Bank remains under the control of the Palestinian Authority (Fatah). This led to a political polarization of the Palestinian population, mainly along this axis. The second section of this chapter gives an overview of the case study setting and focuses on the historical and political, and socio-economic factors that characterize the contexts where Palestinians live on both sides of the Wall; East Jerusalem and its suburb al-‘Eizariyah. This section starts with a brief historical review of East Jerusalem to explain the complexity that led to the research problem. This is followed by a specific overview of the Separation Wall in the region of Jerusalem, to highlight the implications of the already built Wall, in the process of still being built and the final planned route, around al-‘Eizariyah itself. There is then a brief description of al-‘Eizariyah focusing on the research problem, which presents the four research questions:

1- How did physical changes and spatial policies related to the Wall, influence local social networks?

2- What have been the main changes in social capital since the construction of the Wall? Which kinds of social capital have been strengthened, and which kinds weakened and why?
3- What are the particular characteristics of Palestinian society that makes its context peculiar so that a certain type of social capital is dominant? In addition, what are the barriers to collective action?

4- What has been the impact of the Wall on local development and social resilience?

The Literature Review Chapter

Chapter Three tackles first, the literature review on social capital to explore the concept in terms of its origin, definitions, measurements, types and its role in development. The idea of social capital is not new, but since the 1970s the concept has become one of the most influential and popular "metaphors" in social science research (Boari and Presutti 2004; Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004). Social capital, similar to accumulation of other forms of capital; physical and human, accelerates growth and improves standards of living. It refers to the internal social and cultural coherence of a society, its norms and values that govern interactions between people and the institutions embedded within that society. Colman (1988) defines social capital as resources embedded in social relations that permit individuals and communities to achieve their desired goals. The World Bank also stated that there is growing evidence that social capital, under a variety of definitions, can have an impact on development outcomes — growth, equity, and poverty alleviation. The problem is that it is almost impossible to measure social capital directly; in this case, the use of proxy indicators is necessary. The section presents social capital theories starting with the social network theory of Granovetter (1973) and ends with the social resource theory of Lin (1982).

The second section examines the specific literature on social capital within the Palestinian context starting with Naqib’s first study, the Social Capital Index study, the “Bonding Versus Bridging” study, the Corruption study and other studies of social capital in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Naqib (2006) was the first to posit the importance of informal social networks among Palestinians generated by a common resistance; he introduced the idea of social capital as a substitute for market and state failure. The study concludes that there was
a decline in the infrastructure of social institutions as a result of the continuous weakening of Palestinian public institutions by Israeli political and military measures. In parallel, there was an increase in social capital as a result of the boost in solidarity among Palestinian citizens themselves, created by their common resistance. This section also sheds light on "Measuring Social Capital in the Palestinian Territories" study by Nasr & Hilal which was carried out in 2007 under the umbrella of The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) with the cooperation of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). This was in order to design an index that reflects the multi-faceted nature of social capital in the Palestinian Occupied Territories (MAS, 2007). The third study “Bonding Versus Bridging” (2009) which was built on Nasr & Hilal's study of 2007 explores how social capital applies to the Occupied Palestinian Territories and identifies the main forms in which it manifests. The study concluded that bonding social capital is stronger than bridging social capital and that building a civic and viable society/country requires efforts to strengthen the bridging social capital. The chapters shed lights also on other studies such as the “Social Capital and Corruption Puzzle: Evidence from a Palestinian Survey” (2011) by Luca Andriani. The aim of the study was to critically analyze the relationship between social capital components and corruption in the Palestinian Territories. The study highlighted the roles and problems inherent to social capital and corruption such as Wasta, nepotism and favoritism which are utilized to obtain personal gain. The section sheds light on other studies and discusses the methodology used in all of them which were mostly quantitative and points out that the aim of this research is to complement these findings with a quantitative method to answer some questions that arose from them. The third section of the Chapter deals with the notion of civil society; its origin and the progress of its definitions over time including the debate over its components that give birth to certain types of questions. A civil society which, according to the London School of Economics, refers to ‘the arena of un-coerced collective action around

\(^2\text{Wasta refers to the use of personal connections or influence in order to obtain things, such as, getting hired or promoted in a job, passport renewal, the waiving of traffic fines.}
shared interests, purposes and values, it reflects itself through the types of organizations formed such as registered charities, non-governmental development organizations, community groups, women’s organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trades unions… etc. In theory, civil society institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries are often complex, blurred and negotiated. In the Palestinian context the argument was ‘Is there a Palestinian civil society?’ This question is logical in the Palestinian case, because review of the concept revealed that civil society has been always related to, or worked independently from the “State”. Therefore, the chapter discusses this issue and displays the three opinions in an attempt to answer the above question. The first argues that a Palestinian civil society cannot exist before the formation of an independent state. The second opinion is that the Palestinian civil society exists. The third is that the Palestinian civil society is in transition. All these three opinions all well illustrated in the chapter. The third section includes a historic presentation of the civil society and a review of literature connected to it within the Palestinian context.

The Research Method Chapter

The chapter is organized in five sections, after the introduction, starts the methodology and research design section which shows that this research is built on the results of the existing quantitative studies on social capital in the Occupied Palestinian Territories; mainly the Social Capital Index of 2007 and the “Bonding Versus Bridging” study of 2009. These results are examined and then they are exposed to further investigation by the case study qualitative method, using in-depth key informants’ interviews and the life story interviews; the first to collect community data, and the second to collect personal data. The third section of the chapter presents the research limitations, then the data and data collection tools. Section four shows the data collection process and the challenges in the field work. The last section deals with the data analysis.
The Empirical Research Chapter

This chapter first illustrates the research’s main problem and explains how the reality of al-’Eizariyah has changed in the last two decades. It shows, at first, how al-’Eizariyah expanded to adjust with the new economic boom coupled with the political expectations of being part of the future capital of the State of Palestine, according to the Oslo Accords. Second, how the Wall completely isolated al-’Eizaryah which has prevented its residents from entering East Jerusalem since mid-2004. This section presents the situation before the Wall and how al-’Eizariyah depended on East Jerusalem in almost all aspects of life. The chapter discusses the direct and indirect effects of the Wall; the direct effect includes displacement and the loss of access to services such as education, health care and the interruption of the public transportation system. While the indirect effects differ among various groups some were adapted to the new reality and reorganized their lives around the Wall. They learned to co-exist with the hardships that came with it. Thus, the majority adapted their lives to the new reality but in a way that normalized the existence of the Wall. They accepted the fact that East Jerusalem is no longer the center of their social and economic activities, and they organized their lives accordingly, the Wall became invisible. Others had to find solutions, which disperse and wasted their personal resources; many had to have two houses; one in al-’Eizariyah and the other one in East Jerusalem. The general absence of the sense of aesthetics in building control is also discussed here. The section demonstrates the invisible effect of the Wall that changed the social relation map and offers to explain the pattern of marriage changing during the past ten years linked to the existence of the Wall. It also shows how the Wall also had raised the political awareness and frustration among the young generation, and how the Palestinians view the Palestinian Authority after twenty years of the Oslo Accords.

In the second section, and in order to understand the impact of the Wall on Palestinian social capital dynamics, types and characteristics in the case study setting, requires an understanding of the geopolitical environment that changed the desirable status of al-
‘Eizariyah from quasi ‘Capital of the Palestinian State’ to an ‘Arab Ghetto’, and an understanding of al-‘Eizariyah’s social structure and the macro-social forces that influence social capital in the town. Therefore, this section starts with a discussion on the Oslo Accords and its categorization of the town as Area B in the center and Area C for the surroundings. Then it tackles al-‘Eizariyah’s social structure and gives a detailed explanation of its residents. Generally, the population of al-‘Eizariyah is divided into two main categories; the locals, who are originally from the town itself, and those who came to settle there from other parts of Palestine. These groups differ in their place of origin, and when and why they were displaced, and whether it was for political, economic or personal reasons. The section sheds light on various groups, and then discusses the structural macro-social forces that shape social capital; the focus here is on social fragmentation, which is a result of various political, socio-economic and cultural factors. This section also discusses the notable strong bonding social capital on the family level alongside the weak bridging social capital on the community level. The question here is why? And what are the barriers to collective action? To answer these two questions, the chapter analyses the local/stranger relationship and explains the Palestinian refugees’ feelings of displacement. It also analyses how the lack of a sense of belonging to the receiving community is not only because the locals always express superiority over them, but also because the refugees themselves do not want to lose their original identity, rooted in the historic place of birth of their ancestors. The other barrier that the chapter highlights is the social structure itself, where ‘tribalism’ or ‘clanism’ is deeply embedded and influences relationships. It explains the Arab culture which addresses security through "balanced opposition" which enhances feelings of unity amongst one’s own tribe, and normalizes antagonism against outsiders. The third barrier is related to the change in traditions, political forces, culture and religion. It explains how the first Intifada created a new role for the young generation, “Al Shabab”, and how they became the reference point of the society. This section also discusses gender inequality from an educational and religious perspective; it shows how women’s rights to education and work are viewed by males and
females. It shows also women’s inheritance rights and explains why Palestinian women used to accept a consolation amount of money instead of their full share. Other barriers to collective action are also discussed such as the increase in Islamic beliefs and practices amongst the Muslim population thereby influencing certain positive and negative social behavior.

The sixth section of the Empirical Chapter discusses the role of civil society associations and explains their special case; how the Palestinian Government, supported by the International Community, extends into all facets of civil society and promotes specific agendas, funds certain programs and monitors associational activities. The section sheds light on al-‘Eizariyah’s twenty two social associations, which can be categorized according to the type of services they provide or by their target group. It also explains why most of these associations’ community services are limited and ineffective. The section tackles the effect of the Wall on social capital at different levels; from family and extended family level, to the community and social organization level.

The last section of this chapter looks first at the Wall as a physical intervention shock and discusses the socio-economic resilience in terms of the time it took the community to rebound from this man-made hazard and its implication on local development. Then it tackles adaptation and adjustment strategies which cover education and health care in addition to economics. Second it discusses the challenges that al-‘Eizariyah is facing and will face in the future as the recovery is partial and the continuity is not guaranteed especially when the eastern Wall will be completed. In this case and in the absence of planning prospects the community response would be random, not organized, repeating the same mistakes and adaptation would be more like surrender to faith.

This empirical research is followed by the conclusion chapter that presents the research findings and answers the research questions.
CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH CONTEXT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this chapter is to look into the historical, geopolitical and socio-economic factors that characterize and influence the Palestinians types of social capital in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In the belief of the importance of understanding the different components that have a role in determining the context, this chapter attempt to give a holistic picture of the research context. The observations had highlighted the existence of the main research problems. First: the construction of the Separation Wall which Israel started to construct in 2002 to separate Israel and East Jerusalem from the West Bank. The Wall in the area that the case study covers has completely isolated al-'Eizaryah and prevented its residents from entering East Jerusalem with some exceptions. Unless the residents of al-'Eizaryah have the Israeli identity card (Blue ID) or a Palestinian identity card (Green ID) with a permit to reach Jerusalem through only two controlled entrances. Those two checkpoints are; al- Zaytoon “Olive” checkpoint entry for pedestrians, and the other is for al- Za’ayyem checkpoint for Israeli vehicles only.

Secondly the implications of being categorized as area B and C according to the Oslo Accords that divided the West Bank into three administrative divisions: areas A, B, and C with different civic and security authorization for each area, this has its own implication as well as the Wall. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the analysis of the general historic, political and socio-economic environment that led to the current situation; it starts with an

3 “Separation Fence” (or sometimes “Security Fence”) is the term generally used by the Israeli government and media. According to Peter Lagerquist in his article "Fencing the Last Sky; the term is misleading insofar as the barrier complex's primary effect is less to separate or secure than to enclose and expropriate. Others call it the “Separation Barrier”.

4 The distinct areas were given a different status, according to the amount of self-government the Palestinians would have over it through the Palestinian Authority, until a final status accord would be established.
overview of the periods from the 1948-1967 wars to the first Intifada, then to the Oslo Accord in 1993 and to the second Intifada in 2000 explaining its consequences including restrictions on movements represented by the checkpoint security system and the construction of the separation Wall and, then to the contemporary political environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The second section of this chapter presents the research problem, the justification of the choice of this specific case study followed by the research questions. The last section will focus on the specific historic, political and socio-economic environment of the case study setting; East Jerusalem, al-'Eizariya and the Wall between them to shed light on the area covered by this case study; East Jerusalem and its particular geopolitical and legal status, then the story of the Wall as that of an obstacle to a border.

2.2 HISTORIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

Since sociological concepts are produced in relation to a socio-historical context (Passeron 1991; Kalberg 1994), it is important to trace back the influential historical events that shaped the contemporary political and the socio-economic status in the Palestinian context. Starting with the roots of the Israeli Palestinian conflict:

1- Palestine from the Ottoman rule to the British Mandate

The Middle East was ruled by the Ottoman Empire for nearly four centuries before it was replaced by the French and British colonial rule. All of these rules had their influence on what Palestine is today, including the latest European rulers despite their relatively short period. The relations between Ottoman state and its provinces had a certain pattern; Palestine was dominated by autonomous peasantry in the countryside and by urban mercantile in the main

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5 This quote was taken from (Beinin & Vairel, 2013: 8).
cities of the province; a tax farming system was implemented by the central government of Istanbul. There were a diverse culture between the urban mercantile and the rural communal organization of agricultural production (Tamari, 2008). Social organization and social perception were clearly localized and bound by kinship. The bounds between cities and villages were by ties of patronage and other feudal alignments (Ibid). Eisenstadt & Roniger (1984) argue that in order to construct a realm of trust or solidarity requires some kind of basic tension or contradictions (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984). The Ottomans administrative regime used the powerful local elites and their families in the cities and appointed them as provincial governors and bureaucrats on one hand. On the other hand, individuals outside these elites were given long-term or lifetime tax farms (Sluglett, 2008). Therefore, a degree of tension between these two groups was created. Furthermore, the urban notables played a vital role but they did not enjoy “autonomy” from the state, because they were dependent upon it for confirmation in their official positions (Ibid). And they did not enjoy unity among themselves either, because they were divided into groups who fought each other for control over local resources; and while the city or region “paid something approximating to its prescribed tax liabilities to the central state, the state would rarely interfere in the details of the city’s economic activities” (Sluglett, 2008:7). The same strategy was used for cultural and religious activities; the state usually nominates members of the local religious notability to senior posts such as mufti and naqib al-ashraf, and minor posts such imams in mosques or teachers in madrasas (schools). Those religious notabilities were legitimators of the Ottomans political power and the social order (Sluglett, 2008).

The Palestinian elites (or notable families) who assumed leadership during Ottoman times over the quasi-feudal society, continued to control the organized religious, political and social life of the Arab community under the British Mandate (Peretz, 1977). They developed new contacts with the colonial administrations and with a new generation of “national” politicians (Sluglett, 2008). The British mandatory government made efforts to improve many sectors and public service such as health, where malaria that had claimed many victims during the
Ottoman times was eliminated. Government hospitals were constructed, networks of child-welfare centers and clinics were established, in addition to road networks (Ibid). On the other hand, “the mandatory power did little to foster a widespread educational movement, and the state schools were remarkably poor in quality and quantity” (Zahlan, 1974: 46). Although there were efforts in expanding education at the village level, elementary education was limited, leaving a high percentage of the population illiterate (Ibid). More than half the villages had no elementary schools and 95 percent had none for girls (Peretz, 1977).

Secondary education was concentrated mainly in Jerusalem, and there were no public schools that provided education beyond secondary in Palestine during the first fifteen years of British rule, with the exception of the Arab College in Jerusalem (Ibid). Moreover, there was a large difference in the number of elementary school students attending schools in the rural areas compared to those in the urban centers (Zahlan, 1974). Most of Palestinian education was private; some were under Arab jurisdiction, others were under the administration of foreign religious groups (Ibid). “Until the end of the mandate there was no higher education available for Arabs in Palestine. The Jewish universities used Hebrew as the language of instruction, which was an effective barrier to admission of Arabs. Those who were interested in university had to leave the country, and many studied at institutions such as the American University of Beirut in Lebanon” (Peretz, 1977: 54). After the catastrophic event of 1948, education became more important to the ordinary Palestinians as it compensated for their loss of the land especially that the UNRWA6 provided more public schools for boys and girls. The educated members of the family would work in the local market or abroad and support his displaced family.

Although the Jewish migration to Palestine started during the Ottoman rule at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the British allowed the project

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6 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), was created in 1949 to provide education, health care and social services to the Palestinian refugees from the 1948 and 1967 wars in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and elsewhere.
of the Zionist movement\(^7\) to become reality by the Balfour Declaration of 1917. The Balfour Declaration pronounced the right for a Jewish homeland to be established in Palestine in 1917 without the consent of the Palestinian people living in the lands of Palestine at the time (Khalidi, 1997). For the first time Palestine emerged as a separate country “at the end of the First World War with Britain’s conquest of the Ottoman districts of Jerusalem, Acre, and Nablus” (Longland, 2013: 216). The Hussein–McMahon correspondence\(^8\) of 1915 ‘promised’ Palestine as a future Arab state, and as an international zone in the Sykes–Picot agreement of 1916, and as a Jewish National Home in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 (Longland, 2013). The Balfour Declaration was in contrast with the previous two agreements. This had encouraged more Zionist settlers and the Jewish refugees to arrive in Palestine in large numbers since the 1920s (Pappe, 2007). Many of the Palestinians leaders between 1905 and 1910 felt the danger and discussed Zionism as a political movement aiming to purchase land, assets and power in Palestine but without the acknowledgment of the destructive potential, they saw it as part of the European missionary and colonialist motivations, which according to Pappe (2007) partially was, but it turned out to be a dangerous enterprise for the Palestinians (Ibid). The surrounding Arab countries “saw the movement of Jews into Palestine as irresponsible attempt on the part of Europe to transfer its poorest and often stateless people into the country, not as a part of a master plan aimed at the disposssession of the local people” (Pappe, 2007:12). As a result of the Jewish migration to Palestine, the indigenous Palestinians made up the two-third majority by December 1947, while they were ninety percent when the British Mandate started in 1917 (Ibid). Longland (2013) argue that “The Balfour Declaration and its pledge to Zionism made Palestine unique among the Middle Eastern mandates for it precluded any real possibility of the majority Arab population being

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\(^7\)Zionism emerged in the late 1880s in central and eastern Europe as a national revival movement, prompted by growing pressure on Jews in those regions either to assimilate totally or risk continuing persecution, ... by the beginning of the twentieth century ... (Zionism) was associated with the colonization of Palestine (Pappe, 2007: 10).

\(^8\)The Hussein–McMahon correspondence promised the Arab independence movement control of the Middle East territories "in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca Hussein bin Abdullah" in exchange for revolting against the Ottoman Empire.
granted the independence anticipated in the Mandatory arrangement”. The initiate of the declaration that: ‘nothing shall be done, which may endanger the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine’ presents dual obligation to Jews and Palestinian communities (ibid). Some may say that this demonstrated British fair-mindedness, others argue that this “in practice meant that colonial officials consistently switched their support from one side to the other, engendering anger from all quarters” (Longland, 2013: 216), violent clashes started and claimed the lives of hundreds of Palestinians and Jews by the end of the 1920s, which prompted the British to take an action to solve the flaming conflict, they proposed a political structure that would represent both communities on an equal balance in the state parliament and the government. The Palestinians who made up the majority of the 80-90% of the total population refused this arrangement, while the Jews endorsed it (Pappe, 2007). This has led to the Palestinian uprising of 1929, then the 1936 in which “the Palestinian rebellion fought with such determination that it forced the British government to station more troops in Palestine than there were in the Indian subcontinent” (Pappe, 2007:14).The cultural heterogeneity of the Palestinian society during the Ottoman rule has been unified by the ideology of Palestinian Arab nationalism to confront both Jewish nationalism and British colonialism (Tamari, 1982). In three year time the British military subdued the revolt, “the Zionist leadership had wasted no time in working out their plans for an exclusively Jewish presence in Palestine: first, in 1937, by accepting a modest portion of the land when they responded favorably to the recommendation by British Royal Peel commission9 to partition Palestine into two states; and second, in 1942, by attempting a more maximalist strategy, demanding all Palestine for itself” (Pappe, 2007:14). “The violence of the Palestinian Arab Revolt of 1936–1939 and the terrorism of Jewish paramilitary organizations in the 1940s were particularly significant for souring the British on their colonial possession. After first floating the idea of the partition of the country in 1937, an insolvent post-war Britain decided in 1947 to abandon the Mandate

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9 See Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
to the United Nations and its partition plan” (Longland, 2013: 216). In February 1947, “the Zionist policy was first based on retaliation against Palestinian attacks and it transformed into an initiative to ethnically cleanse the country as a whole in March 1948” (Pappe, 2007: xiii). Around 75000 Palestinian became refugees in the surrounding Arab countries and the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a result of the 1948 War\(^\text{10}\). Salim Tamari in his study on Palestinian society and culture suggests that “the unfulfilled modernity of Palestine is seen … as the product of the disintegration of pre-1948, the result of war and displacement rather than a result of underdevelopment” (Tamari, 2008: 3).

\section*{2- The Period from the War of 1948-1967 till the First Intifada in 1987}

The previous section presented the general roots and the wide picture of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This section illustrates the historic events that shaped the political and socioeconomic atmosphere of what was left of Historic Palestine after the creation of the state of Israel. Thus, what remains is the West Bank and Gaza Strip, starting from its political status after the 1948 up to 2014 when this research was conducted. After the 1948 war, the remaining Palestinian territories were under the control of the neighboring countries, the West Bank including East Jerusalem was annexed by Jordan while Egypt took control over the Gaza Strip. In June 1967, and as a result of the 6 Day War\(^\text{11}\), Israel occupied the West Bank including East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, and the Golan Heights of Syria. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in June 1967 shaped a new political and economic order in the territories (Hilal, 2007). While the West Bank and Gaza Strip remained under military occupation, Israel annexed East Jerusalem and some 64 square kilometers of its suburbs that were considered part of the West Bank to build 12 Jewish neighborhoods (B'Tselem, 2009). Resident status

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\(^{10}\) The 1948 Arab–Israeli War (al-Nakba) was fought between the State of Israel and a military coalition of Arab states and Palestinian Arab forces.

\(^{11}\) The war of 1967 also called al-Naksah.
(Blue ID) was given to the Palestinian Jerusalemites, which allowed them to work in Israel, enjoy health insurance and social welfare benefits provided to all Israeli residents (B’Tselem, 2006), and committed to pay all municipal and governmental fees and taxes which were in many cases used as an instrument to force them to leave the city and immigrate (AbuZayyad, November 1, 2013).

The Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza were given an Orange color ID to differentiate them from the residents of Jerusalem. And they were not given any of the rights that were given to the Jerusalemites\(^\text{12}\). The Orange ID was replaced by a Green color one after the Oslo Accords and the creation of the Palestinian Authority in 1993. In the West Bank, and while the Palestinians did not practice national self-administration or self-determination through the Jordanian rule from 1948 to 1967, they however, administered their own affairs within the context of the Jordanian political system (Heller and Nusseibeh, 1993). The Jordanian government actually provided a horizontal "roof" or umbrella for the Palestinian self-administration. Following the 1967 war, this umbrella was replaced by the Israeli military authority to some extent. Palestinian personnel in several Jordanian government departments such as health, education, and social welfare departments fell under the control of the Israeli military governor, later named the head of the "civil administration" (Ibid). In this sense we may say that there were no major changes when it comes to administrative issues. Israel controlled the population movement by a complicated and strict permit system required for crossing the new borders between Israel and Jordan (the Open Bridge policy). On the other hand, the borders between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza were opened, and the people in the Occupied Territories\(^\text{13}\) could move almost freely in Israel\(^\text{14}\).

\(^{12}\) This expression (Jerusalemites) is used to distinguish the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem from other Palestinians who lives somewhere else such as the West Bank, Gaza Strip or Alshatat (diaspora).

\(^{13}\) The Occupied Palestinian Territories refers to East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza strip that have been captured in the 1967 War.

\(^{14}\) "The policy of "open bridges" referred solely to the decision to allow movement from the West Bank to Jordan via the bridges crossing the Jordan River, the "open bridges" policy became a prong in a greater
Since the beginning of the occupation, Israel has taken control of hundreds of thousands of dunams\(^{15}\) throughout the West Bank, with the primary objective of establishing Israeli settlements\(^{16}\) and reserves of land for their future expansion (Bimkom & B'Tselem, 2002). Settlements range in character from farming communities and frontier villages to urban suburbs and neighborhoods. The four largest settlements, Modi'in Illit, Ma'ale Adummim\(^{17}\), Beitar Illit and Ariel, gained the city status. Importantly, all settlements are considered illegal under international law, which prohibits the establishment of settlements in Occupied Territory (B'Tselem, 2009). One hundred twenty one official settlements and some one hundred unrecognized settlements, referred to as “unauthorized outposts”, have been established in the West Bank (Ibid).

During this period education became one of the key Palestinian social values, for both genders. “Over the last few decades, school enrollments have risen markedly throughout the region [MENA]\(^{18}\). Primary education is nearly universal in most countries and the gap between boys’ and girls’ enrolments in secondary school has disappeared in many countries” Glick & Sahn, 2000:4). However, the gap in Palestine is in favor of females, as

\(^{15}\) Every four dunams = 1 acre

\(^{16}\) Since the beginning of the occupation, Israel has taken control of hundreds of thousands of dunams throughout the West Bank, with the primary objective of establishing settlements and providing reserves of land for their expansion. It has done this by means of a complex legal-bureaucratic mechanism whose central element is the declaration and registration of land as “state land.” In addition, Israel uses three complementary methods to seize control of land: requisition for military needs, declaration of land as abandoned property and the expropriation of land for public needs. In addition, Israel has also helped its Jewish citizens to purchase land on the free market for the purpose of establishing new settlements. Using these methods, Israel has seized control of some fifty percent of the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem. (Lein, 2002) these settlements are illegal according to the International Law. See https://www.btselem.org/download/200205_land_grab_eng.pdf

\(^{17}\) This settlement was established on the land of al-'Eizariyah eastwards in the year 1975, a community of 40,000 people, see Allegra, 2012.

\(^{18}\) [MENA] is the abbreviation of Middle East and North Africa. The West Bank and Gaza Strip were included in the study
shown below in the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics for the academic year 2013/2014, referring to the three types of schools; the Government, UNRWA, and private schools.

![Number of Students in Schools by Region, Supervising Authority, Stage and Sex, 2013/2014](image)

Figure 1: Number of male and female students in Palestinian schools. Source: PCBS (2014).

Although education is a virtue for both boys and girls, and Islamic teaching encourage education for both sexes, a close look at the chart above shows that the only schools where male students out-number their female counterparts are in private schools. This reveals that Palestinian parents have been and are more willing to invest in the education of their sons, rather than their daughters. This is because of the male obligations towards his family, which do not apply to women or girls of the family.

Economically, the Occupied Territories became dependent on the Israeli economy; the Palestinian markets became restricted to Israeli goods and commodities, a significant portion of the Palestinian labor force became dependent on the Israeli labor market for employment (Hilal, 2007). There were two main causes; firstly, the high unemployment rates in both West Bank and Gaza Strip after the 1967 war, and secondly, the Israeli urgent demand for working hands, mainly in construction and agriculture during the economic boom that had started in Israel at that time, especially, the construction of the Israeli settlements in the Occupied...
Territories. The economic integration that was implemented by force between both entities; Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories, started in 1967 and ended with the beginning of the first Intifada in 1987 (Gross, 1999). “The shaping of such relations was almost entirely a matter for Israel. The Palestinians had not played a significant role in that context and did not have a say in any decision-making processes … the huge economic gaps between the two peoples were marked by a one-sided dependence of the Palestinian economy on Israel … Furthermore, these relations were not based on a voluntary arrangement between two parties of relatively equal bargaining power and leverage; instead, Israel unilaterally shaped their contours” (Gross, 1999: 1551). The outbreak of the “first Intifada”, in December 1987 led to a subsequent decrease in the number of Palestinian workers employed in the Israeli labor market as a consequence of the Israeli security measures (Hilal, 2007). More on the first Intifada in the next section:

3- The First Intifada 1987-1993

The four Palestinian workers who were killed at an Israeli checkpoint in Gaza on December 1987 sparked the First Intifada\(^{19}\); King& Carter (2009: 1) described the scene: “In the next few weeks, seemingly unorganized protests by Palestinians erupted across the occupied territories, blocking roads and impeding Israeli army. Israel deployed thousands of soldiers to suppress the revolt which afterwards they organize general strikes and boycotts of Israeli civil administration institutions in both; the Gaza Strip and the West Bank”. They practice civil disobedience in the face of the Israeli army orders, and they refused working in the Israeli settlements (Afflerbach & Strachan, 2012). The demonstrators throw stones towards the Israeli army and they remained in the front line despite the tear gas and the rubber-coated bullets used by the Israeli soldiers against them (King& Carter, 2009). Lustick (1993: 560) argued that any Palestinian outbursts would die down after the army opened fire if it

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\(^{19}\)The word “Intifada” in Arabic means “the uprising”.

happened during the past twenty years. He explained: “From the beginning of its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, Israel outlawed almost all forms of political activity by the Arab inhabitants of those areas since the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967”. However, the demonstrations of the first Intifada expanded, drawing such large numbers of protestors into the streets that Israeli units were overwhelmed. Lustick (1993: 561) further noted: “Within weeks there emerged a clandestine coordinating committee that helped sustain an uninterrupted series of commercial and general strikes and mass demonstrations”. The first Intifada was not only a different nonviolent mean of struggle against the Israeli occupation but as King & Carter (2009: 1) wrote: “The intifada constituted for the Palestinians major shift in organization, thinking, leadership, and purpose. The Palestinians determined in essence to discard a tradition of armed struggle … in favor of civilian, nonmilitary measures of struggle”. Allegra (2010: 17) also pointed out that “… the first Intifada had put an end to that system of informal mediation that had developed in Occupied Territories between the Israeli administration and the Palestinian notables”. This genuine civil rebellion has created a new form of Palestinian leadership; Al-Shabab (Young Men) became also the new social reference point instead of the head of the clan or the head of the extended family in the Palestinian Occupied Territories (AbuZayyad, November 1, 2013).

The First Intifada, for many observers and politicians, was one of the most important collective nonviolent resistance actions that the Palestinians had in the twentieth century besides the revolution of the 1936–39. Heller and Nusseibeh (1993:161) saw the spontaneous uprising as “a revolution of mass consciousness, underlining the need for embodying the idea of self-determination in tangible structures in reality”. This consciousness, in addition to the Jordanian disengagement decision in the mid-1988, and

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20 The 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine was a nationalist uprising by Palestinian Arabs in Mandatory Palestine against British colonial rule, as a demand for independence and opposition to mass Jewish immigration.

21 In the mid of 1988 Jordan decided to disengage legally and administratively from the West Bank.
the Palestinian Declaration of Independence\textsuperscript{22} in November of the same year, all worked towards concluding peace with Israel and to establish a Palestinian government in the Occupied Territories. The First Intifada gave birth to the peace process and the two-state solution (Smith, 2010); it lasted until the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993.

4- The Oslo Accord and the Administrative Divisions of the West Bank

The Oslo secret peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)\textsuperscript{23} were concluded with the announcement of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in 1993\textsuperscript{24}, which formed the basis for further negotiations concluded by the Israeli-Palestinian “Interim Agreement”\textsuperscript{25} of 1995, and the creation of “Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority”\textsuperscript{26}, which was supposed to end in 1999 when a permanent agreement would be reached\textsuperscript{27}. It was agreed to postpone a number of issues known as the final status issues till the third year of the process. Jerusalem was one of these issues. Though the DOP did not define the outcome of the process, it was understood that it will end by the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel (Shihadeh, 1993). However, the implementation of the “Interim Agreement” was not easy, many obstacles delayed its implementation, including the suicide attacks carried out by Hamas\textsuperscript{28}, the assassination of

\textsuperscript{22} The statement proclaimed by Yasser Arafat on 15 November 1988 in which he assumed the title of “President of Palestine”.
\textsuperscript{23} The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is an organization founded in 1964 with the purpose of the “liberation of Palestine” through armed struggle. It is recognized as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people”. It has enjoyed observer status at the United Nations since 1974. The PLO was considered by the United States and Israel to be a terrorist organization until the Madrid Conference in 1991. In 1993, the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace, accepted UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and rejected “violence and terrorism”; in response, Israel officially recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.
\textsuperscript{24} See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements on www.cfr.org/israel/oslo-accords.../p9674
\textsuperscript{25} See “The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ("Oslo 2"—9/28/95)” https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/interimtoc.html
\textsuperscript{26} he situation is the same since then till the time being.
\textsuperscript{27} See Shlaim, A. (2005). The rise and fall of the Oslo Peace process; International relations of the Middle East, 241-61
\textsuperscript{28} Hamas is a Palestinian Islamic organization; it was founded in 1987 (during the First Intifada) as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
the Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish right-wing activist and the election of Binyamin Netanyahu as prime minister in 1996 (Pundak, 2001).

According to Oslo Accords the West Bank, excluding the Jewish settlements and military locations, was supposed to be transferred to the Palestinians in three portions one every six months under the arrangement of redeployment. To facilitate this process, it was agreed that it will be divided into three criteria: A, B, and C. Area C was supposed to be transferred to B, then B to A, until the whole area becomes A under the control of the Palestinian Authority (AbuZayyad, November 1, 2013). However, the implementation of the process was halted in the middle, and the West Bank remained divided into three administrative divisions: the area A, B, and C with different civic and security authorization (Jamal, 2009). First: area A, 3% of the West Bank, with a full civil and security control by the Palestinian Authority, it includes the Palestinian cities\textsuperscript{29} and their surrounding areas. Second: area B, 24% of the West Bank with a Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control, such as East Jerusalem suburbs. And finally area C, the remaining 73% of the West Bank, with a full Israeli civil and security control. By 2000, following a series of agreements, the relative distribution of the areas had changed; area A covered 18% of the West Bank, area B covered 22% and area C 64\%\textsuperscript{30}. The areas in which the Palestinians had full control were as Gordon (2008: 36) described "like an archipelago of sorts, while the areas controlled by Israel were strategic corridors that interrupted the territorial contiguity of the West Bank".

The categorization of area A, B, and C was built on the Palestinian population density; all Palestinian cities with high population density were given to the Palestinian Authority with full civil and security control. After the redeployment of Israeli military forces, and the transfer of responsibility to the Palestinian Police, defined as the only Palestinian security authority, their purpose was to act systematically against all expressions of violence and terror. The Palestinian Authority was expected to prevent violence and terror against Israel, and to

\textsuperscript{29}The cities of Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Jericho

\textsuperscript{30}The Agreements were Wye I, II and III and Sharam I.
assume responsibility for the personal security of the Palestinians under its sovereignty. In area B the Palestinians implemented civilian authority while Israel continued to be in charge of security (Shlaim, 2005). There was a different interpretation of the term “joint Israeli-Palestinian security control”. For the Israelis: security means only the security of Israel, not the Palestinians’ security, Israeli security forces actually interfere in area B only when there is a threat to its own security, but it will not interfere when it comes to the Palestinian security (AbuZayyad, October 20, 2013), he further explained: when a car accident occurs between two Palestinian cars, for example, the Israelis do not interfere. On the other hand, Palestinian police cannot move freely from Area A to B because they have first to coordinate with the Joint Security Coordination office, which usually takes up to forty-eight (48) hours to be convened within according to the Cairo Protocol. This is useless in case of emergencies. This classification of A, B, C, was supposed to be temporary whereas area C would-be gradually transferred to area B, and B to the area A in 18 months until all the West Bank, except for Israeli military bases and settlements, would become area A with Palestinian full control of civilian affairs as well as security. All this was not carried out by the end of 1999, the designated time-frame according to the Oslo Accords. Prime Minister Ehud Barak was against the transformation, and suggested to postpone it to the final status agreement (AbuZayyad, October 20, 2013). Gordon (2008) argues that the overarching logic of the Oslo Accords could be summarized with “Israel transferred all responsibilities relating to the management of the population to the Palestinians themselves while preserving control of Palestinian space” (Gordon, 2008: 35).

Economically; the 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles and the conclusion of the Paris Protocol in April 1994, as Gross (1999: 1556), put it “were to signify the dawn of an old-new era. This era was "old" in the sense of a return to the format of economic integration before the First Intifada; that is from 1967-1987, but "new" insofar as that integration was based on a consensual, rather than unilateral, understanding”. Fischer et al. (2001) presented the assumptions for a vibrant Palestinian entity done by a group of Palestinian,
Jordanian, Israeli, and American economists\textsuperscript{31} in 1993, before the Oslo negotiations had reached them or the public. They recommended that the Palestinian economy would be dominated by the private sector and markets will decide the allocation of resources. Free trade in goods and capital among the Palestinian entity, Israel and Jordan and at least, some 100,000 Palestinian workers would be again allowed to work in Israel, since the number was reduced for security reasons during the First Intifada. In addition to a Palestinian economic administration that would be created to manage the financial system, including the chartering and supervision of new banks; and some arrangements regarding taxes that would be spent on Palestinian infrastructure. And finally, foreign aid, that would have to play a major part in the economic development of the new Palestinian entity. Fischer et al. (2001) further argued that some of the conditions above were met; some of the greatest important were not. Support from the donor community, for example, has been generous, and it is definitely not responsible for the inadequate growth performance. But the freedom of trade in goods and services between the Palestinian economy and Israel, and with Jordan, expectations were not valid, Fischer et al. (2001: F264) explained:

“...indeed the Palestinian economy has not only suffered from lack of adequate access to world markets, but also, and probably more importantly, from restrictions on the movement of goods and people between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and at times even among cities and villages in the West Bank. This negative environment has been the result of the permits system and the intensification of controls; including periods of closure which Israel has imposed often in response to security incidents or at times when the risk of security incidents was perceived to be high”.

The Israeli restrictions on the free movement of Palestinians since 1993 reduced the number of Palestinians who were allowed to work in Israel. Fischer et al. (1994) argued that

\textsuperscript{31}As presented by Stanley Fischer, Patricia Alonso-Gamo, and Ulric Erickson von Allmen in their article “Economic development in West Bank and Gaza since Oslo” in 2001.
sustained large labor flow from the West Bank and Gaza to Israel would be essential for the Palestinian economic development, especially in the beginning; the Palestinian economy needs time till investments increase and so does the demand for labor. However, the political situation worsened in the years 1995-6, because of the Israeli closure policy which reduced the number of working permits. Consequently, the employment of Palestinians in Israel and the settlements deteriorated causing a deep recession in the Palestinian economy (Fischer, Alonso-Gamo, & Von Allmen, 2001). Both Parties in signing the Oslo Accords did not fulfil their promise; Israel promised there would not be any more settlements on Palestinian land; Palestinians promised there would be an end to violence. While well-intentioned, the Oslo negotiations eventually fell apart (Smith, 2010). The failure of the peace talks led to the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, a wave of violence and counter violence on both sides had started. More on the Second Intifada in the next section:

5- The Second Intifada

In September 2000, the Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon made a visit to al-Aqsa Mosque (The Temple Mount).\(^3\) This visit, which was seen by the Palestinians as highly provocative, was the match that exploded the powder barrel, which had threatened to explode for years (Pundak, 2009). Various characteristics of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip deepened rather than weakened throughout the period between 1993-2000, (Pressman, 2006). Palestinians expected improvement in their daily life activities such as the freedom of movement and the economic conditions for improved living standards; when both worsened, noteworthy resentment started to feed the anxiety and unrest in the Palestinian society (Ibid). The frustration along with Sharon’s visit started the Second Intifada. Unlike the

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\(^3\)The Temple Mount, known in Hebrew as Har Ha-Bayit and in Arabic as the Haram al-Sharif is one of the most important religious sites in the Old City of Jerusalem. At least four religions are known to have used the Temple Mount: Judaism, Christianity, Roman religion, and Islam. The present site is dominated by three monumental structures from the early Umayyad period: the al-Aqsa Mosque, the Dome of the Rock and the Dome of the Chain.
First Intifada of 1987, the Second Intifada was violent; one of the reasons was that the new generation of the Palestinian militants believed that force would improve the peace negotiation outcomes. Pressman (2006) argues that the Israeli and Palestinian responses during the early protests led to escalation. The Second Intifada witnessed numerous bomb attacks, including suicide bombing by the Palestinians; tank and gunfire and air attacks, targeted killings, and harsh reactions against demonstrations by the Israelis.

An important dimension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is Israel’s control over the movement of the Palestinian people, goods, and resources (World Bank, 2010). The control over Palestinian mobility has relaxed and tightened since 1967. Over time, however, the apparatus of control has gradually become more sophisticated and effective. During the Second Intifada, the extensive and multilayered apparatus of control included permit system, physical obstacles known as closures and restricted roads. The tactic of military “curfew” was used extensively by Israel throughout the Second Intifada. Late in the year 2001, widespread sieges on Palestinian population centers were imposed resulting in virtual “town arrest” for most people in the West Bank. As shown in the map below, checkpoints and roadblocks were erected inside and between Palestinian cities, subjecting all people and vehicles to security inspection as an attempt to stop militants and limit the ability to move weapons around. Ajunli (2003: 67) argue that “the main economic effects of widespread violence and movement restrictions during the Second Intifada were the disruption of production and circulation of goods and services and, therefore, a rapid reduction in national income”. The World Bank estimates that the real GDP and GNI each fell by a further 20

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33 Long-term lockdown of civilian areas
34 Checkpoints map all over the West Bank (www.lcurve.org).
35 Some Palestinian, Israeli and International observers and organizations have criticized the checkpoints as excessive, humiliating, and a major cause of the humanitarian situation in the Occupied Territories.
36 GNI is the broader measure of national income
percent in 2002. Unprecedented levels of unemployment, which increased from 11 percent in 2000 to more than 41 percent in the third quarter of 2002. The siege served further to diminish economic activity, employment, and income, affecting negatively the Palestinian poverty rate (Ajuni, 2003). Israel, which reoccupied the Palestinian territories, started building a Wall in 2002 to separate Israel and East Jerusalem from West Bank.

6- The Wall

Following a series of Palestinians attacks within Israel during the Second Intifada, the Israeli government’s Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs decided to construct a barrier “to hinder, disrupt, and prevent the penetration of terrorist activity from Judea and Samaria into Israel.” The idea to erect a barrier that would physically separate the West Bank from Israel in order to limit unmonitored entry of Palestinians into Israel is not new (B’Tselem, 2002). It was first proposed by the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1992 (Dickey & Dennis, 1995). The suicide bombing at a nightclub on the Tel-Aviv promenade on July 2nd, 2001 that claimed 22 victims created the political opportunity for the Israeli Knesset to move forward with the idea (AIC, 2007).

The Wall route is long and convoluted as shown in the map below, and is not being built on the pre-1967 boundaries. Eighty-five percent of the Wall is located within the West Bank territories, mostly in areas in which Israeli settlements are located, leaving them on the “Israeli” side of the Wall. The route approved by the Israeli government in February 2005

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37 See World Bank Group, West Bank and Gaza update, August 2002.


39 Judea and Samaria are the Hebrew name for the West Bank.

40 Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs, Decision No. 64/B dated 14 April 2002.

41 The” Knesset: is the Israeli parliament.
leaves sixty settlements (twelve of them in East Jerusalem) west of the Wall, separated from the rest of the West Bank and adjacent with Israel (Bimkom & B’Tselem, 2005). The length of the Wall, whether already built, under construction or in planning, is 709 kilometers, practically it is double the length of the Green Line ⁴²(B’Tselem, 2012).

The Wall includes a system of fences that are in effect the high-technology and military intelligence inspired constructions (“warranting”, “preventive”, “warning”, and “delaying” systems): an anti-vehicle component, patrol roads, a trace path on each side to disclose the footprints of infiltrators, plus warning and surveillance systems (B’Tselem, 2012). The total width ranges between 35 and 100 meters. It takes the form of an eight-meter-high concrete Wall, primarily in urban areas such as East Jerusalem, Qalqiliyah and Tulkarm. The Israeli government also built 14 alternative “fabric of life” roads to facilitate movement of the Palestinian between their cities and towns instead of the direct roads that were connecting them before the construction of the Wall. “Fabric of life” roads are usually

⁴² The Green Line refers to the 1949 armistice line between Israel and the West Bank. The name derives from the green ink used to draw the line on the map.

⁴³ The map source: Applied Research Institute, GIS&RS Unit, www.arij.org
longer than the original roads; they are time consuming, in addition to the extra cost. The Wall has turned the West Bank into a fragmented set of social and economic enclaves cut off from one another (World Bank, 2010). About 12 percent of West Bank Palestinians are now living in a closed military zone along the Jordan Valley region, or encircled by the Wall in their villages and towns, or isolated between the Wall and the Green Line (Grassroots Palestine, 2010).

The sections of the Separation Wall that have not yet been built will encompass the settlement blocks deep within the West Bank – “fingers” reaching far into the West Bank to reach and include Kedumim, Ariel, Ma’ale Adummim and Gush Etzion settlements. Notably, the construction of the Kedumim and Ma’ale Adummim “fingers” to the east of al-“Eizariyah, are frozen for the time being due, most probably, to the opposition of the American government.44

Contrary to many Israeli government explicit declarations that the Wall is a temporary security measure and does not designate a border, political or otherwise, and that the intentions when determining the route of the barrier were not solely security related B’Tselem (2012: 7) argues that “an examination of the barrier’s route shows. That the aim was to encompass as many settlements and settlers as possible, so as to enable their de facto annexation to Israel”. The Second Intifada continued, practically, till the death of Yaser Arafat in November 2004 (Smith, 2009). On the 8th of February 2005, in the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit, the new Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon officially agreed to stop all acts of violence against Israelis and Palestinians. Although the Second Intifada was finished, the checkpoint regime was not, neither was the construction of the Separation Wall.

44 See Arrested Development: The Long-Term Impact of Israel’s Separation Barrier in the West Bank, October 2012.
The Contemporary Political Context in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

The violence between the main Palestinian political parties Hamas and Fatah came as a surprise to many observers as the Palestinians have conventionally been viewed as upholding a unified front (Schanzer, 2008). The focused only was on the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. A review of the Palestinian history, mainly over the last twenty years, reveals that the Palestinians are a house divided, manifested by sharp political variances and irregular political violence (Ibid).

The name Hamas is the abbreviation of the name in Arabic for the Islamic Resistance Movement. It was officially created in 1987/1988 at the beginning of the First Intifad; it was an offshoot of the Muslim Brothers movement with the objective of liberating Palestine (Berti-2013). This Islamic vision combined with its nationalist claim and militancy operations against Israel opposed the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process which promotes the two state solutions. Hamas, in fact, bars recognition of Israel (Ibid). On the other hand, Hamas’s heritages and its record since its formation, according to Mishal & Sela (2006) reveal that it is fundamentally a social movement. They argue that Hamas has directed its energies and resources primarily toward providing services to the community especially responding to its immediate hardship and concerns. Hamas, as a religious association very much involved in most types of social activities, it is deeply embedded in the Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and thus is conscious of the society’s worries, sharing its concerns, articulating its aspirations, and give attention to its needs and problems (Mishal & Sela, 2006). On the other hand, Fatah; the leading Palestinian national movement was founded in 1958 in Kuwait by Yasser Arafat, along with seven other Palestinian activists.45 Their objective was to defeat Israel by arm struggle to free Palestine that had been conquered in 1948. Fatah was the largest faction of the confederated multi-party Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It is generally considered to have had a strong involvement in

45 Khalil Wazir, Salah Khalaf, Khaled al-Hassan, Adil Abdel Karim, Mohammed Yusuf al-Najar, Khalid al-Amira, and Abdel Fatah Lahmoud
revolutionary struggle in the past and has maintained a number of militant groups. Fatah as the main factor leading the PLO concluded the Oslo agreement with Israel in 1993 and later established the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The fact that Arafat was the Chairman of the PLO and the Head of the Palestinian Authority reflected on the Fatah and converted it de facto from an armed resistance movement to a political party. The mismanagement and corruption of the PA was attributed to the Fatah and caused a lot of damage to its image in the eyes of its own people. The PA became a highly centralized regime under Arafat leadership where his followers were rewarded and his defectors were sanctioned (Jamal, 2007). After Arafat's death in 2004, factionalism inside the ideologically various Palestinian movement has become more obvious. In 26 January, 2006 parliamentary election, the party lost its majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council (Parliament) to Hamas which won a large majority. Hamas claimed the majority of the parliamentary seats, 76 of the 132, giving the party the right of forming the next cabinet under the Palestinian Authority's president, the leader of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas. The Fatah Party which dominated the first legislature elections and the Palestinian cause for long won only 43 seats. The rest were claimed by other parties; nationalist, leftist and independent parties. Usher (2006) wrote “whatever the eventual consequences of this event, two are already apparent: the Palestinian national movement is going to be dominated by two political forces, not one, and the movement’s nationalism is going to be laden with a greater religious, Islamist content”. However, the Hamas legislative victory led to a conflict between the two parties, Fatah and Hamas. Steven Erlanger wrote on January 26, 2006 in the New York times “Hamas which considered to be a terrorist group by Israel, the United States and the European Union, became in charge of the Palestinian political future”46. This has its immediate political and economic implications; the Israel's acting Prime Minister,

Ehud Olmert, announced: "The state of Israel will not negotiate with a Palestinian administration if even part of it is an armed terrorist organization calling for the destruction of the state of Israel". On the 7th of April 2006, the United States of America and the European Union suspended their aid to the Palestinian Authority. By the Hamas legislative victory in 2006, the Palestinian political field faced a basic change since the establishment of the PA, which is the transition from a field dominated by one party, Fatah, to a field dominated by the two parties; Fatah and Hamas (Hilal, 2006). But this political challenge did not last long. A year later, in 14th of June 2007, Hamas took over the Gaza Strip from Fatah in a series of battles. The political split between the West Bank controlled by Fatah and the Gaza Strip controlled by Hamas was finalized. This political split has its own implication on the Palestinians in both West Bank and the Gaza strip. Broun (2010: 1) noted that “The Palestinian division, however, prevents the Palestinians from speaking with one voice, much less acting in a coherent manner. This rift would vitiate any diplomatic breakthrough that might occur between Israel and the Palestinians in resolving, or even managing, the conflict”. Hilal (2010: 26) pointed out “Since then, Gaza has been subject to Israel’s total blockade; even as Israel’s punitive operations were stepped up, culminating in Operation Cast Lead in winter 2008–2009. All the attempts to reconcile the two parties—undertaken by Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt, among others—have failed”. In April 24, 2014, Hamas and Fatah announced they’ve agreed to reconcile, few weeks after they form a unity government with elections possible by early 2015. This was a development that could see the Palestinian territories under a unified leadership for the first time in years (CNN, April 24, 2014).

### 2.3 OVERVIEW OF THE CASE STUDY SETTING

The main objective of this section is the analysis of the historical, political and socio-economic factors that characterize the context of the case study location, that is the East

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Jerusalem and its neighborhood al-'E'zariyah. This section starts with a brief historical review of the city of Jerusalem from separation to unification till its expansion at the expense of its West Bank neighborhoods, trying to explain the complexity that led to the research problem, then a specific overview of the Separation Wall in the area of Jerusalem, and finally al-'Eizariyah as one of the affected neighborhood of Jerusalem coupled with the analysis of the Separation Wall route around al-'Eizariyah and the implications of the already built, in process, and planed on its inhabitants. This preface will enable us to confront this context with the analysis of the conducted research in the empirical chapter.

1- East Jerusalem

Both Israelis and the Palestinians want Jerusalem to be their capital, and the multitude of holy sites in the city—for the three major monotheistic religions (Christianity, Islam and Judaism)—have contributed towards making the city’s politics extremely impulsive (AIC, 2007). Jerusalem was to be internationalized as a corpus separatum – a separated body – and placed under a special international regime to be administered by the United Nations Trusteeship Council, under the partition plan of 1947, of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181. However and as Derejko (2009: 33) wrote “rather than through the political will of its residents, the dictates of the international community, or the principles of international law, the fate of Jerusalem was determined through military conquest.” The traumatic events between April and July of 1948 turned the 60,000 Palestinians into permanent exiles and refugees prior to that evicted from their homes, neighborhoods and villages in what came to be known as ‘Jewish West Jerusalem’. (Matar, 2011: 214). As result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the city of Jerusalem was divided into a western side under Israeli control, and an Eastern side, including the Old City, under Jordanian rule.

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48 UN General Assembly, Future government of Palestine, 29 November 1947, A/RES/181

(Safieh, 2010) which came to be known as East Jerusalem. The city was crossed by an inter-state border separating Israel and Jordan called the Green Line (Allegra, 2010). Nineteen years later, by war in 1967, Israel took control of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. While the West Bank remained under military occupation, Israel annexed East Jerusalem and became part of Israel. Equal Israeli citizenship was not granted to the residents of East Jerusalem (Kimhi, 2006). Instead, the roughly 66,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites\(^{50}\) were given “Permanent Resident”. This status allowed them to work in Israel, enjoy health insurance and social welfare benefits provided to all Israeli residents (B’Tselem, 2006). On the other hand, East Jerusalem Palestinians lose their permanent residency status, under Israeli law, if they leave Jerusalem for seven years or more (B’Tselem, 2009). In fact, the East Jerusalem Palestinians are stateless: they hold an Israeli residency permit known as “Blue ID ”, and a Jordanian travel document, and are not citizens of either (AbuZayyad, Schenker & Ross, 2013). Any absence from the city, for study, work, marriage, as well as the holding of any other citizenship can lead to a withdrawal of the residency status. Since 1967, about 15,000 Palestinians have lost their residency right, with many more at risk of losing it (Ibid).

The annexed area to East Jerusalem included, however, not only the original municipal area of the city which was 6 square kilometers prior to 1967 war, but an additional 64 square kilometers that were part of the West Bank\(^{51}\). Allegra (2010: 15) pointed out that “the new municipal boundaries were dictated by strategic and demographic considerations and designed to allow future expansion of Jewish communities in the open space around the city, making it by far the largest municipality in Israel”.

\(^{50}\)See “From Partition to Reunification to…? The Transformation of the Metropolitan Area of Jerusalem since 1967”: Palestine-Israel Journal. Special Issue: Jerusalem Vol. 17, No. 1, 2, Dec. 2010.

\(^{51}\)See “The Planning Crisis in East Jerusalem” United Nations : www.ochaopt.org/.../ocha_opt_planning_crisis_east_jerusalem_april_20
The de facto annexation of East Jerusalem was formalized in 1980 when the Knesset enacted the ‘Basic Law’, which stated that ‘Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel’. Israel has shown characteristic disregard for the United Nations declarations against the annexation and for the international law that consider the annexation illegal, concentrating instead on creating geographic and demographic facts on the ground in order to establish exclusive Jewish hegemony over the city (Dolphin, 2006) and to prevent any future division. Amir Cheshin, the advisor on Arab Affairs to the former Israeli Mayor of Jerusalem declared; “Israel’s leaders … adopted two basic principles in their rule of East Jerusalem. The first was to rapidly increase the Jewish population in East Jerusalem. The second was to hinder growth of the Arab population and to force Arab residents to make their homes elsewhere” (Cheshin, 1999: 10). For that purpose, Israel has employed governmental techniques of spatial control and population management, in a manner that discriminates against the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem in many aspects of life.


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52 Worth mentioning that most countries in the world, including the United States, have never recognized Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem.
(Dolphin, 2006), like the unpredictable bureaucratic tools, the fragmentation of space and regulation of movement, complicated fabric of law and regulations (Ophir, Givoni & Hanafi, 2009). Since then till the time being, the situation of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem reflects the consistent policies of negligence, discrimination and expropriation exercised by the Jerusalem municipality and the different Israeli government agencies (Amir, 2011). Housing policy and urban planning, for example, have been used in a biased partisan manner to manipulate and limit Palestinian demography and urban geography in Jerusalem (Bollens, 2000). One third of the area annexed in 1967 was expropriated from Palestinian landowners, and was used exclusively to build 12 Jewish neighborhoods, encircling the Palestinian annexed areas, populated by some 192,000 people53 (B’Tselem, 2006), while Palestinian building is only allowed in 13 percent of East Jerusalem, mostly in existing Palestinian neighborhoods and they will generally not get permits to expand their houses when needed, this drove many to build without permits, and live in fear that one day their home may be demolished (UN-OCHA, 2009), others moved to the suburbs, even at the risk of losing their residency status (the Blue ID) and the social security and other benefits that comes with it, hoping it will improve their life quality and afford them a dignified existence.

Even if Israel had previously declared the annexation of East Jerusalem, as long as the city was open, people were not aware of the consequences (Yousef, 2011) and it never occurred to them that this might ever happen. For that reason, following the construction of the Wall which cuts off the suburbs, many of the same people who moved out of the city are moving back, because of the requirement of crossing the border and passing through checkpoint inspection has proven too disruptive to their daily working routine and the concern over the possibility of losing their residency status. All this, combined with restrictions on building in East Jerusalem, led to an increase in the population density, rising housing prices and growing feelings of discomfort as well, forcing many Palestinians to live in crowded inhuman

53Under international law, these neighborhoods have the same status as Israeli settlements built in other parts of the West Bank, they are illegal.
conditions because they need to stay in Jerusalem, in order not to lose their jobs, business or property (UN-OCHA, 2009).

It is worth mentioning that; the Jewish population in East Jerusalem has increased from 0 in May 1967 to 181,457 in 2006 (42% of the East Jerusalem population), when the encircling East Jerusalem by Jewish settlers was completed (AbuZayyad & Schenker & Ross, 2013). The Master Plan for Jerusalem objective was and still is, to maintain a Jewish majority population in Jerusalem, with a ratio of minimal 60% Jewish and maximal 40% Palestinians in the city by 2020. AbuZayyad et al. (2013) identified some of the major tools that being used by the Israeli Ministry of Interior to achieve this objective: first by revoking the Jerusalem Identity Cards (the Blue ID) from Palestinians by using all kinds of excuses not to renew them; second by restricting and complicating the process of granting building licenses to Palestinians, to force them to seek housing outside the city, leading to the subsequent revocation of their Identity Cards; and third by the establishment of new Orthodox and secular neighborhoods to attract Jewish Israeli migration.

Economically, East Jerusalem played a key role in strengthening the ties between the Occupied West Bank and Israel, as it was strongly tied to the Palestinian cities of Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Jericho and beyond. Jerusalem became a gate through which Palestinians from the West Bank could enter Israel almost freely, until the checkpoint regime of the 1990s prevented that free movement (Gazit, 1985). However, there are now main differences in the legal status of the Palestinians; the Jerusalemites have an Israeli residency status (the Blue ID), which allows them to move freely in Israel and the West Bank

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54 The Jerusalem Master Plan is a comprehensive and authoritative Israeli Planning Scheme that serves as the mandatory legal guide for all zoning and planning within the Jerusalem Municipality. See Aggressive Urbanism @ http://civiccoalition-jerusalem.org/system/files/documents/aggressive_urbanism.pdf

55 The Israeli Interior Ministry implemented the “center of life” policy, which allows for the revocation of a Palestinian Jerusalemite’s residency status if the interior minister determines that the individual’s “center of life” has moved beyond Jerusalem municipality borders. See Ardilmsís, “Facts on the Ground: An Examination of Israeli Municipal Policy in East Jerusalem,” (2000).
besides other benefits. In contrast, the residents of the West Bank have (the Orange\textsuperscript{56} or the Green ID) identification card which allows them to move freely, only in the West Bank. They are not allowed to enter Israel, including annexed East Jerusalem, without a permit.

2- The Wall in East Jerusalem

Prior to 1967, Palestinians could move freely between East Jerusalem and its surrounding areas. Their familial, economic and cultural bonds extended throughout the entire West Bank. No barriers blocked the flow of people and commercial goods or social engagement and exchange. Since 1967, the Palestinian reality, in Both East Jerusalem and the West Bank, has witnessed what, can be called, a reflective change. The East Jerusalem is now almost completely disengaged from the surrounding Palestinian areas in The West Bank. The closure procedures started in March, 1993 with the checkpoint regime to be followed by the construction of the Wall\textsuperscript{57}. In June 2002, the Israeli government approved Stage A, as part of the whole Separation Wall project, which included one section north of Jerusalem that extends from the Ofer army base on the west to the Qalandiya checkpoint on the east. The second section was south of Jerusalem which runs from the Tunnels Road on the west to Beit Sahour (south of HarHoma) on the east. Both sections were about 10 Km each, and were completed in July 2003 (B’Tselem, 2011)\textsuperscript{58}.

On September 11th, 2002 the Israeli cabinet approved the “Jerusalem Envelope” plan—e.g. surrounding the city with walls from the south, east and the north (Hever, 2007). In September 2003, the Political-Security Cabinet approved the Wall’s route except for the section near the Ma’ale Adummim settlement. One section extends from the eastern edge of

\textsuperscript{56} The Orange ID that was given to the Palestinians in the West Bank after the 1967 war was replaced by a Green one after the Oslo Accords and the creation of the Palestinian National Authority.

\textsuperscript{57} See Lagerquist, P. (2004). Fencing the last sky: Excavating Palestine after Israel’s “separation wall”

\textsuperscript{58} See B’Tselem Website (1 Jan 2011): http://www.btselem.org/separation_barrier/jerusalem
Beit Sahour on the south to the eastern edge of al-'Eizariyah on the north, the length of this section is seventeen kilometers. The other section started from the southern edge of 'Anata to the Qalandiya checkpoint on the north with a length of fourteen kilometers. The third section is also fourteen kilometers and surrounds five villages northwest of Jerusalem (Bir-Nabala, al-Judeireh, al-Jib, Beit Hanina al-Balad, and Nebi Samuel), which are situated near the city's municipal border (B'Tselem, 2011).

The Jerusalem Separation Wall is approximately 90 kilometers long (Cohen, 2005). In built-up urban areas, thus affects the daily lives of schoolchildren, workers, families and whole communities (AIC, 2007). Separation has been achieved via a concrete Wall in general, but in some rural areas they used electronic fence. Most of the Wall in Jerusalem is six to eight meters high with twelve official gates in the Wall. Only four of which are open to Palestinians, and the rest are reserved for the settlers’ use only (Aronson, 2006). The Jerusalem Wall follows the 1967 annexation border, with two major exceptions: the Ma’ale Adummim\(^59\) enclave\(^60\) (not yet constructed) which stretches deep into the West Bank, and the exclusion of two Palestinian neighborhoods: Kafr A’keb and the Shua’fat refugee camp (AIC, 2007). Some 220,000 Palestinians now live in these annexed areas, this route of the Wall leaves those Palestinians on the "Israeli" side of the Wall (B’Tselem, 2011). Some argue that Israel excluded the Palestinian neighborhood Kafr A’keb and the Shua’fat refugee camp, although they are inside the Jerusalem annexed boundaries, for a territorial swap with Ma’ale Adummim enclave (where a Jewish majority lives outside the Jerusalem annexed boundaries) in future negotiations regarding the position on East Jerusalem. Others argue that this policy is for reducing the number of Palestinians and increasing the number of Israelis in Jerusalem.

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\(^{59}\)The Ma’ale Adummim settlement was built on al-‘Eizariyah and other Palestinian villages extended land.

\(^{60}\)Enclaves are a result of two walls, one separating the area from Jerusalem and the other separating it from the West Bank, mostly for the benefit of the settlers (AIC, 2007).
In April 2006, in the Ma’ale Adummim area, the government approved an amended route that breaches the West Bank by some 14 kilometers east of the Green Line, and 11 kilometers east of Jerusalem’s post-1967 municipal border. It leaves on its “Israeli” side most of the jurisdiction area of Ma’ale Adummim settlement, this includes E1; Kfar Adumim, Almon, Nofey Prat, Alon, and Qedar settlements; and the Mishor Adumim industrial zone. The planned route will create a 6,400-hectare enclave, which, in addition to the settlements, includes the Palestinian village of az-Za’ayem (3,500 residents) and 3,000 Bedouins from the al-Za’abaneh, as-Sawahrah, and Jahalin tribes (Ibid). This means that thousands of Palestinians will find themselves within the so-called “seam zone” i.e. trapped between the Green Line and the Wall and they will be obliged to require permits to continue to live in their homes and villages. In addition to the fact that the area of Ma’ale Adummim is the narrowest part of the West Bank; the distance between Israel’s border with Jordan in the east and the Green Line in this region is only 28 kilometers. The eastern border of the Ma’ale Adummim city limits is only some 13 kilometers from the border with

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62 Relatives living outside the “seam zone” will have to obtain a one-time permit from the Israeli Civil Administration in order to visit them.
Jordan, it cuts off about one-half of the total width of the West Bank in this area. Therefore, the location of Ma’ale Adummim is responsible for infringement of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination within the framework of a viable state that has reasonable territorial contiguity (B’tselem, 2009).

3- Al-'Eizariyah

Al-'Eizariyah (Bethany)\textsuperscript{63} is one of East Jerusalem's eastern neighborhoods located in Jerusalem-Jericho historic route; less than two miles from Jerusalem (3.2 km). Some 43 hectares from the land of al-'Eizariyah became included within the new city boundaries when Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 1967 (B’Tselem, 2009). But most of the village, however, was left outside the boundaries and is part of the West Bank so that the demographic balance of Jerusalem does not tilt to the Palestinians' favor (Safieh, 2010). Al-'Eizariyah remained connected to Jerusalem with all aspects of daily life with strong commercial, social and familial ties, many of al-'Eizariyah residents use to work in East Jerusalem. In 1975, an appreciable part of al-'Eizariyah land was expropriated to establish the settlement of Ma’ale Adummim. The borders of Ma’ale Adummim were first defined in an order that the military commander issued in 1979 encompassing some 3,500 hectares. In 1981, the municipal boundaries were expanded to cover approximately 3,700 hectares. In 1982, tens of hectares more of al-'Eizariyah land, which lie north east in E1, were declared government property. In 1991, they were again expanded, this time mainly to the west, toward Jerusalem. In 1994, in the midst of the Oslo peace process, 120 hectares were added to the city, in order to connect with Jerusalem’s municipal borders in E1. Ma’ale Adummim’s jurisdiction area now covers some 4,800 hectares. Some 647 hectares are from al-'Eizariyah land (B’Tselem, 2009). Allegra (2010) pointed out that “while the administrative boundaries of the settlements were expanded, the so-called “demarcation plans” were approved by the Israeli Civil

\textsuperscript{63} Commonly identified as the site of the Biblical village of Bethany
Administration for Palestinian communities such as ‘Anata, Abu-Dis and al-‘Eizariyah, effectively restricting their growth to already built-up areas (Allegra, 2010: 17).

As a result of the establishment of Ma’ale Adummim and its expansion, the land reserves available to al-‘Eizariyah diminished greatly. Consequently, a pattern of dense construction emerged in the town.

Figure 6: The land of al-‘Eizariyah and the special out line plan. Source: B’Tselem, 2008

Almost every plot available for construction is utilized for tall buildings, and inside the town there is little open space left. As shown in the map above, the brown line defines al-‘Eizariyah land area during the British mandate period, the blue line defines the present area. Al-‘Eizariyah was left with only 445 hectares, some 39 percent of its land area during the British mandate period.

The Interim Agreement of 1995 administratively has divided al-‘Eizariyah into area B and area C. The Palestinian Authority planning powers were only on area B, while in the 148 hectares that were classified as area C, the situation remained as it had been, and only the Israeli Civil Administration is empowered to approve planning schemes and issue building permits for Palestinians. This means that the Palestinians’ chances of obtaining building permits are very small (B’Tselem, 2009).

During the Oslo Accords (1993) period, al-‘Eizariyah expanded “vertically”, after using most of the land available horizontally, to adjust with the new economic boom coupled with the political expectations of being part of the future capital of the State of Palestine. Palestinian banks, governmental associations and other economic institutions found in al-‘Eizariyah an
alternative for East Jerusalem as the Palestinian Authority was not allowed to function in East Jerusalem.

The anticipated economic boom after signing the Oslo Accords was not the only cause of the prosperity of al-‘Eizariyah, actually, it was a gradual shift through time. Many Jerusalemites were encouraged to buy land and build houses to solve the housing crisis in East Jerusalem, as it costs much less, and al-‘Eizariyah is very close to Jerusalem. Many Palestinians from north and south of the West Bank moved to live in al-‘Eizariyah because of its location close to East Jerusalem and Israel where they can search for work, others moved because of some rumors that al-‘Eizariyah will be annexed to East Jerusalem and they might be considered as Israeli residents and benefit from the Israeli social services. This ongoing movement continued till the construction of the Wall between East Jerusalem and al-‘Eizariyah was completed (AbuZayyad, November 1st, 2013).

Figure 7: The Wall Map. Source: B’Tselem, 2012

The first section of the Wall (the continued red line in the map below) surrounds al-‘Eizariyah from the west moving towards the north disconnects it completely from East Jerusalem. Only those who have an Israeli identification card (Blue ID) or a Palestinian identification card (Green ID) with a permit can go to East Jerusalem through the only two controlled entrances: one is for pedestrians; al-Zaytoon “Olive” checkpoint. And the other is for Israeli vehicles only; al-Za’ayyem checkpoint. The Wall severs the main road and trade route that used to connect East Jerusalem with Jericho in the east. This route used to pass
through al-‘Eizariya, giving it enormous amounts of trade. Now many shops have closed as they are inaccessible both to shoppers from East Jerusalem, and passing trade via travelers going to the Ma’ale Adummim settlement or to the city of Jericho (Michael, K., & Ramon, A., 2004). The second section of the Wall (the non-continuous red line on the map) is supposed to continue from north to the north east heading towards the east cutting the same main road that use to connect East Jerusalem with Jericho, but from the eastern entrance of al-‘Eizariya. This Wall, which is under construction, will affect tens of thousands of Palestinians who live not only in al-‘Eizariya, but also Abu Dis, ‘Anata, and as-Sawahrah ash-Sharqiya. These communities will be trapped between the western Wall (“the Jerusalem envelope”) and the eastern Wall in Ma’ale Adummim. The western Wall has already severed long-lasting ties with Jerusalem that go back generations, and has prevented development of these Palestinian communities westward (B’Tselem, 2009). The eastern Wall will prevent them from building, development, and even the possibility of farming in the eastward direction. Moreover, the disruption of the existing road system in the area will render access to Ramallah, in the north, and Bethlehem, in the south, difficult and prevent direct access to Jericho (Ibid). These three cities are the substitute of East Jerusalem for supplying vital health and education and other services to the residents of this area. In addition, most of the Jerusalemites either living in Jerusalem or in al-Eizariyah are worried about not being able to use the highway that connects Ma’ale Adummim with Jerusalem; the only path for them remains through- Zaytoon “Olive” pedestrians checkpoint.

2.4 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In the Palestinian Occupied Territories, close family ties play a crucial role in coping with political turbulence, the Israeli occupation, and the socio-economic situation. Social capital provides a safety-net for improving people’s chances and the quality of the day-to-day survival, especially after Israel had constructed the Wall to separate Israel and East
Jerusalem from the West Bank. The Wall has turned the West Bank into a fragmented set of social and economic enclaves cut off from one another (World Bank, 2010). This includes over 200,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem, who are totally isolated from the rest of the West Bank (Dolphin, 2006). And while many studies have been carried out on the impact of restrictions on mobility and the construction of the Wall on Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, these studies have been mainly conducted from an economic perspective rather than a sociological perspective. However, the social capital index that was compiled in 2007 and has been the basis, of the majority of the social capital studies in Palestine, referred to the existence of the Wall in the rural northern and southern parts of the West Bank where the construction of the Wall began and was completed. These studies stated that the construction of the Wall has prevented access to agricultural land. Consequently, the family has become a strategy for protection and solidarity between the extended family has increased. This conclusion raises the question about the status of Palestinian social capital now that the Wall has been completed along the majority of the border between the West Bank and Israel including urban arias? And what are the characteristics of Palestinian society that makes its context peculiar so that a certain type of social capital is dominant? Therefore, this research examine the impact of the Wall on the Palestinian's social capital dynamics in urban areas using East Jerusalem and one of its neighborhoods, al-‘Eizariyah, as a case study.

Until the Wall was built, there was a residential continuum ranging across the Palestinian neighborhoods and suburbs of East Jerusalem (Amir, 2011) including al-‘Eizariyah. Although there are main differences in the legal status of the residents of both areas under study, the distinction between these towns, villages, and neighborhoods that were -in or out- of Jerusalem was purely artificial: the social fabric of the residents did not correspond to this distinction. Often, members of the same family have different civic statuses. Some hold Israeli residency status (Blue ID) and others have a West Bank identification card (Green ID). Differences in civil status did influence entitlement for services and benefits, but these
differences did not split the families themselves (Ibid). And although family members and other “West Bank identification card holders were formally forbidden to enter the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem; this restriction was not enforced as a general rule. The construction of the Wall, however, provided the means for implementing this restriction” (Amir, 2011: 773). In its early phases, the Wall was just a complication that held back the flow of people and goods. People managed to find ways to get through in various ways, either by squeezing themselves through its distant openings, or by jumping to the other side using big stones as ladders. In 2009 almost all of these passages or ways to get to the other side were closed, entry to East Jerusalem was restricted to six checkpoints (Amir, 2011). One is the “Olive” checkpoint north of al-'Eizariyah in which only a blue ID holder or a green ID holder with a permit can go through.

The residents of East Jerusalem and al-'Eizariyah responded to the shock of the physical obstruction of the Wall and all the restrictions that resulted from it on a day to day basis, including restrictions on access to work, housing, health facilities, education, services, and family and social life. Most of al-'Eizariyah residents hold a West Bank ID (Green ID). They are a combination of those who are from the town itself, the refugees of the 1948 war, those who moved from different parts of the West Bank and settled with their families for business or personal reasons, and those who have Israeli residency status (the Jerusalemites).

Before Oslo (1993), many of the al-'Eizariyah population used to work in East Jerusalem and Israel and they have strong social ties with East Jerusalem and its suburbs. This free movement did not last long. On 28 of March 1993, the Israelis announced a full closure on the Occupied Territories prohibiting the Palestinians from entering Israel including East Jerusalem. In the 1995, with the implementation of the Oslo Accords, there was little change in these restrictions of movement (B'tselem, 2007). The situation became even worse later as Oslo created enemies of peace from both sides; several suicide attacks carried out by Hamas, and the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish right-wing activist. This caused severe economic and social consequences on the residents of al-
‘Eizariyah. According to the Oslo Accords al-'Eizariyah was classified as area B in the center, which means with a Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control. And area C in its west entrance and the surroundings, which means: a full Israeli civil and security control. This classification has its complications when it comes to personal security of its residents. After the constructions of the separation Wall most of the Jerusalemites, who came to al-'Eizariyah because of the housing crises in East Jerusalem, have moved back into the city because the requirement of crossing the border (the Wall) and passing through checkpoint inspections has proven too disruptive to their daily working routine, and many were also concerned about possibly losing their Jerusalem residency status. The unemployment rate has risen as many of those who used to work in Jerusalem lost their jobs due to not being granted an Israeli work permit. The hospitals of East Jerusalem, which were within walking distance from the town, became out of reach. The one small clinic positioned in al-'Eizariyah cannot meet the needs of the residents. Women in labor, and those requiring advanced medical care, have to drive to the next nearest municipal hospitals in the West Bank, either in Jericho (an hour’s drive), or Ramallah (an hour and a half’s drive away). The same problems arise with schooling. The question, of which side of the Wall one is living on, working on, has a family on and so on, has become crucial. The Wall paralyses the social life. The Jerusalemites who live in al-'Eizariyah were the most affected class, reverse migration began, spacious houses were left empty, leading to a notable decrease in real estate prices in al-'Eizariyah. The Jerusalemites who did not move out of al-'Eizariyah; are now living in suspension (monitoring mode) worrying about the possible closure of the eastern entrance of the town. When this happens, Jerusalemites will not be able to enter al-'Eizariyah by cars, or public transportation. The town also suffers from the high residential density coupled with a general sense of chaos; rubbish and other eyesores on the sidewalks at the main entrance of al-'Eizariyah, unlicensed vehicles for public transportation, unpaved side-streets and unorganized, poorly designed and unfinished high-rise buildings. This is attributed to al-'Eizariyah systematic loss of land over the years.
because Israel has confiscated the towns’ extended land to build and expand the settlement of Ma’ale Adummim. In addition to the categorization of al-‘Eizariyah as Area B in the center, and Area C in its east and west entrance and the surroundings according to the Oslo Accords in 1993. This means that some 27,000 inhabitants are excluded from the National Security Forces, because the Palestinian Police located in Area A, where the Palestinian Authority have a full civil and security control, cannot interfere in Area B before the approval of the Joint Security Coordination Office. Such approval, usually takes up to forty-eight hours to be convened, and this is useless in case of emergencies. The residents of the town hardly can expand in Area C because it is under full Israeli control. The limited space and the absence of law and order have had a major impact on both social security and local development. Looking into this case study in such circumstances, this research seeks to understand the impact of the Wall on the Palestinians social capital dynamics by looking at the case of East Jerusalem and al-‘Eizariyah as one unit to address the following research questions:

1- How did physical changes and spatial policies related to the Wall, influence local social networks?
2- What have been the main changes in social capital since the construction of the Wall? Which kinds of social capital have been strengthened, and which kinds weakened and why?
3- What are the characteristics of the Palestinian society that makes its context peculiar so that a certain type of social capital is dominant? And what are the barriers to collective action?
4- What has been the impact of the Wall on local development and social resilience?

With the context depicted in this chapter in mind, the next chapter will focus on the literature review of the concept of Social Capital and Civil society in general, then in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The Wall by itself is a consequence of the political events, the link between the Wall and the concept of social capital comes from the idea that the Wall is an obstacle, and that social capital was one of the instruments to overcome this obstacle. The "Studies on Social Capital in the Palestinian Territories" series published during the period 2006-2009, stated that the construction of the Wall that has been completed only in the north and the south of the West Bank have had positive impact on the Palestinian social capital. These studies explained that the Wall prevented access to agricultural land; consequently, the family became a strategy for protection and solidarity between the immediate and the extended family members increased. This was only in rural areas; these studies did not examine the impact of the Wall in urban areas as it did not start there yet at that time. Therefore, and now that the construction of the Wall is nearly complete in both areas rural and urban, this research investigates the impact of the Wall on Palestinian's social capital in urban areas. For this purpose and to be able to build on the previous studies on social capital in Palestine, it is important to explore the concept of social capital in terms of its origin, definitions, measurements, types and its role in development. And because the notion of social capital became entangled with that of civil society, the literature review chapter also presents the origin and the definitions of the civil society concept and its capacity to produce certain types of social capital.

The chapter is organized into three sections. The first deals with the concept of social capital and measurements, it examines social networks: negative social capital, types of social capital (Social Network Theories); strong versus weak ties, bonding versus bridging and linking social capital. The second section examines the specific literature on social capital within the Palestinian context starting with Naqib's first study, the Social Capital Index study,
the “Bonding Versus Bridging” study, the Corruption study and other studies of social capital in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The third section deals with the notion of civil society; its origin and the development of its definitions over time along the debate over its components that raise certain types of questions. These questions and some others regarding the civil society within the Palestinian context are discussed in this section, in addition to a historic presentation and literature review of the Palestinian Civil Society.

### 3.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL: CONCEPT AND MEASUREMENTS AND CRITICS

From a sociological perspective, people are often defined by those whom they know. Bonds among people serve as central building blocks of the society (Field, 2003). Emile Durkheim, one of the nineteenth-century founder of sociological thought, observe that society "…..does not become a jumble of juxtaposed atoms… rather the members are united by ties which extend deeper and far beyond the short moments during which the exchange is made" (Durkheim, 1993: 266).

Social capital refers to the internal social and cultural coherence of society, the norms and values that govern interactions among people and the institutions in which they are embedded. Social capital is the glue that holds societies together and without it can be no economic growth or human wellbeing (Grootaert, 1998). The World Bank stated that there is growing evidence that social capital, under any of different definitions, can have an impact on development outcomes — growth, equity, and poverty alleviation (Ibid). The idea of social capital is not new; Trigilia (2001) points out that “earlier references to Weber show how this theme was already visible in the early development of economic sociology. …with the move to forms of more organized capitalism, the interest in social capital – understood as networks of social relations, which facilitate economic exchanges – disappeared or weakened and became marginal. …The processes of bureaucratization of the firm and of re-politicization of the economy through the growing role of the state and industrial relations began to dominate the stage (Trigilia, 2001: 430), however, since the 1970s the concept became one of the
most influential and popular "metaphors" in the social science’s research (Boari and Presutti 2004; Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004).

Social capital, similar to accumulation of other forms of capital, physical and human, accelerates growth and improves standards of living. An increasing number of researchers have used the concept of social capital to answer questions related to their own specific fields of study in line with the idea that social phenomena can influence economic activities (Moran and Ghoshal, 1997). These fields of study are ranging from the impact of social capital on local development projects (World Bank, 2004), poverty (Moser, 1996), employment (Sabatini, 2005), economic prosperity (Rubio, 1997), and peace-building (Capmbell, 2008; Schafft, 1998; Varshney, 2000).

Most researchers in the field agree that there are three traditions concerning the conceptual definitions and measurements of social capital (Adam and Ronvcević, 2003). The first school of thought is based on the work of Bourdieu (1986: 284) who defines social capital as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintances and recognition". Bourdieu emphasizes the importance of social networks in conceptualizing social capital.

The second school traces its origin to the work of Coleman. In a series of investigations of educational attainment in American cities, Coleman was able to show that social capital was not limited to the powerful, but could also convey real benefits to poor and marginalized communities (Field, 2003). He defines social capital as resources embedded in social relations that permit individuals and communities to achieve their desired goals (Coleman, 1988). He argues that distinct from other forms of capital, "social capital inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors" (Coleman, 1988: 8).

The third tradition is associated with the work of Putnam who according to John Field (2003: 40) "stretched the concept further, seeing it as a resource that functions at societal level". Putnam, in his research on citizen engagement in community affairs, Putnam took an
institutional approach to the study of social capital, focusing on the performance of public policy actors in northern and southern Italy. He defined social capital as “the features of social organization such as trust, norms, and networks that improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putman, 1993: 167). He concluded that the successful institutional performance of the northern region was due to the mutual interrelationship between government and civil society.

The original definitions of social capital have been further elaborated by others. For example, Portes (1998:8) defines social capital as “the ability to secure benefits through membership in networks and other social structures”. For Woolcock and Narayan (2000), social capital refers to the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively, while Lin (1999:35) defines it “as resources embedded in social structures which are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions”. Trigilia (2001) points out that “social capital can be considered as a set of social relations of which a single subject (for instance, an entrepreneur or a worker) or a collective subject (either private or public) can make use at any given moment. Through the availability of this capital of relations, cognitive resources – such as information or normative resources such as trust – allow actors to realize objectives, which would not otherwise be realized or which could only be obtained at a much higher cost” (Trigilia, 2001: 430). The World Bank in its motive to fight poverty defines social capital as “the institutions, relationships, attitudes, and values that govern interactions among people and contribute to economic and social development” (Grootaert & Bastelaer, 2002).

Despite several attempts to define social capital, its definition has remained elusive (Durlauf & Fafchamps, 2004). Lack of a clear definition and the complexity of the concept have left its mark on attempts to measure it, with divergent notions of what constitutes social capital thereby hampering efforts to adopt specific indicators to appraise it, or compare it between countries (MAS, 2007). As it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure social capital directly the use of proxy indicators is necessary. Years of education and years of work experience have a long tradition as proxies for human capital and have proven their value in empirical
studies. No such acquired consensus yet exists for the study of social capital, and the search for the best proxy indicator continues. Furthermore, social capital indicators differ both geographically and by sector (World Bank, 2002). The SCI\textsuperscript{64} in their case studies on social capital in different countries around the world found that measures of membership in formal associations were found to be a relevant indicator of social capital in Indonesia, Kenya, and countries of the Andean region, but not in India and Russia, where informal networks are more important, that means that they used different indicators to measure social capital: membership in formal association in some case studies, and membership in informal networks in others. Here, the selection of the proxy variables, in these case studies, was inspired by the specific manifestations of social capital in each study area.

Review of the literature has, however, shown that there are two approaches upon which many empirical studies have been conducted. The first focuses on behavioral variables and attitudes including trust, norms, and values, while the second emphasizes measuring the position of individuals in networks (Adam and Roncvic, 2003). These two approaches reflect unsettled theoretical issues. Given the conceptual and measurement problems of social capital, Grootaert and Van Bastelaer (2001) draw a distinction between structural and cognitive forms: structural refers to the objective and externally observable structures such as networks, associations, and institutions, while cognitive consists of subjective and intangible elements including attitudes, norms of behavior, shared values, reciprocity, and trust (Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, 2001: 3). The two forms of social capital are intertwined.

The literature suggests a need to consider social norms and trust as a byproduct of structural social capital. In Durlauf & Fachamps’s (2004) review, the central premise is that emerging shared trust, norms, and values arise from informal associations based on social networks. They conclude that the study of social capital should start from a network-based

\textsuperscript{64} The Social Capital Initiative (SCI) was launched in 1996 by the World Bank to assess the impact of social capital on the effectiveness of development projects, and to contribute to the development of indicators for monitoring social capital and methodologies for measuring its impact.
approach where positive externalities might emerge through norms and trust. Putnam (1993) argues that the level of associational activity and informal networks are determinants of trust and cooperative norms. People in these networks ‘trust’ each other, resulting in high levels of civic behavior that will lead to positive outcomes for individuals and society as a whole (John, et al, 2009).

Social capital can be analyzed at three levels: micro, meso, and macro. The micro level is associated with the work of Putnam (1993) in his study on civic associations in Italy, involves observations being made on networks of individuals or households. Coleman (1990) expanded the unit of observation by introducing a broader, or “meso” interpretation of social capital which included vertical as well as horizontal associations while considering relationships between groups, rather than individuals.

At the macro level, the focus is on institutions at a national level and within a political context (Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, 2001). This focus on institutions draws on the work of Douglas North (1990) and Mancur Olson (1982), who argued that such institutions have a critical effect on the rate and pattern of economic development. This macro view of social capital includes, in addition to the largely informal horizontal and hierarchical relationships of the micro and meso levels, the political level of formal institutional relationships and structures, such as the political regime, the rule of law, the court system, and civil and political liberties that shape social structure and enables it to develop.

There is a strong degree of complementarities between horizontal and hierarchical associations and macro institutions, and their coexistence maximizes the impact of social capital on economic and social outcomes. For example, macro institutions can provide an enabling environment in which local associations can develop and flourish (World Bank, 2002). The figure below shows the schematic summary of the forms and scope of social capital.
The figure provides a conceptual and methodological basis for research and practice in social capital. The best approach for measuring it includes all four quadrants. In practice, however, the state of the art has not advanced to that stage (Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, 2001: 27). Consequently, scholars in the field have focused on one or several dimensions of social capital that they find relevant to their analytical concerns and research problems (Kinyanjui and Khayesi, 2006). Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) argue that it is more feasible for empirical analysis to step back from "grandiose approaches" and focus on specific components of social capital.

Most of the empirical research relies on the idea that social capital exists in the social networks and that these facilitate expectations and trustworthiness among the participants/players in the network (Coleman 1988). Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004:5) indicated that the study of social capital is a network-based process that generates beneficial outcomes through norms and trust. Similarly, Lin (1999, 35) points out that social capital is rooted in social network and social relations and must be measured relative to its roots. The World Bank declared through the Social Capital Initiative (SCI) project "Understanding and...
Measuring Social Capital" that it is possible to measure social capital and its impact, and that methodological diversity is both; strength and a challenge of research on social capital. The strength of the quantitative studies is that they can determine a confidence interval within which the results hold. As they are usually based on representative data sources, they can say more about the geographic area or the groups of people for which these results are more valid than can qualitative studies. The quantitative studies excel at investigating the in-depth causal processes that lead to certain outcomes, although they often leave open questions about the statistical validity of the results. Of course, this interplay and complementarity between quantitative and qualitative methods is not limited to the study of social capital. However for the analysis of social capital, the SCI project concluded that it is essential to draw on both methods and multidisciplinary approaches to reach valid conclusions (World Bank, 2002).

3.2.1 TYPES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL: BONDING VERSUS BRIDGING; STRONG VERSUS WEAK TIES AND LINKING SOCIAL CAPITAL.

Social networks of an individual comprise relationships within the family, friendship, work, and informal. Social networks influence life chances and outcomes since they connect individuals with people not only in their immediate neighborhood, but also beyond the neighborhood, through contacts of friends and acquaintances. Social capital research advocates the positive role of social networks in economic efficiency, but some researchers argue that social networks can have a ‘downside’ (Meagher 2005). Dasgupta (2000), for example, indicated that social networks can either facilitate or hinder economic efficiency depending on their uses. Meagher (2005) points out that though social networks can provide informal support for better economic performance, they can also function as mechanisms of "parochialism or conspiracy". Moreover, Collier (2002) argues that social networks are not always good, pointing out that ... “the control of free riding by clubs and hierarchies can produce rent seeking institutions like Mafias” (Collier, 2002: 34). The institutional analysis of
mafias has found that, instead of serving as a means of economic efficiency, social networks can act as a medium of "corruption and opportunism" (Gambetta 1996; Meagher 2005). In fact, the advantages and downsides of social networks depend on the culture and socioeconomic environment that facilitates or hinders the development of economically efficient networks (Meagher 2005). As Woolcock further explains:

Where communities or networks are isolated, parochial, or working at cross-purposes to society’s collective interests (in ghettos, gangs, drug cartels, and so on), productive social capital is replaced by what Rubio (1997) —in discussing Colombia—calls perverse social capital, which greedy hinders development (Woolcock, 2000: 229).

Coleman's (1990) idea that certain territorial contexts represent “a greater emphasis on social networks as the basis of social capital rather than on shared culture, trust and civicness” (Colmeman, 1990, 300), Robert Putnam (1993) and Francis Fukuyama (1995) studies on social capital identify social capital with a cooperative culture rooted in the past history of a territory. This according to Trigilia (2001) leads to two kinds of risks: First that the culturalist explanation is rather vague with regard to the origins of the phenomenon, and it underestimates the role of political factors65. Second, that “the consequences of social capital for local development are not always positive; and it is precisely the under evaluation of politics, which makes it more difficult to distinguish under which conditions social capital can have favorable impact for local development, instead of generating collusion, patronage, political dependence or even corruption and criminal economies" (Trigilia, 2001: 434).

Granovetter (1973) developed the social network theory in his work "Strong and Weak Tie Theory", suggesting that strong ties create closed networks whereas weak ties enable access to social circles beyond the actors' own direct network. Strong ties are linked with

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65 See (Tarrow, 1996; Mutti, 1998; Bagnasco, 1999)
people who interact frequently. Links with infrequent interactions, the ‘weak ties’, tend to bridge individuals across social groups of close interpersonal relationships. He argues that new information flows to individuals through ‘weak rather than strong ties, because close friends tend to move in the same circles and the information they receive overlaps with what they already know’. In social capital literature, strong and weak ties are referred to as bonding and bridging social capital (Woolcock, 2001). Putnam (2000) also highlights the importance of distinguishing between bonding and bridging (strong and weak ties). Bonding social capital can result in closed social circles and reduce the degree of sociability beyond these boundaries. It limits the diffusion of information and the building up of inter-group networks, facilitating rent-seeking and self-interested behavior (Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 2004; PRI, 2005; Sabatini, 2005) which can lead to exclusion and sectarianism (Rubio, 1997). However, bonding social capital plays a positive and crucial role in society. It can be the source of precious services - for example emergency cash - and, in poor societies, can play an important role helping to cope with poverty (Kozer & Parker, 1998). Some families in poor countries have a share budget for meals; they buy food in large quantity (wholesale) then divided between them to save some cash for example. On the other hand, bridging social capital has a number of positive externalities: it reduces the cost of information transmission and information asymmetries, it builds trust and civic engagement, and it facilitates collective action (MAS, 2007). Woolcock (1998) and Narayan (1999) suggest that a positive correlation exists between efficient state functioning and high levels of bridging social capital, while the sociological literature emphasizes the positive effects that bridging social capital can have on conflict resolution (Schafft, 1998; Varshney, 2000) and on the development of trust and cooperative behavior in society (Stolle, 1998).

The network view argues that communities can be characterized by their endowments of these two dimensions of social capital, and that different combinations of these dimensions account for the range of outcomes associated with social capital (Woolcock, 2000), Granovetter (1995) argues that economic development takes place through a mechanism
that allows individuals to draw initially on the benefits of close community membership. However this also enables them to acquire the skills and resources to participate in networks that transcend their community, thereby progressively joining the economic mainstream.

Following Granovetter, Burt (1992) extended and reformulated the ‘weak ties’ argument by claiming that what is important is not the quality of the ties but rather the way different parts of the networks are ‘bridged’.

The social resource theory of Lin (1982), taking a hierarchical view of social structure, argues that the success of an action in a network depends on two issues. These are the presence of a high social position contact in a network, which enables access to crucial and good quality resources and the status diversity of a network, which increases the likelihood of accessing appropriate resources. This is related to the third type of social capital, i.e. linking social capital, which describes ties that connect individuals to people or groups in positions of high status. This means that linking social capital enables groups’ access to leverage resources and ideas and information from formal institutions, beyond the community (Woolcock, 2001).

An examination of the above three theories shows that each theoretical stance is not complete by itself and efficient structure of a network depends on the activities and challenges that an individual is facing (Klyver and Schøtt, 2011).

### 3.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL WITHIN THE PALESTINIAN CONTEXT

**Overview**

It is widely understood that Arab culture is collective rather than individual-based (Naqib, 2006), meaning that, at its center it is a family-based society and not one based on the individual. Thus family ties are stronger than community ties. This view of the Arab culture is even clearer in the Palestinian society because of the dismemberment of the community in both the 1948 and 1967 wars (Hilal, 2011). In the Palestinian Occupied Territories, close
family ties play a crucial role in coping with political turbulence, the Israeli occupation, and the socioeconomic situation of the nation. Since the second Intifada, Palestinian livelihoods have deteriorated, yet Palestinian social resilience remains strong. The World Bank (2003) concurs, stating:

“What is quite remarkable is the continued cohesion of Palestinian society. Despite violence, economic hardship, and the daily frustrations of living under curfew and closure, lending and sharing are widespread and families for the most part remain functional. Palestinian society is absorbing levels of unemployment that could well have fractured the social contract in industrial societies” (The World Bank, 2003: 33).

This testimony by the World Bank gives a clear general look of the Palestinian social coherence in times of crises. Specific studies on social capital in the Occupied Palestinian Territories were carried out; the following are the most important:

1. The First Study of Social Capital in Palestine

Although the concept of social capital is not new as explained earlier and it became famous in the West in the 1970s, in the Arab world it was Naqib (2006) who was the first to posit the importance of informal social networks among Palestinians generated by a common resistance, introducing the idea of social capital as a substitute for market and state failure. The study sets out to articulate such a definition that satisfies two criteria. The first is to define social capital within the context of economic growth. The second criterion is to produce an operational definition capable of measuring the level of social capital of a country at a given time, and of changes in it over time. Guided by these two criteria, the study used

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66 Social Resilience is measured by the time it takes for a community (or organization) to rebound from a natural (or man-made) hazard. The longer it takes a community or organization to "bounce forward after a natural or man-made hazard, the greater the risk of damage to the social fabric that holds a community or organization together. Similar to the notion of “broken families”, the effect of psychological or relationship dysfunction reaches beyond the economic impact of that lack of functioning (Sapirstein, 2007).
the definition: Social capital is created by the externality effects of informal social networks. It creates public goods that complement those produced by the market or the state, or compensate for market or state failures.

The study “distinguishes between social capital and social infrastructure. The latter is concerned with the impact of the public sector on economic growth. It is defined by Romer (2001) as ‘the institutions and policies that encourage investment over consumption and productive activities over rent-seeking activities.’” (Naqib, 206:1). Naqib points out that “there are various kinds of groups that produce social capital (bonding groups and bridging groups, or horizontal and vertical groups) but all of them transfer social capital through three channels. The first is the information channel, through which information is passed between members of the group regarding employment, trade, and investment opportunities. The second is related to the formation of group identity. This identity encourages individuals to substitute group preferences for individual ones, leading to an optimal behavior. The third is concerned with one of the most important aspects of market failure, which is coordination failure. Synchronization among the members of the group compensates for a lack of coordination in the market” (Naqib, 2006: 1).

The methodology of the study was the survey. The survey questions were designed in order to capture three features of group interaction: inputs, expectations and outputs. The first is concerned with the characteristics of the group, the second with “the expectations of members, in terms of what they hope to accomplish in relation to compensation for state or market failure. It is also concerned with the expectation of individual members of the group towards the other members, regarding trust and solidarity. The third is concerned with the achievements of the group and the feelings of its members about them. A weighted average of these three indicators was used as a proxy indicator of social capital” (Naqib, 2006, 2).

The study concluded that there was a decline in the infrastructure of social institution as a result of the Israeli continuous weakening of Palestinian public institutions⁶⁷ by Israeli political

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⁶⁷ Such as the closure of the Palestinian cultural institution "Biet Al Sharq" in Jerusalem by Israel in 2001
and military measures. In parallel, there was an increase in social capital as a result of the boost in solidarity among Palestinian citizens themselves created by their common resistance (Naqib, 2006). The study recommended the construction of a suitable measure of social capital in Palestine.

2- The Second Study of Social Capital in Palestine

In 2007, the study "Measuring Social Capital in the Palestinian Territories" by Nasr & Hilal was carried out under the umbrella of The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) with the cooperation of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). This was in order to design an index that reflects the multi-faceted nature of social capital in the Palestinian Occupied Territories (MAS, 2007). "This study adopted the definition of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which views social capital as a multi-dimensional concept, reflecting social networks and the shared norms, values, and understandings that facilitate cooperation within or between various groups" (Nasr & Hilal, 2007:1). This study was the first to measure social capital not only in Palestine but also in the Arab World as a whole (MAS, 2009). The study covers the three Palestinians regions: The West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. "Based on OECD definition, but tailored to the specific Palestinian context, 26 survey questions were designed to inquire into four principal dimensions of social capital: political, civic, and professional participation; informal networks and social engagement; trust in institutions and other individuals; and shared values and norms. The questionnaire also elicited personal and demographic information. It was administered to a representative sample of 2,500 Palestinian households in June and July 2007" (Nasr & Hilal, 2007: 2). On the basis of the responses to the survey questions, the study established a framework that allows the various dimensions of social interaction and engagement in the Palestinian Territories to be measured (MAS, 2007). The
ensuing statistical analysis produced a number of interesting results (Ibid); here I will display some of these results\(^{68}\) of as follows:

- “The overall Social Capital Index in the Gaza Strip was higher than the remaining West Bank\(^{69}\), while the latter was higher than that of Jerusalem. … The highest level of confidence in political institutions was found in the West Bank, followed by East Jerusalem and then Gaza. Results were similar for participation in informal social networks and activities” (Naser & Hilal, 2007:1).

- “Gazans were found to have the greatest trust in local and international organizations and also the strongest adherence to behavioral and social norms, followed in both cases by West Bankers and East Jerusalemites. Meanwhile, Jerusalem scored the highest in terms of social, civic and political participation, with Gaza and the West Bank following” (Naser & Hilal, 2007:2).

- “People in rural areas had the most trust in political institutions but the least when it comes to local and international organizations. This situation was reversed in refugee camps\(^{70}\). In terms of social, civic, and political participation, camps lag behind urban and rural areas. Urban areas scored highest in the dimension of social norms and attitudes, followed by camp dwellers and people in rural areas. However, there was no significant discrepancy between the various population types in terms of behavioral values, and when it came to the overall Social Capital Index; differences between the residences of various areas vanish” (Naser & Hilal, 2007:3).

- “Regarding gender differences, the survey revealed that men scored higher than women on the overall Social Capital Index” (Naser&Hilal, 2007:3).

- Regarding age, the elderly had the most trust in political institutions, while the young had the highest level of confidence in local and international organizations. “The level

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\(^{68}\) These notes were chosen from Nasr & Hilal study of 2007, page 2 to 4.

\(^{69}\) The authors excluded East Jerusalem because it was part of the West Bank before the 1967 war.

\(^{70}\) Refugee camps are usually considered to be urban areas.
of political, social, and civic participation declines with age, while involvement in informal social networks had the opposite effect” (Ibid). “Education level was inversely correlated with trust in political institutions” (Ibid). “The overall level of social capital tended to increase until the level of the medium diploma was reached and then started to decrease, reaching its lowest point with holders of Master’s degrees and above” (Naser & Hilal, 2007: 3).

In addition to the statistical analysis, the study derived various conclusions from other individual aspects of the survey. Here are the most important:

- “The presence of strong political networks with widespread membership contrasted with the much weaker networks related to civil society, such as trade unions and community organizations. Likewise, the study revealed the importance of religious ties compared to membership of charitable or other associations” (Naser & Hilal, 2007:4).
- “There are discrepancies within the West Bank in the way that social capital is manifested through membership of different types of networks. The more affluent and better-connected central of the region has more active membership in community and social organizations, as well as in sports clubs, youth associations, internet networks and trade unions. Likewise, politically-active people were more concentrated in this region, probably due to the presence of the main governmental and political institutions in the Ramallah / Al-Bireh area. However, engagement with religious organizations was lowest in the center, while the southern governorates took the lead in this respect” (Naser & Hilal, 2007:4).
- “High levels of involvement in political rallies and demonstrations throughout the year that preceded the survey reflected the level of politicization of Palestinian society.

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71 These notes were chosen from Nasr & Hilal study of 2007, page 4 to 8.
Rural areas participated more than towns and refugee camps, which reflects the fact that they are worst affected by the erection of the Wall, ongoing settlement activities, and land confiscation” (Naser & Hilal, 2007:5).

- “The frequency of social communication through visits, phone, and email contacts with relatives in the Occupied Palestinian Territories was quite high, greatest of all in rural areas and among people under the age of nineteen. 25 percent of West Bankers invited their friends to visit at least once a week, and although the pattern is more prevalent in the center than the north or south, in Jerusalem the figure is less than 20 percent” (Naser & Hilal, 2007:5).

- “Three-quarters of the participants, in the sample mentioned, had between one and five intimate friends, whilst only a third of these, a quarter overall, had only one or two. It is striking that more than half of the rural participants said they had either no friends or just one or two, as did 45 percent of camp-dwellers and 40 percent of urbanites. This relative lack of close friends indicated, instead, the importance of kinship and neighborly ties, collegiality and, inherited affiliations” (Naser & Hilal, 2007:6).

- “More than three-quarters of the sample in the West Bank and a higher proportion in Jerusalem stated that one should not trust other people in general. Trust in religious leaders, politicians, and work colleagues falls as the education level of respondents rises” (Naser & Hilal, 2007:7).

- “The survey revealed low levels of trust in the Hamas/Fatah national unity government in power during the period when the study was conducted. … The lack of trust extended to other bodies and political factions; local councils, popular camp committees, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), the Palestinian Authority (PA), the Presidency, the judicial system and the police, NGOs, donor countries and international organizations. …The only categories which were generally well trusted
overall were religious and educational institutions and the local press and TV.” (Naser & Hilal, 2007:7).

- 12.5 percent Jerusalemites, 20 percent West Bankers and 33 percent Gazans said that they had thought about emigrating during the previous year (" (Naser & Hilal, 2007).

3- The Third Study: "Bonding Versus Bridging” Study of Social Capital in Palestine

The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) (2009) points out that “in light of the prospect of building an independent state, social capital in Palestinian society could be exploited in order to empower state building, civic cooperation, and economic prosperity” (MAS, 2009: 3). Therefore, MAS contributed by publishing Cavatorta, et al (2009) study “Bonding Versus Bridging” in the "Studies on Social Capital in the Palestinian Territories" series. This study was built on Nasr & Hilal’s study of 2007 and explores how social capital relates to the Palestinian Territories and pinpoints the main forms in which it demonstrates (MAS, 2009). Bonding social capital relates to ‘strong ties’ between people who share similar characteristics; such as family ties and small circles of close friends with similar experiences. On the other hand bridging reflects ‘weaker ties’; that is the connection between individuals from different backgrounds who have different experiences and different sources of information, concluding in looser and more diverse networks (Ibid). The Figure below presents the Bridging vs. Bonding connections in which Andriani (2011) demonstrates “the connections between two members belonging to the same circle (e.g. C-B or L-P or T-S) represent bonding connections (or strong ties) while connections between two or more different circles (e.g. R-B R-H or M-S or A-N) represent bridges (or weak ties)” (Andriani, 2011: 4).
The goal of the “Bridging Versus Bonding” study was to formulate a synthetic indicator for bonding and bridging social capital to test its effects on building and strengthening trust and civic-behavior, which are two central elements in the formation and governance of a sustainable society (Cavatorta, et al, 2009). One criticism of Nasr & Hilal's measure of social capital was that it remained insensitive to the important distinction between bonding and bridging as was used by the OECD’s (2001) broad definition of social capital. This includes trust, norms, values, attitudes, and networks. In this case, many variables were used as a proxy for social capital, so although this approach is comprehensive, it limits preciseness and risks the danger of becoming ‘everything to everyone’ (PRI, 2005). Building on this important distinction between bonding and bridging social capital, the study proposes 17 composite indicators of social capital based on the 26 questions of Nasr & Hilal's study (2007). They aggregate questions whenever needed, such as when they ask, ‘Are you a member of any sport club?’ and ‘Are you a member of any cultural institution?’ Both of which are variables. The “Bridging Versus Bonding” study combines these two questions into a single ‘associational activity variable because their interest was the attitude of people. Hence, the type of association is irrelevant (Cavatorta, et al, 2009).

According to the study, the new composite indicators reflect different manifestations of social capital including indicators of associational activity, frequency of connections with family and friends, trust, volunteering attitudes, and political engagement. These 17
indicators were the input variables in the empirical analysis (Ibid). Annex 1 describes these indicators. In addition, the principal component analysis (PCA) was used to detect ‘latent’ relationships among a set of variables and its distinct underlying dimensions between these variables. “The PCA provides a method to differentiate the indicators across the various dimensions. It also provides a weighting scheme which reflects the extent to which each indicator contributes to each dimension. Technically, the PCA seeks linear combinations of the original variables which helps explain their variance. That is, most of the information contained in the original variables can be maintained in a fewer number of factors” (Cavatorta, et al, 2009: 13). The study pointed out that the first factor is related to ‘strong ties’, which is formed by relatives and friends. The variables, ‘family visits’, ‘family calls’, ‘friend visits’, ‘friend calls’, and ‘friend invite’, depend on this first factor. Therefore, it was identified as ‘bonding social capital’. The second factor indicates weak networks, which includes indicators that relates to associational activity such as ‘political commitment’, ‘discussion meetings’, and ‘donations-volunteering’ behaviors. These associational activities are related to networking between acquaintances that share common goals and voluntarily engage in the network. It represents different kind of involvement and commitment with respect to the relationships within the family and friends. Therefore, this dimension was used as an indicator of ‘bridging social capital’. By comparing the two dimensions, the general conclusion was that the bonding social capital is stronger than bridging social capital in the Palestinian Occupied Territories (Cavatorta, et al, 2009).

The study also, noted that there were a number of limitations in the approach used; the survey questions could not elicit the quality of the networks and hence the study could not assume any degree of satisfaction from those connections. Also, they did not indicate any information about the time that each respondent had spent in the community (ibid). The study concluded that the bonding social capital is higher in the north and south of the West Bank and lower in the center. This is explained by the authors that this “may be due to the fact that the north is largely rural, where livelihoods depend on the proceeds of family
farming. Thus, family networks are closer than in the center, where trade and third sector activities dominate. In the south, Bedouin traditions are relatively strong with large families and hence high levels of ‘bonding social capital’ exist” (Cavatorta, et al, 2009: 18). “Also, in the north and the south, the construction of the Wall has prevented access to fields which are now cut off, behind the Wall in the neighboring Israeli areas. These are also the areas where most land has been confiscated for illegal settlements and where disputes occur more regularly in regards to harvesting crops, access to water and deliberate contamination of land. Consequently, the family has become a strategy for protection, and therefore solidarity between the extended family has increased” (Ibid).

Another reason for these differences between the north and the south of the West Bank and the Center (the city of Ramallah) could also be related to the pattern of internal migration. Ramallah attracts students and labor force from all over the West Bank, this creates kind of ‘weak ties’ among those new comers, as they move away from their own families (Cavatorta, et al, 2009).

In General, the conclusion was that bonding social capital is stronger than bridging social capital in the Palestinian Occupied Territories and that building a civic and viable society/country requires efforts to strengthen the bridging social capital. Moreover, Palestinian Territories suffers from a deceptive deficit in both civic behavior and community trust (ibid). Consequentially, policies should enhance the emergence of social capital in its bridging nature, ensuring the emergence of a fruitful synergy between the efforts to found a state and a greater bridging of social capital (Ibid). “Bridging social capital can enable citizens to develop forms of collaboration and partnerships between community and formal institutions. This may help to create a new form of social contract needed to support the construction of a Palestinian State after decades of occupation. The presence of a strong sense of family can empower the development of the bridging social capital” (Cavatorta, et al, 2009: 25).
4- The Corruption Study

In 2011, The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) published the study of “Social Capital and Corruption Puzzle: Evidence from a Palestinian Survey”, by Luca Andriani. The aim of the study was to critically analyze the relationship between social capital components and corruption in the Palestinian Territories. The study relies on the survey of 2007 by Nasr & Hilal, as well as surveys on the perception of corruption carried out by other independent Palestinian institutions. The study arrives at insightful and important conclusions which shed light on the roles and problems inherent to social capital and corruption in the Palestinian context. The following sections summarize these conclusions with the focus on the types of corruption in the Palestinian Territories and the reasons behind it.

Types of Corruption in the Palestinian Territories:

Andriani (2011) refers to “the poll conducted by AMAN”, “Wasta, nepotism and favoritism represent the most prevalent forms of corruption in Palestinian society. 63% of respondents believe that these three mechanisms are the most common forms of corruption in the public sector” (Andriani, 2011: 14) (Figure 10). The poll also highlights that the peoples are still using these mechanisms to obtain personal gain in that Palestinians have confidence in the reliability of accessing public services through Wasta (Andriani, 2011).

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72 The Coalition for Accountability and Integrity AMAN was established in the year 2000 upon an initiative by a number of Palestinian civil society organizations working in the fields of democracy, human rights, and good governance as a movement aims to combat corruption and enhance the values of integrity and principles of transparency and systems of accountability in the Palestinian society.

73 Wasta refers to the use of personal connections or influence in order to obtain things, such as, getting hired or promoted in a job, passport renewal, the waiving of traffic fines.
Andriani (2011) explains that Wasta is an indication of the darker side of the system of connections. “In these circumstances the aphorism “it is important who you know” receives a negative connotation. Like any other forms of corruption, Wasta bases its strength on personal relationships” (Andriani (2011: 13).

**Regulatory Capacity explains corruption:**

Andriani (2011) refers to the same ‘poll conducted by AMAN (2009)’, to highlight the two main reasons for corruption stems from two factors; first the Israeli occupation (32.8%), second is the absence of law and accountability (20.9%). Andriani (2011) have constructed an indicator of “regulatory capacity” based on the absence of the rule of law, the insufficient punitive legislation and the insufficient monitoring institutions. Figure 11 shows the distribution of this indicator between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The study pointed out that the main problem in the Palestinian “regulatory capacity” is the lack of clear and transparent institutional and legal framework to be able to combat corruption (AMAN, 2009). This inefficient “regulatory capacity” lead to “aggravated state of frustration among citizens... leading them to mistrust the PNA’s willingness to hold the corrupt accountable for their misdeeds or crimes” (AMAN 2009, p. 42). The AMAN report underlines that this lack of transparency is not a product of Palestinian culture; rather it is driven from the unfortunate geopolitical circumstances that have historically affected the institutional and legal framework in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In addition to the Occupation since 1967, the first Palestinian government in 1994 was established without a legislative authority as its governance mechanisms were inherited from the revolutionary resistance movement of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) where transparency and public administration were not priorities (Andriani, 2011). According to Jamal (2007):

“After 1994, the PNA was in charge of a social-political context where the rule of law needed to be implemented and “the judiciary and the executive branches of government were still highly integrated while a clear, coherent and accessible system of arbitration remained in its nascent stages” (Jamal, 2007: p. 23-24).
The hierarchic system consolidated during Arafat’s time in the office favored a system of vertical linkages between associations and the PNA had its roots. These associations needed to be recognized by the PNA in order to work. Therefore, Jamal (2007) argues that “this condition is likely to favor nepotisms and ‘clientelism’ between some associational leaders and public officers. In other words, the associations supporting the PNA receive better access to local resources, more security, prestige and legitimacy compared to non-supporting associations – no matter what” (Jamal, 2007: p. 21). This ‘clientelism’ or as it’s called the patron-client relationship had its roots in the Middle East history. Abou-el-Haj (1982) points out that during the Ottoman rule, which lasted nearly four centuries, the land, natural and commercial resources were exposed to exploitation by forms of fiscal administration both direct and semi-direct "feudal" arrangements. Abou-el-Haj (1982) declares that “the main beneficiaries of the Ottoman sovereignty were the administrators of the fiscal systems and their local allies, ranging from merchants to the clergy (Muslim ulama among others)” (Abou-el-Haj, 1982: 185).

Although the presidential elections of 2005 and legislative elections of 2006 took place under the supervision of a neutral and impartial electoral commission, “AMAN concludes that transparency and integrity within the Palestinian democratic process are still at a very low stage. In fact, in 2007 the conflict between parties caused a geographic, political and institutional division between the “block” running Gaza and that one running the West Bank” (Andriani, 2011: 14). The political division between Gaza and the West Bank has led to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) being suspended. “This “political dis-aggregation” has (and still does) favored the existence of Wasta, nepotism and quotas in the recruitment process of public officials… the lack of “regulatory capacity” has been affecting different areas and institutional bodies, principally due to the lack of judicial independence and ineffective legal enforcement contribute to the sustainability of this uncertain situation” (Ibid).

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74 Malla (2001) points out that numbers of people have described the patron-client relationships arising from unequal class, caste, and status of people.
5- Other Studies on Social Capital in Palestine

The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) continued its contribution to the field and its importance in economic, social, and political development. Many other studies have been published on social capital from different perspectives such as food security, and schooling. It is worth mentioning that all of these studies covered the entire Palestinian Occupied Territories: the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. Although they discovered that social capital is not homogenous in the three regions, they could only partially account for the differences. In the third study, for example, there were differences in the types of social capital within the West Bank but the study did not explain why. They also pointed out that bonding is stronger than bridging social capital and they explain the reasons by the peculiar context of the Palestinian society. These conclusions raise some important questions, such as what are the characteristics of Palestinian society that makes its context peculiar so that a certain type of social capital is dominant? This research tackles elements such as the social forces that influence the formation of social capital and determine its types. Thus it examines the role of social capital in shaping the Palestinians social resilience especially in front of the Israeli policies that aim to undermine the coherence of the Palestinian society, in addition to the highlight of barriers to collective action.

3.4 CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

The notion of social capital became entangled with that of civil society. Edwards & Foley (1998) concluded that both civic society and social capital have proven useful heuristics for drawing attention to neglected relationships and aspects of social reality. Minkoff (1997) argued that “civil society organization plays a critical role in civil society and the production of social capital by providing an infrastructure for collective action”. Bridging social capital, in particular, builds trust and civic engagement, and facilitates collective action (MAS, 2007). Fox (1996) points out that “Social capital can also be coproduced by state and local societal
actors or by the interaction of local societal actors and external actors in civil society” (Fox, 1996: 1089).

The concept of Civil Society has been in vogue since the 18th and 19th centuries, but the 1980s witnessed a revival of interest in it, in particular after the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. According to the London School of Economics, civil society “refers to the arena of un coerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women’s organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups”75.

Kaldor (2003) argued that Civil Society concept is a modern concept but at the same time like all great political ideas, it can be traced back to Aristotle, but there was no clear difference between civil society and the state in the minds of early modern thinkers. Civil society was seen as a social contract; a society governed by laws, based on the principle of equality before the law. Kaldor (2003: 584) explained the notion of civil society as “a social contract agreed among the individual members of society. It was not until the nineteenth century that civil society became understood as something distinct from the state”. She points out that “it was Hegel76 who defined civil society as the intermediate realm between the family and the state, where the individual becomes a public person and, through membership in various institutions, is able to reconcile the particular and the universal. For

75 See http://www2.lse.ac.uk/LSECities/citiesProgramme/pdf/bankside123/16GlossaryAW20pgs.pdf

76 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 –1831) was a German philosopher, and a major figure in German Idealism.
Hegel, civil society was “the achievement of the modern world, the territory of mediation where there is free play for every idiosyncrasy, every talent, every accident of birth and fortune and where waves of passion gust forth, regulated only by reason glinting through them”. Thus Hegel's definition of civil society included the economy and was to be taken up by Marx and Engels, who saw civil society as the 'theatre of history’” (Kaldor, 2003: 548).

Kaldor, herself, defines civil society as: the process through which consent is generated, the arena where the individual negotiates, struggles against, or debates with the centers of political and economic authority. Through voluntary associations, movements, parties, unions, the individual is able to act publicly. On the Other hand, Foley & Edwards (1996) in their article “The Paradox of Civil Society” argue that “if we exclude the market, should we nevertheless include economic associations--trade groups, professional organizations, labor unions, and the like? What about political organizations? Does it make sense, following Antonio Gramsci, to distinguish "civil" from "political" society? If so, how are we to distinguish between political associations per se and the political activities of groups in civil society, from interest groups to religious bodies, which are intermittently mobilized in pursuit of political goals?” Foley & Edwards, 1996: 38). Yom (2005) on the other hand, tackles the question of the civil society in the Arab world, and argue that while the civil society theory assumes that the collective force of the associational sector can challenge authoritarian governments in order to enforce the political reform towards democratization. The Arab states, since the 1980s, have set a strategy of liberalization-repression to control civic activism (Yom, 2005).

As a result, the Arab civil society has signed not the retreat of autocratic regimes, but rather “their stubborn instinct for survival--despite suffering gaping deficits of economic resources and political legitimacy (Yom, 2005:14).

These and other questions will rise in the next discussion of the civil Society in the Palestinian context.
3.4.1 CIVIL SOCIETY WITHIN THE PALESTINIAN CONTEXT

Overview

The formation of the Palestinian civil society is unique to its context, and its relationships to the state and market are formed through its historical and political environment (Weisman, 2012). The previous review of the “Civil Society” concept revealed that civil society has been always related to or work independently from the “State”. Therefore, Hilal (2009) argues that “civil society organizations are usually defined in contrast to state or quasi-state institutions. And this explains, in the Palestinian case, why “the notion of civil society did not appear before the Oslo Accords which heralded the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA)” (Hilal, 2009: 3). It is true that there was no Palestinian state before Oslo, and many would argue that the contemporary Palestinian Authority is not yet a ‘State; and while many researchers declared that most Palestinian civil society organizations “emerged and developed in the absence of the state, in the absence of national independence and in the absence of sovereignty over land and citizenship”77 (Costantini, et al. 2011: 7). Here arise the question is there a Palestinian civil society in the absence of a Palestinian state? Salem (2012) demonstrated the debate and presented the next three approaches to answer the question: First, the Palestinian civil society cannot exist before the formation of an independent state; this approach was adopted by the radical left and other independent thinkers (Salem, 2012). Musa Al Budeiri78 (1995), for example argued that the Israeli occupation and the social fragmentation of the Palestinians both prevented from forming a Palestinian civil society. While Adel Samara (2001) pointed out that in the process of developing the Palestinian civil society, the Non-Governmental organization “NGO-ization” have had adopted Western agendas which distracted the Palestinians’ attention from the


78 The article “Challenges of the Transitional Period of the Palestinian society’ was published in Arabic in the Jerusalem Center for Media and Communication. (1995) Jerusalem
task of liberation towards societal, communal and professional agendas within the framework of the occupation. Salem (2012) pointed out that other thinkers even doubted the presence of Palestinian civil society because the society structured upon patrimonial, familial, clannish, tribal, which exist in a contradictory geographical cleavages and it was not able “to create a civil society based on the bond of citizenship, disregarding cliental affinities. They argued that a society first needs a level of civility as a prerequisite for the establishment of civil society” (Salem, 2012: 18).

The Second approach, which is in contrast of the first one according to Salem (2012); Palestinian civil society exists. Salem presented Ziad Abu Amre (1995) argument that Palestinian civil society does exist in the Palestinian Occupied Territories in 1967; that is the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. “Palestinian civil society has thus been defined as the bearer of the burdens of the Palestinian state in its absence, providing health, agricultural and educational services, among others” (Salem, 2012: 18). Dr. Mustafa Bargouthi (1995), who is leader of one of the NGOs in Palestine, considered that “the existences of democracy basis, pluralism, and the role of the civil society organizations, are not just a luxury or accessories that the Palestinian people can live without in the coming period, but it is a vital condition for the Palestinian people’s survival and continuation as a people that are eager to achieve their self-determination and national independence” (Bargouthi 1995:15). This point of view was based upon the fact that the NGOs were the resources by which the absent PLO “The Palestinian National Entity” could reach its people in the Occupied Territories. Therefore, the services were not only social but also political; they created trust between the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and their leadership abroad (Salem, 2012). Fuqaha (2012) confirms this opinion and argues that the definition of the World Bank is applicable within the Occupied Palestinian Territories in all aspects despite the absence of a Palestinian “State”, as it includes charitable organizations and nonprofit companies. Under these two categories fall wide groups of research and cultural
centers and social, agricultural, unionist organizations, in addition to youth clubs, women’s organizations and empowering organizations or those encouraging political participation. Sadiq (2012) also highlights that civil society “centers around the historic and philosophical context of civil society's work, specifically in Palestine, where its institutions appeared before those of the government sector, because it acted for many years as a foundation for the national struggle, providing basic and important services as part of the Palestinian resistance and steadfastness” (Sadiq, 2012: 42).

The third approach according to Salem (2012) is that the Palestinian civil society is in transition. This approach defines civil society as being “in transition” because both; the old domestic and the new civil organizations in reality do exist, and that there is a transition from one form to the other (Salem, 2012). The other explanation to the term “in transition” has to deal with the transition from being occupied towards independence, in Salem (2012) words it is “the transformation of civil society from being in formation to being complete in the presence of a Palestinian state” (Salem, 2012: 19).

1- Historical Review: The Formation of the Palestinian Civil Society:

The Palestinian civil society organizations started to develop in the early years of the twentieth century. In 1907, the issued “Law of Associations” of the Ottoman Empire had guaranteed the right of association, but in a limited manner, in order to keep control on the formation of nationalist associations within its Arab provinces including Palestine. The groups first had to report to the Ottoman authorities concerning their intentions before receiving licensing (Sullivan, 1996). After the First World War and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine became under the British Mandate, since then “a vibrant civil society emerged in Palestine consisting of religious groups, clubs, labor unions, and women’s societies” (ARIJ, 2012:1)79. During this period (1917-1948), the new law on private

and non-profit making companies of 1922, laid 'the groundwork for the formation of many new organizations that were willing to escape' the control of the Ottoman law (Challand, 2009:60). Sullivan (1996) argue that the vast growth of these civil organizations probably have grown in parallel, or in response, to the growing Jewish Zionist movement (Sullivan 1996). Because of the political expectations of the British Mandate coming to its end, both the Jews and Palestinians began preparing institutions, which would replace those of the colonial powers (Ibid). At that time the Palestinians were subject to British colonial rule and to a Settler-Colonialism that intended to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. This objective was recognized in 1948, upon which Palestinians were distributed comparatively in what was left of Palestine (i.e., West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the surrounding Arab states (Hilal, 2009). Therefore, and by “the creation of the State of Israel and the displacement of over 750,000 Palestinians, social networks became strained and began to break down” (ARIJ, 2012:1).

As a result of the 1948, the West Bank came under the Jordanian rule and the Gaza Strip came under the Egyptian rule. During these years (1948-1967), civil actions in these two areas went separately but Gaza tended to be more independent than in the West Bank (Hilal, 2009). The Parties that worked openly in Gaza worked secretly in the West Bank such as the Palestinian Communist Party, branches of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab Nationalist Ba’ath Party (Salem, 2012). “The only NGOs allowed to work in the West Bank were non-political charities, who established a federation in 1958 but had to follow Jordanian law, obtaining permits for every activity they undertook” (Salem, 2012: 20).

In Diasporas (al-shatat) 80 for example, the Palestinian civil society organizations, according to Hilal (2009), exist in two models; the first consists of political parties and mass organizations such as women, youth and workers and many professional unions to connect the scattered Palestinian communities. The second is the networking charities and human

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80 Diasporas or (al-shatat) in Arabic was mainly in the neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Syria in addition to other Arab countries an worldwide.
rights organizations that are devoted to defend civil rights of Palestinians and provide relief for those in need (Hilal, 2009). While civil society organizations continued to function post 1948, the focus became more towards political and resistance movements (ARIJ, 2012). From 1964 on, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led the civil society focusing on, voluntary work throw youth organizations. In the 1970s and the '80s, health and education NGOs were presented (Salem, 2012).

After the occupation of West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, the Palestinian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) developed as an alternative to the Israeli occupation and tried to build a parallel infrastructure (AbuZayyad, 2012), enabling Palestinian self-determination with very significant political ties with the PLO (Pundak & Khoury, 2012). This last till the first Intifada in 1987 in which a new period emerged; a new political agenda for the OPT with new priorities such as defending human rights against the violations committed by the long, continuing Israeli occupation. Many traditional NGOs related to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) started to lose ground in the field in front of the new grassroots organizations that emerged during the first Intifada, such as the ‘popular committees’ that constituted the main participants in the first Intifada81. This includes the Islamic charitable organizations that began to adopt a new role and understanding to “political participation”. This new role led to the emergence of Hamas as an active participant in the First Intifada (Costantini, et al., 2011). Following the Madrid peace conference82 in 1991, a considerable amount of funding was received from western donors with significant distributions to democracy promotion and civil society development (Brouwer, 2000; Carothers & Ottaway, 2005; Challand, 2009; Hanafi & Tabar, 2005; Le More, 2008) in Palestine. However, the increased funding and the political openings between 1991 and 2001 did not lead to a

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81 See the “Mapping Study of Civil Society Organizations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”. http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/content/civil-society-organisation-mapping-study-palestinian-territories

82 The Madrid Conference of 1991 was a peace conference, hosted by Spain and co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. It was an attempt to revive the Israeli–Palestinian peace process through negotiations, involving Israel and the Palestinians as well as some Arab countries.
stronger civil society. On the contrary, civil society became gradually elitist, characterized by professionalized NGOs with vertical linkages with the grass roots who were merely recipients of services and not active, engaged members (Jamal, 2012). The estimated number of civil society organizations after Oslo agreement in 1993 was some 1400 in the OPT; this number has since dropped to 600 (Costantini, et al. (2011). This is because the newly formed Palestinian National Authority (PNA) began absorbing many civil society organizations to serves as ministries. This move left room for the formation of new service-providing organizations that weren't associated with any political party (Hilal, 2009). Costantini, et al. (2011) pointed out that “the PA invited civil society organizations to become incorporated in its structures (this occurred with some NGOs, particularly closely linked to Fatah, such as the Health Service Council, that ran 62 clinics and merged into the PA). However, many CSOs refused to merge, and thus competition over funds and activities emerged as a new phenomenon. This created tensions between the PA and CSOs. In this framework, the PA began imposing control over the NGO sector and in 1997 a first draft of a law was presented to the Palestinian Legislative Council providing for the Ministry of Interior to “license” NGOs rather than simply “registering” them” (Costantini, et al. 2011: 22). Fuqaha (2012) argues that although theses NGOs and organizations main aim was delivering services, they also represented the priorities of the parties behind them whether they were the PLO or Western or Arab donors. After the formation of the PA, the relationship with NGOs changed, and the nature and fields of work of these organizations also changed, their work regressed in most fields in general, The PLO who signed the Oslo Accord with Israel and later formed the Palestinian Authority was established within the Palestinian territories, thus its duty became to offer the services required of any government, such as education, health, agriculture and social welfare. However, the PLO’s responsibilities were not as such. By Oslo Accords the PLO became an internationally recognized entity, “this motivated CSOs to concentrate more on socioeconomic development rather than political and national indoctrination. They moved more toward institutionalization and professionalism and away
from political funding, while veering toward funding from international donors, and later had to deal with their conditions" (Fuqaha, 2012: 32). Sadiq (2012) argues that it was necessary for these civil society institutions to go through this transition in which “both old and new institutions started engaging in a construction phase to provide quality services with a high degree of professionalism” (Sadiq, 2012: 24). However, their increase in number enhanced competition among them, and they also competed with the PA in terms of roles and tasks (ibid). Fuqaha (2012) pointed out that competition over roles and tasks reduced some of the CSOs’ scope of work; but opened up other new fields such as democracy, governance, gender issues and empowerment, in addition to widening their scope to include the youth sector.

In 2000, the Palestinian civil society experienced a setback because of the outbreak of the second intifada. Political parties turned to armed struggle, and most of the NGOs focused only on providing emergency aid instead of their ordinary work” (Costantini, et al. 2011). Peace organizations also faced a setback because of the problem of ‘normalization’, only Islamic civil society organizations flourished during this period through their grassroots work and their reputation of being untainted by corruption (Salem, 2012). When Hamas won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 2006 and their takeover of Gaza in June 2007, the Palestinian civil society was divided into three fragments: one supporting Hamas, one supporting the PA in Ramallah, and the third comprising of liberal, democratic independent organizations (Ibid). “The Palestinian Authority (Fatah) in the West Bank carried out an intensive campaign against all Hamas CSOs, dissolving some of them and taking over their administration and properties, while Hamas in Gaza did the same with Fatah CSOs. “Both parties exploited the division as an “opportunity” to tighten their grip on civil society, take over its assets and limit its capability of influence” (AbuZayyad, 2012: 6).

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83 Normalization is the participation in any project, initiative or activity, in Palestine or internationally, that aims (implicitly or explicitly) to bring together Palestinians (and/or Arabs) and Israelis (people or institutions) without placing as its goal resistance to and exposure of the Israeli occupation and all forms of discrimination and oppression against the Palestinian people.”
2- Foreign Aid Dependency

Since the 1948 War, the Palestinian people, wherever they settled, became deeply dependent upon external aid. Up to the First Intifada, external aid to the WB&GS came primarily from Arab countries through the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in exile (De Voir & Tartir, 2009) and less from the West. During the First Intifada, many more Western International NGOs arrived to channel more money into the Palestinian NGO sector” (Challand, 2009:80) as NGOs and UN agencies were the only available channels for humanitarian aid to the Palestinian Occupied Territories (Brynen, 1995). After Oslo, “Western donors took the reins of financing Palestinian development” (Challand, 2009:59). De Voir & Tartir (2009) point out that “between 1999 and 2008, external aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip increased by over 600% to 3.25 billion US Dollars per year” (De Voir & Tartir, 2009: x) as shown in the graph below.

Figure 12: Total Donor Disbursements to the WB&GS (1999 – 2008) (Millions USD). Source: (De Voir & Tartir, 2009: 11)
The face of external aid and the work of NGOs dramatically changed during the Second Intifada (2000-2004); it shifted again from development to emergency assistance, between 2000 and 2002; it also increased by over 250% (De Voir & Tartir, 2009). By the end of the Second Intifada aid began to shift back from meeting the immediate humanitarian needs of Palestinians to long-term development (Ibid).

Hanafi & Tabar (2005) argue that the increase in funding from the West was coupled with, “their insistence upon prepackaged programs with pre-defined thematic concerns and sectors” (Hanafi & Tabar, 2005:54). This reflects, in line with Gramsci,84 the donor’s community hegemony over the Palestinians’ civil society organizations, in order to follow the donor’s political and economic views and polices. De Voir & Tartir (2009) pointed out that “Though external aid has acted as a constant buttress to Palestinians since the War of 1948, the manner, type and conduits have changed significantly over time… these shifts coincide closely with political realities here in Palestine and around the world, rather than local development needs” (De Voir & Tartir, 2009: 7). This is clear through the reaction of the donor community after certain political events; the international response to Hamas’ victory of the Legislative Elections in 2006, for example, which was to put a halt to state-building efforts because donor’s governments instituted financial sanctions against the PA. Another clear-cut example was when fighting erupted between the two main rival political factions In June of 2007, Fatah and Hamas. The result was that Hamas took control over the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, President Abbas appointed an emergency ‘technocratic’ government, who became known as the ‘caretaker government’ after exceeding its 60 day (De Voir & Tartir, 2009). According to the Palestinian Ministry of Planning (2008), the Caretaker Government is favorably viewed by the international community, and its appointment led to an immediate reversal of donor financial sanctions and no-contact

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84 In Gramsci’s work; hegemony refers to how a class exerts influence over other classes in such a way that they will follow its political and economic project. http://marxisttheory.org/antonio-gramsci-theories-of-hegemony-civil-society-and-revolution/
policies with the Palestinian Authority (PA). Donors reengaged with the PA in the West Bank on a development agenda (Ibid).

Figure 13: Type of External Aid Disbursed to the WB&GS (2002 – 2008). Source: (De Voir & Tartir, 2009:13)

3- Literature Review: The Civil Society Studies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

There have been a number of studies that looked at CSOs in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The study “Civil Society in Palestine: A Literature Review” by Jamil Hilal (2011) discussed the studies that have been carried out regarding the Palestinian civil society; the study found the following:

1- A short study by Dr. Khalil Nakhla in 1990 in which he outlined basic facts about Palestinian NGOs within the Green Line (i.e., in Israel) and within West Bank and Gaza Strip. There were 170 Palestinian NGOs that were active among Palestinians inside the Green Line in 1989, and 49 workers trade unions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Hilal, 2011).
2- The study “Surveying Civil Society Organizations in West Bank and Gaza Strip.

This sociological study of Palestinian civil society organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was published in 2001; some 1150 CSOs were counted (Hilal, 2011). The survey was carried out by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and the Palestine Economic Policy research Institute (MAS) in 2000. The study presented the following types of civil society organizations and their distribution (the numbers were updated by Hilal, 2011):

a- Political parties and movements

Hilal (2011) points out that “at the end of 1990s there were a total of 18 different political parties or organizations in the WBGS\(^85\). Seven of them could be classified as secular Palestinian nationalist movements whose origins date back to the late 1960s and are factions of the PLO. Four could be classified secular Arab nationalist movements. Five are Islamist parties dating from the 1980s or early 1990s. One is a self-styled "democracy movement" formed in the mid-1990s. Two are special issue groups (an environmental group and a peace group)" Those with tangible membership or support did not exceed eight parties. Fatah as the dominant party in the PLO came to control the finances of the PLO and thus to manage the monthly budget that each of the political parties in the PLO receives, and also to determine the number of jobs these parties had in the PA institutions” (Hilal, 2011: 16). Hamas is the only political organization that has developed a mass support since the second Intifada (Hilal, 2011). However, both, Fatah and Hamas sustained a military wing during the second Intifada, and both still exercise control over a quite large security gadget in the areas each controls. This means Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in West Bank (Hilal, 2011). Hamas, since 2007, have generated a host of active NGOs in education, welfare,

\(^{85}\) WBGS refers to "West Bank and Gaza Strip".
day-care, health relief, and women’s movement. In addition to the strong youth movement who are well represented at the universities (ibid). The study noted that “the present decade saw the re-structuring of Palestinian political field round two major parties, both competing for control of the PA and the PLO at a conjuncture that saw the possibility of establishing an independent state disappear and the Palestinian national project reach a dead end” (Hilal, 2011: 17).

The study also emphasized that the support for Left-wing political parties declined after Oslo. And all attempts to unify them have failed in addition to the failure of creating a new democratic left-wing federation (Hilal, 2011).

b. Unions within Civil Society

The study identified different types of unions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip according to their main constituencies:

**Labor trade unions**

Hilal (2011) points out that “since the establishment of the PA in 1994 two competing labor federations exist in West Bank and Gaza Strip: the first is based only in WBGS, and is called Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU), and the other is called the Palestinian General Workers Union (PGWU) that was established in the Diasporas and moved its headquarters to the West Bank with the establishment of the PA” (Hilal, 2011:19). “Both trade unions are dominated by Fatah and are described as highly bureaucratic and lack any real organized labor base” (Ibid).

**Professional unions**

“There are a fairly large numbers of professional unions representing different professions ranging from dentists, artists, engineers, pharmacists, doctors, and accountants among others. Many of these unions were founded in the 1950s and
1960s. The majority was involved in the national struggle and political parties compete to control their leading committees. Hilal (2011) points out that “since many of professional unions are self-selective, they represent rather narrow constituencies, at the same time; they are one of the few types of unions that have actively lobbied for their members” (Hilal, 2011: 20).

**Occupational associations of manufacturers and contractors**

The fact that quarter of the employed labor force in WBGS is self-employed in small craft and business, therefore a significant group of union-type CSOs are present (Hilal, 2011).

**Umbrella Unions**

The large numbers of charitable organizations who provide some form of social protection in the absence of an effective social security system combined with high rates of poverty among the population in WBGS urged the establishment of special type of union called a higher or umbrella unions representing these organizations who are working in a similar field (Hilal, 2011). “There is also PNGO (Palestinian NGO Network) which represent a large number of the professional type of Palestinian NGOs that were established in the 1990s” (Hilal, 2011:21).

c. **Grass-roots organizations**

The Mass organizations that were promoted by the PLO and its political factions since the early 1970s played an active and direct role in the national struggle. The most active among these were, and still are, university student unions. There are also a number of women's organizations which are affiliated to political parties (Hilal, 2011).

d. **Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)**

The NGOs are the largest sector of Palestinian CSOs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They are heterogeneous group of associations and can be grouped either
according to their main agenda, size, area of operations, source of funds, and features of target group (Ibid).

3- The “Mapping NGOs in the WBGS” Studies

These studies of mapping NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were carried out by the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) in 2000 and in 2007. The two surveys excluded other sectors of CSOs such as political parties, grass-roots organizations, trade unions, and social movements (Hilal, 2011). The studies criteria for defining a non-governmental organization were that the NGO must be first institutionalized; that is with an administration etc. Second it has to be autonomous, non-profit organization, to depend, at least partially, on voluntary participation, not to have a representative character; and not to be aligned to a political organization or faction (Ibid). In contrast with 2000 survey the 2007 survey noted the following features and changes of Palestinian NGOs:

“There has been a significant increase in the number of Palestinian NGOs after 2000: The number of NGOs in the WBGS increased from 926 organizations in mid-2000 to 1495 in early 2007 (that is an increase of 36.5%)” (Hilal, 2011: 28).

- The majority of NGOs were founded after the establishment of the PA and majority are urban-based: (60.3%) where formed after the establishment of the PA (1994) (Ibid).

- More than half of NGOs are charities: (51.7%) of NGOs in the WBGS are charitable organizations, followed by clubs (19.2%), and “development” and “cultural” organizations (17.3%). In 2000 study the percentage of charitable NGOs was 40.4% (Ibid).

- Many NGOs have more than one program which totaled 4581 programs in 2007.

The survey noticed a decline in the proportion of “cultural, scientific and educational”

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programs while charity programs rose to 39% of the total programs offered in 2006 compared to 33% in 1999. This increase reflects the increase in poverty and unemployment rates (Ibid).

- **NGOs employ more women than men, and volunteer work has decline:**

  “The average number of paid employees in the NGOs stood at 20 individuals per organization. Nearly 55% of the paid employees in NGOs are women. About a third (31.6%) of the total NGOs employees worked in health organizations, and nearly a fifth (19.2%) in charitable organizations. The survey reveals a decline (of 17.4%) in the number of volunteers in NGOs” (Hilal, 2008: 28).

- **NGOs have increased their dependency on external funding:**

  The distribution of funds received by Palestinian NGOs that completed the survey for the year 2006 was as follows; 60.9% were from external sources (compare to 46.8% in 1999); 21.5% from their own activities; 9.3% from the local community or institutions. The rest came from the PA (0.7%); from Palestinians within the Green Line (3.7%); from Palestinians in the Diasporas (3.2%); and other sources (0.7%). This reveals the very high rate of dependency of Palestinian NGOs on eternal funding and the danger this entails on their autonomy and sustainability” (Hilal, 2008: 29).

- **The amount of funds received by NGOs doubled between 1999 and 2006**

  “The amount of revenues received by NGOs as recorded by the survey nearly doubled between 1999 and 2006 (from nearly USA $ 113 million in 1999, to $ USA 224 million in 2006). It reached $USA 257.5 in 2008 according to the Palestinian Ministry of Planning” (Hilal, 2008: 29).

- **Low budget local community NGOs is least dependent on foreign funding:**

  Dependence on foreign aid differs by region and area: Gaza Strip showed a higher level of dependency than the West Bank (Ibid).
• **More than two-thirds of NGOs’ operate at governorate and local level.** Fund raising is the main preoccupation of most NGOs: It appears that most NGOs’ concerns are focused on fund-raising. 95.6% of these organizations stated that their biggest need was raising funds (Ibid).

• **Donors and the Israeli occupation are the main sources of restrictions for Palestinian NGOs:** “A majority (58.6%, compared to 43.5% in 2000) considered donors to be their main source of restrictions. Some directors of NGOs complained openly of donors treating NGOs receiving funds as “employees for the implementation of donors’ demands” (Hilal, 2008: 31).

• **Decline of the number of NGOs active in East Jerusalem**

  The decrease in all sources of funding to Palestinian NGOs in East Jerusalem, especially foreign funding reflects the process of judaization87 of the city and the building of the Separation Wall around it, thus tightening its isolation from the rest of the West Bank, thus forcing many NGOs to move out of the city to surrounding areas, inside the Wall, particularly to Ramallah-al- Bireh88 area which witnessed a threefold increase in its share of Palestinian NGOs in the WBGS, that it an increase from 11.9% in 1999 to 36.4% in 2006” (Hilal, 2008: 32).

The MAS mapping studies concludes that “NGOs have fortified the steadfastness of Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza Strip because of their positive role in the health, education, agriculture and other sectors. It also emphasized the NGOs’ active participation in drawing up development plans, providing relief services, and in their active participation in

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87 Judaization of Jerusalem is a term used to describe the view that Israel has sought to transform the physical and demographic landscape of Jerusalem (especially East Jerusalem since its occupation in 1967) towards a fundamentally Jewish city under Israeli sovereignty.
the political struggle against the occupation. It noted that the NGOs responded to second
intifada by increasing their aid and relief programs” (Hilal, 2011, 32).

4-The Study: “Measuring and Developing Social Capital in the Democratization
and Governance Process in Palestine CSOs”.

The Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem (ARIJ) carried out the study “Measuring and
Developing Social Capital in the Democratization and Governance Process in Palestine
CSOs” in the year 2012. The ARIJ research team found out that the Palestinian civil society
organizations have flourished in the 20 years since Oslo. The study declares that in 2012
there were approximately 2,245 civil society organizations operating in the West Bank; a
ratio of one CSO for every three square kilometers (ARIJ, 2012). The study also points out
that “the profusion of CSOs, combined with a high level of international funding, has created
a complex environment in which social relations are conducted, at times preventing the
optimal utilization of social capital. As a result, the social capital that was so instrumental in
establishing Palestinian networks and meeting community needs in the early twentieth
century is increasingly vulnerable, and over the past sixty plus years social relationships
have come under increasing pressure. The domestic context and political situation has been
further compounded by an influx of and growing dependency on foreign aid – factors that
play a determining role in program goals and management style. The interplay between
international donors, CSOs and local communities creates a situation that must be carefully
navigated by Palestinian CSOs in order to ensure worthy collaboration and to avoid project
duplication” (ARIJ, 2012: 1). The study further explained that “the political situation in
Palestine since the end of the First World War has greatly affected civil society and social
relationships thus leading to a decline in social capital. The ARIJ research team posits that
in order for CSOs to enhance their social capital they must focus on strengthening their
relationships with five key stakeholders; their communities, other CSOs, the government, the
private sector, and the media" (ARIJ, 2012: 1). Therefore, the study administrated a 100 question survey to 20 organizations of the West Bank regarding the following: Codes of conduct, cooperation between CSOs, the efficiency of Palestinian NGO networks, partnering with the private sector, if these organizations have influenced government policies, and how these organizations employ the media (ARIJ, 2012). The study used both quantitative and qualitative data to reach the conclusion that the primary steps that CSOs can take in order to enhance their social capital are focused around legitimacy and accountability (ARIJ, 2012). “Based on the results of the surveys and the historical background of Palestinian civil society, the study developed a comprehensive set of guidelines, in order to assist CSOs in strengthening their relationships with the five identified stakeholders. The recommendations are broken down highlighting best and useful practices for each stakeholder. A checklist has also been provided which can aid CSOs in assessing their organizational structure as well as how they engage with the identified stakeholders” (ARIJ, 2012:1).

The study recommended that in order to enhance civil society organizations credibility and legitimacy, it is important to establish clear defined mechanisms, concentrated around accountability. Because when civil society organizations are seen as legitimate, civil society will be more willing to engage and participate (ARIJ, 2012). The study concluded that in order to create lasting social change they should be valued and respected by their stakeholders. Therefore, taking active steps to improve their relations with the five identified stakeholders, they will strengthen social capital, to create a strong and vibrant civil society (Ibid).

4- Other Studies and Reports.
   a- The study: “Civil Society and Political Elites in Palestine and the Role of International Donors: A Palestinian View” by Salah Abdel Shafi- Gaza Community Mental Health Program (GCMHP) in July 2004.

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90 [http://www.euromesco.net/euromesco/media/paper33_final.pdf](http://www.euromesco.net/euromesco/media/paper33_final.pdf)
The study focused on civil society before and after the Oslo Accords; the background of civil society before Oslo tackling political and professional activists of CSOs, the Islamic civil society and political elite. Then the period during the Oslo era focusing on the PA and the CSOs conflicting interests, the “de-politicization” of civil society organizations and the political elite. The study also presents the types of political elites within the civil society. Finally, the study gives policy and CSOs recommendations. The following summary reflects the most important elements of the study:

“The eruption of the first Palestinian Intifada in 1987 marked a turning point in the evolution of Palestinian civil society. Civil society organizations (CSOs) emerged as an instrument for political mobilization as well as necessary institutions for providing much needed services for the population. The CSOs that emerged during the first Intifada were mostly a product of existing political parties and closely associated with them. Accordingly, the elite of these organizations were political activists who were assigned by their political parties to take leading roles within the new institutional infrastructure. With the signing of the Oslo accords and the establishment of the PNA, CSOs and their elites started to distance themselves from their political bases and become independent entities. The new era was characterized by a deep crisis of the secular political parties, social polarization and heavy involvement of donor countries and international organizations. The focus of CSOs shifted from politics to service delivery. A process of CSOs and CSO elite “de-politicization” took place. Despite this process, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) saw in civil society a threat to its policy of centralizing power and controlling all aspects of public life. The influx of funds for Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from donor countries that started during the first Intifada and intensified after the establishment of the PNA accelerated the de-politicization process. The new elite realized that its power derived from its newly gained access to the international arena and the new sources of funding and
not from its affiliation with Palestinian political parties. CSOs not only provided an independent platform for the political elite, they also created new constituencies around them and provided them with access to the international community, the media and to political decision makers within the PNA. Islamic CSOs were established in the mid-seventies. Their main focus was welfare and providing services to the poor and marginalized in the society. When Hamas was created during the first Intifada, it relied on an extensive network of CSOs involved in social services. Islamic civil society elite emerged as a political elite associated with Hamas while the political elite of the national secular factions emerged as civil society elite that gradually disengaged from their previous political affiliation. Democracy remain one of the most crucial issues when it comes to discussing the role of civil society. The existence of an active and independent civil society is an important element of any democratic system. CSOs provide a necessary instrument to ensure the participation of people, widening their choices and thus empowering them. Civil society elites have been active in articulating principles of democracy, participation, empowerment, transparency, accountability and gender equality. They have also been very critical of the performance of the PNA and its inability to provide a model of good governance. This critique is legitimate given the negative record of the PNA in the areas of transparency, accountability and combating corruption. But the question remains regarding the extent to which CSOs provide a better model of governance and urged elites, donors and the community at large to answer the question: Do the structures of these organizations allow for real participation of their constituencies and how accountable are they to their constituencies? It also highlighted issues relating to internal governance i.e., the role of the board of directors as opposed to the role of the executive branch membership, internal procedures, and financial accountability” (Abdel Shafi, 2004: 5).
The study criticized and pointed out that these issues did not have serious attention over the last decade. The first donors’ priority concentrated on the financial accountability and that the organizations have been able to fulfill their contractual obligations. Governance, for example have been ignored or was not taken seriously. This has allowed a patriarchal trend to evolve within the Palestinian civil society organizations. In addition to the absence of internal control mechanisms, which led to those leaders, managers and directors behaving as if they enjoyed unlimited powers, acting similar to heads of tribes. The study recommends in order to be effective and credible in their call for democracy within Palestinian society civil society elites have to abide by democratic principles within their own organizations (Abdel Shafi, 2004).

B- The report “Mapping Study of Civil Society Organizations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”\textsuperscript{91} in 2011.

C- Introduction and methodological framework

The study aim at providing a comprehensive overview of CSOs in the OPT, including their capacity-building needs and recommendations for possible intervention areas to be supported by forthcoming cooperation programs. The study covered the three regions of the Occupied Palestinian Territories: the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The study consulted 262 civil society organizations in order to have an adequate representation, at the national and local levels, of the dynamics and processes characterizing Palestinian civil society. 87 of these organizations were met with and interviewed and filled out questionnaires; 49 in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and 38 in the Gaza Strip. In addition, different tools for the collection of information to obtain information on different features of these organizations and also for the purpose of crosschecking gathered

\textsuperscript{91}\textsuperscript{91} See \url{http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/projects/overview/index_en.htm}
information. 100 participated in focus groups; 73 in the West Bank and Jerusalem and 27 in the Gaza Strip, and they filled out questionnaires. 68 civil society organizations participated in feedback meetings and seminars, held in Ramallah and Gaza. These meetings and seminars served as a further tool for verifying the study findings (Costantini, et al., 2011).

The study main issues and stakes for the Palestinian civil society

The study pointed out that the Palestinian civil society organizations have a peculiar characteristic, unlike most civil societies and against the concept of civil society itself, most of these organizations were created out of an established “state framework”. This situation has changed following the creation of the Palestinian National Authority in 1993, a process of concentration of CSOs on service delivery activities became apparent, despite the fact that their engagement in the policy field was often marked by difficulties.

The civil society organizations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories appear as a wide and vibrant set of actors that are managing a large variety of activities as over 90% of social services in the Territories are managed by CSOs which are working in all sectors, maintaining the Palestinian human resources and establishing and constructing a vital reservoir of information and knowledge, establishing the main channel between the OPT and the rest of the world. However, the study points out that some specific issues emerge when dealing with East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip: For East Jerusalem, the special context produces a two-fold set of challenges for civil society organizations. On one hand, their legitimate existence and activity are at risk; while on the other hand, the increasing social exclusion creates a growing demand for services and for human rights protection activities.

For Gaza Strip; the Israeli siege seriously affects the CSOs. “There is a decrease of trust among the organizations, with constituencies and with political authorities. There is also little space for political dialogue and participation in governance, a lack of access for qualified human resources, equipment and materials, and a dependency on external donors and
resources. Despite all this, CSOs are sometime assuming the role of catalysts for change, fostering technological innovation and social change concerning gender and age, supporting active social integration of underprivileged groups, mitigating and reducing the long-term and structural effects of the “closure” of social space, supporting access to information and knowledge” (Costantini, et al., 2011: 8).

The resources for supporting CSOs

The Study declared that the CSOs supporting resources in the OPT have been considered, the focus was on the European donors and the international aid agencies, the international NGOs and national public authorities and non-state actors. The study pointed out that most of these resources are used to support project-based service delivery initiatives. However, they are rarely engaged in local and national governance and policy dialogue activities. This is also applicable for long-term programs. Moreover, the current allocation of resources risks adopting a further concentration of Palestinian CSOs on service delivery, which creates direct competition with public authorities and increases the competition among them (Costantini, et al., 2011).

5. The study operational recommendations

The study defined recommendations, with main context in the setting of a general strategy for supporting CSOs in the OPT by adopting “the global objective to strengthen the position of civil society in public debate and in the elaboration and implementation of development strategies, complimentary with the Palestinian Authority’s strategy and actions.

Finally, opportunities and options for supporting civil society development were identified as well as sector priorities” (Costantini, et al., 2011: 9).
Other studies were carried out such as “The Role and Performance of Palestinian NGOs in Health, Education and Agriculture” Study in December 2006 by Bisan Center for Research and Development and The World Bank Group, the study: “The World Bank and the Palestinian NGO Project” by Liana Lopes in 2011, and many more.

Reviewing the literature on both social capital and the civil society reveals that both in the Palestinian context are considered to be “special case”, and that they need deeper understanding. Therefore, in-depth study for both concepts is addressed in the empirical Chapter. Social capital will be analyzed on its three levels; macro, meso and micro, in addition to the analyses of the factors that had influenced the Palestinian social capital.
4.1 INTRODUCTION

The general object and the overall preferred theoretical approach of the thesis is to look at current Palestinian social capital after the construction of the Wall, focusing on social resources and relationships. The importance and significance of this general approach is to study the relevance of the Palestinian conflict via sociological analysis of social capital. This is because social capital is not static but varies over time\(^{92}\), due to political and economic change. Therefore this research used the case study approach to answer the What, Why, and How questions regarding the case of East Jerusalem and one of its neighborhoods, al-'Eizariyah (Bethany). Many studies have been carried out about the impact of the Wall on the Palestinians living in East Jerusalem that is; outside the Wall, but inside the Wall, such as al-'Eizariyah, has not been the focus of previous researchers. In addition, the demographics of al-'Eizariyah’s residents represents a cross-section of Palestinian social stratification and is a good and complex example to study social capital dynamics and their effect on local development. This case study enables us to study social capital dynamics between two regions of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and deal with East Jerusalem and the West Bank as one unit, representing both sides of the Wall.

The remainder of this chapter is organized in five sections. Section two presents the methodology and research design. The third presents the research limitations and the forth discusses the data and data collection tools; studies on the Palestinian social capital, observations, in-depth interviews, and the life story approach data. Section five shows the data collection process and the challenges in the field work. The last section deals with the data analysis.

\(^{92}\)Coleman and Putnam allow for change over time ... they allow for the possibility that the volume of social capital may grow or diminish with time. (Field, 2003)
4.2 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

This research builds on the results of the existing quantitative studies on social capital in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Those are, mainly "Measuring Social Capital in the Palestinian Territories" that produced the Social Capital Index (Nasr & Hilal, 2007), and the "Bonding versus Bridging" (Cavatorta, et al, 2009) study. First the examination of the results of these studies was presented. Second, I exposed them to further investigations by the case study qualitative method; in-depth key informants’ interviews and the life story interviews. The preference of a qualitative approach in this research was selected for several reasons. First of all, the qualitative approach uses a practice approach that seeks to understand phenomena in context-specific settings, such as "real world setting [where] the researcher does not attempt to manipulate the phenomenon of interest" (Patton, 2001, p. 39). Unlike quantitative researchers who seek causal determination, prediction, and generalization of findings, qualitative researchers seek instead illumination, understanding, and extrapolation to similar situations (Hoepfl, 1997). Studying social capital via quantitative methods, such as surveys, measuring networks by simplifying social relations into numerical data and depicting ties as either absent or present, does not address the complex processes of human interaction in networks. Qualitative methods, on the other hand, allow researchers to focus on the creation, reproduction, and dynamics of social networks (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Edwards, 2010). The major objectives of qualitative research methods are to describe and analyze both the processes through which social realities are constructed, and the social relationships through which people are connected to one another (Miller and Dingwall, 1997). Therefore, and in order to answer the research questions and to better understand the social capital dynamics following the construction of the Separation Wall between Israel and the West Bank, a qualitative, analytical approach have been chosen and conducted in ‘the case study setting’ using the ‘life story’ approach, and the ‘in-depth interviews’. The case study method is "an empirical inquiry about a contemporary
phenomenon (e.g., a “case”), set within its real-world context—especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2009a, p. 18). Patton (1990) stressed on the importance of selecting “information-rich cases” for study in depth. **Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research.** Indeed, the case study approach has the ability to investigate important topics not easily addressed by other methods, especially when the research involves either a descriptive question such as ‘What happened?’ or an explanatory question such as ‘How or why did something happen?’ (Shavelson & Townes, 2002). The strength of the case study methodology is its ability to examine, in-depth, a —case within its —real-life context (Yin, 2004). The case study approach also illuminates a particular situation and helps to make direct observations and collect data in natural settings (Bromley, 1986). Therefore, the case study of “East Jerusalem and al-‘Eizariyah” is informative and capable of demonstrating the critical effect of the Wall on the Palestinian social capital. Researchers could analyze the data of a case study from a critical science perspective, or obtain one person’s “story,” hence combining narrative with case study (Merriam, 2002). In this sense, and within the case study of ‘East Jerusalem and al-‘Eizariyah’, the life story and the key informants in-depth interview qualitative method were applied; the first to collect personal level data and the second to collect community level data.

This research is conducted with the awareness that the focus is on social capital and its dynamics among various groups of al-‘Eizariyah and how the political and social reality shapes its forms. The three months field work time started from first of October till the end of December 2013.
4.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

While this research was being conducted the author has been aware of its limitations. First of all, because the author can be considered what is referred to as a “native ethnographer” (as in Fournillier, 2009) who may have been too close to the subject matter to be an objective researcher herself or to be viewed as objective by those in the research field (i.e., interviewees, those who are observed, or gatekeepers to the research data). However, despite both of these characteristics that could have had their effects on the judgment and interpretations of the field data “my goal was to arrive at the paradoxical ethnographic moments of dialogue and Otherness”, if I was to use the words of Fournillier (2009). According to Madison (2005:184) “Communion with an ‘Other’ brings the self-more fully into being, and in doing so, opens you to know the Other more fully”. Besides, reading reports and studies by non-Palestinians and brainstorming with scholars and experts in research institutes and conferences helped to reduce the subjective or perhaps a little more biased view of the “native researcher” problem. This “other” and “otherness” have been used as the starting point for interviews to position the interviewer and the interviewees with a certain picture in mind, a certain understanding of conceptual language and the way the questions were asked. This was helpful in preparing the interviewees for conversing and being open to reach out to some very old and distant memories, history, and/or events. Also, process-wise there were limitations as to how much data and what data could be really collected in a short period of time. Most of the research field areas in Palestine in close proximity to the conflict zone, or rather the entire “Question of Palestine” remaining unresolved and stagnant in the policy arena, the movement is restricted, and thus the work related to research data gathering was constantly affected. Only three months of empirical research, which nevertheless, were complimented by the years of day-to-day life observation, oral histories, and anecdotal references well known in the particular milieu of Palestinian scholars or civil society activists) were enough to get a good sense of the situations that highlight certain aspects of the case study under construction. However, some of the time was wasted in
waiting for the travel permit to Jerusalem; the permit was obtained only for one week and came little bit late. The author had to turn to other alternatives like meeting some of the interviewees in alternative places to Jerusalem such as Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron. Traveling to these three cities was time consuming by itself because of the bypass roads and the checkpoints, in addition to the ever present dangers of being near the conflict areas.

4.4. RESEARCH DATA AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS

This research depends on two types of data; primary data collected by me and the study of other previous social capital studies. Several instruments to collect data were used such as observation, in-depth interviews with key informants and the life story interviews.

1- Previous Studies on the Palestinian Social capital

This research builds on previous research, mostly quantitative studies such as “The Social Capital Index” of 2007 and the “Bonding Versus Bridging” study. First of all, on “The Social Capital Index” of 2007 that was carried out under the umbrella of The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) with the cooperation of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). In this index the definition of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) had been adopted, which views social capital as a multi-dimensional concept, reflecting social networks and the shared norms, values, and understandings that facilitate cooperation within or between various groups. The study covers the three Palestinian regions: The West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. 26 survey questions were designed to inquire into four principal dimensions of social capital: political, civic, and professional participation; informal networks and social engagement; trust in institutions and in individuals; and shared values and norms. The questionnaire also elicited personal and demographic information. It was administered to a representative sample of 2,500 Palestinian households in June and July 2007. On the basis of the
responses to the survey questions, the study established a framework that allows the various dimensions of social interaction and engagement in the Palestinian Territories to be measured (MAS, 2007).

Secondly; the study “Bonding Versus Bridging” within "Studies on Social Capital in the Palestinian Territories" series compiled by the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, (MAS) in 2009. This study was built on the Index of 2007 and explored how social capital applies to the Palestinian Territories and identifies the main forms in which it manifests. Bonding social capital relates to strong ties between people who share similar characteristics; such as family ties and small circles of close friends with similar experiences and information. On the other hand bridging reflects weaker ties that are connections between individuals from different backgrounds who have different experiences and information, culminating in looser and more diverse networks. The goal of the study was to formulate a synthetic indicator for bonding and bridging social capital and to test its effects on building and strengthening trust and civic behavior. The conclusion was that bonding social capital is stronger than bridging social capital in the Palestinian Occupied Territories and that building a civic and viable society/country requires efforts to strengthen the bridging social capital. Moreover, social capital suffers from an apparent deficit in both civic behavior and community trust.

Studying the findings of these two quantitative social capital studies is important for my research from two perspectives. First; to what extent these findings are valid now after two major political events occurred since then; namely, the actual physical separation between Israel and the West Bank exemplified by the separation Wall and the radical political split between the Palestinian political parties; Fattah and Hamas in 2007. Second, the quantitative method used in these two studies; their findings construct a starting point for this research, in particular, those interpretations related to the presence of the Separation Wall in certain rural areas. Exposing these findings to a qualitative, analytical approach provides
more understanding and examines the validity of these interpretations in urban sittings now after the Wall is almost completed in Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Other sources for information were also examined such as the Newspapers, the World Bank, the United Nation Agencies, and the Human Rights Organizations reports that cover many aspects of the contemporary life of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. There is an array of the Israeli polices, actions and assaults documented in those official information sources before, during, and after the construction of the Wall.

2- Observations

Patton (1985, p. 1) explains: Qualitative research “is an effort to understand situations in their uniqueness as part of a particular context and the interactions there. This understanding is an end in itself, so that it is not attempting to predict what may happen in the future necessarily, but to understand the nature of that setting—what it means for participants to be in that setting, what their lives are like, what’s going on for them, what their meanings are, what the world looks like in that particular setting.” Patton (2001) also supports the notion of researcher's involvement and immersion into the research. He emphasized that the real world is subjected to change and therefore, a qualitative researcher should be present during the changes to record an event after and before the change occurs. Using Ethnographic Methods which rely substantially or partly on “Participant observation” (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994) that is “establishing a place in some natural setting on relatively long-term basis in order to investigate, experience and represent the social life and social process that occur in that setting – comprises one core activity in ethnographic fieldwork … involves not only gaining access to and immersing oneself in new social worlds, but also producing written accounts and description that bring versions of these worlds to others (Robert et al. 2001: 352). Therefore first I had written field notes while I was conducting research because “writing field notes begins in the field, as ethnographer
participates in local scenes and activities in order to experience them directly and immediately and to accumulate a series of observations to be written up into field notes” (Ibid: 356), in addition to mental notes. I followed the “linguistic turn” of Clifford and Marcus in their book “Writing Culture” (1987) which considered field work is not closed, completed, final text; rather they are indeterminate, subject to reading, rereading, interpreting, reinterpreting, and reopening the author accounts and analyses of the fieldwork (Atkinson et al., 2001). In this research, my personal involvement and observation are not related only to the time I spent in the field conducting research but it reached back to almost my entire life. In this research I played two roles; one as an insider ethnographer as I was born and studied in East Jerusalem, as well as had lived part of my life in al-‘Eizariyah. I witnessed most of the events in the area starting from the war of 1967 till 1978, then from the second Intifada in 2000 till 2010. I was there before and after the Wall was built, I myself experienced the closure procedures between 2001 and 2005 while working at one of al-Quds University faculties in Jerusalem. My other role is that of an outsider ethnographer as I lived abroad for eighteen years from the year 1978-1996; fifteen years in Saudi Arabia and three years in Jordan having missed two of the most important events in the history of Palestine; the first Intifada and the Oslo Accords. In addition I spent five years in Italy for a post-graduate study and research motivation from 2010 till the time being. In this sense we might adopt AM Kusow (2003) opinion about the native ethnographers “the insider/outside roles are products of the particular situation in which a given fieldwork takes place and not from the status characteristics per se of the researcher” (Kusow, 2003: 1). With this logic one might say that I used two eye glasses while observing; one as an insider ethnographer and the other as an outsider. As an insider ethnographer during the second Intifada (1999-2004) and like all others in al-‘Eizariyah who used to go to Jerusalem every day either for work, to school, to shop, or to seek health care, I used the historical main road that connect Jericho with Jerusalem and pass by al-‘Eizariyah to go to work in one of al-Quds University faculties in East Jerusalem. But, with the closure procedures and restrictions on West Bank residents
from entering Jerusalem without a permit, al-‘Eizariyah residents, used other passages to avoid the permanent checkpoint on their way to Jerusalem. For me, the alternative was to climb up the hill through the old passage between the two Christian Monasteries in Mount of Olive that was 500 meters from my house in A-Khallah, north of al-‘Eizariyah. I used to walk up the hill and wait a little bit before the location of the temporary Israeli checkpoint. Few soldiers in a military Jeep used to be there in the early morning to prevent

Figure 14: An Israeli force controlling the Mount of Olive passage to Jerusalem. Source: (B’Tselem, 2006: 22).

Palestinian with a West Bank Identification Card (Green ID) from entering East Jerusalem. I would wait till the temporary checkpoint left as I held a Green ID and I did not have a working permit93. Thereafter, I would walk for at least 200 meters away from that point before getting into the public transportation, pretending that I am a resident of the Mount of Olive (as if I was holding a Blue ID), otherwise the driver would not pick up a West Bank Palestinian with a ‘Green ID’, if the driver’s vehicle was stopped by the Israeli army for inspection, he would have had to pay a fine. By this policy Israel appointed the Palestinian Jerusalemites drivers a ‘Police Officers’ mission to control who has the right to get into their transportation means and who has not. Sometime later, they closed all the passages that lead to Jerusalem by dirt or building materials junk and mud in winter.

93 The Israeli authorities gave working permits to some Palestinian establishments such as hospitals but it is unlikely so for universities.
During that period I witnessed the early stages of the construction of the Wall, the people used to squeeze themselves between the cracks to get to the other side or, sometimes, to climb up and jump to the other side. In 2004 this became impossible, all the cracks were sealed off, and jumping from some point became not possible. By 2005 the Wall was completed in the west and the north of al-‘Eizariyah, I had to be transferred to work at al-Quds University main campus in Abu Dis (outside East Jerusalem) as the University administration failed to provide me with a working permit\(^{94}\) to enter Jerusalem. The Wall blocked the main street in Ras Kobsa junction and cut off al-‘Eizariyah and the surrounding area from Jerusalem.

\(^{94}\)The Israeli authorities gave working permits to some Palestinian establishments such as hospitals but it was not so for universities.
checkpoint regime is time consuming, and they were against the construction of the Separation Wall that cutoff the main Jericho-Jerusalem road they used to use to reach Jerusalem through al’-‘Eizariya.

Figure 18: The Wall to the north of al-‘Eizariyah where it cuts the bypass road I used to take to Jerusalem through the Mount of Olive. Source: www.reynoldmainse.com

In addition to the field observation during the three months, and my observation during the time I lived in the case study area, I referred to my ‘Diaries’ between the years 1997 – 2003 and used them as another source of data, although my aim at that time was to release some emotions and thoughts rather than to document the social reality. However, the Diaries became like writing down social discourse which, as Greetz (1973) put it, “turns it from passing event, which exists only in its own moment of occurrence, into an account, which exists in its inscription and can be re-consulted” (Greetz, 1973:19).

This personal experience and the observation of behavior, attitudes and discussions among the residents of al-‘Eizariyah were an important source of the research data collection whether occurred during the author life time or the specific three months of the empirical research that starts in Autumn 2013.
3- In-Depth Interviews

Dilley (2004) stated that interviewing helps to know the context of study subjects' behavior and thus provides a way for a researcher to realize the meaning of that behavior. To reach this result, in-depth interviews were undertaken with “Key Informants” to collect data at the community level. A semi-structured interview guide was developed that consisted of four principal dimensions of social capital at the local level: political, civic, and professional participation; informal networks and social engagement; trust in institutions and other individuals; and shared values and norms. These interviews were supplemented and enriched by the data collected via the life story method. The key informants that were interviewed have had expert knowledge on the four principal dimensions of social capital at the local level such as representatives of the civic society, civic associations, political institutions, representatives of economic activities, and officials of the al-‘Eizariyah local council, education and health care. Regarding the number of key informants, there was no predetermined number of participants in the beginning. This is because interviews usually require a flexible and pragmatic approach (Dörnyei, 2007). After initial interviews and records were completed and their responses tentatively analyzed, additional participants were included. This “iterative process” went on until the interview data reached a level of “saturation” (Dörnyei, 2007; Arthur et al., 2012). Following this process, five more key informants were interviewed. In addition, a national representative was interviewed to connect the local with the national level to get a more thorough overview. Heyl (2001) points out that “researchers in an ever-increasing number of disciplinary and applied fields have been turning to ethnographic interviewing to help gather, rich, detailed data directly from participants in social worlds under study” (Heyl, 2001: 369). Therefore, the Ethnographic interviewing method was used while interviewing the national representative by establishing respectful, ongoing relationship with him. This includes enough rapport for there to be a genuine exchange of views and enough time and openness (Ibid). The list below
summarizes the names and occupation of each key informant and the contribution of each interviewee’s accounts:

1- **Ziad AbuZayyad a resident of al-‘Eizariyah.** Hi was an ex-minister for Jerusalem affairs, an ex-Legislative Council member of the Palestinian Authority, a lawyer and publisher and co-editor of a quarterly Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture. The contribution of the interview was to better understand the geopolitical environment and the social changes occurred after the Oslo Accords, and the construction of the Wall in the Palestinian Occupied Territories.

2- **The ex-Mayor of al-‘Eizariyah Council.** The contribution of the interview was to better understand the history and complications of the construction of the Wall between East Jerusalem and al-‘Eizariyah, as this was built when he was occupying the mayoral position.

3- **The son of another ex-Mayor.** The contribution being to better understand the history of the social relations and interaction between the various groups of al-‘Eizariyah residents: their social integration, their cooperation in serving the local community, and the strong or weak ties amongst different groups (in respect to their different origins, and their different civil status). Another aim was to gather an overview of how the community has evolved and adjusted to the transformation of the physical and spatial characteristics of the community.

4- **The son of another ex-Mayor notable.** He still practices the role of his father in solving disputes; the aim being to better understand the mechanism of solving social problems in the absence of law and order, and to examine the change in norms and community values.

5- **Al-Quds University Academic and head of Montada al-‘Eizariyah al Thakafi (Cultural Center) in al-‘Eizariyah and a member of al-‘Eizariyah Local Council.** The contribution of this interview was to glean information on local civic networks
since this cultural center works across all the social layers of the community in order to better understand how the presence of the Wall and its restrictions on mobility, influence bonding, bridging and linking forms of social capital amongst individuals and associations within the locality are expressed.

6- **The Headmaster of Muscat High School (al-'Eizariyah Boys School),** who himself is a refugee and a member of al-'Eizariyah Local Council. The contribution of the interview was to shed light on educational opportunities and inequalities. The school’s pupils represent male youth from all social layers within the community. Many students, who used to study in Jerusalem, moved to this school when the Separation Wall went up. Therefore the interview investigated if the number of students had risen since the erection of the Wall and discussed the problems they faced and may still be facing, in relation to their education, their aspirations and their social life. This interview covers also his personal feeling regarding his origin as a refugee whose family settled down in al-'Eizariyah after the 1948 war. This interview also tackled sensitive personal feelings such as; whether he witnessed any sort of discrimination regarding his origin in his role as headmaster of the secondary school or in decision making process as a member of al-'Eizariyah Local Council.

7- **The Teacher of the “Nigrizia Suore” Italian kinder Garden who herself is a refugee lives in al-'Eizariyah.** The contribution of this interview was to investigate the story of the Italian convent that is located in al-'Eizaryiah and was excluded by the Wall and was left within the boundaries of Jerusalem. How this institution dealt with the new situation and how much the wall affected their mission and what forms of resistance they expressed and how they managed to keep serving the community while they became isolated behind the Wall.

8- **The Head of the Mothers’ Committee Council of Yusuf Al-Khatib High School for Girls.** The contribution of the interview was to shed light on the impact the Wall has had on gender, and discuss issues and problems female students face, and how
the Wall affected their education, their aspirations and their social life. And to seek an explanation of the types of services that the Mothers' Council provides to the students and what social capital instruments they use for fund raising.

9- **The Director of Al-Salam Medical Center.** The contribution of the interview was to shed light on how the loss of access to local and specialist hospitals in East Jerusalem has impacted on the medical services the Center can provide and the challenges they face, both physically, financially and logistically, in serving the medical and psychological needs of the local community.

10- **The ‘Arab Bank’ Assistant Manager.** The contribution of the interview was to discuss the bank economic scheme and plans since its establishment, and the challenges that the bank had faced after the construction of the Wall and to what extent the bank and his customers, from the two divided communities; East Jerusalem and al-‘Eizariyah, were affected.

11- **Shops owners whose businesses location is very near to the Wall.** The contribution of these interviews was to shed light on how the Wall impacted the local economy. Al-‘Eizariyah is well known for its 4 km commercial street, the longest in the West Bank that starts from Ras Kobsa Junction in the West (the starting point of the western part of the Separation Wall), to the Ma’ale Adummim Junction in the east (The starting point of the eastern part of the Separation Wall (not constructed yet). This junction connects also the north of the West Bank with the south, it suffer always from traffic jam. The shops in these two points are the most affected economically by the Wall. For this reasons, I thought of randomly choosing another 5-6 persons to interview, I thought of the random-walk techniques after I consulted some informants and relevant documents from al-‘Eizariyah local council, and some relatives. Based on this consultation, I organized a two day tour to the first 500 meters of the Ras Kobsa Junction first. The random-walk sampling procedure resulted in a selection and then interviewing of five shop owners, two of them were perfectly suitable for a
life story interview. One I took on the same day; the other gave me an appointment a week later in his house where I also met his wife and children. The second tour was for the last 500 meters of the other end of the commercial street before the Ma’ale Adummim Junction. Further on, out of five randomly chosen interviewees were selected as follows: An Israeli customer of a shop, and the owner of the car’s spare parts workshop and carwash station. These two interviews out of the five that have been randomly selected were very important in terms of the general understanding of the case study itself.

The total number of the in-depth interviews became eighteen. The draft questions for both the life story interviews and in-depth interviews were developed with my research supervisor at the University of Trento and a scholar from Al-Quds University, who was willing to help. I also consulted experts in the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), as they were the founders of social capital studies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

4- The Life story approach data

Storytelling is a fundamental form of human communication (Atkinson, 1998). It can serve an essential function in our lives as we often think and speak in story form. Therefore it can bring meaning to our lives, thus giving a narrative account of an event, an experience, or a memory. “Life stories cross the embodied and emotional ‘brute’ with the rational and irrational ‘know self’. They make links across life phases and cohort generations revealing historical shift in culture. They help establish collective memories and imagined communities; and they tell of concerns of their time and place” (Plummer, 2001: 395). A life story research approach offers a template that can be applied to many research needs, from sociological to anthropological, to linguistic and literary. It usually ends up as a short or mini autobiography, full of information on research interests and questions. In this context, a life
story interview will probe deeper into the personal life and feelings of the interviewee, in a way that will help to understand certain social actions within the wider social/political context. The life story qualitative research method is also an appropriate way to better understand the past. The study of life histories looks at lives as a whole or at significant periods of a life (Atkinson, 1998). Using this logic, the life story interviews which were conducted focused on the periods before and after the construction of the Wall, covered all the population status categories in al-‘Eizariyah, those with a ‘Blue ID’, those who have a ‘Green ID’ with a permit and those who have a ‘Green ID’ without a permit. The name list was ordered on the basis of gender, age, and types of population origin. The four categories of population origin meant; those who were from al-‘Eizariyah itself, those who were refugees, i.e.; who settled in al-‘Eizariyah after the 1948 War, those whose origin is from different areas of the West Bank, and finally those who have Israeli residency status. The aim of this variation in interviewees was to get under the skin of the social life of a’l-‘Eizariyah community and discover the interaction between the various groups or categories, and to capture the level of cooperation amongst them and to assess their integration into the society as a whole. The interviewees were chosen from this list.

The number of life story interviewees depended on the resources and time that was available. Ten life story interviews were conducted in different periods, I interviewed the first six life stories in al-‘Eizariyah during the first two months, while I managed to interview the four of the life stories in East Jerusalem during the last week in the third month of the data collection as it was not easy to get a permit for one week for me, the holder of the Green ID needing a permit from the Israeli civil administration. The interview segments of each life story are used as data for social capital, social resilience analysis and interpretation.
4.5 THE DATA COLLECTION PROCESS AND THE CHALLENGES IN THE FIELDWORK.

At the beginning of October 2013 I left Trento to go back to conduct the West Bank to conduct the research transferring through the Jordanian Capital Amman. Travel permits from both Israeli and Jordanian authorities are required to cross the king Hussein Bridge\(^{95}\) on the Jordan River that separates Jordan from Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It is currently the sole designated exit/entry point for West Bank Palestinians traveling in and out of the region. The destination between Amman and Jerusalem is 80 km; it takes one hour drive in normal situation without restricted borders and inspections. Most times it takes four to five hours and all day in holidays and other occasions. I went through the Jericho city to al-'Eizariyah and few days later I started the data collection.

The data collection was carried out by me personally, from arranging appointments to the explanation of explaining the research subject, to conducting the interview and recording process, to directing him or her to stay on the research-track of the conversation. All interviews were downloading on the laptop and were classified according to a selected pattern to be recalled and used later. At later stages, the interviews were transformed from the audio form to a written script form. Finally they were translated from Arabic to English ready to be analyzed.

Most of the interviewees had no idea about the concept of social capital, even those who have a high educational level; after explaining the concept, most of them later, needed an extra explanation for the relationship between the social capital concepts and the Wall as a reality. One of the most challenging life story interviews was with the family where the Wall is exactly out of their house windows. One of the interview objectives was to examine the very direct impact of the Wall on this specific category of the population in the case study setting. I proposed my willingness to visit this family and they welcomed the proposal being really

\(^{95}\) King Hussein Bridge is called the Allenby Bridge.
excited about it. The Palestinian father was married to a British woman in London seventeen years ago while he was a PhD student. She came to live with him in his father house in al-‘Eizariyah, they have two girls; the eldest is fifteen and the youngest is thirteen. There was no chance to talk more about the research in details or about the social capital definition at that moment, the general understanding was that they were going to talk about their story before and after the Wall that was built on part of their garden separating them from their neighbors and its implications on their lives. The appointment was in the evening, one hour before the father called me and said to not come with your car as protesters closed the road by burning tires, the Israeli tanks were there, the air was loaded with tear gas and other types of gases\textsuperscript{96}, it was dangerous and may be it was better if I would have later at night or just cancel the whole thing for that day. I preferred to proceed and examine their specific location at that specific time in order to capture the practical and the emotional aspects of this family. I was willing to take the risk despite the dangerous situation.

Figure 19: The interviewee’s daughters talking to their friends through the Wall in 2008 before it was sealed in 2009. Source: The father.

At the beginning the father talked about troubles they faced and still facing on daily bases because of the house location; the protests are always at the entrance of their house, sometimes they have to wait for hours till the area is safe. The wife talked about living almost alone in this neighborhood, most of the neighbors moved to a safer place. She expressed her feelings regarding her daughters who’ve been separated from their friends who live next door and provides me with a picture in which the girls were talking to their friends behind the wall before it was completely sealed.\cite{96} Although I explained perfectly well the objective of the

\textsuperscript{96} Tear gas is usually used by the Israeli army during demonstrations. Recently they are using a type of gas that had a very bad smell just like the stink of swage as means of harassment.
interview when I arrived yet there was a misunderstanding as the father found some of the questions provocative. He is a conservative man; he did not like when his wife revealed some information on the personal level. The tension started when the wife addressed him: “I want to rent a house somewhere else, your father’s house will stay here, our quality of life is more important, we can come and visit, or we could come back when the situation is better”. At that moment, the atmosphere was very tense between them. The father explodes later when I asked his daughter about her feelings and how she compared the life in al-‘Eizariyah with the life in London where they went every year to visit their grandparents. He shouted: “this question has nothing to do with the Wall” I do not like your questions”. I had to control the situation as much as I could, and explained again that the research is about the impact of the Wall on social capital in general and strong and weak ties in particular. The eldest daughter panicked out of fear for her father, she brought the machine to measure his blood pressure. I felt that I violated one of the most important interview ethics; ‘Non-maleficence’ which means that researchers should avoid harming participants.97

As for all the other interviewees, their reactions were smooth and easy going, but that does not mean it was easy all the way. One of the key informant interviews, for example, was carried out in 4 phases; two times at the interviewee house in al-‘Eizariyah, the third time over a dinner in Ramallah, the last one at the interviewee office in Jerusalem. In order to enter Jerusalem I needed a permit to pass by foot through al- Zaytoon “Olive” checkpoint or by any public transportation through al- Za’ayyem checkpoint. At the time my traveling permit was not yet ready. Time was a crucial element in this case as I needed to interview the key informant as soon as possible before his travelling outside the country in a couple of days and he preferred his office as a meeting point. One of my Jerusalemite friends offered to smuggle me with her car, she said: usually they do not stop me, I am blonde and not wearing a veil, they usually think I am one of the settlers. At al-Za’ayyem highway checkpoint the cars are forced to drive in a very low speed, and then, at a certain point, the soldiers stop

cars that they suspect. They would check identity cards of the passengers and driver and they could ask to search the car. The probability to be stopped was 50 percent, everything was legal with my friend; she held a ‘Blue ID’ and an Israeli driving license while also, driving a car with an Israeli plate number. The only problem was that if they stopped her with me in the car then all passengers in any means of transportation would have had to hold a ‘Blue ID’ or a ‘Green ID’ with a valid traveling permit to go through that checkpoint. Acting normally worked and the soldiers did not stop the car. This was a dangerous thing to do but fortunately I got a permit for one week from 7:00 in the morning till 7:00 in the evening. This was not enough to conduct other interviews in East Jerusalem.

Another dangerous situation I had to face was when I came back from Ramallah late at night after an interview with the same key informant. Before the closure and the construction of the Wall, residents of al-‘Eizariyah used to go to Ramallah through Jerusalem. It used to take approximately half an hour to drive to Ramallah. Since the Wall was built the reality changed and people have had to take a longer route to Ramallah threw the road to Jericho, and at the Abu-George junction they turn north to Qalandia\textsuperscript{98} Junction and only then go to Ramallah. This new journey usually takes from one hour to two hours depending on how fast the inspection is at the Jaba\textsuperscript{99} checkpoint. That night, while I was coming back from Ramallah to al-‘Eizariyah through the same route, I noticed a strange movement at Qalandia; the cars with Israeli plate numbers were turning back. The Qalandia checkpoint was closed because of confrontations between protesters and the Israeli army because one of the protesters from the Qalandia refugee camp was injured in clashes and died. Protesters from the refugee camp put old tires on fire and they were throwing stones to express their anger. I heard the shooting by the Israeli soldiers but decided to continue as my car was relatively far, about

\textsuperscript{98} Qalandia is the main checkpoint between the northern West Bank and Jerusalem. Most of the people who use the checkpoint are residents of East Jerusalem separated from the city by the Separation Wall.

\textsuperscript{99} Jaba’ village’s name is thought to have come from the Aramaic word ‘Jaba’ (‘the high hill’). It is located on the way to Ramalla.
200 meters away from the clashes. I could have been shot accidently or my car could have been targeted by stones or bullets.

Some of the interviews, especially with people that I already know, were very informative. I thought that I knew almost everything about the research problem but I needed to confirm it by others’ narratives. I discovered that my knowledge was limited to my own thoughts and observations and there is much more to learn. The trust that was developed between me and the people over the years served this research a great deal. The interviewees revealed some delicate information that I would never reach without this trust. Other interviews were very long as they were conducted in the interviewee working place; have been interrupted for many reasons, but the waiting time has stimulated more practical observations of the environment where the interviewee was working and the type of work he or she was doing.

One of the most interesting interviews was with a carwash workshop at his working place. While interviewing, an Israeli customer with his wife, the wife did not speak Arabic nor English and I did not speak Hebrew but we both managed to communicate in Italian, the Israeli’s wife was born in Libya where she learned some Italian. They discussed general political and economic issues; this conversation opened other types of questions about his customers from the settlement of Ma’ale Adummim, and how the relationship was before and after the construction of the Wall.

During the ethnography period of my research, there were confrontations every day in the evening and demonstrations near the Wall which cut the main road in the western entrance of al-‘Eizariyah. Young volunteers from the town created ways to warn the car drivers and direct them to other safer bystreets to avoid getting trapped in the areas where clashes were.

4.6 THE DATA ANALYSIS APPROACH

Review of the literature of social capital has, however, shown that there are two approaches upon which many empirical studies have been conducted. The first focuses on behavioral
variables and attitudes including trust, norms, and values, while the second emphasizes measuring the position of individuals in networks (Adam and Roncvic, 2003). In this research the focus is on the cognitive form of social capital. Therefore the data analysis will depend on the categorization of the data according to trust in general, and between individuals, norms and practices in addition to values. The analyses of social capital include three levels, namely macro, meso, and micro. On the macro level, it consists of assembling key events in the historical review Chapter that “may not only produce an insightful descriptive pattern but also may hint at possible causal relationships, because any presumed causal condition must precede any presumed outcome condition” (Yin, 2011: 16). Indeed, the historic events that were traced back in Chapter Two show that the reality of today is a product of the past.

The variety of data collection from different sources such as observations, in-depth interviews and life stories are checked to ensure consistency of the findings and sources (e.g., Duneier, 1999, pp. 345–347) for the analyses of social capital at both meso and micro level in the empirical chapter. In other words, triangulating the data in order to establish converging lines of evidence to make the findings as robust as possible, and by using an explanation-building technique, the evidence will be presented with sufficient clarity (e.g., in separate texts, tables, and exhibits) to allow readers to judge independently the interpretation of the data and not to mix between evidence and interpretation.

The analyses covers also the social resilience element in the case study setting, how the residents of al-'Eizariyah responded to the shock of the physical obstruction of the Wall and all the restrictions that resulted on a day to day basis, including restrictions on access to work, housing, health facilities, education, services, and family and social life. The social capital element and its role in local development, in such circumstances, will be analyzed to better understand the factors that prevent reaching the ultimate objective of social capital that is the collective action.

With the context depicted in this chapter in mind, the next chapter will focus on the empirical investigation carried out in al-'Eizariyah.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The second section of this chapter after the introduction, illustrates the research main problem and explains how the reality of al-‘Eizariyah changed in the last two decades. It shows at first how al-‘Eizariyah expanded to adjust with the new economic boom coupled with the political expectations of being part of the future capital of the State of Palestine according to the Oslo Accords. Second, it shows how the Wall completely isolated al-‘Eizaryah and prevented its residents from entering East Jerusalem since mid-2004. The following section presents the situation before the Wall, then it focuses on how the Wall affected social organizations by restricting access to education, housing, medical services, work and social life. Then a discussion on the direct social effect of the Wall such as displacement and loss of services, and the indirect effect explaining how the Wall became invisible in the eyes of most of the town residents, analyzing the absence of urban planning and how the Wall change the social relation map especially in intermarriage relationships. And finally the indirect effect of the Wall on political views of the residents of al-‘Eizariyah.

To study the impact of the Wall on the Palestinian social capital dynamics, types and characteristics requires an understanding of the geopolitical environment and al-‘Eizaryahs’ social structure. Therefore, the third section of this chapter starts with a discussion on how the Oslo Accords categorization; Area B in the center and Area C for the surroundings of al-‘Eizariyah, encouraged the diffusion of informal economy. Then, an overview of al-‘Eizaryahs’ social structure to shed light on the locals, and the rest of the displaced population in terms of their origin, the level of integration with the locals and among various displaced groups, and when and why they were displaced and whether it was for political or economic reasons.

The fifth section investigates the structured social forces that shape al-‘Eizariyah social capital in particular and the Palestinian social capital as a whole. It starts with a discussion on al-‘Eizaryah social fragmentation explaining the conceptual local/stranger relationship
which is further discussed in barriers to collective action section. It displays the types of ‘strangers’ and the locals’ reaction towards each type. Then follows a discussion about how traditions, politics and competition prevent collective action that could resolve community problems. In addition, to a discussion on gender inequality from the perspective of education and religion and other factors that influence collective action.

The next section demonstrates the role Civil Society associations in serving the community of al-'Eizariyah and in its role of raising awareness regarding the construction of the Wall. The following section tackles the effect of the Wall on social capital from horizontal and vertical relationships explaining how bonding and bridging social capital been used as coping strategies, first on social capital at the family and extended family levels, then at the community level covering the social security issue, education and health care.

The last part of this chapter looks at the Wall as a physical intervention shock. The socio-economic resilience in terms of the time it took the community to rebound from this man-made hazard and its implication on local development is considered. And the adaptation and adjustment strategies, which cover many aspects other than economic, such as education and health care, are studied as part of the social resilience that prepares the residents to deal with the challenges that al-'Eizariyah is facing and will face in the future.

5.2 AL-'EIZARIYAH FROM QUASI CAPITAL TO AN ARAB GHETTO

The reality of al-'Eizariyah has changed dramatically in the last two decades. In the first period, after the Oslo Accords (1993), al-'Eizariyah expanded to adjust with the new economic boom coupled with the political expectations of being part of the future capital of the State of Palestine that is East Jerusalem. Palestinian Banks, governmental associations and other economic institutions found in al-'Eizariyah an alternative to East Jerusalem, as the Palestinian Authority was not allowed to function in East Jerusalem. Al-'Eizariyah residents doubled during this period as many Palestinians came from different parts of the
West Bank and settled down to invest in the town. All of this socio-economic growth has been disrupted by the failure of the Oslo Accords, and the construction of the Wall that disconnects the town from its center. The Wall completely isolated al-‘Eizaryah and prevented its residents from entering East Jerusalem with some exceptions since mid-2004. Unless they have the Israeli identity card (Blue ID) or a Palestinian identity card (Green ID) with a permit to reach Jerusalem through only two controlled entrances, one is for pedestrians; the al- Zaytoon “Olive” checkpoint, and the other is for Israeli vehicles only; the al- Za’ayyem check point. Until the Wall was built, there was a residential continuum between al-‘Eizaryah and East Jerusalem. Although there are main differences in the legal status of the residents of both sides of the Wall, the distinction was purely artificial: the social interaction did not correspond to this distinction.

Many of al-‘Eizaryahs’ populations use to work in East Jerusalem and Israel, thus they have strong economic and social ties with East Jerusalem and its suburbs. Al-‘Eizaryah depended on East Jerusalem in almost all aspect of life such as access to education, healthcare and entertainment and other social activities. This was disrupted since 28 of March 1993 when Israel announced a full closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the Palestinians were prohibited from entering Israel including East Jerusalem with some exceptions. The implementations of ‘the Oslo Accords’ did not change these restrictions; on the contrary it escalated them to reach the complete physical separation by the Wall. This had severe economic consequences; the unemployment rate has risen because those who used to work in Jerusalem became unable to reach their jobs. Hospitals of East Jerusalem became out of reach; the one small clinic of the town cannot meet the needs of the residents therefore women in labor, and those requiring advanced medical care have to drive to the nearest city hospitals in Jericho or Ramallah or Bethlehem. The same situation when it comes to schooling and socio-economic activities no matter whether shopping for everyday life necessities or for the wedding ceremonies that used to take place in the halls of the big hotels in East Jerusalem. The Wall had cut off the main road that used to connect the town
with the cities of Ramallah and Bethlehem through East Jerusalem. The long alternative bypass roads alongside the Wall are costly and time consuming. In addition to the disruption of the public transportation system that was efficiently serving the population before the Wall. This raised the number of private cars and encouraged the diffusion of the illegal unlicensed vehicles for internal transportation. The Wall also redirected the social relations map as follows. The ID categorizations ability of inclusion or exclusion became visible and the cornerstone of residents' and non-residents' decision-making process, especially on such issues as where to live, work or study, and even who to marry. The Wall influences their surviving strategies while keeping the Israeli oppression at their backdrop.

1- The Direct Social Effect of the Wall

Displacement

The direct social effect of the Wall was the displacement of some residents of al-Eizariyah. The displacement depended on the resident's house location and the resident type of the identity card they hold either blue ID or green ID. Therefore Ash'Shayyah neighborhood is the most affected because the Wall literally runs down in the middle of the main street leaving half of their residents on the Israeli side of the Wall, and imprisoning the other half inside the Wall as shown in the picture bellow.

Figure 20: The Wall in Ash'Shayyah neighborhood. Source: www.arij.org, 2012
Ash‘Shayyah including and Kobsa Junction\textsuperscript{100} are the affluent northwest neighborhood of al-‘Eizariyah, considered to be one of the most organized neighborhoods in al-‘Eizariyah, famous for its beautiful houses and its residents' high standard of living. This neighborhood was the most affected by the Wall, not only because of the Wall located very close to the houses but also because most of its residents are from the Jerusalemites who held the Israeli Identification card (the blue ID). The neighborhood is almost abandoned now; the residents had to take fateful decisions. Abu Mahmoud who is a Jerusalemite who settled in al-‘Eizariyah in the late fifties explained:

“We left our spacious house empty in Ash-Shayyah. I closed the bakery that had been established by my late father in the fifties. Now my wife and I are living with our son’s family in his small apartment in Shuafat\textsuperscript{101}, within the Jerusalem municipality boundaries, because we are afraid of losing our (blue ID) residency card” (Abu Mahmoud, November 12, 2013).

This family has been paying taxes to the Israeli government for a long time and now, as they are growing old, they do not want to lose the health insurance and other social services benefits attached to the taxpayer’s ID. Now they know that this is not a temporary situation but they cannot afford to buy a house in Jerusalem, especially as the chance of selling their own, at a good price, is almost impossible.

“Who is going to buy a house close to the Wall? Plus it is hard to even think of selling the place. It’s not only our family house; it’s our life’s work and struggle, our strong social relations and memories. It is not easy to let it go. My father bought that piece of land for housing and to establish a family business. Our uncle came and bought the other piece of land. My two

\textsuperscript{100} Kobsa Junction is the joining point of East Jerusalem suburbs; Silwan, aba-Dis and al-‘Eizariyah.

\textsuperscript{101} Shuafat is one of East Jerusalem suburbs outside the Wall.
sisters were married to our neighbor’s sons. We became a big family there. Our bakery products were delivered, not only to Jerusalem and the suburbs, but to the north and the south of the West Bank. We suffered a lot during the Intifada but we never thought of leaving our houses; now we have no other choice” (Abu Mahmoud, November 12, 2013).

Others who hold a West Bank ID (the green ID) still living in Ash‘Shayyah because they have no other choice but to stay or displace themselves far from the Wall, but within the West Bank, as they are not allowed to live in East Jerusalem. Martha, the British woman with two kids who is married to a Palestinian and lives in Ash-Shayyah, the Wall passes by their garden separating them from their neighbors shared her story:

I want to rent a house somewhere else. All of our neighbors have left, there is no one left here but us. Your fathers’ house will stay here [pointing at her husband], we can come and visit, or we could return when the situation is better, our quality of life has declined. When I came to live here in 1993, I could go to Jerusalem and any other place in Israel, but not anymore. They took the Israeli driving license away from me because of the Wall which drew a border; I am in the same house but it's considered to be in the West Bank now. Every day we don’t know if we can come back home or not because of the daily confrontations with the Israeli troops; we cannot avoid the tear gas, even if we close the windows, we are here almost alone. Our neighbors, who have children the same age as my daughters, who used to play together, now live in another country two meters away. That's Israel behind the Wall, and here we are in the West Bank. (Martha\textsuperscript{102}, November 30, 2013).

The attached picture (the previous figure: 19) was taken while the two daughters were talking to their friends through the cracks of the Wall while it was still being built. The family had to withdraw their daughters from their school in Jerusalem, they lost their school mates and now they lost also their neighboring friends.

\textsuperscript{102} Martha is a British woman married to a Palestinian with two daughters, 13 and 15 years old. They live in Ash-Shayyah. The Wall passes by their garden separating them from their neighbors.
During this interview, it was clear that Israeli policies and laws affect even those who hold foreign passports. Martha cannot stay in the same house with an Israeli tourist visa any more. The Wall drew a border and she became a West Bank resident, and has started to suffer like any other Palestinian citizen. Still worse was the division they started to experience as a family. She wanted to rent a house somewhere else to avoid the daily suffering and suggested that the family come back to their family home at weekends, but her Palestinian husband refused.

For him, leaving means surrender and would be a betrayal of his father's soul and the Palestinian cause. The husband never belonged to al-'Eizariyah and always felt a stranger. “We are refugees; we left our home in Safad\textsuperscript{103} once. It was a big mistake, and we are not going to leave this one too” he said. His decision is not rational, he knows it, but he does not think he should leave, no matter what. Their daughters are following the argument; suddenly the 13 year old says “It’s the United States of America to blame for this”.

As shown before, the most direct ongoing hardship is suffered by those who live close to the Wall, and those who hold the blue ID (the Jerusalemite). Most of them adapted themselves to the situation and reorganized their lives around the Wall and they coexist with it despite the difficulties. The Italian “Santa Marta Dei Padri Passionisti” monastery, for example was

\textsuperscript{103}Safad is a city in historic Palestinian which is now in Israel.
included within the Jerusalem municipality boundaries thus continued serving the community of al-‘Eizariyah. Karima the monastery kinder-garden teacher explained the situation:

“The 8 meter tall Wall became our convent fence. The Wall’s route decided that the Santa Maria pre-school is on the Israeli side of the Wall, now our students use a controlled doorway through the Wall. We tried our best to create normal environment; the ‘Sisters’ painted the Wall on the inside and decorated it with paintings of trees and flowers to camouflage the Wall ugliness as you see in these pictures” (Karima Hishma\footnote{Karima Hishma is a pre-school teacher who lives in al-Eizariya and teaches in the Italian convent in the north west of the town.}, December 12, 2013).

Figure 21&22: Santa Maria pre-school. Source: Karima Hishma, 2013.

However, not all the parents agreed to adapt to this controlled environment for their children’s school. Ali who is a father of a 5 year old girl and lives in al-‘Eizariyah said:

“We are already living in a big prison. I do not want to expose my little girl to this experience. The school became like a mini-prison despite that the Sisters trying their best to create a normal environment inside. I have decided to keep my daughter at home for the time being until she is accepted in to another school. Before the Wall, it was easy to enroll your child in any of al-‘Eizariyah schools, but now schools have become crowded. Most of those who used
to study in Jerusalem are studying in al-'Eizariyah because of the checkpoint regime. I have no other choice but to wait". (Ali, December 5, 2013).

The Jerusalemite who didn't live directly beside the Wall but in the center of al-'Eizariyah or in al-Mashroo area, also had to take fateful decisions in order to keep their blue ID; Lana who works at Al-Quds University’s is a Jerusalemite with a blue ID, and had lived most of her life in al-'Eizariyah before she decided to leave. Lana a Jerusalemite mother of two explained her situation:

“Our lives changed dramatically. My husband and I and our two children had to leave our relatively cheap rented, large apartment in al-'Eizariyah, and sell our furniture to live in a very small apartment with my in-laws in Jerusalem. Previously, in 10 minutes, I used to be at Al-Quds University, in Abu-Dis, where I work. Now, because of the Wall, I have to drive 45 minutes, at least, along the bypass road, and go through al-Za'ayyem check point, to get to my work from Jerusalem. We are suffering to keep our blue ID and to make sure that our children will be registered as residents of Jerusalem. We had to move. The Israeli national insurance makes unannounced visits to make sure we actually live inside the municipality borders. Both of my parents are retired and are still living in their home in al-'Eizariyah, but in uncertain environment, they are suffering too” (Lana, November 26, 2013)

The Jerusalemites who did not move out of al-'Eizariyah are living in suspension; unsure about their future movement and worried about the possible closure of the eastern entrance of the town. If the entrance were to close, it would mean that they would not be able to enter East Jerusalem by car through al-Za'ayyem\textsuperscript{105} checkpoint. This will also affect the Jerusalemite who lives in East Jerusalem and work in al-'Eizariyah or Abu-Dis. The only entry would be the pedestrian checkpoint at al- Zaytoon (Olive).

\textsuperscript{105} This checkpoint is located on the bypass road that connects the settlements, in the occupied West Bank, to East Jerusalem and Israel.
The Loss of Services

In addition to the displacement problem comes the loss of services such as education, health care and public transportation. Many of al-‘Eizariyah students used to study in the schools of East Jerusalem, the same happened to health care, the Wall has prevented people from accessing these services and they have to turn to alternatives to solve the problem. Some of these alternatives helped in the local development such as new schools or medical centers, others are harming the environment such as the growing use of private cars (of questionable quality that damages the environment) in the absence of public transportation. Mrs. Sara who is interested in community services explained her concern:

“We do not have good roads but we have lots of cars now that make walking in the streets of al-‘Eizariyah almost impossible. Before the Wall we had the public transportation that connect the town with East Jerusalem and Jericho, now these services had stopped, therefore many had to buy cars for their own internal transportations because taxies are too expensive, the heavy traffic is harming the environment and causing pollution in addition to the discomfort, it is hardly bearable” (Sara, November 13, 2013).

2- The Indirect Effect of the Wall

The Jerusalemites group (blue ID holders) got accustomed and adapted to the new reality. They reorganized their lives around the Wall and they coexist with the hardships. While the vast majority of the population of al-‘Eizariyah (green ID) who were denied access to East Jerusalem, also adapted their lives to the new reality but in a way that normalize the existence of the Wall. They slowly accepted the fact that East Jerusalem is no longer the center of their social and economic activities, and they organized their lives accordingly. The personal pictures below were taken to document a social event without any consideration of the Wall in the back ground of these photos. Perhaps, these pictures demonstrate the psychological adjustment and an act of ignoring the Wall. While it is clear that the Wall is
part of the general landscape in a way that the majority does not consider its presence anymore, they have learned to not think about it. The Wall has become invisible.

Figure 23&24: Personal pictures with the Wall in the background. Source: Facebook 2013.

The Palestinian’s adapting has become necessary but it has since dispersed their personal resources; meaning that it increased the cost of living. Khawla who is a Jerusalemite married to a West Bank ID holder man and teaches math at Al-Quds University in Abu-Dis, described the indirect effect of the Wall on her family life:

“The occupation entered my own bedroom; the Israelis decide if I and my husband can meet or not, and where. My husband has a West Bank ID (green), and he needs a permit to visit me in Jerusalem. We had to have two houses, one in my husband’s town in the West Bank and another in Jerusalem, we are (my children and I) afraid of losing our blue IDs. We used to rent houses in Jerusalem for that purpose until we managed to build one last year. It costs a fortune to have a house in Jerusalem, as you know, and this year we bought an apartment in Abu-Dis too. I thought of my two daughters who are studying medicine in Al-Quds University; It takes hours to move from our house in Jabal Al-Mukaber to Abu-Dis and return. They need this time to study. We have to be prepared. If the eastern entrance of al-‘Eizariyah were to close, it would mean that we would not be able to reach the university by public or private transportation through al-Za’ayyem check point as we do now. The only way will be as
pedestrians via the al-Zaytoon “Olive” checkpoint; to have an apartment inside the Wall solves some of these problems and worries” (Khawla, October 29, 2013).

This family is distributed over three locations, and she is running from one place to the other wasting her physical, emotional, and material resources. Most of the people react to the Israeli policies through a constant search for solutions which, inevitably, disperse their personal resources. “As families grow and children marry, there is an even greater demand on the limited housing available in East Jerusalem. This has driven many to build without permits, and live in fear that, one day, the Israeli authorities will demolish their homes. Many have moved to the suburbs even at the risk of losing social security benefits, while others simply cannot afford any of these solutions. The Center for Advancement of Peace Initiatives (CAPI) noted that “The occupied people consider the circumstances in the territory as an abhorrent situation, in which they must organize for survival, rather than for a full life (CAPI, 2014; 7).

The Absence of Urban Planning

The life story interview referred to in the previous section took place in the interviewee’s new apartment. The building’s entrance was still under construction while they were living in the apartment already because of the economic crises and the hardships caused by the construction of the Wall. This has become a general rule and an acceptable attitude: people care about the inside of their house and they will live in un finished buildings considering this act as normal with the idea that it will be completed at later stages, which can take up to some more years. This has its impact on the aesthetics level of the general look of the town and became an acceptable approach, which enforce the attitude of neglect to the common

\[106\] This analysis was discussed in my article “Al-‘Eizariya (Bethany) and the Wall: From the Quasi-Capital of Palestine to an Arab Ghetto” in the Palestine-Israel Journal (2014).
space. Dust, the lack of green areas and many eyesores, from scattered trash to unpaved side-streets, and the unorganized poorly designed and unfinished high-rise buildings gives a general sense of chaos. Although this kind of a problem is common in most developing countries, some analyses of the visible seen would often explain stigmatize the behavior of the residents as those that are culturally inherent, meaning that chaos is part of the Palestinian culture. Also another view sees this chaos as systemic and a natural development in such political, economic and cultural circumstances. And third opinion is advanced that it was planned by Israel to create this huge gap between Israel and the Occupied Territories in order to establish and propagate a negative image of the Palestinian people.

The Change in the Social Relation Map

Many of al-'Eizariyah families, had strong social ties with families living within East Jerusalem, mainly by intermarriage. After the Wall, It became difficult for relatives to meet and support each other in times of celebration and commiseration. Mr. Izhiman is a Jerusalemite who settled in al-'Eizariyah, before the 1967 war with his immediate family. Accordingly they were issued with green West Bank IDs. Mr. Izhiman complained:

“Who would have ever imagined that there would come a time when we would be forbidden from entering our own capital city to join our family for funerals and weddings? My uncle passed away the other day, I couldn’t be there to pay him respect before the funeral; by the time I got a permit to pass through the checkpoint everything was over. The other day we received visitors, a father, a mother and a potential groom. They left immediately when we told them that we held West Bank ID cards. I cannot blame them, they are looking for a bride who can join their son and live with him in Jerusalem” (Izhiman, November 25, 2013).
Many studies expected that the population mobility along and across the Wall would lead to certain difficulties in the short run, and would change the demographic structure of the communities in the medium and long term (PCBS, 2004). Jamila who is a mother of a 32 year old son shared her story:

“I suggested a beautiful, educated relative to be the future bride for my son. He replied: I know her and I like her but she holds a blue ID and I hold a green one. I’ve seen how much my friends have suffered in such a situation. It is not only about the difficulties of visiting the family; it extends to the type of IDs their children will receive. This will split the family eventually and I don’t think it’s wise to go through this, we should instead be rational and think twice” (Jamila107, December 1st, 2013).

Indeed the pattern of marriage during the past ten years has changed. The exclusion from and inclusion in Jerusalem has resulted in a different social relationship map being drawn and the social structure has changed. People tend to marry someone who has been issued with the same ID to avoid the social difficulties they would face otherwise.

The Change in Political Opinions

The Wall raises the political awareness and frustration among the young generation. During the Martha family interview, the father found it important that his two young daughters who’s half Palestinian and half British were fully aware of the conflict to enforce their Palestinian national identity. The father also criticized those Palestinian workers who he had seen asking for a job from the Israelis during the construction of the Wall in his own yard. The Palestinians who managed to get a working permit are still working in the settlements and inside Israel. This has created an inter conflict between their national identity and their economic needs, in addition to the image that some of the Palestinians are seen as

107 Jamila is a mother of a 32 year old son,
collaborators\textsuperscript{108} with the Israelis especially if the work they do is involved in construction, either in the settlement or the Wall during the time it was under construction.

The young men, who believe in struggle against the occupation, keep on throwing stones and putting used tires on fire at the west entrance that was blocked by the Wall almost every day. The Israeli army retaliates by throwing gas bombs as a collective punishment. This particular area suffered a lot economically, most of the shops are closed and others complain from low frequency of customer’s visits. Mr. Ahmed Al-Khatib whose pharmacy is very close to the daily clashes area had another opinion:

“These masked young men are paid by Israel to keep this area unstable to justify the refusal of the settlers of Ma’ale Adummim demand to reopen this road for them as it is closer to Jerusalem from the bypass road Israel built for them, and they rise a case in front of the Israeli supreme court against the construction of the Wall” (Ahmad Khatib, December 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2013).

Others confirm this opinion and doubt their motive and believe that the Palestinian Authority works as an agent to Israel and instructed the demonstrators to carry on this daily act to serve the Israeli aims. The trust in the Palestinian Authority is at stake and dwindling, many think that the outbreak of the third Intifada, if it will happen, would be against both Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

5.3 THE IMPACT OF THE OSLO ACCORDS ON LOCAL DEVELOPMENT: THE DIFFUSION OF INFORMAL ECONOMY

The field work of this research was started in October of 2013 in the West Bank. It took a few days to start the interviewing work. However the observation and the scheduling of the

\textsuperscript{108} The term ‘collaborator’ usually used to those Palestinians who provide the Israeli intelligent with information and not for those who work in Israel.
interviews program started from the first day. Returning to the researcher’s home in al-
‘Eizariyah after two years of absence had its impact; the town had deteriorated visually and
environmentally over this period. The first thing I observed in al-‘Eizariyah was the high
residential density coupled with a general sense of chaos: rubbish and secondhand furniture,
old machinery and other eyesores on the sidewalks at the main entrance of the town,
unlicensed vehicles, traffic jams, unpaved side-streets and unorganized, poorly designed
and unfinnished high-rise buildings.

The high density was understandable because al-‘Eizariyah’s loss of land was systematic
since the Israeli Occupation in the year 1967. To illustrate the land of al-‘Eizariyah was some
1,135 hectares during the British Mandate period, when Israel annexed East Jerusalem in
1967, it also annexed some 43 hectares of al-‘Eizariyah land to expand Jerusalem’s
municipal borders (B’Tselem, 2009). In 1975 Israel expropriated appreciable part of al-
‘Eizariyah land to establish the settlement of Ma’ale Adummim. In 1982, tens of hectares
more, which lie in the area called E1109, were declared Israeli government property. As a
result, al-‘Eizariyah’s reserve land diminished greatly; consequently, a pattern of dense
collection emerged in the town, almost every plot available for construction is utilized for
tall buildings, and inside the town there is little open space left (Ibid).

In 1995, the Israeli Civil Administration approved a ‘special outline plan’ that “does not mark
building plots and does not allocate land for commerce and industry, for public gardens, for
cemeteryes, and so forth. The 2.2 percent of the land designated for public buildings is
miniscule. …The planning scheme sets a high residential density, running from 66 to 150
housing units per net hectare” (B’Tselem, 2009: 50).

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109 See map: Figure 7
The spatial concentrations of the population had negative effects, not only on the current situation but also upon the opportunities to improve the social conditions in the future (Ostendorf & De Vos (2001)).

According to the Oslo Accords (1993) the West Bank was divided into three criteria: Areas A, B and C. First, Areas A have a full civil and security control via the Palestinian Authority and these include eight Palestinian cities and their surrounding areas. Second, Areas B have Palestinian civil control and the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Security Control; this includes part of al-‘Eizariyah. And finally Areas C have full Israeli civil and security control which includes the entrance and the surrounding outskirts of al-‘Eizariyah. The ex-Mayor of al-‘Eizariyah, Mr. Isam Faroon explained:
“The eastern entrance of the town, close to Ma’ale Adummim settlement and also the surroundings of the town are in area C. We are forbidden to interfere in this area. There is no extra space for al-‘Eizariyah to expand to. Most of the town’s free space was already used and what remained was only 20 percent of what was rightly ours. Israel confiscated 80% of our land reserves for future growth. There is no possibility to expand laterally. The outskirts of al-‘Eizariyah were confiscated by the Israel to build the settlement of Ma’ale Adummim, and to construct the bypass roads and the Wall. The remaining land was designated as area C. The majority of the town are area B, which means an area without National Security Forces (Palestinian police), and this explains the chaos we are living in” (Isam Faroon, November 12, 2013).

This classification of A, B, C areas was supposed to be temporary. The initial proposal was that within 18 months, Areas C would be gradually transferred to Areas B, and Areas B to Areas A until all of the West Bank, except Israeli military locations and settlements, became Areas A with full Palestinian control of security and civilian affairs. The attorney-at-law from al-‘Eizariyah Mr. Ziad AbuZayyad who is also a former Palestinian Authority minister and a former member of the Palestinian Legislative Council further explained:

“All of this was disrupted by the end of 1999. Ehud Barak, the then Prime Minister, was against the gradual transfer and reclassification of land and suggested to postpone the final stage. In 2000, Ariel Sharon became the Prime Minister and it all fell apart. The status quo remained and Areas A, B and C remained, until the present. The Oslo Accords, however, fell far short of the promise of a Palestinian state”. (AbuZayyad, 5 November, 2013).

Therefore the implementation of the process was halted half-way, and the West Bank remains divided into three administrative divisions: Areas A, B, and C, all with different civic and security authorization (Jamal, 2009). The categorization of Areas A, B, and C were based on the Palestinian population density. All Palestinian cities with a high population density became Areas A and were given to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) with full...
civil and security control. It is in these areas that the Palestinian Police is based. After the redeployment of Israeli military forces and the transfer of responsibility to the Palestinian Police, it is the only Palestinian security that has the authority to systematically act against all expressions of violence and terror within these areas. This means that the Palestinian Authority is responsible for preventing violence and terror against Israel, as well as for the civil security of the Palestinians under its sovereignty. For Areas B, the towns where the Palestinian population density is less, there is a different interpretation of the term “joint Israeli-Palestinian security control”. For the Israelis, security means only the security of Israel, not the civil security of the Palestinians. That is why Israeli security forces only interfere in Areas B when there is a threat to their own security but indifferent when it comes to Palestinian civil security. When a burglary occurs in al-'Eizariyah, for example, the Israelis take no interest in it. However, Palestinian police based in the nearest Area A, cannot go straight to the crime scene without first getting permission from the Israelis via the Joint Security Coordination Office. This usually takes up to forty-eight hours to be convened, according to the Cairo Protocol\textsuperscript{110}, and of course this is utterly useless in the case of any emergencies. AbuZayyad further explained:

“Al-'Eizariyah, as Area B in its center and Area C in its east and western entrances and in its surroundings, has a very difficult situation when it comes to civil security. 25,000 of al-'Eizariyah's inhabitants are without the services of any National Security Forces (Palestinian police.)” (AbuZayyad, November 5, 2013).

On the objective level, it is common knowledge that the administrative authority Palestinians have over Areas B, without the presence of law and order, is irrelevant and useless. Al-

\textsuperscript{110}The agreement was signed in Cairo by Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat in Cairo on 9 February 1994. This agreement was in the form of two documents, one on general principles, and the other on border crossings.
‘Eizariyah became a perfect place for criminals, as Mr. Ahmad al-Khatib who’s the director of a medical center in al-‘Eizariyah indicated:

“Al-‘Eizariyah has become a suitable place for criminals and outlaws. There might be someone who is evading a jail sentence, or he or she has committed a crime somewhere else and has moved here to hide” (Ahmad al-Khatib, December 1st, 2013).

At the perception level, many interviewees expressed their concern regarding the absence of law and order but they connect illegal acts to the people who have moved to live in al-‘Eizariyah from other cities or villages of the West Bank. For example, one interviewee, Mr. Ahmad al-Mokahal, who is from the locals of the town and runs a workshop in the al-Mashroo area of al-‘Eizariyah, declared that the local council confronts him because he is not paying for his workshop consumption of water. His reply to the local council was “OK, I am not paying but at least my connection to the water system is legal”. Many of the shops in al-Mashroo were or are still connected to the water system without any formal permits. Mr. al-Mokahal further explained:

“Many of my neighboring shops steal water but the local council cannot force them to pay or punish them in any legal way as the local council is afraid to confront them, the owners of these shops are dangerous and have become like a mafia. The other day a man who is not from this town told me that I must start to pay him a monthly fee of 400 IS$111 (around 100 dollars) in exchange for security services that he will provide to my workshop. I refused and told him that I will leave the doors open and wait to see who dares to come close my workshop. When he knew that I am one of the locals he backed off. My neighbors were afraid of him and they are paying the khawa” (al-Mokahal$112, December 5, 2013).

$111 Israeli shekels
$112 Akhal is a partner of car wash and spare parts workshop in al-Mashroo at the end of the commercial street of al-‘Eizariyah
‘Khawa’, is the Arabic expression for protection money. People pay it to someone who offers the service to avoid the threatened violence, theft or destruction of their property. Being local means you belong to one of the town’s clan and you have ‘Ozwa’ which means high number of relatives who will be ready to protect you so no one can harm you and get away with it. As Robinson (2009) explains “Clans are a source of individual and family security. Outsiders will think twice before attacking a member of a clan, particularly a powerful hamula (extended family) knowing that revenge will be taken” (Robinson, 2009: 2).

As al-‘Eizariyah is considered to be Area B in the center and Aria C in the surroundings which means limited Palestinian Authority in Area B and none of Palestinian Authority in Area C. Under such system; tax evasion is possible and this attracted investments, and it is a suitable environment for informal economy to flourish. In al-‘Eizariyah one may find all forms of informal employment, that is employment without labor or social protection including both self-employment in small unregistered enterprises and wage employment in unprotected jobs (Chen, 2005). The profusion of the unlicensed vehicles is an example, they contribute to the environmental chaos of the town, Mr. Faroon, the ex-Mayor explained: “They are a major problem; on the one hand they give a cheap internal means of transport to the residents of al-‘Eizariyah in the absence of a public transportation system. On the other hand, the vehicles themselves are in unacceptable condition”. These vehicles are ex-Israeli, with Israeli number plates, which were rejected as not suitable for driving within Israel. The owners, rather than send them to the scrap yard, sell them on to Palestinians. They are attractive because they cost 70 percent less than a licensed Palestinian number plated vehicles. They are not legal so they are only found in Areas B because of the absence of law because of the Palestinian police vacuum. The only place for such cars is the scrapyard. This is not the only example of informal economy in the town. The sales of scrap metal and recycled items located on the side of the road at the entrance of al-‘Eizariyah is another example. All this gives a poor first impression of the town and also contributes to the general feeling of chaotic disorder. Mr. Faroon continued: “Some people collect what they think is
useful from the Israeli rubbish dump\textsuperscript{113}, situated on the right when entering the town, and try to sell it on from the sidewalks along the entrance of the main road. This part of al-‘Eizariyah is in area C, where we have no control over and there is no control shown by Israel either”.

Another important issue that I researched in my study is concerning the general look of al-‘Eizariyah; the poorly designed and unfinished high-rise buildings. In this regard Mr. Faroon, the ex-Mayor explained: “we may say that the economic development started in an environment of chaos since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. The structural plan that was adopted by al-‘Eizariyah local council was virtually done with computer technology; fake streets, fake public places, and fake services that were unworkable and unrealistic.” Therefore, there were enormous violations of the structural plan for new buildings and the punishing of developers were, and still are, not applicable. Following the construction of the Wall, local people could no longer hold their weddings in Jerusalem, therefore wedding halls started to be built in the town. However there are now 18 wedding halls in al-‘Eizariyah none of which have their own car parks. This results in double parking and parking on the sidewalks whenever there is a wedding celebration. What should be a happy occasion often nurtures disharmony because other residents resent the traffic jams the poor parking causes, or they are unable to retrieve their own cars because of being trapped by the cars parked illegally. Mr. Zakariyya M. Abu-Rish; the son of al-‘Eizariyah’s ex-Mayor and one of the regional notables noted: “We have no land left, we can expand only laterally. Even this is not a good solution without proper infrastructure. We have no sewers. There is a cesspit beneath every house here in al-‘Eizariyah, we are living over a sea of shit.” Abu-Rish\textsuperscript{114} said with bitterness. Al-‘Eizariyah’s reserves of land were dramatically reduced because a lot of it being included within the jurisdiction area of the Ma‘ale Adummim

\textsuperscript{113} The nearby rubbish dump was part of al-‘Eizariyah and Abu-Dis land. Some 44 hectares that was confiscated and has been used as a refuse dump for various Israeli waste plus contaminants starting from the early 1980s (B’Tselem, 2009).

\textsuperscript{114}Zakariyya M. Abu-Rish: The son of al-‘Eizariyah’s ex-mayor the late Mahmoud K. Aburish, and one of the regional notables.
settlement (Ibid). “We are suffering from severe traffic jam[s] every day at the eastern entrance, which is the only entrance for vehicles we have left. The entrance is in Area C and the right of priority at the junction was given to the few settlers of Kedar\textsuperscript{115}, thus causing long tailbacks in al-‘Eizariyah’s commercial street.” Abu-Rish further explained: “This created economic hardship, the Jerusalemites stopped coming to shop from al-‘Eizariyah because of these traffic jams. In addition their cars may face inspection at al-Za’ayyem checkpoint, therefore adding time to the whole task”. The Jerusalemite, who shops from al-‘Eizariyah, might be subjected to car inspections at this checkpoint. A fine has to be paid if it is found they are transporting large quantities of goods. The prices in East Jerusalem are much higher than in al-‘Eizariyah which used to encourage many Jerusalemites to shop from the town.

This categorization of the town since the implementation of the Oslo accords twenty years ago transformed the town to what it became today. The `neighborhood effect' which implies that there are some behavioral, attitudinal, or psychological features of neighborhoods that affect its residents (Friedrichs et al, 2003) is clear to observers. Mr. Khalil M. Abu-Rish; the ex-member of al-‘Eizariyah local council explained the change in behaviors and attitudes:

“The new generation has less of a sense of belonging; they don’t even care about throwing litter on the street, or about driving too fast and hitting an electricity pole. I call them the ‘generation of the Intifada\textsuperscript{116}; most of them were jailed by Israel and therefore did not finish school. They are confused and always ready to create social problems. The spread of drugs became a new phenomenon. Israeli security forces will get involved only if drugs are being sold to an Israeli, otherwise they do not” (Khalil M. Abu-Rish, October 20, 2013).

\textsuperscript{115} Kedar is an Israeli settlement, was established in 1984 with around 153 families.

\textsuperscript{116} He means the Second Intifada in 2000
Notably, all Jerusalem suburbs were classified as Area B which produces social effect such as displacement, impoverishment and social fragmentation. Many of the interviewees expressed their belief that this classification was deliberate to serve the Israeli scheme which is to influence the destiny of these areas and transform them to what they are today, desperate, degrading, and damaged especially after isolating them from East Jerusalem by the Wall.

5.4 THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF AL-‘EIZARIAYAH

Traditional sociological and anthropological cross-cultural studies have emphasized that the concept of family in Mediterranean societies is founded on two main axes: joint possession and dependence. The family is perceived as the cornerstone of life of its individuals with different roles for each of them like father, mother, child, and spouse. These members are linked together by a strong bond and mutual respect of the value of family culture (Davies, 1977; Smith, 1981). In this traditional society, the individual is inscribed within the family and the community (Laudani, et al, 2014). Family in the Palestinian society indicates a diffuse network of relationships, obligations, and loyalties (Ibid). The Palestinian society is characterized by three types of clan-like familial structures: tribes, clans, and notable families (Robinson, 2009). The first refer to progenies of nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouin populations; they are few who are currently still semi-nomadic. The last refer to clan-like grouping in the urban elite notable family while the clan structure type is the dominant one in Palestine (Ibid). A clan usually consists of at least several extended families claiming a shared ancestry, and linked through the father’s male line. The three types share similar extended familial attributes, behavioral obligations (especially on males), informal networks, and honor-shame cultural systems (Ibid). For al-‘Eizariyah, the social structure is similar to all Palestinians villages of the West Bank under Ottoman, British and Jordanian rule, that is the clan structure in which the traditional extended family leaders had dominated village life and
had the power to solve inter-village and inter-family rivalries and disputes (Peretz, 1977).

Before 1948, the residents of al-‘Eizariyah were homogeneous; around 7000 inhabitants were purely from the village. The head of the village; al-Mukhtar or Sheikh who also represented the village in front of neighboring villages and considered to be the government’s main contact point responsible for the law and order. With his respectful power, al-Mokhtar practiced sovereignty over the village clans’ heads, which then had the same authority over all their own clan members. In the seventies, this system changed, ostensibly at the beginning, by local council’s elections and al-Mukhtar position was replaced by an elected Mayor. After the 1948 war, a wave of refugees came from different Palestinian villages of historical Palestine to settle down in al-‘Eizariyah. Therefore the populations of al-‘Eizariyah are divided into two main categories; the locals, who are originally from the town itself, and those who came to settle down in deferent periods of time and for different motive, the ‘strangers’ as the locals call them. Mr. AbuZayyad and other key interviewees explained the flow of people: Between 1952 and 1954 the Anglican Church adopted a project that aimed to resettle refugees who were expelled from the three villages of Suba, Durban, and Qastal, in the south west of Jerusalem. The church bought the land from the locals, cheap and far from the center, and built houses for those refugees. This area was named “Al Mashroo” which literally means “The Project”. Despite the fact that these refugees lived far from the center of al-Eizariyah, with time, they managed to integrate to a certain limit with each other and the locals, either through marriage, or as colleagues at work, or classmates at school.

During the war of 1967 some of the same displaced people and a number of the locals of al-‘Eizariyah left for Jordan out of fear for their lives. Many of those who fled to Jordan did so because they remembered the trauma of the 1948 war. After the 1967 Six Day War and the occupation of East Jerusalem, a new wave of refugees were displaced in the village after Israel demolished the neighborhood of Waqf Abu Madyan in East Jerusalem which was
adjacent to the Wailing Wall.\textsuperscript{117} The residents were evacuated and transferred to al-
‘Eizariyah, and were settled in the empty houses of those who had fled to Jordan\textsuperscript{118}. The
people of Abu Madyan were originally from the city of Hebron, so later many of their relatives
came and settled in al-‘Eizariyah too. A few years later, many of the locals of al-‘Eizariyah
again left, this time to work in Jordan, the Arabian Gulf, and the United States of America.
In the late 1980s, the overall number of al-‘Eizariyah inhabitant was 15-16,000. It was at this
point that many Jerusalemites moved to live in al-‘Eizariyah, in order to escape the housing
crisis in Jerusalem. It cost much less to buy land and build a house there than in Jerusalem.
However, these Jerusalemites continued to spend the whole of their working day in
Jerusalem and returned to their houses in al-‘Eizariyah only to sleep. This meant that they
did not actually integrate with the locals; therefore this group suffered the most from the
separation Wall as it disrupted their daily routine. Other Palestinians, from various parts of
the West Bank, especially from the villages near to Hebron, moved to live in al-‘Eizariyah
because it was the closest point where they could enter Israel. This was during the period of
the implementation of the Israeli closure policy and the restrictions on movement. In addition
to those who moved to establish businesses in the hopeful atmosphere of the Oslo Accords
in 1993. This phase continued until the construction of the Wall, which started in 2002-2003.
The rumors that al-‘Eizariyah would be annexed to Jerusalem and that its residents might
get an Israeli blue identity card, thereby gaining benefits, encouraged other Palestinians to
settle in the town. “These new migrants were generally unskilled, uneducated, and
considered to be citizens of lower class. The locals and other integrated groups of people
began to feel like strangers as drugs, and disputes over land, and other social problems

\textsuperscript{117}The Western Wall, Wailing Wall or Kotel, located in the Old City of Jerusalem at the foot of the western
side of the Temple Mount., It is arguably the most sacred site recognized by the Jewish faith outside of the
Temple Mount itself.

\textsuperscript{118}By using the Absentees' property' laws that were designed to establish Israel's legal control over lands
and properties. This body of law focused on formulating a legal definition for the people (mostly Arabs)
who had left or been forced to flee from these lands.
started to spread in al-‘Eizariyah” (AbuZayyad, 5th November, 2013). The estimated population, at the time was between 25,000 and 27,000 inhabitants.

Mr. Khalil Abu-Rish, the son of the head of the village (Sheikh) of al-‘Eizariyah explained how the village structure had changed since his father: “now it is difficult to control and discipline the people, we used to know everyone, now the town is full of strangers”. The late notable Mahmoud K. Abu-Rish was the most influential person in al-‘Eizariyah which was inherited from his late father. He was the head of the committee before it was transformed into a local council in the 1960s; he became the first local council president, he gained the trust of the village population including the refugees and other inhabitants; in 1977 he won the local elections. His son Khalil further explained:

“He had power over every member of the village; they trusted him, listened to him and accepted his advice and judgments when it came to solving disputes inside the town, or with other villages. His main responsibilities were providing services such as roads, water and electricity. He used to help the poor who couldn’t afford to pay their water or electricity bills by ‘forcing’ rich people to pay them instead, preventing the poor from being disconnected from these crucial services. From the young to the old used to obey him. These days even the son doesn’t listen to his father”. (Khalil M. Abu-Rish, October 20, 2013).

The late Abu-Rish used to have a good relation with the government during both the Jordanian and the Israeli rule. He passed away before the first Intifada in 1988, which since then, social structure and relationships have witnessed a notable change; Allegra (2010) pointed out that “the first Intifada had put an end to that system of informal mediation that had developed in Occupied Territories between the Israeli administration and the Palestinian notables” (Allegra, 2010: 17). The first Intifada has created a new form of Palestinian leadership; Al-Shabab (Young Men) became the new social reference point instead of the head of the clan or the head of the extended family in the Palestinian Occupied Territories (AbuZayyad, November 1, 2013).
The urbanization of al-‘Eizariyah village cobbled with the increase of its population and the new leadership of the first Intifada reduced the role of the traditional clan leaders and the al-Mukhtar (later the Mayor), as the son of the late Abu-Rish, who was a member of the local council four years ago further explained:

“al-Mukhtar or ‘al-Sheikh’ in the past used to be available twenty four hours a day, seven days a week, in contrast of the Mayor who now is a government employee with limited responsibilities; his daily job ends with his working hours and he is not willing to carry the population’s worries and concerns back home with him. The system has changed. The people who came from outside to live in al-‘Eizariyah considered to be almost fifty percent of the population now. The formula changed as well as the society equilibrium which has certainly changed too” (Khalil M. Abu-Rish, October 20, 2013).

Although it seems that there is no discrimination between the main two groups (locals-strangers) when it comes to the local council services. However, on the social level the society has become polarized; one pole is the locals and the second is the others who the locals refer to them as the ‘strangers’. The populations who originally came from Hebron (al Khalayla) and now live in al-Mashroo area, for example, only interact within their own community and do not interact with the locals (natives). For them al-‘Eizariyah is only a residential location, not a place to belong the same for the Jerusalemites.

5.5 THE STRUCTURAL MACRO-SOCIAL FORCES THAT INFLUENCE SOCIAL CAPITAL IN AL-‘EIZARIYAH

Patulny (2004) argues that although social capital is seen as shaped by individuals through their personal characteristics, the structural macro-social forces, such as, materialism, inequality, gender-family dynamics, and cultural clashes, which are embedded within material reality, also shape social capital. Therefore, the research investigation focused on
understanding the different structured social forces that shape al-‘Eizariyah social capital in particular and the Palestinians in general.

5.5.1 SOCIAL FRAGMENTATION

Al-‘Eizariyah social fragmentation is a result of various political, socio-economic and cultural factors; as explained before, the Palestinian society have a clan-like familial structures, meaning that each member of the community can be traced to one of the community clans. Therefore, anyone who is not from the locals is clearly recognized and labeled as a stranger. Many of old men and women still use the word ‘stranger’ to refer to their daughter’s groom if he is from another Palestinian town, and sometimes if he is from a different clan of the same town. However, the Palestinian society also has a degree of sensibility regarding displacement because of the 1948 Exodus (al-Nakba119). Some 380,000 fled to the West Bank, and were consisting of two categories, namely those who were displaced in refugee camps established by the United Nations (some 100,000) and the rest who settled down in the West Bank cities and villages (Bisharat, 1997). Both categories were labeled by the locals as ‘strangers’. This label is applicable not only to the refugees themselves as first generation, but also to their second and third generations all of whom were born in the West Bank.

In the case study, the term ‘stranger’ embraces everyone who is not local (native) of al-‘Eizariyah. Although the refugees of the 1948 war integrated with the locals, either via marriage or work, and some of them occupy important jobs such as teachers or members of the local council, they still express deep feelings of bitterness and a huge sense of discrimination. Soguk (1999) pointed out that there are many refugee figures whose meanings and identities are negotiated in processes of displacement in time and place, Moghissi et al (2009: 169) noted that “separation from one’s homeland … inevitably involves

119 Al-Nakba is the Arabic word for catastrophe
continuous emotional vulnerability, distrust of others and clinging to a hope or a dream of the impermanency of the situation. This tortured existence seems to be embedded in any involuntary separation from one’s homeland”. Mr. Nabeel Adwan; the refugee who is the headmaster of the boys high school and a member of al-‘Eizariyah local council was born in the town but his father was displaced in after the 1948 war, shared his feelings;

“I did not feel any discrimination against me when I was a student in the boy’s school until the ninth grade. However this changed when, with my friends, I joined one of al-‘Eizariyah’s social associations. When we were trying to elect a president I felt discriminated against by those who I considered to be my best friends. Till now, I feel there is discrimination against me as a school master and as a member of the al-‘Eizariyah local council. You are considered a refugee even if you were born here, and if you forget they will remind you. We also feel that our presence in al-‘Eizariyah is temporary and we should return to our home town of al-Qastal. My father worked hard to buy a small piece of land here and we built a house, but we as a family still feel as ‘strangers’ even after three generations. A year ago, I organized a summer camp, the students were from al-Mashroo, and we asked the local council to provide the camp with water and some cold drinks. The proposal was presented to the local council committee, they did not approve it. I think it got refused because the director and the students were not considered “locals” of al-‘Eizariyah”. (Mr. Nabeil Adwan, November 24, 2013).

After further investigations and while it seems that there is no discrimination on the official level, some of the interviewees accused the local council of discrimination when it comes to services. The justification was that al-‘Eizariyah’s population is as large as the population of the city of Jericho, but the local council of al-‘Eizariyah has only 50 employees, while the council of the city of Jericho has 350 employees. Their budget from the Palestinian Authority is also much bigger. Mr. Isam Faroon, the ex-Mayor explained: “Al-‘Eizariyah has one of the longest commercial streets in the West Bank; four km long. It is in need of good services. To do so we need at least to double the current budget and double the number of the council employees”. With this logic we may say that scarcity of resources explains why some
neighborhoods are not well served. On the other hand, a member of the local council who prefer to remain anonymous said; “Seventy percent of the local council members are from the locals, the refugees and other groups are not equally represented. Al-Mashroo area represents two thirds of the town population while the center represents only one third, but the services go to the center because voters usually are from the locals, who live in the center”. This interview on one hand revealed that there is discrimination also on the official level and that the exclusion against other groups is not only social but also in service distribution. On the other hand it revealed that the other groups (strangers) who live in al-Mashroo boycott the local council elections out of carelessness, therefore services are distributed among the locals who elected the local council members as a matter of gratitude.

5.5.2 BARRIERS TO COLLECTIVE ACTION

Coleman (1998) presented the concept of social capital as a resource for action; and he pointed out the social action is governed by social norms rules, and obligations. This means that social action could be shaped, constrained, and redirected by the social context (Coleman, 1998). The social structure that was illustrated in the previous section of this chapter shows that social action and relationships are governed by certain cultural and traditional constraints. Therefore social capital arises in certain limited forms because of the barriers that prevent collective social action to reach the ultimate desirable goal of social capital, which is to enhance local development and solve community problems. These Barriers are:

1- The Local-Stranger Relationship

Discrimination was the major feeling of all the refugees that were interviewed or observed, even when the question was discussed with the local interviewees, their answers were always that they respect and do not discriminate against the refugees who has been living
with them since 1948 but they used the term 'strangers' when they refer to them. This shows
that the local-stranger relationship is deeply rooted in the social structure of al-'Eizariyah
and considered to be one of the barriers to collective action. As such it prevents cooperation
among actors to solve the community problems. It especially becomes clear when it
important decisions such as marriage and business partnership have to be taken, and the
tendency is mainly to choose the partner from the same group. Although the term 'stranger'
covers all displaced groups in al-'Eizariyah, it has different interpretations based on the type
of each group and when and why they were displaced in the town.

It is well known that the Arabs in general and the Palestinian in particular are warm and
welcoming towards other people. In fact, the locals of al-'Eizariyah are generally warm and
they show good manners towards their neighbors, whether they are locals or they came to
settle down in the town for different reasons. However, the term “strangers” has a territorial
significance; as the Palestinian is generally defined by his family-clan name and the place of
origin, therefore, there are different types of “strangers” in al-'Eizariyah categorized
according to when and why they were deported from their place of origin or if the
displacement was by free choice. Narrowly, these factors determine the locals' attitudes and
behavior towards them. As mentioned earlier, till the year 1948, the residents of al-'Eizariyah
were only from the locals, first group to join them were the refugees of 1948 War. Other
waves joined in different times and different motivations. Yet, they are all labeled by the term
‘strangers but this term has different interpretations:

The Refugees of 1948

The Palestinians of the historic Palestine became refugees in the surrounding Arab countries
and also in the West Bank and Gaza strip after the creation of the State of Israel that led to
the 1948 war. Being a refugee in another country had its own implications; but the term
‘stranger’ that refer to a refugee in the West Bank and Gaza had a taste of bitterness, Abu
Safwan, a refugee from the town of al-'Abbasiyyah, Jaffa sub-district whom and his family fled to the Ramallah district then to al-'Eizariyah expressed his feelings:

“In the al-'Abbasiyyah / Jaffa sub-district (before 1948) we used to have an elementary and a secondary school, while al-'Eizariyah had a primitive school system called “al-kuttab". We were friends with the late notable, Mahmoud Abu-Rish of al-Eizariyah at that time, and we used to exchange visits. During the 1948 war my family, along with many others from al-'Abbasiyyah, fled to the district of Ramallah, and we rented a house there. Mahmoud Abu-Rish searched for us and insisted that he’d host us in one of his houses in al-'Eizariyah. We accepted his invitation and later we bought a piece of land in the best area of al-'Eizariyah. Ten years later, I married his daughter and I became the respected, well-known English language teacher in al-‘Eizariyah boys’ school. However, when I was promoted to the position of headmaster, there were voices amongst the locals that the headmaster of al-'Eizariyah boys’ high school should be one of them not a ‘stranger’. We are all Palestinians, we were displaced from the north to the center, we were lucky not to live in a refugee camp while our cousins did, and after all these years we are still strangers in the eyes of the locals of al-'Eizariyah" (Abu Safwan120, April 13, 2003).

Habashi (2008) points out that “recollection of such events is evidence of the impact of the events of the year 1948 on the collective consciousness and the contemporary political situation” (Habashi, 2008: 15). The Palestinian refugees’ feelings of displacement are close to the emotions felt by Italian migrants121 and their term ‘spaesato’ which was translated by Vanni (2013) as ‘without a village, without a country’. The term “encompasses further meanings of having lost familiar relations to things and places, being in an unfamiliar environment, being or feeling lost, having lost one’s bearings, being displaced, being

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120 This interview with the late Abu Safwan was recorded by the author for “Diaspora by Design: Muslims in Canada and Beyond” research ‘book’ by Haideh Moghissi, Saeed Rahnema, Mark J. Goodman (2009). University of Toronto Press

121 The Italian Diaspora in Australia In the postwar years,
confused, being out of place ... [The term] covers the concepts of home, homeland, hometown, and denotes the fundamental unit of belonging" (Vanni, 2013:2). The territorial emphasis is well illustrated in the everyday language which gives “place of origin great importance” in grounding the refugees’ identity, which embodies their histories, memories and their slight differences in culture (Yiftachel, 2002). The word “ghourba” (dispersion, estrangement) or “ghareeb” (the person himself, which mean stranger) is very much rooted in the social structure. This word refers to every person who is not from the locals; even if this person is from the second or third generation and was born in the town. When it comes to the refugee “stranger” term represents a two-sided problem between the receiving community (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) and those from the sending community (Historic Palestine known now as Israel). The refugee’s lack of feeling of belonging to the receiving community is not only because the locals always express superiority over them, but also because the refugees themselves do not want to lose their rooted original identity. This feeling of pride is driven by the Palestinian nationalism in order to keep the Palestinian question alive; the new generations should not forget; the grandfather will transfer the feeling of “ghourba” to his son who will do the same with his children. This is applicable also to the displaced group of Waqf Abu Madyan which was demolished by Israel because it was adjacent to the Wailing Wall after the war of 1967.

Although the locals do not accept them, the refugees themselves do not accept the locals in order to keep their own Identity. Bisharat (1997: 205) pointed out that “naturalizing the link between a people and their ‘homeland’ ... implying the power and right to exclude the others”. In deed exclusion of the other is proved by their choices when it comes to marriage or business partnerships; they usually chose the bride in case of marriage and the partner in case of work from their own group. Although the refugees almost lost hope of a just political solution to their displacement, by the time the Palestinian question moved to the back of their minds, the everyday practices kept the feeling of being a stranger alive, and always in the front of their own minds. This had a great overall impact on the homogeneity of the
Palestinian society especially that ‘the refugees’ communities constitute approximately 42 percent of the total population of the West Bank” (Bisharat, 1997: 206). The Palestinians in general give more importance or some kind of ‘power’ to the ‘territory’ someone are from. Alatout (2006) explains that “the territorial conception of power stems from the uniqueness of the Palestinian experience of occupation and dispossession, i.e., loss of territory in the war of 1948, the refugee status of the majority of Palestinians, the experience of occupation in 1967” (Alatout, 2006 : 604). Therefore, conflict over territory is not only between Israelis and Palestinians but also between different Palestinian groups in the Occupied Territories. Alatout (2006) further explains that “the dominance of the sovereign nation-state as the only internationally recognized form of political organization also plays an important role. Extra-territorial relations of power, those constructed and exercised along class and gender lines, residency status (refugee, rural, urban), and color (black and non-black), are sidelined in favor of a narrow territorial focus (Ibid).

The Jerusalemite

The above analysis is partially applicable to the Jerusalemite group, although they are considered by the locals as “strangers” too, because the superiority here is in favor of the Jerusalemite because of his/her social class. They are urbanized notable families from the city of Jerusalem who bought land and built their spacious houses in the best locations of the town to escape the housing crisis in Jerusalem. However they kept their interaction with the locals, the ‘Fellahin’ meaning ‘rural’, to the bare minimum. Yousef who is a refugee, his family fled from north Palestine to al-‘Eizariyah during the 1948 war expressed his feeling regarding the different attitudes the locals have for the Jerusalemite:

“Of course we feel different as refugees. We have been displaced and forced to settle here, while the Jerusalemites choose to come for better housing or other reasons. The locals look down on us while they respect them” (Yusef, November 30, 2013).

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122 Social conflict; city versus village
The Displaced Groups for Economic or Political Reasons

For the urbanized (al-khalayla) who are originally from the city of Hebron, this group came after the 1967 war and settled in the al Mashroo area of al-‘Eizariyah for economic reasons, this group expressed no sense of alienation and described the social sphere as positive. Ahmad the young merchant who settled in al-‘Eizariyah four years ago and the owner of an optician’s shop in al-‘Eizariyah, Abu Helweh expressed their opinions as follows:

“I do not feel like a stranger. All Palestinian cities and villages are my home. I just miss my family, my mother and my brothers and sisters. Al-‘Eizariyah is a central place between my wife’s family in Jerusalem and my own in Hebron” (Ahmad November 12, 2013).

“I did not feel like, a stranger although I am a refugee who was raised in the orphanage of al-‘Eizariyah. Every family in the town wanted to give me their name because I was good at school and I always behaved well. However I noticed that the locals appreciated me more after my optician’s shop became famous not only in al-‘Eizariyah but also in the surroundings communities” (Abu Helweh, November 14, 2013).

The locals call this category ‘strangers’ too but their social status depends on what type of occupation they practice. However, the group of relatively new migrants who are generally unskilled, uneducated, and considered to be of a lower class, the locals refer to them as strangers too. The jobs they practice for a living are mainly illegal, some are drug dealers, and others use unlicensed cars for internal transportation, or trade with items that have been collected from the Israeli refuse dump or other kinds of illegal jobs. Ali who is an unskilled worker; he created a job for himself as a parking guard for the cars of those who use al-Zaitoon checkpoint to go in to Jerusalem.
“I am using this piece of land in area C very close to the checkpoint, as a car park. I charge my customers only five IS (almost one Euro) with no time limit” (Ali, November 30, 2013).

The locals might use some of their services but without any kind of respect. They aren’t welcomed, neither by the locals nor by the other quasi-integrated groups.

2 - Traditions Politics and Competition in Relation to Collective Action

Traditionally the family is considered to be the basic unit of production, in fact; it is recognized as the center for economic and social interactions (Barakat, 1993; Sirhan, 1975). However, “when traditional societies are challenged by political and social change, family roles are often questioned, most notably among the upcoming generation … [who start] to question their authority and seek independence from the family, as a result of the Intifada” (Fronk et al, 1999: 705). The first Intifada created a new role for the young generation “Al Shabab”, which means the young men. “Al Shabab became the reference point of the society; the dominance of the family has been weakened and also disintegrating since then” (AbuZayyad, November 20, 2013). Politics also influence relationships; the locals had also been marked by inter-family rivalries depending on their members’ political affiliations. “You may find two brothers, each one belongs to a particular party, one is Hamas and the other is Fatah. A conflict might occur in the family and it’s difficult to solve it as there is no power in the hands of the head of the family, who, before the Intifada could have imposed a particular opinion” (Ibid). The hamula (clan) and leading notable families became second in the political structure after the creation of the Palestinian Authority; this is also made clear during

123 Ali is an unskilled worker, who created a job for himself as a guard for cars for those who use the al-Zaitoon checkpoint to go in to Jerusalem.

124 “The (Hamula العائلة الحمولة) consists of at least several extended families (a’ila العائلة) claiming a shared ancestry, and linked through the father’s male line. Each extended family will generally include male first and second cousins, the women they marry, and the children of that union. Female children who marry outside of the hamula (and their children) then belong to the other hamula. Their “in-laws”, will bind them to a new hamula” (Robinson, 2009: 2).
al-’Eizariyah local council elections over recent years. Those who won did not belong to the most notable families of the town.

The social fragmentation reaches to the neighboring localities also. There was always some kind of competition between al-’Eizariyah and its neighbors, especially with the town of Abu-Dis. Although al-’Eizariyah is well known for its historic and religious status, Abu-Dis has Al-Quds University built on its land, in addition to its contemporary political importance as, at least, two of its local members had and still have political powers as members of the Fatah Party. Those are Ahmed Qurei, the former Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, and Saeb Erekat, the chief negotiator for the peace talks with Israel. A small incident is enough to revive grudges among the two neighboring towns. The following statement reveals how the people reacted after some rumors that the name of al-’Eizariyah was being wiped from the map.

“I can't believe this Palestinian Authority (PA); they are wiping off the name Bethany al-’Eizariyah from the map, a historic, biblical town, and the fourth holiest town in Palestine. I've understood that Abu-Qrei’, a bloody member of the PA who suggested this change and merge the nearby town of Abu Dis with al Eizaryiah....shame on you PA, you are acting and behaving like a Zionist Occupier Israel” (Walid Khatib125, April 13, 2015)126.

This statement brought alive the concept of “asabiyah”, which Ibn Khaldun, the famous Arab sociologist describes, in his introduction (The Muqaddimah),127 as “the group to which an individual feels most closely attached is his clan or tribe, the people with whom he shares a common descent (Rosenthal & Dawood, 1969). According to Ibn Khaldun the term 'tribalism' or 'clanism' reflects the bond of cohesion, which exists at any level of civilization, but its

125 Walid Khatib is one of al-khatib family of al-’Eizaryiah who lives in Amman and he is active on the social media.

126 Sourced from Facebook personal page

127 The Muqaddimah, an introduction to history in three volumes, was published by Princeton University Press in 1969.
stronger in the nomadic era, and he further explained that the Arabs are the least docility to one another because of their competition over gaining power; only religion or state restraint could dominate their arrogance (Ibid). Indeed, the political party of Hamas is strong because of the fidelity of its members; it even gained the respect of ordinary Palestinians because exists under the umbrella of Islam. From another point of view, Salzman (2008) pointed out that “Arab culture addresses security through "balanced opposition" in, which everybody is a member of a nested set of kin groups, ranging from very small to very large. These groups are vested with responsibility for the defense of each member and responsible for harm any member does to outsiders ... deterrence lies in the balance between opponents. Any potential aggressor knows that his target is not solitary or meager but rather, at least in principle, a formidable formation much the same size as his” (Salzman, 2008: 23). This statement on Facebook and all the discussion that followed comes from the educated elite of al-Eizariyah. It reflects the imbedded nomadic norms which influence certain behaviors. The tribal structure enhances feelings of unity among the one tribe, and normalizes antagonism against outsiders (Ibid). The Palestinian people, in general, accept the occupier because of its military superiority but they do not accept the superiority of their peers. The locals of Abu-Dis are ‘strangers’ too in the eyes of the locals of al-Eizaryiah, and vice versa. This is clear in everyday language especially when it comes to marriage; they will refer to their daughter’s groom\(^{128}\) as a ‘stranger’ if he is from another Palestinian town.

3 - Gender Inequality from Education and Religion Perspective and other Variables

This gender inequality is present in the Palestinian society, on the education level, family invest in boy’s education more than girls:

“I was top of my class. I was sent to the local UNRWA school while my brother was sent to a private school; there he was able to study English and French from kindergarten until high

\(^{128}\) In the past they called the groom a "stranger' even if he is from the same town but from a different clan.
school. Meanwhile English only starts being taught in the fifth grade in UNRWA and government schools. I did not feel angry at this inequality as the general belief is that sons are a greater asset to the family. A good education will lead to better job opportunities for them and they can help the family financially, while daughters will get married and even if they work; their money will contribute to their husbands after marriage. My brother did not do well at school and my parents had to send him to another private school, but when he didn't achieve there either, he was sent to a government school; at the age of 13 he dropped out of school and went into work" (Rasha\textsuperscript{129}, November 29, 2013).

What is remarkable is that females were and still are more committed to education. They are more likely to progress on to university and furthermore, the margin of social freedom for them is limited to education and certain types of work, mainly in education and health sectors and other administrative work. The Palestinian male, in general, accepts that the females under his authority (daughters, sisters) will leave the home for study and work. He can see the benefits of education which generally lead to greater financial contributions on their part, to the family’s income, thereby helping to alleviate their financial burden. However the male keeps control over their social life. This includes inheritance rights and no freedom for relationships with males outside the marriage institution, under the pretext of maintaining the family honor\textsuperscript{130}. Most families in the Palestinian society violate women’s inheritance rights; according to the Islamic Shari’a law\textsuperscript{131} the female gets fifty percent less of the male’s share from her late parents’ inheritance. One of the justifications for this is that it is only the males who carry the financial obligations and responsibilities of the family (Welchman, 132).

\textsuperscript{129} Rasha is a mother of two who was married at the age of 18, without any consideration to her excellent educational attainment.

\textsuperscript{130} The situation in cities like Ramallah and Bethlehem is different as girls have more social freedom. This social freedom for females is less in rural areas; it depends on how far the village is from the city center and the geographical location of the city (the north and south of the West Bank are more conservative than the center).

\textsuperscript{131} The Islamic law “Shari’a” is based on the Ottoman Law of Family Rights of 1917and is part of the Palestinian legal system.
2003). Although Islamic law is not based on equal rights for both sexes, and the fact that most of the population is Muslim, they do not even follow the Islamic Shari'a law. A consolation amount of money (which is generally less than their right according to the Islamic Shari'a law) will be paid to the female instead. This is under the pretext of keeping the family fortune within the family, in case the female marries a man from another clan. Welchman (2003: 35) referred to Hammami (1993) who further explained that “the generalized social compromise that took place on this issue was that peasant women exchanged their rightful share of land inheritance for the guarantee of economic and social support from their brothers”. This logic (asking for bonding social capital instead of their right) is still embedded, even in the mind of many women. Mrs. Halima who is a mother to six girls and is a sister of wealthy brothers said: “I forgive my brothers, I do not want my share from my late father’s property, and I only ask them to keep the good relations with me and my family, such as visiting me and my married daughter in times of feasts to show their husbands that they have a big wealthy family” (Mrs. Halima, October 24, 2013). Women accepted this social norm and find a way out by other means such as education. Education is an access to a better, more independent socio-economic life; otherwise they will be traditionally married at an early age and moved from under the authority of her father/brother to the authority of her husband. It is common to see both cases in the society; those who finished their high school and continued into higher education and work, and those who were married around the age of seventeen and started a family young. The latter especially occurs in the rural-areas of Palestine. Many families’ condition for approving a marriage, the proposal to their relatively young daughter is that the bride should complete her higher education after the marriage. Mrs. Nahawand who is a refugee who married her relative and lives in al-'Eizariyah represented her case:

I come from a refugee family who were displaced in Ramallah area after the 1948 Palestinian Exodus (the Nakba). I was married to one of my father’s relatives (in al-'Eizariyah) right after I
finished high school. Although I am a mother of five children, I had insisted to finish my university education to get a bachelor and then a master’s degree. I work in university teaching and I am only thirty six years old. Although I have a successful and a happy marriage, sometimes I wonder why I didn’t finish my education first before getting married! My marriage is successful because I love my husband and I appreciate his strong bond with his family. His parent lost his eldest son, my husband was only sixteen then, he felt he should work hard to compensate the family’s great loss, he even exaggerated especially with his mother who compensates her loss and sadness by over spending, I believe his act is driven by his profound Islamic teaching; Islam order sons and daughters to seek their parents’ satisfaction. It is the road to heaven especially it is true about mothers like following Prophet Mohammad’s saying ‘heaven is under the feet of mothers’. At the end we all benefit out of his hard work, our three stores building gave the family as a whole a higher social status and compensate for our feelings as refugees. (Nahawand, November 25, 2013).

The interview above reveals the role of religion on social capital and social behavior, before the seventies the Palestinians in general were “Muslims by name” meaning that they did not fully practice Islam especially among the young. Some would only fast Ramadan and pray once a week. The older people most likely to practice Islam more; they pray more frequently, in general. The population of al-’Eizariyah were described as ‘More Open’. Shahid (1988) pointed out that the Middle East has witnessed an increase in Islamic fundamentalism during the seventies including the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although the discussion here is about Islam as a religion which influence social behavior and not Islamic Fundamentalism, but the general influence of the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism was that Islamic believes and practices among the Muslim population increased. The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was established in Jerusalem in 1946, but “It was only after 1976 that the Brotherhood began to re-emerge as was evident in its recruitment activity and increased membership. However, the “Brotherhood faced a formidable obstacle in the popular Palestinian nationalist and leftist support in the West Bank. Here the process of the secularization of Palestinian
society was apparent at every level, from pattern of consumption to leisure activities. … The increasing secular nature of society extended to the establishment of a mass-based national movement in the West Bank and the founding of a large number of ‘national institutions’ throughout the 1970 and 1980s including universities, hospitals, research centers, newspapers and magazines” (Milton-Edwards, 1999: 131). The West Bank intellectual trends reinforced additional secularization and were aware of the brotherhood’s intention for societal and political reforms. Although the rural areas and towns like Hebron remained traditionally conservative, politically and socially the impact of a more secular society was obvious (Ibid). However, the increase of the Brotherhood’s followers among Palestinians was substantially aided by the growth of the Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East region as a whole, particularly after the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979” (Shahid, 1988: 662). The table below presents the result of the survey\textsuperscript{132} conducted by Shadid & Seltzer (1988) that aim to measure change in the religious and social behavior in the West Bank and Gaza during the period from 1978 to 1984.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Islamic Practice</th>
<th>Percentage of all respondents 1978</th>
<th>Percentage of all respondents 1984</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pray five times a day</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read the Holy Koran daily</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fasting during the month of Ramadan</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading of religious literature daily</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 27: Islamic Observation in West Bank and Gaza. Source of information: (Shadid & Seltzer, 1988)

The trends continued to escalate during and after the first Intifada in which the offshoot of the Muslim Brothers movement (Hamas) was created. The 2006 elections, during which

\textsuperscript{132} The survey by the authors consisted of 3,306 interviews conducted between August 1983 and February 1984,
Hamas won the majority in the Palestinian Parliament, reflect not only the political affiliation of the Palestinians but also the religious and social behavior. The manifestations of religiosity are clear in al-'Eizariyah too, the increase in the number of vailed women, the frequency of people praying in the mosque, and the celebrations of religious feasts are notable. Many of the young people practice Islam not only because of their strong belief, but also for the higher social status and for the respect that religious people gain in the society. Social norms that were driven mainly from the Islamic teachings oblige sons to respect and be responsible of the welfare of their parents, and seek their satisfaction particularly that of their mother. Therefore the financial aid in so many cases exceeds the basic needs and is often spent on luxury. Reciprocity here is mutual as it leads to community respect and higher social status for both; the son and the parents. The economic practices influenced by Islamic teachings are closer to capitalism than communism; increase in domestic consumption is an indication of wealth and reflects the wellbeing as (God would like to see the reflection of his grace on his slave (follower)\textsuperscript{133}. Therefore exaggeration is notable especially in weddings, size of houses, and types of cars…etc. Although the Islamic teachings urge personal cleanliness inside and outside the house, the public places get less attention from the people. There are several ways to explain this lack of cleanliness in public space. One of the explanations is that this is the responsibility of the Local Council. Another one is the absence of law and order in area B. However, the prevalent view of the locals is that this is how the ‘strangers’ behave, they do not care. There are many examples to show the impact of Islamic teachings on the Palestinians behavior, but one of the most important is that it is used to release political tension and to accept the dramatic acts by the Israeli government such as killing young demonstrators or arresting them. Mothers in general and the society as a whole consider this, in addition to an act of resilience in the face of the Israeli Occupier, as God’s will who will compensate their pain and reward them by a good place in heaven after life.

\textsuperscript{133} An interpretation of prophet Mohammed saying (ان الله يحب ان يرى اثر نعمته على عبده)
This is the general reaction of helpless parents and family, while it might increase rage against the Israeli practices among the younger generation.

Ostrom (1998) in her study ‘A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action’ arrived at the conclusion that “Individuals achieve results that are “better than rational” by building conditions where reciprocity, reputation, and trust can help to overcome the strong temptations of short-run self-interest” (Ostrom, 1998: 1). The actor in al-‘Eizariyah, whether he is a man or a women, young or old, local or displaced, certainly has goals and might arrive at them via a motive of self-interest especially in the absence of the state, which would normally provide services and ensure care of its citizens when they reach old age, such as health insurance and pensions. However the dominant social norms led to social fragmentation and prevented the whole community from benefiting from the relatively strong bonding social capital within each social group in al-‘Eizariyah. Trust and reciprocity, for example, were strong within each group but weak enough among various groups to prevent coordination and cooperation for a better outcome for all. The problems that were observed are not only a reflection of the long term Israeli occupation over many years, nor the principles of the Oslo Accords which did not implement full Palestinian self-government over Areas B and Area C. They also reflect the lack of cooperation and coordination at community level. Strong social relations, which helped holding the population together in the past, now started to disintegrate for the reasons that some of them have been analyzed previously in this chapter.

5.6 THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ASSOCIATIONS IN SERVING AL-‘EIZARIYAH COMMUNITY

The presence of the modern form of civil society associations in al-‘Eizariyah is notable but their role has its own special case which needs to be understood. Jamal (2007) pointed out that the existence and effectiveness of civil associations usually used to evaluate the potential for democracy in the developing states across the ‘Third World’. Scholars argue
that “Civil societies help to hold states accountable, represent citizen interests, channel and mediate mass concerns, bolster an environment of pluralism and trust, and socialize members to the behavior required for successful democracies” (Jamal, 2007: 1). “But in states where government extends into all facets of civil society, as is characteristic of many non-democratic and state-centralized life; they promote specific agendas, fund certain programs, and monitor associational activities. Particularly in non-democratic polarized polities (with strong pro-regime and anti-regime cleavages) like those in Palestine and other Arab countries, ruling governments extend their influence by promoting associational agendas that directly serve their political mandate to the detriment of the general interests of the polity and basic democratic procedures” (Jamal, 2007: 3). Abdel-Raof al-Sinawi from al-‘Eizariyah, who teaches law at Al-Quds University and is also the director of the al-Montada Social Association explained:

“There are twenty two social associations in al-‘Eizariyah, they can be categorized according to the type of services they provide such as development, healthcare, education and charity, or according to the target group such as children, women, youth, disabled, and the elderly. Unfortunately, most of these associations’ community services are limited and ineffective; the beneficiaries are usually the directors and their relatives, volunteer work is almost disappearing. In my opinion, the conditional external funding contributed to this failure. These associations look for projects that will be accepted and financed by the international donors. Therefore, those projects serve the funders’ interests, not the societal needs; this reflected negatively on volunteer work. Before the split between Fatah and Hamas in 2007 there were social associations created by these and other political parties. They served the community as a whole; now each association serves only their own party followers” (Abdel-Raof al-Sinawi, November 28, 2013).

Indeed, (ARIJ) the Applied Research Institute (2012) pointed out that the community services programs are channeled and duplicated according to the international political
trends. The surplus of the civil society organizations (CSOs), along with generous international funding has created a complex environment and a growing dependency on foreign aid in addition to project duplication (ARIJ, 2012). Khalil M. Abu-Rish as one of al-‘Eizariyah notable shared his opinion regarding one of the most important associations of the town:

“The sports club of al-‘Eizariyah did not make any progress; they don't have sports activities, not even a football team although they have a headquarters, facilities and generous financial aid from one of the town's rich benefactors, in the USA. I think it is because they do not have good management. In general, the associations here serve individuals and not the whole community. Politics had a major role in the way they work; most of the al-‘Eizariyah associations are Fatah oriented. During the sport club elections, for example, they made sure that those who won were from the Fatah Party. Maybe two of them were good but the other five were not qualified to run the club, they were elected only because they are members of Fatah Party” (Khalil M. Abu-Rish, October 20, 2013).

Jamal (2007) pointed out that the “civic associations in the West Bank were polarized along two axes - associations with close ties to and favorable opinions of the government (the PNA) and associations that more or less opposed the PNA … Those associations with strong ties to the PNA [Fatah] derived more resources and benefits, security, prestige, legitimacy and credibility than associations without ties of similar strength.” (Jamal, 2007:21). Abdel-Raof al-Sinawi further explained:

“We of the ‘al-Montada المنتدى’ Forum, which was established in 2007. We studied the needs of the population; we found that education, health, social and culture aspects need more attention, especially with the young. We held meetings with the teachers from the schools, the parents’ committee, and people from the town and with students. We focused first on the al-‘Eizariyah boys’ high school, Al-Muscat, as it had low success rates for the annual national exams (Tawjihi توجيهي). It was 22 percent compared to the Girls’ High School which had been
achieving between 80-90% every year for decades. We observed a decline in the values of co-operation and reciprocation within the School. In addition there was a notable lack of in health and environmental awareness. In a few years, our efforts with Al-Muscat School paid off; their success rates rose from 22 to 80 percent” (Abdel-Raof al-Sinawi, November 28, 2013).

The 2001 study of Palestinian civil society organizations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, noted a decline in the proportion of “cultural, scientific and educational” associations (Hilal, 2009). Al-Montada المنتدى Forum of al-‘Eizariya worked intensively with the boys’ high school to enforce these three dimensions. One of the strategies was the initiative of Om Mahmoud, one of Al-Montada members:

“I agreed to join the al-Montada forum to serve al-‘Eizariyah community because I believed in the community service and I am not a member of any political party. I had an idea and I discussed it with my colleagues first then with the headmaster of the boys’ school who agreed in a private meeting with class twelve to motivate them to study and pursue their entrance into higher education. I simply told them my story, how I joined the university when I was thirty nine years old, and how education influenced the type of job I occupy now and how my income increased accordingly. The bottom line was “do not complain of the occupation, the Wall, the closure, our economic situation, or family problems; the first person responsible about your future is you”. Then we, as al-Montada, promised the students university scholarships for the most outstanding students; after that I had a meeting with their mothers to discuss different types of motivations to help their sons to concentrate and focus on their studies” (Om Mahmoud134, November 24, 2013).

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134 Om Mahmoud is a women who was married at the age eighteen, had three kids, lived abroad for twenty years then, with the support of her family, she divorced her husband and returned to al-‘Eizariyah, she worked for few years then she decided to pursue her higher education at the age of forty, she gain the respect of her community for her determination.
The efforts of al-Montada Forum harvested results as most of those student passed the annual national exams (Tawjihi) for that year. The role model and the strong linking social capital between the Forum and Fatah influential figures facilitated the scholarship issue for the top three graduates in the class. Abdel-Raof al-Sinawi continued regarding the volunteer work:

“Before the establishment of the PNA, back in the 1970s and 1980s there was a clear understanding of the volunteer work. That is the sum of activities that enhance social relations among individuals, families, and groups. The motive for volunteering comes from the feeling of belonging. Back then, the volunteer work within the popular committees offered services to all sectors; their goals were clear and they did not need finance. After the establishment of the PNA, all these popular committees needed government approval to be able to work. Those who got the approval became official associations with salaries and financial privileges for their directors and his deputies. These associations became politicized. This resulted in a reluctance of local people to put themselves forward for volunteer work; scouts activities, for example, became limited to political ceremonies which involved beating their drums while marching; this kind of activity only demonstrates power and disrupts traffic” (Abdel-Raof al-Sinawi, November 28, 2013).

Jamal (2007) in her book “Barriers to Democracy” pointed out Putnam’s formulation, “the density of horizontal voluntary associations among citizens (in contrast to the vertical associations under the dominion of the state) correlates with strong and effective local government” (Jamal, 2007: 4). The president of al-Muntada association noted that before the PNA, the voluntary associations in al-‘Eizariyah were horizontal and efficient (Abdel-Raof al-Sinawi, 28 November, 2013). Jamal pointed out that after 1994; the PNA was in charge of a social and political context where the rule of law needed to be implemented and “the judiciary and the executive branches of government were still highly integrated while a clear, coherent and accessible system of arbitration remained in its nascent stages” (Jamal, 2007: p. 23-24). The hierarchic system got consolidated during Arafat’s time in office and it favored...
a system of vertical linkages between associations and the PNA. Although associations were welcome to support statewide reforms, the same associations needed to be recognized by the PNA in order to work. In other words, the associations supporting the PNA receive better access to local resources, more security, prestige and legitimacy compared to non-supporting associations – no matter what (Jamal, 2007: p. 21). After the establishment of the PNA in 1993, vertical relationship were created by directly and indirectly taking control over these associations; they interfered with their strategies and in some cases changed the administrative director and staff if they faced some resistance or reticence to this control, as was the case with the ‘Lazarus Home for Girls’ which was established and run by Ms. Sahaar. She wanted to remain politically independent and struggled with the powers that be but was eventually accused of using the Association for her own benefit and she was replaced. Clare Roberts, a member of a solidarity group in Britain shared her observations and opinions:

I am a member of a solidarity group in Britain. The al-Eizariyah council put me in contact with many local associations all dealing with their separate areas of work. A couple of these associations stood out for me on that first visit, not only for the important work that they were doing within the community but for the obvious integrity and openness of their Directors. One of them was Ms. Sahar of the Lazarus Home for Girls, an orphanage not just for orphans but also for girls rejected by their families. She was clearly a fighter for her “girls” and unusual in that she spoke openly about the inadequacies within the PA. One of the issues she was struggling with concerned a family who had left their daughter with the orphanage for many years. The young woman didn’t want to get married to the man suggested by her family and appealed to Ms. Sahar for support. Ms. Sahar gave her this support and came into direct conflict with the family and eventually the PA. It was during this dispute that Ms. Sahar became very aware that highly negative rumors were circulating about her and her directorship of the orphanage. However she remained vocal but eventually she was forced to relinquish the directorship of the orphanage she had established, many years before (Clare Roberts, July 16, 2015).
Another example is the Alortozexie Orphanage known as ‘Madam Sik-Sik’ which was also financially independent but came under the supervision of the PNA. The workers then started to suffer a financial crises and a monthly delay of their salaries. One association which is the only one that deals with disabled children in al-‘Eizariyah is going to close down because of the sickness of its founder who himself used to transport the children from and to the association. He cannot afford to hire a driver. And he is not supported by either Hamas or Fatah while his strong relations with an international solidarity group cannot help him much in terms of financial support.

While discussing the inefficient role of civil associations in serving al-‘Eizariyah’s community with the key interviewees a shining exception of efficient social engagement would always be the voluntary work of the ‘Mothers’ Council’ of the Girl’s High School. The Council was the idea of the headmistress\textsuperscript{135} of eighteen years ago, before the establishment of the PNA. A group of notable women from the town, were internally elected, along with the president and became the ‘Mothers’ Council’. At the beginning, their mission was to help students from poor families, by providing school uniforms and other clothes. Their efforts gradually increased to building class rooms and providing computers. Finally their involvement included the annual graduation ceremony in which valuable prizes are distributed amongst the outstanding students, including university scholarships. Wajiha or as they call her ‘Om Safwan’ is the daughter of the late Mahmoud Abu-Rish and the Wife of al-‘Eizariyah boy’s high school late headmaster further explained:

“We have a good reputation in all the schools of the West Bank. We are successful because we believe in our mission. We are united and we trust each other and we trust the school’s administration. Our goal is to promote the education of our girls. Islamic teaching urges us to educate girls. We have been lucky in always having good headmistresses, responsible and with discipline. Our girls are committed to learning, unlike most of the boys who have other

\textsuperscript{135} The headmistress of the school is Suad al-Sinawi who’s from the locals of al-‘Eizariyah
interests such as politics, sports or bad habits, like smoking. In my opinion and in so many others, the headmaster of the boys’ school is not strict enough when it comes to student absence and dropout; the follow-up strategy, directly with the parents, is missing. The boys’ school, in the past, had a similar reputation as the girls’ school. During the first Intifada the then head master used his power to forbid participation in demonstrations during school hours. His principle was that education is the best weapon against the Occupation. He was right; the Intifada produced an ignorant generation who unfortunately rose to power after the creation of the PNA” (Wajiha Abu-Rish, December 1st, 2013).

Figure 28: The recognition of contribution gift to the head of the “Mothers Council” from the Officer of the Palestinian Ministry of Education and al-’Eizariyyah Local Council President in the 17th graduation ceremony of al-’Eizariyyah Girls School. Source: Al-Awail news agency, 2014.

The interviews in this section reflect that social capital, in the form of a cohesive network of clan, families, caring individuals and social associations who give support, through schools, to strengthen and serve the community of al-’Eizariyyah. Determination and trust were at the core of all successful efforts of social engagement.
5.6.1 THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL ASSOCIATIONS IN RAISING AWARENESS REGARDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WALL

Regarding the role of the civil associations in raising awareness among the population regarding the Wall, the director of al-Montada Forum explained:

“There were no effective roles for these associations in raising awareness regarding the Wall; they had the ISO\textsuperscript{136} acceptance of security, therefore, they would risk losing their funding from both the PNA and international bodies, if they organized or raised awareness against the Wall. The people of al-”Eizariyah did not have enough information about how the Wall would eventually impact their lives; Israel gave out limited information, piece-meal, and used the “divide and rule” methods while implementing and constructing the Wall. Each family, whose land was to be confiscated on the route of the Wall, or for the construction of by-pass roads, was contacted separately. Therefore the facts on the ground slowly changed and deteriorated without the community organizing a united opposition. Eventually, the people accepted the creeping status quo and did not rebel as it was thought to be too late. Now, after ten years, the consequences of the construction of the Wall affected the whole population; the rise in divorce rate is just an example” (Abdel-Raof al-Sinawi, November 28, 2013).

Indeed, and although divorce rates are escalating in societies nowadays as a trend but many thinks that in the Palestinian case it is attributed mostly to the imprisonment by the Wall; according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of statistics shows that divorce rate had risen from 0.9% in 2002 to 1.7% in 2014 in the West Bank and from 1.1% in 2002 in Jerusalem to 1.5% in 2014\textsuperscript{137}. However, there had been efforts of resistance to the Wall organized by individuals and organizations by where Israel had to change the route of the Wall. The al-Quds University in Abu-Dis for example, was aware that “the Wall would cut through the University splitting it in two and would result in the confiscation of a third of the University’s

\textsuperscript{136} The International Organization for Standardization

\textsuperscript{137} See \url{http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/VS-2014-07.htm}
The al-Quds University acted on two axes to prevent that; via the law and via popular, peaceful resistance. First, the University appointed an attorney to fight the case in the Israeli Supreme Court. Second, they set up a tent in the University grounds, exactly where the Wall was proposed to run cutting the campus into two halves. The University President relocated all the administrative meetings to this tent. Teachers shifted their lectures to the playground, supporters and popular musical bands came to join in the evening. These efforts paid back positively, and the Wall’s route was moved to run along the boundary of the University campus. In this act, The al-Quds University depended on Bourdieu’s notion of “potential resources” in his definition of social capital “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintances and recognition” (Bourdieu, 1986: 284). Meaning that The al-Quds University used the potential power of its community to protest for months against the route of the Wall, and eventually it achieved its goal. This was along with the attorney efforts in defending the case in the Israeli Supreme Court. Other cases of where the Wall was to run beside their domestic gardens used only the legal approach but managed also to change the route of the Wall away from their property. This changed very little in the destruction, dislocation and general theft of land, as the Wall was constructed in the end and if it was not on my land it was on my neighbor’s land. The argument here that if civil associations in al-‘Eizariyah, and elsewhere in the West Bank, had adopted al-Quds University’s strategy, and worked collectively against the construction of the Wall, with education and peaceful, direct resistance, the result would have been different.

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138 See Israel’s "Security Wall" to spilt Al-Quds University in two Date posted: September 03, 2003 By MIFTAH [http://www.miftah.org](http://www.miftah.org)

139 I witnessed this case personally and participated in the final ceremony that was organized to thank all who supported al-Quds University in its struggle against the Wall.
The political situation that led to the construction of the Wall and the Wall itself affected social capital at different levels; from family to the extended family level, the social organizations and civil associations as well.

1- Social Capital at the Family and Extended Family Levels

The life stories that were conducted for this research, bonding social capital is at the core of the story in confronting the hardships caused by the separation Wall. Strong bonds are not only between the members of the family who are living but also with those who have passed away. Important decisions such as the selling of a house or renting another somewhere else were influenced by the spirit of an intimate family member whether a father, mother, grandparent etc. The bonds with these “places” were mostly connected with the people who are living or who have lived there.

Family-related values, such as trust in family members and respecting the elderly, are still present and became stronger coupled with high sense of responsibility by parents towards their children, not only when it comes to health and education but in supporting them with wedding expenses and setting up a home. Zakariyya M. Abu-Rish, the son of al-‘Eizariyah’s ex-Mayor and one of the regional notables shared his experience:

“I worked hard to ensure my sons’ future. I have two daughters and four sons. I reorganized the house that I inherited from my late father. It is located on the main street. In the nineties, when our hopes were high regarding the promised economic boom in al-‘Eizariyah, following the Oslo Accords, I built a three store building in the front yard. There are stores on the first floor and four offices on the second and third floors. I rented them all out and this became my main source of income. The old two-store house was transformed into two apartments, one in which I live with my wife and children and the second for my son who married six years ago
and who now has two children. Having a big family was an asset in the past; boys grew up, worked and supported the family. Now it is a burden; you raise them, you pay for their education, their marriage expenses and provide them a home in which to live. At this point you may think that they’re off your hands, they’re married and have become independent, and then you discover that when they left you they were one person but now they return with their wives and children. Of course this is a great joy but it is also a financial burden. In such circumstances, the Israeli occupation, the closure and the Wall makes the family stick together (Zakariyya M. Abu-Rish, November 26, 2013).

The Arab cultures in general and the Palestinian culture in particular enforce their social capital by having more children especially males. This “preference for boys over girls was deep rooted because boys carried the family or tribal name, helped their fathers with their work and in their old age, and, importantly, were useful in fights with other families, which often developed into blood feuds” (Aburish, 1991: 22). “A man’s Tribal status was often judged by the number of men behind him, his azzwa [ozwa]” (Ibid). The more children one has the more ‘Ozwa’ he will enjoy. In the past it was normal for a family to have up to ten children, now the number is reduced, but still, it is considerably high in comparison with western culture. On the other hand the strong bonding social capital especially between the parents and their grown up children had a negative influence on their development as adults in terms of independence and maturity. In such times of crisis, the family has become a strategy of protection and solidarity between immediate family members has increased. Nevertheless, the situation is slightly different when it comes to the extended family. Ahmed al-Mukahal is a co-partner of a workshop for car wash and spare parts, he shared his experience:

“My workshop location is at the end of the commercial street of al-‘Eizariyah. In the past, most of my customers were from my immediate and extended family and from friends. They supported me according to our traditions and norms. Purchase from relatives is a priority, despite the distance. Now they think about the financial cost first. One liter of fuel costs 7 IS
(1.8 euro). They calculate the overall cost first and usually prefer to wash their cars somewhere closer to their homes. Family relations are not as strong as before, even relationships with friends have changed. The economic crisis has made everyone think of his/her own interest first. Our traditions and norms have changed; this Facebook thing that occupying the people minds and time is a disaster, no privacy any more. There are no basic services such as well asphalted roads but all kinds of luxury is available from the newest models of new cars to IPhones and IPads” (Ahmed al- Mukahal\textsuperscript{140}, December 5, 2013).

The economic situation influences relationships amongst the extended family; there are priorities when it comes to expenditures, the immediate family comes first especially that of luxuries became part of the necessities such as cars in the absence of good and cheap public transportation system. However solidarity is still strong between them when it comes to disputes. Robinson (2009) argues that Palestinian clans have flourished both under Israeli occupation and under conditions of PA breakdown because of the absence of a strong state that can reliably protect its citizens.

2- Social Capital at the Community Level

Edwards & Foley (1998) concluded that both civic society and social capital have proven useful heuristics for drawing attention to neglected relationships and aspects of social reality. Minkoff (1997) argued that “civil society organization plays a critical role in civil society and the production of social capital by providing an infrastructure for collective action”. Bridging social capital, in particular, builds trust and civic engagement, and facilitates collective action (MAS, 2007). The rise of many problems after the construction of the Wall directed the community towards other solutions in the absence of law and order and the irruption of the educational and health systems:

\textsuperscript{140} Ahmed al- Mukahal is a partner of car wash and spare parts workshop in al-Mashroo at the end of the commercial street of al-‘Ezariyah
a- Social Security

This rise of social problems because of the Walled imprisonment of most of al-‘Eizariyah residents, the social security vacuum and the absence of law and order, especially in areas B, the local community compensated by the reinforcement of traditional tribal justice. In September 1994 the Palestinian Authority considered the role of community leaders in parallel with the force of law to solve societal problems. Therefore, the PA reconstituted “management of tribal affairs” to support the rule of law and the establishment of social peace\textsuperscript{141}. Zakariyya M. Abu-Rish who is one of the regional notables explained:

“I am a member of the al-‘Eizariyah Reconciliation Commission. We are trusted by the people. Our mission is parallel and bilateral with the official court system; the people are familiar with the tribal justice to solve disputes. It is efficient especially in Areas B where the Palestinian Authority is forbidden to act. If two people are arrested by the police, we have the authority to release them, without bail, by stamping the tribal reconciliation document صك صلح عشائري, عطوة عشائري (authorized by the Reconciliation Committee. This then binds the two heads of clan with the Commission's decision. This takes a lot of effort, to have a full-time presence and an ever-readiness to solve disputes. This system is efficient and binding to all clan members; now one foolish act by a young member of one of the clans might destroy the agreement” (Zakariyya M. Abu-Rish, November 26, 2013).

Robinson (2009) pointed out that “the formal cement that ties together clan members is mithaq al-sharaf or code of honor, which is binding to all male members. They pledge not only their loyalty to each other, but agree that an attack (physical or honor based) on one member constitutes an attack on all members of the hamula [the extended family]. Given that the Palestinian society shares the honor-shame social system common to Mediterranean countries, individual members cannot easily violate this code without

\textsuperscript{141} See www.wafainfo.ps (Tribal justice in Palestine)
dishonoring themselves and their families. It is powerful social glue, especially in the absence of a functioning state that can provide public security” (Robinson, 2009: 3).

The negative side of solidarity between clan members can erupt sometimes in violent arguments. Members of the extended family might engage in a fight, supporting one or more of their relatives, while they have no idea what the fight is all about. “The idea here is; fight first, understand later” (Khalil M. Abu-Rish, 20 October, 2013). The popular saying “My brother and I against my cousin, and my cousin and I against a stranger’ is still dominant, particularly amongst adolescents” Mr. Abu-Rish continued. This tribal attitude, which could be considered as negative social capital, creates large social problems and reflects the failure of the Reconciliation Commission, in some cases. Mr. Zakariyya M. Abu-Rish continued:

“We, as the Reconciliation Commission, prefer that our role is limited to functioning at only a minimal level, and to have instead a full Palestinian police force as it is in Areas A. In al-‘Eizariyah, which is considered Area B, we only have ten police officers who have neither weapons nor uniforms. According to the Oslo Accords the police are not armed, but the population is! The spread of weapons is a new phenomenon, gunshot became familiar in family disputes; we used to have lawlessness, but now we have organized crime, the arms trade, drugs, money laundering, and prostitution. The outlaws of other Palestinian cities come to hide in al-‘Eizariyah, and the security of its civilians is going from bad to worse. The Commission still has the majority of the population’s respect however there are exceptions and these may well increase in the future and sabotage its fragile existence” (Zakariyya M. Abu-Rish, November 26, 2013).

The absence of low and order developed some forms of negative social capital which can be seen in the formation of new social networks that deals with the arms trade, drugs, money laundering, and prostitution. These networks cooperate with each other and with their source inside the Wall and also outside. Drug dealers of East Jerusalem distribute drug through
their agents in Area B, these operations happen before the eyes of the Israelis but they interfere only if the customer is an Israeli. One of the Israeli policies is to subvert the minds of young Palestinians and to create such social problems in order to weaken the Palestinian communities. Since Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip it plunges the OPT with drugs. The journalist Sawsan Ramahi wrote on the Middle East Monitor on the third of January 2011:

Prior to 1967, the number of people known to use drugs was listed in dozens; at that time, the West Bank was under Jordanian control and statistics available from the Global Report on Drugs showed no narcotics production or trafficking. ...The situation changed after the Six Day War and the start of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Occupied Territories became fertile ground for smuggling and use of all types of illegal substance. ... The occupation authorities appear to condone the drug-smuggling networks in East Jerusalem where no serious attempts have been made to raid dealers’ and addicts’ "nests", even though some are well-known and only 50 meters or so from police stations or other Israeli occupation institutions… There is a feeling locally that the police know very well what is happening but is "comfortable" with the situation as long as the victims are the Palestinians. It has been observed that a known drug dealer is left free to peddle his poisonous wares in East Jerusalem, but as soon as he tries to do the same in Israeli West Jerusalem he is picked up by anti-drug units of the local police" (Sawsan Ramahi, January 3, 2011).

b- Education

Many of al-‘Eizariyah students who were attending schools in East Jerusalem and who were over 16 years old were denied entry into East Jerusalem. However those who were under this age could still pass through the check point by showing their birth certificates but the journey to and from school was both time-consuming and humiliating as the experience of going through the check point is a demeaning one. Because of this, many families took the

142See https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-east/1907-the-scurge-of-drugs-in-jerusalem
decision to change schools for their young children and enroll them at al-‘Eizariyah schools. This has created a problem for the Palestinian Ministry of Education as they had to provide the schools with extra space (classes), teachers, and facilities following the increase in demand. At the beginning they increased the student numbers of each class, then they managed to convert some activity spaces into class rooms and later they built extra classes or new schools to absorb the increasing number of students in all grades. This direct effect is applicable for both sexes. The Wall also had an indirect effect on education as well, Mrs. Wajiha Abu-Rish; the head of the ‘Mothers’ Council’ of al-‘Eizariyah Girl’s High School further explained:

“The construction of the Wall did not only affect the girls (students) directly, but also indirectly; it affected their parent’s economic status, especially those who used to work in hotels and lost their jobs in Jerusalem. The number of poor girls escalated after the Wall. Local fund raising has fallen too. Before the Wall, if I asked a young man for a donation he would have given me at least 100 IS (20 Euros), now he will simply say sorry and give nothing (Wajiha Abu-Rish, December 1st, 2013).

Since the occupation of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, in 1967, Israel has witnessed a rising numbers of international tourists attracted to its historical and religious sites (Mansfeld, 1999). Therefore, investment in the tourism industry has created jobs for both Israelis and Palestinians; however, this was disrupted because of the geopolitical instability during the second Intifada, followed by the construction of the Wall. Many of al-‘Eizariyah’s residents, who hold green IDs and used to work in Jerusalem’s hotels or other tourism services such as tourists guides, taxi drivers or in restaurants, lost their jobs after the Wall policies were introduced. Therefore, social capital played its role through social association to help in solving some of the economic problems:
“Our main source of donation comes from those families who are prosperous in al-‘Eizariyah and those who work and are doing well in the USA and the Arab Gulf. Most of them are my relatives. They trust me and the other Council Members; we act freely in terms of where we choose to spend the funds, for the benefit of the community as a whole. Every year we prepare a list of the students from poor families based on both our knowledge of our community and the school social worker reports. We also give yearly rewards to the outstanding students. We do not discriminate against the ‘strangers’, we help all, whether they are from the locals or not but we’ve noticed that the ‘strangers’ who hold a blue ID are the most privileged; they are better-off because their fathers/mothers still work in Jerusalem/Israel” (Wajiha Abu-Rish, December 1st, 2013).

C- Health Care

After the Wall, the hospitals of East Jerusalem, which were within walking distance from the town, became out of reach. The one small clinic positioned in al-‘Eizariyah cannot meet the needs of the residents. Women in labor, and those requiring advanced medical care, have to drive to the next nearest municipal hospitals in the West Bank, either in Jericho (an hour’s drive), or Ramallah (an hour and a half’s drive away). The pharmacist Ahmad Al-Khatib explained his motive in establishing a health care center in al-‘Eizariyah:

“Before the Wall, we were the only pharmacy that was open for extended hours, so my customers were not only from al-‘Eizariyah, but they came from East Jerusalem and other suburbs too; Silwan, the Mount of Olive and even settlers from Ma’ale Adummim. After the Wall was built I lost those customers. The area was cut off from medical care. Our main hospital, Al-Makassed Hospital143, became on the other side of the Wall; providing medical care by the privet sector was one of the solutions to solve this problem. Therefore I thought of establishing a medical center with general practitioners, specialist doctors, as well as a laboratory and x-ray section.” (Ahmad Al-Khatib, November 24, 2013).

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143 The Al-Makassed Islamic Charitable Hospital which was established in 1968, a 250-bed medical facility with in-patient and out-patient services is located in At-Tur (Mount of Olive).
Professional individuals’ initiatives in addition to the health ministry small clinics served the community, awareness also helped to overcome the problem. Mr. Isam Faroon, the ex-Mayor further explained:

“Although the health care sector still needs further development and investment in al-‘Eizariyah after the Wall, awareness in promoting health care has increased among the population. The community became aware of the difficulties of reaching Jerusalem’s hospitals. Therefore they regularly follow up with the local clinics; these centers now co-ordinate with the hospitals in East Jerusalem to get medical permits on time for their patients when needed, women in labor, for instance, will do all the bureaucratic procedures before the due date” (Isam Faroon, November 12, 2013).

5.7 LOCAL DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

The previous section showed the multiple effects of the construction of the Wall on the local society. Now I will focus on social resilience, adaptation and adjustment to the new situation and local development.

1- Socio-Economic Resilience and Local Development

The residents of al-‘Eizariyah responded to the physical intervention shock presented by the Wall in different ways. Indeed, communities' response to the changes occurred will depend on their resilience: their resources, vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities (Maguire & Cartwright, 2008). The Palestinian concept of the Arabic word “Sumud” which means determination to exist through being steadfast and rooted to the land, is at the heart of the Palestinian resilience to the Israeli occupation (Nguyen-Gillham et al, 2008). The general attitude and practice of the residents of al-‘Eizariyah reflect their belief that suffering and endurance has to be interpreted at both levels; individual and collective. “The construct of
resilience goes beyond an individualistic interpretation: resilience is (re)constituted as a wider collective and social representation of what it means to endure” (Nguyen-Gillham e al, 2008: 292). From this point of view and as a matter of resilience, the ex-Mayor of al-'Eizariyah argued that the construction of the Wall had a positive impact on the town’s socio-economic life, and eventually on local development. In fact, there have been many investments by individuals who either lost their jobs in Israel or felt the need of certain services after the Wall had cut off the town from its center; some of them cooperated and established businesses to fill the gap. Scholars have argued that entrepreneurship is embedded in a social context (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986) and that “social ties provide a mechanism by which investors obtain information, thereby allowing entrepreneurs, without high-capital endowments, to obtain resources to pursue business opportunities” (Shane & Cable, 2002: 378). However, The Wall’s immediate impact was a sudden rise in the unemployment rate as many of those who used to work in Jerusalem and Israel lost their jobs. Over time, the general attitude has changed from seeing only the problems and inconveniences brought by the Wall, to adapting and making the most out of the town’s changed socio-economic and political environment. While effective policies for local development should be formulated and implemented through cooperation between public and private actors, and civil society (Sabel, 1988; Streeck, 1992; Cooke and Morgan, 1998). Therefore, business opportunities were taken, money invested and solutions sought by the public and private actors as well. Mr. Isam Faroon, the ex-Mayor further explained:

“Today I visited Jerusalem to pray in al-Aqsa Mosque. I realized how close Jerusalem was before the Wall, it was only ten minutes’ drive away. Now it takes between forty minutes to one hour, via a difficult and unpredictable journey, to reach the city. I thought of how al-

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144 The aim of using the concept of resilience, which can be somehow conservative in the context of Palestinian, is because it is the term close to the word "Sumud" in Arabic (Liking).

145 The Israeli civil administration allows men and women, over fifty, to enter Jerusalem on Fridays to pray in al-Aqsa mosque in East Jerusalem.
'Eizariyah has developed economically and socially after the Wall. We used to depend on East Jerusalem in all aspects of life; schooling, medical care, and shopping. East Jerusalem suburbs including al-'Eizariyah are quasi-recovered from the negative implications of its separation from the Capital. We have become self-sufficient when it comes to education and economic activities and partially in medical care too. We used to even buy our daily bread from Jerusalem; now we have the longest commercial street in the West Bank. Many of those who lost their jobs in Jerusalem and Israel started their own businesses, whether they had high-capital endowments or just work experience; we witnessed many partnerships and commercial projects between family members and friends. These projects cover services and commerce from mini-supermarkets, hardware and furniture stores to private schools and medical centers. It is my belief that East Jerusalem has suffered more by the Wall. They lost their customers from the suburbs and now the streets of East Jerusalem are almost empty, I think this is the aim of the Israeli occupation” (Isam Faroon, November 12, 2013).

Sapirstein (2007) argue that “Social Resilience” is measured by the time it takes for a community (or organization) to rebound from a natural (or man-made) hazard. The longer it takes a community or organization to “bounce forward” after a natural or man-made hazard, the greater the risk of damage to the social fabric that holds a community or organization together. Similar to the notion of “broken families”, the effect of psychological or relationship dysfunction reaches beyond the economic impact of that lack of functioning (Sapirstein, 2007). The time needed for al-'Eizariyah community to rebound after the construction of the Wall, according to many, was approximately ten years. Abu Helweh, the owner of an optician’s shop in al-'Eizariyah share his own experience:

“I was the first optician in al-'Eizariyah in 1996. My shop was close to Kobsa Junction at the western entrance of the town. 80 percent of my customers were from Jerusalem and the rest were from al-'Eizariyah and the surrounding villages. The second Intifada started two years afterwards. I was not lucky with the timing. A few years later, the Wall was constructed very close to my store. Although I moved away from the Wall, in doing so I lost most of my
Jerusalemite customers, I thought of moving to Ramallah, but I am well known here and had already built a good reputation regarding my career and people trust me, so I decided to give it some time. Now I can say that my work is at its peak. There is zero competition from the Jerusalem opticians after the complete closure of the Wall and my customers are not only from al-‘Eizariyah but also from the neighboring villages, all of whom are denied access to East Jerusalem. My business actually flourished more after the Wall.” (Abu Helweh, November 29, 2013).

The Banks of al-‘Eizariyah had a remarkable role in enhancing local development by the banking facilities they offer to local business men; Mr. Rajaee Ayyad, a department responsible at the Arab Bank explained the role of the Bank before and after the construction of the Wall.: 

“The Arab Bank was the first to open a (selling point) branch in al-‘Eizariyah in 1997, we were forbidden from restarting the bank branch in East Jerusalem, which was closed by Israel after the 1976 war, and no one imagined that we would be disconnected from East Jerusalem by an eight meters high Wall. It was a period of prosperity and fast economic growth which reached 70 percent. After the Wall, we still serve our customers of East Jerusalem because they prefer to deal with a Palestinian bank who speaks their language and understand their customs and traditions although the Israeli banks are economically stronger. Trust is essential in any economic activity, the political instability negatively affect trust, I do not have trust that the customer who lives behind the Wall could reach me, so my distrust is for the circumstances not the customer. The bank business despite all is prospering after the Wall, we helped many business men to start their own economic projects, if we have stability in terms of security, the bank would’ve opened another branch east in al-Mashroo area” (Rajaee Ayyad, November 28, 2013).

Trigilia (2001) argue that “The consequences of social capital for local development are not always positive; and it is precisely the under-evaluation of politics, which makes it more
difficult to distinguish under which conditions social capital can have a favorable impact for local development, instead of generating collusion, patronage, political dependence or even corruption and criminal economies" (Trigilia, 2001:433). Mr. Faroon the ex-Mayor also referred to the vast economic recovery after the Wall to the fact that “Al-‘Eizariyah is in Area B & C. This attracted investment as it is considered to be close to the term ‘free trade zone’ because of the spread of tax evasion in absence of both the Israeli and the Palestinian Authority when it comes to enforcing law and order. Criminal economies are present in the town; they became notable such as arms trade, drugs, money laundering, and prostitution as mentioned earlier. Local development in al-‘Eizariyah was forced by the need to survive “survival” more than an ideology of self-sufficiency, endogeneity, like some cases of local development in Europe or elsewhere. The complicity of the economic agreement of the Paris Protocol (1994) between the Palestinian Authority and Israel had determined certain Israeli channels for the Palestinian economic activities especially that the West Bank has no access to sea ports and do not have airports as well; the only two access to the outside world are through Israel and Jordan. Mohammed Sayyed Ahmad, who runs a trade for motor oils, explained:

“Usually I import from Israeli companies, and some items from abroad through the Israeli ports. It is a complicated process, if I do not write my address in the West Bank coupled with “via Israel” the Israelis will hold the goods at the port and I have to pay a fine in order to release them. My cousin works with the trade of Stones Quarries, other friends export Olive Oil, they are obliged to stamp their products with “made in Israel” if they are going to use the Israeli ports, sometimes they export their Palestinian products through an Israeli company for easier access but they have to pay a commission of course. Even if they export through the overland “trade bridge” to Jordan, sometimes they allow it, and sometimes they stress on the “country of origin” should be changed to Israel not Palestine. (Mohammed Sayyed Ahmad, March 12, 2016).
This has limited the Palestinian capacity to establish stable links with distant markets. Local development became limited to service providing and trade of everyday life necessities, besides the fact that al-‘Eizariyah had no farming activities and its industrial production is limited to few products for local use. Some exceptions were made by small social organizations to sell women’s traditional handcrafts in Europe via foreign solidarity movement but indirectly to avoid Israeli export complications and taxations.

2- Adaptation and Adjustment Strategies

The adaptation and adjustment to the problems or surviving that hardships occurred after the Wall covered many aspects in addition to the economy such as education and health care. The Palestinians were the first to value education in the Arab world; their university enrolment rates were the highest among the Arab nations (Peretz, 1977). Palestinian university graduates constitute more than ten percent of all Arab university graduates although they comprise only 2.2 percent of the Arab population (Ibid). High human capital became an economic substitute for the loss of land during the 1948 and 1967 wars. Most families invested in education and had at least one well educated member who left to work abroad and support the family back home. This made a major economic contribution to the society as a whole and increased in bonding social capital. Education in the Occupied Territories faced three major problems since 1967; first, the phenomenon of boys dropping out of school, to work in Israel, was pervasive, especially before the first Intifada in 1987. The second was during the first Intifada; school boys were at the heart of the dynamics; most of them were jailed by Israel for periods ranging from several months to several years. Most of them did not go back to school when released, and some of them were later appointed to jobs in the PNA as a reward (Jamal, 2007). The third was with the closure regime and restriction on the Palestinian free movement that started in 1993 and reached its highest level by the construction of the separation Wall that started in 2002. Before the Wall, many of al-‘Eizariyah students were attending schools in East Jerusalem, those who were over 16 years old were denied entry into East Jerusalem because they held a Palestinian
identity card (green ID). This has created a problem for the Palestinian Ministry of Education as they had to provide the schools with extra space (classes), teachers, and facilities following the increase in demand. Mr. Nabil Adwan the headmaster of al-“Eizariyah boys’ school further explained:

“At the beginning we increased the student numbers of each class, then we managed to convert some activity spaces into class rooms and later with the help of the ministry of education we built extra classes in the old schools and new schools to absorb the increasing number of students in all grades” (Mr. Nabeil Adwan, November 24, 2013).

This was not the only challenge as the Palestinian Education system suffers also from a decrease of male teachers, as shown by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics for the academic year 2013/2014. Many male teachers neglect the profession to work in more profitable jobs mainly as workers in Israel. The table below refers to the number of both male and female teachers in government, UNRWA, and the private schools and show the difference in the numbers that favored female teachers in all types of schools.

Figure 29: The number of female school teachers. Source: PCBS (2014).
This problem was solved by substituting the male teachers in elementary boys’ schools with female teachers, where the age of the students is between six and twelve years old. Having female teachers at this age does not contradict with the generally conservative society, where only male teachers are allowed to teach in boys’ secondary schools. In al-‘Eizaryah, the Ministry of Education has applied the same strategy to solve the increasing number of students following the Wall and by building the new Muscat Boys’ Secondary School via a donation from the Government of Oman. The old school building now hosts the elementary school; from classes one to six. It has a female headmistress and female teachers. The new building hosts the boys’ secondary school; from classes seven to twelve. It has a male headmaster and only male teachers. For the health care, most of al-‘Eizariyah residents’ health care centers were in East Jerusalem. They were cut off from the town by the Wall, the pharmacist Ahmid Al-Khatib noted:

“The area was cut off from proper medical care; our main hospital, Al-Makassed Hospital, became out of reach, on the other side of the Wall. Therefore I thought of establishing a medical center with general practitioners, specialist doctors, as well as a laboratory and x-ray section. The population that we serve is some 70,000 inhabitants. We are still in need of more medical facilities. We now have no hospital nearby; women in labor, for example, need to travel quite a distance away to reach one in Jericho, Ramallah or Bethlehem. This is if they have been refused a permit by Israel to go through the Wall to enter Jerusalem and give birth in, what was, their local hospital” (Ahmid Al-Khatib, November 24, 2013).

The PCBS (2003) report argued that “although long waiting times at check points, and more time-consuming and costly travel, are frustrating and humiliating, it remains to be seen if the worsened access to health services will have any significant effects on the health of the Palestinian population. … For most users contact with the health sector is rather infrequent, but for education it is the other way around, usually there are no emergencies (except during exams, perhaps) - it is the regular daily work that counts. If this is frequently interrupted or
disturbed the quality of the education will suffer, but this is will only become visible after some time” (PCBS, 2003: 50). Now as we are in the year 2013, it seems that the quality of education has declined, many university teachers complained from the declined level of education and culture of the undergraduate students and they think that restrictions on the students movement has to do with it. Students and teachers are from the same town, no access to public libraries located in the nearby cities, lack of diversity and free movement limit the chances for good education and cultural diversity. These two interviews and other observations reflect the ‘Social Resilience’ which is usually measured by the time it takes for a community to rebound from a natural or man-made hazard (Sapirstein, 2006). The majority of the interviewees said that al-‘Eizariyah has recovered by 60 percent economically, socially, and in providing services including education and health care. This recovery, in a relatively short time could be explained negatively by seeing it as surrender to a fait accompli and normalizing the abnormal (normalization). Or it can be seen positively as resistance “Somud صمود” showing resilience and an ability to adapt to ever-changing conditions. However, most of the key informants expressed their concern about the future. They think that the urban sprawl has reached its peak and expressed their concern about future regarding the economic growth. Isam Faroo the ex-Mayor shared his concern: “There are five banks in the town and we have the longest commercial streets in the West Bank. The question now is about continuity. We have used up all the available land, there is no land left”.

The pictures below demonstrate the al-‘Eizariyah expansion over the last 30 years. The rapid growth over the last ten years refers to the construction of the Wall. The first picture below shows the town’s main street free from commercial buildings or shops, approximately ten years before the Oslo Accords. The second picture demonstrates the same part of the street a few years later, while the third gives a recent overview of the town.
Figure 30, 31 & 32: al-'Eizariyah natural growth over the years since the 80s. Source: Al-'Eizariya page, Facebook.
3- The Future Challenges of al-‘Eizariyah

Summerfield (2002) argued that recovery is ‘grounded in the resumption of the ordinary rhythms of everyday life – the familial, socio-cultural, religious and economic activities that make the world intelligible’. However, recovery in the case study setting is partial and the continuity is not guaranteed. B’Tselem (2009) explained the future development challenges that al-‘Eizariyah is facing as most of the land in the north and in the south of the town’s built-up area has steep inclines: “the town is blocked on the west by the Separation Wall, which runs between it and Jerusalem’s municipal border, and in the southwestern section, the built-up area of al-‘Eizariyah runs up to the built-up area of the nearby town of Abu Dis. Hence, al-‘Eizariyah could develop only eastward, where there are contiguous sections of land having moderate inclines. But this land was expropriated and is now part of Ma’ale Adummim’s built-up area ... At present, al-‘Eizariyah is choked, and its residents have no planning prospects for the community’s development and natural growth” (B’Tselem, 2009: 55). Sapirstein (2006) pointed out the four components of social resilience which are: Response, Self-Organization, Learning, and Adaptation. When the eastern Wall will be completed, the Abu-Dis area will be the only open space to connect al-‘Eizariyah with the surrounding towns and Palestinian cities in the southern part of the West Bank. It will be disconnected also from Jericho and Ramallah and other northern parts of the West Bank. In al-‘Eizariyah’s case and in the absence of planning prospects for the community’s development and natural growth the community response will be random, not organized, repeating the same mistakes. And adaptation to this absence of a decent present and a decent future will be to surrender to a fate once again. The community started to suffer from social problems already even before the complete closure, especially among the younger generation. Mr. Khalil M. Abu-Rish, one of al-‘Eizariyah notables observed:

146 The alternative bypass road (fabric of life road) that will be constructed through Anata, to the north, will connect al-‘Eizariyah with Ramallah and other cities in the northern part of the West Bank. There will no longer be a direct road to Jericho. Residents of al-‘Eizariyah will have to go through Ramallah in the north, and then turn south east; instead of the direct route they have had for centuries on the ancient biblical road to Jericho.
“Expressly, most of the young generation does not belong; just watch them how they move around, ready for a fight or an assault on public property. I would say that this is because we are imprisoned by the Wall. The tension among the young is very notable; the difficulty they face in order to obtain livelihoods is one of the reasons. The main problem in my opinion, that the younger generation are not cultured. They did not experience normal life starting with the first Intifada to the second. Most of them were jailed by Israel at that time and now the Wall encloses them. They have never had the freedom to travel and experience life, to learn about themselves, what they like or not. They’ve never had the opportunity to evolve, naturally. They’ve suffered tremendously under the restrictions and humiliations of the Israeli Occupation and therefore experience inner conflict, low self-esteem and daily pressure, so they expect difficulties and are only equipped for dealing with problems. That is why drugs and drug dealing have become such phenomena. The drug dealers are from outside the town. They ask the unemployed to distribute the drugs in exchange for a supply for their own use. I am very much concerned about this. Personally I think I did the right thing sending my son to the States to live and work during the first Intifada. There is no future here” (Khalil M. Abu-Rish, 20 October, 2013).

In 2008 the Birzeit University’s Institute of Community and Public Health’s study on Palestinian youth, pointed out that the normalization of everyday life within abnormal living conditions reveals contradictions and tensions. “Therefore young Palestinian people complain of emotional distress and boredom. Feelings of desperation are intermingled with optimism” (Nguyen-Gillham et al, 2008: 291). Although the social associations, that work with the youth in al-‘Eizariyah, managed to help somewhat, this sector of the community certainly needs more attention and resources. Other associations’ work is limited to the distribution of supplies amongst the most needy. These institutions are accused of incompetence because the beneficiaries are usually their relatives and other members of the political parties they are affiliated to. In a way, this turns bridging social capital into some kind of bonding social capital.
CHAPTER SIX: THE CONCLUSION

The previous Empirical Chapter demonstrated the role of social capital in coping with the constant social, political and economic change over the past decade. Previous studies on Palestinian social capital concluded that the Wall has prevented access to fields; consequently the importance of the family in becoming a strategy for protection and solidarity between the extended family has increased. This research examined the impact of the Wall on Palestinians’ social capital in urban areas; between East Jerusalem and al-‘Eizariyah (Bethany). The methods used were the life story approach to collect personal data, and the in-depth interviews with key informants to collect community level data. The Empirical Chapter shows that the family became a strategy of protection, even in urban areas, after the construction of the Wall, i.e. the solidarity between family members helped to hold families together in the face of different types of socioeconomic hardships as well as rural areas. The Empirical Chapter shed light on some components of the shared set of norms, values and attitudes that govern interactions among actors and influence social networks and social interaction; it also discussed barriers to collective action at the community level such as the slow integration between various groups because of the strong bond with their place of origin and the locals labeling everybody else as ‘strangers’.

This and the embedded gender inequality regarding inheritance in Palestinian society are specific characteristics amongst others caused sever deficit in both civic behavior and community trust. This chapter will conclude the Empirical Chapter’s discussions presenting the findings in a way that explain the current situation following ten years since the construction of the section of the Wall that separates al-‘Eizariyah from East Jerusalem.
The failure of the peace process, within the framework of the Oslo Accords as explained in Chapter Two, led to a general sense of uncertainty and confusion among the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. The Oslo Accords and the creation of the Palestinian Authority in 1993, had failed to fulfill the aspiration of the Palestinians people. Over the years, and as a consequence of this failure, the Palestinians became politically ‘schizophrenic’, meaning that the majority of them believe historic Palestine belongs to the Palestinians but the major of this land was lost in the 1948 war, in addition they lost the remaining West Bank and Gaza Strip in the war of 1967, which were then "occupied". The Palestinians, in general, are accepting Israel only as an occupier whether they support Hamas or Fatah, working in Israel or not. Therefore, the mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was a golden opportunity for Israel to implement peace, but it was only the first step. The promised economic prosperity would have helped the Palestinian leadership to change the Palestinian population’s embedded concepts regarding Israel; but instead of reaching an agreement according to the timetable set out by the Oslo Accords, negotiations were an endless process leading to dead ends because of the Israeli intransigence and procrastination. This is in addition to the fact that Israel has used the time since Oslo (1993) to confiscate more land, to expand existing settlements and to build new ones. This is coupled with the escalation of restrictions on Palestinians free movements using various approaches and apparatus up to the construction of the separation Wall, which was built not only to separate Israel and East Jerusalem from the West Bank but also to isolate Palestinian communities from each other by a complicated system of checkpoint and bypass roads. The general oppression by Israel and the daily hardships that all Palestinian face under the occupation, despite the general trend of hostility between the followers of Fatah and Hamas, Palestinians unite, at least emotionally, during every Israeli invasion and bombing of Gaza. This is because it is in the souls and subconscious of all Palestinians that they are all in the same boat and have one enemy, however, with the lack of a charismatic
leadership and unless the whole population unites, this power will remain latent. Israel is very aware of this, therefore, all the Israeli policies are made to further weaken and fragment the Palestinians to prevent such unity; the real threat to the state of Israel. The fact that some Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza work in Israel is another ideological fragmentation and reflects the political schizophrenia amongst the Palestinians; the “Working in Israel” image range from absolute acceptance to the accusation of betraying the Palestinian cause. The notion that Palestinians should be grew boycotting working in Israel and purchasing the Israeli products is a growing social movement especially during the Israeli wars on Gaza in 2008, 2012 and 2014. This added to the confusion regarding the economic integration with Israel. On one hand some envy those who have the possibility and are given the permits to enter Israel, whether for work or shopping and entertainment, on the other hand this is seen by others as a lack of national affiliation and will be accused of “normalization” with the occupier. Peace has become more difficult to achieve; this is only possible if the two populations, both Israelis and Palestinians, accept each other on a basis of equal rights for both communities. If the two populations can start to think internationally instead of nationally with Human Rights as their point of reference, only then can peace start to be implemented.

With their imprisonment inside the Wall, Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are deprived of their very basic needs to move, to travel and to have the ability to plan their future. These constraints also add mental and emotional constraints. The Israeli security justification for the construction of the Wall has proven false, especially around Jerusalem, where the Wall actually is separating Palestinians from Palestinians. This proves the human right organizations’ view in which they see the Wall as new border with the aim to annex more land from the West Bank in favor of Israel, and not as a security measure. In addition, the fact that Israel deliberately postponed the negotiations regarding East Jerusalem within the framework of the Oslo Accords demonstrates the result of winning time to change the demographic reality and the character of East Jerusalem, by Judaizing it, which makes it
much more difficult to withdraw these settlements later. The Wall in Jerusalem, as a tool of fragmentation, succeeded in isolating the Palestinians; those of East Jerusalem outside the Wall, and those of the West Bank inside the Wall. The social and economic interaction between these two Palestinian regions is decreasing; consequently social capital dynamics has become limited. Palestinians on both sides of the Wall are busy with problems in their everyday lives which vary according to the different legal statuses and different Israeli policies on either side of the Wall. This means that Palestinians do not share or face the same problems and this sets them apart even more (diametrically difference needs and problems solutions are needed, thus Palestinians get fragmented even further on to resolve them).

The fact that all the West Bank suburbs of East Jerusalem, in clouding al-’Eizariyah, were categorized as Area B surrounded by Area C, means that the Palestinian Authority has civil control over Aria B without social security control (Palestinian Police). This means that the PA cannot enforce law and order over these areas, while the surroundings areas are Area C, which were Area B’s reserves of land for natural growth, are under full Israeli control. This means it is almost impossible to have building permits issued, by the Israeli authorities, therefore the Palestinians cannot expand into these areas as shown in Chapter Five: ‘The impact of the Oslo Accords on Local Development’ section. The twenty years since Oslo has transformed these suburbs to what they have become today; it has generated what is known as the ‘neighborhood effect’, which implies that there are some behavioral, attitudinal, and psychological features of neighborhoods that affect its residents including impoverishment and social fragmentation. Because of economic hardships, many people live in buildings where the exteriors are still under construction hoping that the external work will be completed in a later stage. This is done to reduce overheads. While this usually takes several years, it has become an acceptable behavior, and this has a detrimental impact on the aesthetics, culture and the general character and look of these areas. This, coupled with the decrease of the green areas because of lack of spare land and planning schemes, the
rapid construction of extensions to existing buildings or new buildings, and the profusion of many poorly designed and ugly buildings with poor finishing and no landscaping, give a general sense of chaos which some explain it as “cultural”, meaning that chaos is part of the Palestinian culture. The empirical evidence shows, however, that this has been systematically planned and developed and it is a direct result of the occupation, its political agreements and economic hardships. Many believe that this is the plan by Israel to deliberately create this huge gap between “civilized” Israel with its space and order, trees and flower beds and the Occupied Territories to reinforce a stereotypical negative image of the Palestinian people around the world, and it has worked. The Jerusalem municipality discriminates against Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and the Old City in the distribution of services compared with the Jewish neighborhood in the west of the city and the settlement in the east to dedicate this image. Soon this will lead to a real negative change in the Palestinian culture especially among the young generations as has been demonstrated in the Empirical Chapter: ‘The Future Challenges’ section.

2- The Wall’s Direct Effect on al-‘Eizariyah’s Residents

The Wall paralyses social life and has had major economic consequences; the Jerusalemites who lived in al-‘Eizariyah were the most affected class as explained in the Empirical Chapter. Reverse migration began for fear of losing their blue ID card and all the benefits that comes with it especially the relatively free movement compared with those who hold green ID; the Jerusalemites are allowed to move freely in Israel and use Israeli airports to travel abroad, but they still have to go through checkpoints whenever they travel within the West Bank. This difficulty forced most Jerusalemites to leave their homes in al-‘Eizariyah to avoid the daily hardship they would face having to go through checkpoints and onto the bypass road to get to work or school each day. Instead they have made the difficult decision to live in Jerusalem despite the poor living conditions and the extra expense this entails in relation to accommodation. Most of them have returned to live with one of their first degree
relatives (son, daughter, or parents) as they cannot afford to buy or rent private housing within Jerusalem itself. This has had a negative social and economic effect; spacious houses have been left empty, producing a noticeable decline in real estate prices in al-‘Eizariyah itself and rise in those in East Jerusalem. Others who hold a blue ID card and still living in al-‘Eizariyah, and those who hold a green ID but with an Israeli permit to work in East Jerusalem are the daily users of the pedestrian al- Zaytoon “Olive” and al- Za’ayyem checkpoints with all the suffering and time consumed that comes with it. What the Jerusalemites are being forced to do, as a reaction to the Israeli policies, is dispersing their personal resources; especially those who cannot cut off their socio-economic activities with the West Bank. Many have decided to have two houses, one in Jerusalem and the other in the West Bank to better cope with the situation. One of these two houses will be temporary and sometimes neither of them good enough for living in. The vast majority of al-‘Eizariyah’s residents, who holds a West Bank green ID and are forbidden from entering East Jerusalem and Israel, directed their lives in a way that normalize the existence of the Wall. They accepted the fact that East Jerusalem could no longer be the center of their social and economic activities, and have organized their lives accordingly; the Wall for them became invisible (see Chapter five: ”The Indirect Social Effect of the Wall” section).

The Wall literally broke families apart; especially those families where members hold different IDs and those who live very close to the Wall. It has changed the social relation map and disrupted the socio-economic activities between Palestinians on each side of the Wall. This redirected social networks by weakening some such as football teams that comprising players with different civil status. Those who hold green ID’s had to be dismissed because they cannot enter Jerusalem and they were replaced with others who hold blue ID. Other networks became stronger such as local teachers in local schools; before the Wall teachers were from different places and not necessary from the town itself. Now, because of the restrictions on mobility most teachers are locals; this will limit the inspiration, motivation and openness to new life styles of the students they teach. Other
undesirable networks were created; such as the drug dealers network, and the trade of the un-roadworthy ex-Israeli cars that are used for illegal transportation networks (see Chapter five: “The Diffusion of the Informal Economy” section).

The social fragmentation named as “local-stranger relationship” of al-‘Eizariyah was further subcategorized into those who hold the blue ID and those who hold the green ID, in addition to the subgroups of those who hold green ID with working permit; meaning that there are those who could enter, live and work in Jerusalem (Israel) and those who couldn’t. Social act such as traditional marriage have been directed in a way that each ID group now seeks not to interact with the other group to avoid temptation leading to dramatic consequences such as not being able to exchange family visits, or being told where to live and where not; where to buy or rent a house, and what services they could be entitled to or denied from. In cases in which these groups could not avoid such interaction, couples have had to deal with the consequences and find solutions that inevitably disperse their personal resources such as running and equipping more than one house, the limited choice of schooling, medical care and extra transportation cost, etc.

3- The Wall’s Impact on Social Capital

The first glance of the reality shows that the impact of the Wall on social capital types was positive; bonding social capital became stronger, bridging and linking social capital as well. Family became a strategy of protection more than in the past. Hardships such as the rise in the unemployment rate, the confiscation of land, house demolitions, the restrictions on free movement and the series of laws and policies that constrain the natural growth of the city had created conditions in which families are literary “sticking together”; meaning that they live together in uncomfortable and over-crowded conditions. Although this strong bonding social capital reflects solidarity and solves many social and economic problems on the short run, it also creates other types of social problems caused by the discomfort of both reciprocate and recipient. This may harm the relationship between the family members on
the long run as the solution that was considered to be initially temporary became long-term or permanent. In such circumstances family disputes are most likely to occur, hence the attention and efforts being paid to discuss and solve the core of the problem. However these fall far short from a national collectivism to confront the Israeli occupation which is the very cause of these hardships and sufferings. Many believe that this is a deliberate aim of Israeli policies to engage the Palestinians in social disputes between each other, fighting over resources, which would eventually force some to give up hope and leave their homeland. Others argue that when the pressure reaches the point of despair, it will explode and this will turn negatively on Israel, with a civil uprising.

One of the most important impacts of the political and economic hardships on the Palestinian bonding social capital is that trends are changing, i.e. the usual common dominant trend was that sons were helping parents and the eldest son would help both parents and younger siblings, especially after the loss of land in 1948 war up until recently. The Palestinian family used to invest in their children’s education to enhance job opportunities whether in the Occupied Territories or abroad. Now the general trend is reversed; most families are continuing to support their children, particularly the males, and working hard to help them to bear the cost of their daily life expenses and to build for them a dignified future at least in an economic sense. Bonding social capital among the extended family is present but sometimes it could be described as superficial; especially if the indicator is participating in social events. Members of the extended family still support each other in good and bad times such as visits during feasts and participating in wedding ceremonies and funerals. These activities sometimes are attributed to social norms obligations, more rather than strong bonds. Cases of estrangement started to occur between family members regarding distributing inherited land or money usually because of the gender inequality. Women became more aware of their rights and this complicates the situation especially when females who were married outside the family are involved. The imprisoned population directed their anger against each other and tolerance between them became less; the rise in
divorce rates after the Wall could be considered as one of the indicators of lack of tolerance and the increasing trend of impatient in addition to different types of family disputes.

The challenges caused by the construction of the separation Wall that started in 2002 were too large to be handled only by bonding social capital, therefore combined efforts between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the local civil society associations and the private sector to overcome problems related to education, health care services, trade and labor in addition to social security. Hence bridging social capital and linking social capital were strongly present after the Wall too. According to the discussion on the existence of the Palestinian civil society in the absence of the state in the Literature Review Chapter (3.4.1), one of the opinions stated that the Palestinian society is structured along patrimonial, familial, clannish, tribal lines and contradictory geographical cleavages; hence, it was unable to create a civil society based on the bond of citizenship. While civil associations are strongly present in al-'Eizariyah, most of them work in a way that transformed the intended outcome of bridging social capital to some kind of bonding social capital; because the beneficiaries and the participants are mostly from their family, clan members, or those who belong to the same political party, not the wider community as a whole. All cases of success and failure of these associations’ efforts are linked to rich or powerful individuals, who were either independent or representatives of the Palestinian Authority or International Bodies. A rich and powerful relative supports an association logistically and financially to help in achieving its goals, on the other hand this support might have negative consequences on the association performance especially when staff is appointed for political or personal reasons rather than for their ability to do the job well and efficiently. The associations who give precedence to the donor interest not the community needs in order to stay funded by them, serve only themselves and the donors’ agenda. Others who do not have linking social capital have a greater chance of not succeeding, or their services would be limited according to their own resources. The relationship between civil associations is governed by competition over funding rather
than co-operation and collaboration in providing integrated services; if human rights projects most likely to be funded, at a given time, then associations work on a human rights project proposal, whether this is the greatest need in a community or not. The research findings were positive regarding all types of social capital, however, observations and the empirical evidence show that bonding is stronger than bridging social capital. Many of the community problems could be solved by cooperation between the community members. However, the investigation reveals that there are some barriers to collective action. This problem was attributed to the social fragmentation caused by several social forces such as the local-stranger relationship, the clan social structure, traditions and gender inequality. The empirical analyses explore the feeling of the displaced Palestinian refugees of the 1948 war who were displaced in al-‘Eizariyah, and reached an explanation of their lack of belonging; it is not only because the locals always express superiority over them, but also because the refugees themselves do not want to lose their rooted original identity, this exceeds the first generation to the third which was born in the town. On the practical level, both the locals and the refugees prefer to interact within their own group when it comes to business partnership or marriage. And although the refugees almost lost hope of a just political solution to their displacement, the everyday practices kept the feeling of being a stranger alive. This had a great overall impact on the homogeneity of the Palestinian society especially that ‘the refugees’ communities constitute approximately 42 percent of the total population of the West Bank” (Bisharat, 1997: 206). However, these barriers to collective action could be disintegrated by deep understanding to the local-stranger relationships in order to elevate the quality of the relationship by focusing on the common struggle against the occupier. Also by strengthening the most survivalist and wellbeing traditions and efforts being paid to reduce gender inequality struggles that are embedded in the Palestinian society. Displacement, traditions, clan social structure and the unstable political, socio-economic environment became part of the Palestinian society characteristics which makes bonding
social capital the dominant type in the absence of the state\textsuperscript{147} and efficient civil society institutions.

Trust in first degree family members is high; it is almost the only safety net that an individual could have in the absence of the state\textsuperscript{148} and efficient civil society institutions. Trust in the extended family and the clan is limited to big social problems such as disputes between clans, it also helps if an individual wants to brag or show-off within a larger crowd, such as family celebrations or at times of mourning. Trust in the Palestinian Authority is decreasing in general, and depend mostly on the individual political affiliation; supporters of Hamas are against and their trust is around zero; they highly criticize the ‘security coordination’\textsuperscript{التنسيق الأمني} between the Palestinian Authority and Israel; they claim that the PA are doing the dirty job for Israel by arresting Hamas members in the West Bank. Those who support Fatah, their trust is affected either by their true faith in Fatah principles or interest in the benefits and influence they gain by being a member of this party. Worth mention that education attainment was inversely correlated with trust in political institutions. However, trust in international bodies is decreasing in general unless there is a direct tangible financial aid; solidarity movements for instance are welcomed by the society of al-‘Eizariyah but as what they are usually offering is far from financial aid, the enthusiastic cooperation between the two parties tends to be less with time on the practical level.

Although the attempts to remedy environmental and societal damage caused by the Wall is continues in al-‘Eizariyah, the general attitude of the population is that if there is no personal direct negative effect, there is no initiative to solve the problem. Despite the fact that there is a social security vacuum, the scale of existing problems is balanced out due to the presence of remaining family ties and the efforts made by some heads of notable families, people in power and ordinary people including women.

\textsuperscript{147} According to many political opinions the Palestinian Authority is not yet a State.  
\textsuperscript{148} According to many political opinions the Palestinian Authority is not yet a State.
4- The Impact of the Wall on Local Development and Socio-Economic Resilience

Before the two main influential events on al-‘Eizariyah local development that is the Oslo Accords and the construction of the Wall, al-‘Eizariyah and al-Mashroo were two separated communities that constituted the poles of one road; few shops on the west side (the Kobsa Junction) and other few shops on the east side (al-Mashroo). Now, and in addition to the natural growth, after the Wall disconnected al-‘Eizariyah from its social and economic center, these shops have been joined by so many other shops and businesses that now Commercial Street, the main street of the town, is lined on both sides by commercial businesses for its complete four kilometer length. It is considered to be the longest in the West Bank and despite that the motive behind many of these commercial projects was profit and maximizing utility; these projects boosted local development in the whole area; they created jobs and served the community in a way that became self-sufficient. Al-‘Eizariyah became not only economically independent from East Jerusalem, but it also became the commercial center for the whole isolated region inside the Wall; the town of abu-Dis and al-Sawahra al-Sharqiya, in addition to communities behind the Wall (East Jerusalem and its suburbs) who shop from al-‘Eizariyah because of the price difference. Although social integration between the communities inside the Wall is slow due to cultural aspects, the local development is in progress; the trend in investment now is going towards cultural activities and entertainment after fulfilling the community’s basic needs; sport centers including swimming pools, restaurants and coffee shops started to function. However, till now, there is no public library or book store in the town but there are many internet café.

Communities’ response to the changes that have occurred will depend on their resilience: their resources, vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities (Maguire & Cartwright, 2008). Although local development is visible, it lacks careful planning, future vision, and hope in political, security and economic stability. When the eastern Wall will be completed, the Abu-Dis area will be the only open space to connect al-‘Eizariyah with the
surrounding towns and Palestinian cities in the southern part of the West Bank. It will be disconnected also from Jericho and Ramallah and other northern part of the West Bank\textsuperscript{149}. In al-‘Eizariyah case, social resilience will not hold for long in the absence of resources and planning prospects for the community’s development and natural growth. The community response will be random, not organized, repeating the same mistakes and adaptation will be just surrender to a fate. Some call this kind of coping with the new reality “enhancing the resilience” or “resistance by existence”, others think that this is the only thing they can do. Those few who still believe in negotiations and the Two State Solution assume that, within the framework of any political settlements on Jerusalem, the Israelis will give back Palestinian populated areas to reduce the number of Palestinians in Jerusalem, and at the same time annex all the Jewish settlements around Jerusalem to increase the number of Jews in the city and guarantee that the demographic balance will be always in favor of Israel.

5- The Future Challenges

The population of al-‘Eizariyah are now living in suspended, monitored mode worried about the possible closure of the eastern entrance of their town, according to the stated Israeli plan for the route of the Wall. In this case al-‘Eizariyah will be surrounded by the Wall on the east, west and north sides, the only entrance and exit to the town, for traffic will be via Abu-Dis connecting al-‘Ezariyah with surrounding towns and Palestinian cities in the southern part of the West Bank. If the eastern entrance is permanently closed, that means the town will be cut off from the city of Jericho and Ramallah and other cities in the northern part of the West Bank. The alternative bypass road that will be constructed via the neighborhood of Anata to the north is a shorter bypass road to Ramallah but a

\textsuperscript{149} The alternative bypass road (fabric of life road) that will be constructed through Anata, to the north, will connect al-‘Eizariyah with Ramallah and other cities in the northern part of the West Bank. There will no longer be a direct road to Jericho. Residents of al-‘Eizariyah will have to go through Ramallah in the north, and then turn south east; instead of the direct route they have had for centuries on the ancient biblical road to Jericho.
long journey to Jericho. The people of al-‘Eizariyah and the surrounding towns will have to go to Ramallah in the north first, then from there to the southeast, instead of the direct short road they currently have as explained in Chapter Two: The Research Context and Research Questions; “The Wall in East Jerusalem” section.

The Palestinians on both sides of the Wall are tired, and have lost faith in politics and politicians; everyone is busy doing what he or she has to do to survive and save the family, and this causes selfishness, which leads to the individual family becoming more important than the sense of national collectivism. Israel policies succeeded in isolating the Palestinian Jerusalemite and reducing their numbers in East Jerusalem. Israel prevented all types of interaction between the population on both sides of the Wall, the streets of East Jerusalem are empty from its neighboring towns visitors, the suburbs inside the Wall swell, suffering from the growing population density and overcrowding with the people themselves having very little control or power in the situation. Social capital remains the only mechanism that Palestinians can use to defend their continued presence, although these efforts can only soothe their problems, they certainly have no power to cure them.
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APPENDIX I: THE SOCIAL CAPITAL INDICATORS OF 2009 STUDY:

✧ **Associational Activity indicator (AA)** This indicator is computed from the question ‘Are you member of any of these institutions?’ (q1). Out of 13 different institutions, it measures how many institutions a respondent is a member of. Range value: 1 - 13.

✧ **Density of Associational Activity indicator (DAA)** This indicator measures the proportion of active memberships for each respondent. It is computed as the ratio between active membership and associational activity. Range: 0 - 1.

✧ **Family visits (fmvisits)** This indicator measures the frequency of visits of each respondent with his or her family in Palestine (q9_1). The survey proposes a qualitative answer that is recoded as follows: once a week = 52, once or twice a month = 24, few times a year = 6 (taken from Durkin, 2000), otherwise = 0.

✧ **Family calls (famcalls)** This indicators measures the frequency of the respondent’s phone calls to his or her family residing abroad (q9_4). The frequencies are recoded as in point 3.

✧ **Friend visits (frvisits)** This indicator measures the frequency of each respondent’s visits to friends and neighbours in Palestine. It is computed as the average between q9_2 and q9_3 after recoding the variables as in point 3.

✧ **Friend calls (frcalls)** The indicator measures the frequency of each respondent’s phone calls to friends living outside Palestine (q9_5). It is computed after recoding as in point 3 above.

✧ **Friend invite (frinvite)** This indicator measures the frequency with which each respondent invite friends or neighbours to his or her house. It is computed as the average of question q9_6 and q9_7 after recoding as in point 3.

✧ **Friend number (frnum)** This indicator is formed from the question ‘How many are your close friends?’ (q15). It indicates the number each respondent has reported.

✧ **Family clan (clan)** This indicator measures whether a respondent is a member of a family clan in the village and the frequency of her participation in discussion meetings. The indicator is the product between a binomial variable indicating clan participation (q13) and the
rate of participation (q14) recoded as follow: always = 4, often = 3, sometimes = 2, rarely = 1, otherwise = 0. Range: 0 (no clan or no participation) - 4.

- **Community meetings (commeetings)** This indicator measures the frequency of participation in local community gatherings for discussion on political, local administration, economic or social issues (q12). The qualitative answers are recoded in frequency values as explained in point 3.

- **Trust dummy (dtrust)** This indicator is a binomial indicator indicating whether the respondent answered ‘I trust people in general; when questioned about his or her trust (q17).

- **Generalised trust (gt)** This indicator measures the level of trust that an individual has relative to others (q18). It captures an horizontal path of trust within a community. It is computed as the sum of the trust levels across four different items (family, neighbours, people you work with, religious men, political men). The trust levels are recoded in reversely order as follow: lot of trust = 3, somehow trust = 2, little trust = 1, otherwise = 0. Range: 0 – 15

- **Institutional trust (it)** This indicator measures the level of trust that an individual has relative to the institutions (q19). It is a vertical path of trust from the community towards the governing institutions. The indicator is computed as the sum of trust levels across 19 different institutions. Level of trust are recoded as in point 12. Range: 0 – 57.

- **Civic Cooperation (civic)** This indicator represents the strength of norms of civic cooperation (q23). Each respondend is asked to give a judgment across 7 behaviours of civic cooperation (i.e. absence from work for no reasonable reason, tax evasion, bribery at work, not participating in elections, not following traffic rules, buying stolen products, not returning a found wallet to the police). The indicator is computed as the sum of the answers for each respondent recoded as following: no answer = 0, can justify it = 1, can justify it sometimes = 2, can not justify it = 3. Range: 0- 21.

- **Political Protests (protest)** This indicator measures a respondent’s participation in non-electoral forms of political activities, namely distribution of political leaflets, attendance to political meetings and political marches and demonstrations. It is computed as the number of