New states challenged: education, peacebuilding and statebuilding in post-conflict Kosovo and East Timor

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ABSTRACT

The provision of education has been a core function legitimizing the modern nation-state. Behind education one finds the building of citizenship, between demands for social cohesion and national identification, as well as the preparation of the labour force for the national economy. The moulding of a working education system remains a key challenge for new states and states emerging from armed conflict. Qualitative and quantitative scholarly literature exploring the causal relationship between education and civil war leaves no doubt about the salience of education systems in conflict-affected states.

While a vast body of studies exists on education and violent conflict, less attention has been devoted to the role of education in peacebuilding and statebuilding. Above all, little research has been conducted into how externally promoted efforts at rebuilding education systems may affect (or fail to affect) the consolidation of peace. This study focuses on the ways in which a variety of international actors shape national education systems in states that have emerged out of armed conflict, and how these systems reflect and affect peacebuilding and statebuilding.

From these premises, I have conducted fieldwork in Kosovo and East Timor, two recent cases where major statebuilding and peacebuilding interventions have been launched. The research first has mapped education programming and reform by identifying the main actors that have been part of the process. Second, I have conceptualized the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of these reforms by analysing primary source documents and interviewing key local and international stakeholders. Finally, after identifying the emerging forms of education systems, I have critically analysed the ways in which externally assisted education have reflected and affected processes of building the state and consolidating peace.

The research has found that post-war reconstruction in both cases has led to the emergence of externally-driven and hybrid education systems whereby priorities are set in the intersection between local and international actors, often lacking coordination. Presenting features of extra-territoriality and de-nationalization, such education systems are a combination of global education policies and contextual local agendas. Rather than bringing the education system out of fragility, international interventions have determined and perpetuated a condition of dependency on international assistance. Humanitarian and stability imperatives have determined educational choices and priorities and education
has neither addressed nor transformed root causes of the conflicts, missing the opportunity to contribute to social cohesion, change and justice.

Overall, education has been a marginal sector within the broader political economy of peacebuilding and statebuilding, and a mere reflection of the principles and practices that underpin them. Rather than impacting on such processes, interventions in education in Kosovo and East Timor have reflected, legitimised and enhanced the prevailing models of peacebuilding and statebuilding, and in doing so, have incorporated their dilemmas, pitfalls and shortcomings.
Acknowledgements

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I hereby declare that the thesis I have presented for examination is solely my own work. Therefore, any error or omission is my sole responsibility.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAK</td>
<td>Aleanca per Ardhmerine e Kosoves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AudAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAVR</td>
<td>Commission for Truth, Reception and Reconciliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCPEE</td>
<td>Critical Cultural Political Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDHTL</td>
<td>Commissau Direito Humano Timor LoroSae</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPAD</td>
<td>Centre of Studies for Peace and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFS</td>
<td>Child Friendly Spaces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CNRT</td>
<td>National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DESK</td>
<td>Developing an Education System for Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoES</td>
<td>Department of Education and Science</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAR</td>
<td>European Agency for Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEPC</td>
<td>Education in Emergencies and Post-Conflict Transitions</td>
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<td>ESOK</td>
<td>Employment and Skills Observatory of Kosovo</td>
</tr>
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<td>ESPIG</td>
<td>Economic Strategy and Project Identification Group</td>
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<td>ESRP</td>
<td>Emergency School Readiness Project</td>
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<td>ETTA</td>
<td>East Timor Transitional Administration</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>EWS</td>
<td>Early Warning System</td>
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<td>FALINTIL</td>
<td>Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor</td>
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<td>F-FDTL</td>
<td>Timor-Leste Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORDEM</td>
<td>Forum Democracy Maubere</td>
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<td>FRETLIN</td>
<td>Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Former Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>FSQP</td>
<td>Fundamental School Quality Project</td>
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<td>GB</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
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<td>GEP</td>
<td>Global education policy</td>
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<td>GFFTL</td>
<td>Grupo Feto FoinSae Timor LoroSae</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<td>GPA</td>
<td>Governance and Public Administration</td>
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<td>HCNM</td>
<td>Higher Commissioner for National Minorities</td>
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<td>HE</td>
<td>Higher Education</td>
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<td>International Civilian Office</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INEE</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies</td>
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<td>INFORDEPE</td>
<td>National Institute for Training of Teachers and Education Professionals</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International organization</td>
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<td>IPE</td>
<td>International Political Economy</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<td>IRCT</td>
<td>International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims</td>
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<td>ISF</td>
<td>International Stabilisation Force</td>
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<td>ISSRR</td>
<td>Internal Security Sector Review Report</td>
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<td>JAM</td>
<td>Joint Assessment Mission</td>
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<td>JCEE</td>
<td>Joint Civil Committee of Education</td>
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<td>JIAS</td>
<td>Joint Interim Administration Structure</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japanese International Co-operation Agency</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRS</td>
<td>Jesuit Refugee Service</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<td>KPC</td>
<td>Kosovo Protection Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPD</td>
<td>Kosovo Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDK</td>
<td>Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves</td>
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<tr>
<td>MECYS</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sports</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEST</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Science and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic and Co-operation Development</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund</td>
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<td>PBGs</td>
<td>Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals</td>
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<td>PDK</td>
<td>Partia Demokratike e Kosoves</td>
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<td>PIO</td>
<td>Principal International Officer</td>
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<td>PISG</td>
<td>Provisional Institutions of Self-Government</td>
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<td>PPE</td>
<td>Public-private partnerships</td>
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<td>RAE</td>
<td>Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian</td>
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<td>SRSR</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>SSRP</td>
<td>School System Revitalization Programme</td>
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<td>TFET</td>
<td>Trust Fund for East Timor</td>
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<td>TVET</td>
<td>Technical and vocational education training</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary-General</td>
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<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNATIL</td>
<td>National University of East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific, Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Support of East Timor</td>
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<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
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<td>UNOTIL</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Timor-Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WCA</td>
<td>World Culture Analysis</td>
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<td>WCP</td>
<td>World Culture Polity</td>
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<td>WCT</td>
<td>World Culture Theory</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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INTRODUCTION

1. EDUCATION IN INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS: RELEVANCE, PUZZLE AND FOCUS

Armed conflict swept Kosovo and East Timor during the second half of the 1990s: in a few months both countries saw the destruction of war and the onset of major international efforts at reconstruction. Kosovo and East Timor became testing grounds for the first all-encompassing international interim administrations under the aegis of the United Nations. The aim of both UN missions was to build both the state and peace. As local actors were deemed to lack the capacity to govern the state- and peace-building processes, the UN assumed full authority, with administrative, legislative and executive tasks. Self-government would be gradually possible after a transitional phase.

The path turned out to be less smooth than expected: at the end it saw the emergence of two fledgling independent states, whose population is among the youngest in the world. My interest in the role that education played in these processes is rooted in this historical circumstance, whereby new polities were internationally assisted in addressing the challenge of simultaneously building the nation and the state while ensuring domestic and international peace and stability.

The provision of education has been one of the core functions of the modern state. Behind education one finds the imagining of the national community (Anderson 1991), as well as the building of citizenship and social cohesion: ultimately, education prepares the labour force for the national economy (Dale 1989). While in pre-modern times education was a prerogative of religious institutions, the rise of the modern state in Europe sees the state apparatus embark on its own education effort, sometimes parallel to religious
schools, colleges and universities, sometimes more assertively establishing its own
education systems. The Western powers expanded through colonial conquest, exporting
the state, including its education apparatus (Badie 2000).

The congruence that historically exists between the emergence of the nation-state
and the spreading of public education programs has been challenged by processes of
globalization and new trajectories of state-making, with the emergence of various forms
of hybrid governance that pose a limit to both the autonomy and sovereignty of the state
(Dale 1999). The relative decline in the number of civil wars registered since the early
1990s is accompanied by the emergence of ‘post-interventionary societies’, that constitute
a distinctive political space in which external agencies reshape the delivery of core
services in a long-term perspective (Duffield 2008).

Post-conflict education reform is, in this context, part of a wider process of
building institutions and establishing a lasting peace in ‘fragile’ and post-conflict
contexts: Kosovo, East Timor, and post-invasion Iraq are transformed into ‘governance
states’ (Duffield 2008), namely polities that are (re-)constructed through a coordination of
international efforts, with varying degrees of United Nations involvement. The set of
changes associated with the process of (re-)building the state is typically conceived,
supported, and implemented by a plethora of external actors (Jones 2012). In these
settings, education is usually regarded as part of developmental activities – i.e., those
programs that help to tackle the damage caused by armed hostilities, and assist in the
reconciliation process in a perspective of long-term stabilization and peace.

Only in recent years have UN agencies started to recognize the specific role that
education plays in the precarious environment in which post-conflict peacebuilding
processes take place. The multiplicity of roles that education plays in conflict and post-
conflict settings has come under scrutiny (Paulson 2008). The focus has shifted from
‘education in emergencies and humanitarian responses’ (including the protection of
children) to the role that education has in the prevention of the relapse into violent conflict, and the contribution that it can make to establishing a long-lasting peace.

The debate on the complex nexus that exists among education, conflict and peace in postwar contexts has received growing attention both on the part of policy and academic milieux (Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Davies 2004). Leading international agencies have committed significant resources that has been earmarked for education reconstruction in emergencies, fragile states, and conflict-affected contexts. In education studies, some scholars have focussed on the nexus between education in war/post-war settings and social change, seeking to identify paths to sustainable peace (Novelli 2010; Novelli and Smith 2011; Breidlid 2010).

A step ahead was the establishment in 2007 by the Geneva-based UN Global Education Cluster led by the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and Save the Children within the Peacebuilding Fund framework (PBF). Although education was not given priority in the PBF operational mode, subsequent developments, such as the objectives that were formulated in the Millennium Development Goals and later launched by the ‘Incheon Declaration Framework for Action Education for inclusive and equitable quality education and lifelong learning for all by 2030’ - offer a clear illustration of the increasing significance that the international community attaches to assisting the education sector in conflict and post-conflict settings.

In this regard, in 2011 the United Nations Educational, Scientific, Cultural Organization (UNESCO) called for a joint effort to unlock “[t]he full potential of education to act as a force for peace” (UNESCO 2011: ii). In a similar vein, growing recognition of the specificity of post-conflict contexts came from the World Bank (WB). In a 2005 report on education, one can read that:

1 Moreover, education has been recognized as essential in order to reach other Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) such as health, nutrition, gender equality, child survival, environment sustainability and poverty reduction (DFID 2011: 22).

2 Nevertheless, despite growing recognition of its role in emergency and humanitarian response, education still receives two per cent of global humanitarian aid (UNESCO 2011).
Educational programming in post-conflict societies cannot be business as usual. Education has a critical role to play in the wider reconstruction of the society, from building peace and social cohesion to facilitating economic recovery and getting the country onto an accelerated development track (World Bank 2005: 27).

Education and education systems have to do with conceiving the future of a nation, of a polity and its demos: it comes as no surprise that in deeply divided societies they represent a critical challenge for statebuilding. Here an apparent paradox emerges: the field of education rarely appears in peace agreements (Dupuy 2008). Post-war education has for long time been framed as an emergency and early reconstruction imperative, while its reform has been typically postponed to the medium and long term planning, when international aid funds tend to evaporate.

Much of the existing literature on education and conflict has focused narrowly on an instrumentalist exploration of the role of education along the axis conflict/peace: the two faces of education – namely, that education can prevent war, but also foster violent conflict – and education as service delivery, consequently neglecting the complex links between education, statebuilding and peacebuilding. Moreover, one should consider that the large majority of studies on education and conflict are policy-oriented ‘grey literature’, which typically adopts a narrow, technically conceived problem-solving approach, and an unproblematised state-centric perspective, in which transnational power relations and their role/impact on nationally shaped policies are often overlooked (Novelli and Lopes Cardozo 2008).

Having said that, it is a fact that in the past few years a growing number of scholars have embarked on the study of how education can contribute to broader social change, societal transformations and sustainable peace by acknowledging the many faces of education in war and post-war settings (Novelli 2010; Lopes Cardozo 2013; Pherali 2013; Shah 2013; Breidlid 2013). Concomitantly, the focus on the role of education in
peacebuilding has become more explicit in the agenda of international agencies as well (Novelli and Smith 2011). Once the limitations of democratization, good governance, liberalization, and security (or perhaps ‘securitization’) became evident, education seemed to take center stage as next key policy concept, and as the new strategic sector for consideration when setting priorities for peacebuilding missions.

Notwithstanding this, little research, if any, has empirically explored the link between the education sector under assistance/reconstruction in a given context, the type of state and the quality of the peace that such an effort reflects and constitutes. In other terms, while a vast body of literature today exists on education and violent conflict, less attention has been devoted to the role of education in peacebuilding and statebuilding. Above all, little research has been conducted on the type of the education systems that have been rebuilt (or reformed) in the context of statebuilding/peacebuilding missions. Accordingly, we know little about the specific role of international actors in this sector.

This gap is evident in the literature dealing with post-war international interventions. The past two decades have seen a veritable proliferation of practitioner and academic debates over peacebuilding and statebuilding, focussing on the nature, processes and outcomes of international interventions in managing violent conflict, stabilizing weak and fragile states in the Global South, seeking to achieve peace in divided post-war societies. The means and practices adopted by international governance in leading entire nations through ambitious social engineering attempts have raised a number of issues regarding the boundaries, the porosities and the promiscuities of authority and sovereignty (Chandler 2010, Hameiri 2010). In those debates regarding conflict, peacebuilding and statebuilding one sees virtually no engagement with and reflection upon the place and role of education, a circumstance that might implicitly suggest the drawing of a delinkage between education on the one hand and peace and state on the other.
While the virtual absence of education in the scholarly peacebuilding debate reflects a condition of marginality on the ground that many agencies are committed to overcome, one must note that the actual processes of building peace in weak and post-conflict states provided plenty of space and rationales for substantial intervention on education. Although when discussing with an international official employed in a peacebuilding mission one is likely to hear the justification of the sidelining of education from the peacebuilding/statebuilding agenda on the basis of the idea that education is a ‘national prerogative’ – i.e., a primary domain of sovereign states - the reality one encounters on the ground blatantly contradicts such a claim: one can speak instead of a conspicuous multi-spatial and multi-level engagement of international actors in education reform. This is most evident in that specific type of statebuilding context represented by post-war UN protectorates or interim administrations.

The multi-scalar international commitment to education that one can observe in statebuilding interventions is to be understood as part of a process of a larger and more substantial change (one may say erosion) of the symbiotic relationship that historically exists between the state and education. Such an erosion is supported and complemented by discursive practices that define post-conflict and conflict-affected states as failed, weak, fragile entities, thus unable to provide/deliver basic services to their population – and being disqualified from sovereignty. Moreover, the chance is fuelled by broader processes of globalization, de-territorialization, decentralization, deregulation, privatization, and liberalization, all of which have a profound impact on national education. Finally, to understand ongoing transformations in the nexus state-education one needs to consider how policy statebuilding practices focus narrowly on formal institutions, thereby reducing the relationship between education and the state to one of service provision.³

³ Without overlooking the role and impact of non-state actors/processes on education, my research is
The present research hypothesizes that the consolidated nexus between education and the state that one observes during the process of Western state formation is evolving, and that one can observe this change by studying new states emerging out of wars in the 21st century. This thesis focuses on the ways in which a variety of international and local actors shape national education systems in new-born states, on those challenges that the making of education systems encounters in post-war settings today, and on the type of peace and state education reflects and constitutes.

My research intends to look into the extent to (and the ways through) which agenda-setting in educational reform in unstable peripheries could illuminate the re-articulation of wider global education agendas. It tries to do so by examining the specific context of communities and societies constituting themselves into sovereign nation-states in the aftermath of a war. The thesis is premised on a logic of comparison and contrast, which delves into how varying configurations of education systems reflect, affect and are affected by contingent processes of statebuilding and peacebuilding, contributing in one way or another to such processes. In examining the model and role of education in statebuilding and peacebuilding, it recognizes the complex interaction with and embeddedness of education in broader social, political and economic settings.

To map changes and challenges I have conducted fieldwork in Kosovo and East Timor, two cases where major statebuilding and peacebuilding processes were launched in the end of the 1990s. I consider Kosovo and East Timor as best examples for exploring this field, given the fact that in these new states the commitment of international actors to building peace has been full-fledged and all-encompassing from day one.

2. RESEARCH GOALS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

premised on the persuasion that one needs to bring back the issue of the state in relation to education and vice-versa, in ways that takes into consideration the above-mentioned broader processes, the nature of the state, the functions of education therein, critically reflecting upon the changing and changed relationship between the two.
This is not a research project on ‘peace education’, nor one generically focussing on ‘education and conflict’: rather, this is a project on the specific role of education systems in peacebuilding and statebuilding, and on the role of international actors therein. Peace education programmes (however they are defined or identified) and the relationship between education and conflict fall within the perimeter of this research, where I focus on the specificity of post-war settings or, better said, on the challenges and potentialities of building education systems in a context of peacebuilding and statebuilding.

The research examines the moment of rebuilding education systems after the cessation of hostilities, a phase that is usually defined as ‘post-conflict’. However, I should specify that the post- prefix is a misnomer, since these societies even years after the war remain either conflict-affected (as is the case of East Timor) or conflict-frozen [or both, as it is the the case of Kosovo] (Junne and Verkoren 2005).

In a seminal historical-sociological study, Green (1990) shed light on the role that education played in the process of state-formation and nation-building in three Western liberal democracies (UK, France and the US): he underlined that, as a state-led mechanism, education was employed to cultivate social cohesion, citizenship, and build national culture and identity. The construction of a national education system has, thus, been a key feature of state formation and cohesion: but how powerful and exemplary is this historical trajectory in shaping today’s course of new education systems? Can the building/re-building of education systems in those new states that today emerge from armed conflicts and civil wars perform the same functions?

This research seeks to contribute to the development of a critical research agenda on education, conflict and peacebuilding (Novelli 2010). It seeks to explore the existence of externally induced models of education systems in post-conflict newly emerging states, first of all by studying the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of education aid and reforms as part of major international statebuilding efforts; it will then examine and analyse its implications for
statebuilding and peacebuilding. By adopting an approach that has both explanatory and interpretive intentions, the project also aims to shed light on how new policy agendas and transnational power relations are changing the state, and what role education plays in characterizing new states that have emerged out of war.

By looking into education in terms of examining and analysing the roles and functions that it is expected to perform, I investigate the nexus between building education, building the state and building peace; finally, I reflect upon the implications for current practices of statebuilding, state formation and agenda-setting/making in education reform.

My specific aim is to contribute to the study of a decade of international statebuilding, of which Kosovo and East Timor can be seen as important testing grounds that proceed in parallel, from a relatively unusual angle: education. What are the lessons that can be learnt about the role that education plays in statebuilding and peacebuilding and – more generally – what transformations can be observed in new states about the relation among state formation, education and peace?

I should probably caution the reader about the fact that I do not aim to dissect statebuilding/peacebuilding interventions to find an answer to the question of whether they are successful or not in building states and consolidating peace, by highlighting the detectable contribution that education might make to such processes: this operation would involve benchmarking outcomes against a fictional, ideal-typical view of what states and peace should look like. By contrast, I intend to study the nexuses that exist between education, the state and peace by asking questions such as the following: what forms of statehood and peace process are interventions in education contributing to produce, consolidate and legitimize?

The main research question, therefore, is: when a new state emerges under the aegis of international statebuilding, in a situation in which society is divided by a recent
history of armed conflict, what types of externally-assisted education systems have emerged, and how do they reflect and affect statebuilding and peacebuilding? Put another way, how does the building of education systems after today’s armed conflicts affect the building of new states and the building of peace?

This research is articulated along three objectives, which try to respond to three aspects of the main research question, i.e., the model of education systems emerging, their relationship with peacebuilding and statebuilding, the governance of education reform and the role of international actors therein. First, it seeks to investigate, analyse and conceptualize the different models of education systems that have been promoted by international and local actors in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999-2014; it does so by keeping an eye on how the process has unfolded and the rationales behind given choices. As the empirical chapters will show, international and local actors have interacted in contingent ways in each of the settings explaining differences not just by merely referring to contextual differences. On the other hand, global discourses and agendas have played a role in explaining similarities in intervention or outcome despite the contextual differences. Most of the questions addressing the first objective do not only illuminate patterns in education reform, they also incorporate some elements of a social justice framework that will be useful when investigating the relationship between education and peacebuilding (as part of the second objective). More specifically, some of the questions that I will try to answer with regard to the politics and the process of education reform include:

- In the emerging model of education what is the emphasis put on the different levels/forms/types of education (primary vs. higher education; formal vs. non-formal; private vs. public)?
- What is the focus of curriculum development and content?
- Is it relevant for the students and the broader society?
- To what extent the current system has assured equality in access (in terms of male vs. female; urban vs. rural)?
- How is the 'employment issue' reflected in education?
- How is education linked to the structure of the economy, and what economic structure does education reflect or legitimize?

Second, it seeks to explore and examine the relationship between education, peace and state in a context of peacebuilding and statebuilding. It does so by looking at specific issues at the level of formal education – curriculum reform and content; the language issue; the degree of equal access of educational provision; the structure of educational provision – that have a link in contributing and constituting a peace process in terms of identity and nation building; social cohesion and justice; reconciliation; citizenship and skill building. In addressing such a relationship, it tries to reveal what has been the understanding of peace(building) among different actors that have been involved in the education sector, and whether there has been a consensual understanding of it. Moreover, it tries to understand if (and what) peacebuilding principles have been incorporated in educational reform and programming. As part of this objective I seek to examine the relationship between education and the state in a context of statebuilding and longer-term state formation. Some of the questions addressing the content of formal education and the broader functions of education are:

- Has education interacted with (root causes of) the war? If so, how and in which ways is this reflected in curriculum reform?
- Is education interacting with (or addressing) proximate micro-triggers of current/future violence? If so, how?
- Has the (post-) conflict specificity been reflected in educational reform/programming? If so, how?

- Has conflict analysis been incorporated in educational reform?

- Has education addressed existing divisions and cleavages in the society? If so, how?

- Which aspects of peacebuilding has education directly and indirectly addressed?

- What is education telling us about the type of peace that is being built?

- How and what structures of power and social processes is education legitimizing, reinforcing, constituting, reproducing, or questioning?

- Which functions is education envisaged to perform in new, small, peripheral states?

- Whose interests it mirrors?

- What does it tell about state/society and state/citizens relationships?

Third, it aims at mapping the commitment and role of international actors in educational reform. In this regard, it seeks to understand if the approach to education by key international agencies has changed over a decade of debate and practice of statebuilding and peacebuilding. Furthermore, the ever-evolving relationship between the multiplicity of international and local actors in education governance is put under scrutiny. Ultimately, by looking at international practices as translated in local, post-conflict, protectorate-type settings, it reflects upon the articulation of global agendas that are shaping education reforms in precarious and conflictual peripheries. More specifically, the key questions focussing on the politics of education governance are:

- How has the governance of education changed in a decade of international intervention?

- In other words, what has been the role of international agencies and whether and how it has changed in more than one decade?
- Is it possible to identify patterns among different donors in terms of focus and type of assistance in the education sector?

- Has the relationship between donors and local stakeholders changed over time?

- If so, to what extent decisions and interventions have been determined by institutional strategies or individual choices/leadership?

- What is the degree of consensus and/or confrontation within and among such institutions?

- What is the role played by other social forces in terms of contesting or complying to dominant agendas and discourses? Can we identify sites of resistance and agency for social change and justice in which an alternative vision and discourse on education is elaborated?

- What do the articulations of agendas in the peripheries tell us about the re-articulation of agendas at the core?

3. OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION

The first chapter is divided into three parts. By focusing on the changed nexus state-education, it reviews those strands of literature dealing with forms and modes of national education in a globalized world. It seeks to shed light on those macro processes such as peacebuilding and statebuilding within which post-conflict education reform and governance are embedded. While seeking to bridge existing debates that usually do not communicate with each other, it identifies conceptual building blocks that are relevant for the first part of my research question. As this part of the chapter shows, while the ways through which globalisation affects education is increasingly investigated, little or nothing has been said on how externally-driven processes of peacebuilding and statebuilding affect education.
By inverting the perspective, the second part of chapter one looks at how education affects macro-processes of war, peacebuilding and statebuilding. It develops a framework that guides my investigation as far as the second part of research question is concerned. By reviewing the literature on conflict, peace and social change, this part illuminates the multiple faces of education in post-conflict and conflict-affected settings and the multifaceted ways in which education can affect conflict and peace(building). Finally, the third part sets out the conceptual and analytical lenses for my empirical investigation.

Chapter two presents the methodological framework and the research design of this thesis. It lays out the epistemological and ontological foundations of my research, which rests upon critical realism. The research combines different methods of inquiry: it develops a multi-sited based analysis of two case studies which are selected upon the international engagement to education reform in post-war statebuilding interventions, by comparing and contrasting engagement to education reform and governance. Empirical investigation makes use of ethnographic fieldwork based on semi-structured and informal interviews. Other methods of data collection and analysis include genealogical historical narrative with a focus on processes, cultural political economy analysis, conflict analysis and sensitivity to discursive practices.

Chapter three sets the issue of the Kosovo conflict in its historical context. It particularly focuses on the international intervention in the aftermath of the war, by focusing on the peacebuilding and statebuilding models that the international community in interaction with local elites have produced on the ground. It highlights how a particular kind of conflict analysis had implications for the peacebuilding model that prevailed in Kosovo. It concludes that the main perspective that has shaped international efforts in strengthening state institutions and preventing the relapse into violent conflict has been
one in which the ethnic dimension has been emphasised, while the structural development *problematique* has been largely overlooked.

This perspective has also implications for the reform of post-war education in Kosovo, as examined by Chapter four. In this chapter, education’s intertwining with conflict causes and its centrality to processes of state formation and nation building is set within an historical perspective. Post-war education reform is then analysed with a specific focus on the role of international actors therein. A liberal peace strongly focusing on stability and security and an excessive emphasis on equal collective rights and extensive decentralised autonomy for the different communities, has made education segregation the *de facto* strategy of choice for international actors too, and the reality on the ground. While being one of the sectors most permeable to external intervention in post-war Kosovo (and, more specifically, one of the most marginal in the peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda), education has reflected and reproduced a model of segregated peace, a contested process of statehood set within a framework of externally-promoted, market-based limited state: in this context, inter-ethnic interaction looks like a chimera. Moreover, a ‘reversed pattern’ of ethnic and spatial segregation of education makes this sector a rather problematic foundation for a just and sustainable peace.

Chapter five moves on to the second case study, and starts by showing how, for most of its modern history, East Timor has been shaped by external actors and factors. It critically analyses external interventions patterns – within and outside the UN mandate – and it shows how statebuilding intervention was underpinned by lack of conflict analysis, a circumstance that led to a lack of peacebuilding and reconciliation activities in the first years of the international intervention. The narrow focus on liberal statebuilding has produced a state prone to cyclical political crisis, and a virtual peace that is disconnected by the everyday life experiences and welfare requirements of the Timorese citizens.
Chapter six looks into the politics of education reconstruction following East Timor’s infrastructural and institutional destruction by Indonesia. It then analyses the hybrid governance of local and international actors that have shaped education reform in post-conflict East Timor. More specifically, it investigates the relationship between education, peacebuilding and statebuilding by focusing on those conflictual aspects of curriculum reform such as language, history and religion. The chapter concludes that here too education has been on the margins of the peacebuilding/statebuilding process: the sector is today an example of complex hybrid governance, where the multiplicity of actors involved in various forms of intervention allow to see education as a site of contestation among different agendas.

Finally, Chapter seven elaborates on evidence and insights stemming from both cases, putting in comparative perspective the hybrid governance of education reform, peacebuilding and statebuilding. It shows that, despite the fact that similar international administrations were established (or better deployed), they led to different forms of statehood. Different conflict analysis assumptions and frameworks were employed in each case, yet in both – East Timor and Kosovo – peacebuilding amounts to a form of stability, or negative peace, rather than carrying the seeds of transformatory and emancipatory, positive peace. In both cases, education has been marginal to the peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas. Rather than affecting the state and peace, educations reflects and reinforces some of the pitfalls and the dilemmas of statebuilding and peacebuilding.
Chapter one

Globalised Education between Peacebuilding and Statebuilding

This chapter is structured in three parts. First, I focus on the nexus state-education in the context of globalisation and global governance, with specific attention to peacebuilding and statebuilding. I review those strands of literature dealing with forms and modes of national education in a globalized world: this means shedding light on those processes of international interventions aiming to build peaceful states within which education reform takes place (and which have an impact on education systems and programs). This review effort is particularly challenging, as it attempts to put into communication work that usually do not communicate across disciplines and thematic perimeters: the literature on globalisation (and education) on the one hand, and the literature on peacebuilding and statebuilding on the other. By addressing a gap, I believe that such an effort to build bridges has some merit of its own.

The second part of the present chapter inverts the perspective, and looks at how education, in its turn, affects macro-processes of war/conflict, peacebuilding/statebuilding/state formation: its use for the purpose of this study lies in its developing a framework that guides my investigation as far as the second part of my research question is concerned (i.e., the kind of peace and state that education reflects and the ways it affects them). This part therefore reviews the literature dealing with education, conflict, peace and social change: it is about the multiple faces and facets of education in post-conflict and conflict-affected settings, and the multifaceted ways in which education can affect conflict and peace(building). Finally, the third part of this chapter, distils the conceptual and analytical lenses through which I will investigate the reform of education and the ways through which education reflects and affects the building of a just and
Part One: How Education is Affected by the Macro-Processes of Globalisation, Peacebuilding and Statebuilding

This first section reviews the existing debates on macro processes that affect national education systems. It is useful because it builds conceptual blocks that guide the investigation as far as the first part of my research question is concerned (i.e., the kind of education models emerging in post-conflict settings within a globalized world). While how globalisation has affected education is extensively investigated in literature, little or nothing has been said on how externally assisted peacebuilding and statebuilding affect education. Beside looking at gaps in the literature, this part of the review aims to locate education within broader macro-processes.
A small but growing body of literature (that will be explored in depth in the second part of this chapter) has looked into the complex role of education in fragile states and the conditions under which it may contribute to peacebuilding; however, there exists a gap concerning the models (e.g., the type) of education systems whose building is often observed in those specific contexts that emerge from armed conflict and are made object of external interventions. Along with it, the question of how this might signal, on a broader historical trajectory, changes in the relation between education and the state, and how education has to do with peace and state(hood) is virtually absent in the literature.

1.1 The globalisation of education policies

In the past decade a growing number of scholars have focused on education and global governance, analyzing the increasingly global nature of education agenda-setting and policy-making/implementation. A range of similar education reforms, policies and programmes such as “[c]hild-centred pedagogies, school-based management, teachers’ accountability, public-private partnerships or conditional-cash transfer schemes” are being implemented world-wide in very different local contexts leading practitioners and scholars to define them as “global education policies” (GEP) (Verger et al. 2012: 3).

The development of education policies and agendas at the international, global, supra-national level and their transplantation into the local level has been defined within the field of comparative education in many ways such as “[p]olicy diffusion, policy borrowing, policy transfer, policy travelling, isomorphism or convergence” (Verger et al. 2012: 3). Yet the literature on education policy borrowing or transfer has not focused enough on ways, rationales and effects of globalisation into education policies and politics. The focus has been on the international rather than global dimension of given education policies, and the ways through which such policies transfer and transplant from one national context to the other one, without providing an account of the agents, interests
and power relationships at play.

Another limitation of the policy transfer literature lies in the binary and dichotomous relationship between the international and local level (and unit) of analysis, representing them quite simplicitely as separate layers rather than mutually constitutive of (and in) the educational governance (Mukhopadhyay et al. 2011; Robertson 2012). Robertson (2012) suggests replacing the concept of level of analysis with the concept of scale. In this regard, using scale allows a conception of space that is fluid and a changing product of social relations and struggles, where both the local and the global are intertwined and mutually constituted and embedded.

In most of the research on global education policies the re-territorialization of education policies and models is regarded as happening a-priori, without providing a rich empirical account of the interplay between global(isation) processes and the re-contextualisation of education policies at the local level. Thus, very often, the failure of implementation of global education policies at the local level or the discrepancy between global education policies/agendas and their implementation or outcome at the local level is attributed to contextual differences or local backwardedness/incapacity to comply with global standards/trends, overlooking issues of agency and power.

Only recently have a number of scholars departing from a range of different theoretical perspectives started to address the gaps inherent in the mainstream comparative education literature by seeking to critically analyse the reasons, factors and agents behind the globalisation of education policy, and the ways, structures and events through which a global education policy agenda is being constituted at the supra-national level while being contextualized at the local level: such scholars have paid attention to the effects of these developments (Verger et al. 2012; Sobe 2015, Robertson and Dale 2015). Here, particular emphasis is laid on the role of international organizations and other political (state or non-state actors) actors to shape and disseminate education policies
globally and the ways through which local contexts reply, comply, or resist such policies. Underpinning this recent critical research is the broader idea that “[p]rocesses of globalisation have drastically altered the education policy landscape across the world and, more particularly, in the context of developing countries” (Verger et al. 2012: 4).

Developing countries and their policy landscapes are highly penetrated by global agendas as they are more dependent on aid, foreign expertise and information (Rose 2007). In such countries the multiplicity of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), international organisations (IOs) and donor agencies have the material and ideational capacities to set agendas and priorities.

1.1.1 The definition of globalisation and how it affects education policy

Globalisation can be seen as “[a] constitutive process of increasing interdependence between people, territories and organisations in the economic, political and cultural domains. The dominant processes of globalisation can be characterized as hyper-liberalism in the economic domain, governance without government in the political domain, and commodification and consumerism in the cultural domain” (Verger et al. 2012: 5).

In critically reflecting upon the impact and effects of globalisation on education, Bonal and Rambla argue that “[g]lobalisation has served as a catalyst for the introduction of new discourses, new practices and new agendas [...] In the name of globalisation we have seen the replacement and emergence of paradigms in the field of development policies, changes which have also affected the sphere of educational investment priorities and strategies” (2009: 144). Globalisation has defined new problems that education policy has to address such as the transformation of the labour market and the emphasis put on knowledge-based economy/society. Within this competitive environment that
requires knowledge-intense products and labour, states need not just to expand education but also re-organise it around new skills, competences or concepts such as flexibility (Carnoy 1999 quoted in Verger et al. 2012). States, however, are increasingly complemented by the creation of a (trans)national private market of education provision that often is in competition with them. This private market of education provision not only alters state functions in education provision; it also alters conventional functions of education provision such as nation building (Robertson et al. 2002).

Globalisation also affects state capacities to address education problems or non-education problems through education policy. In this new context, the role of other international actors, below, above and beyond state level that are involved in education policy-making and implementation such as the World Bank, UNESCO, Organization for Economic and Co-operation and Development (OECD), UNICEF, among others, becomes prominent; other actors that have been increasingly involved in education policy-making are non-governmental organisations such as transnational companies/firms, international consultants/experts, or transnational advocacy coalitions (Verger et al. 2012: 6, Robertson et al. 2012).

This plethora of different international players has the capacity and power – through funding mechanisms and aid conditionality – to settle education agendas at the supra-national level and to define countries’ priorities, thus promoting certain education policies. Susan Robertson has defined this as the deterritorialisation of the education policy process with the national state loosing its historical centrality in education processes (Robertson 2012).

The displacement and redefinition of the scale and space through which education policy is formulated, disseminated and implemented at the international/global level has also had a normative dimension concerning the transformation of the legal framework of states that are members within different international organisations. Bonal and Rambla
contend that “[g]lobalisation has consequences for the displacement of explanatory and normative frames of reference at a national or global level, but it also has consequences through legitimising, in the name of globalisation, particular types of political strategy and models of governance which are defined as necessary and appropriate” (Bonal and Rambla 2009: 155).

Some of these education policy ideas and proposals represent “[t]he introduction of market mechanisms and logics (choice, competition, decentralisation), [and] the liberalisation and privatisation of the education sector” which are underpinned by an hegemonic agenda of neoliberal ideology (Verger et al. 2012: 7). However, globalisation has also paved the way for and stimulated the development of transnational social justice movements and advocacy coalition campaigns for establishing education as a human right and a global public good. Moreover, some of these movements have contested the expansion of neoliberalism in education and the neoliberalisation of education (Novelli and Ferus-Comelo 2010). To conclude, as Verger, Novelli and Altinyelken have suggested, globalisation has to be seen as a new (conflicting) terrain, which redefines the education problems and priorities and the scale where they are addressed:

It defines the problems to be addressed and, at the same time, alters the capacity of the states to respond to these problems by themselves; it empowers international actors and makes the transnational organisation of policy networks more pressing; and it is a strategically selective and conflicting terrain for educational policy-making, which is more conducive to certain educational policy ideas and political actors than others (Verger et al. 2012: 7).

1.1.2 Theoretical perspectives on national education systems in a globalized world

The relationship between global education models/trends/policies and national education systems and the effects of globalisation on education has generated a number of debates. Such debates, in turn, are animated by positions that are indebted to a number of theoretical perspectives within the broad field of comparative and international education
studies. These perspectives can be represented along a continuum: on one side, we have neo-institutionalist approaches, represented by the ‘World Society’ Theory (or World Culture Theory [WCT] or World Culture Polity [WCP]); on the other extreme we find international political economy approaches, represented by the ‘Globally Structured Agenda for Education’ and the ‘Critical Cultural Political Economy of Education’ analysis.

In different degrees and ways, all of these perspectives seek to describe, analyze and/or explain how global education models and trends travel, transplant, diffuse or translate and how they are adopted/assimilated within national education systems. They differ, however, in a number of aspects, beginning with the different normative value they put on globalisation (its effects on education, the focus on different cultural, economic and political factors that contribute to the globalization of education) to the emphasis they lay on norms, agency and power.

World society scholars – having a central position among comparative education studies investigating globalisation and education – argue that a global model of schooling exists, has spread around the world and it is part of the diffusion of a culturally embedded model of the modern (Western) nation-state (Anderson-Levitt 2003) or an international ideal type of rationalized and bureaucratic state (Drezner 2001).

Put differently, this theory postulates the existence of “[a] ‘world culture’, or ‘world polity’, [which] constitutes a universal transnational, cultural environment, and it is the existence of this common symbolic universe that explains the apparent worldwide convergence of conceptions of education. This symbolic universe is based on the values and propositions of Western modernity, which frame conceptions of both state and individual, especially through the ‘scripts’ that they provide for states in terms of education” (Robertson and Dale 2015: 157).

Expanding schooling is part of conforming and converging to world models of the
organisation of sovereignty (Meyer et al. 1997 quoted in Verger et al. 2012: 11). Education, in the view of world society scholars, is a key sector for national governments to show to the international community that they are building a modern nation-state (external legitimacy), whose building and provision contributes to the consolidation of an internal type of legitimacy vis-à-vis their own constituencies. World society scholars are not focused on education policy change or specific forms of education models and reform. Their main point is not whether state policy (including education) is exogenously influenced, but that the state is an exogenously constructed entity (Verger et al. 2012: 12).

In trying to understand what explains educational models and change worldwide, the world culture debate has emphasised specifically the existence of convergence towards global models. In this regard, it can be seen as a valuable theory as far as accounting for the isomorphism that exists at the global level (i.e., similar education systems/models/conceptions despite the contextual differences) is concerned. One of the underlying assumptions is that convergence is enacted through the consensual diffusion of cultural norms or models.

World culture theorists have focused on a number of education ‘models’ that have been identified by many scholars as central to the diffusion of the neoliberal ideology in education. Such models (or trends) are (1) decentralisation, devolution, privatisation and marketisation of education; (2) standardisation of curriculum with math and science emphasised; (3) a rise in national education assessment and international testing; (4) evidence-based education policy; (5) managerialism and rationalisation of universities (Silova and Brehm 2015: 17).

Scholars such as Carney (2009) have used the concept of ‘policyscape’ to refer to a range of policy ideas and visions related to conceptions of the role of the state in education, the functions of education, etc., which are shared and used by a variety of international and local actors at various scales and which influence the ways these actors
think and implement education policy. According to him, a transnational policyscape underpinned by hyperliberalism is “[s]tandardising the flow of educational ideas internationally and changing fundamentally what education is and can be” (Carney 2009: 68).

While convincing in its explaining policy convergence, WCT has been criticised for what education anthropologists have defined as the disconnection of policy and practice, and global norms vis-à-vis local meanings (Anderson-Levitt 2003). Critics have pointed out that global policy scripts have not necessarily been adopted in local contexts as they seem, thus the impact of global scripts on policy outcomes needs reconsideration⁴ (Steiner-Khamsi 2004; Silova 2006 quoted in Silova and Brehm 2015: 10). A further line of critique has argued that power dynamics have been ignored in world culture analysis. Stromquist (2015) argues that one of the limitations of WCT is that it contends a conflict-free diffusion of values. It has denied agency (or at least has lacked a theory of agency) and reflective action within local and transnational contexts, and has overlooked the role of social struggles for change. Finally, WCT has at best overlooked, at worst denied the importance of the economic and political dimensions in and of the globalization of education (Stromquist 2015).

International Political Economy (IPE) approaches emphasise the role of economic drivers for educational change. For the Globally Structured Agenda for Education, the world capitalist economy is the driving force behind globalisation, and economic globalisation (and the related competitive pressure) is the main driving force behind the transformations occurring in education (Dale 2000). As mentioned above, globalisation has altered the problems faced by nation-states, and their capacity to respond to them (Dale 2000). It can be seen as a political force, that indirectly (rather than directly) affects

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⁴ By using Japan as a contrasting case in point, Jeremy Rappleye shows how the application of world culture to Japan or any other “insulated” case lead to a fundamental misunderstanding of a given contexts and its people (2015). Consensual convergence/application of global models are not what explains educational reform and change in the case of Japan, as in other contexts.
education by altering the structural conditions within which education change and reform take place (Verger et al. 2012: 13).

IPE approaches problematise the globalisation’s effects on education by critically investigating and highlighting the way through which neo-liberal and efficiency-driven types of reform in education are underscoring core principles in education such as equity (Carnoy 1999 quoted in Verger et al. 2012: 14). Moreover, such approaches bring to the fora the changing nature of state sovereignty by showing how fundamental education policies are being taken by international or transnational networks and organisations beyond the control of democratically elected institutions (Moutsios 2010 quoted in Verger et al. 2012).

Neo-institutionalist and international political economy approaches place different emphasis on the role of international organisations in agenda setting, transfer and policy convergence. For World Society scholars, IOs are Western modernising agents (quite always at the service of their nation states) that spread the Western system of political organisation and state authority (Meyer et al. 1992a quoted in Verger et al. 2012: 15). From an IPE angle, IOs spread particular views/ideas of education and educational reform, which are instrumental to the development of a neo-liberal and market-oriented economy, and are not to be seen as mere extension of nation states but have their own power and agenda. Indeed, World Society scholars overlook the many divergent and competing agendas and meanings of education agendas promoted by different international organisations. The way such organisations spread these views and the corresponding policies is through a range of policy mechanisms or global mechanisms of influence such as imposition, harmonisation, dissemination, standardisation, or the establishment of interdependence (Dale 1999).

Beyond international organisations, there are a number of other international actors, which by using norms, ideational and material capacities, influence educational
policy setting and making. They are knowledge-intensive and their main source of power relies on knowledge and ideas. Among them, the most relevant are networks of international consultants and policy entrepreneurs (Ball 2007, Robertson and Verger 2012), transnational civil society networks (Mundy et al. 2001) or international foundations.

Perhaps not surprisingly, but contrary to the absolute world convergence of education policy and practice that is highlighted by World Society scholars, empirical findings stemming from fieldwork show that globalisation does not have the same effects on education in all places (Robertson et al. 2006). In particular, Rappleye (2015) and Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe (2006) claim that policy ideas are transformed, indigenised or resisted while travelling and as they are implemented in different countries and contexts. This is first of all due to the fact that a policy - beyond its textual form - is and becomes part of a constantly mediated and disputed technical and political debate, which is always contingent and contextual (Verger et al. 2012: 23). Education policies are thus locally mediated by a plethora of international and local actors: they are re-contextualized through multiple processes across a range of different scales.

Scholars point out to four types of factors – material, political, cultural and scalar – that explain why the implementation of global education policies can be problematic across different settings. According to Steiner-Khamsi, failures in education reforms often are not due to technicalities, limited funding or the incapacity of recipient countries to implement them; they are rather due to “[t]he fundamental contradictions that arise when (policy) solutions are borrowed from educational systems where the problems are entirely different” (2010: 331).

1.1.3 Critical Cultural Political Economy of Education

The emphasis placed on the ‘world’ system made up of separate nation states
distinguishes WCT by the ‘structured education agenda’ approach (Dale 2000) which emphasises the importance and role of a number of transnational economic and political organizations, as well as global movements and practices. Most of these transnational organizations are representative of a global project of neo-liberalisation. The structured education agenda’s analysis is underpinned by a political-economy framework rather than a cultural one: “[t]he agenda for globalisation is seen as structured […] by a dominant conception of a global knowledge economy, into which all nation states are incorporated, more or less directly, and which all states are more or less strongly bound and free to interpret” (Robertson and Dale 2015: 158). The critical cultural political economy of education (CCPEE) departs from this approach and tries to address some of its limitations, such as the fact that the approach tends to reduce the economy to one form of economic organization (capitalism), do not incorporate the cultural in its analysis and like the other above-mentioned approaches it lacks “[a] sufficiently developed account of agency or of the basis of social change” (Robertson and Dale 2015: 158).

Both the structured education agenda and the CCPEE see globalization “[a]s a witting attempt by a range of national and transnational organisations to bring about a set of interventions around the globe aimed at extending the role of the market and reducing the role of national states” with effects on national education systems and models (Robertson and Dale 2015: 159). However, the expansion of capitalism or of the market cannot account alone for the globalisation of education processes worldwide. Other more cultural or political factors may in addition explain the globalisation of education, as well as education convergence and change. For example, the agenda of expansion of education around the world has been promoted by a cultural and political process which considers the increase of access at formal schooling a human right.

Building upon critical cultural political economy analysis (Jessop and Yin 2004a, 2004b; Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008; Jessop 2010) Susan Robertson and Roger Dale
(2015) have put forth an ambitious theoretical and methodological project – Critical, Cultural Political Economy of Education (CCPEE) – at the centre of which lies the study of education ensemble, the ways it is affected by and interacts with globalization, and its relationship with the political, the economic and the cultural, ultimately redefining each of these concepts in a non-hierarchical way. Here culture, politics and economics (relationships) in education are approached in critical and non-deterministic ways.

Robertson and Dale (2015) claim that other theoretical perspectives that have analysed the globalisation of education have only focused on one of the three elements (i.e., the cultural, the political or the economic) without incorporating all of them in the analysis. Therefore, the reading that such accounts offer of the structures, institutions and actors underpinning the education ensemble is partial not grasping/offering a picture of the ensemble in the complexity of its forms, scope and outcomes and limited often to the level of that which is visible, overlooking structural, but invisible, processes (Silova and Rappleye 2015: 6). This recent alternative approach aims to enable critique, action and education change.

For Novelli et al. (2013), CCPEE is first of all not a theory but a heuristic approach for engaging with the culture, politics and economics relationship in education; secondly, CCPEE constructively engages with culture-beyond-semiosis, and it links culture to materialist underpinnings albeit in open, non-deterministic ways; third, it constructively and critically engages with postmodernism/poststructuralism; lastly, CCPEE’s engagement with culture allows researchers to take the Globally Structured Education Agenda (Dale 2000) down to the micro-level and back up again (Burawoy 2009 quoted in Novelli et al. 2013).

Going beyond culture as semiosis or discourse may help avoid the risk of ignoring other cultural issues related to civilisational and identity aspects (Novelli et al. 2013). Moreover, the study of economy as capitalist and non-capitalist opens it up to a
comparison of use and exchange value. Finally, the study of the political as more than the state opens it up to comparisons of the different ways in which power shapes education and how power is embedded in different state and non-state actors directly or indirectly involved in education.

Common to this range of diverse comparative education perspectives (both mainstream and critical) is the emphasis put on globalisation and on the globalising effects on education policy, practice and pedagogy to the expense of other ongoing processes in the global South, such as violent processes of civil war, secessionism, and international interventions of peacekeeping/building and statebuilding that shape education.

The next two sections in this chapter will attempt to address such gaps by critically reviewing, the literature on peacebuilding and statebuilding one the one hand, and the literature on conflict and education (of which the scholarship on education, peacebuilding and social change is a recent add) on the other. This is done by putting at center stage how processes of war making, post-conflict reconstruction and statebuilding/peacebuilding impact on education and viceversa. Practitioner and scholarly contributions reviewing statebuilding and peacebuilding processes have only superficially touched upon the issue of education, relegating its role in the post-war peacebuilding architecture as one among several social services that needs to be re-established and provided, de facto disconnecting education from the broader and more complex relationship with processes of statebuilding and peacebuilding.

1.2 The omission of education in debates on statebuilding and peacebuilding interventions

The observable ‘erosion’ and the hypothesized ultimate transformation of what historically used to be a strong link between education and the state has become more
prominent and empirically detectable in post-war, fragile and conflict-affected settings. On the one hand, in such settings the state often is not able anymore to protect education from a multiplicity of attacks. On the other, such states are often exposed to interventionary processes, practices and agendas promoted by different international actors, such as emergency and humanitarian response, development assistance, peacebuilding, statebuilding, all having an impact on education and – one has to assume – on its relationship with the nation state.

Therefore, I argue that using a ‘globalisation/globalising’ lens is not enough for understanding the reform of education, its changing forms and functions, and the transformation of its liaisons with the nation state without incorporating broader processes in the analysis. For this reason, I will now specifically focus on the body of work that examines internationally mandated interventions to build peace in states that have been swept by war or that have been borne out of war. I argue that while this literature is useful for contextualizing education reform within a framework of peacebuilding and statebuilding practice(s), it is quite omissive when it comes to how education is affected by peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions and vice versa.

Any discussion on the complex relationship between education, statebuilding and peacebuilding in a post-conflict country should start from a consideration of the link between peacebuilding and statebuilding and their interchangeable use in discourse and merging in practice. As both peacebuilding and statebuilding aim to achieve similar results, they are often used interchangeably masking differences and contradictions (Campbell and Peterson 2013: 336).

According to Smith (2004: 28), international statebuilding and peacebuilding are pursued through similar set of activities. International interveners have often ignored fundamental differences between the two. While - theoretically speaking - statebuilding can potentially lead to peace, its focus on the building of formal institutions may be
expected to deflect attention from addressing structural causes of violence, which is a condition deemed necessary for the more emancipatory and sustainable peace that peacebuilding should theoretically contribute to build (Galtung 1996).

Some of the aspects that may make statebuilding unsuitable for promoting sustainable peace are the fact that it is ahistorical claiming to be technocratic rather than political (while in fact it is as much political as it is technocratic); statebuilding is often bureaucratic, fragmented and ‘project-ized’; ultimately, it is criticized for harboring a reductivist, state-centric conceptualization of peace (Campbell and Peterson 2013: 339-343). Indeed, critics mark a clear distinction between peacebuilding and statebuilding particularly on the last point; i.e., statebuilding reinforces “[t]he elitist notion that lodges legitimacy in authorities favoured by the ‘international community’, rather than in the customary social contracts and grounded legitimacy of socially meaningful institutions” (Pugh 2013: 17). From critical perspectives, the blurring of peacebuilding and statebuilding has become problematic: Richmond (2011: 46-50) notes that this is particularly the case in those contexts where the state does not hold the key to the social contract.

The case of Kosovo is emblematic in this respect, since the very existence of ‘which state’ has become one of the most problematic aspects of the post-conflict phase. As one of the most pervasive cases of peacebuilding enterprise, Kosovo could also be taken as an illustration of how the shift towards a statebuilding discourse (from independence onward) has been, to a large extent, a rhetorical attempt to hide and overcome failures of peacebuilding efforts during the previous decade (1999-2008). Although here one finds greater emphasis on building state institutions and strengthening the rule of law, power and decision-making remain in the hands of a plethora of international actors. In Kosovo, bolstering the state (which is expected to lead to greater stability in the country) and assisting political elites has also entailed the consolidation of
the grip on power on the part of predatory elites, coming to terms with them for the sake of stability defined as peace: Paris and Sisk refer to this situation as the peacebuilder’s contract dilemma (2009).

This situation highlights one of the many dilemmas that statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts encounter in countries emerging from armed hostilities. The dilemma exposes also one of the main critiques that scholars working from a critical perspective: the excessive attention that liberal peacebuilding agendas devote to rebuilding and enforcing formal state institutions in post-conflict countries rather than focusing more on the community, societal and individual level (Richmond 2011).

1.2.1 Liberal peacebuilding, peacebuilding from below and hybrid peace governance

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of the so-called new wars (Kaldor 1999; Duffield 2001) transformed the engagement of the international community in post-conflict areas. The post-Cold Era marked also a change in the UN approach to tackle war and restore peace, with peacekeeping and peacemaking missions and operations becoming increasingly complex. These missions would not just aim to stop war and violence, but they would also seek to restore and build conditions that are conducive to sustainable peace, by tackling the causes that brought to war and the consequences that the latter left behind. The paradigmatic shift in conflict resolution, supported by a number of UN documents such as the Agenda for Peace (1992) or the Brahimi Report (2000), would become known as peacebuilding, which is consistent with the taking shape of a liberal peace agenda. Supportive of peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts, peacebuilding seeks to address and to overcome structural contradictions that lie at the root of conflict (Galtung 1996).

In Boutros-Ghali’s report An Agenda for Peace (1992) peacebuilding is defined as “[post-conflict action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen..."
and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. The process comprises an overwhelming agenda of intervention, and it focuses on (but it is not limited to) the building of legitimate and accountable democratic institutions through free elections, the establishment of rule of law, human rights, free media, market economy and civil society (Paris 1997, 2004).

While initially conceived as a post-conflict practice, peacebuilding is increasingly considered as necessary during all phases of a conflict (Novelli and Smith 2011: 11). The UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee’s (re)definition of peacebuilding seems to reflect a broader, transformational understanding of it:

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.5

Richmond (2005) identifies 4 strands, or variations, of liberal peace that underpin peacebuilding interventions: 1) victor’s peace: close to a realist definition, whose foundation are underpinned by military strength; 2) constitutional peace: resting upon democracy, free market, free trade and cosmopolitanism; 3) institutional peace: the entities involved in conflict are bound within normative and legal frameworks of international institutions regulating their behavior; 4) civil peace: the focus is on citizens, participation and human rights. In the liberal paradigm that is dominant in peacebuilding operations, peace is achieved through political, economic and social liberalization. It aims at reproducing the neo-liberal (pseudo- and quasi-) sovereign state, as well as liberal, normative and institutional governance through forms of international surveillance (Lidén

5 http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=1765 (last accessed 28 November 2012)
To counter the verticality of top-down peacebuilding and its focus on formal free market, competitive and functioning elections and state institutions, the concept of ‘peacebuilding from below’ has been elaborated over the past decade by Lederach (2005). Peacebuilding from below encourages the empowerment of local communities, stressing the significance and sovereignty of local actors; it should enhance a sustainable citizen-based peace in a partnership between international interveners and local actors. Lederach calls for indigenous empowerment: peacebuilding from below becomes entrenched with the idea of liberating communities, peace represents in this view a process through which a space for the cultivation of the culture and of the structure of peace itself is created (2005).

Activities aiming at building peace, which in the 1980s were associated with “[q]uasi-subversive, bottom-up challenges to the logic of bipolar confrontation” (Strazzari 2008a: 48), during the 1990s were gradually incorporated in the liberal-institutionalist agenda for peace and in the new generation of multi-functional peacebuilding missions of the past two decades. Excesses in top-down peace engineering, inspired by shock therapies of assisted political and economic liberalization, have since been revised with renewed emphasis on local agency and local ownership. Scholarly work and ‘grey’ policy literature have been increasingly stressing the salience of local agency, considering it fundamental for the success of statebuilding and peacebuilding as a transformative yet collective effort for the achievement of a sustainable peace (Baranyi 2008).

Nonetheless, recent experiences and research have shown that peacebuilding from below is far from exempt from problems. Local communities and civil society organizations are site of power asymmetries, and carry on a number of problematic features such as ethno-national discriminations, clientalistic practices and relationships:
“[p]eacebuilding from below is not a panacea or magic wand, and can itself conceal vested interests and the influence of possibly corrupt and self-seeking actors” (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 266).

According to Belloni, liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict countries has by and large failed: “[r]ather than establishing a liberal and democratic peace, intervention has led to a hybrid condition wherein liberal and illiberal, democratic and undemocratic elements co-exist, while the absence of a full scale war resembles a truce more than a substantive version of peace” (2012: 21). A growing strand of literature deals with the concept of hybrid peace, whether as a de facto situation on the ground of peacebuilding initiatives (Mac Ginty 2011, Belloni 2012) or as the (envisaged) overcoming of the liberal peace itself (Richmond 2011). It is not yet clear whether hybridity is a deviation of (or from) liberalism, what are its implications in terms of establishing a more sustainable and locally-rooted form of peace, and if a particular type of hybridity may be more conducive to positive outcomes: be that as it may, the concept gives credit and centrality to the role of local agency in shaping peacebuilding processes and outcomes and it provides useful insights to peacebuilding dynamics on the ground (Mac Ginty 2011; Roberts 2011; Belloni 2012).

Three forms of hybrid peace governance can be identified: first, an informal interaction between traditional and illiberal norms and practices and formal ones; second, formal inclusion of non-state actors into state structures; last, state structures dominated by violent non-state actors, which can be integrated into governmental structures for the sake of stability (Belloni 2012). In reality the three forms are not often pretty distinct, yet, the categories provide useful insights for capturing the dynamics. Although the issue of hybrid peace as a feasible alternative to liberal peacebuilding has been supported by a growing number of scholars (Mac Ginty 2011; Roberts 2011; Boege 2011), and Richmond has provided a set of empirical examples of nascent forms of hybrid peace,
how and which type of hybridity is conducive to (which) peace is still poorly understood (Belloni 2012).

The recently emerged literature on hybrid orders and hybrid peace(building) is virtually silent on education. The marginalisation of the education sector within international (peacebuilding/statebuilding) interventions in post-conflict and conflict-affected countries is more generally reflected in the work of scholars working within IR, peace and conflict studies (both mainstream and critical): sometimes evoked, the relationship between education reconstruction/reform and processes of peacebuilding/statebuilding is typically overlooked, glossed over, and by and large omitted.

The political economy of conflict and peacebuilding literature has extensively investigated plausible causal mechanisms that may lead to further conflict and/or to successful post-conflict peacebuilding. For example, the (policy-) influential conflict theory elaborated by Paul Collier framed along the greed vs. grievance dichotomy has identified economic sources as primary factors for war (Collier et al. 2004). Within this approach, that is fundamentally consistent with neo-liberal tenets - education practitioners and scholars have analysed education for its effects on both conflict and peace, more specifically its securitising potential often linked to broader counterinsurgency strategies (Novelli 2012). What is not recognized in this debate is that the struggle for education injustice might be central to explaining participation in armed conflicts and social and educational justice might be part of the solution (Novelli 2011a).

1.2.2 What role for education in international statebuilding?

Over time growing concern for instability linked to phenomena such as state fragility, state failure and state collapse shifted the focus of international attention from establishing free, competitive economies and democratic societies towards strengthening
the state and its institutions (or institutional capacities), through a new, somewhat more narrowly conceived dimension of peacebuilding. In extreme synthesis, such a shift, which can be regarded as a trend in peacebuilding thinking and practice, came to be known as statebuilding and it has been seen as a means towards the achievement of the longer-term goal of peace (Wennman 2010). Ronald Paris’ imperative ‘institutionalization before democratization’ can be seen as a case in point (Paris 2004).

The two terms are often used in international politics as synonyms. The OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has defined statebuilding as “[a]n endogenous process of strengthening the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state, driven by state-society relations” (2010: 21). In Paris and Sisk’s own words, statebuilding means “[t]he strengthening or construction of legitimate governmental institutions in countries that are emerging from conflicts” (2009: 14). Other scholars have pointed out that statebuilding is a response to the failure of peacebuilding strategies during the 1990s, which were characterized by an excessive focus on quick restoration of democratic institutions and open market economies, with the state playing a minimal role.

Berit Bliesemann de Guevara has identified three analytical perspectives on how international statebuilding influences post-war, non-western states (2012: 2). The first perspective, epistemologically problem-solving, draws on the consensus of western, liberal-democratic policy circles and considers international statebuilding intervention as necessary for the security of post-war countries and that of the international system more broadly. The aim is to mould non-western states according to liberal-democratic standards set by the west (Chesterman et al. 2005; Paris 2004). Such an approach, known as the ‘liberal peace consensus’ has become hegemonic and despite obvious statebuilding failures in a number of contexts there are no signs that it will be changed soon (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012: 3).

Critical perspectives, by contrast, have argued that international statebuilding
discourses and practices have depoliticized the non-Western state. The depoliticization-by-statebuilding argument claims that the states that are being built are phantom and lack recognition by and legitimacy vis-à-vis their societies. While strong in unravelling how (international) power structures through statebuilding have hindered the legitimacy of externally-built state institutions, critical scholars have paid little attention to issues of local agency, social struggles, the effects of statebuilding on these externally-built states and societies and the global and historical structures within which such states are embedded (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012: 3). What both perspectives have in common is a tendency to romanticize the local and underestimate local agency.

More recently, a third perspective that combines political sociology with anthropological approaches to statebuilding has tried to overcome the limits of the above-mentioned approaches (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012; Berger and Weber 2006; Heathershaw and Lambach 2008; Herring and Rangwala 2006; Lemay-Hébert 2009; Pouligny 2006). Such an approach claims that the internationalization or globalization of post-war, non-Western, peripheral states in the global South do not mean the end of local agency or social struggles. Authors within this ‘third perspective’ seem to make a step ahead versus the other two theoretical angles, when they look into the effects of statebuilding for local political contexts and power struggles/structures, the dynamics between local and international politics, and the ways in which effects and dynamics are shaped by global structures and ideas (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012: 4). The multiple aspects unravelled by and grasped through the adoption of this perspective can be analytically captured by distinguishing:

between state-building, as a conscious effort at creating an apparatus of control, and state-formation, as an historical process whose outcome is a largely unconscious and contradictory process of conflicts, negotiations and compromises between diverse groups whose self-serving actions and trade-offs constitute the vulgarization of power (Berman and Lonsdale 1992: 5 quoted in Bliesemann de Guevara 2012: 5).
Seen under this light, the effects of statebuilding are never clearly and fully intentional results that are determined by top-down practices: rather, such effects unfold in contingent, contradictory and often unintentional ways in the interaction between local and international actors (Fergusson 2006: 283 – 4). The concept of state-formation draws attention to the historicity and the global embeddedness of the state and its dynamics. Migdal and Schlichte have highlighted how in such external statebuilding contexts some or the most important state core functions are highly internationalized (2005). Moreover, internationalized forms of financing in interventionary contexts (Schlichte 2005: 182-221) have led to the detachment of the state from its society, whose relationship is not based anymore on state’s capacities for domestic taxation and delivery/provision of core services/functions.

Within the range of theoretical perspectives focusing on statebuilding, the only studies that have investigated the relationship between education and peacebuilding/statebuilding interventions, come from the policy and practitioner world (DFID 2011; McCandless 2011; Novelli and Smith 2011). Such a body of work, that one may identify as ‘grey literature’, has focused on the impact that the provision of education – as one of the main social services to be delivered in the aftermath of the war – has on addressing past grievances and on enhancing (output) legitimacy for national and international actors. Western interventions that aim at preventing state failure or relapse into conflict, have increasingly focused on ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of citizens (Novelli 2010). The reform and provision of education as service delivery is a key part of this strategy, linked to issues of legitimacy for the national government and the international peace/state building mission (McCandless 2011).

McCandless argues that in those post-conflict societies emerging out of war, the lack of or the unequal distribution of social services can be a driver of conflict (2011: 1). The resumption of social services, in the aftermath of a conflict, in the form of education
access is more tangible to the community than the security sector or constitutional reforms (McCandless 2011: 29). The control and/or manipulation of social services can on the one hand create horizontal inequalities and undermine peacebuilding objectives; on the other one, the equal and just provision can foster trust between state and society.

In the 2009 report *Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict* the UN Secretary-General (UN SG) has pointed out that the provision of social services has been one of the five recurring priorities. However, despite increasing recognition that education and other social services constitute a key pillar for state legitimacy and societal resilience, too little attention is given to them in statebuilding interventions that remain focused on the security sector and political process (McCandless 2011: 2).

In conflict-affected areas, the distribution of aid to education remains mainly determined by security imperatives and it reflects the increasing trend in blurring the lines between the diplomatic, defence and developments rationales. With the rise of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and statebuilding missions during the 1990s, international actors have been supplementing or substituting the state in its capacities to deliver education in the aftermath of armed conflict. This has been particularly clear in cases such as East Timor and Kosovo, where internationally mandated administrations were created in 1999. In East Timor and Kosovo, for example, the UN and other international actors have since the beginning been involved in rebuilding school infrastructure, in recruiting teachers and in procuring instructional materials. As case analysis of East Timor and Kosovo will show in the following chapters, both countries 15 years after still deal with the strong legacy of external involvement, education sector included.

According to Tawil and Harley (2004), post-conflict educational reconstruction should comprise a long-term strategy of policy and curriculum development and teacher

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6 For example, while Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan have received most of the share in official aid to education, other conflict settings such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad or Cote d’Ivoire have been poorly supported despite the equally large financing gap (UNESCO 2011: 174).
training that is driven and provisioned by local actors and processes rather than external actors (see also INEE 2011). Besides hampering bottom-up, locally-driven processes, externally-driven educational projects have been increasingly target of attacks, with the life of aid workers and of those teaching and learning seriously put under threat (Novelli 2011a; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo 2012).

In the second part of this chapter, I will analyse the scholarship (both problem-solving and critical) that tackles education reform in emergency, humanitarian and broader peacebuilding/statebuilding interventions, with a view at those theoretical perspectives and approaches that have characterized the field of education, conflict and peacebuilding in the past two decades. As section one has shown, the field of education (and its reform in post-conflict international interventions) is seriously overlooked in both mainstream and critical scholarship on peacebuilding and statebuilding. This state of affairs reflects and reinforces the marginality of education sector reform within the current peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas.

**Part Two – How Education Affects Conflict, Peacebuilding and Social Change**

This section will analyse academic and policy debates on the relationship between education on the one side, and conflict, peacebuilding and social change on the other side. The main research works that have inspired the proliferation and reinvigoration of these debates in the late 1990s are the UNICEF report by Kenneth Bush and Diana Saltarelli *The two faces of education in ethnic conflicts* (2000), and Lynn Davies’ *Education and Conflict: Complexity and Chaos* (2004): while the former draws a distinction between the negative and positive face of education, the latter elaborates an interdisciplinary framework for analysis that rests upon complexity theory.

This research situates itself within a critical perspective that seeks to go beyond
the above-mentioned ‘two faces of education’ debate: the review that is presented here, therefore, aims to develop analytical categories that can guide my analysis and allow to grasp the multifaceted roles of education, while challenging dichotomizing and deterministic relationships between education and conflict/peace. The purpose is to question and ultimately destabilize the concept of peace and conflict that are commonly in use by looking at their contingent, contextual and conjectural manifestations: elaborations and articulations that I will extract from the literature review have a value in leading my analysis of the actual post-war settings where I will put education under scrutiny, specifically in Kosovo and East Timor.

I would like to contribute to a recent body of literature that, far from constituting a school, in recent years has nonetheless sought to account for the complex and multiple faces of education, conflict and peace. Important steps in this direction have been made, for example, by Mario Novelli and Alan Smith in their research work for UNICEF dated 2011: other examples are Lopes Cardozo and Shah (2014; 2015), Gross and Davies (2015), and Pherali (2015). Much of these scholars’ work can be characterized as “[a] shift away from grand narratives towards more contingent, specific and contextually driven understandings of how educational processes, decisions and actions unfold in such settings” (Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2014: 3).

These scholars’ work has not only critically analysed the multifaceted role of education in conflict-affected and post-conflict settings, but it has also made an attempt to move the debate on: from ‘education and conflict’ towards the investigation of the potentially multiple ways through which education could contribute to building a just and sustainable peace. Linked to the impact of education on the conflict/peace nexus, education can play a role in terms of addressing inequities and discriminatory schooling structures/contents that are reflected in and reinforced through education systems, and which mirrors the broader structural inequities of a given context. Such role is played and
enabled through at the level of structure, content and agency.

Either by laying emphasis on the analysis of education and conflict or, by contrast, on peacebuilding and education, the issues that need to be examined are similar: the inequity of access and opportunities in education, as well as the relevance, quality and representation in the governance of education reform, are themes that will be reviewed more in specific in the third part of this chapter. This last section, beside presenting the debate, will elaborate a framework of analysis for investigating the relationship between education and peacebuilding from a social justice perspective by looking into questions such as access, curricula, pedagogy, the role of teachers, and broader governance of education reform. In doing so, it will consider authors that have examined the ways in which the reform and rebuilding of education can play a transformative role, as opposed to a conservative/restorative role.

1.3 The nexus education-conflict: from ‘two faces’ to ‘many faces’

Only a few years ago, research on conflict and education could be described as a ‘field in its infancy’ (Tomlinson and Benefield 2005). Recent contributions to this field can be characterized by attempts to bridge problem-solving and critical theory through an interdisciplinary perspective. Novelli and Lopes Cardozo (2008) have called for the development of a critical research agenda on education and conflict, which draws upon Roger Dale’s work on mainstream educational research and globalization. Dale argues that the existing research on education tends to avoid the contribution of other disciplines, such as IR theory, conflict and security studies, and development studies. He puts forth a ‘politics of education’ approach that seeks to overcome the pitfalls of ‘methodological nationalism’ by placing education practices and policies within a broader regional and international political economy (Dale 2005).
Part of the literature on education and conflict has examined the negative effects of war on education systems: here the focus has been on reconstructing educational infrastructure in the aftermath of the war. Another stream of literature has investigated the ways through which educational opportunities and access affect the probability of the restart of the conflict: here success has been measured in terms of enrolment rates, and the focus has been on the quantity of education (Dixon 2009; Ishiyama and Breuning 2012).

A further body of research has analyzed the complex and multifaceted role of education in (post-) conflict settings (Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Smith and Vaux 2003; Davies 2004; Gallagher 2004; Tawil and Harley 2004; Buckland 2006; Lai and Thyne 2007; Novelli and Lopez-Cardozo 2008; Paulson 2011b). This body of work has specifically focused on the structure and content of education systems, and on how they may reproduce and exacerbate conflict or contribute to peace (Gallagher 2011; Paulson 2011a; Davies 2011; Mosselson 2011).

In times of emergency and/or conflict and in its aftermath, education is often seen as one of the few protective measures that provides with a sense of normalcy, routine and psychosocial recovery (Smith and Vaux 2003, Smith 2005, Winthrop and Kirk 2008, UNESCO 2011, Novelli and Smith 2011, Save the Children 2013, Talbot 2013). As mentioned above, education provision plays a role as a peace dividend and in restoring state legitimacy (Dupuy 2008, Rose and Greeley 2006). Education more broadly plays a role in terms of reconciliation, nation-building and social cohesion through those messages, values and skills that through education are transmitted and built (Fukayama 2001, Tawil and Harley 2004, Sommers 2002: 18).

In their seminal report *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Peacebuilding Education for Children*, Bush and Saltarelli (2000) investigated the ways in which education both affects and is affected by war, ranging from positive to negative
effects. Bush and Saltarelli note that education has the potential to contribute positively to building peace as part of a process of social repair, reform and social justice: however, a certain type of education under certain circumstances can do more harm than good. ‘Post-conflict educational provision’ as a fixed package is not enough: issues of educational content, organization and governance can contribute to further conflict if due consideration is not placed over how such issues might have been among the causes or other factors that have fuelled escalation in the pre-war phase.

A body of work is increasingly recognizing and emphasising the fact that certain educational aspects (i.e., equity, content, relevance, management) and specific conflict drivers (i.e., security, economic, social, cultural and political aspects) operate in contingent and at times conflicting ways (Shah and Cardozo 2014b). Not only is education seldom the solution to conflict, but the way in which it is reformed, rebuilt or located within the broader political economy of post-conflict reconstruction may turn it to be more a force of bad than a force of good.

According to Shah and Lopes Cardozo “[e]ducation has multiple faces and dynamics in relation to conflict and reconstruction. [...] Education is deeply embedded in the context, history and cultural norms of societies, as well as current socio-political realities, making observed outcomes contingent, dynamic and inherently partial within the full realm of possibility” (2014: 4)

Drawing on the work of Salmi (2000), Shah and Lopes Cardozo relate education to conflict and violence in two ways: (1) direct violence and conflict in which schools are physical battlegrounds for control in war and conflict-affected contexts, and where education communities and infrastructure are either attacked or serve a protective role against violence; (2) indirect violence, where social injustices and inequalities are reflected, reproduced and legitimised through discriminatory schooling practices and contents, that may lead to social exclusion and may represent causes of previous or
further conflict, or on the opposite injustice and inequalities are addressed through inclusive schooling practices and contents (2015: 191).

Shah and Lopes Cardozo (2015: 191) complement their conceptualization of the link between education and conflict with a conceptual framework for defining social justice and linking it to education and conflict. They draw and adapt Nancy Fraser’s (1995, 2005) three-dimensional conceptualization of social justice in terms of redistribution, recognition, and representation, by looking at how certain educational domains might interact with social tensions in ways that could mitigate or exacerbate conflict, specifically in terms of (1) issues of safe and equitable educational access and opportunity; (2) educational relevance; (3) educational governance (Ibid.).

1.4 Education and peacebuilding

In 2011, thanks to research initiatives undertaken by UNICEF, the practitioners’ and scholars’ focus shifted from education and conflict to education and peacebuilding: in other terms, the ways in which education could contribute to the building of a positive, transformative peace. Among the questions that shaped the new agenda there was whether and how education was to be placed within peacebuilding in conflict and post-conflict interventions. The discourse on the link between education and peacebuilding was based upon a reappropriation of Galtung’s concept of positive peace, which implied not merely the absence of war but the transformation of structural causes (of the different types) of violence.

While formerly the focus was on the ways into which education could be a cause or solution to conflict, now the main concern became the identification of the multiple potential ways through which education could contribute to building a sustainable peace by addressing and/or transforming those structural conditions that led to violence and war in the first place. As the shift in education went from conflict to peacebuilding, the peace
that was envisioned to be built through education moved from negative to positive, as first elaborated by Johan Galtung in the 1970s.

In the literature review for the UNICEF-funded *Education in Emergencies and Post-Conflict Transitions* (EEPCT) research project, Smith, McCandless, Paulson and Wheaton (2011) noted five limitations in the extant literature on education and conflict research. First, a lack of emphasis on the role that education played for longer term peacebuilding. Second, a scarce attention and analysis towards the context, political will and motivations of the various actors that were involved in the broader reconstruction in conflict and post-conflict settings, and in educational reform in particular. Third, while too much emphasis was put on analysing educational service delivery and the successes and failures linked to such provision, too little focus was placed over the location of education within broader agendas of social change and peacebuilding. Forth, too little research existed on the complex role of education vis-à-vis conflict and peace, as well as regarding the location of education within the broader political economy of conflict/post-conflict at various scales (local, regional, national and global). Fifth and last, the absence of theory of the relationship between education and conflict drivers in dimensions such as social mobility, social inclusion, economic opportunity, social justice (Smith et al. 2011).

One can hardly disagree with Smith et al. (2011): education initiatives in conflict-affected environments all too often lack explicit links to peacebuilding theories and tend to focus on the immediate humanitarian needs with “[a] greater emphasis on protection and reconstruction” rather than “transformation” that “[r]equires a more explicit commitment to political, economic and social change” (Smith et al. 2011: 7). According to Pherali (2015), educational interventions in conflict-affected and post-conflict settings are underpinned by a liberal view of schooling, which assume that public education creates opportunities for individual development, social mobility and empowers those who have been traditionally denied access to economic and political power.
As part of the same UNICEF research project, Novelli and Smith argue that “peacebuilding is essentially about supporting the transformative processes any post-conflict society needs to go through, and these changes unfold over generations. Development through the education sector represents a very important part of this transformative process, with huge potential to impact positively or negatively” (2011: 7). According to them, the literature reviewed argues that “education can contribute to peacebuilding more effectively if interventions and reforms are conducted at the sector level and by contributing to political, economic and social transformations in post-conflict societies” (Novelli and Smith 2011: 12).

They also question the sustainability of donor interventions during or after the conflict, if such interventions do not extend beyond short-term problem-solving approaches towards longer-term structural improvements of the education sector. The new critical research agenda, therefore, is one that explores how education can contribute to social transformation and longer-term peacebuilding and seeks to research how, why and under what conditions education and peacebuilding processes can mutually support each other.

As mentioned earlier, research in the past has been treating the issue of education and conflict from a problem-solving perspective, focussing on how to get the education system back to working, overlooking whether, where and how is education located within the broader social transformation agenda (Smith et al. 2011). Such problem-solving approach explains the overemphasis on solving policy dilemmas that conflict and fragility cause on educational access and quality, overlooking the conditions under which educational problems are identified and defined (Novelli and Lopes-Cardozo 2008). Within this framework, the failure of educational interventions is explained as the result of poor policy design and implementation.
However, restoring educational provision and access is not enough, if due consideration is not paid to the ways in which education historically and at present is related to cultural, political and economic structures (Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2015: 197). A ‘too educationalist’ mindset has characterized much of the research so far, while overlooking how education is located within broader social structures and institutions.

Reflecting on this background, scholars are now recognizing that some of the challenges, dilemmas and problems of education systems in conflict settings are not intrinsic to education, but are the product of deep-seated historical legacies, social, economic and political structures and more often than not are linked to issues of power, injustice and inequality.

While observing how domestic conflicts are increasingly managed and supervised by international interventions, Novelli argues that “[c]onflict and its resolution is shaped by a range of structures, institutions and agents that operate below, around, above, and beyond the nation-state” (2011: 7). The fields of education, conflict and peacebuilding are located in a “[c]omplex and highly unequal system of local, national, regional and global actors, institutions and practices.” (Novelli and Lopes Cardozo 2008: 483). In overall terms, the literature on education and conflict has been suffering from an excess of state-centrism: this has entailed the overlooking of processes and actors operating above, below and beyond the nation-state.

Another under-researched topic in this field is the relationship between and the transition from short-term humanitarian responses (often conceived and implemented by international actors) to long-term developmental strategies [whose efforts are mainly led by local actors] (Novelli and Smith 2011). Research is lacking on the role of the state and the institutional changes and challenges that occur during and after the transition phase from donor-led humanitarian assistance to domestically-led developmental strategies (Lopes Cardozo and Shah 2013: 3).
In 2004, Lynn Davies investigated the relationship between education and conflict, showing how such relationship was complex and non linear. She argued that “[i]nput-output models do not work in social terms, as too many messy contextual factors and power interests intervene. The’attribution gap’ is too huge. Even if conflict were to decrease, it is almost impossible to trace this back to something in education” (2013: 3). Any attempt to link particular actions and interventions in the education sector to given outcomes in a conflict-affected or post-conflict settings is prone to failure, since “[p]ositivist, reductionist and deterministic understandings based on mapping clear cause-effect relationships between education and conflict are insufficient” (Davies 2013).

What is needed – Davies argues – is a careful analysis of the cultural, political and economic nature of conflict and its roots causes before envisioning the role functions and modalities of education reform in the aftermath of a conflict. Research drawing on critical cultural political economy helps to identify education’s positionality within the broader society, by looking at the ways in which: (1) education is both a reflection of and contributor to past, present, and future social relations, experiences and practices (the cultural); (2) the ways in which education fits into existing relations of production, distribution and exchange in society (the economic); (3) how and by whom education’s purpose, role and function in society has and is being determined and governed (the political): “[e]ducational policy production, reproduction, modification and adaptation become located within highly contested projects of state, nation and region building” (Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2015: 198).

The above-mentioned framework on social justice proposed by Nancy Fraser challenges mainstream representations of what peace or stability represents in the post-conflict moment (Shah and Cardozo 2014a: 7) and how education could be related to and contributing to both. The evolution of the discourse and practice of education in emergency, conflict and post-conflict moments, reflect a shift in emphasis from ‘do no
harm’ approaches and activities to supporting and increasing ‘resilience’ in and through educational projects and reform (Smith 2011). Both approaches, underpinned by a problem-solving framework, imply that education contributes to bringing the system back to the pre-war phase and restoring the status quo, rather than promoting an education reform that would be transformative (Fraser 1995: 86).

Social justice and social change frameworks can be used as conceptual lenses against which the relationship between education and peacebuilding can be investigated and analysed. They also provide with the possibility to normatively link peacebuilding to social justice goals. IR scholarship that is critical of neoliberal peacebuilding has been advocating an emancipatory and sustainable peace without further elaborating what such an ‘emancipatory‘ and ‘sustainable’ peace would look like (Richmond 2008). Moreover, it is not clear which forms and through which relationships, processes, actors and sectors would peacebuilding become emancipatory in post-conflict settings and if and how education can play a role in this regard.
Part Three: Developing a framework of analysis

1.5 Education and social justice between reproduction and transformation

Robertson (2013) contends that education is a key site of cultural production and social reproduction. Bourdieu argues that education produces and reproduces class differences and inequalities, pointing out to the fact that children and students are passive recipients of educational practices and contents in which they learn to conform to the social structure (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). In Bourdieu’s own words, education “[i]s in fact one of the most effective means of perpetuating the existing social pattern, as it both provides an apparent justification for social inequalities and gives recognition to the cultural heritage, that is, to a social gift treated as a natural one” (1974: 32).

In low and middle-income countries, as well as in conflict-affected settings, one often observes that social hierarchies and divisions are not only class-based but also ethnic-based (Pherali 2015). In post-conflict contexts, schools may well take center stage in reproducing those inequalities that might have been at the core of the conflict in the first place.

Scholars that have identified in the education system a site and tool of reproduction of the broader class structure in the society have failed to acknowledge the space for confrontation and struggle between the structural and ideological functions of schooling such as reproduction and control and the role and power of agency – such as teachers and students – to oppose and resist. According to Pherali (2013), students and educators cannot be reduced to the role of passive recipients of hegemonic curricula imposed by the state. Acknowledging their agency, by contrast, means recognizing their ability to exploit and expand those autonomous spaces that can emerge within the classroom and its surrounding community, resisting the structural determinants of the education system. Educators can be seen as social and political agents that can channel
counter-hegemonic pedagogies (Pherali 2013: 54). In this perspective educational institutions are not only the space devoted to the formation of the workforce, but also the space where teachers and learners critically engage in debates regarding state policies that have an impact on their lives.

Giroux (2003) suggests looking at schools as confrontational spaces that contain and convey the struggle over the type of knowledge and versions of the past, present and future that should be institutionalized, legitimated and transmitted to students. In line with Apple, for Giroux (2003) schooling has to be seen as a space for confrontation, resistance and possibility.

Intrinsic in education is thus the possibility for social change and social justice. Based upon the work of Nancy Fraser (1995, 2005), a number of scholars have elaborated analytical and conceptual frameworks that link education to social justice and change. According to Lopes Cardozo and Shah (2013: 8) “[a]ny educational framework that attempts to seriously work towards an objective of building peace would need to consider responsibility around [...] the cultural (recognition), political (representation) and economic (redistribution) injustices,” as defined by Nancy Fraser (1995, 2005).

Keddie suggests that “[F]raser’s model should not be offered as an ideal of justice that is static and uncomplicated but rather as a productive lens for thinking about and addressing some of the key ways in which different dimensions of injustice are currently hindering schooling participation, engagement and outcomes of marginalised students” (2012: 15).

Tikly and Barrett put forward a social justice framework that is informed by the work of both Nancy Fraser and Amartya Sen, as a way to “[p]rovide a fuller rationale for a policy focus on education quality than that provided by a human capital approach with its emphasis on economic growth or by the existing human rights approach with its emphasis on the role of the state in guaranteeing basic rights.” (2011: 3-4)
Lopes Cardozo and Shah argue that when education serves the principles of redistribution, recognition and representation, it can play a role in fostering a positive and sustainable peace and social justice, both necessary to address and transform the root causes of conflict (2013: 9). In this regard, education can play a different and stronger role than just either incorporating ‘conflict sensitivity’/‘do no harm’ as some scholars such as Davies (2010) have proposed or, as others such as McCandless (2011) and DFID (2011) have suggested, being reduced to a peace dividend bound to increase state legitimacy.

The analysis that follows is essentially aligned with the proposal by Novelli and Smith, who acknowledge and advocate a role for education in building peace from the early phases of emergency and reconstruction to longer-term reforms and development strategies, suggesting that the analysis of the contribution of education to peacebuilding would require for “[t]he need for structural and institutional changes that involve changes to existing power relations within society” (2011: 14).

Informed by Fraser’s theory and by other scholars who have reflected on education and social justice (Connell 2012, Robertson and Dale 2015, Young 2006), Lopes Cardozo and Shah (2014: 6) identify three ways in which the normative contribution of education to social justice and peacebuilding in conflict and post-conflict can be conceptualized, discerned and mapped out: (1) redistributing access to safe and secure educational opportunities and resources; (2) recognizing culture diversity through a relevant (i.e., acceptable/adaptable) curriculum; (3) ensuring fair and transparent representation in educational governance.

Unequal distribution of educational access can reflect social, economic and political exclusion within a society and can fuel motivations and serve as a conflict cause (Dupuy 2008). Equal and redistributive educational opportunities are in contrast expected to lessen social tensions. Better and safer schools and equal opportunities of educational
access and into the job market decrease motivations and opportunities to engage in armed conflict. Some scholars argue that the opportunity cost of engaging in armed conflict will be higher than attending school (Ishiyama and Breuning 2012). However, to date little research has been conducted postulating and corroborating such an hypothesis.

Education can be seen as irrelevant when it is seen as not promoting social mobility, does not increase economic opportunities, does not contribute to improving livelihoods, and there is a mismatch between skills offered by the education system and the labour market needs and demands. To the concept of ‘educational effectiveness’ which is a reflection of a neoliberal market agenda for education that focuses on competitiveness and standardized testing, Shah and Lopes Cardozo (2014) oppose the concept of ‘just education system’ – that is, a system that responds to diversity and provide relevant education for all. Connell suggests drawing on “[i]ndigenous knowledge, working-class experience, women’s experience, immigrant cultures, multiple languages, and so on; aiming for richness rather than testability” (2012: 681-682).

1.5.1 Access to education and the prevention or relapse to war

Academic and policy studies have documented how communities in emergency and conflict situations consider education to be one of the few protective measures left in times of instability (Smith and Vaux 2003, Smith 2005, Winthrop and Kirk 2008, UNESCO 2011, Winthrop 2011). There has been a strong emphasis in assuring educational provision in such contexts since education can play a role in restoring or enhancing state legitimacy and as a peace dividend (Rose and Greeley 2006, Dupuy 2008).

While quantitative studies have been important in establishing a correlation on the role of educational provision and access for the prevention of armed violence or the relapse into war, there exists no consensus as to which level of education is more
important in the short and medium/long term and what type. Arguably, by laying emphasis on the type and quality of education, a body of qualitative research has been more successful in addressing the complex relationship between education and conflict (see next section).

The literature dealing with the link between educational access and conflict have claimed that expanding and increasing education access can prevent the relapse into war. The rapid reconstruction of education systems can boost postwar economic recovery by building social capital and civil society (Putman 1993 quoted in Ishiyama and Breuning 2012: 61).

Dupuy (2008) shows how in several conflict contexts such as Rwanda, Liberia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone, the lack of equitable access to schooling among the civilian population and amidst different ethnic groups represented one of the causes that brought to or fuelled the conflict. In Rwanda during the colonial period, schooling opportunities disadvantaged the Hutu majority and favoured the Tutsi minority, who assumed political, administrative, cultural and economic control. After independence, the Hutu-majority put in place quotas to limit access of Tutsis to schooling. Not only schools did not promote national unity after independence (Weinstein et al. 2007: 55 quoted in Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2015: 192), but discriminatory and racial quotas in schools alienated the Tutsis minority, who fled the country during the 1980s, formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front and would later be involved in the 1990s civil war. In Kosovo, restrictions and discriminative policies in the education sphere for the Kosovo Albanian community led to the creation of a parallel system of education and to the spatial separation of schooling practices, a legacy that was perpetuated in the post-war phase and which still persists nowadays.

The common assumption that increases in educational access are necessarily good for the consolidation of a durable peace has been challenged by several studies (Retamal and Aedo-Richmond 1998; Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Smith and Vaux 2003; Davies
2004; World Bank 2005). Some of these studies have found that pre-war education systems may carry the seeds of violent conflict. Thus, often it is not the education system as such (and its expansion), but the unequal access to the education system, or the lack of linkage between the education system and the economy that create frustration: education is strongly connected to several root causes of a conflict such as identity and culture, distribution of resources, and access to economic and political power (Degu 2005).

The above-mentioned examples point to how unequal access and distribution of opportunities in and through education can fuel conflict, but it also suggests how in the aftermath of a conflict opportunity and access to education can be more equitably provisioned. Careful analysis of how and which groups have been historically disadvantaged in and through schooling should be complemented by a fair distribution of access and opportunities for all groups of learners in the post-conflict moment. Safe and secure access means protecting students and teachers from attacks, ensure an education that is free of gender-based or other types of violence and discrimination and in the long-term promoting critical pedagogies that encourage children’s expression (Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2015: 192).

An example where efforts of equal access and distribution have been successful is the case of Aceh, a province in northwestern Indonesia hit by a devastating tsunami in 2004, and with a history of conflict that had lasted for thirty years. In order to address educational disadvantages suffered by the province and its population, the government “[c]anceled school fees, increased targeted support to conflict-affected regions/populations and made a legal commitment to directing the province’s resource revenues to education” (Shah and Lopes Cardozo – forthcoming quoted in Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2015: 192). Education as part of the peace settlement, occupied a critical

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7 However, as the empirical chapter will show, in Kosovo the promotion of bottom-up, critical pedagogies by external actors have been resisted or adapted by local teachers, especially in such a context whereby an historical legacy of top-down and hierarchical pedagogies still persists
role in terms of meeting public expectations of service delivery and redistribution of
entitlements and opportunities. In the provincial government’s first educational strategy
plan in 2008, education was mentioned to serve a transformative role by “[r]edressing
past inequities caused by conflict, and working to (re) build a peaceful future for the
province” (Bailey 2008 cited in Shah and Cardozo 2014: 2).

The contribution of education to the perpetuation of structural violence or the
intensification of a conflict has less to do with funds invested in education and more to do
with the degree of equity in educational access. Moreover, if expanding access is not
accompanied by expansion of economic opportunities, there is the risk of creating an
educated but unemployed generation.

Much of the focus in policy and academic milieus has been on primary and
secondary education. In this context, the vast part of the literature on the relationship
between educational access and conflict has focussed on the role that primary and
secondary education play as a deterrent or catalyst for war. Few have addressed the role
that access to higher education can play in reducing the likelihood of conflict
reoccurrence in the short and medium term.

In their quantitative study, Ishiyama and Breuning show that “[e]arly expansion of
primary and secondary enrolments neither increases nor decreases the likelihood of
conflict reinitiating”, however, early expansion of higher education opportunities in terms
of enrolment rates during the first five years following the end of a war (in the form of
increases in enrolment rates) reduces the hazard of civil conflict recurrence by 86 per cent
(2012: 71-73). Generally speaking, there is no abundance of studies that address
education systems as a whole: the vast majority focuses on portions of it.

If one were to apply the definition of access given by the UN Special Rapporteur
on the Right to Education’s definition of access, Katarina Tomaševski (2003), i.e.,
education must be available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable to all, restoring
educational access might not be sufficient for conflict mitigation, transformation and peacebuilding, if education is not safely and equitably provisioned.

1.5.2 Education through cultural recognition: the structure of education, curricula development, pedagogy and the role of teachers

The literature dealing with the complex relationship between education and conflict has focused on the structure and content of education in fostering the relapse into war or preventing it (Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Tawil and Harley 2004; Paulson 2011a). Particular school structures and contents have the potential to contribute to oppression or to fuel hostilities (Gallagher 2011; Paulson 2011a).

Historically, the key role of education has been to inculcate a sense of homogeneous community and to form future citizens; such a process has been intrinsically assimilationist. In post-conflict societies, in which ethnicity has been often a significant component of the conflict itself, the process of education restructuring and curricula development is unstable and conflictual (Jones 2011).

In terms of structure, an education system that is fragmented and segregated contributes to perpetuating and reinforcing prejudices, stereotypes and intolerance among young people of different communities. Such systems keep young people apart and are a barrier to reconciliation (Clark 2010: 345). Furthermore, institutionalized forms of segregation legitimize discriminatory attitudes as socially acceptable behaviours (Kreso 2008: 365). Conversely, forms of education that does not take into consideration the ethnic composition of societies might be used as a tool of assimilation that denies the rights of minority groups to expression.

In terms of content, the focus in recent years has been on school curricula and in particular on history curricula (Tawil and Harley 2004). Exclusion can occur not only through the segregated structure of education systems, but also through learning content
that stereotypes ‘the other’ (ethnic, linguistic, religious) in negative terms, further fuelling distrust and separation from the classroom level to the broader community and societal level, perpetuating a division within a country that might already exist (Shah and Lopez Cardozo 2014b: 193).

Freedman et al. note that “[i]f public education can function to inflame hatreds, mobilize for war and reach acceptance of injustice, it can be used also as a powerful tool for the cultivation of peace, democratic change and respect for others” (2004a: 226 quoted in Clark 2010: 352).

Of particular importance in countries that have gone though an ethnic conflict is the history curriculum, particularly the development and implementation of curricula dealing with the recent conflict (Cole 2010; Paulson 2011a; Paulson 2011b). The history curriculum has, historically, reflected the need to transmit a unitary and common narrative linked to a national territory. Nowadays, the existence of competing truths implies that the teaching of history will be particularly contentious, and this represents a major educational challenge (Clark 2010: 355).

Thus, a major challenge when reforming history curricula in ethnically divided societies is to create more complex and dynamic narratives. Such narratives allow for recognition of diversity, often striking a balance between the acknowledgment of diversity and lingering threat perceptions. Stated in another way, the key challenge is “[t]o find ways in which schooling can contribute to processes of social cohesion, while at the same time recognising and dealing with the reality of diversity” (Gallagher 2011: 1).

Spurred by the recognition of the important role that youth might play in preventing future violence, other types of training courses and curricula focussing on human rights and peace education have sought to tackle the issue of diverse and often competing (ethnic) identities (Oglesby 2007; Niens and Chastenay 2008). Such courses
aim at addressing and transcending ethnic identities, but in societies where the ethnic component have been constitutive of the conflict itself such a task is not easy and straightforward (Jones 2012).

Indeed, a different type of problem has arisen in certain contexts whereby the attempt to neutralize or ‘de-ethnicize’ the content of the (history) curriculum, following an ethnic conflict, has resulted in a removal of (references to) differences. This risks estranging students and citizens towards the official narrative transmitted through the curriculum because important issues of identities and struggle have been removed in the name of the national unity (Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2015: 194). It also removes the possibility for potential lessons that could be drawn from a critical reflection of the past. The current curricula reform in Rwanda reflects such challenges/dilemmas, in which history curriculum has been developed through a focus on a one-nation narrative, despite the fact that identity in the Rwandan context is deeply entrenched in ethnic belonging/differences (with the past conflict having an important ethnic component) (Paulson 2011a).

Bush and Saltarelli note that peacebuilding education should involve “[a] bottom-up rather than top down process driven by war-torn communities themselves, founded on their experiences and capacities. It would be firmly rooted in immediate realities, not in abstract ideas or theories” (2000: 23). In other words, in order for education to contribute to building peace, it should be characterized by action-oriented multidisciplinary learning process, that incorporates but is not limited to formal education or the knowledge-based classroom activity on peace (i.e., peace education programmes). Classroom-based interactions should be combined with community-based practical activities that relate to social, cultural and political issues (Pherali 2015).

Some scholars have reflected upon and advocated for a critical, intercultural pedagogy, one in which minorities are framed, defined and seen as indigenous rather
than as ‘invaders’ or ‘infiltrators,’ one that emphasises hybridity (Davies 2004; Davies 2011), rather than essentialist and homogeneous ethnic compositions and identities, but also one that is not informed by uncritical and stereotyped forms of multiculturalism that do not consider issues of religion, race, gender and class (Davies 2011: 13, 17, 34).

Giel and Niens propose a dialogic humanising pedagogy that draws upon critical theory and Freire’s liberatory pedagogy of participation, emancipation and transformation (Gil and Niens 2014). According to them, for peace to be taught there is a need to engage critically on the causes of conflict. Building and strengthening the social foundations for a sustainable peace would require macro-level structural reforms that on the one side improve the life conditions of marginalized populations, promote inclusive democracy and social justice, and on the other side promote a “[h]umanising and transformative agenda” (Gil and Niens 2014: 25). Current education systems do not conduce to ‘dialogic pedagogy’ and would thus require a shift towards new teaching and learning practice (Pherali 2015).

Pherali (2015) identifies in the teachers the social agents that could provide with the tools and spaces for a transformative and emancipatory pedagogy. He suggests teachers ought to be viewed as intellectuals in their capacities as educators who have important social functions. In using Aronowitz and Giroux’s four categories of teachers as intellectuals - hegemonic, accommodating, critical and transformative (993: 45-48 cited in Pherali 2015), Pherali (2015) identifies in the ‘transformative intellectual’ the kind of teacher that would help students to resist hegemony and would empower students to take control of their education.

The knowledge and ideologies that underpin and are transmitted through schools and other ‘educating institutions’ in society are ‘partial representations of social reality’ which ‘simultaneously frame, fragment, and distort the perceptions and concerns of more subordinated groups’” (Livingston 1987: 55 cited in Pherali 2015). Such institutions are
often tools for legitimising the monopoly of the dominant class. According to Pherali (2015) ‘peacebuilding educators’ should challenge such monopoly and should provide learners with those intellectual tools in order to question those dominant structures that reproduce inequalities and normalise injustices.

More broadly, there seems to be scholarly consensus on the fact that education is likely to have an impact if it is made part of a broader process of social change and in the presence of a longer-term political strategy (Weinstein et al. 2007; Tschirgi 2011). Lynne Davies’ seminal Education and Conflict: Complexity and Chaos demonstrates that failure to recognize the critical role of education in the path to war has ominous consequences for the building of a peace-prone post-conflict education system (2004). Davies proposes a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding the way in which education can play a role for building peace, and she identifies relevant target areas of peacebuilding and statebuilding engagement.

1.5.3 Education governance between participation and representation

The way management functions and stakeholders’ participation within education governance and processes are designed and configurated can either promote constructive or destructive/distrustive interactions and relationships among different actors involved in the governance of educational reform (Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2015: 194). In this regard, there seems to be consensus in literature on the fact that political representation should be fostered in such a way that it ensures fair ethnic, gender, and linguistic representation and participation along the different levels of the educational governance (Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2015: 195).

Educational provision that is centrally controlled, managed and deployed can create a lack of accountability and transparency between citizens and the state, especially in those cases when resources are perceived to be deployed and managed in unequal
ways. In some cases such as Afghanistan or Aceh, school-based management and decentralization of authority, control and provision to local levels have been used as mechanisms for promoting inclusion and cooperation, potentially increasing levels of accountability, transparency and participation between educational service providers and communities (Dupuy 2008).

Decentralization of management functions to community-based committees has been criticised by some scholars. They argue that often, communities are not trained, resourced or supported by the central government. Moreover, cases such as Nepal, post-conflict Cambodia and Indonesia have showed that community-based committees are either prone to elite capture or unwilling to challenge educational actors (Bjork 2006, INEE 2009). As Poppema (2012) has pointed out, in particular contexts, decentralization of education at the local, community level does not complement but rather substitute the state.

The agenda of decentralization has been globally promoted by a number of international actors, especially the World Bank, actively involved in the reform of education governance, in particular in post-war and conflict-affected countries. Its advancement has coincided with the rise of the good governance agenda and with the promotion of the privatization agenda. The latter has found its expression in the form of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in educational projects and reforms. Dale contends that “[t]his initiative [PPPs in education] is intended to depress the role of the state in the provision of public services, as it opens up space for transnational firms, with a mechanism of articulation with national policies and agendas” (2009: 14).

Recently, the global agenda of (neoliberal-infomed) education reforms have been increasingly characterized by a rise in discourses for ‘stakeholder participation’ or ‘citizen voice’ in educational decision-making, and more generally of increasing decentralization of funding, control and provision of education service at local levels.
As mentioned above, mechanisms for stakeholder participation in schooling can promote citizenship and social inclusion. However, when participation is perceived to be restrictive, exclusive and biased it can lead to distrust between citizens within communities and towards the state (Dupuy 2008). In a number of cases, decentralization reforms in schooling have resulted in rising inequities and fragmentation within the national education system, which weakens the already fragile social contract between the state and its citizens in post-conflict and conflict-affected countries (Angus 1993, Gorostiaga and Paulston 2004, Lewis and Naidoo 2004). What emerges from a recent Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) research synthesis is that decentralization in educational governance has resulted in education reinforcing conditions of fragility or contributing to the status quo (2011).

**Concluding remarks: scales and contexts beyond methodological nationalism**

This chapter has reviewed the literature on education, peacebuilding and statebuilding with a view to highlighting the existence of critical connections, seeking to account for the complexity and the evolution of debates and to spell out an understanding of globalization and social change; it has done so with attention to identifying existing gaps, so as to set the present research to address them. As a result of the proliferation of ‘new wars’, with a higher toll for civilians and school children and workers, and the rise of humanitarian international interventions, education has been affected and shaped by new concerns and dynamics that characterize a novel interplay between global, transnational, national and local actors.

While there is now widespread recognition and empirical documentation of the impact of conflict on education (and *vice versa*), there remains a conspicuous lack of research on the impact of international interventions on modes, forms and functions of education in post-conflict and conflict-affected settings. Likewise, a research gap can be
detected on how education affects externally-driven peacebuilding and statebuilding operations; finally, a gap exists on those education models that are emerging in contexts of fragility and external intervention. My research question – i.e., when a new state emerges under the aegis of international statebuilding, in a situation in which society is divided by a recent history of armed conflict, what types of externally-assisted education systems are emerging, and how do they reflect and affect statebuilding and peacebuilding – seeks to address these gaps.

In this regard, one has to point out that studying post-conflict and conflict-affected settings cannot be oblivious of the fact that the education sector has often become part and parcel of counter-insurgency strategies (Novelli 2009). Several scholars argue that this is one of the reasons why education in these specific contexts has come under direct attack, and anyway it has been seen as an externally-driven initiative, thus estranging local communities (Novelli 2009; Novelli and Selenica 2014). In global terms the commitment to education responding to security and strategic imperatives or to education regarded as a social service to be delivered in the emergency phase has had an impact on the assistance and aid to education, which rather than focusing on longer-term efforts of development and sustainable peacebuilding has been limited to the early phases of emergency and reconstruction.

Such volatility has often made educational reform unsustainable and not linked to objectives of peacebuilding, social change and transformation. Research is still relatively weak, for example, on how the transition from short-term humanitarian assistance to longer-term developmental strategies actually takes place in the field of education (reform), if at all. Another related under-researched topic is the role of the state and those institutional changes and challenges that occur during and after the transition phase from donor-led assistance to domestically led developmental strategies.

While in the early 2000s attention on the role of education on conflict (and
viceversa) emphasized the negative face of education in armed conflict, in the 2010s the debate has shifted towards education and peacebuilding - i.e., an agenda on how and under what conditions education can contribute to building a sustainable, transformative and socially just peace has emerged. The new critical agenda that has been developed has sought to explicitly link education with peacebuilding, albeit in open, non-deterministic and contingent ways.

What emerges from the research of a growing number of critical conflict and education scholars is that the relationship between education, conflict and peacebuilding is complex and non-linear, thus input-output models do not work as sometimes expected. Mapping clear cause-effect relationships and establishing input-output models for investigating the link between education, conflict and peacebuilding are insufficient and prone to failure as social reality is messy, complex and contingent, while our investigation will always be inherently partial.

What is needed – one may conclude - is a thorough analysis of cultural, political and economic nature of conflict and its root causes as a base for envisioning the role, functions and modalities of education in the aftermath of a conflict. Social inquiry should also be complemented by a thorough analysis of the relationship between education and conflict drivers in the pre- and post-war phase or in conflict-affected settings.

Against this background, one can say that the new critical agenda of research on education has taken a more explicit normative stance. Such a move is most welcome, because it links education to peacebuilding through social justice frameworks. The latter are not only useful in analytical and conceptual terms - as they serve as tools and lens against which the relationship between education and peacebuilding is investigated and examined on the ground. They also offer an alternative perspective on the type of education and peace to be built, and how it can be best tuned with the goal of transforming conflict root causes and build a just society.
It can be said that those education, conflict and development scholars that have worked along this trajectory have been ‘daring more’ in defining a certain type of peace as a goal, than those IR scholars that have criticized the liberal and ‘undemocratic’ peace (built through statebuilding missions and administrations) often without a commitment to elaborating on how a different kind of emancipatory peace would look like, and what sectors and pillars are to be given priority.

The debate on education and conflict emerged out of the recognition that wars and violent conflict are negatively impacting on education, but that certain types of education - far from being necessarily good - could further fuel conflict, if not lying at the core of its causes. This chapter has sought to show how, depending on the type of education and its embeddedness in the broader political economy of conflict, education can contribute to building positive peace. While less normative, my research is underpinned by a social justice analytical framework for unravelling and spelling out the type of peace and state that education has reflected and affected in the two cases of Kosovo and East Timor.

In this regard, empirical analysis should always depart from the interaction between education and economic, cultural and political drivers of conflict. Furthermore, the investigation of the relationship between education, peacebuilding and statebuilding has to be multi-sectorial (looking at all levels of education) and able to examine the multiple issues involved in educational reform: access and opportunities (whether education it is safe and equitable), relevance (curricula, content, structure, pedagogy and teachers), representation and participation (the governance of educational reform and policy-makings and the role, positionality and power of the different actors involved).

In conducting such an investigation, following Dale’s suggestion, one should avoid ‘methodological nationalism’, ‘state-centrism’ and ‘educationism’, thus making the research open to other processes and actors that are shaping educational reform beyond
the nation-state and beyond the sector of education itself (2009). Post-war and conflict-affected settings may be characterized by various levels of direct and indirect conflict, violence and social engineering, whereby education is shaped in, out and beyond the nation-state on multiple scales and by a multiplicity of international and local actors. When addressing education reform in post-conflict contexts, it is necessary to problematise the complex intertwining of actors, interests and processes within the field.

Dale and Robertson (2009) suggest that one should look beyond the state level in the study of the purposes, functions and roles of education: this means examining how they are formulated, interpreted and implemented by private agencies, foreign consultants/advisors, international agencies and local institutions. In order to avoid the pitfalls of methodological nationalism that frames much of the existing research, they recommend to explore the relationships between the various scales, spaces and levels of educational decision-making and policy production and acknowledge that conflict and solutions to it depend on a range of structures, institutions and agents that work in, out and beyond the nation-state (Dale and Robertson 2009; Robertson 2012).

Processes such as globalisation, war and international intervention have challenged the basic unit of analysis - i.e., the nation-state. While traditionally, education policies have been developed within the boundaries of the Westphalian state, national policies are increasingly “[a] combination of political forces, social structures, cultural traditions and economic processes entangled in a matrix of intersecting multi-level, multi-scalar (local, national, regional and global) sites and spaces” (Yeates 2001: 637).

This is related to another limitation of much of the existing literature(s) - i.e., the simplification of the levels of analysis along the binary and dichotomous split national/international (local/global), which is a limitation that needs to be overcome (Dale 2005). The conception of space and scale as used by Robertson (2012), in which the local and the global are intertwined and mutually constituted may contribute in such direction.
It has implications on how state is understood and conceptualized too, not merely as a monolithic, national, entity or unit of analysis but made out of different components, apparatus, bureaucrats and social relations and struggles that albeit operating within the state are simultaneously networked/constrained by their participation and membership with international organisations (i.e., the global level). Moreover, the state is embedded and constituted by social forces that work in, out and beyond the state level. In this regard, IOs or international actors are not something external to the state, or at least, they are more external for some states than for others, which also depends on the unequal distribution of power and bargaining capacities (Verger et al. 2012: 8).

The Bourdieusian concept of field comes to help: it lends itself as a tool for overcoming the local-global binomial in education policy, since it allows to look at and framing the global education policy as a conflicting field or terrain in which different kinds of national and international actors struggle for its transformation and production/reproduction. In this regard, agenda-setting, policy-making and borrowing in education are not to be seen as the result of a conflict-free, one-way transfer along the axis global-local, but as the result of this struggle for problem definition, education de-territorialization and re-contextualisation in which agency and unequal power (relations and distribution) play a key role.

This brings to the fora the need to problematise the unitary nature of the state, and a certain methodological statism that is implied, i.e., looking at the state as “[a] rational and cohesive entity” (Verger et al. 2012: 9). The state needs to be understood as composed by a range of apparatuses that are the result of material condesations of social forces and struggles (Hartmann 2007 quoted in Verger et al. 2012: 9) and which often have contrasting agendas and interests (Cox 1995).

Within the governance of education, state role and functions in relation to education policies and politics have been redefined, with the state being less autonomous
than in the past in terms of definition of policies/priorities as well as agenda setting in national issues/sectors. Overcoming methodological nationalism and statism implies recognising and capturing the role and relevance of non-state actors in the governance and reform of education (Dale et al. 2007): “[f]unding, provision and ownership of education are carried out by a broad range of supra-national, national and sub-national agents, including IOs, the state, the market, the community and/or families. [...] the global governance of education means the redefinition of the relationship between education and the state” (Verger et al. 2012: 10).

Most of the research produced in education and within the field of education and conflict has been problem-solving (Paulson and Rappleye 2007: 341). The pitfalls of this type of research are to be found in the fact that it tends to focus narrowly on problems inherent within a project or sector, while overlooking the relationships among problems generated within that project/sector, the conflict and the broader geo-political situations. It is thus much needed to go beyond an ‘educationist approach’ or a ‘disciplinary parochialism’ approach that studies education projects as insulated from the surrounding context within which they are embedded (Dale 2005; Dale et al. 2007). In other words, policy trends and changes in education may be depending on extra-educational structures, events, processes and needs such as economic development, social cohesion or levels of welfare and poverty in a given country. Therefore, changes in education policies and priorities are better captured and understood as embedded within local and global political economy contexts (Novelli and Lopes Cardozo 2008).

What emerges from the different bodies of literature that I have reviewed is that in a globalized world, the model of education system in conflict-affected countries draws on the hybrid logic of (Western-led) development that favours free market, liberal democracy, individualism and competition with some recognition of human rights, civil liberties and gender equality (Rappleye 2011). In other words, educational reforms in
conflict-affected and post-war settings seem to be converging around the processes of liberal peacebuilding that have promoted a Western model of economy and governing system aiming to achieve the objective of “[a] self-sustaining peace within domestic, regional and international settings, in which both overt and structural violence are removed and social, economic and political models conform to international expectations in a globalized transnational settings” (Richmond and Franks 2007: 27).

However, post-conflict settings whereby conventional political structures have been ruptured or destroyed provide with the kind of opportunities for envisioning and promoting progressive educational reforms beyond the ‘liberal peace’ framework. From such perspective, educational reforms should be implemented within broader political and social reforms that address structural inequalities. Indeed, there seems to be scholarly consensus on the fact that education is likely to have a positive impact only if it is made part of a broader strategy and process of social change in the presence of a longer-term political strategy, bearing in mind that “[t]he nature of the education system is at the heart of societal debates on social justice and well-being” (Novelli and Smith 2011: 27).

As this chapter has shown, much of this recent line of research is based upon a shift from grand narratives towards more contingent and contextually driven understandings of educational processes, decisions and actions in post-conflict and conflict-affected settings. It is along this methodological and theoretical trajectory that my research intends to develop its empirical analysis.
CHAPTER TWO
RESEARCH DESIGN

we fill pre-existing forms
and when we fill them
we change them
and are changed

(F. Bidart, Borges and I)

2.1 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1.1 Critical theory and critical realism

My theoretical perspective rests upon the epistemological and ontological foundations of critical theory (Cox 1996) and critical realism (Bob Jessop 2003, 2006; Jones 2013; Neil Brenner et al 2003; Dean et al 2006; Kurki 2008). My research is indebted to the tradition of critical theory, which adopts critique as the basis for social change (Cox 1996). Concerned with the conditions for knowledge production and reproduction, critical theory assumes that knowing, experience and social realities are co-constituted by us (Jessop 2009). In applying critique to my investigation of the relationship(s) within and between education, peacebuilding and statebuilding, one of my objectives is to reveal the existence of contradictions - and by doing so, to pave the way for further critique and social change.

In a critical realist perspective, the social world is “[c]omprised of various layers of structures and generative mechanisms, [...] so that the social world is also comprised of a stratified ensemble of structures and relations” (Joseph 2000: 186). Critical realism makes a distiction between the ‘experential’, the ‘actual’, and the ‘real’ when approaching and investigating the social world, or social phenomena/objects. (Robertson and Dale 2015). The role of the researcher becomes investigating those visible and
invisible mechanisms, relationships (and non) between “[w]hat we experience, what actually happens, and the underlying mechanisms that produce the events in the world” (Danermark et al. 2002: 21 quoted in Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2014: 4).

For the field of education, conflict and peacebuilding this implies looking at education’s multiple faces and dynamics in relation to conflict and post-conflict reconstruction and education’s embeddedness into broader (contextual), historical, cultural norms, structures and institutions within the society (Ibid.). This also implies that the outcomes observed are “[c]ontingent, dynamic, and inherently partial within the full realm of possibility” (Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2014: 2).

My methodology will be qualitative based upon a comparative analysis of two case studies, which are selected upon the international engagement to education reform in post-war statebuilding interventions. Empirical investigation makes use of semi-structured interviews to relevant stakeholders on the ground. As methods for data collection and analysis I also make use of cultural political economy analysis and conflict analysis.

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8 Mingers and Willcocks 2004, critical realism diagram
The research is exploratory in its nature, and it does not aim to test hypotheses that are meant to broad generalizations. The goal is to make sense of the types of education reform and programming that are put in place in different contexts. This seems to be an urgent task: the literature review that I have conducted reveals the existence of a lack of empirical investigation on the ways in which the specificity of a conflict context has been addressed in education reform; on how country-specific education interventions have interacted with peacebuilding/statebuilding processes; on what have been the implications of peacebuilding/statebuilding interventions on education reform; on if and how education reform has been made by an implicit or explicit peacebuilding perspective.

The research has been based on primary and secondary sources. First of all, it has involved an in-depth literature review, which has constituted a solid conceptual and analytical framework through which data has been collected, processed and analysed (Cohen et al. 2007). The review has tried to highlight knowledge and research gaps, identify relevant education initiatives, analyse evaluation/policy reports and other official documents.
A first strand has investigated the relationship between education and the state as a result of globalization, statebuilding and peacebuilding processes along non-Western trajectories (i.e., in unstable peripheries). Two main theoretical debates have framed the discussion around how global education models travel, transfer and transplant in/across national contexts, and how globalization has affected education systems around the world: World Culture Analysis (WCA) and Critical Cultural Political Economy of Education (CCPEE, that is an evolution of the Structured Education Agenda).

I have drawn mainly from the last debate, focussing on the literature on critical cultural political economy to the study of education (Jessop 2004, 2005, 2008, 2010a, 2010b; Robertson 2012; Robertson and Dale 2015). It helps to focus, among others, on educational embeddedness in wider social, economic, political structures and relations. In this regard, Roger Dale and Susan Robertson’s theoretical reflections on the globalization of education (beyond the boundaries of the national state) can be seen as a starting point for an empirical examination of the (changing) relationship between education and the state in those newly emerging states affected by post-war peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas of international interventions.

Moreover, scholarly debates on peacebuilding/statebuilding in post-conflict settings have been critically examined with the aim of locating education reform and governance in the context of pervasive peacebuilding and statebuilding. Current debates among leading donors tend to narrowly conceive of the link between education and statebuilding as one to be identified at the level of service delivery. In this view, education is one among several service deliveries that might enhance or hamper state legitimization, thus contributing to the likelihood of successful statebuilding outcomes (DFID 2009, 2010, 2011). However, as argued above, in the complex post-conflict arena in which is it constantly reformed and reconstituted, education does and is more than merely service delivery.
A second part of my review has looked at the strand of literature that focuses on academic and practitioner debates on education, conflict, peace(building), and social change/transformation. Main works that have inspired the proliferation and reinvigoration of these debates are the UNICEF report by Kenneth Bush and Diana Saltarelli *The two faces of education* (2000) which draws a distinction between negative and positive faces of education, and the book by Lynn Davies *Education and Conflict: Complexity and Chaos* (2004), which elaborates an interdisciplinary theoretical framework starting from Complexity theory, and which investigates the complex interaction between education and conflict.

Debates that have investigated the relationship between education and social change/transformation have sought to examine the ways through which the reform and rebuilding of education can play a transformative role rather than a conservative/restorative role. In this regard, and linked to the impact of education in the conflict/peace nexus, education can play a role in terms of addressing inequities and discriminatory schooling structures/contents that are reflected in and reinforced through education systems, and which mirrors broader structural inequities in the society. Such role is played and enabled through at the level of structure, content, and agency within the education system.

I draw on such review, as my research posits itself within those critical contributions that seek to go beyond the ‘two faces of education’ debate. The research aims to challenge deterministic and binary conceptions of the relationship between education, conflict and peace. It recognizes the existence of and seeks to account for the multifaceted and complex role of education in conflict and post-war situations. However, it also seeks to address an aspect that is not so explicit in literature: it seeks to destabilize and question mainstream conceptualizations of peace, education and conflict (along with stability and statebuilding) by looking into their contingent, contextual and conjectural
manifestations, elaborations and articulations in post-war settings.

In the second phase of research, data collection combined desk review and in-country data collection through semi-structured interviews for each of the two cases. Data collection methods involved individual semi-structured and in-situ collection of grey literature that would have been otherwise difficult to get access to (Gilbert 2001: 123-63). Questions were framed not only by deductively and consistently deriving them from primary research questions, but also by fine-tuning them according to the specificity of each case study, and each informant’s features. Questions were aimed at gaining an insight into programmes, expectations and policies that the informants had for education initiatives. I carried out interviews with the highest regards to the privacy and informed consent of the interviewees.

Triangulation of sources and data has been used whenever possible as a mechanism for ensuring robustness, validity, and quality of the research. Research questions have been addressed by a number of angles ensuring inclusion of different perspectives. Triangulation took place in terms of contrasting responses of different actors and in terms of using different data sources and methods of collection. What I have sought to take into consideration throughout my research is that although each method can compensate for the limitations of another, mistakes in one method can cumulate when methods are applied sequentially and build upon one another.

2.1.2 Qualitative and comparative research methodology

The research is premised on a logic of comparison and contrast, initially focusing on the commitment of international actors to education reform. As I proceeded along my research I became aware of how simplistic the dualistic categories of international/local are when seeking to investigate education reform in conflict-affected contexts. While I maintain that these education systems are externally assisted and shaped, I have soon
come to recognize that the role of and the relationships among international and local actors is much more dynamic and fluid than I initially expected: most importantly, power is diffused among a plethora of different international and local actors and played out at various levels.

The research intends to analyze how varying configurations of one specific sector such as education reflect and affect processes of building state and peace, and what has been the role of international actors therein. For this purpose and with a view to assuring rootedness through historical context of education systems and their development, I conducted ethnographic research in two cases: Kosovo and East Timor.

In doing so, I have been guided by the intention of developing two theoretically informed but empirically rich case studies of education reform in newly emerging post-war states. A key concern for me upon setting out with this research was that, in contrast to variable-oriented analysis, case-oriented research may yield more insights if one is interested in the context and in the complexity of outcomes and processes (Gerring 2007). In line with interpretive approaches to social sciences, here emphasis has been placed on ‘thick description’ of few cases: generalizability is limited, while the specificity of contexts plays a significant role (Della Porta 2012): “[c]ase studies can trace not only which choices were considered and actions were taken, they can also show that some other actions were deliberately avoided in anticipation of the choices and actions of the other players” (Goemans 2007: 11 quoted in Ahmed and Sil 2012: 943).

Kosovo and East Timor are major recent examples of statebuilding initiatives encompassing activities in support of re-designing the education system in a context of emerging sovereignty out of a long secessionist process characterized by armed violence: the deployment of ambitious statebuilding plans represents the main criterion for case
selection. Comparison is ensured by a fixed set of core questions. Both cases develop in parallel along the same time frame, and for both the observation period is 1999-2014. A time frame of fifteen years allows the researcher go beyond the description of outputs, enabling the tracking of changes and the unraveling of outcomes that occur throughout middle/longer-term processes of education reform and international intervention.

Investigation had to take into account the complexities and differences on the ground. The two countries differ substantially in a number of ways (i.e., geographically, historically, culturally, and politically), which call for some form of analytical control. Yet when internationally mandated interim administration missions were established, both cases were announced as examples of a possible new way to address similar conflicts. Similarities are not lacking: in both cases the conflict was for secession and it led to the creation of a new state, which is a crucial, additional criterion for selection here.

My treatment of educational and statebuilding/peacebuilding interventions has been grounded on an explanatory and interpretive framework and detailed case studies of Kosovo and East Timor. The emphasis on social conflict shaping statebuilding interventions and inherent in educational reform may explain what actually emerges in practice, rather than merely lamenting the gap between plan and reality as most of the existing literature does (Hameiri 2010).

Indeed, this research tries to go beyond merely describing the gap between the apparent intentions of interventions and their practical results and which results typically in either criticising the plans for being ideologically misguided or proposing technocratic or lessons learnt solutions (Jones 2011). Attention is paid to explaining differences in outcome, not just by referring to contextual differences. Full understanding of outcomes of interventions in education must involve analysis of the forces that come together in any specific instance, both intervening and intervened upon, in a historically and

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9 The UN staff that had designed the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) drafted the United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor–Leste (UNTAET) a few months later.
sociologically informed fashion.

The analysis has been grounded on the recognition that externally-driven interventions are not simply trying to ‘build’ states and reform education as we classically understand them, but also to ‘regulate statehood’ (Hameiri 2010) and education, thus fundamentally transforming the nature of target states and their education.

2.2 METHODS

2.2.1 Field research and semi-structured interviews

Field visits and semi-structured interviews were conducted in East Timor and Kosovo, respectively in June-July 2013 and October-November 2013 targeting international and local stakeholders from international organizations that were involved in educational reforms (reps. from the World Bank, UNICEF, UNESCO, other UN agencies, bi-lateral donors etc.), government officials (especially within Ministries of Education), representatives from civil society organizations, and university professors and school administrators.

According to Wood (2008), field research is based on personal interaction with research subjects in their own setting. The risk of ill-conceived field research is that it may confirm preconceptions with which the researcher went to the field. Field research is an important tool of inquiry when it brings the researcher in contact with important categories of data that would be otherwise hardly accessible. Such data concerns beliefs, preferences, rationales and interests of political actors involved in strategic interactions and entrenched in power relationships with other actors (Wood 2008):

Site-intensive methods (SIM) are of particular value when what we’re studying is subtle (for example, relationships, networks, identities, styles, beliefs, or modes) and when what we’re studying is sensitive, hidden or otherwise kept behind barriers that require building trust or unlocking access (Read 2006: 12).
In addition to these data, researchers in the field often come across and generate other kinds of data that would not be available without personal interaction (Wood 2008). This dialectic and dynamic interaction between the researcher and the actor under study may generate new insights and questions on both sides.

In the case of East Timor, I discovered how crucial the language issue and its link to (national) identity was only by being in the field. Unexpectedly, most of the interviews revealed the tensions that were inherent in language policy providing useful insights on the relationship between education reform, peacebuilding and nation building in ways and degrees that I had not previously been aware of. Moreover, interviews illustrated in a straightforwarded way the disconnection that I was expecting to find between education, peacebuilding and statebuilding, and the paradox of education expecting to contribute to peace without a strategy on how to achieve so. Issues of power (especially the conflicting relationship with the former colonizer - Portugal - and its significant impact on language and curricula reform) were better revealed while in interviews and informal conversations in Dili. The role, influence, and power of international consultants and advisors, and the dependency effect that they instigate, has been another aspect that I could only grasp in its complexity and conflict potential only by being in the field.

In the case of Kosovo, by doing fieldwork I could better grasp the significant impact that local actors would attach to the first period of international intervention in education following the end of hostilities (the so-called ‘Daxner period’, see chapter four). The significance and extent of the proliferation of private universities and their impact on the devaluation of the diplomas was another aspect I better captured during those five weeks of interviews in Pristina. The connivance between political elites and university positions (i.e., how university degrees and positions are used as legitimising or power distributional tools for political actors) was another element I could neatly grasp during interviews and informal conversations I had while being in Pristina.
In order to ensure representativeness of the different actors involved in education reform, peacebuilding and statebuilding in Kosovo and East Timor, and consider a substantial degree of variation, my fieldwork sought to favour breadth (interviewing key representatives from each of the organizations) over depth (interviewing many representatives within few organizations).

Interviews are key to qualitative field research (Wood 2008) when they explore subjects’ meanings and perspectives. In-depth, semi-structured interviews represented the core of my field research, and were organized around a set of fixed questions. However, they were tailored according to the subject’s profile (branching pattern) and each interview slightly adapted and refined building upon information collected from earlier interviews (building pattern). Interviews suggested recurrent discursive patterns, gaps or new avenues for inquiry. In conducting interviews I was aware of the dynamic nature of interviews (mainly semi-structured), through which the identities of the interviewer and interviewee are performed and the knowledge co-constructed.

I used the snowball technique, which builds upon a potentially increasing, expanding and diversifying network of research subjects by using different informants and institutional gatekeepers (Gusterson 2008). An access strategy that included preliminary emails of presentation of my research position and my research project anticipated the field visit. I took detailed notes, which I transcribed in a daily field diary. I collected most of the data through semi-structured interviews; when this was not possible I conducted informal ones. I have conducted 35 semistructured interviews and 15 informal interviews.

I have not cited in the dissertation all of these interviews because several resulted as having similar contents, and the indications that I could distil from them were fundamentally converging. In addition, during fieldwork I had the opportunity to be part

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10 Interviewees draw on complex repertoires of discourses to perform themselves in response to particular questions
of several informal discussions that were not strictly related to the topic of my thesis, but have helped me to grasp the broader socio-political dynamics in Kosovo and East Timor. I partly recorded and daily transcribed most of the semi-structured interviews, and I wrote reports on the most salient informal interviews. Updating regularly my reports allowed me to approach proactively the amount of data that I was gathering, and to constantly re-evaluate my research questions. In East Timor people felt more comfortable replying to my questions while I was taking notes in a field diary. In Kosovo most of the people I interviewed expected me to record them. In other cases, where recording or taking notes was not possible, I made a report at the end of the day.

As I was a researcher bridging between different worlds (the locals and the internationals), I used my linguistic skills to try to deeply embed myself into the reality (ies) that I was researching. In Kosovo this implied the use of three different languages in interviews and other forms of conversations: Albanian (my mother tongue, although the Albanian spoken in Kosovo differs in many ways from the Albanian spoken in Southern Albania where I was born, a circumstance that prevented mimetic strategies) for approaching local interlocutors, English and Italian for the international milieux. By contrast, I used English for most of the interviews that I conducted in East Timor, while I made use of a local translator for two interviews with local NGOs’ representatives. I had constructive exchanges with the researcher/translator, who proved to be quite resourceful in suggesting additional contacts for further interviews. Perhaps not surprisingly, the little Portuguese I had studies in preparation for the fieldwork turned out to be quite useless.

2.2.2 Political economy and conflict analysis

Data analysis has involved a critical cultural political economy approach to the mapping of activities, actors and relationships in education reform and a conflict analysis to education programming and reform. The political economy approach entails recognizing
that “[e]ducational projects and interventions succeed or fail not only on the basis of their technical quality but also of a range of political and economic factors” (Novelli 2011b: 9). This type of analysis seeks to examine the interaction between structures, institutions and agents, and their impact on education programming and reform.

Critical cultural political economy supports the examination and analysis of education processes, outcomes and discourses. It is a useful approach because it allows the researcher to understand the complex arrangements of agenda-setting, decision-making and educational governance in place in post-war settings. Moreover, it helps to identify and map out the link(s) between education and political, social and economic relationships in the society, and allows detecting given strategic actions and responses by actors at various scales and moments and with outcomes that may simultaneously or consequentially reinforce or hamper aspects of state and peace formation.

In critical political economy analysis context is crucial, although it is often fluid and therefore challenging: the notion of context includes the interactions between structure(s), agents and institutions (i.e., norms), and how such interactions affect and are affected by different policies. Robertson and Dale’s approach to political economy advocates taking culture seriously, and avoiding methodological nationalism/globalism, economism or ethnocentrism; furthermore, they suggest to consider and explore other issues such as nationalism, identity, values, and knowledge (production) (Robertson and Dale 2015).

According to Novelli et al., critical political economy analysis is more effective at “[u]npacking the tensions, contradictions and inequalities in everyday life and in education systems – analysing what policy work or not and for whom, but appears less useful in offering easy policy solutions.” (2013: 20). Yet, CCPEE provides with a framework for disclosing “[t]he complex (and contradictory) ways in which education is being re/constituted in particular ways by discourses/ideas/imaginaries (such as
development, reconstruction, peacebuilding, social justice or cohesion), actors/institutions (such as the central and provincial government, international organizations, state and religious schools) and material capabilities/power (resources, aid, information)” (Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2014: 8; see also Robertson 2009 quoted in Jones 2010). Such a framework has been useful throughout the empirical analysis for both case studies, in that it channels and processes the research by looking for the themes that emerges out of each of them.

A conflict analysis approach implies an understanding of the relationship between education and the pre- and post-conflict environment, specifically the root causes of conflict and the latent, structural violence. In this regard, it is first of all necessary to understand the drivers of the conflict (security, political, economic and social factors are often identified as key drivers of a conflict) and how education has interacted with them; second, it is useful to understand to what extent and how education has addressed these conflict roots and drivers (either challenging or reproducing them, mitigating or exacerbating). Moreover, attention has to be paid to how education interacts with current micro-sources and proximate triggers of conflict. Generally speaking, root causes are

the general structural and deep-rooted background conditions. [They are] underlying events and conditions that have existed for many years and are mostly static or change slowly over time. They tend to be embedded in historical/cultural contexts, e.g., religious conflict, long-standing border disputes, difficulty in state building, poverty/economic exclusion or ecological degradation. Root causes are thus necessary but not sufficient conditions of armed conflict. They can be instrumentalized by political actors and are generally used to assess the risk potential of a country (Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez 2002: 10).

By contrast, proximate triggers are those dynamic causes, “[m]edium-term conditions and emerging socio-political economic trends. Together with root causes they can create sufficient conditions for armed conflict” (Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez 2002: 12).

2.3 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS
Informed consent, transparency and anonymity were the ethical principles that guided my research. The focus of my research, the academic institutions behind it and any further explanation that was asked by the participants, was presented at the beginning of any interview. The interviewees were informed that they could have the right to withdraw themselves from the interviews at any time. The transcription of the interviews and the daily report of the observation have been accurately treated, stored in a removable memory stick, and protected. In both cases, several respondents asked me to preserve their anonymity. I have chosen to preserve the anonymity of all interviewees, and to refer only to their current or former position, next to date and location where the interview took place.

With regard to challenges that I encountered in the field, one major constraint were the specific moments in which I conducted my fieldwork in Kosovo and East Timor. In the case of East Timor I was in the field during June-July 2013: once in the country I found out that this was a period where some international advisors I was targeting for interviews were in fact leaving for holiday. I had difficulties in accessing different international officials: in particular, despite many efforts, I could not interview any current or past, local or international official working with UNICEF, which was one of the main actors in curriculum reform.

I encountered similar access problems in the case of Kosovo, for which November 2013 was a period of high political tensions due to administrative elections. Some of the potential contacts I approached for interviews were abroad for conferences or field visits. Here too, despite several attempts that I made, no UNICEF representative was available for interviews. Moreover, while I had an informal conversation with an Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) official who gave me insights on the role that her organization had played on the reform of higher education and multicultural and minority education, I could not formally interview any OSCE
official. The OSCE department on higher education was expected to cease its activities a few months later (it closed its office in January 2014). I tried to reach the director of that department (in charge until the very day I arrived in Pristina), but he declined my invitation on the basis of the fact that he would leave Kosovo soon. This meant that I could not gain access to the archives related to the OSCE programmes on higher education and minority issues.

I was born in Albania, a circumstance that had some effect on the way in which I could gain access to the Kosovo context, if nothing else because of the benefit of speaking the main local language. Moreover, I wrote my master thesis on the EU development strategy in post-war Kosovo: I already had had fieldwork experience in the country. Compared with East Timor, I began my field research with a better understanding of the Kosovo context, also thanks to a number of pre-existing local contacts. Being an Albanian, and locally identified as a kin, made me feel that I could penetrate and decode with relative ease local meanings and social practices; on the other hand, the fact that I am not from Kosovo, and that I have been studying for some years within the European Union (EU) – Italy and the Netherlands – made me feel in several ways distant from the context that I was observing. Perhaps surprisingly, I experienced more frustration with organizing and conducting interviews in Kosovo than in East Timor, where my fieldwork was certainly more rewarding.

In the case of East Timor, I felt that I was identified by all people I interviewed as an external scholar with no previous links with the context or subject I was researching. In more than one occasion, I was identified and defined as an ‘East-European woman’, a circumstance that induced me to think that my status/position as a scholar was being overlooked. On another occasion I was identified “as beautiful as all other East-European
women.” In this latter case, while I tried to frame the conversation according to my research questions and subject, the interviewee was inviting me to his village during the weekend, asking me to be potentially his guide when he was visiting Albania sometime in the future. In both countries, most of the people I interviewed were men sitting in different power positions, somehow embedded in paternalistic and sexist contexts. I sometimes found myself to be observed as an exotic object, asked who I was and where I came from rather than raising interest in the subject of my research.

2.4 CONCEPTS

According to Boyer, “[t]he definitions are less important in themselves than for the way in which they assist research” (1990a: 60 quoted in Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum 2006: 306). Therefore, in preparing a research design I believe one has to be aware that “[c]oncepts are never introduced once and for all at a single level of abstraction but are continually redefined in the movement from abstract to concrete – acquiring new forms and transcending the limits of their previous formulations (Aglietta 1979: 15-16). In this regard, I present below an attempt to define education and peace, while the definition and evolution of peacebuilding and statebuilding were reviewed and presented in chapter one.

I have tried to engage with such concepts in a critical and ‘problematizing’ way all along the process of dissertation writing.

Bodies of literature reviewed on education and conflict in peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions reveal that none of such concepts is indeed problematized as it should be. More specifically, in debates over education, war, and peacebuilding/statebuilding, conflict is seen as negative and in need for prevention, rather than as intrinsic of/in any society, so the question becomes how to prevent conflict rather

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11 Interview with an highly-ranked official within the Ministry of Education, 1 July 2013, Dili, East Timor
than what conflict (or its absence) would reflect about underlying (power) relations and (legitimate) political orders.

By contrast, peace is regarded as a neutrally positive outcome, process or utopia, or criticised due to its externally-imposed and liberal nature. Debates abound on the definitions, evaluative benchmarks and indicators, ways to consolidate/achieve it, or reasons for its failure. The fragility of a state of peacefulness and the difficulty to measure or evaluate it suggests seeing peace as an historical process and the result of particular social relations. Attempts to conceptualize it against a number of agreed-upon benchmarks at which interventions are then assessed presume an a-contextual process, and ignore the fundamentally historical and contingent nature of peace.

When dealing with education, there is growing concern and increase in interest on the part of involved international actors on how to quickly rebuild it along the emergency, medium- and long-term imperatives. Moreover, there is by now a growing literature that criticises the neo-liberal policies and strategies that are transplanted and implemented from one context to the next one on a global scale. However, there is little research on how such neo-liberal agendas are interacting with social forces on the ground, what are the effects and outcomes of such interaction, and what is the rationale behind prevailing education agendas and choices. Thus, there is a need for more empirical insights on the role of local actors in receiving, implementing or contesting such global educational agendas.

Lastly, the nature of the state that emerges through, in and from peacebuilding/statebuilding interventions is rarely questioned. Most of the approaches that study the issue of state failure in international statebuilding interventions, depart from neo-institutionalist or neo-weberian perspectives that take for granted the unitary nature of the state. Some scholars (Jones 2013; Hameiri 2010) are proposing a Gramscian perspective to studying the state that emerges in post-war statebuilding interventions,
emphasising its relational nature (i.e., state as social relation as extensively elaborated by Bob Jessop).

2.4.1 Education

In my research, I adopt a description of broad state-specific educational trends. I therefore try to avoid a rigid compartmentalization of education through a sector-by-sector analysis of the education system, which I read as dimensions along which models may differ. By models of education systems I intend recurrent patterns in organizing an education system which may vary in terms of more or less emphasis on public vis-à-vis private education; technical and vocational training education vis-à-vis higher education; emphasis on majorities vis-à-vis minorities (in education structure or curricula); emergency response in the form of service provision vis-à-vis longer term curricula development; degree of intrusiveness of donors vis-à-vis degree and power of local agency. The research will seek to unravel the rationale for and the agency behind such patterns. In looking at education as a complex (more than a) system, the category of ‘education ensemble’ as used by Robertson and Dale (2015) is particularly useful. They urge to see the ‘education ensemble’

As a complex collective, construction of the social world, that is not reducible to schools, or universities, learners and teachers. [...] Education involves an array of actors and other institutions, [...] whose logics, interests and forms of authority generate tensions and contradictions within the ensemble. [...] Education is the outcome of sets of ideas and activities accredited over generations, which, whilst individually irreducible to each other, can be seen to be in an internal relationship with each other in the production of the ensemble. [...] there can be no understanding of the individual elements of the ensemble, without an overall understanding of it (Robertson and Dale 2015: 155-156).

The broader concept of ‘ensemble’ is useful in that it places education in multiple relationships with(in) societies and it allows detecting the range of relationships within education and between education and the broader society. Education is a “[c]omplex and
variegated agency of social reproduction” (Robertson and Dale 2015: 150), which cannot be reduced either to “‘[a] system’, or ‘an agent’ of socialisation and social selection, or indeed a provider of vocational qualifications” (Robertson and Dale 2015: 150).

Robertson suggests to view education “‘not’ as pre-given container or universal and unchanging category of social relations and life-worlds, but as a complex terrain and outcome of discursive, material and institutionalized struggles over the role of education in the social contract” (Robertson 2014: 2). In investigating the education ensemble one has to take into account four elements that are related to it and which contribute to its definition and construction: the wider, cultural scripts through which education is constructed or by which it is influenced (e.g., Western Modernity, Western education, Islam, Catholicism, etc.); its relationship with the society(ies) at the local, national, regional and global level; its relationship with the economy (modes of economic organization/production such as capitalism); forms of organizations that features it as a system (Robertson and Dale 2015: 156).

Methodologically, investigating the education ensemble would involve a number of ‘education questions’ as largely debated by Dale and Robertson (Dale 2000, 2005; Robertson and Dale 2013, 2015). These questions move along four “analytical moments” or levels of analysis that constitute “[d]ifferent framings and realisations of the ‘education ensemble’” (Robertson and Dale 2015: 156).

*moment of educational practice*, which deals with issues of distribution of educational experiences and revolve arounds questions such as ‘who is taught what, by whom, how, where?’;

*moment of educational politics*, which deals with the relationship between policy and practice focusing on questions such as ‘how and by whom are those things

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12 These moments remain distinct at the analytical level: while moving at the ground level one finds them overlapping, in a dynamic relationship.
decided?’, always recognizing that events occurring at these two ‘moments’ are placed in a dynamic and co-constitutive relationship;

- **moment of the politics of education**, which is “[e]ncerned with both political-economic structures, and deeply embedded cultural/civilizational/national structures and discourses, [...] ‘paradigmatic setting’ that both promote and set limits to what is considered possible and desirable from education” (Robertson and Dale 2015: 156);

- **moment of outcomes of educational processes**, include immediate consequences of the three previous moments for those directly involved, but also the wider consequences and effects at the individual, collective, societal levels arising from the production and operation of the education ensemble (Robertson and Dale 2015: 157).

A critical cultural political economy is better suited to capture the complex array of structures, institutions and practices of the education ensemble, and of its scope, forms, and outcomes, since it focuses on the cultural, political and economic elements of the ensemble. Importantly for the study of education around the world, the idea of culture, economy and politics are pluralized, so that whilst it is recognized that capitalism and modernity are major determinants of the shape of education in many parts of the world, this is not to say that all cultural projects can be characterized as modernity, and nor are all economic relations in education capitalist.

The approach suggested and adopted by Robertson and Dale goes beyond a traditional understanding of the economy (i.e., recognizing one form of organising the relations of production, distribution and exchange), by looking at the education sector itself as an economy in its own right, partly “heavily commodified” and partly depending on a “gift economy” (Robertson 2012: 3). Also, the ‘political’ within such framework and
in education does not limit its scope to the formal institutions of government or to the state and state actors as such, but extends to the multiplicity of non-state actors that operate in, out and through education, ultimately suggesting that power and politics in education is and works in a myriad of ways. Finally, the ‘cultural’ in their framework does not only refer to ‘semiosis’ or ‘discourses’, but also to wider “[c]ivilisational projects – such as modernity, Confucianism, Islam” (Robertson and Dale 2015: 154).

2.4.2 Peace

Peace has always been a contested concept. Nearly four decades after the foundation of peace research and following three decades of peacekeeping/peacemaking/peacebuilding missions, peace remains an “essentially contested concept” (Strazzari 2008a: 46). The stance that this research takes is one that considers peace as an inter-subjective and context-specific process, constructed in the interplay among different subjects, which struggle to define it. Such subjects underwrite explicit or tacit ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions, further various interests, and are entrenched within power relations (Richmond 2008: 16)

Peace, as a concept and as a practice, is subjected to the varying historical and material conditions. Approaching the definition of peace genealogically and contextually is useful in that peace cannot be a fixed and universalizing concept and that “[p]eace always has a time and space...and exists in multiple forms in overlapping spaces of influence” (Richmond 2005: 16). Examining the conceptualization of peace one cannot exempt from questions such as what is peace (for), why, who creates and implements it, how and for whom? (Pugh et al. 2008)

According to Richmond, the focus in the disciplines of peace research and conflict studies has been on preventing conflict rather than on “[a] sustained attempt to develop a self-sustaining peace” (Richmond 2008: 9). The preponderance of war
discourses over peace discourses has to do with the idea that peace has been seen as non-war, a generic non-event that is difficult to measure (Strazzari 2008a). The establishment of peace research in the 1960s critically challenged and questioned the definition of peace as merely the absence of war.\textsuperscript{13}

One of the most prominent exponents of that generation of peace researcher has been Johan Galtung. Central in his work is the search for positive peace, encompassing the addressing and overcoming of structural and cultural violence, the search for human empathy and solidarity, and the inclusion of social justice as a pivotal dimension of a broader conceptualization of peace. In this view peace comprises the implementation of social justice, a condition where human rights are respected (Johnston and Slyomovics 2008). Such a broader understanding and definition of peace lays the foundation for multidimensional approaches to peace (ranging from the management and prevention of war, to the removal of injustices and inequalities, to the overcoming of the latter through non-violent means). This is also found in the UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee’s (re)definition of peacebuilding that seems to reflect a broader, transformational understanding (and application) of it encompassing elements of Galtung’s positive peace.

Part of my research question is looking at the kind of peace(s) that education systems reflect and affect in Kosovo and East Timor. On another level, the review and contextual analysis of the empirical case studies aims to grasp the meanings and theoretical foundations underpinning the peacebuilding agendas and practices of international actors in both cases. In this section, rather than using and choosing a definition of peace against which I test the results on the ground and the measurable

\textsuperscript{13} The multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary nature of peace research aims at shedding light at the conditions of a sustainable and durable peace. A number of institutions mark the origins and evolution of the discipline: in 1959, the creation of the Norwegian-based International Peace Research Institute that becomes an independent institution in 1966 and is guided by the founding scholar in peace research Johan Galtung; in 1959, the setting up of the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution based at the University of Michigan, led by Kenneth Boulding; in 1961, the founding of the Canadian Peace Research Institute; in 1966, the founding of the Swedish-based Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
contribution of education respectively, I aimed to briefly present the ambiguity and complexity of the debates surrounding any definition of peace and peacefulness as well as their elusivity.

In doing so, I nevertheless argue that any attempt to define, build and practice peace and its (mutually constitutive) relationship with education has to incorporate a concept of social justice. In this regard, Nancy Fraser’s conceptualization of social justice in terms of redistribution, recognition and representation is useful as a conceptual framework that links education reform to (contributing and building) a just and positive peace, in terms of (1) redistribution, i.e., issues of safe and equitable educational access and opportunity; (2) recognition, i.e., educational relevance; (3) representation, i.e., educational governance. Linking (social) justice to peace challenges mainstream representations of what peace and stability may mean or represent in the post-conflict moment and how could education be related to and contributing to it.

In other terms, frameworks of social justice and change provide with the possibility to normatively link peacebuilding and education to social justice goals. IR scholarship that is critical of neoliberal peacebuilding has been advocating an emancipatory and sustainable peace without further elaborating what such an ‘emancipatory’ and ‘sustainable’ peace would look like (Richmond 2008). Moreover, it is not clear which forms and through which relationships, processes, actors and sectors would peacebuilding (as a process) lead to a just and emancipatory peace in post-conflict settings and if and how education can play a role in this regard.
CHAPTER THREE

MULTICULTURAL PEACEBUILDING IN AN INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED KOSOVO

Introduction

The province of Kosovo, which had historically been the poorest in the former Yugoslavia, underwent a war in 1998-99. NATO launched an air bombing campaign between April-June 1999 that forced the Belgrade’s security forces to withdraw, along with ethnic Serbian civilians, and facilitated the return of Kosovo refugees (most of whom were of Albanian origin\textsuperscript{14}). In the aftermath of the war, Kosovo was administered according to Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). This implied that, although Kosovo remained de jure part of Serbia, de facto the province (for most of its territory) was not responding to Belgrade’s authorities.

New governance structures came to Kosovo in the form of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), operating as a transitional, interim administration with unlimited legislative and executive powers. UNMIK functioned in coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Kosovo Force (KFOR): over time it gradually transferred its competences to democratically elected provisional local authorities. During 1999-2008, the international community provided over three billion Euro in foreign aid, and undertook large projects in peace- and institution-building. [...] many criticize the international administration for being ineffective in satisfying the real needs of the Kosovar population, constructing social trust across ethnic communities and in realizing economic recovery and psycho-social reconstruction. The international administration is instead criticized for not providing for the special needs of the Kosovars, particularly in the spheres of health and education. This criticism is not without merit.

\textsuperscript{14} Ethnic Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo will be referred to as Kosovars, following the local use of the term. By contrast, I will sometimes refer to Kosovans (a term that has no local language correspondence) to design the entire population that lives in Kosovo, including other ethno-national groups. I use, otherwise, the terms ‘Kosovo Albanians’ and ‘Kosovo Serbs’ to refer to particular ethnic groups of the Kosovo population.
administration is also criticised for deepening ethnic fragmentation, [...] inhibiting local ownership and making bottom-up approaches to transition and normalization impossible (Beha and Visoka 2010: 84).

In spite of these efforts, that were made under a UN quasi-protectorate, it is hard to define Kosovo a success story of peacebuilding and statebuilding post-conflict reconstruction: major failures and systematic fragility persist. One of the main failures was the political solution that came with the unilateral declaration of independence adopted by the Kosovo parliament on February 17, 2008, following the breakdown of diplomatic efforts that sought to bring the parties (i.e., Pristina and Belgrade) to an agreed upon outcome over the status of the province.\footnote{\footnotesize{Kosovo’s political status has been at the core of a long conflict between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. After the war, the negotiation process between Belgrade authorities and Pristina’s provisional government resulted in a deadlock, with Kosovo Albanians becoming increasingly frustrated vs. the international UN mission.}}

The declaration of independence of 2008 was not the first one adopted by Albanian parties, but unlike the previous ones it was met with recognition on the part of most Western states: locally it was welcomed with widespread euphory by the vast majority of Kosovans, most of whom are ethnic Albanians. For nine years following the end of hostilities, the (intractability of the) ‘status issue’ had been used by both the international community and the local authorities as an alibi for posponing other pressing issues and problems of post-war Kosovo, such as widespread levels of poverty and unemployment, in an highly demographically young country. Indipendence was thus given a talismanic meaning, and expected to contribute to solving some of these issues.

Following independence, international governance mechanisms were reconfigured, in a process characterized by tensions and ambiguities: given the fact that a number of countries that were participating in the post-war multilateral rebuilding effort refused to recognize the new state, complexity on the ground reached unprecedented levels: different actors, in primis the EU and the UN were struggling to redefine and reassert power and competences. When I visited Kosovo in March 2008, in the immediate
aftermath of the unilateral declaration of independence, the disillusionment and desolation I could grasp by talking to local inhabitants was amplified by the growing complexity of the international presence which made me look at the country as embroiled within a frozen conflict that has never ended. Despite the prospect of EU integration and unprecedented levels of international assistance, the picture I could grasp in two distinct fieldworks (in 2008 and in 2013) is that of a country where poverty and underdevelopment assumes different but persistent forms.

The international community put twenty-five times as much money and fifty times as many troops into Kosovo, on a per capita basis, as into Afghanistan. And yet despite this enormous commitment of resources and effort, by the mission’s own standard it still largely failed (King and Mason 2006: 240).

As mentioned above, underdevelopment has been a key question related to Kosovo during Yugoslavia: development indicators which worsened throughout the decade that preceded the war, as the Yugoslav economic and budget crisis reached unprecedented peaks. Failure to reach planned development standards can be regarded as one of the underlying causes of conflict; an aspect that has, nevertheless, been largely ignored and neglected by the international community in post-war Kosovo (Montanaro 2009).

It is sometimes thought that the disintegration of Yugoslavia started in Kosovo during the student riots in 1981. The protesters were asking for a rise in salaries, measures for addressing high unemployment rates, and an overall improvement of the economic situation. Moreover, the status of ‘Republic’ for the ‘Autonomous Province of Kosovo’ also featured among the requests that were aired in Pristina. Commenting on the student riots at University of Pristina, the journalist Zdenko Astic emphasized the role of the dire socio-economic situation of Kosovo,\(^{16}\) underlining how a (relatively) huge amount of funding that had been poured by the Federation into ‘the development of Kosovo’ were not translated into growth: the region had remained the poorest in Yugoslavia.

\(^{16}\) For a documented analysis of underdevelopment in densely Albanian inhabited areas see Roux 1992: 103-127
One could already identify here the close relationship between conflict dynamics, (higher) education and underdevelopment as being part of underlying conflict causes. The socio-economic and political situation in Kosovo further worsened during the 1990s, as an effect of the discriminatory policies that were the fruit of the politics game played by Slobodan Milosevic against Kosovo Albanians.17

The 1999 war was the result of a number of dynamics and factors: the worsening of the socio-economic conditions in which the large majority of the population lived can be considered one of them. Although one should refrain from mechanistic explanations, the deterioration of living standards affected both the Serbian and the Albanian communities. The major violent riots swept post-war Kosovo in March 2004 (causing 21 deaths) was both addressed against the Serbian community and the international community. Beside the frustration related to the question of the political status, once again, high unemployment rates, a decline in purchasing power and the deepening of socio-economic inequalities made Kosovo’s social landscape particularly unstable and vulnerable. According to King and Mason:

If economic privation was a spur to the lethal violence of March of that year, it was no coincidence that the riots occurred when they did. 2004 was the year people woke up to their manifest poverty. Prosperity, like independence, seemed to have been postponed much longer than initially hoped; by 2004, many had concluded it would never arrive [...] Poverty no more presents an excuse for the ethnic violence of March 2004 than a deprived upbringing should count as an excuse for other violent crime; but if there was a casual link, it is that the ‘feel-good factor’, fleetingly delivered by the reconstruction effort in the early days, had gone into reverse (King and Mason 2006: 224).

As the EU took the lead in 2008, seeking to mentor the course of post independence Kosovo, many socio-economic problems remained unaddressed and unresolved: among them, the existence of large sectors of informality, extremely high (youth) unemployment

17 This period was characterized by a large job displacement of Kosovo Albanians, which were substituted with Serbian workers. Milosevic was trying to create demographic imbalances between the different ethnic groups. He was forcing the repopulation of the Kosovo region with Serbian refugees from other parts of the former Yugoslavia.
and poverty rate, a young and unbalanced demographic structure, and decreasing levels of migrants’ remittances and international aid. Six years after independence, such a situation is hardly improved: on the contrary, it is further exacerbated by the political and geographical isolation in which Kosovo lies, being the only Balkan country excluded from visa liberalization vis-à-vis the EU-Schengen area.

3.1 The intractable conflict: a background analysis

All parties can agree that the issue of Kosovo is, quite simply, the most intractable of all the political conflicts in the Balkans (Malcolm 1998: xxvii)

For most of its modern history, Kosovo has been a poor and contested frontier area, in which the control of central authorities was nominal, insecurity characterized social and economic life, social capital was quite low, and the basis for stability was to be found within the family or kin group (and related networks). Michel Roux defined it as a “[v]éritable périphérie de la périphérie” (1992: 238). Kosovo was the poorest province of Yugoslavia. The issue of development interacting with the ethno-national question was of critical importance for the way the conflict unfolded.

A genealogy of the Kosovo issue which aims to contextualize the root causes of such a long conflict is not a straightforward task. There has always been a manipulation of historical facts and sources, and controversy over different ‘national historical truths’ (Dogo 1999). However, a background to the recent history of Kosovo that includes phases and causes of a long conflict between the two main ethnic groups of Albanians and Serbs is useful because it provides with the context within which education has been developed and reconstructed.

The current administrative structure of Kosovo is still legally grounded on UN
Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSCR 1999), which brought Kosovo back to the autonomous status it gained following the adoption of a new constitution in Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1974 (Klasnja 2007: 15). This constitution gave to Pristina the same functions and representation within the Yugoslav Federal state as those of the other six Yugoslav republics.\textsuperscript{18} Yet, Kosovo formally remained an autonomous province within Serbia. By not being a republic in the Yugoslav federal system, Kosovo did not have the right to secede. In the aftermath of Tito’s death, Yugoslavia showed the first signs of economic and institutional crisis, which preceded the rise of dangerous nationalist movements in the respective republics.

As mentioned above, in 1981 Kosovo Albanians started hunger striking and rallied in protests asking for the status of ‘republic’ for ‘two million’ Kosovo Albanians: one of the underlying reasons for such a claim was that neighbouring Montenegro, home to 600,000 inhabitants had the right to secession. Albanians accused the Yugoslav authorities of discrimination \textit{vis-à-vis} the main non-slavic nation within the Federation. By the end of the 1980s, Milosevic began a process of re-centralization of Yugoslavia, which started by removing Kosovo’s autonomy, and reducing Kosovo to a Serbian district called Kosmet (i.e., Kosovo i Metohia). Re-establishing Serbian direct rule over Kosovo was followed by replacing Kosovo Albanians with Kosovo Serbs in the public administration (Del Castillo 2008: 137). The systematic discrimination perpetuated by the Milosevic regime worsened Kosovo’s socio-economic underdevelopment, with unemployment rising and inter-ethnic inequalities deepening (Del Castillo 2008: 138).

Following the attack on the autonomy of the province, Kosovo Albanians organized a referendum, in which the majority voted for the independence of the ‘Republic of Kosova’. As a result, government structures and a parliament were created.

\textsuperscript{18} In other words, Pristina could decide on matters of infrastructure, agriculture, light/heavy industry and it was an equal member for the rotating Yugoslav presidency, government and the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.
On September 7, 1990, two thirds of the political representatives of the ‘elected parliament’ gathered clandestinely in Kačanik, and after a few days a declaration that came to be known as the ‘Constitution of the Republic of Kosova’ was adopted. Two years later (1992), general elections were held in a situation in which Belgrade – that was present with its own administration and security apparatus – formally ignored developments among Kosovars: they were won by the main political organization Lidhja Democratike e Kosoves (LDK – the Democratic League of Kosovo) led by Ibrahim Rugova, who became the president of the self-proclaimed republic.

The Serbian authorities did not recognize the new structures, and the latter operated in a condition of clandestinity, as shadow institutions performing the same functions of a state, particularly as far as the delivery of basic social services is concerned. This led to the creation of a parallel state system with a self-taxation mechanism (within Kosovo and outside in the Kosovo Diaspora), education system, medical and media structures, but it lacked a policing and judicial system (O’Neill 2002). Throughout those years, while the Balkan wars were disintegrating Yugoslavia, Rugova opted for nonviolent resistance as the way to achieve independence.

This changed after the Dayton agreements which seemed to award those countries that reached independence through war and violence. According to Morozzo della Rocca (1999), Kosovo was left out of the agenda in Dayton: this meant the postponment sine die of the Kosovo problem on the international agenda. Parts of Kosovo’s society and of the diaspora community at this point joined ranks, feeling that the gradualist, non-violent project had entered a dead-end alley: a growing number of subjects started to question Rugova’s authority and his peaceful approach. They proposed an active resistance strategy that could clearly escalate into armed confrontation.

Soon after, a guerrilla-like ‘army’ known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was formed, in part thanks to diaspora remittances. The KLA confronted systematically
both the LDK and the Serbian authorities during the period between 1997-98 (Klasnja 2007: 16; Morozzo della Rocca 1999; O’Neill 2002; Scotto and Arielli 1999). Serbian police and paramilitary factions responded with increasing repression against the civilian population, and as clashes between Serbian forces and KLA combatants escalated throughout 1998, non-Serbs (mainly Albanian) were forced into a mass exodus into the neighbouring countries of Albania and Republic of Macedonia.

The ‘Racak massacre’ of Albanian fighters (January 1999) was a turning point that pushed the international community to organize negotiated talks between Kosovo Albanian leaders and the Belgrade authorities in Rambouillet, near Paris. Although the agreement were eventually accepted by the Kosovo delegation, they failed as a result of Milosevic’s refusal to sign the conditions that were aiming to reinstate Kosovo’s autonomous status of 1974, asking for the withdrawal and replacement of Serbian troops with an international peacekeeping force, and the establishment of an international mission that after three years open the door to a referendum on the political status of the province (Morozzo della Rocca 1999: 111-119). The refusal by the Serbian delegation meant the braking down of the negotiation and the start of a war campaign by NATO: 78 days of bombing and the creation of an interim international administration under UN guidance.

3.2 How many Kosovos and which one counts more? The complexity of the context

Mapping out the international commitment to peacebuilding and statebuilding in post-war Kosovo and its interaction with conflict roots and dynamics requires sketching out a number of ‘images’ of Kosovo or issue-driven representations. The place of Kosovo in Western cognitive maps is part of the deep-rooted tradition of representation of the Balkan region as an intractable problem awaiting remedial and therapeutical strategies. In
scholarly and policy literature, Kosovo is characterized, for example, as a case of post-socialist transition, as an ethno-national conflict, as a post-conflict country, as a peripheral territory facing serious development challenges, as a failed, fragile, neopatrimonial, criminal, or quasi-state preparing for EU accession (Pugh 2006; Strazzari 2008b; Woodward 2007; Montanaro 2009), or a post-liberal order and neo-colonial protectorate (Chandler 2010). However, these dimensions have not been equally considered and emphasised in post-war Kosovo.

While the perspective of Kosovo as a potential candidate country for EU accession has been increasingly emphasised by EU officials since independence (which was mirrored by a more complex EU role and presence), its prospects on the ground have blurred to say the least: Kosovo’s growing isolation reflects this state of affairs. Yet, Kosovo remains part of the EU integration process and the corresponding EU Enlargement strategies and policies. A second dimension concerns the status of Kosovo as a developing country, and the extent to which such a dimension has been linked to broader sectors and processes such as post-conflict education. While a range of data point to the existence of an unambiguous ‘development problematique’, the latter has been largely ignored by the international community: this was particularly apparent in how the European Union came to terms with the region, when it volunteered for assuming primary responsibility under UNMIK for economic development and reconstruction.

A third representational line and characterizing dimension concerns the definition of Kosovo as a post-socialist, transition country. This dimension and its legacies have been often eclipsed or overlooked by the international community by putting more emphasis on another significant dimension of the Kosovo conflict, i.e., its ethno-national matrix. Another important line has depicted and framed Kosovo as a post-conflict country. What has to be taken into consideration when analysing conflict and international intervention in Kosovo is that there exists the possibility that development,
reconstruction and education assistance are conceived and concretized in ways that they become ethnically uneven and polarized, thus reinforcing instability or conflict cleavages.

3.3 International governance in post-conflict Kosovo

Following the NATO air campaign (April 1999-June 1999), the Serbian forces withdrew and Kosovo fell under UN rule, administered according to the lines formally established by UNSCR 1244 (June 10, 1999). The latter paved the way to an unprecedented “[c]omplex multi-pronged transition to peace” (Del Castillo 2008: 140). UNMIK was exerting functions that were close to those of a state, but which did not put (de jure) into question the territorial integrity of Serbia, recognizing Kosovo as formally part of Serbia.

The UNSCR 1244 gave to the UN unprecedented civil administrative functions and broad government responsibilities. Executive and legislative powers were exercised by UNMIK and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) until the resolution of the final political status of the province: “[t]he UN led, for the first time, ‘an integrated operation’ as advocated by Boutros-Ghali in the early nineties, in which the UN set priorities, coordinated humanitarian, civil administration, democratization, and economic reconstruction activities” (Del Castillo 2008: 140). UNMIK powers were not intended as merely regulative, but also as transformative, “[c]oncerned with provision of public goods and good governance, maintenance of peace, and facilitation of formation of local democratic and accountable political actors to whom UNMIK powers could gradually transfer” (Mulaj 2011: 246).

Within the framework of UNSCR 1244, any solution to the political status was stated to be done by respecting the territorial integrity of the then former Yugoslavia. For Woodward (1999) while the two missions of Kosovo and East Timor were almost identical, they differed in one aspect, the political status in each of the settings. In East Timor the political path to nation- and statehood was clear from the beginning, while in
Kosovo it remained unsolved with consequences still felt today. King and Mason (2006) argue that not addressing the political status in the aftermath of the war was one of the failures of the UN mission in Kosovo, and this might explain several mistakes that the mission recorded in Kosovo, such as in the fields of development, rule of law, security etc.

The governance system that emerged in post-war Kosovo, led some authors to define it as a modern form of protectorate, whose supervision and functioning were managed by a range of international actors, within and outside the UN mission (King and Mason 2006; Montanaro 2009). UNMIK rested upon a pillar-based structure that separated functional areas of responsibility, respectively entrusted to key international actors (the UN, the EU, the OSCE, the World Bank) (Héthy 2002).

The first Secretary-General report on UNMIK outlined the mission’s main tasks, responsibilities and powers (UN SG 1999a). The report stated that “[i]n order to ensure that the institutional capacities of the agencies cooperating with the UN are pooled for optimal effectiveness on the ground, each component will be assigned to an agency which would take the lead role in a particular area” (UN SG 1999a: par. 5, emphasis in the original). The four pillars were:

(a) Interim civil administration, entrusted to the United Nations;¹⁹

(b) Humanitarian affairs, entrusted to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR);

(c) Institution-building, entrusted to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE);

(d) Economic reconstruction and development, entrusted to the European Union.

¹⁹ Education was part of the first pillar, the interim civil administration
Tensions soon arose in the UNMIK governance systems, as each of the respective pillar-leading actors took a different approach. There were tensions between OSCE – tasked with institution building – and the UN agencies, that were given implementation responsibilities. The UN was building the capacities of institutions, municipalities and other sector of the administrative machinery, while OSCE was building the capacities of ‘soft-power institutions’ (and sectors) such as the media, the organization of elections and the promotion of human rights. Other tensions were more related to structural UNMIK deficiencies.

From its very outset, UNMIK deployment was slow: several important goals were never achieved also due to intra-agency rivalries. In the early months the void was filled by Kosovo Albanians, who had been running education, health and other civil and social services during the 1990s. Illustrative of international, intra-agency rivalries was the lack of a ‘conflict resolution’ unit, most likely because international institutions were reluctant to see it under the control of any of them. King and Mason contend that there were too many leading masters within UNMIK, which was reflected in a lack of coherence and coordination in pursuing strategies and goals (King and Mason 2006: 251).

Some specific functions were performed by different institutions and agencies, a fact that caused major overlaps and duplications. In the beginning, for example, decisions regarding economic development were taken by three different actors without coordination among them, i.e., the UN, the EU and the United States Agency for International Development [USAID] (King and Mason 2006: 126). A similar situation occurred in the media sector, for which both the OSCE and the UN were performing similar tasks. In terms of accountability, it was not clear who the UNMIK was responsible to, beside the Security Council.

UNMIK embarked upon implementing its mandate with a strong emphasis on pursuing the overall goal of building democratic institutions and making Kosovo reach
democratic standards. This was seen as a precondition for resolving the ‘final status’ issue. By February 2000, UNMIK had established the Joint Interim Administration Structure (JIAS), for sharing administrative functions with Kosovars, although the latter did not exercise decision-making authority.

The 2001 UNMIK-sponsored Constitutional Framework paved the way to an elected legislature and autonomous government with limited powers. Similar to the process of ‘Timorisation’, the process of ‘Kosovisation’ aimed to partially hand over power from the international community to elected local authorities. Elections for the Kosovo assembly were held on November 21, 2001, but a local government was formed only months later due to political tensions between the different political parties (Del Castillo 2008: 141). The Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) started operating as of April 2002 and the three ethnic Albanian parties were represented. The local authorities would work parallel to UNMIK, in a situation in which the UN mission maintained ‘exclusive’ power and competences over a number of areas and issues, while the provisional authorities gained ownership in the ‘transitional areas’ (Hèthy 2002).

The relationship between the local and international authorities were marked by rivalries and confrontation concerning the devolution and power sharing, with tensions arising in the period before and after the 2008 independence. Local authorities were frustrated because UNMIK had the power and control over the most important sectors and the local government often complained of controlling social issues such as health, education, environment, which were small budget sectors.

With the final political status in a limbo, SRSG Michael Steiner launched the ‘standards before status’ policy in April 2002, which listed a number of benchmarks that

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20 The three parties were the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK, ex KLA), the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK, another ex-KLA branch).
local authorities had to reach before a negotiation for the final status could start. Critics to the ‘standards before status’ strategy have pointed out to the fact that the success and feasibility of the envisaged standards in a context of institutions-building was problematic in a context of “[s]uspended sovereignty” (Mulaj 2011: 251). Five years later, in March 2007, as negotiation between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians had reached a deadlock, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General proposed a UN plan that would grant Kosovo ‘supervised independence’ under EU tutelage and NATO protection. Kosovo Albanians accepted the plan, which was nevertheless rejected by Serbia.

On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared unilateral independence from Serbia. Kosovo authorities accepted EU supervision according to the Ahtisaari Plan that envisaged the transfer of power from UNMIK to EU. In practice, this happened only partially and post-unilateral independence has seen an even more complex governance, in which the UN mission has been complemented by an EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), and an International Civilian Office (ICO) led by a special representative appointed by the Council of the European Union. UNMIK scope and mandate had to be redefined, with the EU expected to lead and supervise the post-independence phase.

The whole international governance system upon which Kosovo is legally based remained in place – UNMIK formally included - as the Resolution 1244 could not be overcome due to Russian’s veto in the Security Council. Serbia and the Serbian-inhabited areas of Kosovo have since been objecting to the deployment of the EULEX mission, which – they claimed - would imply acknowledging the de facto independence. EULEX, for its part, had the problem of some EU member states not recognizing the independence of Kosovo, and therefore declared itself status-neutral. On the ground, the deployment of international missions in Kosovo has been carried out along ethno-territorial lines.

21 The standards included developing sound and functioning democratic institutions, the rule of law, freedom of movement, refugee return and reintegration, economic reforms, enforcement of property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and the establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) (Del Castillo 2008: 340).
22 The ICO was the authority in Kosovo responsible for interpreting the Ahtisaari Plan and supervising Kosovo’s independence and it ceased its activities in September 2012.
3.4 Externally-driven statebuilding and peacebuilding

The international community treated Kosovo as a ‘tabula rasa’ or an ‘empty shell’ where everything had to be rewritten from scratch (Lemay-Hébert 2011). International interventions administering the territory and building the state during the 1990s had re-proposed some of the most problematic aspects of former UN trusteeship colonial administration during the 1920s, “[c]onsidering post-conflict territories – such as East Timor or Kosovo – as ‘blank slates’ needing complete (re)construction of governments, economic and social systems.” (Montanaro 2009: 5; Blair 2002). Yet, Kosovo was not a “blank slate” and in the aftermath of the war it had inherited a number of social, cultural, political and economic legacies and fragilities from the pre-war phase.

Fragility in Kosovo can be seen first and foremost as an effect of the basic lack of state capacity to exercise its authority over the territory. Yet, Kosovo contains other dimensions of fragility, in that it is a weak and poor performer in providing basic services to the population. Moreover, in Kosovo power is channelled through a deep-rooted patronage system that was reconfigured due to the emergence of new actors in the war season: political leaders have derived their legitimacy for their contribution as peaceful dissidents during the 1990s or their liberation (and military) roles during the 1998-99 war, their overall contribution to the independence of Kosovo and more broadly their regional and clan-based embeddedness (Montanaro 2009: 6). This has led some scholars to define Kosovo as a neo-patrimonial or quasi-state whereby different political authorities compete for legitimacy in a situation of deep economic stagnation and weak bond between the state and society (Montanaro 2009: 6).

As in other post-war and post-interventionary systems of governance, stability came at the cost of building or accepting the emergence of states that have been innefective showing scarce interest in generating public goods or economic development:
“[i]nstead of creating and investing in domestic conditions, which would provide durable peace and human security in Kosovo, the policy of the international community in Kosovo was shaped by a preoccupation with stability” (Beha and Visoka 2010: 89). For Zaum “[s]uch a policy [...] makes the international presence a condition of stability, rather than an instrument to attain self-sustained peace” (2009: 1).

What is most critical, is that external-led statebuilding intervention in Kosovo has failed to address the underlying causes of conflict and it may have contributed to building a state that is weak and fragile in a number of ways. Despite the OECD ten principles for engagement in fragile states (2007), that point to the context as a starting point, and speak of an inclusive bottom-up rather than elite-based approach, the absence of a proper understanding of the context and conflict drivers on the part of the international community stands out in post-war Kosovo. I argue that rather than the absence of conflict analysis, the problem is that analysis upon which intervention and assistance plans were premised laid excessive emphasis on the ethnic component and overlooked the socio-economic aspects of the conflict.

Although Kosovo was nominally the biggest recipient of international and EU aid, the international community has failed to foster economic growth and promote social inclusion by fighting unemployment: there has been no focus on medium- and long-term development, while most of the donors’ assistance has been ad hoc and short term. The role that economic and social development had played as conflict drivers and the role that they can play for the consolidation of a sustainable peace has been overlooked. Indeed, international actors have prioritized short-term security and stability rather than development and long-term peace. Instead, the international agencies working on governance focused extensively on the ethnic causes of the conflict, whose potential risk was managed through decentralisation rather than reconciliation, and it has thus done little to weaken social and ethnic divisions in contemporary Kosovo.
Moreover, the structure of the international governance, with its overlapping and confusing mandates and the way in which the status issue has been managed have reinforced existing patterns of parallel political authorities. In this regard, Kosovo-Serbs have developed their parallel governance systems as a sign of resistance towards the Kosovo state, and control over schools, university (and curricula), hospitals, courts, social pensions etc., is exercised by Belgrade: “[T]he language barriers, different school curricula and different ways of teaching history, identity and nationhood risk contribute to a worsening of the inter-ethnic divide.” (Montanaro 2009: 12).

The inter-ethnic divide has been tackled through the promotion of a form of multiculturalism and protection of minority rights which has been translated in practice in territorial decentralisation along ethnic lines (Randazzo and Bargués 2012: 27). The international community has adopted a narrow understanding of multiculturalism which rests upon a homogenized and essentialized understanding of identity and which has been translated and expressed in ethnically-defined and divided municipalities. According to Randazzo and Bargués, the international community, has been committed to

the promotion of a multicultural approach at State level, supporting the existence of diverse groups, but which has ultimately imposed homogeneity within communities and polarized identities, as it has taken for granted already defined groups, omitting possible hybrid or ambiguous identities (2012: 27).

Difference in Kosovo is institutionalized and protected through decentralisation: the condition for sovereignty and statehood is the accommodation of claims by distinctive identity groups, which – however – seek payoffs and rewards by avoiding connections, exchange and integration.

3.4.1 Development, a removed dimension

Several International Monetary Fund (IMF) *Aide Memoires* and World Bank documents
have pointed out the existence of a number of urgent problems related to the socio-economic situation in Kosovo such as high levels of poverty and “[e]xtremely high levels of unemployment,” low annual growth (less than 1.5 percent per year), decrease of remittances, “[d]epleted stock of human capital, dilapidated main public utilities and infrastructure” (Moalla-Fetini et al. 2005: 2; IMF 2005a; IMF 2006; IMF 2008; World Bank 2007).

The economic and human consequences of the 1998-1999 war were enormous (Del Castillo 2008: 139). Both the war and the NATO bombing campaign had turned large portions of Kosovo into a terra nullius where nothing was functioning. In a historically very poor area, infrastructures had been extensively destroyed and the population displaced en masse (King and Mason 2006: 86). Around 75 percent of houses were either destroyed or burned by Yugoslav forces or NATO’s air strikes and approximately more than half of ethnic Albanians (900,000) were forced to leave or left Kosovo to neighbouring countries such as Albania, Bosnia, Republic of Macedonia (Del Castillo 2008: 139).

Beside the widespread destruction of infrastructure, other post-war vulnerabilities that hampered reconstruction were an high structural unemployment rate and low human development (Del Castillo 2008: 158). In the emergency phase, difficulties arose also due to “[s]taffing problems, an unclear division of responsibilities, duplication in functions, and a lack of transparency and cooperation among the UN pillars” (Del Castillo 2008: 160).

Notwithstanding such a devastating post-war scenario, the first years after the war were characterized by extraordinary rates of ‘nominal’ economic growth, a growth that was mainly due to (and distorted by) the presence of the international community, the big amount of assistance that Kosovo received in the first years, and diaspora remittances
(Wittkowsky et al. 2006). However, growth was bringing Kosovo’s economy to the pre-war level of development - i.e., to being the poorest economy in the region.

Aid delivery in the aftermath of the war was difficult and both international and local actors lacked sufficient capacities in managing and implementing the large amount of available assistance (IKS 2007). As in other post-conflict settings, assistance in the beginning was focused on emergency and rehabilitation programmes. Assessment analysis of needs and damages were carried out by a number of states, organizations and donors, mostly foreigners, and prioritization was based on these assessments (IKS 2007: 17).

Aid flows and priorities changed around 2003, whereby growing attention was put on capacity building and technical assistance in the areas of democratic governance and civil society (Vasolli quoted in IKS 2007: 17). For the Kosovar Stability Initiative (2007), some sectors have been over-funded and others overlooked. Agriculture and education has been amongst the most ignored sectors in the post-war phase (IKS 2007: 18; King and Mason 2006: 85). Few attempts at assisting these two sectors have prioritized reconstruction and infrastructural rehabilitation objectives and missed an overall long-term vision/strategy. The typical focus of donors’ assistance has been on good governance, market liberalization, privatization and civil society, neglecting areas such as social and rural development, and public health. After the 2004 riots, donors’ projects acquired a multi-ethnic focus and became more concerned with minority protection.

According to former co-head of the UNMIK Reconstruction Unit, Roy Dickinson, “[d]emocratization is of course vital. But to have had so much money poured into civil society initiatives, whilst the keystones of a democratic society – education, police, justice, public service training – seem to have been under-funded seems – well strange” (2000).
While the post-conflict economic outlook were already envisaged in the first two Secretary-General reports issued in 1999 (UN SG 1999a; UN SG 1999b) - i.e., a market-based economy with the perspective of integration in the broader regional economy of South East Europe, the international community in Kosovo lacked a development strategy. The same can be said for the local governing elite. To date, Kosovo is missing a development strategy.

UNMIK first stressed the need for a comprehensive national development plan in 2003, which has, nonetheless, remained a draft known as the Kosovo Development Plan (KDP). In 2004, two Economic Strategy and Project Identification Group (ESPIG) papers assessed the state of the economy and proposed principles and activities for the strategic framework of a development plan (ESPIG 2004a, ESPIG 2004b). The overall aim, as envisaged by both documents, was the transformation of Kosovo from a low to a high-productivity economy, yet it has remained a draft and most sectors have their own strategic framework (EPO 2006: 20). Therefore, what is also missing from a policy perspective is an explicitation of the ways in which education is linked to national development.

Among the population, frustration related to the economic situation grew in the post-conflict phase. When the country was unilaterally declared independent, the World Bank was defining poverty in Kosovo as shallow, in which 45 percent of the population lived below the poverty line, 18 percent was vulnerable to poverty, and approximately 15 percent of Kosovans were defined as extremely poor (World Bank 2007, 2009). On the eve of independence – i.e., nine years after ‘international engineering’ – Kosovo was defined by the World Bank as the poorest region in the Balkans and among the poorest in Europe (World Bank 2008). One of the main causes of poverty remained unemployment – with the highest rates in the Balkans at around 40-50 percent – in a country where half of the population is younger than 25 [the youngest population in Europe] (UNDP 2006a;
Kosovo’s weak economy was identified as a source of social and political instability already in 2007, by Martin Ahtisaari. Poverty is widespread among the most disadvantaged portions such as older people, single mother households, people with disabilities, unemployed and non-ethnic Serb minorities such as Roma and Gorani, with a potential destabilising effect on inter-communal conflict (Montanaro 2009: 13).

According to the United Nations Development Plan (UNDP) Internal Security Sector Review Report in Kosovo (ISSRR) “[t]hreat of internal division in Kosovo remains present and may increase if economic and unemployment issues are not comprehensively addressed” (2006b: XIV). Far from the inter-ethnic violence issue to which the international community had dedicated much of its focus until then, the ISRR reported that

for the people of Kosovo high unemployment, a lack of economic development and widespread poverty have created an atmosphere of insecurity. [...] economic instability has exacerbated problems such as ethnic violence, corruption, increased crime rates and contributed to a growth in mistrust of Kosovo’s key institutions of government, both international and indigenous (UNDP 2006b: XIII).\footnote{See also UNDP 2013}

Quite tellingly, among Kosovo Serbs escalation of ‘ethnic violence’ was regarded as the main threat to stability, while unemployment and poverty score first among Kosovo Albanians (UNDP 2007).

3.4.2 The ethnic dilemma: the institutionalisation of parallel structures through territorial decentralisation

Under UN legislation, Kosovo’s eight communities (i.e., communities whose members belong to the same ethnic, religious and linguistic group) are Albanians (92 percent),
Serbs (4 percent) and then, in lose order, Turks, Bosniaks, Gorani, Roma, Egyptians, Ashkali (Mulaj 2011: 244; Krasniqi 2013: 402). The majority of the Serbian community in Kosovo challenge the legitimacy of Kosovo’s statehood, although Kosovo has a constitution that provides with wide autonomy, protection and quota for proportional political representation for smaller communities (Mulaj 2011: 244).

Ethnic decentralisation has been introduced by UNMIK as the way to address the conflict and tackle what was deemed to be its cause, the ethnic divide. This was particularly clear in the Ahtisaari Plan (the Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement), which served as the basis for the solution of the status issue and as the framework for managing the supervised independence. Its main goal was to solve the status issue by providing it with a decentralised solution to what was considered the main cause of conflict, the divide between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs.

The plan envisaged an asymmetrical system of power-sharing: it provided wide autonomy for the minorities through the creation of six new municipalities of Serbian majority that would have exclusive powers in matters such as higher education, secondary health care, cultural and religious affairs, local police and the entitlement and collection of local taxes (CPKSS 2007: Annex III, Art. 4 and 8.2).

On February 17, 2008, Kosovo was declared “[t]o be a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and protection under the law” (Kosovo Declaration of Independence). According to Krasniqi, “[K]osovo is not defined as a national state of its titular nation, but a multi-ethnic state of all citizens, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law of all communities” (2013: 403).

This definition of the state has implications for the relationship with its citizens and it has implied an array of rights and protection for its minorities as eshrined in the Ahtisaari Plan (Annex II) and the Constitution of Kosovo (Chapter II and III). Among
others, it includes reserved seats in the parliament (ten for Serbs and ten for the rest of the communities), two ministerial portfolios in the government, proportional quotas on other governance’s levels, and double-majority for issues of vital interest to non-majority communities (Krasniqi 2013: 403). Despite this legislation and efforts from the Kosovo government and the international community, return and reintegration of refugees and Serbs in the Kosovo institutions remains practically non-existent (Ibid.).

Since 1999, approximately 200,000 refugees and internally displaced people (mostly Serbs) have left Kosovo (UNHCR 1999; ICG 2003: 8). Other Serbs have moved to other parts of Kosovo: this movement has created Kosovo-inhabited areas known as enclaves. As a matter of fact, post-1999 Kosovo suffers high levels of ethnic polarisation, with the Serbs living in Northern Kosovo or in segregated enclaves. The 1999 war and the 2004 riots have widened the gap between the Serbian and Albanian community, furthering the lack of interaction between people from different communities, a legacy inherited by the 1990s. Lack of contacts is particularly evident among younger generations, that have no Yugoslav background and virtually no language bridge.

In terms of political participation, local Serb population living in the enclaves slowly became part to some degrees of UNMIK-led Kosovo institutions. At least until the 2004 crisis, Kosovo Serbs increasingly co-operated with UNMIK and the new PISG institutions. Interethnic relations deteriorated after violence escalated in March 2004. Two episodes – the killing of a Serbian youth in Pristina, on March 15 and the alleged death of three Albanian children in the Ibar river in unclear circumstances – sparked acts of violence and aggression from Albanians against UNMIK and Serbs: 19 people were killed (8 Serbs and the 11 Albanians), 1,000 more injured, approximately 550 homes and 27 monasteries destroyed and burned and 4,000 people displaced (Ker-Lindsay 2009: 20).

The 2004 violent riots alienated Kosovo Serbs with many of them boycotting Kosovo institutions and turning increasingly towards the consolidation of parallel
institutions supported by Belgrade. In post-independence Kosovo, even those Serbs that had returned to Kosovo institutions, urged by Belgrade withdrew from Kosovo administration. After 2008, Serbia intensified its efforts to reinforce parallel political structures in northern Kosovo and other Serbian-inhabited areas (OSCE 2008). Although two thirds of Kosovo Serbs live in the enclaves, the majority of funds from Belgrade would go to the Kosovo Serbs living in northern Kosovo (Krasniqi 2013: 407).

However, politico-administrative decentralization and the creation of new Serbian municipalities led to tensions and divisions between the Serbs living in northern Kosovo (increasingly looking towards Belgrade) and the Serbs living in the enclaves, territorially less contiguous, and unable to interact with Belgrade. Indeed, Serbs living south to Ibar river to some degrees integrated in some of Kosovo institutions while those living north of Mitrovica strengthened their collaboration with Belgrade in an attempt to sever the links with Kosovar society and what they perceived as an hostile political system (Krasniqi 2013: 405). According to Krasniqi, “[N]orth Kosovo has in many ways become a hub of Serbs in Kosovo, an intellectual centre. It holds a university [officially called ‘Pristina University’] which is part of Serbia’s system of education” (2013: 405).

Although the EU has facilitated the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, and a number of agreements have been reached on matters of custom stamps, border crossing, civil registers, the situation in northern Kosovo remain embroiled in a frozen conflict. Despite the efforts put in place by the international community to turn Kosovo into a multiethnic society, Kosovo has remained “[a]n ethnically divided society after nine years of direct international rule and control” (Krasniqi 2010: 532-534) and after 16 years of shared power by the international community with Kosovo local authorities.

There is a total lack of bridging social capital between Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovo Albanians (atrophied during the war) and between Kosovo-Albanians and other communities such as Gorani. Clan and regional divides are exacerbated by generational
divides, of which the high youth unemployment is an underlying aspect. The difficulties in building a cross-ethnic social contract may be partly explained by the fact that Kosovo has historically been characterized by “[t]he existence of inward-looking social capital, […] rooted in clan and regional ties and interests” (Montanaro 2009: 8).

Moreover, country’s embroilment in parallel ethnic structures has resulted in non-efficient, discriminatory provision of public services along ethnic lines (Montanaro 2009: 11). According to the European Centre for Minority Issues (2009), there is “[a]n extensive network of parallel, Serbian language schools run by the Serbian government in Kosovo, which further hinders integration of Serbian pupils into Kosovo educational structures.”

According to Randazzo and Bargués, territorial autonomy has resulted in segregation: “[A]s ethnic territorial decentralisation relies upon a static notion of contending ethnic groups, the borders include one group and exclude another. Reconciliation or cooperation becomes problematic, as patterns of conflict are reproduced instead of appeased when peacebuilding is about mapping the territory according to ethnicity” (2012: 36). They propose a focus shift upon those cross-factional issues that affect all ethnicities. UNDP surveys point out to a number of issues of common concern for most of the ethnic groups in Kosovo such as unemployment, economic problems, education etc. (UNDP Kosovo 2010).

Some authors have proposed an integrative approach, which implies the building of a common citizenship identity overcoming ethnic cleavages. According to Kallaba, “[I]nstead of decentralising Kosovo and leaving it mired with complex regional political problems, a better approach for Kosovo’s future would be to help build a strong and authoritative central government capable of providing good governance and effective territorial control” (2010: 7). The dilemma (pitfalls) of building a political community
based on citizenship rather than ethnicity might be that it overlooks or do not sufficiently protect differences and minorities.

**Conclusion**

Kosovo has always been and still remains a poor and underdeveloped country. Dire socio-economic conditions have played a key role in the conflict between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. However, the international community failed to tackle the development dimension. Development and growth were expected to be a *by-default* product of externally-led, post-war market liberalization and privatization. This expectation hinged upon a misled form of conflict analysis by the international community whereby excessive emphasis was laid on the ethnic dimension, which eclipsed the peculiar configuration of the socio-economic dimension of the Kosovo conflict, and its intersection – through relative gains, perceptions and manipulated fears – with the ethnic question itself.

Despite suggestions by major donors such as the World Bank and DFID (2005) that statebuilding have to emerge from processes of peacebuilding and reconciliation, as in other post-war contexts there has been a fragmented and overall emphasis on strengthening formal and stable state institutions, in a condition of suspended, post-postponed and supervised sovereignty and statehood. Longer-term peace and reconciliation have not been achieved, focussing instead on shorter-term stability, meant as the absence of ethnic frictions, and managed through an accurately process of territorial decentralization along ethnic lines. As Monteux has suggested, decentralisation “[s]eems to have become a ‘one size fits all’ device for the international community to ‘freeze’ ethnic conflict and escape its responsibility for dealing with the reasons behind these conflicts” (Monteux 2006: 163).

The excessive focus, by the international community, on formal state institutions...
has overlooked the need to enhance the relationship between state and society, which DFID (2009) has suggested to be one of the main factors for an effective statebuilding process. In Kosovo, the social contract and bond between the state and its citizens has been already weak by a long history of distrust of public authorities, of which communal self-sufficiency has been a result, and by current overlapping and contrasting forms and levels of political authority (external and internal), in a nation whose very existence is contested or understood in exclusionary and ethnic terms.

If peacebuilding is about setting in motion a set of transformational interventions and processes that would lead to the building of a sustainable and lasting peace and that would prevent the return to the pre-war situation, the reversal ethnic segregation in post-war Kosovo, perpetuated and institutionalized by decentralisation processes – among others – does not speak on behalf of a just peace but on that of a frozen conflict. Put another way, the narrow application of a shallow form of multiculturalism has resulted in a negative peace characterized by the absence of open conflict and violence, but where diversity and ethnicity are frozen and contained within non-dialectical, isolated islands. Liberal peacebuilding in Kosovo has resulted in the protection of minorities by ethnically separating them, thus undermining the conditions for ethnic interaction, social cohesion and trust.
CHAPTER FOUR

SEGREGATED EDUCATION SYSTEMS, SEGREGATED PEACE?

Introduction

Kosovo’s education system is an interesting case not only because of the country’s exposure to massive, unprecedented levels of per-capita post-conflict reconstruction aid that were channelled through a formal internationally-controlled statebuilding architecture, but also because in few (if any) other cases the functioning of the education system is so patently and directly intertwined with conflict drivers as in Kosovo. Not only has education played an important role in the rise and the shaping of Albanian nationalism, as with all other national identities in the Balkans: in Kosovo the struggle over education emerged as the primary site of contention between Serbs and Albanians in recent history, and to date it remains very much a minefield. In other words, restrictions to the use of the Albanian language in schools for several decades (Ottoman period-First Yugoslavia) and, following the rise to power of Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade, the abrogation to the high degree of autonomy of the education sector that from 1974 onward was guaranteed under the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia, fuelled the awareness than studying in Albanian was conditional upon the creation of the Albanian national state.

This chapter provides first of all an overview of the role that education has played in the unfolding of the Kosovo conflict. It then examines post-war education reforms: more specifically, it investigates the role played by a plethora of international and local actors, trying to unravel their agendas and modus operandi. Finally, it zooms in on those areas that were deemed to be strategic and that have received more attention on the part
of international and local actors: curriculum and textbook reforms, multicultural community education, and higher education.  

As education is historically intertwined with conflict, post-war education has been a problematic foundation for peace. The present chapter shows that – perhaps counterintuitively - education has been marginal to the externally-driven peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas in Kosovo and to the process of nation building more in general.

Although no evidence can be found documenting that education was on the peacebuilding agenda for Kosovo, the peacebuilding model that prevailed in Kosovo indirectly informed choices and priorities made by international actors in the field of educational reform. Tension arose between education as a sphere that may contribute to social cohesion through building national identity and education as an area of reforms that should introduce modern standards of efficiency and effectiveness while not threatening stability, in a context in which state and nation are contested and problematic notions.

The perspective that has shaped the (re)construction of an education system as part of an externally-assisted effort to build peace is one that sees Kosovo as ‘a post-communist country with an ethnic problem’ but which overlooks the existence of a domestic development question. Rather than emerging as an arena where root causes of the conflict could be identified and addressed, education has been regarded as a sphere that simply reflected and reinforced the ethnic division between the different communities. For quite some time considerations about underdevelopment, unemployment and youth demographics were kept at safe distance from thinking about the education system.

As shown in Chapter three, the international community promoted in Kosovo a ‘divisive version’ of multiculturalism, based upon a narrow understanding of the notion

24 Another area that has received substantial attention is the training of teachers. It is left out from this analysis for reasons of space and because it has not been linked to any peacebuilding objective.
of identity, mainly in ethnic terms. This has led to the creation of a multiethnic society which is kept fictionally homogenised within ethnic groups but that is practically polarized among diverse groups. In the sphere of education this situation can be grasped when observing the actual working of the decentralisation of education governance and curricula.

The promotion of a multiethnic and pluralist society through education has led to a multiplication of curricula in different languages. Albeit not entirely available due to lack of funds and political willingness, where some education integration exists the outcome is not integration among different communities. An excessive emphasis on equal collective rights and extensive decentralised autonomy for the different communities, along with a strong focus on stability and security, has made education segregation the de facto strategy of choice, and the one reality one can observe on the ground.

4.1 Education and the Albanian national question in Kosovo, 1970-1989

The pivotal moments of the conflict that have characterized much of Kosovo’s modern history have been accompanied by educational events that turned out to be proximate causes/triggers for, and instances of the articulation of this long-simmering conflict. A look at the history of the Balkans, during the 19th and 20th centuries, suggests “[t]he existence of a link between education policies, dynamics of national identity-formation and those state-making practices that lie at the very heart of violent conflict in this region” (Strazzari 2000: 12).

In analysing the history of the education/war relationship in the region, education practices seem to have been both constitutive and reproductive of violent, bellicist, and exclusivist discourses. They have been used by national elites as part of their strategic repertoires and political calculus. In this context, education can be seen both as a root and a proximate cause through which a violent ethnonational conflict can be fostered by
making it appear socially acceptable and politically necessary. As a root cause, education is a long-term process with clear links to wider processes of identity formation, national articulation, and state-making; as a proximate cause, by contrast, it can be seen as an extremely sensitive issue-area, one that is endowed with a strong potential for triggering the flaring up of violent crises, and spilling over into other arenas (Strazzari 2000).

In Kosovo ‘national question’ and education system have always coincided: education has been the stage in which the national question has been performed by both the Albanian and Serbian sides, involving claims about autonomy, statehood, and sovereignty. The establishment of the University of Pristina in Albanian language on November 19, 1969, represented the first instance of autonomy for Albanians in Kosovo after many years of repression: it came to symbolize the Albanian national identity and paved the way to inter-Albanian exchanges in the Balkans.25

The Yugoslav constitutional reforms of 1974 gave to the autonomous province of Kosovo theoretically nearly full control over education governance and content matters. Kosovar Albanians were at that point empowered to promote their own culture and history through education in their own language (World Bank 2001a: 107). This was very much in line with the former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) education system that – unlike the other socialist countries in East and Central Europe – put in place a strong system of decentralized management and financing of the education system. The ‘Secretariat of Education, Science and Culture of Kosova’ – that is, the de facto ministry of education of the province of Kosovo - administered independent curricula, decided about the maintenance of schools, and controlled the whole education system.

During the 1980s, authorities in Belgrade progressively re-centralized control over the content of education. It all started with the riots that flared up around the University of Pristina in 1981, soon after the death of Yugoslavia’a leader Jozip Broz

25 The University of Pristina functioned as a bilingual institution, with both Albanian and Serbian languages in use.
Tito. Although the origin and the extent of the protests have never been fully clarified, the
nexus between education and socio-economic conditions was certainly central. According
to Woodward, “[t]he student rebellion in Kosovo in 1981 began not as a secessionist
movement, but as a demonstration against the lack of jobs for university graduates”
(1999: 279-81). The transferring of authority over education to Belgrade was part of a
process of repressive reassertion of central prerogatives that began with introducing
segregation in different school buildings, and culminated with the expulsions of teachers
and the closing of secondary schools when Kosovo’s autonomy was abrogated in 1990,
triggering the proclamation of the shadow ‘Republic of Kosova’.

4.2 Between resistance and statehood: education under the ‘parallel system’,
1990-1998

The conflict over Kosovo’s education system during the 1990s was fuelled by the
nationalist campaign inaugurated by Milosevic as early as 1987. The removal of
autonomy was part of constitutional changes that restricted political, economic and
cultural rights of the Kosovar Albanian community, derailing their aspiration to the status
of federative ‘republic’ (as opposed to ‘autonomous province’). Discriminatory measures
were adopted in classes that had been long taught bilingually and this led to the mass
dismissal of the Kosovar Albanian teaching staff that refused to teach in Serbian.

Kosovar Albanians established an organized parallel system of governance,
opting for a non-violent form of resistance. In the sphere of education, this meant that
most Kosovar pupils boycotted state classes and attended instead parallel schools, which
were typically organized in private houses, garages and cellars. The education system
became ethnically segregated, with a formal façade that was boycotted by the vast
majority of the population, and a tolerated parallel system that went underground, and
was separated in structure and content. Looking at how the Albanian identity in Kosovo
during the 1990s was presented in Albanian history and geography textbooks that were used in the parallel schools, Kostovicova highlights the pre-eminence of the spatial dimension in the construction of the nation (2005: 11).

Throughout the 1990s, ‘parallel education’ was the only fully functioning system in the shadow Kosovo Albanian state. Education was supported through a number of arrangements for financing from within (via a system of informal municipality-level tax collection between 3-5 percent that provided for 70 percent of education expenditure) and from external remittances that would cover the rest of the costs. There were no reliable statistics, but it is estimated that around 20,000 teachers and non-teaching staff supported around 300,000 pupils in 400 primary schools, 50,000 students in 65 secondary schools and approximately 10,000 university students in 20 faculties (World Bank 2001a). The parallel education played an important political role by representing the Albanian non-violent strategy as a legitimate form of national struggle against Serbian repression: “[it] was both a symbolic and a political expression of Kosovo Albanian nationhood” (Kostovicova 2005: 2).

In 1996, through the mediation of the Sant’Egidio Community, which deemed education as crucial for positively channeling the Kosovo conflict, two distinct agreements were brokered between Belgrade and Pristina’s Albanian representatives in the fields of schools and university: the basic idea behind the mediation was that it was possible to de-segregate education, bringing communities back to the same buildings. It was the one and only success of diplomacy in the increasingly violent Kosovo landscape (Strazzari 2000). Soon after, a prominent negotiator was killed in an obscure car accident, and the rector of the Pristina university survived an attempt on his life, while the conflict escalated into open violence. It is worth noting that the end of the fragile equilibrium between the Belgrade authorities and the ‘Republic of Kosova’ parallel institutions coincided with the return to the streets of students from the University of Pristina.
Following Dayton’s agreement that left Kosovo issue unresolved, the students started questioning the passivity of the nonviolent and ‘quietist’ strategy promoted by Ibrahim Rugova – himself a respected intellectual - and his LDK party.

One final annotation is in order. Given the fact that education was the only fully functioning public good produced by the Kosovo Albanian parallel state, controlling education became an expression of political power. Power competition among the Kosovar elite over the control of education turned education into an arena of struggle and conflict, almost leading to its own destruction, along with that of the parallel state (Kostovicova 2005: 210-11). This intra-ethnic conflict also exposed the political faultlines within the Albanian leadership.

When the international community landed in Kosovo in the aftermath of the war, it fed this struggle and favoured certain groups (i.e., former Kosovo Liberation Army’s combatants, now PDK party members) over others (i.e., the LDK party) by allocating certain representatives in the UN structures in Kosovo. In other words, the international community intervened in a context of power relations, and its choices were far from politically neutral: they promoted certain political elites, and certain visions of education over others.

4.3 ‘Kosovo international’: the war and post-conflict hybrid governance, 1999-2014

In the aftermath of the 1999 war, the structure of Kosovo’s education system was a result of the legacies of Yugoslavian Socialism and post-autonomy education. Kosovo’s parallel system of education during the 1990s was itself an evolution of the Yugoslav system, and it maintained its main features of being simultaneously administratively decentralized, politically centralized, and hierarchically structured. Pedagogically, it was teacher-centred.

26 Interview with executive director, Kosova Education Center, 21 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo
27 Ibid.
and its curriculum relied upon uniformized textbooks. The close connection between education and the world of production/industry, an important feature of Yugoslav education, was no longer existent during the 1990s (Bacevic 2014).

After NATO’s bombing campaign, infrastructural reconstruction and teacher training were among the most urgent needs. A UNESCO assessment conducted with a number of NGOs on the ground assessing the physical conditions of 784 schools revealed that 37 percent were “either completely destroyed or in extremely bad physical conditions. [...] a total of 1,034 (out of 1,211) schools were assessed, out of which 800 had suffered damage and needed to be repaired” (Daxner 2000: 206).

During the parallel education era, the system was almost totally isolated thus few teachers or administrators benefited from any professional skills upgrading. The system was found isolated from trends in pedagogy, methodology and education management and administration (World Bank 2001a: 109). The issue of minorities’ rights and their access to education was another problematic aspect in education. The bifurcation of education during the 1990s – between a formal Serbian system and an underground one in Albanian language – and its extreme fragmentation had an impact on educational access for minority groups.

In the initial post-conflict phase there seemed to be at least two education systems and a multiplicity of textbooks and curricula, mainly in Serbian and Albanian. In Serbian and Turkish, the curriculum was the one specified by Belgrade. In Albanian the existing curriculum of the parallel period was used for the 1999-2000 and the 2000-2001 school years. The Albanian curriculum was fragmented and on an ad-hoc basis: it comprised the curriculum from the pre-1989 system and books newly developed or borrowed from neighbouring countries, mostly Albania.

4.3.1 How the UN started an education experiment
It is often assumed that post-war settings provide compelling opportunities for international organizations and educationists to rebuild education from scratch, not merely reconstructing but also reforming the system. For the international community in Kosovo, the past seemed wiped away from the war, while the present was treated as a *tabula rasa* or an *empty shell* (Lemay-Hébert 2011).

Unlike in other post-conflict situations, the UN and other international organizations in Kosovo were confronted with no formal local government when they engaged in post-conflict educational reform. Moreover, the extent and scope of the UN mandate in assuming full responsibility for the administration of this territory was unique and unprecedented (Søbjerg 2006). Albeit in the form of an interim administration, the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) established through UN Security Resolution 1244, was described as the most all-encompassing and comprehensive mission in a post-conflict country. Compared to previous post-conflict missions, the UN assumed full power and control for the reconstruction of the education system.

The UN in Kosovo engaged in a grand scale experiment of simultaneously managing educational reconstruction and reform (Søbjerg 2006). In this context, the parallel system of education—the centrepiece of Albanian resistance to the repressive rule of Milosevic—was sidelined and his legacy disregarded by the newly established UNMIK’s Department of Education and Science (DoES), operating under UNMIK Pillar II (Civil Administration) (Sommers and Buckland 2004: 35).

DoES replaced the previous Joint Civil Committee of Education (JCCE). It worked with an international and a local co-head whose tasks were needs assessment, aid and donor coordination, identification and initiation of domestic reforms. Veteran Serbian and especially Albanian education leaders were left on the back, often supportive of educational changes but marginalized from the process.

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28 The Department of Education and Science (DoES) was established under UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/11
The previous JCCE had been the first attempt to bring the two main communities to work together on educational reconstruction, and it was composed by international consultants, as well as Albanian and Serbian representatives. The attempt was doomed from its very inception since the Committee was boycotted by the Serbian representatives, and the JCCE was an apathetic and slow mechanism for educational reconstruction: it was unable to coordinate the different actors working on the ground.

When UNMIK was established, priorities in education were divided between immediate reconstruction needs and long terms curriculum reform ones. UNMIK’s three-phase education strategy aimed at creating a unified and working educational system and a transfer of power and competencies from the international to the local counterparts.

Reconstruction in education went through three institutional phases: the first phase from June 1999 to March 2000 was directed at emergency and infrastructure projects, including the repairing and reconstruction of school infrastructure, provision of essential supplies, and getting children back to school; in the second phase from March 2000 to 2001, the aim was starting curriculum reform and more broadly the designing of an education system that could suit Kosovo needs; the third phase between 2001 and 2002 aimed to transfer power and responsibilities to a provisional government and to an assigned local Ministry of Education.

Infrastructural reconstruction was a priority also for the government in power (2008-2010 and 2010-2015) at the time of my fieldwork. According to the Deputy Minister of Education, while education was never a priority for the previous local governments (2000-2008), it had become central to the current government, proof of which was the construction of 100 new school buildings between 2008-2009, and the

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29 Kosovo underwent snap elections in November 2010, which were won by the same political party in power (PDK)
30 Interview with Deputy Minister of Education, Science and Technology, 6 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo
expected completion of 24 more by the end of 2014.\footnote{Ibid.} However, investments in education contradict such a claim. The latest data from the World Bank show that public spending in education is lower than regional and GDP per capita comparators, suggesting that education is currently not among government’s top priorities: in 2012, Kosovo was spending 4.1 percent of its GDP in education, lower than the average in Europe or Central Asia (World Bank 2015: 8).

The reform phase was launched by DoES through the articulation of a strategic initiative called Developing an Education System for Kosovo (DESK). It was composed by various multi-stakeholder working groups that addressed development issues in primary, secondary and higher education, and more broadly systemic and strategic issues. It was an advisory body with 22 international and 25 locals with tasks in planning. It had three working groups specifically working on preschool/primary, secondary and higher education/research, with a particular focus on teacher training and curricula development (Nelles 2006: 104).

The slow pace of reform during the first months after the war changed in 2001 when Michael Daxner became the Principal International Officer (PIO) of the DoES and the Principal Administrator of the University of Pristina. According to several international and local consultants, under his leadership educational reform was enacted in ways that continue to affect Kosovo’s education system. During Daxner’s two-year term, the UN’s effort to rebuild education was defined as “[n]othing less than reinvention” (Sommers and Buckland 2004: 20).

Kosovo’s Yugoslav-time educational legacy was considered problematic and obsolete by the international community, thus in need of substantial and drastic change, not of gradual reform: “[d]ramatic reform, even renewal, became the order of the day” (Sommers and Buckland 2004: 20). Daxner managed to develop his vision of the
education system by obtaining from the UN *charte blanche* so as to attract considerable levels of funding for education, recruit a considerable number of international consultants, and inaugurate the new ‘lead-agencies approach’ whereby renowned international agencies were assigned core tasks within the education system: UNICEF together with UNESCO were in charge of curriculum reform; the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was in charge of teacher training; the European Commission was in charge of infrastructural reconstruction; the World Bank focused on quality assurance, and management information system support; the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) on technical and vocational training (TVET) and the Dutch NGO Spark and later OSCE on higher education.

A local education expert that I interviewed distinguished between two different approaches by the international community: the first was exemplified by Peter Buckland, who was sensitive to the local context and to the past legacy, while the second which prevailed and initiated most of the substantial reform was the one enacted by Michael Daxner.\(^\text{32}\) According to this expert, in Daxner’s vision there was the pupil, the book and the international: there was no consideration for teachers.\(^\text{33}\) With the promotion of the ‘lead agencies’ approach, Daxner ignored and sidelined local capacities.\(^\text{34}\)

The World Bank called for political authorities in Kosovo and the donor community to grasp the unique opportunity of building “[a] modern and responsive educational system that is compatible with a new economic environment and with European legislation, policies, governance and institutions, as well as content and performance standards” (World Bank 2001a: 112). Key objectives and priorities had to focus on improving education governance and financing in general and those of higher education in particular; curriculum and assessment; textbooks; teacher training and

\(^{32}\) Interview with local education expert, AAB University, 1 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo

\(^{33}\) Ibid.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.
learning; secondary technical/vocational education and adult training; personnel costs efficiency; capital budget, including the decentralization of capital expenditure and granting. Public education and investor promotion programmes were foreseen as immediate and important tools for promoting the launch of the Kosovo Privatization Strategy (KTA 2004).

According to Daxner, UNMIK’s two main goals were “[e]nsuring rapid resumption and continued learning during the period of transition to an elected democratically accountable government” and “[s]upporting the longer term reconstruction and transformation of the education system to reflect the needs of a modern European society on the brink of the twenty-first century” (2000: 216). For OECD (2001) “[t]he international community remains committed to ensuring a peaceful multi-ethnic society, with an education system that serves the needs of Kosovo’s young society and reflects modern European standard” (OECD 2001: 10).

One of the main priorities set in the Kosovo Education Strategic Plan 2011-2016, is “[t]o establish, preserve and improve standards and relevance of all levels of education in Kosovo to European standards” (MEST 2011b: 26) and in particular “[i]mproving the quality of higher education by ensuring quality control, the application of European standards and a review of academic structures organization” (MEST 2011b: 12). It is indeed in the area of higher education that “[E]uropean and international trends”35 play an important role, according to the Strategic Plan (Ibid.: 38).

The main aim of the Kosovo Education Strategic Plan has been linking life-long learning (another European policy trend)36 to inclusive education as the basis of the whole education system, with the overall objective to reach out to all learners, whom are

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35 See for example European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education – ENQA (2009)
36 “[L]ife-long learning implies an inclusive education and learning model that includes all – children, youth, women, minorities and adults as learners. It also encompasses learning throughout the life-cycle, from pre-primary to retirement taking in formal, non-formal and informal education methods” (MEST 2011b: 11).
provided with equal opportunities for relevant and quality education (MEST 2011b: 11). According to the plan, there is the need for the education system to respond to “[t]he labour market demands, aligned with key government priorities and pressing development goals.” (MEST 2011b: 11). According to the Plan

The vision for education is to create an inclusive education system and to provide all citizens in Republic of Kosovo with equal access to quality education at all levels; a system which provides the people of Kosovo with life-long skills for an advanced knowledge integrated into European society and to contribute to the long term sustainable development of the country through job creation and enhanced social cohesion (MEST 2011b: 26).

The pursuit of and convergence towards ‘European standards’ and trends such as ‘life-long learning’ inclusive education, has been an overarching policy theme that has informed international and local interventions in education reform throughout the past decade, and it has been applied as the ultimate goal in teacher training and in broader institutional and curriculum development.

An analysis of policy documents and interviews conducted in Pristina reveal that consensus and understanding regarding what is meant by European and Western standards are very thin, especially given the fact that those ‘standards’ vary considerably across European context, not to speak about variation ‘within the West’. In the OECD’s view, some of the changes that might reflect given standards include “[a] shift from the ‘lecturing’ model to ‘interactive learning’: introducing ‘science’ as a single subject to replace the separate subjects chemistry, biology and physics; or introducing new subjects such as civics. In other cases, ‘European standards’ referred to the quality of buildings, equipment, furniture, computers, and even on occasion to teacher salaries” (2001: 19).

4.3.2 Other international initiatives

In the post-reconstruction phase, Kosovo was overwhelmed by a myriad of international governmental and non-governmental agencies that became active in
post-war education. A number of NGOs were engaged both as donors and as implementing partners in the repair of schools. There were different types of donors, and often it was difficult to identify their roles and functions, since they were wearing different hats on several occasions (Daxner 2000: 214). During the early emergency phase, a number of training courses on human rights were organized by the international community.  

A number of education initiatives such as policy debates, conferences, aid projects and reforms were initiated and organized by international actors. UNMIK’s priorities “[c]oncentrated on making the schools attendable” and getting pupils back to school (Daxner 2000: 7). Most of UNMIK’s civilian budget in the phase from 1999 to 2000 was committed to education reconstruction and implied rebuilding infrastructure and re-establishing the teaching staff.

The World Bank got involved in early infrastructural reconstruction and later in education system management and school decentralization. UNDP ran the Schools Rehabilitation in Kosovo project (with a US$ 2.6 million grant by the Japanese government) for rebuilding school infrastructure (UNDP 2002a). UNDP together with the Department of Education, UNICEF and the Mine Action Centre organized training on environmental health and landmines awareness. The European Commission’s Task Force and the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR - the operative arm of the European Union in Kosovo) prioritized vocational training relating it to labour market needs (2000).

The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology has remained heavily dependent on the financial and technical assistance of the international community: the World Bank continues to provide support for management system capacities and implementing decentralization programmes, while the EU has been providing

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37 Interview with local education expert, AAB University, 1 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo
38 In 2011, the Ministry of Education, supported by the World Bank, started the implementation of a pilot project on increasing financial decentralization in the education system, which aimed among
support for curriculum development, teacher development and quality assurance measures (USAID 2014: 38-39). USAID has also been an active donor in pre-university education through its Basic Education Programme, which has linked the development of basic education to enhanced human capital, with the latter identified as a cornerstone of economic development and growth (USAID 2014: 38).

Despite the attempts made by the international community to create a pluralist and multiethnic society, post-intervention education reforms reinforced ethnical segregation in a reversed way (Nelles 2006: 98). By 2000, most of the Albanian students and teachers had moved from the parallel system into government schools, while Serbs across Kosovo had now moved from the government buildings into making their own parallel system of education.

A decade of (ethnic) segregation during the 1990s followed by an ‘ethnic war’ from 1998 to 1999 made post-conflict segregation also a foreign choice (Kostovicova 2005). At the end of hostilities, there were a few schools that attempted some steps towards integration, including one in Kosovo Polje and another in Kamenica (Pupovci and Hyseni 2001: 9). The integration of the Serbian community into a unique education system became a highly politicised issue and it has not been resolved yet. Although reliable data are lacking, the Kosovo Ministry of Education citing sources from its counterpart in Belgrade, reports that by 2011 there were approximately 80 Serbian education facilities in Kosovo with around 1,054 classrooms. As Serbs in Kosovo may be around 7 percent, the Ministry of Education Science and Technology (MEST) estimates that around 30,000 students are enrolled in the pre-university system and approximately 10,000 students are enrolled in the University of Mitrovica (MEST 2011b: 43).

The parallel system of education in Serbian has been seen by the representatives of the Serbian Education Ministry in Mitrovica as a pillar of Serbian...
survival in Kosovo. In the aftermath of the war, bringing children to school meant a return to normality and to some form of future prospect. By being anchored to Serbian education, the parallel system has sought to establish a form of continuity of Serbian rule between pre- and post-war Kosovo, thus acquiring a national and political importance. However, the Serbian education system has constituted a barrier to the Serbian integration into an Albanian state, and indeed a form of denial of the existence of this state. The relationship with UNMIK has always remained confined to infrastructural reconstruction projects (Nelles 2006).

4.3.3 Current challenges

According to a 2014 report by USAID, “[t]he education system in Kosovo fails to address the pedagogical and skills training needs of Europe’s youngest population, resulting in vast numbers of unemployed youth without the skills or training required of a growing economy.” (USAID 2014: i). As mentioned in Chapter three, Kosovo struggles with the highest levels of poverty in the whole Balkan region – with an estimated 34 percent of the population living below the poverty line (World Bank 2012) – worrying unemployment rates (approximately 45 percent), over-dependence on imports, an extremely small export base, and a steady 3.5 percent of growth rate in the decade 2001-2011 (USAID 2014: 4; World Bank 2015). While data differs, youth unemployment rates are thought to reach 70 percent, in a country where 50 percent of the population is under the age of 25, and where one fourth of the population is enrolled in primary and secondary education (USAID 2014: 4; World Bank 2015: 7).

According to USAID, with such estimated poverty and youth unemployment rates, Kosovo’s stability and development are strictly linked to job generation and to a better education system (2014: 6).

Achievements have been reached in physical infrastructure, curriculum development and in “[i]nstitutionalizing a decentralized, modern basic education system with assessment-based and student-focused learning.” (USAID 2014: 4) Improvements have been achieved in access to pre-primary and secondary education,
respectively 72 percent and 92 percent by 2012; by strengthening the financing of education system although regional disparities across the country remain; by promoting teacher management and professionalisation; and by adopting the reform of curricula – which included the introduction of learner-centered and outcomes-based teaching methodologies. The overall improvement of learning and school infrastructure was reached by either restructuring or building new schools and by reducing to 70 percent the number of schools operating in two shifts (World Bank 2015: 7).

This being premised, several challenges are still unanswered: among them, over-crowding in urban areas (due to rapid rural to urban migration); inequitable access to quality education (especially between and within urban areas, between rural and urban schools and for minorities); poor completion rates among minorities; inadequate curricula; overall shortage of learning materials; scarce teacher professional development; gender gaps in education management; and high female dropout rates, especially at grades 9 and 10 (USAID 2014: 8, 38). With reliable data regarding student achievements being poor, the low passing rate and overall achievement levels at grade 12 suggests the need for further improvement: there remain large regional disparities and differences between girls and boys as well as between rural and urban students (World Bank 2015: 8).

The situation does not look any better if one moves onto considering the higher education level. The main public higher institution, the University of Pristina, has serious management, curriculum relevance and pedagogy problems. The quality of the graduates is poor and it is not matched to workforce requirements. The liberalization of the public higher education space – promoted by different governments – has resulted in the creation of 7 new public universities between 2010 and 2014:39 interestingly, the process was based on no comprehensive strategy for tackling the low market absorption rates in a country with extremely slow growth of the private sector.

39 In 2010 the university of Prizren was inaugurated, followed by two universities in Peje/Peć (2011), and three more in Gjilan/Gnjilane, Gjakove/Đakovica and Mitrovica (2013) and the latest in Ferizaj/Uroševac (2014).
International and local initiatives in the education sector in the period 2013-14 have sought to consolidate the quality of pre-university education (in particular by further implementing curriculum reform and teacher professional development) and to increase access to higher education [as mentioned above, through the establishment of new higher education institutions and the improvement of existing ones] (ETF 2015: 3). Moreover, since 2008, there has been an increasing focus on vocational education and training. By 2013, the Law on Vocational Education and Training was passed and a strategy for developing vocational practice was approved including the finalisation of the syllabus for 21 new profiles based on demands of the labour market for targeted centres of competence; the Agency of Vocational Education Training and Adult Education was established in March 2014 and it governs four centres of competences in Skenderaj, Malisheve, Prizren and Ferizaj and two technical schools in Prizren and Pristina (ETF 2015: 3-4). The project is supported by the German GIZ, which provides capacity building and management for the Agency’s staff. However, a local education expert highlighted how the centres of competences in Malisheve and Ferizaj were still not operating by the end of 2013.40

Overall, the need to match education reforms with labour market needs is highlighted in government strategies, at least rhetorically. In particular, one finds stronger emphasis on enhancing the link between education and the economy in the sectors of vocational education and training and higher education (ETF 2015: 4). Yet, “[a] systematic approach to meeting education and employment challenges through skills development” is missing (ETF 2015: 4). Supported by the European Training Foundation, Kosovo has drafted a capacity development roadmap for the country’s skills system up to 2020 that identifies the following main priorities: the promotion of competence-based learning and improvement of the responsiveness of the education and training system to labour market needs (aiming to tackle unemployment and social exclusion); fostering entrepreneurship and innovation; reforming employment services; developing capacities for coordinated sector policy development, especially by improving inter-ministerial cooperation (ETF 2015: 5).

40 Interview with local education expert, AAB University, 1 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo
4.4 Key trends in Kosovo’s post-conflict education reform

This section examines three areas that international agencies have prioritized in Kosovo with the apparent aim of institutionalizing multiculturalism and addressing the multi-ethnic nature of the new state: curriculum reform, community education, and higher education.

4.4.1 Curriculum reform and textbooks

In leading curriculum reform, UNICEF initiated a dialogue and process for primary curriculum – which was funded by a Japanese grant (US$ 16,160,000) through the United Nations Human Security Trust Fund – that could promote a pluralist and multicultural society (UNICEF and DoES-UNMIK 2001). UNESCO joined UNICEF in curriculum reform and together with its International Bureau of Education organized curriculum development workshops in Geneva. The first reform initiative was the new Kosovo Curriculum Framework, which was based upon the current and past trends of educational development in the West, particularly by introducing the focus on learner-centred approaches (Tahirsylaj 2013).

An evaluation of the curriculum framework made by the London Institute of Education in 2005 stated that “[t]he Curriculum Framework for the National Curriculum produced by MEST with the support of UNICEF and the technical expertise of UNESCO/Institute of Education is an excellent, modern, high quality document and an excellent model for education in Kosovo” (London Institute of Education 2005: 3).

In 2002, with the creation of the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology (MEST), local authorities took over education reform and policy development, including curriculum development. MEST took a number of steps to make Kosovo’s education
system compatible with European standards. An early step was the adoption in 2002 of 5+4+3 education structure instead of the previous 4+4+4 (OECD 2001). However, some local experts in education said that it was done in a hasty way not allowing time for the system to adapt to the change and initially without a curriculum for grade nine. The adoption of new textbooks followed that of the curriculum framework, the last updated version of which was adopted by MEST in 2011 (MEST 2011a).

The revised Kosovo Curriculum Framework focuses on “[l]earner-centeredness, competencies, integrated teaching and learning, flexibility, mobility and transparency,” which reflects “[t]he fundamental values and principles of human rights, living together, social justice and inclusiveness” (MEST 2011b: 24). The competency based curriculum encourages “[l]earning to learn, problem solving, critical understanding and anticipatory learning” identifying them as some of the skills that are needed in order to practically achieve life-long learning. (Ibid.: 25). Many Kosovo educators considered the curriculum framework not to be as successful as planned because it did not consider Kosovo’s past educational experiences and contexts (Tahirsylaj 2013: 7).

By 2006, MEST drafted the Pre-university Education Strategy 2007-2017, aim of which was to turn Kosovo into a “[k]nowledge society integrated into the mainstream of European processes, offering equal opportunities for personal development to all individuals, who will in turn contribute to sustainable economic and social development” (MEST 2006: 20).

One of the most potentially conflictual and underdevelopment aspects in curricula reform has been history curriculum reform, especially with regard to the period between the end of World War II [WWII] (when Kosovo became part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and the 1999 war. A Purdue University project mobilized a network of

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41 Interview with executive director, Kosova Education Centre, 7 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo; Interview with executive director, Kosova Education Centre, 21 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo; Interview with local education consultant, 27 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo
scholars in joint research and conferences “[t]o resolve the Yugoslav controversies, including theme groups interpreting Kosovo’s problematic history” (Nelles 2006: 99).

The battle over Kosovo’s history has resulted in competing and exclusivist school curricula (Sommers and Buckland 2004: 39). Much of the conflict over politics and education in Kosovo has been around different and competing interpretations of Kosovo history by Serbs and Albanians (Dogo 1999). As Sommers and Buckland (2005) highlight, the issue of history was a constant theme in the interviews that were conducted with Kosovar Albanians and Serbs in 2004.

However, such controversies did not emerge from the interviews that I conducted with MEST representatives almost a decade later, in November 2013. MEST has recently launched an initiative at multiperspective approach to history. It is still in the piloting phase and the project has not reached contemporary history, leaving out the most contentious part of Kosovo history from the end of WWII until recent history.

MEST has been on the way of having a single curriculum for all Kosovan communities, with translation in the different languages. However, the curriculum in Serbian has been drafted but not issued, and there is no record or statistics on the number of Serb pupils and schools of the parallel system, nor is there a strategy of integration of the Serbian parallel system into the Albanian one (OSCE 2003, 2006, 2009b).

The three MEST strategies for pre-university education have shown a changing and progressive de facto acknowledgement of the Serbian parallel system. In the first MEST strategy issued in 2003, the goal was the “[u]nification of the Education system” (MEST 2003: 8); in the second strategy issued in 2006 the Serbian parallel system was identified as “[a] challenge to be dealt with” (MEST 2006: 18); while the last strategy drafted in 2011 – three years after the unilateral declaration of independence from Kosovo authorities – accepted the use of curriculum and textbooks from the Republic of

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42 Interview with head of curriculum section, MEST, 12 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo
Serbia as stated by the *Law on Education in the Municipalities of the Republic of Kosovo* (MEST 2011b: 70). It is not clear to what extent this change in strategy depends on Kosovo’s authorities accepting the *de facto* existence of the parallel system or whether the acceptance is due to international pressure. The fact that Kosovo’s curriculum and textbooks to date have not yet been translated into Serbian illustrates the existence of lack of will on the part of Kosovo institutions to create the conditions for the integration of Serb students into the education system of the new state – providing an easy alibi to those Serbs who call it the ‘Albanian system’.

In 2009, a process of revision of the Curriculum Framework was relaunched following the 2007 strategy for pre-University Education. Concomitantly, an Independent Commission – composed of three MPs from the Serbian community, three MEST representatives, and one representative from the International Civilian Office (ICO) – was established to review the Serbian curriculum and textbooks. It released a report with measures and actions for ensuring conformity with the Kosovo constitution and the Ahtisaari plan (Bozzato 2013). It was most likely influenced by the OSCE report that stated that Kosovan authorities did not seem committed neither in including the Serbian community in education system nor in integrating the Serbian parallel system into the Albanian formal one (OSCE 2009b).

The report issued by the Commission stated that the use of Serbian curriculum and textbooks was necessary, given the lack of curriculum and textbooks in Serbian language by MEST (MEST 2010: 2). The report identified a number of contentious contents in the Serbian curriculum and textbooks, followed by recommendations of “[m]easures and actions to be taken by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology in order to ensure reasonable conformity of the Serbian language curriculum and textbooks with the Constitution of Kosovo and relevant legislation” (MEST 2010: 4).
Two of the contentious issues regarded curriculum – the different structures of education systems (5+4+3 in Kosovo and 4+4+4 in Serbia) – and religious education. Religious education is compulsory in Serbia while is not part of the curriculum in Kosovo. The third regarded the contents in Serbian textbooks that are considered incompatible with the Constitutional Framework of Kosovo. The most problematic is the history curriculum, since it does not present a history of Kosovo but of the Serbian nation as a whole, and it does not touch upon the core events after 1998, which is when Kosovo stopped being practically part of Serbia (MEST 2010: 6).

According to Bozzato, the process was politically-driven as most of the members of the commission on both sides were not technicians but politically appointed personalities (2013: 18). Although considered as an interim solution until MEST issues a Serbian-language version of the curriculum, the fact that changes and harmonization to the Kosovo constitutional framework were proposed on those sensitive, national subjects–history, geography and religion–that represent the main controversy with Serbia suggests that the process is destined to fail (Ibid.).

While curricula in Kosovo satisfy the educational needs of specific communities, they fail to promote “[m]utual respect, understanding and tolerance”: OSCE suggested the need for initiatives promoting “[i]ntegration within diversity and intercultural education” (OSCE 2009b: 24). OSCE concluded in its report that the generation of youth from different communities in Kosovo that are being formed in the current education systems will find it difficult to communicate with each other for lack of a commonly understood language and for lack of a non-divisive and shared history (Ibid.).

The politics of curriculum reform in Kosovo and the related debates in Kosovo and Serbia show that there is little concern about the improvement of the curricula, textbooks and didactics more generally (Bozzato 2013: 24). Hence, it is rather unlikely that objectives of fostering inclusion, integration, and consolidating cohesion and peace
have been or are currently informing curriculum reform in Kosovo. Indeed the process is tied to the broader political dispute between Kosovo and Serbia over the status issue.

4.4.2 The question of minorities

Under UNMIK and within the DESK process the aim was to develop an education system that would include interactive methodologies and new curricular topics in ways that would promote equity in access and mutual understanding among different ethnic groups. At the beginning, UNMIK tried to achieve its goal of multiethnic cooperation and schooling by organizing shift schemes or shared facilities, focusing especially on the Serbian and Albanian community. However, it did not work either because of the lack of will on the part of the two communities to attend same schools or for lack of physical security. Broader development and security issues had an impact on Kosovo’s education in the post-war period (Nelles 2006: 102). In 2002, UNMIK officials negotiated an agreement with the Serbian Ministry of Education, but it seems that the attempt failed in the last moment because the Serbian delegation could not hold together (Sommers and Buckland 2004: 127).

Following the 2004 riots, the OSCE was engaged in “[a]n interesting initiative” promoting the democratization of society through education, as part of the longer term objective of peacebuilding.\footnote{Skype interview with former employee with the Dutch NGO Spark, 21 November 2013} It was quite an unusual approach from OSCE working jointly with MEST, to use education to promote democratization and built social cohesion. As argued by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, the main objectives were the promotion of human rights and multiculturalism. Moreover, OSCE launched a special unit on higher education, whose main function was to facilitate the integration of national minorities within higher education.\footnote{Interview with local education expert, AAB University, 1 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo}
Community areas have been off limit zones for the Kosovo institutions, where the international community alone had the mandate to work. The role of the international community in higher education increasingly became limited to the communities, sometimes with outcomes that rather than solving were exacerbating certain issues. This was particularly the case of the Gorani community. USAID has tried to get the two main conflicting communities together through a couple of projects that aim at the development of inter-ethnic communication and interaction between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbian communities, focusing on languages, capacity building, education and economic development (USAID 2013).

There seems to be partial integration of the Bosnian, Turkish, and Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian (RAE) communities within the Kosovo system of education, while Gorani and Serb communities are not integrated at all (OSCE 2009a). The OSCE report showed that communities seem to be moving gradually on their own separate ways: this is seen as evidence of the fact that community integration within the education system is not sufficient for the integration of minority communities within the broader society (OSCE 2009a). This is particularly visible in a few areas: between the Albanian and Serbian communities in Kosovo, whose absence of relations is influenced by political obstacles mainly due to the active engagement of the Serbian government to the maintenance of Kosovo Serb schools and school staff operating within the so-called parallel system; in the blossoming of prejudice and stereotyping due to the lack of communication and exchange in most of the municipalities in Kosovo (in this regard, the existence of the so-called ‘enclaves’ has played a very negative role); finally, in the a lack of pro-active approach by any of the parties, accepting the issue of Albanian/Serb relations in Kosovo in a status quo of no communication (OSCE 2009b).

Most of the international organizations involved in multicultural projects to education such as OSCE, Council of Europe, US Embassy, UNICEF have addressed one
or more education issues of a given community without a comprehensive and trans-
community approach. The OSCE report found that curricula for community-specific
‘national’ subjects for the most vulnerable Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, Gorani, Kosovo
Croat and Kosovo Montenegrin communities have not been developed yet (OSCE 2009b: 
1).

The Ministry of Education of Kosovo claims that specific attention has been paid
to the education of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities by stimulating their
participation in the formal education system and by developing curricula in Romani
language, which includes elements of their culture and history as an optional subject
(MEST 2011b: 29). In 2011, MEST with support by the OSCE Higher Commissioner for
National Minorities (HCNM), was developing two textbooks designed for boosting
intercultural education: a textbook for learning Albanian as second language for
minorities’ students and a textbook for civic and intercultural education (MEST 2011b: 
29).

Although the legislation adopted by the new state provides for comprehensive and
specific educational rights “[t]he right to receive public education at all levels in one of
the official languages (Albanian and Serbian), in areas inhabited by communities whose
mother tongue is not an official language, students belonging to these communities are
entitled to receive pre-school, primary, and secondary public education in their mother
tongue” (OSCE 2009b: 1), for non-majority communities, implementation is weak
characterized by a number of deficiencies (OSCE 2009b: 1). There are insufficient
textbooks for primary level and lack of textbooks in Turkish and Bosnian languages.

Kosovo Serbs do not face difficulties accessing curricula and textbooks for
primary, secondary, and higher education. Kosovo Bosniak and Gorani students who
choose the Serbian curricula are quite satisfied with its quality, although they complain
that it lacks sensitivity over their cultural diversity. Quality and availability of curricula in
the Kosovo curricula depend on the language in which they are developed (i.e., Albanian, Turkish, Bosnian). The Kosovo curricula lacks the same sensitivity when it comes to community-specific ‘national subjects’ (OSCE 2009b: 5).

The promotion of multiculturalism as a tool for resolving ethnic conflicts and achieving a peaceful political resolution (one of the key tenets of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm) has informed the international peacebuilding agenda in Kosovo since 1999 (Randazzo and Bargués 2012). As shown in chapter three, the respect of the rights and interests of minority communities has led to the promotion of decentralization policies along ethnic lines with consequences felt in the fragmented and decentralised education system(s). Decentralization has emerged as the panacea for the international community: it ‘freezes’ ethnic conflict by territorially insulating potentially problematic units, and ultimately it may help avoiding the necessity to deal with the reasons and root causes behind a given conflict (Monteux 2006: 163). However, while the aim has been to prevent conflict, pursuing it through territorial decentralization, has been counterproductive (Randazzo and Bargués 2012: 27). The Kosovo Human Development Report in 2010 concluded that local issues including the quality of teaching has not improved where decentralization has been implemented (UNDP 2010).

4.4.3 Reforming higher education

There are two areas in which the international community has been more active in the field of higher education (HE): the promotion of the ‘Bologna process’, which aims to integrate Kosovo’s universities into the European system, and initiatives that could strengthen the autonomy of higher education versus party politics.

*The Bologna process*

As Kosovo emerged from hostilities, higher education in Kosovo went through dramatic changes and reforms. The peculiarity of the process lies in the fact that it was not initiated
from internal needs of the University of Pristina, but emerged as a result of decisions taken by the international community. In the early, post-conflict phase reforms in higher education were planned and implemented by international agencies and foreign consultants. Local university staff or experts were not consulted or made part of the process, while the reforms caught many professors unprepared for the demanding process (Rexhaj 2001).

There were several communication and policy-making gaps, and underlying power relations that hampered local ownership in the sector of higher education. Moreover, the same ‘tabula rasa approach’ was adopted by the international community, ignoring structures, contents, and institutional legacies that were in place prior to the war. As with the rest of the education system, UNMIK’s intentions were a new brand higher education, since the system inherited from the past was not deemed suitable for the reforms. According to Tahirsylaj, not crediting university professors and treating them as outsiders from the process may have been the biggest mistake committed by the international community in higher education (2010: 177).

Since the beginning, there has been a strong focus on Kosovo’s capital – that is, on the university of the ruling elites: the University of Pristina, in particular, was completely spoiled with donor money. The sudden availability of funds caused difficulties in effectively managing resources across overlapping projects. For trivial that it may seem, one reason for an overflow of assistance and money to the University of Pristina is that NGOs and INGOs had better and easier access to institutions in the capital city. The Dutch NGO Spark in 2010 launched an International Business School in the northern city Mitrovica with the aim of bringing together students from both sides of the

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45 Skype interview with former employee with the Dutch NGO Spark, 21 November 2013
46 Ibid.
ethnic divide. However, the process was characterized by obstructions and the NGO received threats, apparently for crossing a red line.\textsuperscript{47}

The OSCE, which never had a mandate on education, created a department on higher education and communities and made a link between higher education and processes of statebuilding and peacebuilding. What emerges from the Council of Europe, World Bank, OSCE, and EU projects and NGO work such as Spark’s, is the existence of strong confidence – almost faith - on the fact that higher education is a vehicle for state formation and as a critical vehicle for progress.\textsuperscript{48}

The Bologna process and the transposition of the discourse of ‘knowledge-based society’ have been an important point of reference for interventions in Kosovo’s higher education (Bacevic 2014). Curriculum, teaching and learning strategies, and assessments were the areas on which the reforms focused the most (Mustafa et al. 2004). Although commentators and interviewees tend to give much credit to the inclusion of the Bologna process as the driving force behind the reforms, there exists little evidence that the process actually altered teaching and learning strategies. Despite training in these directions, traditional learning and teaching strategies (teacher-centred direct instruction) remain the most applied method. One may suspect that the Bologna process has been used as an alibi to justify all sort of changes and decisions, regardless of the actual content.

As mentioned above, in terms of principles and objectives guiding the reforms, planning and implementation, one encounters in the field of Kosovo’s education little understanding and little explanation of what is actually meant by European standards (OECD 2001: 38). In daily reality, the main activity in university life remains teaching, while little research is undertaken by the faculty in departments, with more than 50 percent of university professors having a second job, often teaching at private institutions.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
Depending on the interlocutor, the Bologna Declaration came to be seen as either the utopia (an alibi for inaction) or the realistic imperative (an alibi for unpopular reforms) that paved the way to the urgent changes in higher education in Kosovo. The adoption of the Bologna Declaration was the first step undertaken by the University of Pristina right after the war. As early as in 2000, the University of Pristina established the Committee for Strategy and Reforms (later known as the Bologna Working Group), a body in charge of implementing the Bologna process (Beqiri 2003). The Council of Europe was contracted by UNMIK for a two-year project sustaining the University of Pristina to reach European standards in legislation and management. Based on the experts contracted by either the Council of Europe or locally, the law on higher education was drafted and passed by the Kosovo Assembly. At that time, Kosovo had the first law in Europe based upon the Bologna Declaration (Beqiri 2003).

The objectives of the Law on Higher Education were “[t]o establish, develop, protect and transmit scientific knowledge and research,” functional to cultural, social and economic development (MEST 2002: 5 quoted in Tahirsylaj 2010: 179). In the same document, MEST admitted that the biggest challenge for higher education in Kosovo was to establish a link with the economy. According to the Employment and Skills Observatory of Kosovo - ESOK (2004), the university of Pristina concentrates on academic learning rather than on workplace competencies. Beside its role for economic development, the University of Pristina has to play a role as an agent for the democratization of the country (MEST 2004).

According to the new Statute of the University of Pristina, the institution aimed to become a leading centre for the advancement of knowledge, ideas and science in Kosovo, along with its full integration in the regional and European higher education space (University of Pristina 2004). Indeed, one of the rationales behind the hasty implementation of the Bologna process was to integrate Kosovo into the European higher
education sphere. However, applying the Bologna framework for Kosovo – namely, the poorest country in Europe, just emerging from the war with a disastrous institutional structure in place – was in many respects problematic. Among other problems, the process was launched without a reading of the local context and an idea of the impact it may have (Rexhaj 2001). After more than a decade of reforms based upon the Bologna process, the University of Pristina does in no way compare with universities from other European countries. The diplomas, knowledge, and skills it produces do not match those demanded by the economy and are not competitive in the European market (Tahirysylaj 2010: 174; ETF 2015).

Universities and party politics

Higher education and politics have been inextricably linked for the Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. As it was before the war, soon after the cessation of hostilities in 1999, university life in Kosovo became deeply intertwined with inter- and intra-ethnic politics: “[c]lose association between national schooling, on the one hand, and a national state, on the other, eventually became an impediment to the implementation of any gradual solution to the contested sovereignty in Kosovo” (Kostovicova 2005: 211). The politics of higher education reform in post-war Kosovo has been contentious, revealing the faultlines and the political struggle within the Albanian political and academic elite and between the first two and the international community.

As for the Albanian/Serbian clash over higher education, Kosovo Serbs preserved the Serb-dominated Pristina University now based in north Mitrovica. The pursuit of higher education in Serbian in Kosovo was institutionalized through a compromise agreement in 2001 between UNMIK and the Serbian Education Ministry.

In the beginning, UNMIK tried to reopen the University in Pristina, as a democratic, non-segregated institution regardless of ethnic background. The inclusion of
Serbs at the Albanian Pristina University, as more in general the inclusion of Serbs in the Albanian education system, rather than educational was a political issue. The acceptance of Serbs in the University before the solution of the Kosovo political status was rejected by the Albanian leaders now chairing Kosovo state authorities, on grounds that it could have been interpreted as compromising the Albanian quest for independence (Kostovicova 2005). Moreover, some Albanian lecturers and students were involved in the war, and in clear violation of UNMIK regulation had been deeply involved in Kosovo’s politics at times holding also civils service posts as party representatives (Gjurgjeala and Shala 2004). While conducting interviews within MEST and the university of Pristina, I noted that those appointed at the most important positions at the Ministry of Education had been involved with the Kosovo Liberation Army, whose most of the combatants had conflated within the PDK party, the political party that led the government during my fieldwork in November 2013.

The clash for the control of higher education in which local political elites were embroiled emerged after the creation of the Kosovo provisional government institutions. Between 2002-2004 and 2004-2006 arm-struggling took place between MEST (controlled by LDK party) and the university rectorate, which was conquered by the rival PDK party. Quite tellingly, the ministry did not recognize the outcome of the elections for the new rector, denouncing irregularities and frauds. The Rectorate, for its part, defended itself behind a call for the autonomy of the university.49

In the beginning, the local governments maintained a restrictive approach towards higher education, avoiding any opening to private universities. This situation changed after the declaration of unilateral independence of 2008, as the local government gained more power and liberalization was extended to the university field, with a corollary of corruption accusations touching both LDK and PDK parties. By the end of 2013, a

49 Interview with local education expert, AAB University, 1 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo
country of approximately million inhabitants had 8 public higher institutions, six vocational training institutions, and 23 private colleges.\textsuperscript{50} According to the Deputy Minister of Education, Science and Technology, one of the strategies for making Kosovo a “knowledge state” has been boosting development of the higher education sector, which includes its liberalization.\textsuperscript{51} As the Kosovo public sector, strictly monitored by international financial institutions, does not have the potential to absorb most of the young people that are educated in the current education system, one of the rationales behind the development of higher education and vocational training has been the development of a workforce equipped with the skills for competing and integrating in the European labour market.\textsuperscript{52} In an interview, the Deputy Minister of Education claimed that the development of higher education pursued the goal of strengthening Kosovo’s legitimacy at the international level and increasing political support for the government in power.\textsuperscript{53}

The proliferation of private and public universities throughout Kosovo, has had little to do with market demands, and much more to do with private interests and political agendas.\textsuperscript{54} Judging from the amount and the type of cases brought to the attention of the public opinion, and comments I could gather through interviews and subsequent exchange with Kosovo’s scholars and civil society representatives, the liberalization of higher education in Kosovo brought about a devaluation of knowledge, quality and diplomas.\textsuperscript{55} It comes as no surprise that, following a report from the local centre of investigative journalism \textit{Preport}, the University of Pristina was swept by student protests

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{50} Interview with Deputy Minister of Education, Science and Technology, 6 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo
  \item \textsuperscript{51} \textit{Ibid.}
  \item \textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ibid.}
  \item \textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}
  \item \textsuperscript{54} Interview with local education expert, AAB University, 1 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo
  \item \textsuperscript{55} Interview with assistant professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Pristina, 2 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo; Interview with investigative journalist, \textit{Preport}, 10 November 2013, Pristina, Kosovo
\end{itemize}
against the rectorate and clientelistic system that have characterized the appointment of administrative and academic staff (Boletini 2013; Kalaja 2013).

The growing emphasis on higher education and the proliferation of a number of public university and private colleges all over Kosovo regardless of budget and demand/supply considerations illustrate the widespread phenomenon of ‘populist use’ of higher education on the part of those elites that have captured it.\textsuperscript{56}

\textbf{Conclusion}

As the analysis has tried to show, the Kosovo case illustrates the close and deep link between the education system and conflict. After the short-lived experience of unification during WWII under the auspices of a puppet entity bolstered by Italian Fascism (during which young Kosovars were exposed to Albanian-language administration and education), Kosovo’s Albanian identity was cultivated in virtual isolation from Albania, which remained a remote and not accessible site of romantic cultural propagation. Attempts to bridge the gap by the Yugoslav authorities were reversely engineered as the Federation entered crisis and politics in Belgrade designated Kosovo as the first battle to reassert nationalism.

When the collapse of communist regimes removed Cold War barriers, the resurgence of nationalist narratives that swept ‘Eastern Europe’ brought the question of national education back to center stage. Kosovo Albanians came to that appointment with history following two decades of struggle whose epicenter had been the sphere of education, the University of Pristina, and the construction of a parallel schooling system whose sized matched that of the Kosovar society.

Education acquired a crucial role as the symbolic producer and the amplifier of nationhood and a political expression of statehood, and Kosovars lacked no generation of

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Ibid.}
intellectuals and activists, having a host of teachers from Pristina with a background in Albanology that due to the Serbian repression in Kosovo had expatriated into the newly emerging independent Republic of Macedonia, in whose Western districts they set up in 1994 their own controversial colony – the University of Tetovo. Initially met with police repression by Skopje, the new spin-off of the University of Pristina was eventually regulated and recognized, and later flanked by a newly conceived Tetovo-based ‘University of South-East Europe’ that was funded by former OSCE Commissioner on National Minorities Max van der Stool with a view to matching the region’s educational need for educated administrators through externally assisted higher standards of academic performance.

Throughout this trajectory, the emphasis shifted from ‘class’ during Yugoslavia to ‘identity’ during the nationalist revival of the 1990s (Bacevic 2014). The international community that stepped into Kosovo following the war followed this trend, further reinforcing the ethnic discourse, but attempting to shift the focus onto (multi-) ethnic identity.

The UN experiment in post-war education reform, as its broader engagement in post-war reconstruction in Kosovo, can be characterized as one following a tabula rasa approach. Its ‘reinventioning’ approach was turning away from Kosovo’s educational past, and started constructing from scratch an education system based upon European and Western standards. Although the international community has strongly emphasised education during the post-conflict phase, the fact that responsibilities to local authorities were handed over quickly shows that education was not a strategic sector in the peacebuilding agenda in Kosovo.

The propulsive character of education as the driving force behind the national question was to be mitigated and education had to respond increasingly to security and stability imperatives. While before the war education rallied around the Albanian national
question, increasingly education needed be reorganized in ways that it would contribute to build a tolerant, multi-ethnic society.

In this regard, a human rights-based framework–enabled through a proliferation of short training programmes–and a multi-ethnic/multicultural perspective, shaped education reform. Education had to be modernized, de-nationalized, de-ethnicizised, and made compatible to European and international standards, turning away from its Communist and nationalist past.

Moreover, education had to be redesigned to be compatible with the new economic framework and market reforms put in place by the international community. Although economic and development strategies were not drafted either before or after the declaration of independence, a number of actors and documents highlighted how education were expected to serve the needs of the new economic structure. As shown by the first draft document that laid out the privatization strategy, education was expected to play the role of the legitimizer by institutionalizing consensus on the new economic model and privatization recipes enacted by the international community in Kosovo.

Despite the rhetoric about local ownership, in the aftermath of the war, reforms in education were characterized by a serious lack of local involvement in the process of educational reform. After more than a decade of technical assistance there are clear deficiencies in local capacities. Curriculum and higher education reforms have been externally driven and neglected institutional memory and context. The EU-funded Sector Wide Approach was introduced to increase ownership, but it has been hampered by low absorption and human capacities at the local level. As has been the case in other post-conflict settings, donor assistance has been chaotic and has lacked coordination.

The process of curriculum reform in Kosovo has been tied to the broader political dispute between Kosovo and Serbia over the status issues. History curricula and textbooks remains among the most contentious and underdeveloped issues. In the struggle
between majority and minority over history curricula one finds a segregation and multiplication of exclusivist and opposite readings of history(ies) and a lack of communication between such readings. They proceed in parallel as the more general education system(s) in Kosovo.

The politics of higher education reform has been characterized by the political struggle within the Albanian political and academic elite and between the first two and the international community. An asymmetry in donor funding and assistance versus the Pristina-based Albanian university has fuelled the self-imposed isolation of the Mitrovica-based Serbian university and has furthered separation at the level of higher education between the Albanian and Serbian communities.

The Bologna process and the transposition of the hegemonic discourse of ‘knowledge-based society’ have informed interventions in Kosovo’s higher education. As the Bologna Declaration becomes the benchmark against which progress in higher education reform is assessed, the Europeanization of higher education in Kosovo is made in a hasty and de-contextualized way.

The liberalization of higher education is paving the way to the devaluation of knowledge, quality and diploma, and it is addressing in a problematic way youth unemployment. Even though in the past six years there has been a refocusing on vocational training from a number of international donors, there is no coordination nor a strategy that could match the booming young population of Kosovo, the building of skills, the informality of the economic structure and market needs, and a strategy of employment generation.

There has been a proliferation of private and public colleges that through the conferement of degrees have postponed the moment in which students enter the job market. In this way, the situation that has been determined is one in which unemployment rates are kept fictionally low and the explosive link between a frustrated, educated youth
and unemployment is managed through postponement of graduation and the multiplication of degrees per each student. The same structural problems that characterized Kosovo during Yugoslavia, such as those related to unemployment, underdevelopment, demographics in Kosovo have not been properly addressed in and through today’s education reform.

Education has been and still remains one of the main settings of tensions and conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. Education policies have been directly influenced by the unresolved political status in Kosovo. Even after the unilateral declaration of independence on February 17, 2008, the structure of the education system – characterized by spatial segregation and separation – has been a reflection and a perpetuation of such conflict. The politics of Serb-Albanian relations, intra-Albanians relations, and international intervention at post-war education reform have made the challenge of education to prevent conflict a complex and difficult task, leading one to consider education as a problematic foundation for building peace in Kosovo.

Albeit not explicitly linked to the peacebuilding agenda, the peacebuilding model that prevailed in Kosovo informed choices and priorities made by international actors in educational reform. A tension arose between using education to build social cohesion through building national identity and reforming education in ways that could not threaten stability. In this regard, the very notion of which, whose and how many nations or states (and which state/s) were there in Kosovo was an underlying problematic aspect.

In the post-war context, the international liberal agenda identified local culture and ethnicity as the primary causes for the conflict, thus proposing as the solution a governance of decentralization that would accommodate and institutionalize difference preventing any space for cross-level, dialectical interaction between different groups.
A narrow understanding of multiculturalism has been primarily based upon a notion of identity leading to the creation of a multiethnic society which is homogenised within ethnic groups but it is polarized among diverse groups, which are territorially divided into a system of decentralized municipalities. Such approach has taken for granted the existence of pure ethnic identities and has omitted the possibility for hybrid or ambiguous identities that might have existed prior to the war. In the end the result is the perpetuation and institutionalization of ethnic division that were further polarized as a result of the war.

As the chapter has tried to show, the politics of education reform in post-war Kosovo has been strategically negotiated between Kosovo local authorities, Serbian authorities in Belgrade and Mitrovica and international and transnational actors involved in education assistance in Kosovo. The perspective that has shaped the (re)construction of an education system as part of an externally-assisted effort to build peace is one that sees Kosovo as a post-communist country with an ethnic problem but which overlooks the existence of a development question.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CONFLICT, PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING IN EAST TIMOR

INTRODUCTION

The fact that the main cause of conflict was removed when the Indonesian occupier withdrew induced many observers to believe that building peace in East Timor would be easier task than in other post-war settings. The emphasis that international and local actors laid on statebuilding and the priority accorded to short-term reconstruction goals (as opposed to long-term development) seems to suggests that the country was not regarded as in need of peacebuilding. East Timor was soon labeled a successful story of UN statebuilding and peacebuilding intervention, implying that the getaway of Indonesian troops was sufficient for building peace. The task forward was narrowly defined by international actors as one of building the state and constructing the nation.

Albeit not as highly and explicitely divisive as other post-war settings such as Kosovo, historical or present-day divisions in East Timor have been and still remain those between the East and the West, between different ethno-linguistic groups, and between different political parties and elites. Moreover, potential conflict drivers that are worth analytical consideration appear to be those social, economic and gender inequalities that still hamper the country’s development.

The chapter first offers an introduction to the history of colonization and conflict in East Timor, showing how the modern history of the country (including the history of education itself) has been shaped and influenced by a plethora of external actors and factors. Second, it critically analyses external intervention patterns - both those happening
inside and outside the UN mandate - and it reflects about the lack of conflict sensitivity/analysis on the part of international actors despite the fact that the root causes of conflict were far from removed after the referendum. It highlights how the narrow focus on liberal statebuilding has produced a fragile if not failed state, inducing a reformulation of peacebuilding priorities only following the violent political crisis that swept the country in 2006.

5.1 A history of conflict and colonization

Conflict has characterized East Timor historical development since early human settlements (Paulo Castro Seixas 2006 quoted in Ofstad 2012: 4). When the Portuguese arrived in 1513, they did not find a united people and they exploited these local differences in order to tackle resistance, according to a ‘divide and rule’ approach (Ramos-Horta quoted in Ofstad 2012: 5). The long period of Portuguese colonisation (1513-1975) had an impact on the Timorese identity in terms of culture, language and religion (Anderson 1993). During this long period, formal and informal relations systems took place between the Portuguese and the Timorese elite. The Portuguese invested very little on the social, economic and physical infrastructures of East Timor concentrating on the extraction of sandalwood (Gunn 1999). The 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal led to regime change and the new government started the process of decolonisation.

As the colonial power left East Timor hastily in August 1975, what followed was a brief and violent civil war between local political factions over the leadership in post-colonial East Timor (Fox and Soares 2000). According to the final report of the Truth, Reception and Reconciliation Commission (CAVR) “[t]he brief civil war was over by early September, but it had changed the situation irreversibly. The fighting took up to 3,000 lives and left deep and enduring scars.” The Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (FRETILIN) came out victorious and unilaterally declared independence on
28 November 1975. The other four political parties flew to Indonesia and signed the Balibo Declaration proclaiming integration with Indonesia. The Indonesian military, which had been conducted small-scale incursions for one year, invaded the country on 7 December 1975, on the basis of an alleged political vacuum (CAVR 2005).

Jakarta’s occupation of East Timor was actively promoted by the Indonesian political leadership of General Soeharto, who justified the invasion on grounds of common geographical, historical and cultural ties, and defined East Timor as Indonesia’s 27th province (Cribb 1997). The Indonesian leadership managed to gain support from the West also by depicting the Timorese leadership as communists that could threaten regional stability. Besides being an ally of the West against communist expansion in the region, Indonesia was also a supplier of natural resources such as oil and gold, making the US, Australia and other countries to turn a blind eye regarding the invasion and widespread human rights abuses (Nevins 2005).

Large-scale military operations were initially launched with the aim of eradicating and destroying the FRETILIN. Civilians that were considered to be close to FRETILIN suffered torture, rape, and extrajudicial killings. Around 100,000 people died from starvation as a consequence of forced migration and the destruction of agriculture (CARV 2005).

The violence and destruction that characterized the invasion did not spare teachers and their families. While school directors and Indonesian teachers were seen as sympathetically serving the regime and its purposes of assimilation, Timorese-born teachers transmitted to the future generations the values of resistance and the distinctiveness of East Timorese culture and history (Arenas 1998).

Notwithstanding large-scale Indonesian atrocities, “[m]any Timorese sided with the occupying power,” as during Portuguese colonization (Ofstad 2012: 5). The Chega! report found that in the period June-September 1981, 60,000 people were forcibly
recruited by the Indonesian army to fight the Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor [FALINTIL] (CAVR 2005: 65).

However, atrocities were perpetrated by both sides: 29 percent of all unlawful killings and disappearances were perpetrated by forces that were affiliated with FRETILIN/FALINTIL (CAVR 2005: 59, 61). Violent conflicts emerged within the resistance movement too, showing that conflicts occurring during the brief civil war and the ensuing occupation years were multifaceted and complex (Gusmao 2000). In the crucial years 1974-1976 the Catholic Church did not play a mediating role, nor did it promote dialogue among the different and conflicting Timorese factions: “[i]t took sides and fanned the flames of the conflict” (CAVR 2005: 55).

However, this situation changed during the 1980s, which was a decade characterized by guerilla warfare, resistance and mobilization – whereby the Catholic Church emerged as an important actor supporting and channelling resistance against the Indonesian state; this change marked an increase in the number of Timorese affiliated to Catholicism (Hughes 2009). The Church became an active supporter of the perspective of independence, a task it performed by also encouraging the development and use of Tetum as the language of resistance.

Throughout the 1990s, Indonesian control over the region was weakened by the increasing international visibility given to the repression and brutality of Indonesian forces. This brought to the forefront the issue of the illegal occupation of the island with the international community increasingly condemning it. Other factors such as national protests in Indonesia against the economic decline and the 1997 Asian financial crisis led to the demise of Soeharto’s dictatorship (Jones 2010). His successor, president B. J. Habibie accepted the possibility of a UN-supervised referendum in the island, through which the Timorese population would choose between full independence or greater autonomy under Indonesian rule.
Tripartite negotiations with Portugal and under the auspices of the United Nations were resumed to discuss the future of East Timor and would soon lead to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question of East Timor on 5 May 1999.\textsuperscript{57} According to the Agreement if the option of greater autonomy within Indonesia would be rejected by the referendum “[t]he Secretary-General [would], subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, initiate the procedure enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence.”\textsuperscript{58}

On August 30th 1999, over 78 percent of the Timorese voted for independence from Indonesia. Soon after and until the arrival of a multinational peacekeeping force, the withdrawing occupation forces and their local militia proxies were embarked upon a campaign of destruction of most of the infrastructure – schools, hospitals, roads, government buildings – that were present in East Timor, forcing 300,000 refugees into Indonesian West Timor while internally displacing two-thirds of the population. Throughout 1999, around 1,500 were killed, with thousands more displaced (CAVR 2005). A culture of martial arts gangs emerged and divisions within the population were instrumentalized by Indonesian in the aftermath of the referendum and partly explained the chaos that followed afterwards. When the UN peacekeeping forces arrived in late September 1999 little was left of the educational infrastructure. The damage of educational infrastructure was worsened by the massive escape of the Indonesian teachers from the island.

As this section has shown, the history of East Timor has been more conflictual and divisive than is usually debated and thought. Early ethnic divisions, Portuguese oppression, the 1975 ‘civil war’ and 24 years of Indonesian occupation have rendered

\textsuperscript{57} (http://www.eastimorlawjournal.org/UN/indonesiaportugalconquestionofeasttimor.html, last accessed 15 September 2015).
\textsuperscript{58} Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question of East Timor, UN, May 5th 1999, art. 6
East Timor a traumatized society, with deep divisions, personal conflicts, mistrust and an overall lack of national cohesion (Ofstad 2012: 7).

The local elite requested both support to end the violence and to construct a new state upon different institutional and economic basis. The local leadership requested a ten-year transition to independence but this was not accepted as a possible commitment from the international community. Ironically, the UN with a number of missions remained officially engaged in East Timor for more than 10 years (1999-2012). Successive UN missions with a mandate that was to be annually renewed could not conceive a long-term strategic development plan (Vieira and Engel 2011: 4).

International actors that were faced with the huge challenge to build a new state from scratch and with the ambitious plan to do so within two years, lacked the intentions and tools to conduct a thorough background knowledge of the Timorese society. Underpinning their commitment was a widely-shared view that the 24 years of struggle for freedom against Indonesia had united the population. The UN focused more on the relationship with Indonesia and related issues such as border management. Yet, not taking into consideration internal conflicts was surprising with consequences that violently emerged in 2006 and in the different bi-annual political crisis that have characterized East Timor since 1999.

5.2 INTERVENTION OUTSIDE AND INSIDE UN MANDATES

5.2.1 The UN and the Timorese question

Like in Kosovo a few months earlier, East Timor was supervised under the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was tasked with the role for outlining the mandate and organization of the mission (Ofstad 2012: 9). According to Ofstad, “[t]he fact that DPKO
was given the job instead of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) implies that East Timor was considered a peace-keeping and not peace-building case, a choice that was clearly inadequate in light of the situation and history of Timorese society” (2012: 9).

The mission architecture was a further evolution of the peacekeeping missions of the 1990s, whereby the international community’s role in maintaining peace and security was to be achieved through political and economic means along more traditional military operations (Atwood 2002; Ruffert 2001): “[e]conomic-policy formulation was largely outsourced to other agencies, primarily the World Bank, and was to a large extent divorced from political considerations. The World Bank also led development efforts in strategic sectors, including agriculture, health, education and community development” (Engel and Vieira 2011: 5)

After two years of UN transitional administration, East Timor gained full independence on May 20th, 2002.59 According to Engel and Vieira, the support of the international community after independence did not change, following a “[l]imited-state, market-driven economic model,” thus failing to gradually move from a heavily subsidised economy under Indonesia to a liberal, market-driven economy under UN and Timorese lead (2011: 5). Despite strong emphasis in institution-building by the international community through technical support to ministry officials aiming at developing the legislative and administrative frameworks of the new state, the link between the state and its citizens remained weak with the latter “[s]truggling to adapt to the new laissez-faire economic model” (Engel and Vieira 2011: 5).

5.2.2 Externally-driven statebuilding

59 Covering half of the island of Timor and with a population of approximately one million, it became the youngest nation in the 21st century. Outside its capital Dili, East Timor remains a village-based society with sixteen different languages, and a geographical landscape that has favoured isolation and different local traditions.
The different UN missions that were established in East Timor between 1999-2012\(^\text{60}\) have promoted peacekeeping and statebuilding agenda and have been defined as “[g]overnance or national building missions” (Suhrke 2001: 1; Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005; Hainsworth and McCloskey 2000; Dunn 2003). The UN role in Timor-Leste was similar to the role that the UN played in Kosovo and Cambodia by assuming full authority under a transitional phase until self-government. Similar to the pillar structure that was adopted in designing UNMIK in Kosovo, UNTAET had three pillars: governance and public administration (GPA), humanitarian aid and rehabilitation and peacekeeping (this third component was the largest) (Suhrke 2001: 7).

However, in East Timor the UN went further by assuming full sovereignty with administrative, legislative and executive tasks: local actors were deemed to lack capacities to self-govern (Richmond and Franks 2008: 188). Its centralized approach to exercising political authority has been criticized as arbitrary and authoritarian, while its unwillingness to share power has led critics to define the UN approach as an expression of neocolonialism (Richmond and Franks 2008: 190).

As it had been the case in other UN missions, UNTAET failed to incorporate locals and be accountable to them. Such a failure affected capacity building efforts in the civil service despite later efforts to develop political mechanisms for local consultation as a result of the pressure from the Timorese and donor governments for greater Timorisation (Richmond and Franks 2008: 190). In Suhrke’s view the mission was a UN operation staffed with internationally recruited people that lacked local knowledge and did not understand indigenous languages, and which did not recognize local counterparts (Suhrke 2001: 11).

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\(^{60}\) UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in 1999 that oversaw the referendum regarding independence/autonomy from Indonesia; UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) between 1999-2002 mandated with peacekeeping/statebuilding objectives and which oversaw the transition to independence; UN Mission in Support of East Timor (UNMISET) 2002-2005 promoting post-independence development; UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) 2005-2006 mandated to phase out the UN mission; UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) 2006-2012 following the outbreak of violence in 2006.
The UN failed to recognize the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT) as a local partner for development which led to a contest of authority between the CNRT and the UN. By not engaging it politically, “[a] gap therefore developed between the UN’s de jure authority on paper, and the CNRT’s de facto control in the field,” and the CNRT developed its own parallel structures (Chopra 2002: 32). Local actors lacked the mandate to enact long-term strategic reforms. This was more problematic in those sectors of intervention that were left to local actors, a fact that was justified with the fact that they were a national prerogative. One such of them was education.61

The international community adopted a market-driven model of limited state: although it invested substantially in institution-building, the absence of the state or the presence of a limited state(hood) was felt by most of Timorese citizens with consequences for state legitimacy. The approach to institution-building was a mechanical one, following a model of governance ultimately resting on technocratic expertise, without much consideration of the question of legitimacy: the latter was narrowly defined and understood as supported by the electoral process. Underlying this understanding one might see the expectation that legitimacy would be built not so much on inputs, but rather by outcomes, i.e. by building the capacity ‘to deliver.’ The extent to and ways in which state legitimacy is defined by the capacity of the state to effectively deliver and provide social services were overlooked and therefore not properly tackled (Engel and Vieira 2011: 9).

The nexus between conflict and state legitimacy has been increasingly recognized by a number of international agencies intervening in post-conflict or fragile contexts. In its World Development Report Conflict, Security and Development, the World Bank explicitly linked state legitimacy to violent conflict, suggesting that institution-building

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61 Interview with Social Protection and Education Economist, World Bank, 18 June 2013, Dili, East Timor
and service delivery are central to the consolidation of post-conflict legitimacy (World Bank 2011).

The development and consolidation of state legitimacy was essential in East Timor also in view of emerging antagonisms and regional cleavages for years overlooked or obscured by the struggle against the common enemy identified in the Indonesian occupier (Engel and Vieira 2011: 2). The international community failed to consider such cleavages nor it incorporated them into policy-making, hampering its own state-building efforts:

widely held attitudes of the international community regarding the absence of conflict in the post-independence period; its efforts to transpose international ‘best practice’ onto a perceived blank slate; and the application of a ‘limited-state’ model and reliance on market-driven economic growth reduced the ability of the state to shape its relationship with the population” (Engel and Vieira 2011: 2).

In the aftermath of independence, the international community did little to promote a sense of national identity, in terms of engaging and stimulating the local leadership “[o]n the merits of promoting a sense of shared history and to make resources available to that end” (Engel and Vieira 2011: 11) Throughout the different UN mandates, the approach and focus remained on institutional development and top-down liberal governance while the active and politicised agency of Timorese citizens was ignored (Richmond 2011: 85). The form of statebuilding that came to characterize international intervention in East Timor over time was based upon:

top-down peacebuilding and governance at the expense of bottom-up peacebuilding, social justice, and welfare. [...] in Timor, this marginalised the political experience, history, culture, and needs of its subjects. Its focus on secular, public spaces for politics, on marketisation, on rights over needs, and on various institutions and programmes, effectively disenfranchised the vast bulk of the population, often through strategies of romanticisation (Richmond 2011: 87).

The Timorese government was instrumental in seeking to develop a locally-led statebuilding process which was elaborated within the g7+ Agenda for Statebuilding. It is
part of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding which emerged in
the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness which was held in Accra, Ghana in
2008 (Wyeth 2012). The Dialogue represents a platform for bringing together donors
(traditional or new ones, bilateral or multilateral partners), recipient countries and civil
society actors for addressing root causes of conflict and fragility and to enhance the
effectiveness of aid delivery.

The g7+ was formally formed in East Timor in April 2010, and the group’s vision
for peacebuilding and statebuilding was elaborated within the Dili Declaration. The group
emerged out of the recognition that in conflict-affected countries there were serious gaps
in terms of achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and in aid
effectiveness. It aimed to draw attention to common challenges and dilemmas shared by
countries affected by conflict, fragility and external intervention/assistance with the
overall objective of advocating for better international developmental policies.

The g7+ was initially led by East Timor while it is currently led by the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and it includes around twenty countries affected by
conflict such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Haiti, Cote d’Ivoire
among others. The g7+ call for a New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States was
endorsed in the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea in 2011.
The New Deal has elaborated a number of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PBGs)
or priorities that are considered to be essential pre-conditions for development in fragile
contexts:

1. Legitimate politics: foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution
2. Security: establish and strengthen people’s security
3. Justice: address injustices and increase people’s access to justice
4. Economic foundations: generate employment and improve livelihoods
5. Revenues and services: manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery

The New Deal sets out three sets of principles which should be taken into consideration in any intervention in conflict-affected and fragile states:

1. A focus on the five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals
2. A focus on nationally-led planning and priority-setting based on fragility and conflict assessment
3. A focus on increasing and building trust between national and international actors by promoting aid transparency, delivering a timely and predictable aid, strengthening capacity, and sharing risk.

The above-mentioned objectives are very similar to those proposed, elaborated or implemented by the international community in conflict-affected countries, although a greater focus is placed over justice and employment. Yet, the g7+ has gained recognition for being the first platform to bring together some of the most fragile and conflict-affected countries with the aim of putting forward an agenda for change in aid practice (Denney 2011 quoted in Rocha Menocal 2013). It has sought to be context-sensitive and it has advocated country-led and country-owned peacebuilding and statebuilding processes for addressing fragility, conflict and for achieving resilience and sustainable development, ultimately seeking to achieve or at least propose a mutual accountability between governments, civil society and international actors/donors.

5.2.3 Which peace, whose peace in East Timor?
The first three UN missions in East Timor did not include reconciliation and political dialogue in their respective mandates (Ofstad 2012: 8). However, from its very beginning, UNTAET took some reconciliation steps, and therefore it could be said that to some extent it conducted peacebuilding activities. Moreover, it promoted refugees’ return, cross-border dialogue, and it launched a programme ‘The future of democracy in East Timor’ that was based upon the promotion of “[c]ivic education on constitutional development, the rule of law, as well as political education” (Ofstad 2012: 13). The civic education programme was evaluated by the majority of Timorese as insignificant, although credit was given to the UN for its effort. It is a rare example in which education has been used for democracy promotion in post-1999 Timor-Leste.

The UN most significant effort in reconciliation was establishing the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) between 2001-2005, expected to investigate and report on serious crimes and conduct reconciliation activities and dialogue processes between victims and offenders. The final CAVR report Chega! in 2005 recommended large-scale reconciliation activities but they were neither taken into consideration nor implemented. The Chega! report was not enthusiastically received by President Xanana Gusmao, who adopted a conciliatory approach with Indonesia rather than putting emphasis on the pursuit of justice: indeed, very few perpetrators have been charged and the majority of the Timorese victims have not received justice or reconciliation (Ofstad 2012: 19). Therefore, the government has been supporting peacebuilding through a form of reconciliation that has not dealt with past crimes.62

Contributions for the stabilization of peace in the early phase emerged outside the formal UN mandate, specifically from UNDP, the World Bank and the IMF, with programmes focusing on institution building, poverty reduction, community and infrastructural development (Ofstad 2012: 14).

62 Interview with former advisor at the Ministry of Education on ‘Mother Tongue-Based Multilingual Education –MTB-MLE-Policy for Timor-Leste,’ 26 June 2013, Dili, East Timor
Despite such efforts, the UN with its missions did not adequately sustain political dialogue on national unity among different local political actors, did not prosecute atrocities, missed an early monitoring mechanism for conflict assessment and did not pay attention to sources of violence such as the martial arts groups (Ofstad 2012: 12). Most importantly, reconciliation was formally and explicitly included within the UNMIT mandate following the 2006 crisis, that is seven years later.

In March 2006, around 591 soldiers from the Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) (roughly 42 percent of the army) went on strike over poor working conditions, lack of advancement opportunity, discrimination and nepotism in the armed forces (Ofstad 2012: 3). Shortly after, they were fired by the then Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. As army and police started fighting each other, youth gangs took control of Dili, looting shops and destroying property (Brown 2009; Harris and Goldsmith 2009; Scambary 2009). In the ensuing weeks, social riots paralyzed Dili, houses were burned, foreigners left the country temporary going to Indonesia.

Violence quickly spread beyond the capital: social and political tensions that had remained unresolved after the end of the Indonesian occupation came back to the surface. The clashes resulted in 150,000 people displaced and 6,000 properties destroyed (Taylor 2011). The ensuing episodes of violence, included clashes between people from the East and from the West. Although, the crisis was primarily interpreted as a clash between the police and the army, it also reflected old divisions between the East and the West dating back to the years of resistance against Indonesia. Some politicians instrumentalized such divides for their own interests, blowing on the fire. The Prime Minister eventually resigned and an international peacekeeping force was again deployed under Australian guidance.

While until 2006 the UN mission and the international community focused on state building rather than peace building, after the 2006 crisis, it increasingly focused on
peacebuilding. Such refocusing represented an inversion to the approach of the international community in the aftermath of the 1999 war. Following independence and the establishment of elected representatives and local government, much of the UN mission was withdrawn by early 2006: dire social conditions, poverty and unemployment were not addressed by the UN, IOs, INGOs and were not considered a threat to political stability. There was general tendency to put political rights over economic and social rights, an assumption that proved dangerous for stability as the 2006 crisis showed shortly afterwards.

Indeed, by 2006, the economy was stagnating, with unemployment on rise and human development indicators such as health and education remaining low (UNDP 2006c; ICG 2013). Some blamed the donor-led ‘good governance agenda’, which had brought the state to use resources to boost its economy (Hughes 2009). Others pointed to the withdrawal of the UN mission in 2005 and the reduced donor presence which had a significant impact on the stagnating economy in the capital Dili (Moxham 2008).

It was acknowledged that the UN mission in 2006 withdrew too soon, and the exit strategy has been ill-prepared. In the aftermath of the 2006 violence, the UN Secretary-General report identified socio-economic factors as leading to the collapse, in particular poverty, deprivation and unemployment.63 Indeed, it is for this reason that after 2006, local governmental and non-governmental actors started negotiating country poverty reduction strategies (Richmond 2011: 85).

After the 2006 crisis, the Security Council resolution gave the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) a mandate which aimed among others: “[t]o support the Government in consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance,

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63 UN Secretary-General’s Report on Timor-Leste pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1690, 8 August 2006
and facilitating political dialogue among Timorese stakeholders, in their efforts to bring about a process of national reconciliation and to foster social cohesion.”

Yet, conflict roots and the Timorese welfare, culture, languages, and history were still neglected due – among other things - to a persistent over-emphasis on liberal state-building and neoliberal economic policy. The exclusion of Timorese from the internationals’ statebuilding project and the failure of Timorisation of local government structures reflect the lack of a social contract between the citizens, the government and the internationals: “[t]he disregard of the socio-economic situation, the neglect of grassroots welfare and social justice [...] has left a mass of discontent amenable to political entrepreneurship.” (Richmond and Franks 2008: 197)

In a report published on September 2009, the local NGO Centre of Studies for Peace and Development (CEPAD) pointed out a number of obstacles to peace which were related to the link between modern democracy and traditions of East Timor; the lack of local participation in development; divisions and distance between politicians and the population; persisting issues of poverty, unemployment and corruption; lack of peace dividend for different groups; and lack of a shared national narrative and other identity problems connected to language issues (CEPAD 2009).

According to the then president Xanana Gusmao, “[t]he experiences of peacebuilding in Timor-Leste indicated that peace was not just a normative aim but a basic human right that involved preventing not just international and civil violence, but an engagement with socio-economic deprivation, a lack of development, and an engagement with the experience of recipient communities on the part of internationals” (Gusmao 2004 quoted in Richmond 2011: 88).

Using Richmond’s categorization of peace in post-war context, the type of peace that has been built in East Timor has had elements of the conservative peace since it

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required military intervention and elements of the orthodox peace consisting in externally-driven and imposed top-down peacebuilding methods, while emphasizing the role of civil society (Richmond and Franks 2008: 191).

According to Richmond, the peace that was built in East Timor has been an hybrid, “[p]art liberal, part local”, that is a mediation of what local and international actors aimed for (Richmond 2011: 91). The hybridity as a concept does not add much to the substance of the peacebuilding model in East Timor, as in such contexts more than in other ones everything could be said to be a mediated or unmediated form of the interaction between international and local social forces.

What is important for understanding the type of peacebuilding process unfolding after the war is the fact that the UN and the broader range of actors involved in country did not or were not able to engage with a number of contextual issues. The peace that has emerged, as argued by Richmond among others, is a virtual one with a state subject to frequent political crisis, failing to address conflict roots, paralysed by a lack of capacities and with problematic levels of unemployment and poverty (Richmond and Franks 2008: 191, 197). The aspect of virtuality is linked with the fact that the state has had little substance if measured against the impact on the everyday life experience of the majority of the population and their welfare requirements.

Although since the last elections in 2012 the country has enjoyed relative levels of stability, in many aspects, East Timor remains a fragile state that can easily become a failed state. With 70 percent of the population under the age of 30, unemployment and youth bulges problems have been exacerbated by the growing affiliations to martial arts groups, which have been involved in crime and episodes of violence (Horta 2013). Furthermore, substantial gas and oil revenues (estimated at 2 billion dollar a year), at least since 2010, have led to a ‘double-digit growth rate’, but they also have deepened the gap between rich and poor, with growing problems of crime and insecurity (Horta 2013).
5.3 The missing analysis: conflict roots and social fragmentation

The lack of a comprehensive conflict analysis hampered the UN’s efforts, and represented a surprising omission, given East Timor’s conflict history. [...] no overall plan or strategy to guide peace or statebuilding activities was created by the UN, and few explicit efforts were made for longer-term reconciliation or conflict resolution. (Ofstad 2012: 2).

This section will reflect upon the lack of conflict analysis from the part of the international community in the aftermath of the referendum and in the first years of the intervention. It claims that this was a surprising neglect given the highly divisive nature of the Timorese society. After presenting some of the conflict roots that still continued to play a role even after the withdrawal of Indonesia, the final part will focus on current cleavages and conflict drivers, particularly those social and economic issues that represent potential sources of conflict in the present or near future.

5.3.1. Conflict roots pre- and post-1999

When it started its efforts to build the state in 1999 the international community was confronted with a complex situation. One critical aspect had to do with the scars left by violence between pro-autonomy and pro-independence groups, as well as by the broader legacy of Indonesian repression. A second aspect regarded ideological and political disputes within the political elite that were dating back to the 1980s and were reinvigorated once the new political system opened up space for power competition. Another important question was the precarious socio-economic situation of the country, as the flaring up of the 2006 crisis would show so clearly only a few years later. However, UNTAET was confronted with an element that could rarely be found in other peace missions: the occupying power had withdrawn, and the local interlocutor could be found speaking under a single authority or political actor – i.e., the CNRT.
The approach of the international community was one that regarded East Timor a *tabula rasa*, in which international best practices could be transposed and implemented into a context- and historic-free setting where the Indonesian legacy was ignored, underestimated and fought. (LeMay-Hébert 2011). Illustrative in this regard was the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) background paper commissioned by various international actors in 1999, which - quite tellingly indeed - claimed that “[a]ny plan for the future must start from zero” (JAM 1999: 2). The same approach could be found among the myriad of social forces and political parties representing the local elite. In the opinion of a then international consultant working with the UN mission, the local authorities were putting pressure on the international interlocutors regarding the need to start everything from scratch.

As mentioned above, reconciliation and conflict resolution activities were mainly incorporated in UN operations in East Timor only after the 2006 crisis. However, most of them failed to tackle those conflict roots or proximate triggers that were crucial to the 2006 crisis and to previous/subsequent political crisis. The international community did not incorporate within its various efforts any form of appreciation or reflection upon the Timorese historical context. Intervention(s) took place within an environment that was considered to be devoid of the possibility of new violent conflict. In this regard, an Early Warning System (EWS) was not even conceived for East Timor until 2006, unlike in Kosovo, where such a mechanism was established already in 2002 by the UNDP via quarterly early warning reports.

For both, international and local actors, the withdrawal of the Indonesian military and its militias represented the end of the conflict. No domestic conflict dynamics were

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65 The paper was a product of a joint mission of experts from East Timor, bilateral donor countries, UN agencies, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank.
66 Informal interview with a practitioner working with the UN mission in 1999, 16 September 2015, Oxford, UK.
identified as threats to the stability and sustainability of the state-building project (Engel and Vieira 2011: 5). For example, the World Bank and its programmes limited reference to ‘conflict prevention’ advocating for ‘development’, ‘capacity building’ and ‘empowerment’ (Engel and Vieira 2011: 5).

Established in 2001 and functioning until 2005, the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) was the only domestic mechanism to pay and draw attention to those cleavages arising in post-independence East Timor, which solidified upon pre-existing strata of divisions among elites. Its final report of 2005 suggests that attention should be paid to conflict dynamics, and called for reconciliation within communities and among political elites. These recommendations were largely ignored (CAVR 2005).

According to Engel and Vieira (2011: 6) the main issues that could potentially lead to violent conflict and that were largely ignored by the international community in the first phase were: individual/communal antagonisms during the civil war and resistance to occupation; the patronage structures in post-independence; the relationship between the population and the elite partly coming from the diaspora; the opportunity disparities created by the international community; large-scale rural-urban migration; competition for scarce land and employment.

These issues became more evident during and after the 2006 political crisis, when the UN recognized that the political crisis was the result of chronic and deep-rooted problems (United Nations 2006: 1). Indeed, in a report following the 2006 riots, the UN identified the “[u]nderlying causes” of the crisis as “political and institutional” but suggested that “poverty and its associated deprivations including high urban unemployment and the absence of any prospect of meaningful involvement and employment opportunities in the foreseeable future, especially for young people, have also contributed to the crisis” (United Nations: 9). This argument was confirmed by the UNDP
in 2007, which identified both poverty and (youth) unemployment as causes of the ongoing (political) crisis (UNDP 2007). To sum up, the international community failed to underpin “[t]he cross-sectoral analysis and programme design” on the historical context and fragility of post-independence (Engel and Vieira 2011: 6).

5.3.2 Current conflict-potential drivers: social and economic issues

East Timor has the fastest growing population in the region (2.14 percent) and one of the youngest population in the world (Curtain 2010: v). With 20 percent of the population aged 15-24 years and 54 percent of all Timorese under the age of 19, the country will have a very large segment young population, at present and for some time to come (Curtain 2010: iv; Narten 2012). Such a ‘youth bulge’ will increase demands for services such as access to education and decent work opportunities.

Youth bulges have been linked to conditions that may favour social and political violence, and a pressure on the economy (Barakat and Urdal 2009; Urdal 2011). The 2014 BELUN report confirmed an increasing number of incidents involving young people, indicating that youth issues coupled with other economic and social factors increased conflict potential at the national and district level (2014: 23). Youth issues entailed youth (un)employment, internal migration from sub-district/district to main cities to look for jobs, the lack of training or development programmes involving young women/men coupled with insufficiency in employment opportunities (BELUN 2014: 21; 24).

Relevant social indicators that have a strong bearing on conflict potential have been “[a] lack of dialogues or activities between youth groups and martial arts group to strengthen peace and unity”, a decreasing number of “[d]ialogues and workshops on conflict resolution or peacebuilding in the community [...] a lack of activities to integrate
people from different groups [languages, religions, different clan totem houses, etc.] and reconfirmed data on domestic violence (BELUN 2014: 22).

While violence has downsized since the then prime minister Xanana Gusmao outlawed martial arts groups in the late 2011—considered as one of the biggest sources of conflict between 2011 and 2012—root causes of violence have not been addressed. Indeed, youth unemployment coupled with widespread poverty, lack of prospects, forms of dislocation and displacement, especially among the young male population, that have moved from rural areas to Dili and Baucau, remain critical potential sources of conflict.68

GIZ has been one of the few international organizations that through its Peace Fund programme has tried in recent years to raise awareness about the link between peace and youth promotion under a rationale of conflict prevention.69 In interviews and focus groups conducted with young people within the framework of the Peace Fund programme, possibilities for education and labour market perspectives are confirmed to be perceived as central (Narten 2012: 2).

The youth dimension has been addressed within the Timor-Leste’s National Strategic Development Plan, the most important strategic document issued by the Timorese government, which has identified young people as an important human asset for its implementation: according to the plan, youth development is to be supported through education, health, employment and social development (Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan 2010). In terms of education, “[t]he Plan states that young people shall be allowed to achieve their potential by providing good quality of education and expanding their life opportunities” (Curtain 2010: 2). In this regard, key strategies for the development of education include the improvement of pre-school education, basic education, secondary education, higher education, vocational and recurrent education. In

68 Interview with former conflict analyst, Joint Information Centre, UNMIT, 19 June 2013, Dili, East Timor
69 (http://www.peacefund-timorleste.org/background, last accessed 15 September 2015)
terms of employment, the vision enshrined in the Development Plan is one pursuing the creation of jobs in all sectors, assuring economic growth through the improvement of the training system.

Nonetheless, until recently there have been few successful attempts at preventing the potential of violence of young people (Narten 2012: 1). With a country whose economy is low labour intensive and 60 percent of the population under 25 years old, no synergic strategy has been put in place between the education system and the job market currently unable to absorb the skilled workforce. While the internationally-driven statebuilding process had been inspired by neoliberal doctrines since its very outset, local actors have been gradually pushing towards the development of a welfare system. Reflecting this, the National Development Plan is aiming to tackle inequalities through a “[s]tate organised form of development and redistribution” (quoted in Richmond 2011:169).

Following state collapse and failure in the 2006 political crisis, addressing poverty and providing a basic form of welfare included payments for war veterans and some forms of job schemes (Richmond 2011: 89). The drafting of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper illustrated the local attempts at making peacebuilding economically sustainable and acceptable. It mobilized many Timorese voices and was internally drafted equating peace with “[s]ecurity, freedom, tolerance, equity, improved health, education, access to jobs and food security” (IMF 2005b: xvi).

However, the economic stability of the country rests upon weak foundations and it is considered as one of the factors bearing a strong conflict potential. As a matter of fact, East Timor is often defined as a rich country with poor people (Richmond and Franks 2008: 196), with 80 percent of the population still depending on subsistence economy and between 40-56 percent unemployed (Richmond 2011: 160). East Timor is the second most oil-dependent country in the world, whose GDP is made by 90 percent of
oil revenues, a figure arguably representing the highest dependency rate on a single commodity in the world (World Bank 2013). The government has maintained (fragile) political stability by extending patronage networks and by making substantial use of gas and oil revenues for that purpose (Horta 2013). Nonetheless, a number of studies estimate that the country’s gas and oil reserves will last for no more than another 15 years (Horta 2013).

The so-called ‘resource curse’ and the destabilizing effects that come with it have been addressed through the creation of a World Bank administered petroleum fund (Timor Gap) that is modelled according to the Norwegian pension fund. A small percentage of the fund has been funding trainings for people working within the oil sector, and some recent strategy has focused on short term job creation. However, most of the revenues from the fund have focused on infrastructural projects (Richmond 2011: 160).

The draft report of an internal evaluation by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group covering the period 2000-2007 asserted that, by following the advice of the World Bank itself, East Timor had chosen to save much of the petroleum revenues rather than spending them on social projects: this circumstance contributed to high levels of poverty and unemployment (Knowlton 2011). Poverty, according to the draft report, “[r]ose significantly through most of the evaluation period and declined only after 2007, when the government, against bank advice, increased its spending using petroleum resources” (quoted in Knowlton 2011).

Another current dimension of conflict is represented by the strong East-West cultural divide within East Timor that has roots in the Indonesian occupation and in perceptions regarding the role played during the resistance. As mentioned above, the East-West divide, in its turn, is closely linked to the enduring rift between the army and the police. The West, which was most advanced during the Indonesian occupation, is
usually identified with a preeminence of the police, while the East with the army. Since the 2006 crisis, the army/police divide has been addressed and mitigated through new more balanced recruitment and promotion policies in the army and via Australia, Malaysia and Portugal-promoted trainings for both the police and the military. Yet, economic and social imbalances between the East and the West have not been properly addressed, remaining (potentially) a problematic source of conflict.

**Conclusion**

Back in 1999, the international actors involved in the process and in the practice of statebuilding in East Timor perceived the country as a *tabula rasa* where virtually everything was to be rewritten from scratch. The state model that the main international actors aimed to build, in tune with what had been envisioned for Kosovo a few months earlier, was by all means a liberal democracy based on the free market. In transplanting the same standard model of democracy, the international community failed to recognize the existing forms of traditional authority and the structures and systems that had been institutionalized during Portuguese colonization earlier and the brutal Indonesian rule later (Jones 2010), as well as the existence of disputes among the new national elite. These disputes did not spare the role and the forms that education should have in the new independent state.

Based on a critical analysis of the literature and on interviews conducted on the ground, it seems that East Timor is ‘paying for peace’ rather than building peace: in other terms, peace is first of all configurated as the stability of a system where former war veterans are given key power and political positions. As with other cases of post-war intervention, the notion of peace over time has been aligned with a narrower definition than previously thought and proclaimed: a definition that comes closer to stability than
development and emancipation. The field of education pays a price for this state of affairs.

Between 1999 and 2006, peacebuilding was more aligned with a form of statebuilding focusing on the development of a neoliberal model of free market, a political system based on successful and free elections, and the building of institutional capacities. The violent crisis provided with the space for the local elite to play a more prominent role in the peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda. Indeed, after the 2006 crisis, a focus on poverty reduction was first of all elaborated by the local government and representatives from the civil society.

However, within this reframing of priorities, the full potential of education for the development of key sectors of peacebuilding and statebuilding was neither envisioned nor unlocked. As mentioned above, education has only played an uncoordinated role for democracy development and national reconciliation with scarce results.

The lack of an overall peacebuilding strategy and the lack of a comprehensive conflict analysis in the first years of the intervention hampered UN efforts at building the state and consolidating a sustainable and socially just peace. Conflict analysis tools were developed only after the 2006 crisis. This represented a surprising neglect given East Timor’s conflict history and the many cleavages that were present pre- and after 1999. Conflict roots were neither identified nor addressed.

Based of the latest UN’s definition of peacebuilding, one could say that the UN failed to conduct and achieve peacebuilding in East Timor since it failed to address those conflict roots and conflict drivers, failed to promote national reconciliation and social cohesion. Moreover, it did not promote or simply neglected the Timorese local context, i.e., culture, language, history. More broadly, the international community failed to promote or lay the basis for a transformative and emancipatory peace by not focusing on
social change and welfare and by not encouraging or pushing the local elites to address social (in)justice.
CHAPTER SIX

THE ‘UNKNOWN PATH’ TO PEACEBUILDING THROUGH EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

As discussed in chapter five, for most of its modern history East Timor’s identity and politics have been shaped by conflict patterns in which external actors have had a determinant role. Following a long period of Portuguese colonization, more than 20 years of Indonesian occupation and few years of transitional UN administration, in 2002 East Timor became the first independent state in the 21st century. Since 1512, Portugal controlled the eastern part of the island of Timor through Catholic missionaries, without caring about establishing a proper civilian administration (Hill 2002). The provision of education never featured among the priorities of the Portuguese metropole: mirroring a tradition rooted in pre-modern era, the church took main responsibility in handling this task.

The FRETILIN that was formed by Timorese intellectuals and other members of the local elite that were studying in Portugal (where they were inspired by the trajectory of education movements in other African colonies) declared independence from Portugal on November 28, 1975. With the purpose of fighting decolonization, they established literacy classes, health clinics and agricultural cooperatives (Cabral and Martin Jones 2008), adopting and adapting Paulo Freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed to their own context (Freire 2007).

Nine days after the declaration of independence, Indonesia invaded the country, embarking on an occupation that would last for more than two decades. Under Indonesian rule, the world of education played an ambivalent role. For the Indonesian state, it was supposed to act as a force of ideological indoctrination and assimilation of the Timorese
society under Indonesia. During the period of 1975-1999, characterized by active and passive forms of resistance that were met with growing repression, education institutions and schools were often to be found standing both on the side of the victim and of the perpetrator. As in other colonized settings, schooling became a crucial battlefield in itself, as well as an arena for mobilization of further conflict due to the messages that were produced and transmitted in classrooms.

Prior to the UN-supervised referendum on independence held in 1999, the Timorese elite in exile gathered in Australia with the aim of formulating a national development plan, which envisioned that “[a] new East Timor would aspire to have an education system that enhances the development of our national identity, based on our selective cultural and universal human values” (CNRT 1999). The plan envisaged the transformation of the teaching learning process through the introduction of critical learning skills and methods and the promotion of indigenous forms of learning (Millo 2002).

Against this historical background this chapter adopts the lenses of the ‘critical cultural political economy analysis’ presented in chapter five, in which the main patterns characterizing the East Timor conflict and external intervention were examined, aiming to locate education in the specific Timorese context by looking at the processes that have shaped the sector and its relationship to peacebuilding and statebuilding: historical legacies, patterns of external intervention, processes and types of externally assisted peacebuilding and statebuilding.

The first part of the chapter looks into the politics of educational reconstruction by mapping out educational programming and priorities. The second part will delve into the hybrid governance of education and how the relationship and role of international and local actors have changed during more than a decade of educational reform. It will put under scrutiny the actors and institutions that have had a key role vis-à-vis the education
sphere, in terms of laws, regulations and specific aspects of formal education that have a link with processes of peacebuilding and statebuilding. Finally, it investigates the specific nexus between education, peacebuilding and statebuilding by focusing on three specific – controversial and conflictual – aspects of curriculum reform: (1) the multi-lingual foundations of the new nation; (2) the role of religion, and more specifically Catholicism in the new state; (3) the question of traditions and history in the new curricula.

6.1 The politics of post-1999 educational intervention

6.1.1 Legacies of colonialism and occupation

Modern education in East Timor has been shaped by those foreign actors that have been active in distinct historical periods. The legacy of the Portuguese colonial period (1515-1975), the Indonesian occupation (1975-1999) and the United Nations administration (1999-2002) are still quite tangible today. Each of these foreign administrations has introduced a different language, civil service and structure into the education system. The Portuguese rule and the Indonesian occupation had different impact upon education and language policy. The Portuguese introduced a Western model of education administered by the Catholic Church, which emphasised the quality of education for a small elite that was functional for colonial maintenance; by contrast, the Indonesian occupier focused on quantity, using (mass-) education as a means of indoctrination, spreading the Indonesian language and promoting Indonesian national unity (Nicolai 2004: 19, 30). During the Indonesian occupation, a clandestine resistance movement emerged: its promotion of popular education would leave its legacy too.

The Portuguese legacy is mainly to be found in the presence the Portuguese language and Catholicism, as well as in political ties with Portugal which make the country distinct from the rest of the region. The post-1999 political elite has fuelled and
emphasised some of these features, for example by making Portuguese one of the official languages of the new state, as well as by developing preferential ties with Portuguese-speaking countries. By travelling to Dili, one still finds a distinctive presence of agencies from the Lusophone world. By contrast, the decision to make East Timor a secular country initially excluded a role for Catholicism in the primary curriculum. In spite of this reversal, the Catholic Church has remained a key religious and social institution affecting all public life.

During the Portuguese rule, the Church served as the major education provider, offering non-governmental educational services in the form of colegios: moreover, it also founded and funded kindergardens, primary schools, and a teacher training institution (Wu 2000: 3). In 1992 it assisted the then provincial government in establishing the University of Timor-Leste (World Bank 2004: 2).  

According to Millo and Barnett, religious education under Portugal served as “[t]he main tool for building a submissive local elite.” (2003: 5) Overall, the Portuguese rule was characterized by lack of emphasis on mass education: its objective was the formation of a small administrative elite, located in the urban centres of Dili and Baucau. This was achieved by opening a few schools for upper-class Timorese: most of today’s Timorese leaders studied in those schools. The first public secondary school was founded in 1952; throughout the 1960s there was an expansion in education provision with figures at primary education rising fivefold while at the secondary level doubled. By the time the Portuguese left in 1975, the illiteracy rate was 90 percent (Saldanha 1994 quoted in World Bank 2004: 2).

Those that studied under the Portuguese claimed that the quality of education was higher with a sense of “[w]ider ‘literature’ and ‘culture’, and that teaching was superior”

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70 Catholic schools represent approximately 10 percent of enrollments in primary and secondary education (World Bank 2004: 2)
71 (https://timorrising.wordpress.com/2013/10/13/curriculum-project/, last accessed 15 September 2015)
(Odling-Smee 1994: 14 quoted in Nicolai 2004: 42). While this might have been the case, it is a fact that it was achieved by encouraging Portuguese culture and Catholic values at the expense of local culture and geography (Nicolai 2004: 42). Beside legacies of language and religion, many of those in leadership positions in the education sector have studied under the Portuguese system.

When Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975 it substituted the Portuguese system of education with mass-education in Bahasa Indonesian. During the first years of occupation, FRETILIN organized literacy programmes and ran schools while hiding in the mountains, yet these efforts stopped soon as the Indonesian occupation increased control over the population. During the following 24 years enrollment in primary and secondary education increased rapidly with primary education compulsory, and available in most villages. Between 1975-1999, primary school enrolment increased from 10,000 to 165,000 students (World Bank 2002: 55), while secondary education enrolments grew from 315 to 32,000 students and senior secondary education grew from 100 to 15,000-19,000 students (United Nations 2000; Lee 2002).

However, enrollment was not universal and public spending on education remained much lower than in the rest of the country. Enrolment rates were lower than in Indonesia, and differences between urban and rural areas remained more pronounced in East Timor than in Indonesia, with distinctively increasing gaps at higher education levels (World Bank 2004: 5; UNDP 2002b). The expansion of education in East Timor was part of the broader Indonesian development plan, which saw in a well-educated population a key element of economic development. However, in East Timor the education sector served both the purpose of integration and control: spreading the Indonesian language and propagating the concept of ‘one nation’ were crucial, since Indonesians spoke neither Portuguese nor any of the other East Timorese languages.
According to the UNDP Human Development Report, two main limitations of the Indonesian approach to education in East Timor have been the use of education to ‘Indonesianize’ the population and the low quality of teaching standards (2002: 5). There were high levels of absenteeism and widespread lack of professionalism since many of the East Timorese teachers were not adequately trained. High repetitions rates were a constant feature of the system and rote learning was used extensively. Moreover, classrooms had the minimum of equipment with shortage of school textbooks (Odling-Smee 1999; United Nations 2000, both quoted in Nicolai 2004: 47). Indeed, despite the introduction of mass-education, East Timor remained the second poorest province of Indonesia.

Low educational attainment affected employment prospects and kept East Timor within a circle of dependency, whereby teaching and administrative positions were assigned to people coming from other parts of Indonesia. The fact that most Timorese lacked administrative, technical and professional expertise and experience that were essential for administrative and government functions was felt when the skilled Indonesians left the country following the 1999 referendum. It was in this vacuum that the international community strategically drove its wedge, when it parachuted onto Dili a squad of internationally-recruited staff and external consultants. Expectations about strong discontinuity were at that point quite high: some of these expectations would be soon betrayed by the generation of a new cycle of dependency, this time on international professional expertise.

Expectations regarding the role of education in the process of Timorese nation building were envisioned before the declaration of independence. The vision that a “[n]ew East Timor would aspire to have an education system that enhances the development of our national identity, based on our selective cultural and universal human
values”, was enshrined in the development draft plan that was presented by resistance leaders in Australia in August 1999 (CNRT 1999).

More specifically, some of the strategic goals included: developing an appropriate education system similar to the Portuguese system; an appropriate curriculum with teaching of Tetum from kindergarten and Portuguese from grade 1 (both languages would be taught in parallel until year 9), together with the teaching of East Timor’s history and geography; introducing Portuguese literacy programmes and developing/intensifying the teaching of Tetum; developing vocational studies within non-formal education; enhancing students’ achievement by establishing networks that encourage local community participation and by including human rights and civic education in the national curriculum: upgrading the level of teacher training; developing an adequate pedagogy/methodology; developing the East Timorese history and culture (CNRT 1999).

6.1.2 New developments

The violence that broke out following the referendum, brought the education system nearly to a total collapse, whereby 95 percent of schools were either severely damaged or destroyed. Moreover, the majority of supplies and equipment were looted and most of the teachers fled to Indonesia (Nicolai 2004: 19). In terms of infrastructure, the school system became a tabula rasa. Timor Aid, an NGO of East Timorese from the Diaspora describes the situation in the education sector as follows:

At the end of 1999, East Timor was a strange land. There was no government, no official language or currency, no system of law, no media, and no shops or schools. Not only was the country physically plundered and raped, but also no former structure existed which could be used as a base for rebuilding (quoted in United Nations 2000: 18)

By the start of the 2000 school year the education system became operational, with many schools rehabilitated and a new workforce of teachers hired. In the ensuing years,
enrollment increased rapidly\textsuperscript{72} and between 2001-2003, primary school teachers increased from 2,992 to 4,080 (World Bank 2004: xviii).


The first emergency phase between the referendum and the official re-opening of schools in October 2000 was characterized by a preminence of localized response; the second transitional phase lasting until independence focused on physical reconstruction, the increase of primary school enrolments, recruitment of teachers and the setting up of the administrative foundations of the system; a third phase starting since independence (May 20, 2002) focused on system reconstruction, including the establishment of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sports (MECYS) and a whole range of administrative, legal and financial issues (Ibid.).

Overall, during the first five-year phase following the referendum four were the priorities that shaped the reform of education: (1) reopening the schools with the goal of establishing some sense of normalcy by bringing children back to school; (2) teacher recruitment made on a voluntary base; (3) reintroduction of Portuguese and Tetum as languages of instruction; (4) reconstruction of educational infrastructure in a context of constrained and limited resources.\textsuperscript{73} Throughout this phase, three constitutional governments were changed, and the system was built in absence of a regulatory framework or national educational act. In a context of emergency, the main objective was just the provision of education. Nicolai (2004) highlights how the focus on system

\textsuperscript{72} In primary education, the gross enrollment ratio GER rose from 89 percent before 1999 to 110 percent in 2011 while the net enrollment ratio NER rose from 51 percent to 70 percent.

\textsuperscript{73} Interview with former minister of education 2007-2012, 1 July 2013, Dili, East Timor
reconstruction in practice amounted to giving priority to physical infrastructure rather than policy reform.

Between 1999 and 2002, intervention initiatives in the education system were funded by the World Bank, and they were implemented in partnership with UNTAET and other donors. During this period, projects aiming to reconstruct education were poorly accountable to local citizens; as with other similar cases, the main focus was on documenting achievements to the headquarters, thus undermining the “[l]egitimacy of UNTAET’s and the World Bank’s efforts [in education]...[and] promoting mistrust and tension” (Millo and Barnett 2004: 730, 734).

Following the achievement of full independence in 2002, in the aftermath of the peaceful elections of the Constituent Assembly, education was expected to play a leading role in the transformation of Timorese society. This is clearly seen by the first National Development Plan (NDP), which envisaged a society that was “[w]ell educated, healthy, highly productive, democratic, self-reliant, espousing the values of nationalism, non-discrimination and equity within a global context” (Nicolai 2004: 177). Its goals were: “[t]o improve the education status of the people; to contribute to the improvement of the economic, social, and cultural well-being of individuals, families, and communities in Timor-Leste; and to promote gender equity and empower women in Timor-Leste” (World Bank 2004: xviii).

Key programs in education as elaborated in the NDP aimed to expand education access and improve internal efficiency of the school system; improve the quality of education; build management capacity and improve service delivery; promote non-formal education and adult literacy; promote East Timor culture and arts; promote physical education and school sports; promote youth welfare; and develop tertiary education, among others (NDP 2002: 152-157).
For the World Bank, education is central to the country’s equitable development as “[i]t provides a foundation for democratic discourse through literacy; it helps increase productivity; and it provides skills and abilities for an increased workforce in the formal sector” (2004: xvii). This was confirmed by a national survey which showed that seven out of ten Timorese listed it as the top national priority for the country’s future (Planning Commission 2002 quoted in Nicolai 2004: 29).

After 2002, the UN started to devolve powers to the elected national authorities. The UN commitment was confirmed but redesigned, and the United Nations Transitional Administration gave way to the United Nations Mission of Support (UNMISET). Donor engagement remained high and focused on capacity development and strengthening state institutions. Capacity development focused on improving fiscal responsibility, transparency and accountability in government institutions through the establishment of a set of norms and rules. Technocratic solutions were prescribed; the existence of embedded social conflict over power and resources within such institutions was ignored (Moxham 2008; Hughes 2009).

Between 2002 and 2005, the assistance approach towards the education system shifted from the early reconstruction efforts to more qualitative reforming, focusing on pedagogy, content and forms of assessment underpinning education, and teacher training/selection. In 2003, with significant donor assistance, the Ministry of Education commenced the process of design and implementation of a new curriculum for the country’s primary schools (approved in October 2004), which would be better aligned to the aspirations of East Timor as a nation and a state, and more relevant and inclusive to its citizens. The implementation phase started in 2006 until 2008, with teacher’s guide in both official languages and student and teacher textbooks in Portuguese that were distributed in schools.
While the process of primary curriculum reform was guided by UNICEF, the curriculum for secondary education, which started years later (2010), was guided by the local government, although design and implementation were once again outsourced to a foreign institution, this time the Portuguese University of Aveiro.

By 2005, East Timor was regarded as a successful example of multilateral interventionism that had led to the establishment of a sustainable state and peaceful society. Full confidence in the sustainability of the peace process led to the departure of the UN mission and the peacekeeping forces (Ballard 2008). Soon after, divisions inside the Timorese army spread into the streets of Dili and led to the ‘2006 crisis’.

During the 2006 crisis, schools were closed and the emergency needs of restoring educational provision postponed the longer term plan for curriculum reform. From being a ‘successful example of state-building’ the country was downgraded to the status of ‘failed state’. An International Stabilisation Force (ISF) that included a large contingent from Australia and New Zealand joined the United Nations Integrated Mission (UNMIT), which was extended up to December 2012 and aimed at supporting the government in restoring stability, security, rule of law, enhancing a culture of democratic governance, and fostering greater social cohesion amongst citizens.

Since 2006, the security situation in the country has considerably improved: the government has gradually taken control of all core state functions, and its action has been fuelled by oil revenues, with economic growth reaching unprecedented growth rates of 12 percent per annum (Taylor 2011). Among other things the return to political stability meant that education reform continued. In 2008, the government claimed that the new primary curriculum was successfully being introduced. In 2010, the Prime Minister revealed a 20-year strategic plan for development focusing on human resource development and infrastructural improvement. According to the plan, “[T]imor-Leste has

74 Since 2008, the country has been listed as a failed state according to the Fund for Peace Failed States Index (http://global.fundforpeace.org/, last accessed on 25 March 2013)
entered a period of rapid double-digit growth, extended stability, and growing confidence, and the slogan became ‘Adeus Conflito, Bienvenido Desenvolvimento (Goodbye Conflict, Welcome Development) (RDTL 2011: 6). By December 2012, following the peaceful set of presidential and parliamentary elections in the summer of 2012, the ISF and UNMIT mission withdrew from the country.

Since then, three ministers of education have been changed within the same constitutional government. The reduction of the National Institute for Training of Teachers and Education Professionals’ (INFORDEPE) funds suggests that teacher training is not a priority despite the existing gaps in the sector.75 Some of the interviews on the ground confirm that the focus of the current ministry of education has been on vocational training and pre-school education.76 Recent primary curriculum reform (discussed in detail in section 6.3) focusing on language and local context suggests an attempt to tackle and address those problematic issues pertaining the relevance of education content-wise.

_Education between the referendum and the transitional phase_

While local communities engaged in activities for re-establishing schooling, the international community arranged its emergency response in line with the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) which gathered information regarding the damage of the education sector and its needs, ultimately identifying short-term reconstruction initiatives. UNICEF acted initially as the ministry of education given the struggle over legitimacy and authority between UNTAET and the CNRT. Special focus from UNTAET, CNRT,

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75 Interview with international consultant, INFORDEPE, Ministry of Education, 9 July 2013, Dili, East Timor
76 Interview with New Zealand Aid advisor within the Ministry of Education on pre-school level, 18 June 2013, Dili, East Timor; interview with head of education section, AusAid, 17 July 2013, Dili, East Timor
the Catholic Church, several INGOs or local organizations and UNICEF itself were given
to educational provision, in particular for children and young students with special needs,
and for children separated from their families (Nicolai 2004: 20, 73). Moreover, several
local associations addressed the needs of adolescents and youths with initiatives that
sought to integrate them educationally and socially (Nicolai 2004: 20).

The JAM, co-ordinated by the World Bank, and composed by a team of major
donors, UN agencies and East Timorese specialists, assessed the situation and the needs
of eight sectors (including education) during a ten-day mission in November 1999.
According to the JAM report, the destruction of education was so widespread (more than
95 per cent of schools and education institutions were destroyed) that it required repair or
reconstruction. Beside reconstruction, teacher recruitment and training was the other
pressing issue as around 80 percent of administrative staff and secondary teacher (at both
junior and secondary level) had departed (World Bank 1999: 6). Other issues identified
were the feasibility of official languages at the school level, and the sustainability of the
education system which it was suggested had to be redesigned in stark contrast with the
former Indonesian system that was characterized by mass education and a large and
ineffective administrative body (JAM 1999).

JAM identified four urgent priorities in the education sector: (1) primary and
secondary education (coupled with rehabilitation and repair of classrooms); (2) teacher
training and (administrative) capacity building; (3) education and training for out of
school youth; (4) tertiary and technical education (JAM 1999). Of this priorities, only the
first recommendation has been addressed quite successfully despite still existing
challenges. Recommendations regarding teacher training and the low youth and adult
literacy levels were overlooked in subsequent reforms.

The return to schools and their opening were in the beginning a job made by the
local communities’ willingness and efforts. Schools and teacher recruitment were
functioning on an ad-hoc basis, yet shortage of teachers especially at secondary level of education increased the student/teacher ratio. Teachers, initially working on a voluntarily base, were organized and paid by UNICEF and later on by UNTAET. According to Doyle (2001), while everything else was missing, local communities were inspired and enthusiastic to bring their children back to school. Local communities organized District Education Committees that were responsible for data collection, school feeding programmes, supply distribution (JAM 1999).

Schools officially opened one year later in October 2000, yet primary schooling during the first year gained significant results and the World Bank stated that “[t]he massive increase in enrolment by the poor, girls and rural children” was the “[m]ost phenomenal accomplishment” (WU 2002: 2). Net enrolment in primary education rose from 65 percent before the referendum to 75 percent by 2000 (TFET 2002). According to Wu, it narrowed “[g]aps in school participation rates between the richest and the poorest, boys and girls, and urban and rural areas” (2002: 2).

As in other post-conflict contexts, the destruction of the former Indonesian system provided with the opportunity to spur change regarding educational policies and curriculum design. In particular, this was translated in the introduction of “[p]ro-poor policies such as the removal of school fees, examination fees, and the withdrawal of required uniforms”, which contributed to the rise of net enrolment in primary education (United Nations 2000: 64).

Two levels of education - i.e., early childhood and secondary education - were neglected during the emergency phase, both in terms of national priorities and donor-funded activities (United Nations 2000: 63). Secondary education was re-established according to the Indonesian model, but enrolment rates declined comparing to the pre-1999 level (Joint Donor Education Sector Mission 2000).
Technical and vocational training had little success with shortage of teachers and equipment (Sanderson 2001). During Indonesia, the TVET had little connection with the needs of the workplace (UNDP 2002). During the transitional phase 10 schools were opened which provided training in agriculture, construction, electronics, manufacturing, tourism, oil and gas and small businesses. The rationale behind the choice of which sectors to prioritize in technical education was based upon reported labour shortages (Nicolai 2004: 86).

In terms of higher education, the National University of East Timor (UNATIL) opened unexpectedly in October 2000 due to pressure by 6,000 students and one of the early problems was over-enrolment. Immediately after, a number of private institutions of higher education were opened, and by 2003 there were 14 of them, a disproportionate number for a country with such a small population (La’o Hamutuk 2003). Moreover, between 1999 and 2002, there were approximately 170 Catholic schools and 26 non-Church private schools operating in East Timor (UNDP 2002: 50). The Catholic Church played a significant role in re-establishing the education system in the early days, from encouraging local communities to re-start government-run schools to re-starting its own.

During this phase, adult literacy received a small amount of funding despite “[E]ast Timor high illiteracy levels” which were then at around 55 percent with differences between urban and rural areas respectively at 18 percent and 63 percent (World Bank 2002a: 21; UNDP 2002: 27). In the 2002 budget, the overall expenditure for non-formal education and language training was 3 percent (World Bank 2002a: 21). Non-formal education has been provided on a small-scale and has been led by local NGOs such as GFFTL, which focused on literacy courses in the Tetum language (Silva 2002). Brasil has targeted a portion of 3,500 adults through a literacy programme called Alfabetizaçao Solidária and a programme called Telessalas which used television to improve the language skills of those already speaking Portuguese (UNDP 2002: 54).
In this context categories requiring a special support (as they face barriers to access) typically included girls, children with disabilities, and children from minority religious groups. Moreover, other categories whose educational opportunities were affected by the 1999 violence were included: children from rural areas, separated children, and adolescents. In primary school, gender parity was achieved early; albeit, this was not the case in upper grades where the gender gap is wider (Planning Commission 2002 quoted in Nicolai 2004: 89). While – perhaps tellingly - ethnicity has not played an important role in access to education, religion has: by 2004 there was only one Islamic school in Dili (Nicolai 2004: 89).

Rural/urban inequality patterns in educational access were reinforced following the 1999 referendum especially at the secondary level of education. Restoring boarding facilities for secondary education in rural areas were a low priority for donor partners. Exception here were the World Food Program (WFP) that arranged programmes of food supplies and the UNHCR providing blankets and cooking utensils (Nicolai 2004: 91).

In 2001, Oxfam (Great Britain) and UNICEF assessed the education needs of rural East Timor: their goal was to “[p]ublicize the educational needs of people living outside the urban areas of East Timor, especially those in rural and remote communities” (Field et al., 2002: 1). Their research revealed that rural communities had no sense of how education could improve their lives. What emerged as relevant educational issues for rural communities were language difficulties faced by teachers and students that had to conform to the introduction of Portuguese with the majority not being able to speak it. Others stressed the need for adult literacy classes in Tetum and others emphasised the long distances for reaching junior secondary school (Field et al., 2002: 34).

Adolescents and youth were categories that did not directly and immediately benefited from the increased enrolment rates in primary education. By 2001, enrolment rates of those over the age of 14 were lower than in 1998 (Wu 2002: 2). Nicolai argues
that “[C]onsequences of neglecting this area have included delinquency, unemployment and human resource development problems” (2004: 93). Young people were important in building networks, organizing protests and in preparations during the voter education campaign prior to the 1999 consultation (Nicolai 2000: 9). The International Rescue Committee (IRC) together with local NGOs and student organizations were involved in non-formal education by organizing lesson plans to be used by youth study groups in discussion-based activities. The groups that took part in this project were (Nicolai 2000: 21):

- Forum Democracy Maubere (Fordem) established by East Timorese students studying in Indonesia, whose aim was the promotion of people’s democracy movements and who organized lessons on indigenous culture.
- IMPETU was formerly established and organized by the Indosian military to support East Timor’s integration, it was taken over by pro-independence students that were working on a civic education programme and were involved in writing lessons on reconciliation.
- East Timor Teacher(s) Association was involved in teacher training and the design of high school curricula, specifically writing lessons on traditional story writing.
- Grupo Feto FoinSae Timor LoroSae (GFFTL) was organized in 1998 with the aim of increasing women involvement in the political dialogue. Following the referendum they focused on a literacy campaign.
- Commisaun Direito Humano Timor LoroSae (CDHTL) was established by young people working on post-conflict human rights. They were involved in civic education and writing lessons on conflict resolution.
Albeit locally-based and involving original activities, most of these groups ceased to exist after the first three years that followed the referendum.

*Education in the transition to independence*

In the second phase (August 2000-May 2002), the East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA) – jointly formed by UNTAET and CNRT – took the lead in education through its Education Division. ETTA was an attempt for overcoming the competing leaderships between UNTAET and CNRT that had operated during the first year as two parallel structures. According to Yiftach Millo, in education this meant “[a] dual system of authority, with CNRT’s legitimacy rooted in support at the local level, and the UNTAET’s legitimacy rooted in international law” (Millo and Barnett 2003: 9). Such confusion over leadership hampered decision-making in the moment in which needs were more urgent (Nicolai 2004: 98). The process of power-sharing that led to the merge of structures and staff came to be known as ‘Timorisation’.

During the transition to independence the focus remained rebuilding educational infrastructure and bringing children back to school, while policy problems and quality issues were postponed (World Bank 2002b: 58). Moreover, scarce efforts were directed towards addressing decentralization. ETTA took over the management of the multi-donor Emergency School Readiness Project (ESRP), which aimed to ensure safety in school buildings, provide furniture and other learning materials, and management support (Nicolai 2004: 21).

Within the framework of ESRP, the focus remained on collecting and providing materials for primary schools, for which textbooks were acquired from Portugal, Indonesia and Finland. Portugal and Brasil were providing materials for pre-secondary and secondary education. The transitional curriculum that was introduced had a strong Indonesian base. Controversial content related to history and national identity was
removed from the Indonesian textbooks. Textbooks were chosen based upon familiarity rather than any link with real education aims for the future (Nicolai 2004: 110). Portuguese was introduced as the language of instruction in years one and two.

Moving from issues of infrastructural rehabilitation and delving more into classrooms and the policy-making process throughout transition, Doyle argues that “[E]ast Timor seems like a case of lots of project and activity underway, but little policy development underpinning them” (2001 quoted in Nicolai 2004: 114). The reluctance to be involved with policy issues stemmed in part from the nature of the international administration. According to Gorjao, “[O]n the one hand, [international transitional administrations] have enormous influence concerning the political decisions to be taken during the transition to democracy... On the other hand, their lack of a democratic mandate constrains significantly their political power” (2002: 230).

Despite the fact that the World Bank (2002b) emphasized the important role that teachers had to play to improve the quality of education, there were only few efforts in terms of training and professional development during the transition. Developing teachers’ skills was deemed a priority from UNDP (2002) given the low levels of qualification and experience of the new teacher workforce. Teachers were facing challenges in terms of missing proficiency in Portuguese, teaching without a finalized curriculum and the need for incorporating a different pedagogy based upon active learning methods and multi-grade teaching (Nicolai 2004: 117). Yet, as UNICEF (2002) had warned, there was a lack of substantial attempts to effectively train teachers. Curriculum development was postponed to a later stage, in spite of its being a precondition for other related educational issues, such as textbook selection, in-service teacher training and students learning outcomes.

Throughout those phases, and since independence language has been a divisive issue, with the East Timorese leadership opting strongly for the re-introduction of
Portuguese as language of instruction as early as grade one. The decision had implications in terms of teacher performance (recruitment and training) and quality of students’ learning achievements, which are felt still today. Governance issues related to authority, decentralization and corruption hampered the broader process of reform: as section 3.2 (below) will show, donors’ support was influenced mainly by geopolitical rationales and/or historical links.

During the two years that led to independence, education reform remained heavily focused on infrastructural reconstruction. The ESRP’s implementation completion report concluded that the “[t]ransitional government authority made it impossible... to reach a consensus on policy formulation issues”, not tackling issues as urgent and relevant as the “[s]tructure of the MECYS, the national education law, teacher training, curriculum reform and production and distribution of teaching-learning materials” (World Bank 2003: 3). Reflecting upon that period, Millo and Barnett argues that “[w]hile attempts at educational reconstruction were partially successful, the opportunity for transformation was missed” (2003: 8).

*Education in the new country*

In the aftermath of independence, the only framework within which education policy was formalized into law was the Constitution of Timor-Leste, which laid out the most basic principles of the new political order. With specific regard to education, the Constitution (Section 59) states that “[a] public system of universal and compulsory basic education [...] that is free of charge in accordance with its possibilities and in conformity with the law” has to be supported. Emphasis is put to ensuring access to each level of education for every citizen. Yet, education for youth and vocational training has to be promoted “[a]s may be practicable” (Section 19).
Areas of priority for intervention and further development were identified the following: a National Education Law providing state policy on education; a Law and regulation on private schools; a Law or Charter for the National University of Timor-Leste; guidelines on the national curriculum, for primary and secondary levels of education (Ministry of Planning and Finance 2002: 6). According to the World Bank, “[a] commitment to ensuring that all children complete at least primary school should be the top priority – and is achievable in the first years of independence” (2002b: 66). The expansion of junior secondary education “[w]ill depend on [the supply of trained teachers] and the availability of additional resources” (Ibid.)

Educational planning in the aftermath of independence and its essential role for East Timor’s development was based upon: first, the National Development Plan (developed a few months before independence), which set a 20-year vision including programmes of action; second, a Countrywide Consultation which found that “70 per cent of the population prioritized education as the most important sector to be developed for the country’s future” (Planning Commission 2002: 143); third, a poverty assessment and eight working groups within the minister of education. According to the National Development Plan, interventions in the education sector should expand access, improve service delivery and quality. In the short-term, consolidating reconstruction was set as the priority, focusing on enhancing educational provision, and building human and institutional capacities. In the longer term, the aim was curricula development, prioritizing teacher training and enhancing management efficiency. Gender issues and adult literacy programmes were also mentioned in the National Development Plan.

6.1.3 Challenges in the education sector: access vs. quality?

77 Interview with former director of Planning and Curriculum, Ministry of Education, 26 June 2013, Dili, East Timor
Throughout the fifteen years that constitute my observation period, the system has faced a number of challenges in terms of access, distribution, internal efficiency, student achievement, and sectorial management capacity (World Bank 2004: xviii).

In terms of access, Timorese children tend to either enter school late or drop out early, with such problems most prominent in rural areas. While access to education has been expanded since independence, dropouts and repetition rates remain high and are “highly correlated to poverty” (World Bank 2004: 33). Enrollment numbers have put the system under pressure, since “[t]he number of students enrolled in East Timor’s schools reached 364,000 in 2014 – a 50 percent jump in 12 years.” (Harson 2015). Yet, the government’s most important targets of reaching the Millennium Development Goals of gender parity in enrollment by 2005 and universal enrollment in and completion of primary education by 2015 have not been met.

As a matter of fact, access to schools in rural areas is still a problem with primary schools/pre-secondary schools having very poor infrastructure. A large access gap between urban and rural areas remains, with gross enrollment rate at pre-secondary and secondary level at 100 percent for urban residents and only 60 percent for rural residents (Ramos and Patrinos 2015), while 10 percent of children have never enrolled.

The schools face different challenges. Studies point out that despite the construction and the rehabilitation of more than 570 school buildings, after more than a decade of UN intervention and independence, there is a significant shortage in the number of schools, with most of them remaining underfunded and/or lacking basic infrastructure and sanitation facilities (World Bank 2014). One of the most problematic aspects is a persistent shortage of trained teachers (many of them have completed only secondary education) in a context in which approximately 58 percent of the adult population remains illiterate (UNICEF 2013). Other challenges concern a high degree of

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78 Interview with director, NGO La’o Hamutuk, 25 June 2013, Dili, East Timor
student/teacher absenteeism, a culture of violence in schools from teachers which have a background from the past teaching practices (Portuguese and Indonesian),79 difficulties with the language of instruction, curriculum’s lack of relevance, a mismatch between skills and the job market with persisting high rates of unemployment (World Bank 2004: xix, 33).

Quality issues are a major problem with student learning outcomes remaining problematic and this has been increasingly acknowledged by international donors too. Recent economic data show that on average it takes children 11.2 years to complete six years of primary schooling (MoE 2010). According to a World Bank study, 70 per cent of Grade One students fail to read a single word in Portuguese and the native Tetum language, decreasing to 40 percent by the end of Grade Two (World Bank 2009). This has led a number of major donors in education reform such as the World Bank, AUSAid, New Zealand Aid shifting their discourses and priorities in educational assistance towards quality of education (learning outcomes) for all levels of formal and non-formal education rather than quantity (number of students enrolled and access to education).80

Despite these challenges, the education sector seems less of a priority for the current government, as data from 2012-2013 show that the rise in education budget has been from 0.1 to 0.4 percent, with considerable resources invested in overseas scholarships.81 Government expenditure on education went from 13 percent in 2004 to 25 percent in 2010 (Ramos and Patrinos 2015). However, in the 2013 state budget only 8.4 percent were invested in education (Marx and Pinhero 2013), 11 percent in 2004, with

79 Interview with former Director of Planning and Curriculum, Ministry of Education, 26 June 2013, Dili, East Timor
80 Interview with New Zealand Aid advisor within the Ministry of Education on pre-school level, 18 June 2013, Dili, East Timor; interview with international World Bank advisor within the Ministry of Education on Recurrent and Non-formal education, 24 June 2013, Dili, East Timor; interview with Social Protection and Education Economist, World Bank, 28 June 2013, Dili, East Timor; interview with international advisor, UNESCO, 9 July 2013, Dili, East Timor; interview with head of education section, AusAid, 17 July 2013, Dili, East Timor
81 Interview with Director, NGO La’o Hamutuk, 25 June 2013, Dili, East Timor
percentages decreasing at less than 7 percent for the 2015 budget for education (Harson 2015).

These figures point to the opposite direction of the *Incheon Declaration*, which calls for increasing “[p]ublic spending on education [...] and urge adherence to the international and regional benchmarks of allocating efficiently at least 4-6% of Gross Domestic Product and/or at least 15-20% of total public expenditure to education.” As an interviewee suggested, rather than on building the state apparatus through education, the main preoccupation in Dili seems to have become forming a small elite of government bureaucrats and people working in the oil industry.

This seems to be in contradiction with a speech that the then Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao addressed to the UN in New York in 2012, in which the role of education to the country’s aspiration of overcoming conflict and bringing development was confirmed by, claiming that “[E]ducation not only changes the loves of people [...] it drives the future of nations” (ETAN 2012). A growing gap exists between what is stated in the main documents regarding educational priorities and what has been effectively invested in education in the past years.

To sum up, as in other post-conflict settings, the focus of externally assisted reforms in the initial period 1999-2002 was on educational reconstruction. In a second phase, after the country became independent, the focus shifted towards pedagogy and curriculum reform, with access remaining the priority together with teacher training. By the end of the observation period, quality issues (e.g., learning outcomes) were dominating the discourse(s) proposed by those international donors that are engaged in education reform.

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83 Interview with Director, NGO La’o Hamutuk, 25 June 2013, Dili, East Timor
More than a decade after independence, poverty, poor school infrastructure, a shortage of quality teachers and language issues remain major challenges in the education system (Harson 2015). For many years, the main emphasis has been on primary education while the last government’s emphasis has shifted towards pre-school education and vocational education. The focus on vocational training may suggest that the nexus between education, employment and the demographic structure of the Timorese society is no longer only evoked, but also that it has started to be tackled, although to date a proper strategy has not emerged. The fact that the education sector itself has never featured as key for peacebuilding and statebuilding might help us understanding why.

6.2 The hybrid governance of education

Hybridity in the governance of education reform refers to the fact that the education sector, once a national prerogative (often an exclusive national domain), is increasingly shaped and reformed in the interplay between international and local actors that operate in, through and beyond the nation-state, as chapter four and the current one show. In the aftermath of the 1999 Timorese referendum, and of the violence that followed shortly afterwards, international organizations did not have a formal mandate for intervention in the education sector. Yet, the UN mission sat on a governing role, having full authority for managing the territory, including ensuring service provision, and therefore education.

6.2.1 Donors engagement and the relationship with the local leadership

In took almost one year for UNTAET to have some sorts of leadership in education reform. In the beginning education was managed by UNTAET District Administrators

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84 The situation in pre-school education has been one in which there have been more private preschools than public ones.
85 Interview with New Zealand Aid advisor within the Ministry of Education on pre-school level, 18 June 2013, Dili, East Timor
and each district office was assigned a District Education Officer that was hiring local staff (World Bank 2000). As mentioned above, UNTAET’s education efforts were directed towards the first priority as recommended by JAM - i.e., bringing children back to school.

In the absence of a national education authority during the emergency period, UNICEF took the lead becoming a de facto Ministry of Education (Nicolai 2004: 75). It provided basic education supplies through the ‘School-In-A-Box’ kit; took the lead in managing repair and re-roof of schools; it also launched a psychosocial programme called Child Friendly Spaces (CFS) implemented at eight different sites. In the aftermath of independence, UNICEF commitment continued in the areas of teacher training and curriculum development (UNICEF 2002).

In the months following the referendum, CNRT had started establishing District Education Committees made up mainly by a voluntary team of central education administrators (World Bank 2000: 6). CNRT education representatives were better informed of local realities than internationals (Doyle 2001). As mentioned above, CNRT and UNTAET worked in parallel (rather than partnership) in the education sector. While more informed and rooted to the local context, CNRT’s education division was characterized by “[i]nexperience and [...] a top-down management culture that left people with little confidence to take decisions” (UNDP 2002: 49). The Catholic Church was one of the first local players to quickly re-open its schools and encourage communities to open public schools. While quality of Catholic schools and its authority were not put into discussion, the relationship with international agencies was not smooth or straightforward, leading to an absence of co-ordination in the emergency response to educational provision (Doyle 2001).

Among the international players in education reform as from the emergency phase, the World Bank has been a key one. It co-ordinated the JAM and administered the
education grant from the Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET). The World Food Programme (WFP) was responsible for a large school feeding programme, providing daily snacks (WFP 2001).

During the transitional period, education reform remained heavily reliant upon donors’ contributions. Such reliance had implications for legitimacy as the extensive role that the international community had in setting the education agenda implied that “[a]ccountability was therefore primarily to foreign stakeholders and the UN in New York.” (Millo and Barnett 2003: 9). During this period, UNTAET and the broader international community prioritized education, which budget-wise was second to infrastructure in funds allocations. Multi-donor funds represented the bulk in education investments. Contributions from Portugal and Brasil came through individual support to education, focusing on strengthening Portuguese as the language of instruction, language training for teachers, textbooks procurement, non-formal education through literacy campaigns and vocational education (Nicolai 2004: 101).

The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) provided capacity building through consultancy on school-reconstruction, technical and vocational training, and co-funding teacher training. The Japanese International Co-operation Agency (JICA) supported infrastructural reconstruction too. USAID and the European Community Humanitarian Organization (ECHO) supported school rehabilitation (Joint Donor Education Sector Mission 2000). A number of international donors supported university students through scholarships to complete their studies in Indonesia or undertake them at universities in supporting countries. Some of these supporting donors included Portugal, Australia, Ireland, Norway, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Caritas Norway through its Bishop Belo Scholarship Program (La’o Hamutuk 2002).

Throughout the transition years the most important, large-scale effort to restore the education sector was the School System Revitalization Programme (SSRP), which
was regarded as a sector-wide approach to education assistance. Administered by the World Bank, representatives from UNTAET’s Division of Education and CNRT, and designed according to findings from the JAM education assessment, CNRT’s pre-consultation work on education, its overall purpose was “[t]o improve the quality and relevance of education available to East Timorese children and youth” (World Bank 2000: 3).

In the first phase, ESRP’s emphasis was on rebuilding school infrastructure with an overall emphasis on primary education. In the second phase, the Fundamental School Quality Project (FSQP) followed on the ESRP. Reconstruction and restoring primary and secondary education enrolment to the pre-1999 levels were confirmed as priorities but there was a shift in emphasis towards recovering quality by re-building quality standards schools and by providing instructional materials (World Bank 2001b).

The ESRP was a success in terms of infrastructural rehabilitation and distribution of instructional materials. It was criticized for being “[t]oo heavily focused on infrastructure, too centralized and too reliant on CNRT information alone” (Nicolaï 2004: 104). Issues outside physical reconstruction, such as the need for a national education law, curriculum reform and MECYS’ work were neglected. Moreover, some of its assumptions regarding “[d]ouble-shifting, community participation and distribution of materials, were not realized” (Ibid.).

After independence, the role of multilateral and bilateral partners shifted from one substituting the state in delivering core services to one aiding state institutions for efficiently and effectively delivering services to its citizens; “[i]n this transition, within the framework of aid effectiveness, the international community is following rather than leading the state towards stability and long-term development” (Shah 2011: 71-72).

Between 2002-2004, Portugal was the leading player in teacher training because it met the need of the national government to introduce Portuguese as one of the two
official languages in the classrooms. In the aftermath of the war, approximately 20 percent of primary teachers and 80 percent of secondary teachers left the teaching profession permanently and relocated in Indonesia (UNESCO 2008: 122). A major need and challenge in the period of emergency and reconstruction was thus to recruit and introduce in the system a new workforce of teachers.

Teacher training was organized on an ad-hoc basis failing to reach most of the teachers, especially in rural areas. Education remained heavily influenced by the logic of emergency whereas “[t]eacher training and administrative capacity-building were treated as being of lower priority” (King’s College London 2003: 253).

A number of studies assessing the progress of East Timor’s educational system agree on the fact that the approach ‘access first, quality later’ adopted by UNTAET and the national government had determined a number of long-term problems, such as high student attrition rates and low student achievement (Millo and Barnett 2004; Nicolai 2004; Beck 2008; World Bank 2004). However, throughout those years (and until 2008) in-service training provision of primary and secondary teachers was considered as one of the priorities by a number of donors and by the same national government (Shah 2011: 75).

Provision of teacher training mirrored well the limitations and the problems of reconstructing education system through a plethora of local and international actors. Training provision was plagued by fragmentation, competition, duplication of efforts, poor coordination, monitoring and accountability, leading to inefficient use of teacher’s time and resources that were invested in these programmes (Romiszowski 2005; World Bank 2009).

As far as cooperation was concerned, the subsequent partnership arrangements between the international actors and the Ministry of Education shifted the locus of power within the education sector from being one driven by donors’ agenda(s) to one articulated
by the Ministry of Education (Shah 2011). One of the dilemmas that the donors involved in the education system have increasingly faced in the last years has been whether to support the state in its drive to efficiently qualify all teachers (often focusing more on quantity and outcomes rather than quality and impact), or – alternatively – to target and tailor interventions in the sector to meet the actual needs of the teachers. Leading donors have often opted for the first scenario, while smaller donors such as the Norwegian Refugee Council have followed the second option, finding themselves excluded in the process of education reform (Shah 2011).

During the period under observation (1999-2014), the leading international actors in the education sector in terms of reconstruction, reform and capacity-/system-building have remained the World Bank, AusAID, UNICEF, and - to a smaller degree - New Zealand Aid. They have remained key players at times interchangeably, taking either the position of donor or service provider. Throughout this period, Portugal and Brazil have been working with the Timorese national authorities on a cooperative basis.

6.2.2 Civil society and education

Of those international NGOs that were mainly active during the emergency phase, and whose focus was non-formal education, one may mention the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Oxfam Great Britain (GB), Save the Children US, Timor Aid, the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT), the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS). Local NGOs such as Grupu Feto Foinsa’e Timor Lorosa’e (GFFTL), and KSI and Sahe Institute that focused on literacy education.

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86 Cooperation and co-ordination between international and local actors have been problematic since the beginning. In the aftermath of the 1999 referendum and ensuing violence, OCHA coordinated all humanitarian efforts. Subsequently, UNICEF took this role (due also to the fact that it led the sectoral Working Group for Education). Until independence, the UNTAET Division of Education was responsible for co-ordinating efforts in education reform and provision.

87 Despite several attempts at approaching past or current UNICEF officials, I received no reply, thus I was not able to interview any representative from the organization.
The NGO Forum, a co-ordinating platform for local and international NGOs engaged in policy formation, together with Oxfam GB, launched in 2000 an education working group that included 21 civil society organizations. In June 2001, it presented a paper which criticised the lack of a coherent national vision or strategy for education from the side of UNTAET. The paper argued that the difficulty for civil society actors to engage in education reform was partly due to the lack of such a strategy (Millo and Barnett 2003: 13).

In the first years, there was resistance on the part of the local leadership with regard to interventions and initiatives on education coming from non-profit, civil society actors that went beyond the focus on rehabilitation of school infrastructure (Doyle 2001). As Nicolai reports from several interviews, at the beginning “[m]ost NGOs did not seem to see education as an emergency issue at first, when they showed interest in the sector they were rebuffed by the centre” (2004: 127).

One of the most active NGOs in education was OXFAM GB, which in 1999 had set up a programme on education and civil society focusing on in-service teacher training, specifically organizing workshops on children-centred teaching and approaches to dealing with conflict-affected children (Nicolai 2004: 127). As it was not feasible working on the formal education sector, OXFAM GB re-focused its activities on non-formal education and literacy programmes working with local women’s organizations. Timor Aid, founded by the East Timorese from the Diaspora, was another NGO that focused its commitment towards literacy education (Timor Aid 2002).

Another international agency active in education was the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), which focused on supporting Catholic Schools in areas around Dili, Luro and Maliana by providing teacher training methodology. One of the rare projects that addressed the psychological needs and recovery of the children through schools and which involved partnership between an international NGO and East Timorese teachers
was conceived and implemented by the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT) in 2001. Teachers were trained for delivering classes that emphasized play, song and co-operative group work with contents drawing on East Timorese culture. It resulted in a guidebook called ‘Trauma recovery through play’ and in its second year the project added a number of peace education modules, with a geographical reach beyond the capital (IRCT 2002).

Another organization that worked with peace education during this period was the Catholic Relief Services (CRS), through a programme called Culture of Peace focusing on peace building in community-based organizations and targeting in particular young people. Within this programme the CRS collaborated with local organizations to work with in and out of school youth groups. Through participatory workshops a school peer mediation programme was developed which focused on conflict resolution and communication skills (Nicolai 2004: 91).

6.2.3 The capacity gap: discourse and reality

In the first years following the 1999 referendum, the terms of UNTAET’s ‘direct governance versus capacity building’ were not always clear: “[U]NTAET staff members often worked diligently in an effort to carry out their technical functions at the expense of transferring skills to their counterparts” (King’s College London 2003: 256).

The interviews that I conducted reveal that the logics and approaches of donor partners in terms of building capacity within the Ministry of Education or at the broader sectoral level have been mainly divergent instead of convergent. While the relationship and the power dynamics have since the beginning been far from smooth, in the past few years they have considerably changed, moving towards a greater decision-making power and a more pro-active role on the part of local actors. In brief, local and international voices agree on the fact that the change of the Timorese government in 2012, the
elaboration of the g7+ agenda for statebuilding (2010-2011), and the withdrawal of the UN mission by December 2012, have led to a change of approach vis-à-vis donor partners from the side of local actors. In the specific case of education, this has meant that the political will emerging is one that sees the minister of education and the vice ministers willing to take technical and political decisions, from the macro to the micro level.

Some interviews confirmed the confusion that exists with regard to different modes of international assistance and intervention, particularly between capacity building and technical assistance. The official discourses as they emerged from interviews with both international and local staff emphasized the fact that ownership was and is local, especially with regard to the political decisions that had to be taken. In particular, some of the international staff working for donor partners were very keen on drawing clear lines between technical vis-à-vis political decisions, the former usually taken by international donors or international consultant working within the ministry of education while the latter usually taken by local actors. ‘Technicising’ the fundamentally political nature of assistance in education carries a risk of depoliticization of decisions, with implications in terms of responsibilities and accountability of the decision maker.

A relevant problematic aspect, on which the literature and field interviews tend to converge, is the fundamental absence of coordination among international actors with regard to education. Lack of coordination is also observed among local and international counterparts, within the Ministry of Education and among different ministries. According to a local advisor within the Ministry of Education, there is little coordination among national/regional/district offices. Lack of coordination, absence of a clear vision

88 Interview with local advisor on Human Resources Development, Ministry of Education, 20 June 2013, Dili, East Timor
89 Interview with local advisor on capacity assessment, Ministry of Education, 19 June 2013, Dili, East Timor; interview World Bank international advisor within the Ministry of Education on Recurrent and Non-formal education, 24 June 2013, Dili, East Timor
and the overweight of (international) advisors mainly concentrated in Dili is reflected in poor policy implementation.  

One of the most contentious issues in the governance of education reform and assistance remains the role and presence of international advisors/consultants. This has been one of the recurrent themes in interviews, especially the consequences in terms of policy-making and implementation. A relevant number of technical advisors are from Portuguese-speaking countries. According to a local advisor within the Ministry of Education (MoE), the main problem is that often international advisors/consultants lack knowledge about the local reality while being little propensed to coordinate with their local counterparts.  

Most of the interviews acknowledged the widespread lack of capacity within the MoE emerged, at the operational, budgeting, accountability level. However, there is also widespread recognition that there are a lot of hard-working people within the MoE, which remain little incentivized. Although international technical advisors have substantially shaped and influenced the decision-making process, one has to note that the elaboration of strategic choices and the extent to which external advisors or organizations do influence decision and policy making increasingly depends on the agency of the (local) leadership in each of the directorates.  

Most of the interviews with international and local actors confirmed that education was built and reformed with the expectation that it would contribute to peacebuilding. However, none of the interviewees were able to tell me how, nor to describe expected causal dynamics, a circumstance that suggests that education has not been informed by an explicit reflection on peacebuilding objectives. What emerges from

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90 Interview with local advisor on capacity assessment, Ministry of Education, 19 June, Dili, East Timor  
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid.  
93 Ibid.
the interviews instead is both an unspecified ‘lack of political will’ problem, and the absence of a strategy that could link education, the building of the new state and the consolidation of peace.

6.3 Reforming curricula

Motivations to reform curriculum in post-conflict, or post-colonial states are often driven by the need to (re)construct a cohesive and publicly legitimated national identity that is starkly different to that which existed prior (Shah 2012: 31).

In post-conflict situations, education reform is tied to the state’s need to restore public trust and regain political legitimacy (Moxham 2008). According to Miller-Grandvaux (2009), for education to mitigate rather than exacerbate existing divisions in post-conflict societies, it has to be reformed by taking into account principles such as shared ownership, transparency of decision making and community participation.

Curriculum reform in East Timor has been part of a broader process of fostering social cohesion in the society. The key challenge in post-conflict countries is to identify the appropriate time and place for these reforms to occur (Shah 2012). However, in post-conflict fragile states, there are a number of competing imperatives for rapid curriculum reform such as the need to show rapid action from the government to meet access and quality benchmarks of global educational agendas or the expectations to reform and adapt the curriculum for preparing a labour force for the economic needs (Davies and Talbot 2008; Al-Daami and Wallace 2007).

As the curriculum had to deal with “[d]efinitions of Timorese identity, nation building, cultural values and religious morality,” its reform was recommended to be started at a later state once independence was achieved (Millo and Barnett 2003: 10). However, even after independence, the lack from the government of financial and human resources for supporting curriculum reform beyond the stated intention to do so, led to a situation in which the international community, often through ungovernable flows of
assistance, has made significant contributions to support this area of education reform (Shah 2012). According to Hughes (2009), large inflows of donor assistance have exhausted government’s capacity to effectively deliver services, thus perpetuating a condition of fragility and dependency.

The multiplicity of donor projects within the education sector has made it difficult for the Ministry of Education to coordinate and take ownership of reform initiatives. It has been specifically the case of the primary (basic) curriculum, funded by UNICEF and implemented by a university in Portugal. Concerns have also been raised regarding the involvement of Portugal and Brasil in providing human and financial resources to support government plans to introduce Portuguese as one of the two official languages in the classrooms. According to Millo and Barnett (2004), the introduction of the two official languages in the classrooms have been implemented in an unequal way in the curriculum, and such an inequality has been in large part determined by the involvement of external actors in the process.

Insights stemming from research conducted in similar contexts confirm the gap that exists between well-intentioned policies to the goal of nationbuilding and detrimental outcomes to the achievement of such goal because of the involvement of donor assistance. (Tawil and Harley 2004; Vongalis-Macrow 2006; Murray 2008). Moreover, decisions regarding education have been made within the government without sufficient public consultation, dialogue or information-sharing (Molnar 2010), leading to a picture of political leadership that is widely recognized as lacking transparency with its constituents. In particular, primary curriculum reform in East Timor has missed ownership and legitimacy by civil society, widening the gap between the state and its citizens, undermining the precursor to building social cohesion that is public trust (Colenso 2005 quoted in Shah 2012: 34).
According to the World Bank, “[i]mproving the quality of education requires the development of a relevant curriculum that addresses the needs of the country, that manages the transition of the language of instruction from the child’s mother tongue to the official languages of Portuguese and Tetum, the provision of teaching and learning materials, and the undertaking of periodic student assessments and continual in-service teacher training” (2004: xxiii).

6.3.1 Primary curriculum reform

In 2005 the adoption of the National Development Plan redefined the purpose of education in the new state, by explicitly proposing a key role for the development of individual capacities and for the overall improvement of the Timorese society. According to the plan, education would contribute to the construction of a society that was “[w]ell educated, healthy, highly productive, democratic, self-reliant, espousing the values of nationalism, non-discrimination and equity within a global context.” (Nicolai 2004: 177). In the same year, the ratification of the new Constitution defined education as a right for all citizens, and the state was expected to create a public education that was free, mandatory and universal (Art. 59).

In 2003, the delegates participating at the first National Education Congress recognised that “[t]here is a conception of education, teacher and school that is different from the one we now seek...this means we need to change” (MECYS 2007, p. 4). What emerged from the Congress and from subsequent reports was a critique of the transitional curriculum (1991-2001), which was by all means a continuation of the Indonesian curriculum with some minor adaptations (Nicolai 2004). By that time it was recorded that a high number of students were withdrawing from school because families either perceived what was taught was not reflecting Timorese’s struggle for independence or the language in which it was taught was not reflecting society’s needs and composition (World Bank 2004, Nicolai 2004). Drafted in 2003 by the Ministry
of Education, Culture, Youth and Sport with donor assistance, the first National Education Plan reflected the above-mentioned concerns, the need to alter the curriculum and effectively promote change.

The national primary school curriculum plan that included a new curriculum was developed throughout 2003 and approved in 2004: it aimed at creating a new system of teaching and learning that would both reflect and contribute to build a new post-colonial and post-conflict Timorese national identity (Chadwick 2004, MECYS 2004).

Shah contends that what emerged from discussions regarding the pedagogy, content, and implementation was a need for the reform and the curriculum to be democratic, i.e., meeting the needs of most students; flexible and locally-based, i.e., adapting to local needs and context; inclusive - i.e., explicitly committed to recognizing gender, cultural, language and geographical limitations that were embedded in processes of teaching and learning (2009: 4-5). The overall goal was to make a curriculum that was perceived by teachers, students and the broader society as socially and culturally relevant to the context of East Timor (MECYS 2004). The ability to equitably and effectively provide mass education was considered to be key to enhancing state legitimacy.

Content-wise, the curriculum emphasized the need to promote academic fluency in both official languages. The development of Tetum was expected to be implemented particularly in the lower grades with a gradual transition to Portuguese. Both languages were expected to be equally utilised in Mathematics and Environmental Studies (Quinn 2008). Religion, which had been a mandatory subject under the transitional curriculum, became optional. This change reflected the secularist approach adopted by the state and enshrined in the new Constitution (Berlie 2007). Called Estudu do Meio, Environmental Studies was a new subject that incorporated social sciences, science, geography, history, civic education with the goal of developing an understandings of East Timor as a nation and as a country at the primary level (Heyward 2005).
Reports regarding the implementation of the primary curriculum and interviews from the fields both confirm that the reform and implementation of the basic curriculum education reform has been hampered by limited institutional capacities, low teachers’ skills, and dependency on external donors’ assistance and support. This is recognized by governmental officials and development partners in interviews, a fact that confirms that the slow path of reforms has been determined by the lack of local ownership, especially in the early years. Following the approval of primary curriculum, and other educational reforms, teachers have been relying extensively on textbooks in Portuguese due to shortage of resources or lack of textbooks in Tetum (Heyward 2005).

The development and introduction of the primary curriculum represented an improvement and the accomplishment of a fundamental need in the education sector: however, it was written outside East Timor by non-Timorese, and was characterized by limited reference and relevance to East Timor’s context. The 1st to 6th grade curriculum has been regarded as having serious gaps in terms of contents, which are not anchored to local culture and realities. Needless to say, textbooks produced in Portugal have failed to address convincingly the links to life, languages, and geography of East Timor.

Since a new government took office in 2012, a revision of the primary curriculum tried to tackle some of these gaps, limitations and problems - i.e., high drop out and repetition rates, low rural enrolment rates, widespread lack of knowledge of Portuguese among students and teachers. The revision has involved a group of national and international experts – with a predominance of Timorese including teachers, trainers and educational consultants – and has involved research, consultation and field visits. Underpinning the new curriculum has been the need to assure equal access to quality education for all children without discrimination, thus making it child-centered, based on

94 [https://timorrising.wordpress.com/2013/10/13/curriculum-project/](https://timorrising.wordpress.com/2013/10/13/curriculum-project/), last accessed 12 September 2015
active learning and principles of inclusion and positive discipline. The goal has been to make the new revised curriculum an indigenous one that will seek to approach all concepts from a local perspective.

According to the new government, recent curriculum reform has been underpinned by ‘the theme of applied learning’, which is explained by the Prime Minister as the prioritization of two key principles: “[t]he curriculum must be connected to local culture and the Timorese way of life, and it must ensure the development of the whole person.” Among other objectives, curriculum objectives lay emphasis on “[T]imorese culture and history to create a sense of nationalism and tolerance of others.” In this regard, East Timor’s pre-colonial history – non-existent in the first basic curriculum – is a new entry. The very broad subject ‘Estudo do Meio’ has been split into two distinct subjects, Social and Natural Sciences.

Beside the subject of history, the revision of the primary curriculum has tried to tackle East Timor’s complex linguistic reality through a sequential learning approach. The new curriculum devotes more hours to Tetum literacy than to Portuguese in the first cycle. The prioritization of the Tetum language spoken by approximately 90 percent of the population should develop a strong base of literacy when students are deemed fluent in oral and written Tetum, they will start reading and writing in Portuguese. Changes in the primary curriculum reflect what was envisioned by the Ministry’s Curriculum department many years ago, when such a curriculum was first written. In other terms, the

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96 Asia Pacific Analysis, ETAN, 10 March 2015
97 (https://timorrising.wordpress.com/2013/10/13/curriculum-project/, last accessed 15 September 2015)
99 Ibid.
100 (https://timorrising.wordpress.com/2013/10/13/curriculum-project/, last accessed 15 September 2015)
101 Asia Pacific Analysis, ETAN, 10 March 2015
primary curriculum should be contextualized, child-centered, integrated, relevant and effective.

6.3.2 Secondary curriculum reform

After the restructuring of the primary curriculum, the country embarked upon the reform and implementation of the new general secondary education curriculum. As with primary curriculum years earlier (2004), the secondary curriculum (2010-2013) was conceived and developed outside Timor-Leste, through the support of Portuguese institutions.

The University of Aveiro in Portugal was assigned the responsibility to design and develop all didactic resources (i.e., programs, textbooks and teachers’ guide) for the secondary curriculum (Capelo et al., 2015: 239). Simultaneously, a group of Portuguese teachers recruited by the same university has been providing in-service teacher training for Timorese teachers (Capelo et al. 2015: 239). The overall objective of the project was twofold, assisting the development of a system of quality secondary education through curriculum reform and strengthening Portuguese as the language of instruction (Lucas et al. 2015: 734).

Meetings were held between different stakeholders with the aim of making the process participative and understanding the expectations vis-à-vis the new curriculum (Martins, Moreira and Ferreira 2009; Martins et al. 2010, all quoted in Lucas et al., 2015: 734). Recommendations that came out from the round of meetings included “[t]he need to simplify language used, […] the need to include evaluation methodologies and resources, […] the need to integrate more Timorese references in the resources” (Ferreira et al., 2011 quoted in Lucas et al., 2015). The project was concluded in 2013, with implementation starting in 2012 for the 10th grade, in 2013 for the 11th grade and in 2014 for the 12th grade (Lucas et al., 2015: 734).
The secondary curriculum focuses on students’ competencies by developing skills that would enable their participation in the Timorese and the global society; by promoting critical skills and respect for diversity; and by “[c]ontributing to the construction of a world perspective that takes into account its social, cultural and linguistic diversity” (Lucas et al., 2015: 735). The curriculum offers two educational paths, one in Sciences and Technology and the other one in Social Sciences and Humanities, with both sharing a common set of subjects aimed at building transversal skills within an integrated perspective, which includes among others Citizenship and Social Development; Religion and Moral Education but it excludes History which is a specific subject of the Social Sciences and Humanities path.

Albeit in its early phase, an evaluation project from the same University of Aveiro pointed out to a number of implementation challenges of the secondary curriculum. These refer to the linguistic flaws in the use of Portuguese language, limitations in the pedagogical training of teachers, and the limited organizational, pedagogical and administrative management capacities in most of secondary schools (Lucas et al. 2015: 736-737).

Quite tellingly, the evaluation report issued by the same University that designed the curriculum, presents the choice of Portuguese as the language of instruction as the “[a]ppropriate option for Timorese society” (Lucas et al., 2015: 737), firstly because Portuguese is one of the official languages as enshrined by the constitution, and secondly, because Tetum “[s]till lacks a solid structure and does not comprehend enough technical and scientific vocabulary to support a new curriculum”. Training in Portuguese seems to remain a priority, which is being provided by Portuguese personnel that is in charge also of the training on the new secondary curriculum.

102 Director of the National Directorate of School Curriculum and Assessment quoted in Lucas et al., 2015: 737
The reform process of the secondary curriculum has been characterized by the same challenges that were encountered in the design of the primary curriculum less than a decade earlier. Although more attention seems to have been paid to issues of context and relevance to the Timorese society, the whole process was led by an external institution, based far away from East Timor. It is not clear to what extent the University of Aveiro was aware of and neutral vis-à-vis the promotion/adoption of one of the most conflictual aspects of education reform, i.e., the use and prioritization of Portuguese as the language of instruction.

While meetings have been held with officials from the Ministry of Education, policy-makers, religious leaders and other national and international institutions the whole process remains pretty much top-down, and it is not clear to what extent the broader civil society and local communities have been involved. Notwithstanding this, once the curriculum was designed, several other meetings were held including district-level officers and Timorese teachers (Lucas et al., 2015: 734).

6.3.3 The language issue

The complexity of the language issue dates back to at least the Indonesian occupation of the island (1975). The occupation had a significant impact on the language situation in the island. On the one hand, it underpinned Tetum as the language of national unity, and it created the condition to make Portuguese - once the language of the colonizers - the language of resistance. On the other, the expansion of education led to an expansion in proficiency of Bahasa Indonesia among the Timorese society. Furthermore, the introduction of English in 1999 due to the presence of the international community rendered the language landscape in the island more complex.

It became clear since 1999 that the choice of language would become a dangerous divisive issue (Simonsen 2006). In December 1999, the Constituent Assembly voted by
almost at unanimity to pass Tetum and Portuguese as the two official languages in the island; while in the later 2002 Constitution Bahasa Indonesia and English are described as ‘working languages’. Tetum became the Lingua Franca during Indonesian occupation used by the Catholic church to conduct its services since 1980, and in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the population, Indonesia introduced Tetum as the second official language in 1990 (Oenarto 2000 quoted in Simonsen 2006).

Portuguese was the language of instruction for the small elite that had received education during Portuguese rule, and it was the language of the elite in exile, who used to study in Portugal or Mozambique. Furthermore, it was used as the language of the clandestine networks among the resistance leaders. Political elites chose Portuguese with the intention to strengthen a distinct post-independence Timorese identity and because Portuguese would provide more opportunities in the global economy/market. However, it meant little to the majority of the East Timorese, who had received their instruction in Bahasa Indonesian, and the language was understood by 90 percent of the population under the age of 30, and 50 percent of those over 30 (Oenarto quoted in Simonsen 2006: 585). When Indonesia pulled out in 1999, 80 percent of primary school teachers were East Timorese and 20 percent were Indonesian; while in secondary school and above the relationship was the opposite. Indonesian teachers left the country in 1999, and among the Timorese 90 percent were teaching in Bahasa Indonesia.103

The UN mission used the FRETILIN’s unifying definition of Timorese identity based upon anti-colonial feeling and the euphoria of independence (Richmond and Franks 2008: 195). Beyond the surface of euphoria, however, social cohesion was rather weak. The choice of Tetum and Portuguese as the two official languages of the new nation was made by FRETILIN, that represented the new political elite in power, but was also representative of the Portuguese-speaking, educated and urban elites. The rest of the East

103 Interview with Armindo Maia quoted in Simonsen 2006: 588
Timorese, mostly living in poorer and rural districts, speak one of the 16 indigenous languages, of which Tetum – the lingua franca during resistance for the majority of the population – is the most widely used.

Although the decision was taken by the local government, Millo and Barnett (2004) suggest that the choice to introduce Portuguese in classrooms as one of the official languages, was in part influenced by Portugal’s commitment to support the whole process by funding language courses for teachers and providing a set of curriculum resources in Portuguese. Both Portugal and Brasil have been important donors in the education sector, and most of their assistance has consisted in introducing Portuguese into classrooms, either in the form of language courses, Portuguese teachers or textbooks. The introduction of Tetum in schools and textbooks, on the contrary, have been carried out by smaller NGOs, New Zealand Aid and Ireland. In particular, the Mary MacKillop Institute of East Timorese Studies in collaboration with Catholic education authorities have been developing teaching-learning materials in Tetum for primary and secondary school children in 60 Catholic schools (Mary MacKillop Institute 2003).

The situation that emerged in the following years, shaping much of the debate and tensions around the language issue, was one that saw Portuguese as the official language in documents, Tetum as the language of choice for conversation purposes, and Bahasa Indonesian (and increasingly English) as the working language spoken by the majority of educated East Timorese for doing business.

Such a complex mosaic of written and spoken languages has had repercussions in the classrooms throughout the past fifteen years in terms of teaching performance and learning outcomes. The choice of language(s) in the classrooms can be a critical aspect of reinforcing or undermining state legitimacy as well as contributing to grievances against the government (Tawil and Harley 2004; Miller-Grandvaux 2009). Despite the fact that Bahasa Indonesian was the official language in classrooms and the majority of the
population still spoke Bahasa in the wake of independence, its exclusion from the curricula was made with the intention of relinquishing the recent colonial past. The preservation of Portuguese was decided on the basis of the fact that it represented the language of resistance following the 1975 Indonesian occupation (vonKaltenborn-Stachau 2008).

However, for the majority of Timorese, the Portuguese language is not strongly associated to national identity, while a segment of Timorese society sees it as a form of cultural imposition or neo-colonialism (Leach 2007; Taylor-Leech 2008). On the other hand, the Tetum language is widely regarded as key to everyday existence and a source of identity formation. Teachers in schools are highly motivated to use and teach in Tetum because they see it as the language of identity and civic participation, while Portuguese is used out of compliance to government policy (Quinn 2008).

The choice of Tetum and Portuguese as the two national languages in the new state was strongly defended by the Foreign Minister and Nobel Prize laureate José Ramos Horta, who explained “[i]t was a strategic decision to strengthen the uniqueness of East Timor, the national identity of East Timor.” However, the choice of Portuguese sparked intense debates within the international community too, with most donors criticising the decision to emphasize the teaching of Portuguese over Tetum in the curriculum and in classrooms.

In 2009, the statement made by NGOs at the Development Partners’ meeting suggested that the government should prioritize Tetum, a first language in East Timor and essential for the development of children and people’s cultural identity. Tetum, according to the statement, could serve as a vector and facilitate the “[i]ntegration of Timorese culture and languages into the curriculum, to ensure a relevant and culturally-appropriate learning environment for Timorese children” (Development Partners 2009 quoted in Shah 2012).

104 Comment made by José Ramos Horta, BBC News Talking Point Forum, June 12, 2002
In theory, East Timor’s primary curriculum stresses the equal importance of both languages (Taylor-Leech 2008), with teaching initially building on Tetum literacy to a gradual transition to Portuguese (Chadwick 2004). However, as Quinn shows (2004) the Ministry’s documents and decisions illustrate that in practice in 2004-2007 schools were told to prioritize Portuguese over Tetum. Progressively Tetum was reduced to the level of auxiliary language in the teaching process. According to Taylor-Leech (2008), the government position on Tetum reduced it to a symbolic official language rather than to a substantive and a real one.

Against this background, the implementation of the language policy has been problematic from day one. According to the World Bank (2004), when the primary curriculum framework was introduced in 2004 only 6 percent of the teachers reported fluency in Portuguese.\textsuperscript{105} The Ministry of Education enacted large-scale compulsory Portuguese language training courses, while it did not do the same for Tetum on the basis that the language was widely spoken among teachers.

Due to its little official use, teachers are proficient in spoken Tetum, while they lack any proficiency in written Tetum (Quinn 2007, 2008). Furthermore, a few hours of weekly Portuguese has proved not enough for teachers to master the new language, let alone to impart knowledge and skills through it. Student studying under non-proficient teachers in Portuguese most likely will not master the language sufficiently well with repercussions on students achievements. Moreover, Portuguese remains the third or fourth language for most of the students (World Bank 2004: xxi). Shortage of language-learning materials has made it difficult to develop literacy in any language (Ibid.). Lastly, Tetum is mostly used in schools attended by children of the poorest families while Portuguese and Bahasa Indonesian are mostly used in schools attended by children of the richest families.

\textsuperscript{105} Precisely those teachers that finished secondary education before 1975
Thus, the introduction of Portuguese has been more problematic in poorer areas, further reinforcing economic divisions and social fragmentation. In the longer-term, the prioritization of Portuguese in schooling, in a situation in which the vast majority of the East Timorese do not feel a strong association to it, will further alienate the formal schooling system from the people it is supposed to serve (Shah 2012).

The draft of an internal evaluation report by the World Bank challenged the choice of the Bank to distribute teaching materials in Portuguese at the request of the Timorese government: the report suggested that a more useful approach could have been developing indigenous or English-language texts, as these languages are far more widely spoken than Portuguese, which at the time was spoken by 5 per cent of the population (Knowlton 2011). The result of this choice the report stated is that by 2009, more than 70 percent of students tested at the end of the first grade “[c]ould not read a single word” of a simple text in Portuguese, suggesting that after 10 years of efforts, “[a] full cohort of the population may by functionally illiterate” (quoted in Knowlton 2011). The language issue and the prioritization of textbooks in Portuguese raise the issue as to when and who can resist government policies if these seemed ill-advised (Knowlton 2011).

According to Simonsen, while a golden rule to resolve the conflictual language situation of East Timor does not exist at present, “[w]hat might have served national unity and nation building better than the current policy of rigid emphasis on Portuguese (and half-hearted investment in Tetum) is a more pragmatic approach, acknowledging that Indonesian and English too will remain, and that all four languages have roles to play in the country” (2006: 588).

A multilingual approach to education has been discussed and promoted in the past few years, especially since the change of government following the 2012 elections. As a matter of fact, the ministry of education in 2013 adopted a pro-mother tongue approach,
with bilingual texts starting to be printed out and distributed across the country.\textsuperscript{106} Prior to that, in February 2011, the National Education Commission’s Language in Education Working Group launched the ‘Mother Tongue-Based Multilingual Education – MTB-MLE-Policy for Timor-Leste’ with the aim of increasing literacy rates for children who speak other languages than the official ones and with the goal of improving learning outcomes at the pre-school and early grade of primary schooling levels.

The program emerged out of the recognition that “[a] comprehensive ‘language in education’ policy, clearly rooted in Timor-Leste’s educational and linguistic reality and in international best practices” was much needed” (UNESCO 2012: 1). Using mother tongue in pre-primary schooling and early grades of primary education can build students’ “[c]onfidence and independence, knowledge and understanding, skills and strategies, use of prior and emerging experience, and critical reflection” (Klaus et al. 2001 quoted in World Bank 2004: 91).

During an important conference on bilingual education organized in Dili at the Ministry of Education in December 2011, local officials and senior education officials from CARE, UNICEF, UNESCO, Plan International, ChildCare, the Alola Foundation and the World Bank debated who was going to lead the process of multilingual education, specifically the implementation of the MTB-MLE pilot program. The issue was unanimously recognized to be sensitive and complex. The main recommendation that came out from the conference was that East Timor had to develop a multilingual education.\textsuperscript{107}

Assistance for MTBE-MLE project has been provided by UNESCO, whereby 12 schools are participating in the three districts of Lautem, Manatuto and Oecusse, with activities ranging from teacher training, community education, writing workshop and

\textsuperscript{107} Interview with New Zealand Aid advisor within the Ministry of Education on pre-school level, 18 June 2013, Dili, East Timor
classroom implementation (UNESCO 2012: 1). The whole process was ill-received by the Portuguese development cooperation agency, which defined the multilingual approach as anti-constitutional. The program fuelled a tense and politicised debate about the virtues of the MTBE in establishing literacy and numeracy among young children. It soon became the hottest issue in the country, with the public opinion divided.\textsuperscript{108}

A brief UNESCO progress report dating 2012, revealed the discrepancy that existed between political elites on the national level and communities on the ground, with the latter recognizing the benefits of acquiring literacy skills in mother tongue (UNESCO 2012: 3). Although how the Ministry of Education may manage the process is far from clear, the goal has been to start the pre-school level and early grades of primary schooling in mother tongue education, and gradually move to Portuguese and Tetum at later grades in primary education and subsequent grades.\textsuperscript{109} In an attempt to address the disparity between Tetum and Portuguese, the Asia Foundation, in collaboration with the Alola Foundation and with support from USAID’s All Children Reading Program, has been developing Tetum language books for first through third grade students and for teacher training.\textsuperscript{110}

A sense of identity, essential for nation building, and transmitted through language(s) has remained a problematic concept and process in East Timor, with consequences for the implementation of more complex concepts such as human rights and the rule of law (Richmond and Franks 2008: 196).

6.3.4 The religion question

Over time, the Catholic Church played an important role during Indonesian occupation because it recognized human rights violations committed by Indonesians; it recognized

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
common sufferings by the Timorese regardless of their ethnic or cultural backgrounds, and it encouraged Tetum as the lingua franca during occupation (Kingsbury and Leach 2007).

According to the World Bank, private schools, especially Catholic schools have been important for the Timorese education since the Portugal rule: “[b]y injecting diversity and competition into the system, private schools have the potential to provide alternative approaches to quality improvement. [...] Since the transition period, the public sector has treated Church and government schools equally with regard to teachers’ salaries and instructional materials” (World Bank 2004: 72).

Nowadays, East Timorese identity remains closely tied to Catholicism. For the important part that the Catholic Church played in national identity formation, it was recommended that in the curriculum development process the government and the Catholic Church “[c]ollaborate to develop curriculum and teaching methodologies which are values-based [...] and that will promote a culture of peace, non-violence and human rights” (CAVR 2005: 166).

Interviews pointed out the existence of concerns regarding those national narratives that have been transmitted through the primary curriculum and the extent to which they are representative of ‘true’ Timorese identity or are shaped by liberal and modern values of other societies (see also Leach 2007a). One example of this is the decision to exclude the teaching of religion from the basic curriculum, making it optional, since for the government religion held no place in the construction of a modern and secular state (Molnar 2010). While the government may have taken such decision to symbolize the creation of a new state based upon liberal, democratic, progressive and modern values in line with donors’ expectations (Berlie 2007), it did not consider the fact that contemporary Timorese identity has been and still is strongly tied to Catholicism.
Indeed, the decision was contested by both the church and civil society organizations, which saw in a curriculum excluding Catholicism as ‘un-Timorese’. Two prominent bishops wrote in 2005 that the decision made by the government regarding the new curriculum implied the divorce of Catholicism from Timorese identity (Ricardo and Nascimento 2005 quoted in Shah 2012). To their call for reintroducing religious education in the curriculum, the government initially did not react. Faced with refusal from the government, the church organised a number of demonstrations in Dili between April and May 2005. The then prime minister, Mali Alkatiri, a former guerrilla leader, ordered the police to block the protesters, in a display of unwillingness to make concessions (Berlie 2007: 410). Following demonstrations in which the church mobilized hundreds of protestors, leading to months of unrest, a compromise was reached, reinstating religion into the curriculum at the discretion of each school.

This was the first large-scale challenge to the legitimacy of state decisions by the Catholic establishment (Berlie 2007; Leach 2007b), and it reflected social fragmentation and disconnect between the political elite ruling the state and its constituents. These manifestations of dissent can be said to have served as a precursor to the more violent clashes in 2006 that led to the forced resignation of the then Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri (Kingsbury and Leach 2007; Brown 2009; Scambary 2009). In the words of vonKaltenborn-Stachau, it reflected “[a] disillusioned and disempowered population who consider state institutions as politicized, distant and not serving the public interest [...] giving space and voice to destructive non-state actors [...] who manipulated political grievances [in 2006]” (2008: 52).

6.3.5 The history conundrum

Through the development of the primary curriculum, the state recognized that a central objective of history education should be to
[C]ontribute towards the defense of national identity and independence and to the strengthening of identification with the historic matrix of Timor-Leste, raising awareness as to the cultural legacy of the Timorese people, by way of a growing interdependence and solidarity among peoples, and the duty to consider and valorise different knowledge and cultures (Republica Democrata de Timor Leste 2008, Art. 5b).

Despite the recognition of the importance of history education, the primary curriculum diminished the significance of the study of history by incorporating it into the abovementioned broader subject called Estudu do Meio (MEC 2005). In the same year, the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation recommended that a cornerstone of peace and reconciliation in the country would be the development of a history curriculum that discusses the complexity of the Indonesian occupation between 1975 and 1999 (CAVR 2005).

However, the government and the donors have not directed any effort to the development of a complex and endogenous history curriculum, perhaps with the idea that it is still too early for such a process (Shah 2012). Simplified historical narratives, typical in post-conflict states, can in the long-term divide a nation (Vongalis-Macrow 2006; Weinstein et al. 2007; Murray 2008). In absence of subject specific materials regarding East Timor history, teachers have been found to use historical texts and readers donated by Portugal, while others have been found using old Indonesian textbooks (Leach 2007a). Such a situation can in the long-term delegitimise the post-colonial and transformative purposes of education in a fragile state (Shah 2012). Following the conflict in 2006, in the same year the Secretary-General to the United Nations stated that “[t]he resurfacing of divisions that pre-dated 1999 has highlighted the need to address the past as part of the nation-building process.” (quoted in Leach 2007a: 200 quoted in Shah 2012)

While in the short-term it may be necessary to appeal to simplified narratives of the past, in the long run the addressing of past divisions requires the development of a more complex and nuanced historical narrative. Weinstein et al. (2007) maintain that it
should be an endogenous process that is developed through consensus and consultation and that ultimately foster critical thinking and debate.

The Ministry of Education (in partnership with the local NGO Timor Aid) is developing a curriculum for civics that is participatory and bottom-up in the determination of topics and content (Leach 2007a). The content of civics curriculum should include some of the most contentious issues such as human rights, national identity and the place of religion in Timorese society (Timor Aid 2009).

History education remains a politically sensitive issue. The fact that to date there is no history department at the national university suggests the approach of the post-war Timorese elite with regard to issues of reconciliation and how it has been (not) dealing with the past. This is illustrated by the approach of the then Timorese government concerning the Chega! report’s recommendations for specific large-scale reconciliation activities.

These recommendations were neither taken into consideration nor ever implemented. Since the end of the 1990s, the various Timorese governments have chosen the path of a conciliatory approach towards Indonesia, offering inclusive images of unity in the name of independence to the different Timorese linguistic and ethnic groups. This has led to a form of reconciliation that has not been informed by justice: transitional justice has been non-existent, and past crimes have not been prosecuted.

Fernanda Ludovica, secretary of the post-CAVR, has been quite firm on claiming that there is no peace without justice. 111 Within the framework of the peace programme ‘Road to Peace’, an MoE project that is implemented by CAVR itself - and that is supported by the EU, HIVOS and the Norwegian embassy, Insist press, and the

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111 Interview with technical secretary post-CAVR, 1 July 2013, Dili, East Timor
International Centre for Transitional Justice – has been tackling the issue of history
education at the primary level by publishing five books of history curriculum.112

Conclusion

Recent research work by scholars and international organizations suggests that in
conflict-affected and fragile countries, education is a key sectors for statebuilding, since it
restores public confidence and enhances state legitimacy (DFID 2011, Davies 2009). Both the literature review and the interviews conducted in East Timor confirm the existence of high expectations concerning the transformative and nation building role of education, but that – in spite of this - education was never formally and explicitly included within a peacebuilding/statebuilding strategy. Officials interviewed for the present research were not able to envision paths through which education may play a peacebuilding role.

Given the functions and the expectations that education is expected to perform in a 21st knowledge economy/society in terms of identity construction and skill-building, there is no way one can elude the fact that it is a difficult and complex sector to (re-)construct. A crucial need related to enacting educational reform and change is the building of capacities: this emerges without any doubts as a central theme in interviews, while it keeps being identified as a vulnerability in the sector.

Resources and capacity have been scarce in education reform, and more than a decade after independence, the education system if still fraught with a number of limitations and problems. While the ‘capacity missing and building’ rhetoric has allowed to detect vulnerabilities, it has also contributed to the shaping of a discourse through which donors have been legitimizing their own interventions and priorities in education reform. Growing emphasis on human and social capital has surrounded the discourse on

112 Ibid.
education, which is typically expected to build both, within a framework in which citizens have been seen and defined as economic actors.\textsuperscript{113}

Although most of the interviewees did link education to both peacebuilding and statebuilding, little clarity remains as to whether and under what conditions education could contribute to building both peace and the state. In this regard, education policy could perhaps be labelled an \textit{anti-policy}: significant discrepancy characterizes actual outcomes and existing expectations, while the absence of strategic thinking obscures possible linkages, preventing the emergence of a public debate on socially just and sustainable peace and/or stable state institutions.

One example upon which this chapter has shed light is the process of curriculum reform. Despite the fact that curriculum reform in East Timor aimed to a more inclusive, democratic and distinctive Timorese educational system, important elements of the new curriculum have ended up alienateing and further fragmenting segments of the Timorese society (Shah 2012). The expectations and attempts to trigger rapid change in the aftermath of the war through curriculum reform worked at cross purposes with the aspiration to use it at the service of nation building.

The reform and implementation of the primary curriculum have to some extent responded to statebuilding imperatives and principles and have hampered nation building objectives and processes. The radical reform of education was one of the main priorities of the nascent state together with development partners. Beside the reconstruction of education infrastructure and the rehabilitation of education provision, a key component of educational reform was the overall transformation of the primary curriculum-in terms of content, language and pedagogy-in ways that what was taught and how could support broader objectives of state reconstruction and social cohesion.

\textsuperscript{113} Interview with Director, NGO La’o Hamutuk, 25 June 2013, Dili, East Timor
Supported by the primary curriculum, state promotion of a certain version of Timorese identity (i.e., secular state and Portuguese as first language) did not recognize the perceptions and beliefs of the wider Timorese society. Nor did it recognize the many divisions that exist in the society (Shah 2009: 2). Crucial elements of the new curriculum – e.g., the Portuguese language and the presence of religion - have been perceived as elite- and/or donor-driven. The design, reform and implementation of the basic curriculum reform was characterized by public-contestation, by confusion at both school-level and in the broader educational governance. The decision to make Tetum and Portuguese the two official languages of the nation and the way in which this has been done so far keeps polarising Timorese society (Moxham 2008; Taylor-Leech 2008).

In overall terms, the goal of education contributing to social cohesion remains a chimera for contemporary East Timor. The language policy has suffered from lack of capacity/resources for an efficient implementation of a multi-lingual system of education. Choosing the language(s) for the new nation has been characterized by tensions, resistance and pressure by international actors, leading to the estrangement between the state and its citizens. Two other controversial aspects of curriculum reform – i.e., religion and history curricula, both strictly tied to the elaboration of a post-war national Timorese identity - have hampered rather than enhanced the legitimacy and the trust of the new state or donor partners.

After 2012, a focus on mother tongue education, vocational training, as well as greater attention paid to the teaching of history can be seen emerging, as a possible indication of the way in which the Timorese government seeks to address some of shortcomings underlying the no longer deniable process of social polarization characterizing the post-independence phase.

With regard to the role that international actors have played in educational reform, mapping out their commitment has proved far from easy. Field interviews
confirm a significant degree of exogeneity in educational development and reconstruction. Although education might have still been marginal in the peacebuilding/statebuilding processes, the sector can be seen as an example of complex hybrid governance, where the multiplicity of actors involved in various forms of intervention allow to see education as a site of contestation among different agendas. One aspect that certainly would deserve further investigation and research are the sites of resistance and agency that exist within the Ministry of Education, in schools, and in the broader body of the Timorese society.
Chapter Seven

Comparing and contrasting internationally-driven education reforms

This chapter puts the empirical findings of the previous four chapters in a comparative perspective. It is organized along the three main objectives that are laid out in the introduction, with an eye on those themes that emerged out of chapters three, four, five and six.

7.1 The models of education in post-conflict Kosovo and East Timor

7.1.1 The politics of education reform in a state of perpetual fragility

Post-war reconstruction efforts in Kosovo and East Timor have led to the emergence of externally-driven education systems: especially at the beginning priorities appear to have been set by a plethora of international actors, lacking coordination among them and with local authorities. As with other post-conflict contexts, in both cases the main focus of intervention and reforms in the early emergency phase was on reconstruction: reconstruction, in its turn, mainly consisted in the physical rebuilding of educational infrastructure as well as the provision of education services that would bring children back to school and increase overall access (especially at the primary level). The focus on reconstruction was more prominent in East Timor, whereby longer-term reforms were postponed for quite a few years. By contrast, in Kosovo, reconstruction and reform were launched simultaneously.

In East Timor, of the four priorities that were identified by the international community in the aftermath of war – that is, the rehabilitation and reopening of primary and secondary education; teacher training and capacity building; training for out of school youth; tertiary and technical education – only access and enrolment in primary education has been successfully addressed. Although in the beginning of the
process some associations tackled the needs of adolescents and youth, one has to conclude that in overall terms these two categories have not been a priority for the past fifteen years. Early childhood, secondary education, higher education and vocational training have also been overlooked by both national projects and donor-funded activities. Moreover, despite high and persisting illiteracy rates, adult literacy and non-formal education have never ranked among the priorities.

By contrast, in Kosovo the UN engaged in a grand-scale experiment of simultaneously managing educational reconstruction and reform. Infrastructural reconstruction and teacher recruitment/training along with increasing access for minority groups were identified as the most urgent needs and were therefore prioritised. The existence of a segregated, fragmented and bifurcated education system along ethnic lines - with a multiplicity of textbooks and curricula - had made educational access for minorities an urgent problem.

During the first three years of intervention, UNMIK’s educational strategy was articulated in three distinct phases (i.e., infrastructural reconstruction, curriculum reform and gradual transfer of competencies to the local government): it aimed at creating a unified and working education system. Beside education provision and the creation of a unified education system, its main goal was the transformation of education along modern European standards. The parallel system of Albanian education that was built during the 1990s was jettisoned and terminated: the UN Department of Education regarded it as too imbued with a Yugoslav and socialist legacy (i.e., administrative decentralization, political centralization, hierarchical structure, pedagogical teacher-centredness, with homogenized textbooks) not to be deemed obsolete, and therefore useless. As Chapter four has shown, while educational provision and access have increased (especially for the Albanian-speaking majority and in urban areas), the current education system is far from unified or equally provided.

The sector-wide approach that was adopted implied that each level and aspect
of education was a key objective to be prioritized. However, a particular focus was initially put on teacher training and curricula. Over time, higher education and vocational training were prioritized by both the international community and local provisional authorities, while community education received external funding and attentions. The analysis of the documents of the most relevant international agencies illustrates how particular emphasis was put on the modernisation of education, which was expected to be responsive and compatible to the new economic environment. In this regard, as shown in chapter four, public education was identified as a significant tool for promoting the launch of the Kosovo Privatisation Strategy.

As competencies and responsibilities were transferred to the local government, the priority for Kosovo national authorities became the establishment of an education system that on the one hand reflected European standards and policy trends (e.g., life-long learning and inclusive education) and on the other contributed to long-term sustainable development through job creation and enhanced social cohesion. While a clear understanding of European standards proved hard to be found anywhere, the main implications of this posture – and in line with global educational trends – were the shift from a teacher centred/lecturing approach to the promotion of an interactive one, the introduction of science as a single subject, and the appearance of new subjects such as ‘civics’. However, in practice, the promotion of child-centred pedagogies and interactive learning have been resisted by those teachers that were expected to introduce such approaches.

In post-independence East Timor, as competencies and responsibilities were gradually transferred to local authorities, the focus shifted towards pedagogy and curriculum reform, while the question of access to education remained a priority. Although the National Development Plan envisaged the introduction of critical and transformative pedagogies, it is not difficult to show that traditional learning and teaching practices have remained the norm. Throughout the first years, the system was built in absence of a regulatory or national educational act. More recently, quality
issues (e.g., low learning outcomes and functional illiteracy) have dominated the discourse among those international donors that are involved in education reform. In overall terms, one can observe a recent discursive shift from access to quality.

While reconstruction can be considered as partially successful, the opportunity for ‘system transformation’ has been missed (Millo and Barnett 2003: 8): an exception that is limited to the early phases of intervention is the promotion of pro-poor policies (i.e., removal of school and examination fees and that of the uniforms) which were implemented with the aim of increasing access and enrolment rates in primary education.

More than a decade after independence, poverty, poor school infrastructure, a shortage of quality teachers, language issues, high dropout/repetitions rates and a high functional illiteracy remain major challenges in the Timorese education system. While gender parity has been for a great extent achieved in primary education, the gender gap keeps widening in upper grades and in rural areas. For many years emphasis has been laid on primary education while the government that took office in 2012 shifted the priority onto pre-school education and technical vocational education training.

The focus on vocational training may suggest that the nexus between education, employment and the demographic structure of the Timorese society has finally come under the spotlight: yet to date a strategy addressing this link has not been put in place, and in East Timor there remains a mismatch between skills and the labour market, resulting in high rates of unemployment. Despite the prioritization of transformative pedagogical practice in the Strategic National Development Plan and existing gaps in the sector, teacher training is no longer a priority. A growing gap between what is stated in the official documents regarding educational priorities and what is being effectively invested upon in the education sector suggests that education, in overall terms, is now less of a priority.

In Kosovo, the education system is even less of a priority than in East Timor.
Notwithstanding the goals and priorities set by the international community upon its arrival in Pristina, and later incorporated by national authorities within the Kosovo Education Strategic Plan – i.e., the creation of a unified, non-segregated and inclusive education system – the biggest challenge remains today the persistence of a fragmented system characterized by the presence of territorially divided education systems along ethno-national lines. The integration of the Serbian community into a unique education system has become an highly politicised and unresolved issue. The parallel system of education in Serbian has come to be regarded by the Serbian community as an existential challenge: a pillar for their survival in Kosovo, and a manifestation of the rejection of an independent Kosovo state.

In contrast to the objectives set by the Kosovo Education Strategic Plan the system cannot be said to provide equal opportunities to relevant and quality education to all ethnic groups. Access and integration to date remains partial and vary depending on the specific ethnic community. Access and participation of non-majority communities within the Kosovo education system is hampered by insufficient or lack of textbooks in Turkish and Bosnian languages. Quality and availability of curricula is also tied to the language in which they are developed. As reported by the OSCE (2009b), the lack of a commonly understood language and of a non-divisive and shared history is leading to a situation in which a generation of youths with different ethnic background who live next to one another will not be able communicate with each other.

For this purpose, the MEST and the OSCE Higher Commissioner on National Minorities have been developing two textbooks that aim to boost intercultural education: one for learning Albanian as second language for minorities’ students and one for civic and intercultural education. Although there have been a number of international organizations engaged in multicultural projects to education, they have failed to develop a comprehensive and trans-community approach, and have usually focused on education issues of a specific community.
Unlike in the East Timor case - where for the past fifteen year neither higher education nor vocational training have scored among the priorities - in Kosovo higher education and vocational training have received considerable funding and attention by both the international community and local authorities. It is indeed in these two areas that the two cases differ most: rather than global agendas of educational policies (which always tend to prioritize primary education), contextual and contingent factors may account for such a difference.

As shown in Chapter four, higher education in Kosovo has been important for processes of state making and elite legitimization prior to the war as well as in its aftermath. However, the ways in which political elites have invested on higher education and vocational training in Kosovo can be regarded as missed opportunities, if not a case of political collusion. Even more than in other education levels, the development and bifurcation of higher education in Kosovo reflects the existence of a deeper and broader conflict between the two main ethno-national groups - i.e., the Serbian and the Albanian community.

The politics of higher education reform in Kosovo has been characterized by the political struggle that took place on the one hand within the Albanian political and academic elites, and between those elites and the international community on the other hand. An asymmetry in donor funding and assistance versus the Pristina-based Albanian university fuelled the self-imposed isolation of the Mitrovica-based Serbian university and has deepened separation at the level of higher education between the Albanian and Serbian communities.

The Europe-wide reforms induced by the ‘Bologna process’ and the transposition of the hegemonic discourse of ‘knowledge-based society’ have informed interventions in Kosovo’s higher education sphere. With the Bologna Declaration as the benchmark against which progress in higher education reform is assessed, the Europeanization of higher education in Kosovo has been carried out in a hasty way across formal templates that did not take into account the specificity of the context.
As illustrated by chapter four, the liberalization of higher education has paved the way to a form of devaluation of knowledge and quality (as well as university diplomas): its addressing youth unemployment – a major problem in Kosovo – is problematic to say the least. Even though after the independence of 2008 one observes the refocusing on vocational training on the part of international donors, and although the Kosovo Education Strategic Plan links education to sustainable development for its contribution to job creation and social cohesion, neither coordination nor a strategy that could properly address the booming young population of Kosovo is in sight: the building of skills, the deep mark that informality leaves on the market, and the need for a strategy of employment generation remain critical aspects that are disconnected from the reform of higher education.

At the same time, one observes a veritable proliferation of private and public colleges that postpone the moment in which students enter the job market. Along this path, one can observe how unemployment rates are masked by a plethora of education initiatives and procrastination tactics, while the explosive link between a frustrated, educated youth and unemployment remains untouched. The same structural problems that characterized Kosovo during Yugoslavia, such as those related to unemployment, underdevelopment, demographics have not been properly addressed in and through today’s education reform.

7.1.2 Curriculum reform: for the nation or for the internationals?

In post-conflict situations, education reform is tied to the state’s need to restore public trust and regain political legitimacy (Moxham 2008). According to Miller-Grandvaux (2009), for education to mitigate rather than exacerbate existing divisions in post-conflict societies, it has to be reformed by taking into account principles such as shared ownership, transparency of decision making and community participation.
Curriculum reform in East Timor has been part of a broader process of fostering social cohesion. The key challenge in post-conflict countries is to identify the appropriate time and place for these reforms to occur (Shah 2012): however, in similar contexts, there are a number of competing imperatives for rapid curriculum reform such as the need to show rapid action from the government to meet access and quality benchmarks of global educational agendas, or the expectations to reform and adapt the curriculum for preparing a labour force for the economic needs (Davies and Talbot 2008; Al-Daami and Wallace 2007).

In East Timor, curriculum reform was postponed for a considerable number of years. The transitional curriculum had a strong Indonesian base, while part of it came from Portugal. However, initiatives, similar to the Kosovo case, were on an ad hoc basis and disregarded the relevance of the context and content. In East Timor, both primary curriculum and secondary curriculum were designed and implemented by Portuguese universities. However, while the former was UNICEF-led the latter was led by the Timorese government. Primary curriculum reform, too, recorded low ownership and legitimacy levels: this did not help to bridge the gap between the state and its citizens (Colenso 2005 quoted in Shah 2012: 34). After 2012 primary curriculum reform that focuses on language and local context suggests that an attempt to tackle and address the problematic question of relevant education content is being made.

Despite the fact that curriculum reform in Timor-Leste aimed to a more inclusive, democratic and distinctive Timorese educational system, some elements of the new curriculum have alienated and fragmented segments of the Timorese society (Shah 2012). The expectations and the attempts to encourage social and political change through curriculum reform in the immediate aftermath of war was somehow at cross purpose with the idea that the reform would serve a nation-building purpose. The decision to make Tetum and Portuguese the two official languages of the new nation and the way in which the decision was implemented continue to polarise the
The process of curriculum reform in Kosovo has been tied to the broader political dispute between Kosovo and Serbia over the political status of the province. As in the Timorese case, curriculum reform was initiated and enacted by UNICEF in a joint co-operation with UNESCO. It was based upon current trends of educational development in the West, particularly by introducing the focus on learner-centred approaches. As curriculum reform was taken over by local authorities, the objective of making Kosovo’s education system compatible with European standards represented a continuity with the UNICEF work. In practice, this was translated in the adoption of the 5+4+3 education structure which was criticised by local education experts as done in a hasty way not allowing time to the system to adapt to change.

The revised curriculum focused on learner-centeredness, flexible and integrated teaching and learning, competency-based education, reflecting the values of human rights, social justice and inclusiveness within the broader life-long learning framework. Many Kosovo educators questioned its success and implementation as it was detached by Kosovo’s educational experiences and context (Tahirysylaj 2013). Underpinning curriculum reform is the need and objective to turn Kosovo into a knowledge society integrated into broader, mainstream European processes, which will also “[c]ontribute to sustainable economic and social development” (MEST 2006: 20).

The process of having a single curriculum for all Kosovan communities, with translation in the different languages has been there since a while, yet to date it remains incomplete. For example, the curriculum in Serbian was drafted, but it has not been issued. For the other communities, one finds a combination of textbooks imported by the Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and Bosnia. Currently, there is no strategy for integrating the Serbian parallel system of education into the Kosovo one. The three subsequent MEST strategies for pre-university education illustrate a changing and progressive de facto acknowledgement of the existence of a Serbian
The politics of curriculum reform in Kosovo and the related debates in Kosovo and Serbia show that the improvement of the curricula, textbooks and didactics more generally are a cause of little concern (Bozzato 2013: 24). Given this state of affairs, it is rather unlikely that objectives of fostering inclusion, integration, and consolidating cohesion and peace have been or are currently informing curriculum reform in Kosovo. While curricula in Kosovo satisfy the educational needs of specific communities, they fail to promote mutual understanding, interaction and integration among them (OSCE 2009b: 24).

Separation and segregation: language policy and community education

In East Timor, language has been a complex and divisive issue that has hampered teacher training/performance and students’ learning outcomes. Its complexity depends on colonial legacies and post-war decisions that were taken by the political elite and supported by some foreign donors who encouraged the introduction of Portuguese as one of the official languages, prioritising it over Tetum. Language policy has estranged the broader population because it has been elite-driven. Political and policy decisions related to omission or selective prioritization have made the implementation of a multi-lingual system of education and curricula, in a country lacking capacities and resources, a pretty difficult task.

A sense of identity, essential for nation building, and transmitted through language(s) has remained a problematic concept and process in East Timor, with consequences for the implementation of more complex concepts such as human rights and the rule of law (Richmond and Franks 2008: 196). Recent developments since 2011 point to the redressing of some of these issues that had polarised Timorese society in the early years of independence. In the intention of the current government, mother tongue instruction will be the focus of the early years of
schooling and Tetum will be prioritized as an important national language (MoE 2011).

In Kosovo, dealing with and implementing a multi-lingual system of education at first sight did not represent a dilemma (nor was it per se a contentious issue), due to the Yugoslav legacy of multi-lingual education system and the spatial segregation of education along ethnic and linguistic lines. Having premised that, the polarization of education policies and practices has had a significant impact on smaller ethnic minorities in Kosovo: they were faced with the choice of either being assimilated in one the two main education systems (proceeding in parallel) or be excluded from education. While each of the two main groups has education in the respective mother-tongue, smaller communities rely upon either textbooks from one of the two main languages (Serbian and Albanian) or from textbooks that are imported from neighbouring countries. Be that as it may, official data tend to conceal ongoing polarization and show partial integration of the Bosnian, Turkish, and Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian (RAE) communities within the Kosovo system of education, while Gorani and Serb communities are not integrated at all (OSCE 2009a). At the same time, however, the OSCE reports that communities seem to be moving gradually on their own separate ways, a proof that community integration within the education system is not sufficient for the integration of minority communities within the broader society (OSCE 2009a).

Early attempts by UNMIK to develop an education system that, by combining interactive methodologies and new curricular topics, would promote equity in access and multiethnic cooperation and schooling, failed either because of the lack of will by the two main Serbian and Albanian communities or for lack of physical security. Security issues in post-war Kosovo has affected the education system and made segregated and separated schooling a foreign choice too. Schooling has been further separated due to decentralisation policies, which in the Kosovar case has been made along ethnic and linguistic lines. As it was analysed in chapter three and four, the
respect of the rights and interests of minority communities has led to the promotion of decentralization policies along ethnic lines with consequences felt in the fragmented and decentralised education system(s).

Omitting history or opening it up to multiple perspectives?

History and historiography have a strong role to play for legitimization narratives, and it comes as no surprise that in Kosovo, history curricula and textbooks remain among the most contentious and untransparent issues. Much of the conflict over politics and education has been around different and competing interpretations of Kosovo history by Serbs and Albanians. In the struggle between majority and minority over history curricula one finds the mutual mirroring of exclusivist readings of history and a lack of communication between historians. They proceed in parallel as the more general education system(s) in Kosovo. By the end of my observation period the Ministry of Education in Kosovo launched an initiative that pursue a multi-perspective approach to history. However, at the time of my fieldwork the project was still in the piloting phase and it had not reached contemporary history, leaving out the most contentious part of Kosovo’s history and memory – the period that follows WWII.

While the development of a history curriculum that discusses the complexity of the Indonesian occupation has been identified by the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation as a cornerstone of peace and reconciliation, primary curriculum reform in East Timor has diminished its significance, making history education for years part of a broader subject – estudio de meo (study of the self). Neither the local government nor donors have directed any effort to the development of a complex and endogeneous history curriculum (Shah 2012). Simplified historical narratives, typical in post-conflict states, can in the long-term divide a nation (Vongalis-Macrow 2006; Weinstein et al. 2007; Murray 2008).
Addressing the past was identified by a Secretary-General report following the 2006 crisis as part of the nation-building process in East Timor (quoted in Shah 2012).

While in the short-term the need for appealing to simplified narratives tends to be recurrent and might be understood, in the long run the addressing of past divisions requires the development of a more complex and nuanced historical narrative. Weinstein et al. (2007) maintain that an endogenous process should be developed through consensus and consultation, ultimately fostering critical thinking and public debate. By the end of my observation period, reforms that introduced a new curriculum for pre-secondary and secondary education in East Timor placed greater attention to the teaching of history and civics. Problematic remains, however, the transformation of the national resistance experience, often represented as a monolithic effort, into a shared and nuanced historical narrative.

7.2 Conflict, peacebuilding and statebuilding and their relationship to education

7.2.1 Same timing, different history and varying conflict sensitivity

While fundamentally different on a number of aspects for most of their modern history, both Kosovo and East Timor have been deeply shaped by external actors and factors: in different eras they were both remote subjects to colonial occupation and imperial administration. In both cases, a long legacy of conflict, external intervention and societal mistrust versus political authority has affected social, economic and political structures and relations. Linguistic, religious and ethnic features have distinguished and positioned Kosovo and East Timor along the peripheries of the respective rulers. The process of modern state formation has been externally driven, as part of different yet assimilationist nation building projects that had different outcomes.
Conflict characterized the Timorese society even before Portuguese colonisation, which exploited regional and ethno-linguistic divisions to further divide and rule the small island for over 400 years. Societal cleavages and divisions within the Timorese liberation movement were also manipulated by the Indonesian occupier to control the country for a quarter of century. Conflicts occurring during the brief civil war (1975) and the ensuing 24 years of occupation were multifaceted and complex. While the conflict in East Timor has not been as neatly divisive as in Kosovo, there remains a number of persisting historical and current fault-lines of a regional, ethno-linguistic and political nature and potential conflict drivers underpinned by economic, gender and social inequalities, which have been largely overlooked (if not completely ignored) by the international community, within and outside the UN mission(s).

The Indonesian occupation was identified as the main cause of conflict, and the withdrawal of Indonesian military forces was seen *sic et simpliciter* as the removal of the conflict cause. Underpinning the commitment of the international intervention was the widely shared view that the 24 years of struggle for freedom against Indonesia had united the population, transcending existing grievances. This resulted in the omission of conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity during the first years that followed the conflict, with serious consequences for peacebuilding planning, social cohesion and education reform.

The fact that a thorough conflict analysis was nowhere to be found among the UN and the international community agencies intervening in East Timor, led to an insufficient focus on reconciliation or conflict resolution/transformation in the first years after the conflict. In his analysis of international intervention in East Timor, Richmond contends that, “[p]olitical and institutional reform had failed to address underlying causes or identity issues, or the actual connection of the state to the worldview of Timorese communities” (Richmond 2013: 6). Only years later was a focus on peacebuilding articulated, following the violent political crisis that detonated
in 2006. International and local actors put a major emphasis on short-term reconstruction goals of rebuilding the infrastructural and institutional state capacities as opposed to longer-term peacebuilding and development.

By contrast, the Kosovo conflict has been seen as the epitome of an intractable, ethno-national conflict, indeed as “[t]he most intractable of all the political conflicts in the Balkans” (Malcolm 1998: xxvii). Here too, the Serbian military forces withdrew with a consistent number of Serbian refugees. However, a small Serbian community remained scattered around Kosovo and confined to small enclaves, while one third of Kosovo Serbs were located in northern Kosovo. This gave to post-war Kosovo a status of being embroiled in a condition of potentially explosive, present, postponed or frozen conflict, with key questions such as the political status of the country, and the relationship between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs regarded by the foreign actors as impossible to be solved.

Unlike in the Timorese case, here early conflict assessment placed emphasis on the main cause which was identified in the deep-seated divisions between ethnic Albanians and Serbs. The analysis that I have proposed argues that rather than lack of conflict analysis, in the Kosovo case the problem has been the overemphasizing of certain conflict causes and dynamics, and the symmetrical neglecting of others that are equally important. Put differently, the perspective that shaped international intervention in the aftermath of the war was one in which the socio-economic and development dimension of conflict was systematically and dismissively overshadowed by the ethnic component.

As chapter three has shown, Kosovo has always been a poor and underdeveloped country where socio-economic conditions play a key role in the conflict between the two main communities – i.e., Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. The organization of (higher) education and policies to address (under) development have been underlying conflict causes already during Yugoslavia, if not since the Ottoman Empire. However, since the end of the 1999 war, the
international community has conspicuously failed to identify first, and tackle later
the very existence of a development question in the country: the entire matter was
deemed to be part of a generic growth problem, a *by-default* function of market
liberalization and privatization; for long time no political economic sensitivity was
developed, and no corresponding strategy was articulated.

A certain neglect of social, economic and political inequalities that are rooted
in societal segmentation and reinforced by the opportunism of elites characterize the
international community in both countries, thereby preventing to tackle deep
conflict causes. A partial change in perspective materialized only in the aftermath of
the violent political crises that shook the two countries, respectively in 2004
(Kosovo) and 2006 (East Timor). The UN recognized that the stagnation of socio-
economic situations had become part of the ‘big picture’, fuelling causal mechanisms
were partly underpinning violent conflict. The new perspective, therefore does not
emerge as the product of a lucid re-assessment of peacebuilding in the light of
empirical evidence regarding goals, means, and recources: rather, it stems from an
incident-driven reconsideration.

Despite the recognition by important international players of the need for
contextualizing policies and interventions in post-war and fragile context (OECD
2007, 2010; DFID 2011; DFID and World Bank 2005) the international community
approached the two countries in a very similar way: the state-building mission was
designed in New York at the UN headquarters according to an abstract matrix of
governance functions, and historical institutional and contextual legacies were kept
very much on the margins of strategic planning. As section 7.2.3 will show, proof of
this is a similar statebuilding toolkit that was applied in both.

7.2.2 Addressing or reproducing conflict through education?

Education in East Timor has been, from the beginning, shaped by external actors with
lasting legacies and differing impacts upon language policy, religion, (the lack of) indigenous knowledge and the broader educational structure. The Portuguese emphasised quality of Western education for forming a small and docile elite, while Indonesia by contrast focused on quantity - using mass education as a means of indoctrination, integration and control spreading the Indonesian language and promoting Indonesian national unity. As chapter six has illustrated, education under Indonesian rule played a very ambiguous role. Used to assimilate linguistically the Timorese population, it soon became also a site of active and passive resistance against the Indonesian occupier.

Similar to other colonial contexts, in East Timor and Kosovo, schooling became a crucial battlefield in itself, as well as an arena for mobilization for further conflict due to the messages that were produced and reproduced in classrooms. In Kosovo, education played an important role in the rise and for the shaping of Albanian nationalism: following the massive strikes and firing of mine workers between 1988-1991, the struggle over education became the primary site of contention between Serbs and Albanians. In Kosovo, national question and national education have always coincided: education has been the stage in which the national question has been performed by both the Albanian and Serbian sides, involving claims about autonomy, statehood, and sovereignty.

The prohibition of schooling in Albanian language during the Ottoman empire and the first phase of Federal Yugoslavia nurtured the idea that education in Albanian and respect for the national identity was conditional upon the creation of a nation state. The significant openings to bilingualism and autonomy experienced during the second phase of Federal Yugoslavia were widely considered as a concession to a legitimate aspiration to statehood, not as a step into a different system that would transcend nation states. During the 1990s, education became the most oiled mechanism, a fully functioning sector in the parallel Albanian state in Kosovo. Nonetheless, its existence rested upon a system of segregation and spatial separation
along rigid ethnic lines.

Given its being historically intertwined with a story of conflict, nation building and state formation processes that turned violent, education in post-war Kosovo is a problematic foundation for peace. By contrast, in East Timor, despite explicit emphasis by the local elite on the role of education for the enhancement of national identity (as well as for introducing transformative teaching and critical learning practices and skills) the education sector has been virtually irrelevant in the building of a sustainable and just peace: the education system has been studiously kept far away from deliberately addressing some of the structural deficiencies and fragilities of the Timorese state.

As discussed in Chapter five, education in East Timor has not been linked to a strategy for tackling high (urban) unemployment rates in a situation of expanding youth demographics. Furthermore, education has only deepened social fragmentation by increasing the divide between the elite and the broader population, the East and the West and other language and socio-economic disparities. The education reform has neither reflected nor was it incorporated in a broader strategy for tackling the low-labour intensive economic foundations of a demographically young country that has become highly dependent on oil revenues.

In Kosovo, rather than addressing root causes of the conflict, education reverberates and ultimately reinforces the lines of ethnic division: at the same time, its reform has not addressed structural elements of vulnerability of the Kosovo society such as underdevelopment, unemployment and youth demographics.

In the aftermath of the war and despite the fact that we are in presence of mass education, both cases were respectively the second poorest province of Indonesia and the poorest province of the Balkans (arguably of Europe). However, while educational attainment and employment policies under Indonesia had kept East Timor within a circle of dependency with effects on post-conflict assistance, in Kosovo the development of education during the 1990s had paralleled with the
development of para-state structures. Thus, albeit in both cases, administrative/governmental and educational structures were highly affected and destroyed by the conflict(s), in its aftermath Kosovo and East Timor were starting from different levels of what was then regarded by the international community as the bottom, or better the scratch (i.e., the *tabula rasa*).

While in both cases education has a record of strong interaction with (root causes of) conflict, its reform in the aftermath of war was affected by different legacies that were the product of years of resistance and occupation. In the case of East Timor, this is most evident by observing the language policy, especially the removal of the largely spoken Bahasa Indonesian as an official language and its replacement with Portuguese, of which only a small elite was (and remains) proficient: this circumstance makes teaching and learning problematic for the majority of teachers and students. Moreover, the almost total infrastructural destruction that resulted from the war that affected an already fragile institutional system of education (previously reliant upon Indonesian resources) turned East Timor and its education increasingly (if not permanently) dependent on foreign assistance.

Throughout much of Kosovo’s modern history, educational events have been proximate causes/triggers for (and instances of) mobilization and conflict. In Kosovo, the clearest legacy of such a conflict is the continuation and structuration in a reversed way of the segregated and ethnically divided education structure that characterized the 1990s, with an impact on language, curriculum reform and content, as well as access. Rather than emerging as an arena where root causes of the conflict could be identified and transformed, education has become a sphere that is kept hostage by existing divisions.

7.2.3 Different paths to statehood: international governance and the tabula rasa

While being very different contexts, Kosovo and East Timor were administered by
the international community through missions that were the copy-paste of each other, perhaps premised on the dubious assumption that the war had swept away political, social and economic structures and legacies along with infrastructural destruction, thus removing ‘bottlenecks’ that would act as setbacks along the path in which the ‘right path of reform’ would be implemented. Both Kosovo and East Timor were small countries where experiments could be attempted: by emerging from war and destruction they would oppose little resistance, and therefore they could be ultimately considered as empty shells where to inoculate the germs of future pearls.

The state model the international community aimed to build, in both cases, was a liberal democracy. In transplanting the same standard model of liberal democracy that they had envisioned for Kosovo a few months earlier, the international community failed to recognize the existing forms of traditional authority and the structures and systems that had been institutionalized during Portuguese colonization earlier and Indonesian rule later (Jones 2010). In both cases, political power disputes among the new political elites were overlooked by the newly established international architecture. Failing to recognize local authority at the beginning favoured the development of parallel (and overlapping) authorities and structures. The UN deployed its missions and failed to incorporate local capacities and to design any form of accountability towards the local elite or population. This hampered capacity building efforts, despite political mechanisms that were developed later, for greater Timorisation and Kosovisation.

Over time, the support of the international community remained focused on promoting a limited form of state that was underpinned by a market-driven economic model. Perhaps, precisely by over-emphasizing the strengthening and the development of formal institutions within a framework of market-driven, limited state, the international community failed to address the historical weakness of the link between the state and its citizens in these regions, as highlighted among others by Montanaro (2009) and Richmond (2011). The mechanistic approach to institution
(and state) building followed a model of governance resting upon technical expertise, whereby state legitimacy was narrowly understood as being validated by the electoral process. State (and international) legitimacy was expected to be built by building the capacity to deliver rather than by effectively delivering and providing social services. According to the World Bank (2011), institution building and service delivery are central to the consolidation of post-conflict legitimacy. While fragility in Kosovo has been identified as the lack of state capacity to exercise authority over the territory, in both cases, the state stands out as a distinctively weak performer, one lacking political will to providing basic services to the population.

Although UN powers were not intended as merely regulative but also as transformative, structural fragilities and root conflict causes in both cases have been little transformed. This has been clearly the case in East Timor, where a top-down model of liberal governance, focussing on institutional development and marketisation, and on rights over needs, has overlooked considerations regarding social justice and welfare and has marginalised the political experience, history and culture of the Timorese subject (Richmond 2011). Rather than providing social services, in both cases, local political leaders have derived their legitimacy for their contribution during the war. As with other post-interventionary systems of governance, stability has partly come at the expense of building (i.e., accepting the emergence of) states that prove to be ineffective in generating economic development or public goods.

Albeit both states have been externally-shaped, unlike in Kosovo, East Timor has been central in elaborating a locally-based and locally-led statebuilding process as part of the G7+ Agenda for Statebuilding. Although objectives are very similar to those elaborated and implemented by the international community in conflict-affected countries, a greater focus is placed over justice and employment, advocating for context-sensitive, country-led and owned peacebuilding and statebuilding processes.
The two missions, according to Woodward (1999), were almost identical, but for the issue of political status. While in East Timor – where intervention was clearly identified as the rectification of a path of decolonization - the political path to nation and statehood was clear from the beginning, in Kosovo it remained unsolved until early 2008, and it is still disputed and contested. The result in the Kosovar case is that international governance has contributed to and reinforced existing patterns of parallel political authorities. As difference in Kosovo is institutionalized and protected through decentralisation, the condition for sovereignty and statehood, goes through multiple international authorities which supervise the successful accommodation of the claims and the grievances put forward by distinct identity groups. This segmentation, in turn, has led to a weak and unfinished process of nation building characterized by multiple claims for autonomy and nationhood.

The reform of post-war education in Kosovo, similar to what one observes in the East Timor case, is inserted within such a process of nation building, reflecting and reinforcing its problematic incompleteness. In other terms, in order for education to serve statebuilding purposes (with its emphasis on security and stability), it had to be ‘de-nationalized’ or at least disjointed from the nation building project. The paradox is that while throughout much of Kosovo’s modern history, education played an important role in terms of nation building and state formation by contributing to the rise and shape of Albanian nationalism and by acting as a symbolic producer and amplifier of nationhood and as a political expression of Albanian statehood, in the post-conflict momentum education became marginal to the externally-driven statebuilding efforts and to the process of nation building more in general.

The reform of education, therefore, has been characterized by tension between education as a sphere that may contribute to social cohesion through building national identity and education as an area of reforms that should introduce modern standards of efficiency and effectiveness while not threatening stability, in a context in which both state and nation are contested and problematic notions.
The overall aim of the international community was ensuring a peaceful multi-ethnic society with a unified education system serving the needs of Kosovo’s young society and reflecting European modern standards. As argued in Chapter four, the promotion of a multi-ethnic and pluralist society through education has led to a multiplication of curricula in different languages and to competing versions of history, in a situation in which there is little understanding among local and international actors about the ‘European’ or ‘western’ standards to be promoted.

Similarly, an analysis of the Kosovo Education Strategic Plan suggests that local authorities have discursively aimed at building an inclusive education system where all Kosovo citizens would be provided with equal access to quality education at all levels, and where education would contribute “[t]o the long term sustainable development of the country through job creation and enhanced social cohesion” (MEST 2011b: 26). It is, more specifically, in the area of higher education that both the international community and local authorities have concentrated resources and attention. The sector has been seen by international actors as a vehicle for state formation; local authorities have seen it as functional to cultural, social and economic development; finally, both see it as a tool for democratisation. In practice, however, higher education reform has been an arena for political struggles among and within local and international actors. On the one hand it has served to legitimise local elites in power, while on the other its liberalization has failed to address the structural problems of unemployment, underdevelopment and demographic pressure.

In East Timor, while during the occupation education was used by Indonesia as a means of assimilation and indoctrination, in the aftermath of the conflict local elites saw in its decolonization and transformation potential an opportunity not to be missed. Expectations concerning the role of education in the process of Timorese nation building were already explicit before the referendum on independence. The new education system was expected to enhance national identity by emphasizing the selective and universal human values (CNRT 1999) and by promoting indigenous
forms of learning (Millo 2002).

After full independence in 2002, education was expected to play a leading role in the transformation and construction of a new Timorese society. Social cohesion, political legitimacy and economic development were tied to education premised on the assumption that an equitable and effective quality education that could provide citizens with the knowledge and skills necessary to participate and contribute to socio-economic and political development would promote social equity and national unity (Caroll and Kupezyk-Romanczuk 2007). The National Development Plan (2005) further elaborated the purpose of education in the new state by explicitly proposing a key role for the development of individual capacities and the overall improvement of the Timorese society.

Nevertheless, as Chapter six has shown, the opportunity for transformation was soon missed. This was particularly the case with primary curriculum reform which did not always mirror the needs of the country and the broader population. In the intentions of the Ministry of Education, the aim of the primary curriculum – through a new system of learning and teaching – was to reflect and contribute to building a new post-colonial and post-conflict Timorese national identity (MECYS 2004). However, in practice primary curriculum has had limited relevance and reference to East Timor’s context and has not promoted forms of indigenous knowledge. Moreover, some of the most important aspects of curriculum reform in terms of national identity building – i.e., language, religion, history – have estranged the broader population from the political elites. For their part, international actors have received criticism by local civil society organisations for lacking a coherent national vision or strategy for education. Education reform in post-war East Timor has responded to reconstruction and humanitarian rationales, but has not been incorporated in the broader peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda.

7.2.4 Peace as stability: what consequences for education?
In East Timor, peacebuilding and reconciliation activities were not formally included among the efforts undertaken by local and international actors until the 2006 crisis. Since 2006, the UN mandates have included a greater focus on building peace and on strengthening social cohesion. Using Richmond’s categorization of peace in post-war contexts discussed in chapter one, the type of peace that has been built in East Timor and Kosovo contains both elements of “conservative peace” (it required military intervention) and elements of “orthodox peace”, since it rests upon externally-driven and top-down peacebuilding methods, with a growing emphasis on the role of civil society (Richmond and Franks 2008: 191).

Speaking specifically of the Timorese context, Richmond argues that the peace that has been built is a hybrid, “[p]art liberal, part local” (2011: 91) - that is, a mediation of what local and international actors aimed for. Hybridity as a theoretical device does not add much to the substance of the peacebuilding model in East Timor: as a matter of fact, in such contexts pretty much everything could be said to result from a more or less mediated form of interaction between international and local social forces. By contrast, what is important to observe with a view to a more fine-grained understanding of the type of peacebuilding process is the fact that the UN and the broader range of actors involved in the country did not (i.e., were not able to, were not willing to) engage with several contextual issues.

The peace that emerged from those selective efforts, as argued by Richmond among others, is to a significant extent virtual: failing to address conflict roots, it is a political condition where the state is subject to frequent political crises, and is paralysed by lacking capacities, by problematic levels of unemployment and poverty (Richmond and Franks 2008: 191, 197). The virtuality aspect is linked with the fact that the state has had little substance if measured against the impact on the everyday life experience of the majority of the population and their welfare requirements.

Similar to the Timorese context, the international community in Kosovo was
not involved in promoting reconciliation as much as it was involved in maintaining
stability and preventing ethnically-motivated violence to re-surface: the pogroms of
2004 stroke a very sensitive chord in this regard. Unlike in East Timor, the
international community read the Kosovo conflict and its root causes mainly through
the ethnic lens. International governance efforts were geared to managing the ethnic
divide through decentralisation rather than reconciliation – which was considered not
realistic for the time being.

This approach, which was informed by a rather shallow acceptance of the
‘ancient hatreds’ argument of which Balkanist cliché (Todorova 1997) is imbued, has
reinforced social and ethnic divisions instead of weakening them. External agencies
assumed that the main transformative tasks that are needed to build genuine and
positive peace would be carried out by Kosovo’s integration in the international,
European (i.e., EU) and regional context: however, the Euro-zone crisis that flared up
by 2010, and the ensuing turbulence in EU governance mechanisms, dampened any
enthusiasm about Kosovo’s integration trajectories.

While waiting for liberalization and democratization by default, the inter-
ethnic divide in Kosovo was tackled through the promotion of a form of
multiculturalism and minority rights protection that in practice consisted in
territorial decentralisation along ethnic lines (Randazzo and Bargués 2012: 27). In
other words, the international community adopted a narrow understanding of
multiculturalism, which - by resting upon an essentialist understanding of ethnic
identity - did not engage in their transformation: the outcome are ethnically-defined
and divided municipalities.

Perhaps not surprisingly, but also along historical necessity, both in Kosovo
and East Timor the notion of peace has been aligned over time with a narrower
definition than previously thought and proclaimed: a definition that clearly boils
down to something closer to stability than development, and that steers the course of
policy reform clear of emancipation. The field of education has paid a price for this
In both cases, education has not been a strategic sector in the peacebuilding agendas. In Kosovo, the role of education as the driving force behind the (Albanian) national question was to be mitigated and education had to respond increasingly to security and stability imperatives. While before the war education rallied around the Albanian national question, in its aftermath it was organized in ways that it would contribute to building a tolerant and multi-ethnic society. Nevertheless, it is a fact that education has remained one of the main settings of tensions and conflict between Albanian and Serbs.

While education was not explicitly incorporated in the peacebuilding agenda, the peacebuilding model that prevailed in Kosovo informed choices and priorities made by international actors in education reform. The solution to address what were considered the primary causes of the Kosovo conflict – local culture and ethnicity – was a governance of decentralization that would accommodate and institutionalize differences up to the educational level, preventing any space for cross-level, dialectical interaction between different groups.

Similar to the Kosovo case, despite high expectations about the transformative and nation building role, education in East Timor was never formally included within a peacebuilding strategy. Although most of the interviews that I conducted with local and international officials do link between education to peacebuilding, it is not clear under what conditions education may contribute to peacebuilding, and indeed no interviewee was able to envision any path through which education may play a peacebuilding role.

In this regard, while curriculum reform aimed at a more inclusive, democratic and distinctive Timorese educational system, some elements of it – language, history, religion – have alienated and fragmented segments of the Timorese society (Shah 2012), hampering rather than enhancing the legitimacy and trust of the political elite or donor partners.
7.3 The governance of education reform between local and international actors

7.3.1 The role of international actors in the reform of post-conflict education

Mapping out the commitment of international actors in educational reform has been far from an easy task. The literature and interviews analysed reflects and confirms the exogeneity and social engineering of educational development and reconstruction in post-conflict international interventions. The governance of education reform, in East Timor and Kosovo, shows that the education sector, once a national authorities’ prerogative, is today shaped and reformed in the interplay between international and local actors that operate in, through and beyond the nation-state. This development does not seem to be a concession to circumstances, or a temporary phase, but rather the permanent state of affairs in post-war settings that are undergoing externally assisted reforms of peacebuilding and statebuilding.

In both Kosovo and East Timor, the aftermath of the armed hostilities saw a preminence of localized response on the part of communities as the UN struggled to organize and co-ordinate its efforts to affirm its leadership along the policy-making/implementation chain. However, in both contexts, local agency and capacity were ignored, then sidelined and eventually excluded from policy processes. In the past fifteen years, the processes of promoting local ownership while sidelining local capacities have characterized the relationship between local and international actors. In the early emergency phase – where priorities were set out – education reform seems to have similarly consisted and reflected what Verger et al. have called global educational policies (GEPs), i.e., a focus on reconstruction and increasing access at primary level, increasing efficiency and enhancing management at the systemic level, promoting decentralization etc.

However, different historical legacies and contingent factors – a stronger local
agency in the Kosovo case, following years of parallel education – have led to a stronger focus on higher education and vocational training in Kosovo and an earlier focus on curriculum reform for all levels of education. By contrast, post-conflict education in East Timor had inherited strong fragilities at the institutional level and widespread level of destruction at the infrastructural level. The degree of permeability of international actors and their power to set agendas and priorities were therefore higher. In overall terms, one could see a higher compliance versus global education policies and trends in the case of East Timor. Notwithstanding differences in local agency, resources and focus, in both countries the role and functions of some of the main international actors in education reform have been respectively the same. As chapter four and six have shown, UNICEF has been responsible in both cases for curriculum reform while the World Bank has focused on reconstruction and improving management systems.

In East Timor, education reform, during the emergency and transitional phase, was extensively reliant upon donors’ contributions, with clear implications for legitimacy. In overall terms, the role and the commitment of international actors in education reform has been poorly accountable to citizens, thus undermining UN and WB efforts in education, and promoting tensions with the local authorities as well as mistrust inside the educational community and larger portions of population. Confusing and competing leaderships, and a dual system of authority has hampered decision-making and capacity building especially in the Timorese case. The approach chosen by multilateral and bilateral partners has gradually evolved and changed since the first days after independence: external partners have redefined themselves as aiding actors that are supportive of state institutions’ efforts to effectively deliver education to its citizens. However, their presence and role has remained consistent and has undermined efforts to consolidate local ownership, as the next section will further illustrate.

By contrast, in Kosovo the strong emphasis on dramatic reform and renewal,
and UNMIK’s own ‘lead-agencies approach’ – whereby renowned international agencies were assigned core tasks within each and every aspect and level of the reform of the education system – seems to suggest the creation of a more coherent, strategically conceived and coordinated response to the need for educational reform. However, here too, overlapping, competing and uncoordinated efforts on the part of international donors and partners were not difficult to find. In Kosovo, too, the recruitment of a considerable number of international consultants together with the lead-agencies approach eventually sidelined local capacities, which were relegated to the margins of the education reform picture.

The few internationally-sponsored attempts at developing political mechanisms for making the Serbian and Albanian community work together failed as a result of the local Serbs’ decision to boycott the emerging new institution. Overall, ethnic Serbian and ethnic Albanian officials were marginalized from the process, as they were both regarded to be problematically politicised. Nevertheless, the response of the international community was not homogeneous: interviewees were quite consistent in pointing out that while the prevailing approach, represented by the Daxner period, disregarded local context, past legacy and teachers, a different approach to be found among some international officials showed more sensitivity to both the context and historical continuities.

Throughout my fieldwork visits in both countries one of the most challenging issues has been identifying or unravelling sites of resistance or alternative agendas/visions of education by social forces other than the local government or international agencies. As education has been marginal to post-conflict reconstruction, peacebuilding and statebuilding, there have been little efforts or examples of local civil society organizations either involved in the reform of education, or contesting dominant agendas and discourses. I have encountered critical reflections out of informal interviews, especially in the case of Kosovo, and there have been single voices that have criticised the reform and role of international
actors or local actors in education.

Another question that is less explored is the relationship between policy-making at the ground level and re-articulation of agendas at the global level. I was especially interested in investigating at the ground level the extent to which the UNICEF-funded Research Consortium on Education and Peacebuilding launched in 2011, did have an impact on UNICEF’s discourses and programming in the education sectors in East Timor and Kosovo. As shown in Chapter two, in both cases I could gain no access for interview with any past or current UNICEF officials. This being duly noted, the broader change in the discourse that international actors articulate at global level with regard to education and its multifaceted role in post-conflict and conflict-affected situations did not seem to have a deep impact on the discourse and above all the practice that the very same international agencies articulated ‘in theatre’ and on the ground: here, where I could observe actual developments, education remains disjointed from peacebuilding and statebuilding processes.

7.3.2 Capacity problems and the vicious circle of dependency

In both Kosovo and East Timor a ‘capacity gap’ has framed interventions and assistance throughout the past fifteen years. In East Timor, the ‘capacity missing’ issue is both reality and discourse: by referring to it donors have legitimized their intervention in educational reform for years. Richmond claims that in the case of East Timor “[t]he ‘lack of capacity’ became a mantra that internationals deployed to legitimate their control of governance, as elsewhere” (2011: 86). Local actors – while recognising the lack-of-capacity problem at multiple levels – have also pointed at the lack of local language skills, cultural understanding of society and empathy by international actors (Ibid.). International advisers and consultants would often lack institutional and contextual grounding and their rapid and continuous rotation would result in contradictory inputs at times in contradiction with governmen policy.
Institution and capacity-building processes have been hampered by lack of coordination among international and local actors and by a model/approach of technical expertise that did not favor mentoring and skills-transfering to national counterparts (Engel and Vieira 2011: 7). Therefore, rhetorical emphasis on coordination was not translated into a practical will to actually improve coordination.

Capacity building was identified by the UNDP as the appropriate response to the development of civil society (2006: 47), whose emergence has been painfully slow (Richmond and Franks 2008: 194) but it applied to all sectors at each level, including education. It has shaped the discourse of the main donors and development agencies whose preassumption was that East Timor was to be rebuilt from scratch. Real or perceived lack of capacity has been first determined by the fact that many officials that were working in the civil service left the country along with the Indonesians; second, formal job market requirement and external (donor) standards do not match levels of education; third, donors’ expectations for quick results lead international advisors to carry required tasks themselves without involving East Timorese civil servants who are deemed to lack the needed administrative and executive capacities (Richmond and Franks 2008: 194).

While for East Timor the role of the international community has been critical in the development and evolution of the state apparatus that were built following its independence in 2002 (Shah 2011), in the specific field of education the role and modes of international assistance has been embroiled in a vicious circle of dependency. In East Timor one observes a high degree of confusion regarding the difference between capacity building and technical assistance. Moreover, the persisting discourse of the significance of local ownership clashes with the degrees of penetration – ‘for lack of local capacity’ or ‘local capacity absorption limits’ – of international assistance in education reform.

Interviews with international staff draw a clear line between technical and political decisions: the former as part of externally-driven capacity building efforts,
the latter as a prerogative and expression of local ownership. Yet, by reducing to technical skills and sequences the fundamentally political nature of assistance in education, the risk (and often the outcomes) that one observes is the depoliticization of decisions that ultimately imply responsibility and accountability. Accountability and legitimacy issues aside, this situation has led to conflicting and uncoordinated efforts in education reform processes.

In this regard, one of the most contentious aspects in the process remains the role of international advisors and consultants, a fact that has important consequences for policy-making and implementation. In East Timor, external consultants have substantially shaped and influenced the entire decision-making process: this has hampered local ownership by failing to invest on the building of local capacity and, in turn, by reinforcing dependency. The capillarity of the presence of consultants and advisors in the system remains significant, although increasingly disputed and confronted. The elaboration of strategic choices (and therefore the extent to which external advisors or organizations influence decision and policy making) is increasingly depending on the (local) leadership in each of the directorates of the Ministry of Education.

In Kosovo, despite a similar strong (often rhetorical) emphasis on local ownership, after more than a decade of technical assistance there remain clear deficiencies in local capacity. In overall terms, one can argue that early curriculum and higher education reforms were externally driven, to the expenses of institutional memory and context. Yet, over time local actors increased their ownership in the higher education sector. As with other post-conflict settings, donor assistance has been chaotic and has lacked coordination, but the EU-funded Sector Wide Approach was finally introduced with the specific purpose of increasing ownership: nonetheless, it is not possible to claim that an improvement of ownership levels can be detected, a circumstance that is often officially explained with ‘low absorption levels’. The vicious circle is ultimately unbroken.
CONCLUSIONS

If anything comes through in spite of all [...], it is a miracle, and probably no book is born entire and uncrippled as it was conceived.

(Virginia Woolf, A room of one’s own)

1. Globalised education between peripherality, agency and hybridity

Externally assisted post-war reconstruction processes in Kosovo and East Timor have accompanied the emergence of national education systems, whereby education reform is negotiated between international donors and local elites along multiple layers of governance, and where priorities are set by a heterogeneous international community that lacks a strategic vision on education and whose coordination with local authorities shows significant limits. In similar contexts, the education sector appears in the shape of a service developed and provided by a plethora of local, national and international actors, at the margins of the projects of building small and peripheral states. Although marginal in the statebuilding and peacebuilding enterprises, the education sector is an example of complex and hybrid governance: the suprising multiplicity of actors and interventions one encounters in studying it makes it an interesting site of contestation among different agendas. The analysis that I have proposed here has offered the opportunity to study international statebuilding interventions from a sector-based approach.

The politics of educational intervention in Kosovo and East Timor confirms the features of extra-territoriality and de-nationalization that have been characterizing education policy-making in increasingly large portions of the world, as
argued by Susan Robertson (2012) among others. However, as this research has shown, far from being the exception of the post-war phase, aspects of exogeneity and hybridity in the governance of education reform have become the norm. The governance of education reform, increasingly beyond and above state sovereignty, suggests that education, once historically central to nation building and state formation, is increasingly less of a national prerogative or exclusively bound to state imperatives and interests in externally-assisted countries. To follow Turner and Kühn’s definition and problematization of the conundrum of international intervention (2016) – which happens so regularly in everyday domestic politics that cannot be regarded as an exception to the discourse of sovereignty – one is led to conclude that being marginal to international statebuilding intervention has not made education an exception to such conundrum.

Both in Kosovo and East Timor, rather than leading the education system out of a condition of fragility, interventions have perpetuated a situation of dependency on various forms of international assistance to education reform. The governance of education reform stands out as an example confirming typical contradictory dynamics of promoting local ownership and sidelining local capacities (or institution-building versus local empowerment). Such tension has underpinned the relationship between local and international actors and further confirms similar dynamics found in other sectors of internationally-driven peacebuilding and statebuilding as highlighted by Lemay-Hébert (2012) and Richmond and Franks (2008) among others.

In both cases, the role and engagement of external actors has been substantial over time. A difference stands out: in East Timor both before the referendum and after the declaration of independence (2002), a locally-articulated vision for the role of education in the new state is found: education was expected to be a driving force for the transformation and construction of a post-colonial and post-conflict Timorese society. Social integration, political legitimacy and economic development were tied to education: an effective education system was expected to provide citizens
with the knowledge and skills necessary to participate and contribute to socio-economic and political development, promoting social equity and national unity (Caroll and Kupczyk-Romanczuk 2007). This turned out to be a discontinuous goal, mainly due to the lack of vision and coordination on the part of the international community, which overlooked the potential of that blueprint. Nothing of this can be detected in Kosovo, in spite of the key role education had for the agency of the national liberation movement.

In both cases this suggests that when education is part of externally-driven statebuilding interventions, its transformative potential is lost in the projectised and technicised reform. Education’s simultaneous incorporation and marginalisation both in external statebuilding efforts and internal state formation processes undermine the many ways that education might contribute to positive social change. Its reform, carried out by a plethora of actors lacking a strategic vision is detached by broader processes and education’s links to other sectors key to peacebuilding and statebuilding are neither recognized nor addressed.

The fact that education was part of the two most ambitious projects of statebuilding has not made education reform any different from what one may observe in other post-war settings. As with other emergency, humanitarian and conflict-affected contexts, the set of interventions promoted in both Pristina and Dili by the international community reflect more general global education policies and trends identified by Verger et al. (2012): a focus on reconstruction (mainly physical rebuilding of educational infrastructure) and educational provision (in particular increasing access at the primary level); increasing efficiency and management capacities at the systemic level; and the promotion of decentralization.

The focus on reconstruction and increasing access at primary education has been more prominent in East Timor, whose government postponed curricula and institutional development to the medium-term, suggesting that local Timorese elites have been more compliant with global agendas and priorities. Put differently, the
degree of permeability to international action (and international agenda setting) is higher in East Timor. Such a degree of permeability is proportional to the high level of infrastructural destruction and the magnitude of institutional fragilities inherited from the country’s past.

By contrast, reconstruction and reform were launched simultaneously in Kosovo within the framework of a more ambitious, grand-scale experiment of rebuilding and system renovation. Here, stronger agency by local elites, after years of parallel education experimented during the 1990s, has led to a sharper focus on higher education. Such a focus stands out, given the fact that this sector has never been top of the agenda for international actors involved in post-conflict contexts. Quite surprisingly, in the Kosovo case, both the international community and local authorities converged on an early focus on curriculum reform for all levels of education.

The two cases illustrate the limits of the World Culture Theory to explain the differing focus of international actors on educational levels or curriculum reform despite similar international interventions and assistance. This is due to the fact that as argued by Robertson and Dale (2015), Rappleye (2015) and Silova an Rappleye (2015) and confirmed by this study, the World Culture Theory overlooks and neglects contextual issues, power relations and the role of agency that may account for a differing focus within the reform of the education system as well as the power and permeability of international actors to set their agendas.

More specifically, in East Timor early childhood, secondary, higher and vocational education, along with non-formal and adult literacy have been overlooked by both national and donors-funded projects. Only recently has the government shifted its reform focus on early childhood and vocational training. By contrast, in Kosovo, the overall aim by the international community was the creation of a unified and efficient education system: efficient, modern and inclusive quality education for all has been introjected as an overarching goal by national authorities, as illustrated by
the adoption of the Kosovo Education Strategic Plan. In Kosovo, every sector – thus all sectors of education – were labeled top priority, although greater attention was placed on improving minority access to education and teacher training; over time, as the local elite gained more power, most of the resources have been allocated to higher education.

In both countries, quantitative aspects such as access and enrolment rates received more attention than qualitative aspects such as (functional) literacy or the broader connection with the economic structure and labour market. In line with global educational trends, in both cases one observes a shift from a teacher-centered/lecturing approach to an interactive, child-centred learning model: the introduction of science as a single subject and the introduction of new subjects such as civics. In East Timor, the local elite had early envisaged the introduction of critical and transformative pedagogies. Yet, in both cases, traditional forms of teacher-centered learning have remained the norm.

In Kosovo, the international community from day one sought to develop a unified education system that could be able to accommodate difference and the multi-ethnic nature of the new state. This was done by promoting decentralization, although lacking a comprehensive and transcommunity approach and underpinned by an analysis of the conflict that placed too much emphasis on the ethnic issue, overlooking the broader development *problematique*. It comes as no surprise that the same structural issues that characterized Kosovo during Yugoslavia – unemployment, underdevelopment and demographic boom – have not been addressed in and through education.

Characterized by a young demographic structure and high rates of unemployment, both countries know no match between education and skills: an explicit strategy linking education to economic development and labour market is missing in both cases. The reform and development of higher education and vocational training – two aspects on which two cases diverge very clearly – appear to
be nonetheless equally disconnected from realities such as widespread informality (in Kosovo), a low-labour intensive economic structure (in East Timor), and – more generally – seem to be stumbling ahead in addressing market needs through employment generation. Higher education in Kosovo has been important for processes of state-breaking, state-making and elite legitimization both before and after the war. However, the ways in which Kosovo’s political elites have captured the higher education field and made use of it represent a case of missed opportunities and, ultimately, political collusion. Moreover, the development and bifurcation of the education system reflect and exacerbate the conflict between the two main ethnic communities.

While – at least on paper - education was expected to lead nation building processes, contribute to social cohesion and underpin individual and collective development, in practice the space for reaching such goals has been limited in both East Timor and Kosovo. A possible explanation for this might be that education has gradually become less of a priority for international donors and national elites. Indeed, there exists an observable discrepancy between stated goals/expectations and actual outcomes and more broadly between global discourses, on the one hand, and practices on the ground on the other.

In Kosovo these gaps are illustrated by the international community’s commitment to the goal of creating a unified, non-segregated and inclusive education, a discourse that was later appropriated by national authorities for inclusive and quality education for all. However, in practice, Kosovo’s education is characterized by the presence of fragmented and territorially divided education systems, each following ethno-national demarcations. In East Timor, this is exemplified by the crucial role of education in building a distinctive Timorese identity (a lofty aspiration that is explicitly articulated in official documents), while in practice the development and implementation of education curricula have been carried out by Portuguese universities and foreign experts in absence of any reference and relevance to the local
context, leading to no construction of distinctive identity.

More generally, the growing recognition by a plethora of international donors such as UNICEF, World Bank and UNESCO of the complex and important role that education should play in post-conflict and conflict-affected settings has not boosted education programs in those countries assisted and shaped by international state building interventions. This study has shown that education remains marginal in processes of nation building and state formation in conflict-affected settings.

The critical cultural political economy of education approach (Robertson and Dale 2015) that has informed this study has allowed to unravel the different narratives, discourses and imaginaries that have characterized the discourse and practice of educational reform in the two case studies notwithstanding similar international interventions. In East Timor the Education for All (EFA) and the Millennium Development Goals have constituted the frameworks (and benchmarks) that inform educational objectives and reform, while the notion of capacity building has underpinned and justified the international presence in the education sector. In Kosovo, Europeanization, modernization and life-long learning have shaped the landscape of educational policy-making and reform. In both cases, a similar ‘knowledge-based society/economy’ imaginary is reverberated in discourses on education. Yet, the marginalization of education in the new states tends to make this imaginary an empty shell: ultimately, the marginality of education stands as a symptom of peripherality.

This study has addressed a gap that existed in the scholarly debate on peacebuilding and statebuilding processes regarding the specific role of education in post-conflict countries affected by international interventions. It showed how the sector was at the margins of both processes. Moreover, it has showed how the marginalization of education within international statebuilding interventions has similarly affected the agendas of local elites in both countries. Irrespective of contextual and contigent differences, local political elites have not aimed at building a
strong nation or national identity through education: their commitment to this goal
did not go beyond the consolidation of their grip to power.

2. Education between limited states and peace-as-stability

Education has been a marginal sector within the broader political economy of
peacebuilding and statebuilding, and in fact a mere reflection of the principles and
practices that underpin them. Put differently, rather than affecting the processes of
consolidating peace and building the state – for example, by igniting change and
promoting social justice – intervention in education in East Timor and Kosovo has
reflected, legitimised and enhanced the prevailing models of peacebuilding and
statebuilding, dragging along their dilemmas, their pitfalls and their shortcomings.

The entire process of intervention in the two countries is characterized by an
understanding of peace, development and reconciliation programs as by-default
processes and functions of the strengthening of formal state institutions and free
market. While in East Timor this has been conducive to a form of virtual peace that
is disconnected from the everyday life experience and welfare requirements of the
vast majority of the population (Richmond and Franks 2008), in Kosovo it has
resulted in a peace characterized by both the absence of conflict and (ethnic)
interaction among homogenized and yet polarized communities (Randazzo and
Bargués 2012).

In both cases, peace has assumed over time a narrow form of stability, with
relatively low levels of violent clashes, persistent political crisis and structural
vulnerabilities/inequalities that are left unaddressed, a condition close to Galtung’s
definition of negative peace (1996). One of the several dilemmas facing post-war
contexts is the imperative of stability and the prevention of relapse into war (Paris
and Sisk 2009). In Kosovo and East Timor, the imperative of stability that has
underpinned statebuilding and peacebuilding processes have dictated priorities and
determined choices in education reform and content.

Chapter three, four, five and six have shown that Kosovo and East Timor education has also been marginal to the nation building process. In such contexts the process of nation building - mediated between local and international actors - is often suspended, postponed, or incomplete, with impacts for what is taught or not being taught, and to whom. Confirming previous work done by Jones (2011) on the post-conflict education system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kosovo case here analysed confirms that in settings where the ethnicity component has been a significant component of the conflict itself, the process of curriculum reform and development is unstable, incomplete and conflictual. In particular, the debate over national history is a case in point. As in other post-war contexts such as Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where identity and ‘ethnic factors’ have played an important role in the conflict, history is either omitted or reduced to quick fact browsing. In both cases, education has not contributed to social cohesion or reconciliation by building a strong and complex national identity (Clark 2010).

This study confirms that the Western trajectory of education and state formation has not had an impact in contexts where the main aim is not the building of a strong nation and state but, as Hameiri and Kühn (2011) have argued, the governing and the managing of externally-maintained fragile governments, permanently sitting on the fulcrum between conflict, insecurity and instability. In a context of all-encompassing peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions, education reform has been treated as business as usual, presenting similar features as in other contexts of emergency and post-war humanitarian response.

In East Timor there have been high expectations about education, even though such expectations did not push education all the way into any peacebuilding and statebuilding strategy. Most of the interviews with international and local actors confirm that education was built and reformed with the expectation that it would contribute to peacebuilding. However, none of the interviewees were able to specify
any plausible path through which this may have happened in the Timorese context: to paraphrase, ‘after all, education is good, nobody is in principle against education’. And, by the way, ‘peace is good too’: so they must be related to one another. Moreover, as Chapter five has shown, building peace was not even a priority in the Timorese case, at least until the 2006 violent riots. What emerges from my fieldwork is a disarming lack of political will and absence of a strategy concerning ‘peacebuilding and statebuilding through education’. When it comes to its link with peacebuilding/statebuilding, if one were to conceptualize education policy in East Timor it could be called an anti-policy of education, as there is discrepancy between conception, expectations and outcomes, with a clear lack of strategy of how a given process would produce expected outcomes.

In Kosovo, as argued by Randazzo and Bargués (2012), the international community has adopted a divisive version of multiculturalism, based upon a narrow understanding of the notion of identity, mainly in ethnic terms. This has led to the creation of a multi-ethnic society which is kept fictionally homogenised within ethnic groups but it is practically polarized among diverse groups. In the education field, this has entailed the decentralisation of education governance and curricula, which is in continuity with broader global trends in educational reform as argued by Poppema (2012), Robertson and Dale (2015), Dale (2009) among others. The promotion of a multi-ethnic and pluralist society through education has led to a multiplication of curricula in different languages. Albeit not all available for lack of funds and political willingness, where some education integration exists this has not resulted in a integration between different communities. Emphasis on equal rights and extensive decentralised autonomies for the different communities, along with a strong focus on stability and security, has made education segregation a clear choice that anyone can gauge on the ground.

In Kosovo, the fact that education has been marginal to peacebuilding and statebuilding projects has not made education a safer space for ethnic interaction.
Perhaps because it was too central to conflict and nation building dynamics for providing with such an opportunity. Moreover, in Kosovo, with the exception of higher education, the sector has been marginal for the local elite and for the state making process. In East Timor, where education has historically been less contiguou with conflict, it has not provided with the space for addressing conflict drivers either.

The study of education reform in Kosovo and East Timor suggests that the focus on formal state institutions and institutional development tends to hamper local ownership and perpetuate vicious circles of dependency even in those sectors that are considered to be key to addressing fragility by building individual and social skills and human development. Education reform in both cases shows that the international community ended up sidelining the contribution and the capacity of local communities. By focusing over time on political elites and on the strengthening of formal state institutions, the international community contributed to solidifying the ‘capacity gap’ that it sought to fight.

In embarking on this study I expected that I could demonstrate that education is crucial for social transformation and cohesion: however, by reflecting upon the limits that I could observe in the way education was incorporated in statebuilding and peacebuilding interventions I have to draw conclusion on the failure to exploit the potential of education for broader social change and justice. Part of the problem could be in the fact that the objective of international statebuilding intervention is not to transform the root causes, but to contain the risk of a relapse into war. Be that as it may, the fact that education, on a macro-historical scale, was marginal to the processes of nation building is probably to be understood as a result of its incorporation to the (neo-)liberal projects of statebuilding and peacebuilding: neoliberalism does not entail a key role for public education in state formation.

At the end of this reflection, the problem of where to locate cohesion in the shaping of a national community seems to remain urgent, especially for new born states. As a matter of fact, for classical political science, thinking about state
formation and the education sector means thinking the nation. Stein Rokkan’s ‘comparative macro-history of the territories of Western Europe’ sees the formation of the nation as the result of a long-term process that can be understood only through the medium of the state and its institutional framework (1987: 75; 1975). In this perspective – that extends sequential modernization schemes to extra-European contexts and that I would not hesitate to call ‘modernist’ – nationalism stands out as the by-product of state making, irrespective of whether it is deliberately propagated by the political center, or by a periphery that seeks to resist cultural homogenization and assimilation. Nationalism, in this perspective, has to do with those political activities “[t]hat aim to make the boundaries of the nation – a culturally distinctive collectivity aspiring to self-governance – coterminous with those of the state” (Hechter 1999: 7 quoted in Jaffrelot 2003: 7). Against this background, I believe that we observe changes in the way in which education relates to statebuilding and nationalism in new states, and that we need further research to better substantiate the direction of ongoing changes.

When thinking about the trajectory of the relationship between new states and education Ernest Gellner’s theory of nations and nationalism (1983) is somehow unavoidable. My study shows first of all that even in small states emerging after wars that take place in times of globalization and sustained international intervention, new education systems are configurated in line with the modern nation scheme: a pyramid at whose base there are primary schools, staffed by teachers, led by the product of advanced graduate schools. With Gellner, one is therefore tempted to conclude that the education pyramid provides the criterion for the minimum size for a viable political unit. According to Gellner, who wrote that “[t]he limits of the culture within which they were educated are also those of the world within which they can morally and professionally, breathe” (1983: 36), the minimal size of a nation are defined as the minimal scale of an efficient educational apparatus (Jaffrelot 2003: 44).

Questions for future research - to which the present study has sought to
contribute only through insights based on partial evidence – regard how the nation relates to the state and how both relate to education in a late-modern age - that is, an era dominated by information technology, transplanetary economic exchange, and new forms of mobility and intervention that often bypass state control, and exert formidable pressure on small, young, peripheral states.
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