The Impact of Political Opportunity Structures on Networks of Immigrant Associations: A Comparison of Two European Cities

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Abstract

Political inclusion of migrants is at the heart of contested scholarly and political debate. The increasing diversity of European democracies and the exclusion of a large part of the resident population from the political process raise questions about social cohesion and the quality of democracy. In the absence of voting rights for migrant residents, associations are often considered as an alternative for voice, representing migrants and defending their interest in the political process. Yet, little is known about the conditions favoring the political inclusion of migrant associations.

Studies on migrants associations tend to consider migrant organizations as discrete units acting independently from each other. Yet, migrant associations do not act in a vacuum and are embedded in webs of relations as well as in a wider political context. Social movement scholars implicitly acknowledge an interaction between institutional and relational context in affecting collective action, but studies analyzing this interaction are scarce. Considering only one of the two structures in which associations are embedded might lead to wrong conclusions as to what fosters political inclusion. Thus, the objective of this study is twofold. First it attempts to link two traditions in the social movement literature: the political opportunity theory and the relational approach. Second, it aims at furthering our knowledge on the mechanisms linking the embeddedness of migrants associations in an institutional and a relational context and their political inclusion.

Empirically, this study analyzes network structures in the field of immigration and the political inclusion of migrant organizations in Lyon and in Zurich. To analyze network structures the study draws on a relational approach to social movements that provides useful tools for comparing networks across contexts by defining a typology of modes of coordination of collective action. Modes of coordination are the mechanisms through which resources are allocated within collectivities but also how collective representation are elaborated as well as collective identities. The specific opportunities in the field of immigration draw on the citizenship approaches of nation-states to define the opportunities in the field. Two dimensions of political opportuntiy structures are defined. An institutional dimension, which refers to the rights

and duties offered to immigrants as well as the institutional channels available to them, but also resources to actors acting in the field. The cultural dimension refers to the notions of citizenship and national identity that act as discursive opportunities and provide public recognition of different identities in the field. The main argument of this study is that the specific institutional and discursive opportunities in the field of immigration affect the network structure of migrant organizations and that the political inclusion of migrant organizations is affected by the interaction of both structures.

Drawing on the social movement literature, this study analyzes the effect of the specific opportunity structure in the field of immigration on network structure and the political inclusion of migrant organizations. The results show that migrant organizations adapt to the specific opportunities when creating alliances, and the networks that emerge vary between the cities under study. Indeed, associations tend to create alliances on the basis of their access to institutional channels, and the publicly recognized identities in the field. Moreover, it shows that the interaction of the opportunity structure and the network structure affects political inclusion of migrant associations. Indeed, the embeddedness of associations in similar relational structures has different outcomes for political inclusion according to the context.

The study concludes by stating that analyzing the interaction of specific political opportunity structures and network structures is necessary to get a better understanding of the conditions favoring or hindering the political inclusion of migrant organizations.

Résumé

L'inclusion politique des migrants fait l'objet de débats controversés aussi bien dans le milieu académique que dans la sphère politique. La diversité grandissante des démocraties européennes et l'exclusion du processus politique d'une grande partie de la population résidente soulèvent des questions quant à la cohésion sociale et la qualité de la démocratie. En l'absence de droit de vote pour les migrants résidents, les associations sont souvent considérées comme une alternative à l'expression des migrants ainsi qu'à la défense de leurs intérêts dans le processus politique. Cependant, les conditions favorisant l'inclusion politique des associations de migrants sont peu connues. Les études sur les associations de migrants tendent à les considérer comme des unités distinctes, agissant indépendamment les unes des autres. Toutefois, les associations de migrants n'agissent pas dans le vide ; elles sont incorporées dans un réseau de relations ainsi que dans un contexte politique plus large. Les spécialistes des mouvements sociaux reconnaissent implicitement que l'interaction du contexte institutionnel avec le contexte relationnel peut affecter l'action collective, mais les études analysant cette interaction restent rares. Ne considérer qu'une seule des deux structures dans lesquelles les associations de migrants sont incorporées peut mener à des conclusions erronées sur ce qui favorise l'inclusion politique. Ainsi, l'objectif de cette étude est double. Premièrement, elle tente de combiner deux traditions de la littérature sur les mouvements sociaux: la théorie des opportunités politiques et l'approche relationnelle. Deuxièmement, elle a pour objectif de développer nos connaissances des mécanismes reliant l'incorporation des associations de migrants dans un contexte institutionnel et relationnel et leur inclusion politique.

Au niveau empirique, cette étude analyse les structures de réseau dans le champ de l'immigration et l'inclusion politique des associations de migrants à Lyon et à Zurich. Afin d'analyser ces réseaux, elle s'appuie sur l'approche relationnelle des mouvements sociaux. Celle-ci offre des outils utiles pour la comparaison de réseaux dans différents contextes en définissant une typologie des modes de coordination de l'action collective. Les modes de coordination renvoient aux mécanismes à travers lesquels les ressources sont affectées au sein des collectivités, mais également à la manière dont les représentations

ainsi que les identités collectives sont élaborées. Les opportunités spécifiques dans le champ de l'immigration se basent sur les approches de la citoyenneté des état-nations pour définir les opportunités Deux dimensions des opportunités sont définies. La dimension institutionnelle se réfère aux droits et aux devoirs des migrants ainsi qu'aux accès institutionnels dont ils disposent. Celle-ci prévoit les accès institutionnels mais également les ressources des acteurs agissant dans le champ de l'immigration. La dimension culturelle fait référence aux notions de citoyenneté et d'identité nationale qui agissent comme des opportunités discursives et prévoit la reconnaissance de différentes identités dans le champ de l'immigration. L'argument principal de cette étude est que les opportunités spécifiques institutionnelles et discursives dans le champ de l'immigration ont un effet sur la structure des réseaux des associations de migrants et que l'inclusion politique de celles-ci dépend de l'interaction des deux structures.

Faisant appel à la littérature sur les mouvements sociaux, cette étude analyse l'effet des structures d'opportunités politiques spécifiques dans le champ de l'immigration sur les réseaux d'associations des migrants et leur inclusion politique. Les résultats montrent que les associations de migrants s'adaptent aux opportunités spécifiques en créant des alliances et que les réseaux qui se forment varient d'un contexte à l'autre. En effet, les associations tendent à créer des alliances sur la base de leur accès aux canaux institutionnels et des identités reconnues publiquement dans le champ. De plus, les résultats montrent que l'interaction des structures d'opportunités et de la structure du réseau a un effet sur l'inclusion politique des migrants. En effet, l'incorporation des associations dans des structures relationnelles similaires a différentes conséquences selon le contexte.

Cette étude conclut en déclarant que l'analyse de l'interaction des opportunités politiques spécifiques et des structures de réseau est nécessaire pour une meilleure compréhension des conditions favorisant ou empêchant l'inclusion politique des associations de migrants.

Riassunto

L'inclusione politica dei migranti è al centro del dibattito scientifico e politico. La diversità in progressivo aumento delle democrazie europee e l'esclusione di una vasta parte della popolazione residente dai processi politici sollevano importanti questioni inerenti la coesione sociale da un lato e la qualità della democrazia dall'altro.In assenza del diritto di voto per gli immigrati residenti, le associazioni sono spesso considerate una possibile alternativa di protesta, rappresentando i migranti e difendendone i diritti nel corso del processo politico. Tuttavia, le condizioni che favoriscono l'inclusione sociale delle associazioni di migranti sono state ancora poco esplorate.

Le ricerche sulle associazioni di immigrati tendono a considerarle organizzazioni isolate che agiscono indipendentemente l'una dall'altra. Ciononostante, esse non agiscono in un vacuum, sono piuttosto integrate in relazioni di rete così come in un più ampio contesto politico. Gli studiosi di movimenti sociali d'altro canto assumono implicitamente l'esistenza di una interazione tra contesto istituzionale e relazionale in grado di influenzare l'azione collettiva, ma gli studi che analizzano specificamente tale interazione sono ancora poco numerosi. Prendere in considerazione solo una delle due strutture in cui le associazioni sono inserite potrebbe portare a conclusioni errate circa ciò che promuove l'inclusione politica. Per queste ragioni, gli obiettivi di questo lavoro sono duplici. Prima di tutto cerca di unire due tradizioni della letteratura sui movimenti sociali: la teoria dell'opportunità politica e l'approccio relazionale. In secondo luogo, mira ad approfondire la nostra conoscenza dei meccanismi che legano le associazioni di migranti, esaminate nel contesto politico e relazionale in cui sono inserite, e la loro inclusione politica.

Da un punto di vista empirico questa ricerca analizza le strutture di rete nel campo dell'immigrazione e dell'inclusione politica delle organizzazioni di migranti a Lione e Zurigo. Per analizzare le strutture di rete si basa sull'approccio relazionale ai movimenti sociali che fornisce utili strumenti di comparazione delle reti attraverso i vari contesti definendo una tipologia degli stili di coordinamento dell'azione collettiva. Gli stili di coordinamento sono i meccanismi attraverso cui si allocano le risorse all'interno delle collettività, ma permettono di stabilire anche come le rappresentazioni e le identità collettive siano elaborate. Le opportunità specifiche nel campo dell'immigrazione

si basano sugli approcci di cittadinanza degli stati-nazione per definire le opportunità nel campo. Saranno definite due dimensioni di opportunità. Una dimensione istituzionale, che riguarda i diritti e i doveri di cui gli immigrati sono portatori, e i canali istituzionali di cui possono avvalersi, ad anche le risorse disponibili per gli attori attivi sul campo. La dimensione culturale fa riferimento ai concetti di cittadinanza e identità nazionale che agiscono come opportunità discorsive e offrono riconoscimento pubblico alle differenti identità culturali in campo. La tesi principale di questa ricerca è che le opportunità istituzionali e discorsive nel campo dell'immigrazione influenzino gli stili di coordinamento dell'azione collettiva delle organizzazioni di immigrati e che la loro inclusione politica sia a sua volta influenzata dall'interazione di entrambe le strutture.

Poggiandosi sulla letteratura dei movimenti sociali, questa ricerca analizza gli effetti della specifica struttura di opportunità nel campo dell'immigrazione sulle strutture relazionali e sull'inclusione politica delle organizzazioni dei migranti. I risultati mostrano che le organizzazioni di immigrati si adattano alle specifiche opportunità creando alleanze e i network emersi variano tra le due città studiate. Cionondimeno, le associazioni tendono a creare alleanze sulla base degli accessi ai canali istituzionali e sulla base delle identità pubblicamente riconosciute sul campo. Inoltre, questa ricerca mostra che l'interazione fra la struttura delle opportunità e la struttura relazionale influenza l'inclusione politica delle associazioni di migranti. L'inserimento di associazioni in contesti relazionali simili ha esiti diversi in termini di inclusione politica a seconda del contesto.

La ricerca evidenzia quindi che analizzare l'interazione sia delle specifiche strutture di opportunità politica e sia delle specifiche strutture relazionali è necessario per poter comprendere le condizioni che favoriscono od ostacolano l'inclusione politica delle organizzazioni di immigrati.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Aims and research questions

This study focuses on the effect of political opportunity structures on fields of migrant organizations, and on the consequences for collective action of actors embedded in these structures. More precisely, it aims at understanding the underlying mechanisms linking institutional structures, network structures and collective action and their consequences for the political inclusion of migrant organizations. More precisely, its aim is to understand the mechanisms favoring or hindering their political participation in the receiving society. The study analyzes how the institutional context affects the network structure in the field of immigration and how the interaction of these two structures impacts political inclusion of migrant associations. Empirically, it looks at the networks in the field of immigration in Lyon and Zurich and at the political participation of migrant organizations in these cities.

The issue of political integration of migrants has become an important political and scholarly debate (Bloemraad, 2006; Fennema and Tillie, 2001, 1999; Giugni and Passy, 2006; Ireland, 1994; Koopmans et al., 2005; Morales and Giugni, 2011b; Portes and Zhou, 1993; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a). Previously, integration has been studied mainly in its economical, social and cultural dimensions, particularly in Northern European countries, where immigrants were long considered as only temporary residents who would return to their homeland. As immigrants settled, the question of their integration in the decision-making process started to become salient.

Indeed, few European countries are granting immigrants voting rights. Thus, a large part of the resident population is excluded from the political sphere.

The growing diversity of Western democracies and the exclusion of a large part of the resident population has raised the question of migrants' political inclusion and of how immigration policies can foster migrants' political involvement in the host society. The exclusion from the political arena of a large part of the population not only raises questions about the quality of democracy, but can also have negatives effects on democratic politics as well as social cohesion. To address these issues, the question of granting migrants voting rights has been debated in many European democracies. In France, for example, the socialist government is attempting to introduce voting rights for migrants at the local level since the 80's. In Switzerland, while some cantons grant migrants with voting rights, it is a recurrent issue in those which do not. Popular initiatives were launched in different cantons - such as Zurich - that were rejected by voters. However, 8 cantons out of 26 grant migrants voting right at the local level.

As mentioned previously, the absence of voting rights of a large share of the resident populations can have negative consequences for democratic politics. Indeed, it weakens the process of political representation and the legitimacy of political authorities. Moreover, the political exclusion of migrants is likely to spill over to their social and economic integration, as the policy process will fail to address adequately their needs in these domains (Morales and Giugni, 2011a).

This raises the question of the quality of democracy, when considered in its participatory dimension and in terms of access to decision-making processes. Participation in the political sphere is by no means limited to voting activities and migrants can access the political sphere through associations. Migrants' associations can serve as vectors of migrants' interests and represent them in the political process. The integrative potential of migrants' associations is widely emphasized by state actors. However, the means to deal with migrants' associations is highly contested. Should states favor migrants organizing processes by actively encouraging associations by providing funds or let migrants organize by themselves? Which policies favor associations' capacity of representing migrants and defend their interests? Moreover, not all associations in general, and migrants' associations in particular, do engage in political activities and are able to make their voice

heard. The question of why some migrants engage in political activities and others do not remains an open one, as well as the question of the most efficient policy favoring their political participation.

Since Tocqueville, the density and variety of civil society are considered as conditions for a democracy to work. In this perspective, social integration through associations is necessary for democratic institutions to work (Putnam, 1993, 2000, 2007). Many scholars addressed this issue and showed the positive outcomes of a developed associational life on the quality of democracy. Associations are increasing the level of political participation (Verba et al., 1995), but they also increase the social capital of its members and thus the general level of trust in a society (Putnam, 1993, 2000, 2007). There is in this literature a consensus about Tocqueville's view that viability of a democracy depends on the robustness of its associational life. Associations are said to provide representation, as well as means of resistance. In terms of political equality, associations allow for voice for the disadvantaged by the existing distribution of power (Warren, 2001).

Following this line of reasoning, works on migrants' integration emphasize the positive outcomes of associations for social, cultural, and political integration of immigrants (Schmitter, 1980; Fennema and Tillie, 1999, 2001; Vertovec, 1999; Odmalm, 2004; Vermeulen, 2005; Pilati, 2008; Portes et al., 2008). Such organizations are considered important for immigrants' participation and integration in the host society. This importance can be traced back to the fact that these associations provide services for newcomers' settlement, welfare services for settled immigrants, but they can also provide immigrants with access to the local political community and help them in maintaining ties with their homeland (Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005a). More generally, migrants' organizations are said to provide immigrants with social and cultural resources, favoring their integration and participation in the host society or helping them in maintaining their identity.

Studies on immigrants' political integration also emphasized the positive effects of immigrants' associations on political participation. At the individual level, membership in associations (ethnic and non-ethnic) favors political participation of immigrants (Jacobs and Tillie, 2004; Morales and Giugni, 2011b). Associations endow individuals with resources such as civic skills, social capital or group consciousness. At the community level, Fennema and Tillie (1999) showed the positive effect of associations, through their

networks and the resources they provide for political integration. Following Putnam's (1993) work on social capital, they explain levels of political participation of migrants at the group level in Amsterdam, by the density of ethnic organizational networks and their level of trust in the members of the community they belong to. To do so, they looked at the network of ethnic organizations and suggested that denser ethnic organizational networks favor the political participation (electoral participation in local elections) of ethnic groups. Indeed, a denser ethnic civic community increases trust and mutual reciprocity within the community, which spills over to trust in political institutions, which in turn favors political participation. Starting from their study, different authors tested the social capital hypothesis of Fennema and Tillie by applying it at different local contexts (see the special issue of the JEMS edited by Jacobs and Tillie, 2004; Morales, 2011). These authors looked at immigrants' membership in voluntary organizations and its link to political participation from an individual perspective and showed that membership in voluntary associations spurs political participation.

However, the approach based on Putnam's social capital considers that more participation makes citizens more virtuous, and that participation increases with trust and reciprocity (Warren, 2001). Yet, associations can also exclude migrants from the receiving society. Identity-based groups may increase in-group solidarity, but at the same time, demonize out-groups. Democracy requires a variety of effects, not just trust and reciprocity, but also, in different contexts, capacities for dissent and resistance (Warren, 2001). As pointed out by several authors (Kymlicka, 1998), there are two key questions about ethnic associations from the perspective of liberal democratic citizenship: whether these associations develop the ability to question authority and whether they are willing to engage in public discourse.

Political inclusion refers to the possibility that some groups have to access the institutional channels and make their claims heard, not only through voting, but also as collective actors. Many authors tend to take the positive effect of immigrants' organizations on integration and voice for granted. However, immigrants' organizations could also exclude immigrants from the host society. Finally, associations may replicate or reinforce existing power relations among groups (Warren, 2001). So the question remains open, of to what extent are immigrants' organizations positive for political inclusion of the migrant population. Indeed, the positive effect of dense networks of

ethnic associations found in Amsterdam by Fennema and Tillie may not be observed in other contexts. The multicultural context encourages migrants to organize on an ethnic basis and in this context, dense networks of ethnic associations may be the appropriate network structure for political integration. In contrast, in assimilationist countries, where organization on an ethnic basis is not encouraged, dense ethnic networks may exclude migrants from the host society or reinforce the existing exclusion.

Thus, context matters. In his account on social capital as a resource for action, Lin (2001) stresses that dense networks can be useful for preserving and maintaining valued resources, what he calls expressive actions. Instead, for instrumental actions, that is the search for obtaining resources that are not yet in possession of a group, it is more useful to access and extend bridges. Migrants do not have access to the same resources according to the context; migrants' associations are embedded in political contexts with different opportunities for participation. Studies on collective claim making show that multicultural contexts give migrants the legitimacy to intervene in the public sphere which enhances their level of mobilizations. Other contexts exclude migrants from the public sphere. Indeed, according to Soysal (1994), particular policies define forms of participation that also configure the collective patterns of migrants' organizations. Some scholars have addressed this issue and suggested that the modes of incorporating migrants (i.e., the specific political opportunities to the field of immigration) shape their political mobilization (Koopmans et al., 2005; Giugni and Passy, 2006). The political opportunities have also been shown to impact the nature and continuity or the formation of immigrants' organizations (Bloemraad, 2005; Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005a). Few studies also examined how the host society institutions shape the organizational incorporation of immigrants. They showed that political institutions can pattern the political organization of groups through the way in which public resources are provided, through the process of selection and expression which gain legitimation by the state, and through the kinds of representational categories which are officially recognized (Soysal, 1994).

At the individual level, the context has been shown to affect the role of migrants' organizations for political integration. Indeed, in some contexts, cross-ethnic or non-ethnic organizations play a more important role in explaining political integration of migrants than do membership in ethnic

organizations (Jacobs et al., 2004). Using social movement theories to compare levels of political integration of migrants, some authors have taken into account the effect of the context on political integration and how it affects migrants' organizations. Testing for the crowding out effect of government intervention on civil society hypothesized by Tocqueville, Bloemraad (2005) shows in Boston and Toronto how political intervention favors the number as well as the diversity of migrants' organizations. The founding and continuation of migrant organizations have been found to be context dependent (Vermeulen, 2005). Others show how the mobilizing role of migrants' organizations, but also the ability of migrants' associations to represent migrants interest, have an effect on local politics and make their voice heard (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a).

At the organizational level, the political opportunity structure also affects the integration potential of migrants' organizations. In Milan, characterized by an ethno-assimilationist model of citizenship, migrants' organizations that are linked to autochthonous organizations are better integrated politically than migrant organizations densely related to ethnic organizations (Pilati, 2011). Migrants organized on an ethnic basis are excluded from the political sphere and autochthonous organizations act as brokers between migrants and the receiving society's public sphere. Vermeulen and Berger (2008) , by comparing the network structure of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and Berlin, found a horizontal and densely interconnected network in the open context of Amsterdam and a hierarchical and fragmented network in the rather closed context of Berlin. As a consequence, Turks in Amsterdam are better integrated politically than Turks in Berlin.

These studies point to the importance of taking into account the context in which migrants are embedded for explaining political inclusion, and more specifically, the modes of incorporating migrants. Yet, few studies looked at why certain organizations play a positive role for integration, are able to make their voice heard and influence politics and decision-making and why others are left out of the process (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a). Moreover, studies of immigrants' associations usually consider associations as discrete units, acting independently from other associations. Only few looked at the networks in which associations are embedded, and when they do, they tend to focus on one specific ethnic group. Yet, associations are not only embedded in specific political opportunity structures, they are also

embedded in a context of interaction with other actors. Inter-organizational networks create constraints and opportunities for collective action (Diani, 2004; Knoke, 1990). In order to understand what resources are available to immigrants' organizations for political integration, one should take into account the relational aspect in the field of immigration and try to identify how organizations can access the resources provided by the networks. The idea that networks provide resources stems from the social capital literature (Coleman, 1988; Bourdieu, 1980; Putnam, 1993; Lin, 2001), and some authors have demonstrated that different network structures provide different type of resources (Lin, 2001). In this vein, the type of resources available to immigrants' organizations will also depend on how organizations are linked to each other, on the content of their ties, and on the structure of the whole network. It is thus important to identify the factors explaining the variations in the network structure so as to explain differences in the level of political inclusion of immigrants' associations.

This discussion raises different questions about migrants' associations and political inclusion. While it underlines the importance of taking into account the context in which associations are embedded, it also shows how taking the relational structure into account might improve our knowledge of the processes favoring migrant's associations' political inclusion. Thus the research questions are the following: What is the shape of migrants' organizational networks? Do migrants' organizational networks vary from one context to the other?, and if so, what accounts for different structures of migrants' organizational networks? Do different network structures provide migrants' associations with different resources for political inclusion? And how does the network structure interact with the context in providing resources to migrants' organizations?

1.2 Political opportunity theory and the relational approach to social movements

To answers these questions, this study draws on the social movement literature, with the attempt to link two traditions in social movement analysis: the political opportunity theory and the relational approach to social movements. The political opportunity theory posits that the political context and the political opportunity structure have an impact on the action repertoire,

on the mobilization level, and on the outcomes of social movements (Tarrow, 1989; Kriesi et al., 1995; Giugni, 2004). They have been defined as "signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use internal resources to form social movements" (Tarrow, 1996, p.65). Drawing on the political opportunity theory, authors dealing with migrants' collective action developed a theoretical framework for the analysis of claim-making and formation of collective identities in the field of immigration and ethnic relations (Koopmans et al., 2005; Giugni and Passy, 2006). They defined specific opportunities to the field of immigration, drawing on the conceptions of citizenship and nationhood. This approach allows to overcome a limit of the traditional political opportunity approach, which focused on the "how" of mobilization, and neglected the question of why social movements constitute themselves around specific collective identities and aims (Koopmans et al., 2005). Thus, it adds a cultural dimension to the institutional dimension of political opportunity structures. Hence, specific opportunities to the field of immigration combine two dimensions: (1) an institutional dimension which refers to the rights and duties offered to immigrants, as well as to the resources and institutional channels available to them and (2) a cultural dimension referring to the cultural notions of citizenship and national identity, the discursive opportunities.

Social movement scholars recently started to emphasize the importance of a relational approach for understanding collective action (McAdam et al., 2001; Diani and McAdam, 2003; Fligstein and McAdam, 2011). One of these approaches stresses states that social movements are not mere aggregates of organizations or protest events, but that they are a characterized by a specific relational pattern which distinguishes social movements from other forms of collective action (Diani, 2003b; Diani and Bison, 2004; Diani, 2011). As a consequence, in order to identify social movements, the analysis has to be extended to organizational fields instead of selecting organizations on the basis of their specific interests or the participation in specific protest events. In this perspective, social movements are defined as networks of organizations combining dense resource exchanges with a collective identity. Analyzing organizational fields and the relational patterns that take place within these fields allows us to identify social movements as opposed to other forms of collective action. This approach emphasizing the relational dimension of social movements and its distinction of different forms of collective action

based on the patterns of relations in which associations are embedded, this approach offers useful tools for the analysis of migrants' organizational networks. Indeed, by developing a typology of forms of collective action (i.e., different forms of relational patterns), it allows us to compare networks of migrants' organizations in different contexts and to identify the relational patterns in which they are embedded. Ultimately, it allows assessing the resources available to migrants' organizations for political integration.

The relation between political opportunities and organizational networks has received only little attention from social movement scholars. Indeed, whereas the political opportunity literature has neglected the intermediate structural basis for the mobilization, on its side, the resource mobilization theories have neglected the broader political and cultural environment in which they are embedded (Rucht, 1996). Only a few studies have examined this relation (Baldassarri and Diani, 2007; Cinalli and Füglister, 2008; Diani and Bison, 2004; Diani et al., 2010; Kriesi, 1996; Rucht, 1989, 1996), but their findings are inconsistent or even inconclusive. The present study is thus an attempt to relate both traditions and to examine in a systematic and formal way the effect of political opportunity structures on organizational network structures.

Hence, the main argument is that network structures will vary according to the institutional and cultural contexts in which they are embedded by giving incentives to actors to create certain types of alliances rather than others. More specifically, migrant organizational network structures are expected to vary according to the specific opportunities in the field of immigration. These provide migrants' organizations with symbolic and material resources which vary from one citizenship regime to the other. These resources are thus expected to affect the networks in the field of immigration and consequently the political inclusion of migrants' organizations.

1.3 Research design

To analyze networks of migrants' organizations and the way they are affected by political opportunities, the study follows a comparative approach. The next section describes the case selection as well as the comparative strategy adopted. It is followed by sections describing the data collection and the method of analysis.

1.3.1 Comparing Lyon and Zurich

To examine the relation between specific opportunities to the field of immigration and migrants' organizational networks, the study compares migrants' organizational networks at the local level. The local level is where organizations act on a daily basis, create alliances, draw boundaries and are politically active. Thus, two cities in two different countries are compared: Lyon and Zurich.[1] These two cities were selected for different reasons. First, France and Switzerland are two traditional immigration countries with similar immigration patterns. After World War II, both countries developed a policy of massive guest-worker immigration to overcome the shortage of labor, hence responding to the economic needs these countries. In the 70's, they both closed their borders to labor immigration but couldn't stop family reunion. Immigration thus resumed in both countries. Nowadays, in both countries, the main immigration source is still family reunion, additionned by asylum seekers and illegal immigration. Second, France and Switzerland have different models of citizenship. France combines a civic territorial conception of citizenship with the request of assimilation of immigrants. Switzerland combines an ethnic conception of citizenship with assimilation. Yet, the request for assimilation follows country specific lines of thinking (Giugni and Passy, 2006). The French ideal relies on universalism, republicanism, stemming from the revolution and deeply anchored in its definition of the Nation State. By contrast, the Swiss conception of assimilation relies on an ethno-assimilationist approach of its citizenship.

Lyon and Zurich being two important economic centers, immigration trends in both cities follow their national patterns. Both have a large immigrant population. Indeed, in Lyon over 20% of the population (Bozec, 2007) and over 30% of the population in Zurich has an immigration background. In addition, while both cities developed their own integration policies, the conceptions of citizenship at the local level are deeply anchored in their respective national conception of citizenship. Thus, both cities are confronted with a large migrant population and with the challenges it represents in dealing with integration and cohesion issues. However, they give different responses in terms of policies aiming at promoting migrants' integration. The two countries differ not only in their approaches to the incorporation of

[1] We refer her to Lyon for simplicity, but the study has been conducted in Vaulx-en-Velin a commune of the Greater Lyon

migrants, but also in the structure of the state. While Switzerland is a highly decentralized state in which the cantons and the communes have a great autonomy in the definition and implementation of public policies (and this is particularly true for the integration domain), France is a highly centralized country giving only limited competences to subnational units. However, the decentralization law gives cities in France strong power. The similarity of Lyon and Zurich in their immigration patterns and their differences in the way of dealing with migrants' incorporation make them very good cases to examine the mechanisms linking political inclusion of migrants' organizations and the interaction between institutional and network structures.

In order to achieve this aim, the present study follows a strategy of paired comparison between contextualized cases based in part on qualitative evidence (i.e. evidence about the context) and a detailed analysis of the network structure. Paired comparison is a comparative strategy in itself; it is neither a most similar nor a most different strategy, but rather a combination of both (McAdam et al., 2001). As opposed to most different or most similar designs, paired comparison allows us to look at common mechanisms rather than at correlations between variables (della Porta, 2002). "Paired comparison is not simply a degenerate form of large-N analysis, nor is it only a "case study plus one." It is a distinct analytical strategy for working through complex empirical and historical materials using the leverage afforded by the differences and similarities of comparable cases."(Tarrow, 2010, p.243). More precisely, paired comparison draws on deep background knowledge of the cases under analysis allowing us to disentangle the mechanisms lying beyond a phenomenon. Using this strategy allows identifying the mechanisms linking political opportunities and network structures, and highlighting the interaction of these structures in the way they affect political inclusion of migrants' organizations. More precisely, the study qualitatively analyses the specific opportunity structure in the field of immigration and combines it to a detailed network analysis of inter-organizational networks in both cities in order to show how different settings and combinations of mechanisms produce different processes and outcomes (McAdam et al., 2001).

1.3.2 The survey

The empirical focus of the study are the networks of migrants' voluntary associations, where an association is defined as "a formally organized named

group most of whose members –whether persons or organizations – are not financially recompensed for their participation" (Knoke, 1986). An association is said to be a migrants' association if at least around half of the board members have an immigration background or/and if at least half of the members have an immigration background. Such a definition of migrants' organizations allows us to examine migrants' self-organizing processes and their networking strategies. It extends the study of migrants' organizations' political inclusion to the field of immigration, as its selects organizations on the basis of their constituency and not on their interest in specific issues or in their participation in protest events.

The field work took place between 2007 and 2008. We proceeded in two steps. First, active migrants' organizations had to be retrieved. To retrieve migrants' organizations in Zurich and Lyon, we relied on different sources. Since associations do not have to register at the administration, there was no readily accessible exhaustive list which we could rely upon. Consequently, organizations were selected from different sources (official directories of associations, chamber of commerce registers, directories of associations published by private firms, consulates of the most important immigrant groups in the cities, internet search, interviews with informants and finally using the snowballing method through short interviews with already identified associations). During the mapping process, we assessed whether the contacted associations fit the definition of migrant associations. Those which did not correspond to the definition were dropped from the list. When new names were no longer mentioned, the mapping process was considered completed. As a total, 218 associations were mapped in Zurich and 535 in Lyon. Respectively, 142 and 176 were confirmed active (see table 1.1). The response rate was similar in both cities. The non response of associations that were confirmed still active was mainly due to the fact that no accurate contact information could be found. It is worth mentioning that few associations cancelled the interview, did not show up, or refused to participate to the study. Thus, in each of the cities, the sample of associations gives a reliable picture of the migrants' associations being active and visible. This was further confirmed by looking at the network of interviewed associations. Indeed, some associations also mentioned non-interviewed associations as their alliance partners. However, with the exception of two associations in Zurich, none of the reported non-interviewed associations was mentioned more than

Table 1.1: Response rate of migrant organizations in Lyon and Zurich

	Lyon	Zurich
Mapped associations	535	218
Confirmed active	176	142
Confirmed not active	23	16
Interviewed associations	52	39
Response rate (total active/total interviewed)	29.5	27.5

once. In other words, these associations do not have a higher indegree (i.e., the number of times an actor receives a tie from another actor) than 1, which means that none of these associations were considered as important actors in the network by the interviewed associations.

In a second step, the organizational survey was conducted. The data were collected through face-to-face interviews with associational leaders. Aside from the relational questions that constituted the core of the questionnaire, dimensions such as organizations' activities (whether they engage in civic, cultural and political activities and the frequency of such activities), associational identity, and associational resources (size and origin of membership, sources and amount of finances) were addressed. The duration of the interviews varied between an hour and a half and two hours.[2] During the interviews, some associations were found not to correspond to the definition of migrants' associations, and were dropped from the final list.

The data were analyzed using social network analysis. Social network analysis, as opposed to traditional analysis in social sciences, focuses on the relations of actors rather than on their characteristics. It looks at the relational patterns of actors as well as at the implications of these relationships. This method draws on a number of principles. First, actors are considered as interdependent; the links between actors are channels for transfer of resources. Finally, the network environment in which actors are embedded provide opportunities and constraints for action (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Applying this method allows us to understand in what relational patterns migrants' associations are embedded and to identify opportunities and constraints these networks provide for their political integration.

[2]See Appendix ?? on page ?? for the questionnaire.

Together, the objectives of the present study are twofold. First, it aims at analyzing in a systematic way the effect of the political opportunity structure on organizational fields. As mentioned earlier, the social movement literature implicitly acknowledged the link between political opportunity structures but it rarely looked at it in a systematic way. Moreover, existing results are inconclusive or inconsistent. Addressing the link between political opportunity structure through a detailed reconstruction of political opportunities in the field of immigration and a detailed network analysis of the inter-organizational networks will allow us to better understand the mechanisms linking political opportunities and organizational networks and enhanced knowledge about the conditions under which different forms of collective action emerge.

The second objective of the study is to get a better understanding of the factors favoring or inhibiting the political inclusion of migrants' organizations. Since migrants are excluded from electoral politics and migrants' associations are considered as alternatives for voice, grasping the conditions under which they participate or not is a central issue for social cohesion and for political actors to address migrants needs in other domains.

1.4 Outline

The manuscript is structured as follows. The next chapter provides a discussion of the political opportunity theory and of the relational approach to social movements and develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of migrants' organizational networks and associations' political inclusion. More precisely, the chapter first provides a discussion of the typology of the modes of coordination of collective action (the relational patterns). It then examines the general opportunity theory and how general political opportunities affect social movements' organizational networks. It also looks at the specific political opportunities in the field of immigration and insists in how specific opportunities are better suited for explaining network structures in the field of immigration. Building on the discussed literature, hypotheses are formulated on how the political opportunity structure can affect the network structure of migrant organizations. In a second part, the chapter addresses the political inclusion of migrants and discusses how the interactions of the specific political opportunity structures and the network structures affect the

political inclusion of migrants' organizations. It concludes with the hypotheses formulated regarding the political inclusion of migrants' organizations.

Chapter 3 offers a detailed description of the context in which migrant organizations are embedded. It first gives an overview of immigration in France and Switzerland and then, more specifically, in Lyon and Zurich. It then compares the political opportunity structure in the field of immigration in both cities. It shows how Lyon and Zurich provide migrant organizations with different opportunities and how the context is generally more favorable to migrants in Lyon and in Zurich. It concludes by providing a specification of the hypotheses formulated in the previous chapter.

Chapter 4 and 5 report the empirical assessment of the hypotheses of the effect of the specific political opportunity structure on the structure of migrants' organizational networks. These chapters examine the migrant organizational networks in Lyon and Zurich on two different aspects. Chapter 4 reports the comparison of the networks in Lyon and Zurich, and looks at the ties of resource exchange and ties of boundary definition and the relational patterns in which migrant organizations are embedded, that is the mode of coordination of collective action. Chapter 5 provides the examination the fragmentation principles at work in the networks.

In Chapter 6, the implications of the network structures for the political integration of migrant associations are analyzed. The analysis shows how different relational patterns can provide associations with different resources according the the political opportunity structures. Indeed, associations embedded in the same relational patterns in the two cities show different degrees of political inclusion, which suggests that the political opportunity structures interacts with network structure in affecting organizations' political integration.

Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, summarizes the results and discusses the implications of the findings for the analysis of the political integration of migrant associations. Open questions are presented and direction for further research is proposed.

Chapter 2

Political Opportunity Structures and Network Structures in the Field of Immigration

The objective of this chapter is to discuss the relationship between institutional context and network structure of migrant associations and to develop a theoretical framework for the analysis of networks in the field of immigration. Section 2.1 focuses on network structures. It first presents two dimensions along which global network structures (i.e., the whole organizational network) can be analyzed. It then looks at the interaction patterns and the content of ties between associations, shows the importance of distinguishing between instrumental ties and identity ties, and examines how these local relational patterns can affect the global network structure. Drawing on a network approach to social movements, how instrumental ties reflect processes of resource exchange and how identity ties reflect processes of boundary definition are shown. Finally, it discusses a typology of relational patterns that emerge from the combination of these two types of ties. Section 2.2 focuses on the context in which networks are embedded and discusses the political and institutional context in which networks are embedded, drawing on the social movement literature and more specifically on political opportunity theory. It first describes the traditional political opportunity approach and how these opportunities can affect social movements' organizational net-



Figure 2.1: Theoretical framework for the analysis of immigrants' associational networks and political integration

works. It then turns to the specific opportunities in the field of immigration and ethnic relations. It argues that specific opportunities may shape the way in which immigrant associations are related to each other by giving incentives to develop certain type of ties. It shows that, when addressing the issue of organizational networks, the traditional political opportunity theory focuses mainly on instrumental ties and strategic adaptation of actors to the political context, the specific opportunity structure to the field of immigration mainly addresses identity ties and processes of boundary-making. By combining these two approaches, it develops a theoretical framework that explains tie formation in the field of immigration. Finally, a section is devoted to the opportunities and constraints created by the network for the political incorporation of migrant organizations and how different combinations of political opportunity structures and network structures affect the political incorporation of migrants' associations. It concludes by presenting the hypotheses that will guide the empirical analysis. Figure 2.1 shows the theoretical framework. The next section discusses the central box of the figure.

2.1 Network structures of civic organizations

2.1.1 Global network structures

It is widely acknowledged that organizations are not acting in a vacuum and that they are embedded in sets of relationships with other organizations. This also holds true for immigrants associations. Yet, networks are also embedded in different contexts that may affect their overall structure (Entwisle et al., 2007). What forms can organizational networks take? What are the possible structures that immigrants' organizational networks can display? Different research domains have taken into account the relational perspective in studying actions of organizations, their global network structures, the local configurations of these networks, and the structural position of actors within the network. Community and organizational studies as well as social movement studies draw particular attention to organizational network structures.

First, the relational perspective has been taken into account in research on community power structures (Knoke, 1990). This approach emphasizes how personal and inter-organizational resource exchange result in collective actions to influence the outcome of political controversies. Second, organizational studies look at the way organizations interact to reduce uncertainty related to the environment and how organizations react to the constraints and opportunities of this environment in creating some type of networks rather than others (Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Brass et al., 2004). Finally, the social movement literature adopts a relational perspective to understand different levels of mobilization, recruitment strategies, and outcomes of movements, or to define a social movement compared to other forms of collective action (see (Diani, 2004) for a review of social networks in social movement studies).

These research domains found that organizational networks take different forms and define similar dimensions to describe network structures. In community power studies, networks are found to be centralized and hierarchical (Hunter, 1953) or pluralistic, with a diversity of major players and many lines of cleavage, such as the affiliation to different political parties (Dahl, 1961). Community studies conceive community structure as an "aggregate network of inter-organizational relations" (Laumann et al., 1978, p. 455). Actors are involved in complex relationships that affect the mobilization of

collective efforts for supporting or opposing different policy initiatives. From these relationships, network structures emerge that can be analyzed along different dimensions. Organizational networks are structured along two principles: centrality and periphery, and interest differentiation (Laumann and Pappi, 1976). The centrality periphery principle occurs in many networks such as friendship or authority relationships. Some actors receive more ties than others, and they tend to send ties to others having similarly high popularity. The resulting global network structure contains a few central positions occupied by actors tied to many others and a large number of peripheral positions occupied by actors with lower visibility, fewer ties, and generally little involvement in the system. The interest differentiation principle draws upon the relational contents of communication and specifically the tendency for pairs of organizations sharing common interests across a range of issues to establish a tie. In a network as a whole, organizations with identical or similar interests are thus more closely linked than organizations with divergent interests (Laumann and Knoke, 1987).

In their study of community power structures in Germany, Laumann and Pappi (1976) found a centralized structure in which the center was composed of more integrative organizations and the periphery of highly specialized organizations. Others found a highly clustered network in which clusters were organized around functional areas (Galaskiewicz, 1979). Thus, networks can take a centralized pyramidal form or a decentralized fractionalized one (Knoke, 1990). Comparing national policy networks in different domains along these two principles Laumann and Knoke (1987) found, for example, that central positions in the network are dominated by organizations serving as information brokers, while peripheral positions were occupied by specialist organizations having only limited capacity to sustain large amounts of communication because of lack of resources or low interest in the domain at stake. To conclude, community power structures and policy networks take different global structures and vary in time and place along two main dimensions: hierarchy/centralization and fragmentation. Moreover, the fragmentation principles also vary. In some cases, networks are fragmented along the functional area (Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz, 1993), while in others, fragmentation occurs along ideological lines, such as party affiliation (Laumann and Pappi, 1976).

Social movement studies also try to identify how social movements take different organizational forms (Campbell, 2005). While some authors argue that social movements typically take a horizontal and polycentric form (Gerlach, 2001), others found rather hierarchical structures of social movements (Diani, 2003a; Osa, 2003)[1]. Furthermore, social movement networks have been found to be fragmented along different lines. For example, fragmented along a generational line, whereas more established organizations clustered together and other, more recent organizations formed another cluster (Diani, 2003a). Other social movement networks are fragmented along ideological lines, such as the environmental movement in Milan in the 70's, in which ideological cleavages prevented collaboration between political ecology organizations and more conservationist organizations (Diani, 2003a). Networks of civic organizations have also been found to be fragmented along different principles, like shared interest and identity (Diani and Pilati, 2011). In conclusion, social movement networks vary in place and time along the dimensions identified in community power structures and policy networks. The first dimension refers to the level of hierarchy in a network, and the second one to the level of fragmentation and the principles guiding the fragmentation. These dimensions refer to characteristics of the global network structure that emerge from local interaction patterns. The next section discusses local interaction patterns and how these patterns give rise to different global forms.

2.1.2 Local interactions and the content of ties

The previous section showed how global networks can take different forms according to the principles of hierarchy and fragmentation (center box in figure 2.1). This section focuses on the second aspect of network structures (center box of the figure and on arrow 2) on the local level of the network, the content of ties, and how global structures emerge from local patterns of interaction.

Hierarchy and fragmentation refer to global structural patterns. Social network analysts distinguish between local and global network structures. The global structures can only be determined by examining the entire network. Global features of the network are contrasted with local patterns of

[1] See Diani (2003b) for different network forms of social movements

interaction that can give rise to them. Local structures rely on small network configurations, that is, subgraphs involving only a few network ties. These configurations are the outcomes of local social processes. Network ties emerge, persist, and disappear by virtue of actions made locally on the scale of the individual actors in a network (Robins et al., 2005). On the basis of their localized views, actors form strategies and make decisions that intersect with those others who are socially proximate. Combinations of these competing or complementary intentions and actions constitute social processes that make up local patterns of relationships (Robins et al., 2005). These local patterns agglomerate to create the global structure.

Local patterns of interaction can be examined by looking at the content of ties and at their distribution. Actors in a network are usually involved simultaneously in different types of ties. Organizations can be involved in exchanges of information, exchanges of resources or more personal relationships such as sharing core members or friendships between members. Studies of inter-organizational networks identify two main dimensions of linkages between organizations. Although links between organizations have mainly been considered instrumental links (resource transfer), Laumann et al. (1978) identify "two main types of inter-organizational relationships, linkages of resource transfers and those based on interpenetration of boundaries." If both types of linkages are instrumental, Laumann et al. (1978) emphasize the additional solidarity maintenance component of relationships involving boundary interpenetration. Resource transfer ties refer to money, funds, and information exchanges, whereas ties involving interpenetration of boundaries refer to common membership in federations or coalitions and shared membership. This distinction is also acknowledged by social movements studies, in which resource transfer relations are opposed to personal ties between organizations. Resource transfer refers to such exchanges as information, sharing an office, or other material resources. Personal ties refer to shared core members or board members or friendships between members (Knoke and Wisely, 1990). Different type of ties can occur simultaneously between associations. Looking at the content of ties Baldassarri and Diani (2007), take into consideration the composition of ties and their interplay in networks of civic organizations. Indeed, it is more than likely that network processes will involve different kinds of relational ties (Koehly and Pattison, 2005). Multiplexity of ties (which refers to the tendency for two or more different types of relation-

ship to occur together) may also play a role in shaping network structures. Multiplexity of ties has been mainly analyzed in its role in explaining actors' behavior, acting as opportunities or constraints shaping their behavior. By looking at the distribution of certain types of ties (making a distinction between instrumental ties and ties reflecting belongingness), Baldassarri and Diani (2007) show how ties reflecting belongingness, what they call "social bonds", characterize clusters of dense interactions between similar organizations and how instrumental ties create bridges between different groups and increase the overall interconnection of civic networks. Thus, the global network structure that emerges from these patterns of interaction takes on a polycentric form.

In a similar vein, a relational approach to social movements (Diani, 2003b; Diani and Bison, 2004; Diani, 2011) follows the distinction of type of ties of Laumann et al. (1978) for the analysis of social movements and offers useful tools for the analysis of organizational networks and the relational patterns taking place within these networks. To define social movements as opposed to other forms of collective action, Diani and Pilati (2011) defines a typology of networks relying on the content of ties and their density. Defining collective action as "social phenomena in which actor engage in collective activities for demanding and/or providing collective goods" (Baldassarri, 2009, p.321), this approach proposes a typology that identifies social movement types of collective action as opposed to other forms of collective action. These forms are differentiated by the modes of coordination of organizations in networks of organizational fields. Modes of coordination are "the mechanisms through which resources are allocated within a certain collectivity, decision taken, collective representation elaborated, feelings of solidarity and mutual obligation forged" (Diani, 2011, p.xx) and rely on two mechanisms related to the content of ties between organizations: resource allocation and boundary definition.

Relations of resource coordination are relations such as exchange of information, collaboration on projects or exchange of any other type of resources. Resource coordination refers to the use of organizational resources that is the instrumental aspect of relations between associations. Networks of voluntary associations are composed of various types of associations. They vary in their structure (formal, informal) but also in the type of resources available. Instrumental ties are the locus of resource exchange between various

actors endowed with different amount of resources allowing them to pursue joint collective actions. While resources might be invested only in organizations' own project, they might also be used for collaborative projects. The way associations use their resources might thus have an effect on the overall network structure.

Boundary definition refers to a more symbolic, ideational element of social life (Diani, 2009). Boundaries classify elements of social life in different groups and categories and defines "us" as opposed to "them". A boundary is thus a fundamentally relational concept (Lamont and Molnar, 2002). Processes of boundary definition are related to social representation. In that sense, they can be seen as processes of identity building. Collective identity is described as constituted by a dialectic interplay of processes of internal and external definition (Jenkins, 1996). Individuals must be able to distinguish themselves from others by drawing on criteria of community and a sense of shared belonging within their subgroup. On the other hand, this internal identification process must be recognized by outsiders for an objectified collective identity to emerge (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 14-21). This follows a non-essentalist definition of identity, based rather on processes and activities. It is related to a process of recognition of others as similar, that is, as belonging to the same group (de la Rúa, 2007). In the case of voluntary associations, links between associations through shared core members and personal ties can serve as a proxy for ties reflecting boundary definition, links of identification. Indeed, in voluntary associations, resting largely on solidarity incentives, multiple involvements provide an indicator of whether activists perceive two organizations as compatible and close enough to share their commitment (Diani and Bison, 2004), thus generating broader collective identities and processes of boundary definition. Processes of boundary definition can take place across and within organizations. Thus, a collective identity can be located within a single organization and may not cut across organizational boundaries. In this case, boundary definition processes take place within organizations.

The distribution and density of resource exchange and boundary definition ties and their various combinations yield different modes of coordination of collective action (see figure 2.2) (Diani, 2011). A *social movement* mode of coordination combines high investment in boundary definition and high exchange of resources, that is, a network of dense interpersonal networks and



Figure 2.2: Modes of coordination of collective action

multiple affiliation cutting across organizational boundaries. Indeed, for mobilizing, movements need different types of resources, not only material but also more symbolic resources such as a collective identity. Engaging in resource exchange networks can provide organizations with resources they are not endowed with. Not only will dense organizational resource exchange increase the number of individuals organizations can mobilize, but they might also gain more visibility and political legitimacy. Organizations involved in a social movement mode of coordination also invest highly in boundary definition ties. Boundary definition provide organizations with a collective identity that goes beyond single organizations and acts as motivation for participation.

When organizations are involved in resource exchange alliances without processes of boundary definition, the mode of coordination is a *coalitional* mode. Indeed, in this cases organizations exchange resources for specific initiatives and for a determined period. This process does not involve any collective identity, and coalitions are only temporary alliances.

The third type of mode of coordination is *organizational*. In an organizational mode of coordination the boundary definition process takes place within organizations, collective action is limited within a specific organization. Organizations invest in their own niche for example and do not exchange resources, or at least not at a significant level with other organizations.

Finally, *subcultures/community* is a mode of coordination of collective action with low resource exchanges but strong collective identities that goes beyond organizations representing this identity.

Modes of coordination of collective action are local interaction patterns, and different modes of coordination can be found in a field. The combination of different modes of coordination yields various global network structures. For example, a network composed of subnetworks involved in a social movement mode of coordination, with only few connections between them would give rise to a highly fragmented and horizontal network. Thus, looking at the interaction patterns and at the distribution (the density) of ties at the local level and identifying subnetworks within the whole network allows us to understand why specific forms of global network emerge. This aspect is crucial since different global structures provide organizations embedded in these webs of relationships with different resources for political participation. This point will be addressed in section 2.3. The next section focuses on the context in which networks are embedded and discusses the conditions under which specific tie distributions occur and specific global structures emerge (see left box in figure 2.1).

2.2 Context and networks structures

Local interaction patterns affect the network's global structure. But how do actors in a network decide to whom they will send which type of ties? What can explain these local interaction patterns? This section discusses contextual factors that may shape tie formation of associations in the field of immigration. Under what circumstances can we observe one structure rather than another? What factors may explain different network structures? Different bodies of literature point to the importance of the context in which networks are embedded as an explanatory factor of different network structures: organizational studies (Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz, 1993;

Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Powell et al., 2005), community studies (Knoke, 1990; Entwisle et al., 2007), policy network studies (Marsh and Smith, 2000), and social movement studies (Kriesi, 1996; Rucht, 1989, 1996; Baldassarri and Diani, 2007; Diani et al., 2010; Osa, 2003; Meyer et al., 2005; Cinalli and Füglister, 2008). By defining typologies of network structures, these studies, implicitly (most often) or explicitly recognize that network structures may differ and that such differences might be traced back to the institutional context in which they emerge. The institutional and political context can affect the position of some actors in civil society, and consequently it can affect the network by having an impact on agents' positions and alliance strategies, that is, instrumental ties (Marsh and Smith, 2000). The political and institutional context gives signals to actors in terms of strategies of alliances, giving them incentives to forge instrumental or identity ties with some actors rather than others. Following this line of reasoning, this section discusses the link between network structures of immigrant associations and the context these networks are embedded in (arrow 1 in figure 2.1). It first discusses the political opportunity theory in social movement studies and how political opportunities can affect social movement organizational networks. It then looks at the specific opportunity structure in the field of immigration and how these opportunities shape the mobilization of immigrants, their collective identities, organizing processes, and the network structures of migrant organizations.

2.2.1 Social movement studies: political opportunity theory

Political opportunity theory suggests that the political opportunity structures (POS) affect the action repertoire, the mobilization level, and the outcomes of social movements (Giugni, 2004; Kriesi et al., 1995; Tarrow, 1989). Political oportunities have been defined as "signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements" (Tarrow, 1996, p.85) as well as "options for collective action, with chances and risks attached to them, which depend on factors outside the mobilizing groups" (Koopmans, 1999, p.65). Although the concept has been applied to a great variety of different dimensions (Meyer, 2004), most work has focused upon one or more of the four following aspects of political opportunity structures: (1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; (2) the stability

or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; (3) the presence or absence of elite allies; and (4) the state's capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam, 1996, p.27). Others include cleavage structures as a component of the POS (Kriesi et al., 1995).

Political opportunity theory and movement network structures

While the interaction of context and organizational structures has been emphasized and the network approach has been widely used in social movement studies (see Diani, 2004, for a review), only few studies have examined network structures in different contexts in a systematic way. These studies suggest that the POS signals the type of alliances that social movement organizations create by a strategic adaptation to the institutional context.

The effect of political opportunity structures on network structures has received little attention from social movement scholars. While studies of coalition formation focus on the effect of the emergence of threats and opportunities to explain the decision of social movement organizations to join a coalition, few studies look at the effect of the POS on the network structure of a social movement or civic organizations in different political settings (Rucht, 1989, 1996; Kriesi, 1996; Diani and Bison, 2004; Baldassarri and Diani, 2007; Diani and Pilati, 2011). Moreover, findings are rather inconsistent since some studies show that network structures vary according to the political opportunity structures (Rucht, 1989, 1996; Kriesi, 1996; Diani, 2003a), while others find very similar structures in different contexts (Diani and Bison, 2004; Baldassarri and Diani, 2007). Still these works looking at the effect of POS on network structures offer some insights for developing hypotheses. The findings on network structures in different political settings will be discussed in the remainder of the section, and the hypotheses that will guide the analysis will be formulated.

Work on social movement coalition formation addresses the relationship between context and alliances between organizations. Resource mobilization theories stress the importance of mobilizing structures, that is, organizations and their networks, for the success of mobilization. To mobilize many participants' social movements need coalitions between organizations. The question these authors are addressing is how and under what circumstances do coalitions form given the obstacles to cooperation organizations are facing. Indeed, the choice to participate in a coalition carries with it

potential costs such as obscuring an organization's own identity and thus diminishing its capacity to recruit members or funds (Meyer and Corrigall-Brown, 2005). Moreover, social cleavages or ideology can prevent organizations from working together. Work on coalitions in social movements has shown how coalitions form when threats (strong countermovements or socio-economic threats) and opportunities emerge (Staggenborg, 1986; McCammon and Campbell, 2002; Van Dyke and Soule, 2002; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown, 2005). Under these conditions, the benefits of forming a coalition are higher than the costs involved, and organizations can temporarily overcome some ideological cleavages. Still, although coalitions form in relationship to specific initiatives and dissolve with time due to the costs implied in maintaining them, they are strategic alliances formed to attain a specific goal, thus focusing on short-term objectives. Moreover, coalitions are only one form of collective action. The objective of this study is to look at networks of mutual recognition of associations in an organizational field in which more stable aspects of the context rather than changes in threats and opportunities will affect tie formation .

Studies examining the impact of the POS on network structures or organizational fields identify two main dimensions of the context: an institutional dimension and a cultural, symbolic dimension. Although operationalization of these dimensions differs between authors, we find some consistency in the mechanisms linking institutional and cultural aspects of the context and network structures. Basically, institutional aspects are related to access to the decision-making procedures and cultural, symbolic aspects relate to cleavages. More generally, "it refers to the resonance the organization's issues and demands have with the framing of the problem at stake and how these issues and demands resonate in public discourse" (Diani and Pilati, 2011, p.xx).

Rucht (1996), for example, shows how the open access of the political system favors more centralized movement structures. Comparing the environmental and women's movement in France, Germany, and the U.S, he found a highly centralized network in the U.S., where the decision-making process is very open. Open access invites challengers to take a chance to influence the system. In the long run, it encourages the formation of centralized and professional interest groups in a movement. This openness encourages professional organizations, which thus act as brokers between the system and more grassroots organizations having fewer resources. As professional

organizations seek to make their voices heard, they invest less in alliance-building with other organizations. Less resourceful organizations would seek access to decision-making by seeking alliances with more professional organizations. The network structure that emerges from such linking strategies is thus centralized. In Germany, where opportunities are relatively less open compared to the U.S., the network structure is decentralized.

While access to decision-making procedure can affect the network structure, the salience of cleavages may also shape the network structure. A salient cleavage can lead to fragmentation of the network into densely interconnected clusters, whereas in contexts in which cleavages are less salient, the network structure can be more centralized connected, through a small number of organizations.

Rucht (1989) compares the environmental movement in France and Germany and looks at the different POS in the two countries. He examines whether social movement structures adopt the SPIN model (segmented, polycephalous, informal networks) and whether the movement structure differs across contexts. He found a clustered but interconnected movement in Germany, where opportunities are more favorable. In France, the chances of participation and mobilization are much more limited, and he found a more hierarchical segmented movement, highly polarized around different orientations of the movement with only weak ties connecting the different segments.

To be efficient, associations have to take into consideration the context in which they act. Indeed, Kriesi (1996) showed that the political context shapes external structuration (i.e., the integration of an organization in its organizational environment) of a movement, that is, the type of alliances social movement organizations create. The presence of the left in the government affects the ties new socialmovement organizaitons have with leftist parties, and the salience of the class cleavage also shapes alliance structures of new social movements.

Social movements vary over time under different political conditions. The structure of the environmental movement in Milan changed between the 70's and the 80's under changed political conditions. In the 70's, the salience of the left-right cleavage prevented social movement organizations from different locations with respect to the cleavage to develop linkages. The reduced salience of the cleavage in the 80's facilitated linkages between social movement organizations. A new structure emerged, in which an integrative core,

representative of the different orientations within the movement, acted as bridge between various orientations. The differences between orientations did not disappear, but organizations had a rather inclusive strategy in their choices of allies. A salient cleavage can thus favor fragmented network structures and prevent organizations from different sides of the cleavage from creating alliances, while in situations in which cleavages are less salient, centralized structures might emerge, in which organizations ally across different locations with respect to the cleavage(Diani, 2003a, p.119-120). Hence, in the presence of ideological conflict, fragmentation of the network occurs along ideological line, and the absence of conflict favors fragmentation along functional lines.

These results suggest that open institutional opportunities would lead to a more hierarchical and centralized network. Indeed, access to resources and representation would lead to a professionalization and specialization of an organization, which would "replace the kind of activism that rely on the mobilization of identity" (Diani and Pilati, 2011, p.x). Depending less on their members for resources and working mainly in their own niche, organizations would develop only instrumental ties to more central organizations. Indeed, resources of organizations in this context would be concentrated in participating in the political process, instead of being invested in alliance building. Closed institutional opportunities would favor strong identities because organizations will have to rely on members for collective action. In this case, the network is expected to be horizontal and fragmented in densely interconnected clusters that would compete for scarce resources.

The salience of cleavages in specific fields can also affect the network structure. Indeed, when cleavages are salient, the network may be fragmented along the lines of the cleavage, preventing alliances from cutting across the cleavage. In a context with less salient cleavages, the network is expected to be fragmented along functional or issue interest lines. Associations are more likely in this context to cut across cleavages and to create alliances based on a division of labor within a field rather than on ideological lines.

In addition to the salience of cleavages, institutional opportunities can condition the network structure of voluntary associations. The relationship between POS and network structures is expected to be curvilinear (Einsinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986; Cinalli and Giugni, 2011). In a totally open context,

associations would compete for access to institutions as well as for resources. This may lead to a totally atomized network, in which associations have no contact with one another. At the other extreme, in a totally closed system, such as authoritarian regimes, we might also find an extreme fragmentation of the network. In such a system, relationships with other associations and the danger of coalition because of repression force associations to act in clandestinity, since relationships with other associations carry potential danger. The network would thus be totally fragmented and decentralized, with a density of 0. However, in relatively open or closed contexts, some differences are expected. In relatively open contexts in which civil society actors have access to the decision-making process, through consultation in definition of public policies and participation in implementation, associations can be expected to concentrate their activities in this direction. More resourceful associations will participate directly in the process and invest less in alliance-building with other associations. Associations having fewer resources would invest in relationships with associations that have access to the decision-making process to gain access, although indirectly, to the process. In this case, they would be less likely to create close horizontal ties with other associations. The network in such a context is thus expected to be rather centralized, and the density of exchanges would be rather low, with little investment in boundary definition ties. It would thus display a organizational mode of collective action.

In more closed institutional contexts in which access to decision-making is difficult and resources for voluntary associations are scarce, associations would have to rely more on their members for collective action. In this case, creating alliances with other associations would be encouraged to mobilize as many adherents as possible. Moreover, the higher dependence of associations on their constituencies would prevent them from forming alliances that would require a negotiation of their identity. In this case, we can expect a more fragmented network, less centralized, with higher investment in boundary definition and a high density of resource exchange. The network can be expected to display forms of social movements.

The salience of cleavage may also affect alliance-building between associations. A salient cleavage can influence the fragmentation lines of the network. Indeed, when a cleavage is salient, associations may think in terms of political differentiation. Associations will be less likely to create ties with

associations from the other side of a given cleavage. Moreover, when relying primarily on their members for collective action, they will not want to lose their credibility. Thus, the saliency of cleavages is expected to affect the level of fragmentation as well as the principles fragmenting the network. In a context with a salient cleavage, organizational networks may be highly fragmented along ideological lines. In this case, associations are expected to invest a great deal in processes of boundary definition. When cleavages are less salient, the network is expected to be less fragmented, and when fragmentation occurs, it is expected to be along functional or interest lines. Furthermore, investment in boundary definition is expected to be lower.

This section showed how the general POS can affect social movement network structures. However, studies of the collective claim-making of migrants show that their mobilization is shaped by specific opportunities in the field of immigration. The next section discusses this approach and how the specific opportunities can affect the network structure in the field of immigration, integrating a symbolic dimension into the POS concept.

2.2.2 Models of citizenship as opportunities for migrants' organizations

In the field of immigration, scholars looking at collective claim-making of immigrants suggest that not only cross-national variations in the level and issues and scope of immigrants' claims, but also their collective identity and organizing process depend upon a specific political opportunity structure in the field of immigration and ethnic relations.

Drawing on social movement studies, authors in the field of immigration have also acknowledged the impact of POS on intermediary structures. Vermeulen (2005) suggests that immigrants' organizational patterns (the creation and continuity of immigrants' organizations) are partly shaped by POS. Testing for the crowding-out effect of government intervention on civil society, Bloemraad (2005) shows how political intervention favors the number as well as the diversity of migrants' organizations. Nevertheless, these authors look at processes of organizing from a population ecology perspective.

Modes of incorporating migrants and organizational processes

The modes of incorporating migrants into the host society have proven to have an impact on the organizing process of immigrants. Associations are embedded in a political context with different opportunities for participation. Indeed, according to Soysal (1994), particular polities define forms of participation that also configure the collective patterns of migrant organization. The way migrants are incorporated in the host society affects migrants' organizational strategies, discourses, and identities. Soysal (1994) found that host societies shape the collective organization of migrants by providing (or not) certain resources for and models of organizing. Some host countries provide explicit channels for the participation and organization of migrant populations, thereby affecting their self-organization. Certain host countries' institutions and policies encourage collective identity and organization by means of categorization and the provisions of resources to ethnic groups. Migrant organizations, in turn, define their goals, strategies, functions, and level of operation in relationship to the existing policies and resources of the host state. Hence, the expression and organization of migrants' collective identity are framed by the institutionalized forms of the state's incorporation regime.

While no studies look at networks of immigrant associations' in a systematic and formal way, Ireland (1994) describes different network structures in France and Switzerland. In 1981, when foreign associations became subject to the same conditions as French associations, the number of ethnic organizations increased dramatically. The new decree on associations and the progressive creation of consultative bodies at the local and national level created opportunities for contacts between French citizens and immigrants and also between the various immigrant communities. These factors produced a gradual convergence in the strategies of many immigrants associations. This period witnessed an inter-ethnic movement that widened its scope and developed a political mission. Inter-ethnic collaborations transcended ethnic divisions and coordinated member associations' activities with the aim of improving the lot of all immigrant workers in France. Collaborations thus overcame the ethnic cleavage and created a more integrated network. Moreover, ethnic associations developed a new identity as "immigrants" overcoming the distinction between ethnic and/or national groups. Before, immigrant associations were few and were financed and controlled by the countries of

origin with the agreement of France, which saw in this a means to ensure migrants' solidarity and identification with their homelands, which would encourage their return. With the change of opportunities, the network shifted from a highly fragmented structure, with processes of boundary definitions within national groups, that is, a community mode of interaction, to a more integrated network with lower fragmentation. This may be seen as an intermediary situation in which the network structure changed in reaction to a new opportunity. The opening of opportunities for immigrants may in the long run encourage more centralized structures. Immigrant associations that access to resources, such as funding because of the new conditions in the long run may become more professionalized. The process described earlier may thus lead to a more centralized structure and an organizational mode of coordination.

A community mode of coordination, with a highly fragmented network and high investment in processes of boundary definition within clusters characterizes the network of immigrant associations in Switzerland from the 60's to the 80's (Ireland, 1994). Networks of immigrant organizations were densely connected in subnetworks of associations with the same national origin. Each of these national subnetworks sent ties to a central actor (a federation, for instance). Immigrants in Switzerland were organized along national/ethnic lines, since the networks of immigrant associations were set up and financed by homeland governments. Each national group from the main immigrant population in Switzerland (Spaniards, Portuguese, and Italians) had a central association that regrouped all the local ones. These federations connected different immigrant groups in the late 80s, but ties were very weak and only activated for specific purposes.

Ireland also observed a very fragmented and decentralized network, without any boundary definition process, an organizational mode of collective action in which associations tended to work on their own without any contacts with other associations in Switzerland before the 80's. Immigrants had very few individual and collective rights, the political opportunity structure was very closed, and immigrant associations during this period tended to act on their own, without collaborating with other migrant or autochthonous associations.

These studies point to the effect of modes of incorporating migrants on their organizing process. They show that, depending on the context, immi-

grant associations develop different relationships with other immigrant associations and also with autochthonous associations. Different contexts may give different resources (symbolic as well as material) and thus structure the logics of interaction in the field of immigration. Drawing on these studies on political opportunity theory, Koopmans et al. (2005) and Giugni and Passy (2006) developed a theoretical framework for the analysis of claim-making and formation of collective identities in the field of immigration and ethnic relations. The next section describes this framework, summarizes its findings, and shows its usefulness in explaining variations in network structures in the field of immigration.

Models of citizenship and claim-making in the field of immigration

Koopmans et al. (2005) conceived of citizenship not as a static model, but as a conceptual (and political) space in which different actors and policies can be situated. As mentioned previously, the POS (national cleavage structure, formal institutional structure, prevailing elite strategies, alliance structure, and cleavage structures) define the available channels of access for challengers to the polity. According to Koopmans and Statham (2000), the conception of citizenship and nationhood are first of all part of a nation's cleavage structure. Second, citizenship has a formal institutional dimension that especially affects opportunities of access of immigrants to the political system. The national configuration of citizenship also reflects the prevailing strategies for dealing with societal cleavages and conflicts. Finally, controversies over citizenship and nationhood are important determinants of the alliance and conflict structures in the politics of migration and ethnic relations. Looking at specific POS in the field of immigration and ethnic relations, they argue, overcomes a limitation of the traditional POS approach, which has focused on the how of mobilization and neglected the question of why social movements constitute themselves around particular collective identities and aims. The questions of the constitution of identities and aims of collective actors are especially salient in the field of immigration. What is at stake revolves around questions of identity, the national identity of the receiving nation state and its relationship to the group identities of immigrants as well as to tendencies toward closure from the perspective of the majority population. Discursive opportunities (cultural notions of citizenship and nations' identity) influence how people see themselves in relationship to others. The best

example is the race category used in Britain, but not in France, where racial categories are virtually absent from the public debate.

To take into account both aspects of citizenship, the identity dimension and the institutional dimension, Koopmans et al. (2005) distinguishes between institutional and discursive opportunities. The rights and duties offered to immigrants as well as the resources and institutional channels available to them act as institutional opportunities. The cultural notions of citizenship and national identity act as discursive opportunities, i.e., as symbolic cleavage in the field of immigration.

Discursive opportunities have consequences on the self-definition of immigrants and on the collective identity they mobilize. Discursive opportunities determine a collective actor's chances of gaining recognized access in its interaction with decision-makers. Discursive opportunities "determine which collective identities have a high likelihood to gain visibility, to resonate with the claims of other collective actors and to achieve legitimacy in the public discourse" (Cinalli and Giugni, 2011, p.46). Thus, immigrants are expected to organize along different identities according to the discursive opportunities.

Institutional opportunities are defined not only by the rights and duties offered to migrants, but also by their access to institutional channels. These opportunities are defined along two dimensions. First, a cultural dimension distinguishes between cultural pluralism (countries such as Britain and the Netherlands) and cultural monism (France and Switzerland) and defines the collective group's rights. Cultural pluralist countries recognize cultural differences and sometimes even promote them. On the contrary, cultural monist countries ask immigrants to assimilate into the majority culture. The second dimensions concerns the formal requirements for acquisition of citizenships and distinguishes between jus sanguinis and jus soli, in other words, between an ethnic conception of citizenship and a civic-territorial one. The combination of these two dimensions constitutes the conceptions of citizenship, or the specific institutional opportunity structure for the field of immigration and ethnic relations (Koopmans et al., 2005). Modes of incorporating migrants into the host society shape the political mobilizations of immigrants. Cross-national variations are explained by the access to the political system given by the institutional opportunities and the legitimacy, resonance, and visibility discursive opportunities give immigrants to intervene in the pub-

lic sphere of the receiving country. A country having a more exclusive way of conceiving citizenship may exclude migrants from the majority political community. Migrants would thus feel less legitimized to intervene in political issues in the host country. For example, these studies showed that in countries combining a territorial approach to citizenship and ask immigrants to assimilate, such as France, the level of mobilization of immigrants is higher, but they also address their claims to the host society on issues such as integration. In contrast, in countries with an ethnic conception of citizenship that ask immigrants to assimilate, such as Switzerland, the focus of their claims is mainly their homeland, and they express themselves on issues of entry and stay conditions than on integration. Finally, in countries combining a civic-territorial approach of citizenship with a multiculturalist approach of collective rights, migrants mobilize on an ethnic basis, but they address their claims to the host country.

Ethnic boundaries perspective

The POS have an effect on the collective identities of migrants, their alliance strategies, and the global network structure in the field of immigration. Nevertheless, these processes are fundamentally relational, and none of the previous cited work looks at the actual network structure and the processes of resource exchange and boundary formation in the field of immigration

Wimmer (2008) proposes to study migrants' integration from an ethnic boundary perspective. The main argument of this perspective is that ethnic communities do not necessarily overlap with ethnic identity and culture and that different factors may affect the definition of ethnic boundaries, among others, the institutional rules. His model explains the varying features of ethnic boundaries as the result of negotiations between actors whose strategies are shaped by the characteristics of the social field in which they are embedded. In this model, the institutional framework determines which types of boundaries (ethnic, social class, gender) can be drawn in a meaningful and acceptable way in a particular social field. Boundaries display a categorical and a behavioral dimension. While the categorical dimension refers to acts of social classification and collective representation, the behavioral dimension refers to everyday networks of relationships resulting from individual acts of connecting and distancing(Wimmer, 2008, p. 975). As opposed to POS theory, this approach explicitly looks at social networks to understand which

boundaries are salient in a specific field: "ethnic categories are relational and segmentary in nature and therefore not all correspond to communities held together by dense webs of social ties" (Wimmer, 2008, p. 975). From an ethnic boundary perspective, as in the POS theory, the division between nationals and immigrants is part of the ongoing process of nation-building and needs to be studied rather than taken for granted to understand the dynamics of migrant incorporation.

Still some boundaries are politically salient while others are not. Institutions provide incentives for actors to draw certain boundaries, ethnic rather than class or gender, and to emphasize certain levels of ethnic differentiation instead of others (Okamoto, 2003). The institutional framework specifies the historical context within which boundary definition take place, which in turn has an effect on the boundary-making of actors embedded in the context. The way in which the boundary between those belonging to the nation and the others is defined varies from one context to the other. These boundaries then affect, for example, the claim-making of migrants and their organizing processes.

Looking at levels of racial and ethnic boundaries, (Okamoto, 2003) shows, for example, that the level of ethnic or racial boundaries are shaped by the institutional context. Wimmer (2002) found that individuals in neighborhoods with high immigrant populations in different Swiss cities are not segmented along ethnic lines, but rather along a distinction between insiders and outsiders. Immigrants from the guest-worker period distance themselves from the recently arrived refugees from former-Yugoslavia and Turkey. In these Swiss neighborhoods, notions of community and belonging are defined in cross-ethnic terms. Ethnic categories play a secondary role in this classification; it is not the main principle for constructing the boundary, and both insiders and outsiders are ethnically heterogeneous. Using social network analysis (primary ties of individuals), he finds that the main interactional cleavage separates old-established neighborhood residents from newly arrived immigrants, but he also finds that most of the networks where mono-ethnic. While this study looks at the boundary definition of individuals, the same logic can be applied to organizations. Indeed, previous studies identified migrants' organizing process (Soysal, 1994) and the collective identity on which migrants mobilize in the public sphere. The citizenship regimes may thus also impact the processes of boundary definition of migrant organizations.

This discussion suggests that the POS shape the organizing process of immigrants as well as the network structure of immigrants' organizations. While Soysal (1994) shows how institutional approaches define migrants' organizing process and the identities upon which they organize, Ireland (1994) finds that political opportunities can affect the network structure. Although not in a formal and systematic way, he finds variations in the way migrant organizations are related to other migrant and autochthonous organizations. In a similar vein, the boundary definition approach of Wimmer (2008) emphasizes the impact of institutions on the relational aspect of boundary definition. When it addresses the issue of networks, the traditional POS approach mainly focuses on instrumental ties and the strategic adaptation to given opportunities and constraints, but authors looking at immigrant collective action extend the traditional POS approach by also taking into account the formation of collective identities and boundary formation. Their definition of the POS in the field of immigration allows them to explain not only resource exchange processes, but also boundary formation.

2.2.3 Hypotheses on the effect of the POS on network structure

Based on these findings, different explorative hypotheses can be developed. The central idea of this research is that the network structure in the field of immigration is affected by the political opportunity structure in the field in its discursive as well as in its institutional dimension. Discursive opportunities act as a symbolic cleavage in the field, while institutional opportunities define the chances of migrant organizations gaining access to the political system.

Contextual aspects are expected to shape patterns of interaction by affecting the logic of inter-organizational linkages of resource exchange and boundary definition. The structure of the organizational network in the field of immigration and ethnic relations, and its level of integration depends upon the specific POS. These contextual factors are expected to have an effect on the modes of coordination of collective action, which in turn shape the global network structure. The combination of the institutional aspect of the specific POS in the field of immigration as part of opportunities for migrants to access the political system and the cultural aspect of citizenship regimes,

as part of a nation's symbolic cleavage structure is expected to affect the network structure of migrant organizations.

As outlined previously, general POS define the access of actors to the political system and have been shown to affect logics of organizational interactions. The institutional dimension of specific opportunities in the field of immigration defines the access of migrants to the political system. Specific POS determine whether migrants are recognized as legitimate actors and have access to the public sphere. The civic-assimilationist and the mutliculturalist models recognize migrants as legitimate actors who can intervene in the public space and as a consequence give them access to institutional channels. While in both systems migrants are recognized as legitimate to intervene in the public sphere, their legitimacy stems from different conceptions of citizenship and different definitions of legitimate collective identities (this aspect will be developed further in the upcoming discussion of the effect of the symbolic cleavage structure on networks). Since migrants can access institutional channels, they have also access to resources, representation, and recognition. In this case, their resources are expected to be concentrated on intervention in the political process and to encourage the formation of professionalized and centralized associations in the field. More resourceful associations would participate directly in the political process and invest less in alliance-building. Associations with fewer resources would invest in alliance-building with associations that have more resources, to indirectly access the political process. Moreover, because of the recognition of migrants as legitimate actors and their access to resources, associations would have to rely less on strong collective identities for collective action and are thus expected to invest less in ties reflecting boundaries (because of the costs related to creating and maintaining such ties). As a consequence, in open specific POS, networks of migrant organizations are expected to display higher densities of resource exchanges and to be embedded in organizational or coalitional modes of coordination of collective action in which boundary definition does not cut across single organizations. Therefore, the network is expected to be hierarchical and dominated by a few specialized and professionalized associations acting as brokers between the system and more grassroots associations.

In a context of closed specific POS, resources for collective action are scarce, since access to the political system is more difficult and associations

do not have the resources and legitimacy to intervene in the public sphere. Ethno-assimilationist models of citizenship exclude migrants from the majority political community, and both symbolic and material resources for collective action are scarce. Migrant associations in this context will have to rely mainly on their constituency for collective action. Creating alliances with other associations would be encouraged to mobilize as many adherents as possible. Therefore, associations are expected to develop collective identities cutting across single associations to increase the number of members they can mobilize. In a closed context, organizations would thus invest more in ties reflecting processes of boundary definition. The higher dependence of associations on their members would prevent associations from forming alliances that would require a negotiation of their identity. In this context, the network of migrant associations is expected to display higher densities of ties reflecting boundary definition. Therefore, the associations are expected to be embedded in social movement or community modes of coordination of collective action. As a consequence, the network is expected to be more horizontal, but also highly fragmented. Indeed, the high investment in ties reflecting boundaries is expected to favor a network with different highly interconnected clusters with distinct collective identities that are only slightly connected to one another.

Besides specific institutional opportunities, networks in the field of immigration are expected to vary along the symbolic cleavage in the field, namely, discursive opportunities. Indeed, migrant identities and patterns of organization and participation are shaped by the receiving society's discourse and policies regarding migrants. By defining the legitimacy, resonance, and visibility of migrants in the host society, discursive opportunities are expected to affect the lines along which immigrants' organizational networks are segmented. In other words, discursive opportunities and the recognition of identities in the field of immigration are expected to affect the fragmentation principle at work in the network of migrant organizations in the same way as cleavages affect the fragmentation principles of social movement networks. As a consequence, discursive opportunities are expected to shape the network structure.

In the field of immigration, discursive opportunities reflect the salience of the ethnic cleavage. Discursive opportunities determine which collective identities are more likely to gain visibility and achieve legitimacy in the pub-

lic discourse; they have consequences on the self-definition of migrants and on the collective identity they mobilize (Koopmans et al., 2005). In the civic-assimilationist model, migrants are recognized as legitimate when they mobilize and organize on a civic basis, that is, as citizens without any particularistic identity such as ethnicity. In this context, ethnic identities are not recognized, and migrants would thus not organize on an ethnic basis. However, the discursive context is rather open in this case, since migrants are considered legitimate to intervene in the public sphere as long as they do not mobilize on an ethnic basis, but the symbolic ethnic cleavage is not salient. Consequently, the network of migrant organizations is expected to be fragmented along functional lines on the basis of a division of labor in the field of immigration, because migrant organizations are expected to form alliances cutting across ethnicity. In the ethno-assimilationist model and the multicultural model, ethnic identities are recognized. In the multicultural model, ethnic identities are promoted and migrants are encouraged to mobilize and organize on an ethnic basis. On the other hand, ethnicity is not recognized as a legitimate identity in the ethno-assimilationist model, but migrants are defined as members of a national or an ethnic group. The consequences of the discourse on ethnic identities on the legitimacy of migrants to mobilize on an ethnic basis differ in these two models, but the symbolic ethnic cleavage is salient in both contexts. As a consequence, in both contexts the network is expected to be fragmented along ethnic lines.

To summarize, the hypotheses concerning the impact of political opportunity structure on the network structure are:

In a context of open specific institutional opportunities, the network of migrant organizations is expected to display organizational or coalitional modes of coordination, a hierarchical structure with a lower level of fragmentation. In closed specific institutional opportunities, the network of migrant organizations is expected to display social movement or community modes of coordination of collective action, a horizontal structure and a high level of fragmentation.

When the symbolic ethnic cleavage is salient as expressed by discursive opportunities, the network of migrant organizations is expected to be fragmented along ethnic lines. When this cleavage is less salient, the

network of migrant organizations is expected to be fragmented along functional lines.

2.3 Political inclusion of migrant organizations

What are the consequences of the network structures in which migrant organizations are embedded for the political inclusion of migrant organizations? Organizations do not act in a vacuum. Networks provide opportunities and constraints for political participation (Knoke, 1990). Thus, taking into account the relational context in which associations are embedded is central to understanding the dynamics of political inclusion of migrant associations and what favors or inhibits their political inclusion. This section addresses this issue. It first briefly reviews studies of political participation of migrants at the individual and collective levels. It then defines political inclusion of migrant organizations. It finally examines the combination of POS and network structures and its consequences for political inclusion and concludes with hypotheses on political inclusion of migrant organizations.

2.3.1 Organizations and political inclusion

A growing body of literature addresses the integrative role of migrant organizations. Migrant organizations are considered positive for economical, social, and political integration. Associations have been found to favor political integration of migrants by providing ethnic groups with social capital. Following Putnam's (1993) approach of social capital, Fennema and Tillie (1999) look at ethnic civic communities and their impact on political integration of migrants. They found that in Amsterdam, dense ethnic civic networks provide migrant groups with ethnic social capital, which favors their political integration. Following the same approach but examining individuals' political integration in different European cities, others found that participation in migrants' associations increases the political integration of individuals (Jacobs and Tillie, 2004). However, these studies also found that the depending on the context, membership in cross-ethnic and non-ethnic organizations played a more important role in explaining political integration of migrants than did ethnic organizations (Jacobs et al., 2004).

Political opportunity theory has also been used to explain the organizing process of migrant groups in different European cities (Vermeulen, 2005) [2]. These studies show that the founding and continuation of migrant associations is context-dependent. More precisely, active integration policies favoring migrants' organizing process play a positive role in the foundation and continuation of immigrant associations. Finally, some studies look at the mobilizing role of migrant organizations and how they can mobilize migrants, but also at whether these associations are able to represent migrants' interest, have an effect on local politics, and make their voice heard (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a).

While these studies focus on the political integration of migrants, their definition of integration differs largely. When looking at group-level integration, Fennema and Tillie (1999) analyze migrants' level of participation in local elections. The studies of individuals' integration extend migrants' participation to different forms of participation that are also available to non-citizens, such as contacting and protest activities. But they also take into account the attitudinal dimension of participation, such as interest in politics. Finally, analyzing the political incorporation at the organizational level, Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008a) look at the abilities migrant associations have to defend migrants' interest and make their voice heard by public officials. Distinguishing between civic and political engagement, these studies look at three dimensions for both forms of engagement: the resources available to organizations, their presence (their visibility and recognition, their degree of connection to other political or civic organizations), and their weight (access to public officials, ability to have their agenda represented) (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a, p.17-22).

Analyzing political participation of migrants, most of these studies refer to political integration or political incorporation. Yet, the notion of political integration is complex and multifaceted and is still the object of an ongoing debate in the literature (see Morales, 2011, for a review). While some argue that integration equates assimilation, others distinguish between processes and outcomes of political incorporation. However, the main issue is that most of the definitions of migrants' political integration contain a normative dimension that defines when migrants are politically integrated. This means defining a threshold distinguishing successful from failed integration. This

[2] See the JEMS special issue (Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005b)

also holds true for most studies of migrants' political participation. Another debated issue is whether to take autochthonous participation as a landmark for assessing the level of migrants' integration. However, as pointed out by Morales (2011), depending on the context, migrants may engage in different forms of participation than autochthonous populations do. To avoid the normative dimension of integration, this study will consider migrants' political inclusion. This will allow us to assess whether migrants engage in political activities, to what extent, and in what forms. The extent to which migrant engage in political activities and what forms their participation take will be compared in different contexts to understand under what conditions migrant associations participate in the political process.

Focusing on migrant organizations, and drawing on Morales (2011), three dimensions of political inclusion will be considered. The first is the political function of associations. The political function distinguishes associations' activities between policy- and client-oriented (Kriesi, 1996; Lelieveldt et al., 2007). While most voluntary associations engage in collective action, their activities are not necessarily political. Making a distinction between policy and client-oriented activities will allow us to assess the extent to which associations engage in political activities as opposed to activities oriented towards their clients.

The second dimension refers to the forms of political activities of associations, in other words, their action repertoire. The repertoire of action of migrant associations might vary according to the POS (Koopmans et al., 2005). Moreover, being embedded in social movement mode of coordination or in organizational mode of coordination might also affect the forms of political activities in which they engage. The forms of political activities can be more conventional ones, but can also take contentious forms.

The last dimension refers to the political contacts of migrant associations and assesses their ability to gain access to public officials, in other words their potential political impact. Their access to public officials and institutions might also depend on the modes of coordination in which they are embedded as well as the overall network structure.

2.3.2 POS, network structures and political inclusion

In the literature on immigration, ethnic associations are viewed as positive for the social, cultural, and political integration of immigrants. These views

are in line with a Tocquevillian approach to civil society that considers that active civil societies are virtuous (Warren, 2001). In this perspective, the number of voluntary associations is an indicator of a well-functioning civil society and consequently a virtuous democracy. This view is common in studies of migrant associations and their potential for integration. The more immigrants are organized, that is, the higher the number of immigrant associations, the better their integration in different spheres: social, political, and cultural.

However, why would migrants with more associations be better off? Immigrant associations are embedded in patterns of relationships that act as constraints and opportunities for political action and the possibility of making their voices heard. The structure of immigrant associations' network as well as the structural location have to be taken in consideration to better understand the mechanisms explaining immigrants' associations' political integration.

In their study of ethnic civic communities in Amsterdam, Fennema and Tillie (1999) showed how a dense ethnic organizational network favors the political participation of ethnic groups. While this might hold true for Amsterdam, a city characterized by a multicultural citizenship model that encourages organization on an ethnic basis, in other contexts in which ethnic identities are not encouraged, dense ethnic civic networks may exclude migrants from the host society. In Milan, which is characterized by an ethno-assimilationist model of citizenship, migrant organizations that are linked to autochthonous organizations are better integrated politically than migrant associations densely related to ethnic organizations (Pilati, 2011). Migrants organized on an ethnic basis are excluded from the political sphere, and autochthonous associations act as brokers between migrants and the receiving society's public sphere. Vermeulen and Berger (2008), comparing the network structure of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and Berlin, found a horizontal and densely connected network in the open context of Amsterdam and a hierarchical and fragmented network in the rather closed context of Berlin. As a consequence of these structures, Turkish organizations in Amsterdam are better integrated than their counterparts in Berlin.

These findings highlight the role that the combination of POS and network structure can play for the political integration of migrant associations. Still, focusing on a specific group in different contexts or on different mi-

grant groups in the same context does not tell the whole story about the network structure in the field of immigration in different contexts. How are organizations composed of migrants, related to each other, and what are the consequences of the network in the field of immigration on their political integration? The overall network structure might have an impact on the level of political incorporation of associations. Moreover, different network structures might have different effects on political integration in different contexts. Social movement studies found inconsistent results on the form of network structures and mobilization. While some found that hierarchical networks favor mobilization of social movements (Osa, 2003), others pointed to the positive effect of more horizontal networks (Rucht, 1989). These findings suggest that the effect of the network structure varies in time and in space. But the structural location of actors within specific global networks might also affect the political integration of associations. At the individual level, some authors found that the centrality of actors in a network was an important determinant of political mobilization in a context characterized by low levels of contention, while in contexts with a long contentious tradition, centrality was not as important in explaining the level of mobilization (Knoke, 1990, p.73). In a similar vein, associations embedded in social movement types of coordination of collective action show higher levels of participation in contentious activities in a context characterized by a contentious political tradition, whereas civic organizations embedded in the same relational patterns in a political context characterized by a more consensual political tradition tend to participate in more conventional types of political activities (Diani et al., 2010).

2.3.3 Hypotheses on political inclusion

Drawing on these findings and following the POS approach, the following hypotheses can be formulated. The central argument is that political inclusion of migrant organizations depends on the interaction between POS and network structures in which they are embedded. More precisely, the combination of POS and network structures will affect the political participation of migrant organizations (arrow 3 in figure 2.1).

As previously outlined, institutional POS are expected to affect the prevailing modes of coordination of collective action and consequently the centralization and fragmentation of migrant organizational networks. Moreover,

the fragmentation principles at work in the networks will depend on the discursive opportunities. Political opportunity theory, as well as previous studies on collective claim-making in the field of immigration argue that collective mobilization is shaped by the POS (arrow 4 in figure 2.1). However, since associations are embedded in networks that also provide opportunities and constraints for political participation, and since these networks in turn are embedded in political contexts, the effect of given network structures on political participation is expected to vary according to the context.

It has been previously argued that similar network structures can be found in different contexts. For example, multiculturalist models and ethno-assimilationsit models of citizenship are expected to favor social movement or subcultural models of collective action. Moreover, in both contexts, the networks of migrant organizations are expected to be fragmented along ethnic lines because of the salience of the symbolic ethnic cleavage. However, given the different discursive opportunities related to ethnic identities in these contexts, the outcome for political inclusion of migrant organizations is expected to vary. In a multiculturalist context in which ethnic identities are recognized and even promoted, migrant organizations embedded in social movement or subcultural modes of coordination fragmented along ethnic lines will show higher levels of political inclusion than associations embedded in similar networks in an ethno-assimilationist context. Indeed, in a multiculturalist context, migrants embedded in such networks will have the resources to participate politically. Being recognized as legitimate actors, this configuration will favor their political inclusion. But in an ethno-assimilationist context, these network structures would exclude migrants from the political sphere because their organization around ethnic identities is not recognized as legitimate for intervening in the public sphere. As a consequence, migrant organizations embedded in the latter context are expected to engage rather in client-oriented activities, to show lower levels and more contentious forms of political activities, and finally to have fewer contacts with political institutions.

In a civic-assimilationist model, the pattern is expected to be different. As outlined previously, the network is expected to display more hierarchical forms and organizational or coalitional modes of coordination of collective action. Moreover, the network will be fragmented along functional lines. In this context, ethnic identities are not recognized. However, migrants can ac-

cess institutional channels as long as they do not organize on an ethnic basis. This institutional openness and the absence of a symbolic ethnic cleavage is expected to have a positive effect on political inclusion of migrant associations. This combination of POS and network structure is thus expected to have a positive effect on the political inclusion of migrant organizations. In such as configuration, migrant associations are expected to engage more in policy-oriented activities than in the ethno-assimilationist model. While associations are also expected to have more contacts with political institutions, their forms of participation will be less contentious.

To summarize, the hypothesis concerning the impact of the interaction of specific POS and network structures on political inclusion is:

> The interaction of specific POS and network structures is expected to impact the political inclusion of migrant organizations. Migrant organizations embedded in modes of coordination displaying high densities of ties reflecting boundary definition, will show higher levels of political inclusion if the boundaries are drawn along the recognized identities in the field.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the factors that can affect the network structure of migrant organizations. It showed how the specific opportunities in the field of immigration can explain network structures of migrant organizations. More specifically, two dimensions of specific POS can affect network structures in the field of immigration: the institutional dimension, which defines the access of migrants to institutional channels, and the discursive dimension which defines the visibility, resonance, and legitimacy of migrants to intervene in the public sphere. It discussed how the fragmentation principle and the modes of coordination of collective action can be affected by the specific opportunity structure in the field of immigration, but also how the interaction of the specific POS and the network structure can affect migrants' organizations' political inclusion. The chapter then developed the hypothesis that will guide the empirical analysis. The next chapter will provide an overview of the specific institutional and discursive opportunities of the cities under study and will specify the hypotheses.

Chapter 3

Institutional and Discursive Opportunities in Lyon and Zurich

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter presented the theoretical framework for the analysis of networks of immigrants' associations in different political settings. It highlighted the role played by institutional and discursive opportunity structures in influencing strategic choices and in the formation of legitimate collective identities of immigrant associations. The chapter suggested different mechanisms for the formation of instrumental and identity ties. The central argument is that context may play a role in shaping field network structures by giving incentives to associational actors to ally with some actors rather than others. The main idea is that by shaping legitimate collective identities,the institutional and discursive factors will have an effect not only on the way migrants organize as a collective actor, but also in how associations relate to each other. This chapter aims at describing this context, i.e., the independent variable. First, it briefly describes of immigration and some general aspects of integration philosophies in France and Switzerland and in the two cities under stud, Lyon and Zurich. In the second part, it focuses on the institutional opportunity structures in both cities and shows how immigrants' associations face a more open institutional context in Lyon than in Zurich. It first describes the individual rights dimension, followed

by the cultural group rights' dimension. It then examines specific opportunities at the local level. It shows that individual rights are more developed in Lyon, but that immigrants in Zurich have more cultural group rights. Moreover, the specific opportunities at the local level are also more open in Zurich, because policies for immigrants' integration are more developed there. The next section looks at discursive opportunity structures in both cities and shows that the symbolic ethnic cleavage is more salient in Zurich than in Lyon. The chapter concludes by discussing the implications these differences have for tie formation of immigrant associations in both cities, examining the hypotheses formulated in the previous chapter in light of the specific political opportunity structures in Lyon and Zurich.

3.2 Immigration and integration in France and Switzerland

3.2.1 France

France has been an immigration country since the thirteenth century (Weil, 2004) and has faced different immigration waves. Mass immigration to France began in the mid-nineteenth century. Migrants came mainly from Belgium, Italy, and Poland. By 1930, France had the world's highest rate of immigration (Weil, 2004; Wihtol de Wenden, 2002). After World War II, immigration resumed, and France had the highest world's foreign-born population. A new wave of migrants of Spanish, Asian, or North-African origin came to France to work in the mines and factories in which French peasants were reluctant to work. In 1901, nearly two-thirds of the foreign population in France was Belgian or Italian (Horowitz, 1992). During the interwar period, many Slavs came, as did Poles, Czechs, and Ukrainians. However, immigration involved people from elsewhere in Europe, who would have either left after a short while or undergone complete assimilation into French society. In the immediate after-war period, lacking the work force for the reconstruction and modernization of the country, and to reconstruct and develop its economy, France adopted a policy of importing guest-workers. The arrival of immigrants on the national territory is strongly linked to its economic needs. After World War II, the composition of the foreign population changed to become more heterogeneous, and this ethnically diverse

foreign-born population transformed into true minority communities (Ireland, 1994). In 1974, France decided to end labor immigration and closed its borders, mainly because of the economic crisis and fear of unemployment. But authorities could not stop family reunions. A new wave of immigration started in which families from Maghreb moved to France. Those migrants were mainly young, unqualified single men. Although France had closed its borders, immigration resumed from Maghreb, and from southern European countries such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal.

As opposed to the 1920 and '30s, which saw high numbers of workers immigrating to France, or the 1950s through the 1970s, France is no longer an immigration country. The share of foreign-born population living in France has been stable for the last twenty-five years. After the decision to close French borders to new labor-related immigration in the 1970s, such immigration decreased drastically. Family reunion is nowadays the main source of immigration to France. Immigrants to France are mainly from Africa, especially North-Africa. Of the existing immigrant groups in France, almost half of them are Europeans (45%) (Bozec, 2007)

Like many European states with a long guest-worker tradition, France only started relatively late to address the issue of integration of migrants. For a long time, France did not have any integration policy, because the question about migrants' settlement remained open (Weil, 2004). Migrants' integration was left to private firms, political associations, and trade unions. Furthermore, since immigration was reduced to its economic dimension, it was left out the political debate (Chabanet, 2005)

After the war, integration took the republican path. Migrants' integration into the labor and housing markets (by gaining access to housing in the newly built social housing, where they lived with middle-class Frenchmen medium (Loch, 2005)) allowed individual upward mobility and social integration. Over time, immigrants assimilated in the creuset français (Noiriel, 1988), although they maintained their original culture through cultural organizations. These strong links to their country of origin were encouraged by both the countries of origin and the receiving country, because they were expected to leave after a short stay. Different institutions played a central role in the integration of immigrants and mainly of their children who were born in France: the school, the army, churches, trade unions, and political parties. Many of them identified themselves as workers and members of

the workers' parties. Moreover, the republican integration model worked as planned: starting with social integration, it was followed by cultural assimilation and finally national identification. Immigrants became workers and then citizens ("de l'immigré au citoyen", Schnapper). Ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious conflict were not non existent, but in the political sphere, class conflict was much more salient (Chabanet, 2005).

In the 60's, in answer to the population's awareness about the social and housing conditions of immigrants, the government created structures aimed at dealing with immigrants' specific problems (Sonacotra and FAS). The first integration policy was related to housing. The lack of decent houses for migrants and in general led to the creation in 1956 of the SONACOTRAL (Société Nationale de Construction de Logements pour les Travailleurs Algériens), aimed at constructing houses for migrants and their families. In 1958, the state created the FAS (Fonds d'action sociale pour les travailleurs musulmans d'Algérie en métropole et pour leurs familles), which finances socio-cultural activities. The creation of these institutions illustrates the particularity of the French way of dealing with integration issues, by creating institutions that respond to a specific social problem particular to immigrants. In the 70's, new sectorial institutions were created, each dealing with a specific social problem: housing,for instance, or education (Lapeyronnie, 1993; Weil, 2004; Loch, 2005). The approach is not much different nowadays. Many specific institutions deal with immigration and integration in a transversal approach, involving different ministries.

In the 1980s the immigrant population was concentrated in certain areas where socio-economic disadvantaged people lived, which mobilized national public opinion. The priority of public action thus focused on one these residential areas, and state intervention shifted to the local level. In these years, the state was using a new method: means were concentrated on specific locations, not toward specific populations, as is done in the U.S. (Weil, 2004). Hence, for each specific problem, an institution was created. For the schooling issue, ZEP (Zones d'éducation prioritiaires) were created, which are defined by the share of foreign pupils (30%). The ZEP get more financial resources on the basis of pedagogical projects as well as human resources. Another issue that became increasingly sensitive after the riots in the summer 1981 (l'été chaud) was the professional and social integration of young people. It was during this period that the Mission locales were cre-

ated, which are institutions aimed at favoring the professional advancement of young people. These Mission locales intervening in education, health, and housing issues.

Housing is a domain in which the state intervenes at the local level, via the mayors because of the decentralization law. The objective of this action is the rehabilitation of degraded houses in selected urban areas in to avoid the development of ghettos. Finally, with the contrats d'agglomération the state engages in measures by financing public collectivities and associations. Contracts are also created with associations, which have flourished since the liberalization of migrants, organization in 1981. The FAS selects but also orients associations' activities by granting funds and making associations playing a central role in integration. Nevertheless, if these policies had a positive effect in certain areas, they did not have the expected success. Migrants are still facing high levels of unemployment, housing problems, and school problems. Urban segregation was aggravated, and the most disadvantaged communes became poorer.

Presently, the Politique de la Ville and its actions at the local level still remain one of the main instrument of France's integration policy. It has two main objectives, housing and the rehabilitation of socially disadvantaged areas and social inclusion. Two institutions are implementing this policy. The ANRU (Agence nationale pour le rénovation urbaine) focuses on the housing issue, and the ACSE (Agence nationale pour la cohésion social et l'égalité des chances) focuses on social inclusion. These policies reflect the awareness of national political actors that emerged when the tensions in the suburbs with high concentrations of immigrant populations were getting critical (riots in the 90's and again in 2005). Positive discrimination seemed to be the right answer to the lack of social and professional integration and to the high unemployment rates in those areas. However, the issue of positive discrimination remains sensitive in France, so, other criteria than nationality or ethnicity had to be defined. As a consequence, the target of these policies became specific territories and not specific populations. The Politique de la Ville is considered the best means of fostering integration of people living in disadvantaged areas. Nevertheless, this approach is sometimes criticized, because many neighborhoods classified as "politique de la ville" are not mainly composed of immigrants. Furthermore, the effects of the policy

are not those expected, since the number of recipients increased and funding for each neighborhood decreased (Simon, 1999).

Under these integration policies, public authorities had to recognize the discrimination problem, whether it was based on a religious, cultural or national basis (Weil, 2004; Fassin, 2002). Authorities recognized the racial foundation of these inequalities. Discriminations concerned primarily housing and employment. The state reacted by different means to this issue, the last being the creation of the HALDE (Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l'égalité) in 2005, following a European directive. It has real investigation and mediation power as well as full jurisdiction, although it has no sanctioning power. At the local level, with the decentralization in the 1980's and the Politique de la Ville, French localities have an instrument giving them a certain autonomy to deal with integration issues. These policies are mainly oriented towards disadvantaged neighborhoods, but they de facto address immigrants, who are concentrated in those areas. Nevertheless, the French policies are ethnicity-blind. No reference is made to ethnicity because of the republican model.

To conclude, the major issue in the debate on immigration and integration in France concerns the place of immigrants and their descendants in the French society. Two main issues are central: socio-economic disadvantages of people from ethnic minority groups and the way cultural diversity and minority identities are addressed in France. These issues questioned the traditional French model of integration, which is based on an individualistic conception of integration and a negative vision of any institutional recognition of groups and minorities as such. Although the French integration model has been regularly questioned, and the idea of policies oriented towards disadvantaged groups has been raised, France is holding firm to its republican integration and a strong rejection of multicultural policies such as the U.S. model. Indeed, a recent report of the Haut Conseil à l'Integration (HCI) (HCI, 2009), highlights the importance of the individual and universal aspect of rights. Integration is still considered a direct link between the state and individuals, and the model is based on individual rights. The French integration model is based on a politically defined nation, to be understood as a community of citizens of the state that allows immigrants a political identity (Loch, 2009). In return, it expects them to assimilate to French values, which it considers universally valid.

3.2.2 Lyon (Vaulx-en-Velin)

The history of Lyon perfectly reflects national trends on immigration and integration. Vaulx-en-Velin is a commune of the Greater Lyon of 40'000 inhabitants. It has a long immigration tradition, and nowadays 20.8% of the population has an immigrant background (Bozec, 2007).

Lyon is one of the cities that received most of the North-African immigrants along with Marseille and Paris, and it has always been an economic center. It was one of the three most important industrial places on the north-south axis of France, with its textile, metal, and petrochemical industries. This industrial activity attracted many immigrants. The economic growth was paralleled by the development of the agglomeration, mainly toward the east with workers' cities, to which Vaulx-en-Velin belongs.

Until the nineteenth century, Vaulx-en-Velin was a rural village on the border of Lyon. Industrialization in Vaulx-en-Velin took place in the communes at the east of the city where Lyon is located. When the traditional silk industry declined, Rhône-Poulenc created several factories for the production of synthetic silk. One of the most important was situated in Vaulx-en-Velin. Industrialization started to develop between 1892 and 1898, and many workers migrated to Vaulx-en-Velin during this period (Chabanet, 2005). The village was growing fast with the establishment of new textile and pharmaceutical factories.

Industrialization goes together with the growth of the migrant population. The first migrants come from Poland, followed by Armenians after the genocide. In the interwar period, many Italians and Spaniards migrated to Lyon. After World War II, mainly Kabyles leaving Algeria for economic and/or political reasons, and Portuguese escaping the Salazar regime migrated to the city. In the 70's, Rhône Poulenc was hiring many workers from Maghreb. Before France closed its borders in 1974, the las immigration wave, which was mainly composed of workers from North and Subsaharan Africa and the Far East, took place.

Industrialization and the demographic development that followed was the source of the accelerated urbanization of Vaulx-en-Velin (Chabanet, 2005). As in the "banlieues rouges" [1], social and political activities took place by the association of production and housing functions related to the develop-

[1] Workers' suburbs in Paris, strongholds of the French Communist Party in the after war period.

ment of the city. Indeed, Vaulx-en-Velin had a communist mayor from 1929 until the 1990s. For a long period, the French Communist Party (PCF) had the hegemony over a relatively homogeneous social milieu. With the emergence of the worker culture, labor unions started to play a role in interest representation in the city.

Vaulx-en-Velin became a residential town with the creation of the ZUP (Zone à Urbaniser en Priorité) in the late 60's [2]. While in the first years the ZUP was characterized by a heterogeneity of social origin of its population, with mainly middle-class households abandoning the area, the social distribution of its inhabitants changed in the 70's as the ZUP became an area where mainly poor families lived. More wealthy households left the ZUP, and more disadvantaged populations started to move in. Because immigrants are often more precarious, predominantly migrants were exposed to this population movement. These areas are nowadays confronted with a high concentration of immigrant population, high unemployment levels, and a younger population than are other areas (Chabanet, 2005).

Immigrants who came after the industrialization to Vaulx-en-Velin got involved in the labour movement. In this way, migrants were integrated into the communal clientelist system in which local counselors provided apartments or jobs to newcomers in exchange for their political support (Loch, 2005). The PCF had already lost its dominance by the 70's. Votes for the PCF started to drop, and in 1981, Vaulx-en-Velin elected a coalition with the socialist party. This coalition run the city until 2001 under the lead of Maurice Charrier. Since the elections of 2001, the new mayor has been a social-democrat. The right has always been weakly represented in Vaulx-en-Velin, but the Front National (FN) has risen continuously since 1984. In the 80's, the FN was the strongest right-wing party in Vaulx-en-Velin. The political situation in Vaulx-en-Velin is rather fragmented, with the PCF on one side and the center right on the other. In the 90's, the clientelist system of Vaulx-en-Velin faced a crisis, although the left maintained its majority (Loch, 2005). If until today it is still the main stream in the commune, this lies mainly in the important role that the French system grants the mayors.

[2] The Zone à Urbaniser en Priorité was a French public program between 1959 and 1963 aimed at resolving the housing issue. Many social housing were build in the framework of this program. Entire new neighborhoods were created, which became the "grands ensembles". These grands ensembles are still today the target of the Politique de la Ville.

As other similar cities in France, Vaulx-en-Velin is characterized by a low voter turnout, one of the lowest in France.

In cities such as Vaulx-en-Velin, the integration of migrants was marked by the French worker culture that was dominant there. Traditionally and following the republican model, institutions such as the school, the church, and the political institutions were the main integration instruments (Schnapper, 1991). Nevertheless, with deindustrialization and the concentration of immigrants and disadvantaged populations in some areas, the french integration model did not work as planned any more, and the capacity for integration of the traditional republican institutions decreased (Loch, 2005).

Vaulx-en-Velin has been an early target of the Politique de la Ville because of the awareness of the social problems in the "grands ensembles". In the 1980's, policies were developed in Vaulx-en-Velin such as the renovation of the ZUP and the creation of a city center. Vaulx-en-Velin was considered an example of the success of the renovation policies initiated by the central state. The riots in the 90's in Vaulx-en-Velin came as a surprise to local and national political actors because the rehabilitation of the ZUP, which started in 1985, was already considered as a model of the success of the Politique de la Ville.

In the framework of the Politique de la Ville, contrats de ville were developed from 1990-1994 that became later the grands projets urbains (GPU) and grands projets de la ville (GPV) in 2000-2006. The objectives of these programs are wide. The planned objectives of the 90's was divided into urban development and social provisions.The first objective of the city development was the construction of the city center. The social aspect concentrated on the vitalization of the neigborhoods. These objectives were aimed at developing neighborhood identity for communities from different cultural backgrounds as well as taking measures on behalf of young people. The social measures comprised the creation of participatory forums in the neighborhoods and the development of associations (Loch, 2005, p.228). Indeed, after the riots in the 90's, one of the objectives of the FAS was to finance local centers and associations. These associations were supposed to be intermediary instances of interest representation of the population in the neighborhoods. Funding was provided by the city and the state, mainly through the FAS. The foundation of new associations was supported, but lacking a real constituency, these new associations were dissolved soon after the riots (Loch, 2005; Wih-

tol de Wenden and Leveau, 2007). Nevertheless, the city and the state are still funding associations within the framework of the Politique de la Ville through the ACSE, and the city has a specific department devoted to the development and the support of associations. Nevertheless the main business of the Politique de la Ville in Vaulx-en-Velin remains urban renewal.

3.2.3 Switzerland

Like France, in the after-war period, Switzerland was confronted with a shortage of workers. The agreements signed with Italy in 1949 opened a wave of massive immigration from Italian guest-workers. These migrants worked primarily in agriculture, hotel businesses and domestic work, the textile industry, construction, and the mechanical industry. The approach in Switzerland was the same as that followed in France, namely that guest-workers will only remain temporarily in Swiss territory. The immigration policy is oriented toward discouraging guest-workers settle (Cerutti, 2005). Four main phases of immigration can be distinguished: a rapid and continuous increase of immigration from 1949 to 1962, followed by a decline from 1963 to 1976, a moderate increase from 1977 to 1992, and finally a new decline until recently (Piguet, 2005). Although immigration decreased in the 70's as in many other European countries, different national groups migrated to Switzerland. In the immediate after-war period, most immigrants came from European countries. In the 1950s, the most important groups were Italians, Germans, French people, and Austrians. Spaniards started to migrate from the 70's and the share of Austrians decreased drastically. The diversification of national origins of immigrants to Switzerland started in the 1980s with the arrival of Yugoslavians and increased numbers of immigrants coming from Turkey and Portugal. By the end of the 1990s, the share of immigrants from Yugoslavia was as high as the share of Italians. Nowadays, Switzerland, like other European countries, faces a more heterogeneous immigration. Indeed, in 2005, foreigners of 188 different nationalities were living in Switzerland (ODM, 2006). The most important source of immigration are European countries (59% of foreigners living in Switzerland), which can be related to the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and European countries on free movement of people. Italians still constitute the most important national group in the country. Immigration from non-European countries has also increased and the most important national groups are

Turks and nationals from former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, and Brazil. While European immigrants are mainly highly qualified workers, the main reason for immigration for non-Europeans is family reunion (Turks, Brazilians, and nationals from former Yugoslavia) and humanitarian (Sri Lanka) (ODM, 2006).

Although Switzerland has been an immigration country for over sixty years, Swiss policies on integration are introduced only in 2000 at the federal level. Switzerland has a long tradition of non-integration, reflected through the rotation principle of foreign workers and the debate on "überfremdung" (overforeignization) (Niederberger, 2005). The question of integration of foreigners came late to the public agenda. Previously, the naturalization process was expected to assimilate foreigners in Switzerland and to reduce the share of foreign population. The very restrictive naturalization laws implied that this objective has never been reached.

Until 2000, the Swiss immigration policy was based on the assumption that immigrants would come to the country for a limited time and then would return to their homelands. The immigration issue was characterized until the end of the 1980s by an antagonism between two main actors: the economy, demanding open borders to fill the need for workers, and the xenophobic milieu lobbying for more restrictive conditions of entry to the territory, using to a large extent the instruments of direct democracy (Mahnig, 2005a). One of the reasons for the late awareness of national authorities about the settlement of immigrants and the need for an integration policy can be related in part to the conflict between these two main actors, since the federal authorities were more reacting to the demands of these two main actors, than developing a coherent immigration and immigrant policy. Another reason could also be that integration issues were always a competence of the cantons and the communes (Niederberger, 2005). The concept of integration has been mentioned in the federal law only in the new law on foreigners. Naturalization is still considered the last step in the integration process, and candidates for naturalization are expected to be assimilated into Swiss culture. The law on nationality now requires integration into the Swiss community, but the text remains vague about defining the concept. This change in the law came along with the adoption of the ordinance on integration in 2000. According to it, policies of integration are left to the cantons, which are implementing and adopting it to their specific contexts. At the national level, only

broad objectives are defined. Some integration projects are then funded by the confederation according to these objectives, but also to the extent that cantons, communities, or third parties make appropriate contributions.

3.2.4 Zurich

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the region of Zurich has always been a region of immigration. The expansion of the construction sector attracted many workers from France, Germany, and Italy, as well as from the rural regions of the country. The City of Zurich before World War II already had a high percentage of immigrants (about 34% of the population had a foreign background) (Mahnig, 2005a). At that time, the most important community was the German one, but Italians were the most visible community because they were concentrated in a specific area. The exceptional economic situation in Switzerland just after World War II led to a new wave of massive immigration to the city. The most important populations were the Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, and Turks. Zurich is still a city with a high percentage of immigrants (around 30% in 2005), but the composition of the immigrant population has changed in the last twenty years. It is less homogeneous now than after World War II, when immigrants from the same country of origin came in massive numbers. Indeed, the first waves of immigration after the war were mainly composed of guest workers from south European countries: Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Immigration was rather homogeneous in terms of national origin of immigrants. The city of Zurich shows a similar pattern of the immigrant population as the national trend. The main and more visible immigrant groups in Zurich are still Italians, but Turks and Kosovars also are present in significant numbers.

Zurich is the biggest Swiss city, with 360'000 inhabitants (1 million in the agglomaration), and the nation's economic center. It has a large share of foreign population, and immigrants are concentrated in some areas of the city. It is led by a coalition of three parties (social democrats, center right, and christian democrats). Zurich is the home of the extreme-right wing of the Swiss People's Party and of its leader, Christoph Blocher. Since the 90's, the share of this party has continuously increased to reach 19% at the last elections in 2006. However, the Swiss People's Party has been out of the government coalition since 1998.

The federalist structure of Switzerland implies that the cantons and the communes have great autonomy in defining and implementing their policies. This also holds true for naturalization and integration policies, but not for granting stay permits, which is a federal competence.

In Zurich, the issue of integration started to become salient only in the 1990's because of the declining integration of migrants into the Swiss economy, which was largely due to a general increase of unemployment that hit the migrant population much harder than the Swiss. This was a new problem for Switzerland, where unemployment of foreigners had always been resolved through the guest-worker policy. With the settlement and family reunion of guest-workers, during the 1990s, Switzerland was confronting a high unemployment rate of foreigners (much higher than that of the Swiss). The problem struck strongly the cities and raised the question of integration on the public agendas, most specifically in cities such as Zurich, Bern, and Basel (Mahnig and Wimmer 1999). In these years, Zurich elaborated an integration policy design (Integrationsleitbild) to create a new comprehensive approach to the question. Based on its previous experience, Zurich developed in the last years a clear integration policy and is also implementing it. A department is specifically devoted to immigrants' integration. This is directed at newcomers, with welcome conferences give some insights into the city, the Swiss way of life, and the most important administrations. Another aspect focuses on settled migrants. The program offers language courses aimed specifically at immigrant women, who have not had the opportunity to learn the language in their workplace. Another central aspect is the integration of young immigrants in the labor market with a specific target on the transition from school to the workplace. Finally, the department for integration is responsible for the implementation of the federal law on integration and specifically the funding of integration projects. It also developed a policy of exchange and networking with immigrant associations, but has no specific funding program for migrant associations. The city of Zurich also created a consultative body of immigrants, because immigrant do not have voting rights in Zurich. This body can make suggestions to the city council on issues related to immigration and integration and is also consulted by the city council on these issues.

3.3 Institutional opportunities in Lyon and Zurich

The previous section described the way France and Switzerland, respectively Lyon and Zurich, deal with immigration and incorporate migrants. To give a more systematic description of the context, the next section analyzes the political opportunity structure in both cities. A large set of indicators allows us to classify Lyon and Zurich and to define the political opportunity immigrants face. Two dimensions of the specific POS will be discussed: the institutional and discursive dimensions. As outlined in chapter 2, the institutional dimension is defined by the rights and duties offered to migrants and their access to institutional channels. Discursive opportunities refer to the cultural notions of citizenship and national identity. These two dimensions constitute the specific opportunities in the field of immigration (Koopmans et al., 2005). This section is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on institutional POS. It describes the individual rights granted to migrants in both cities, then looks at the cultural groups' rights, and finally at the local access to institutional channels. In the second part, discursive POS are described. While the level of analysis is local, some aspects of the POS are defined at the national level (such as access in both countries to national competence and some aspects of access to citizenship).[3]

3.3.1 Individual rights

The first dimension of the specific institutional POS in the field of immigration and ethnic relations focuses on different aspects of individual rights granted to immigrants (see table 3.1). Basically, it refers to the conditions for migrants to access the community by looking at the conditions of entry and stay in the receiving country and the conditions required for naturalizations. It also looks at equality of social and economic rights between migrants and nationals, that is, to what extent migrants have access to the labor market and to the welfare state. Finally, it considers whether anti-discrimination rights are foreseen and whether the states grant migrants political rights (table 3.1 on page 66 summarizes the scores for both cities).

[3] Institutional opportunities are measured through a series of indicators. Scores range between -1 and 1. -1 is assigned for closed opportunities, 1 for open ones, 0 for neutral. Scores have been assigned in a comparative perspective. The description of the data collection for the POS indicators in to find in Appendix ?? on page ??. The full list of indicators is to be found in Appendix ??, table ?? on page ??.

To measure access to the community, three indicators are considered: access to different type of permits (long and short-term) and conditions for naturalization. Access to short-term permits is more open in Vaux-en-Velin than in Zurich. If conditions to enter are quite similar, France allows parents of a minor national child access the territory, which is not the case in Switzerland. Another difference lies in the relationship between the work regime and work permits. Whereas in France foreigners can stay in the territory to search for a job, this is not the case in Switzerland, except for UE nationals. For the second indicator, access to long-term permits, we find a greater difference between the two cities. In France, access to long-term permits is much less restrictive than in Switzerland, be it by marriage with a national, for the parents of a minor national, or in terms of length of stay or economic requirements. The last indicator of access to the community is family reunion. On this aspect, Switzerland is much more restrictive than France.

Like access to long-term permits, access to nationality is also more restrictive in Switzerland than in France. Naturalization is a cantonal as well as a local competence. Communes and cantons are primarily responsible for naturalizations. The federal law on acquisition and loss of Swiss nationality (LN) gives only general orientations on the required conditions for naturalizations. The communes and the cantons can set their own requirements in terms of length of stay, economic resources, language knowledge, and integration. Thus, Swiss citizenship is a three-level citizenship: one needs to obtain the national citizenship, the cantonal, and the local one. The main difference between the two cities is found in the required length of stay to be eligible and provisions for second and third generations. While Switzerland follows a jus sanguinis logic, France tends toward a jus solis logic. First, the required time of residence is much higher in Switzerland (12 years) than in France (less than 5 years). Furthermore, Zurich requires two years of residence in the canton. Second, and third-generation immigrants are not granted automatic citizenship as in France, for example. They can only benefit from a facilitated naturalization, for which the years between the ages of ten and twenty count double in the calculation of the length of stay.

Access to the labor market varies considerably in each city according to the type of permit (long- or short-term) and the origin of the immigrants. UE and EEA nationals have much easier access to the labor market than

immigrants from third countries in both countries. However, as opposed to access to citizenship, Switzerland seems to be a little more liberal in terms of access to the labor market. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that immigrants from non-EEA or non-EU countries have almost no other way of entering the Swiss territory than with a work contract. That is, if third-country nationals have a stay permit (long- or short-term), they are already integrated into the labor market. As a consequence no specific restrictions need to be legally made; restrictions are at the entry stage. Social rights granted to immigrants are also greater in France than in Switzerland. In France, we find a very open access to a well-developed welfare system. Illegal immigrants have access to a wide range of benefits, which is not the case of illegal immigrants in Switzerland. Although they can access a wide range of social benefits, they usually do not subscribe to insurance because the possible discovery of their illegal status entails a risk of return in their country of origin. For holders of long term permits, Switzerland and France do not differ much. Still, in Switzerland, the use of the right can have negative consequences because dependence on welfare can be grounds for withdrawal of the permit.

As far as anti-discrimination regulations are concerned, France has a more developed regulation than Switzerland. If both countries have anti-discrimination laws, France has more power for implementing it. Indeed, the types of sanctions for racially discriminatory hiring are higher in France. Moreover, the public structure on ethnic discrimination has stronger powers such as responsibilities for processing complaints, reporting and making proposals to the government. In Switzerland there is no such structure. The national structure dealing with racial discrimination has only a consultative power. Furthermore, the anti-discrimination legislation is regularly questioned by the Swiss People's Party as well as the mere existence of the Federal Commission against Racism.

Finally, in terms of political rights, Lyon and Zurich do not differ. None of the cities grant immigrants local voting rights, with the exception of EU migrants at the local level in France. The issue has been discussed in France, specifically in 1981, just after the election of François Mitterrand. The objective of granting immigrants voting rights at the local level, faced many objections from the right, but also from public opinion. The main reason why voting rights for migrants on the local level raised so many oppositions lies in the French conception of the political community. In French history,

citizenship and voting rights have always been deeply linked to one another. Moreover, national and local citizenship have never been separated (Weil, 2004, p.227). The issue has also been addressed several times in Zurich. The right of immigrants has been an issue in Zurich since at least 1998, when the State Council defined guidelines for immigrants' integration. One of the objectives of these guidelines was to grant voting rights to immigrants. So far, attempts to change the cantonal constitution have been made via popular initiatives to introduce an article giving the communes the competence to grant immigrants voting rights at the local level (facultative voting right). But all these attempts have failed. The last attempt was in 2006 with an initiative asking for the facultative voting rights for immigrants at the local level. This initiative requested a change in the cantonal constitution that would allow communes to grant immigrants voting rights.

To sum up, the overall score for individual rights is higher in Lyon than in Zurich, mainly due to less restrictive access to French citizenship and to the welfare system. Immigrants in France and specifically in Lyon have more open opportunities in terms of individual rights than in Zurich.

Table 3.1: Individual rights

	Lyon	Zurich
Access short term permit	0.8	0.2
Access to long term permit	0.7	-0.5
Family reunion	0.4	-0.2
Access to nationality	-0.2	-0.4
Labour market rights	0.0	0.5
Welfare state access	0.7	-0.3
Anti-discrimination rights	1	0.3
Political rights	-1	-1
Individual rights	0.3	-0.2

3.3.2 Collective group rights

The collective group rights dimension looks at the extent to which the host country grants cultural rights to cultural immigrant minorities. Different indicators are used to measure this dimension: cultural requirement to access short and long term permits and citizenship. Programs for host country languages, cultural difference in schooling, religion and cultural difference in the media (the scores are summarized in table 3.2 on page 70). Collective

group rights refer to the extent to which the host society requires assimilation to migrants or promote cultural pluralism.

France and Switzerland are both defined as assimilationist countries. Yet, assimilationism follows a different logic in the two cities. French assimilationism follows a republican logic deeply anchored in the definition of the nation-state, whereas Switzerland follows an ethno-nationalist logic (Giugni and Passy, 2006). The same scores on cultural requirement to access the community illustrates this tendency to assimilationism.

In Lyon, new or strengthened cultural requirements have recently been defined. Language and civic knowledge is assessed for the renewal of short-term permits, for the issue of the long-term permits, and for naturalization. Yet, these conditions do not apply to UE nationals and Algerians and Tunisians, because of special regulations for these groups. Still, the practice might be different, and the prefecture might assess language and civic knowledge of Algerians and Tunisians when they are applying for long-term permits or naturalization Bozec (2007). In Zurich, cultural requirements constitute a key element of the naturalization procedure. So far, there are no cultural requirements for short-term or long-term permits, although changing for long-term permits.

Lyon also differs in terms of multiculturalism in schools. First, in France, there is a possibility of public funding for Muslim or other minorities, private-owned schools, but not in Zurich. Furthermore, in France, there are publicly funded programs of language courses for minorities in public schools. These programs also exist in Zurich, but they are only partly funded by the city. However, in both cities, these programs are not aimed at promoting multiculturalism, but are leftovers from previous labor-related immigration policies, which funded and implemented these programs to maintain immigrants' links to their homelands because they were expected to return (Weil, 2004). However, Zurich is starting to take into account cultural diversity and introduced recently courses on the history of religions (Eggert and Morariu, 2007). In France, no such changes have been made to the public school curricula. Indeed, according to the republican ideal, the school is the central element of integration.

To assess the level of acceptance of particularistic identities, indicators focus on the tolerance of religious identities, more specifically on Islam. Indeed, religion is the less negotiable identity for minorities, but is also the most

problematic one in terms of political handling of ethnic relations (Giugni and Passy, 2006)? In both cities, there is no religious education in public schools. The republican tradition of a secular school, aimed at promoting a civic and national identity excluding traditional and primary identities (religious, but also social or local identities), remains prevalent. Religion is present in schools only in an historical perspective. Religious education is totally conducted outside the public school. The high score of Switzerland on the religious aspect is mainly related to the fact that there is no regulation about religious signs in the public and the private sectors, as opposed to France, which strictly regulates religious signs in the public sector.[4]

Until 2001, the cantonal decree on cemeteries did not allow creation of separate spaces in cemeteries. The canton and the City of Zurich, in a dialogue initiated by the city at the end of the 1990s, did not reach any agreement. The most plausible envisaged solution at that time was to create private cemeteries for Muslims. But the lack of resources of Muslim associations in Zurich made this impossible. The dialogue with the canton was then re-opened and in 2001, the decree on cemeteries was modified to allow separate spaces for other religions in public cemeteries. This allowed the creation of a space for Muslims in 2004 in the City of Zurich, where burials according to Islamic rite are allowed.

In France, the 1905 law on separation between church and state prohibited the presence of religious signs in the public areas of cemeteries. Yet, funerals can be conducted following the religious ritual of the deceased, and religious signs are allowed in the private parts of cemeteries (graves and places of worship). The presence of an important Muslim population in France led to some adjustments in this field. No law explicitly forbids reserving some parts of cemeteries for different religions, so setting up Muslim squares and other specific places for minority religions became a common practice. Specific burial places can be reserved but must not be separated by any material means, such as wall or hedges. There are several Muslim squares in the Lyon urban area, but Vaulx-en-Velin forbids such Muslim squares.

[4] It has to be noted that in Switzerland given the high decentralization and the competences for dealing with such issues ate the local level, the situation differs from one canton to another. For example, Geneva has special regulations concerning islamic veil in public schools where it has been prohibited.

Finally, neither city grants any public funding to mosques. What distinguishes the cities is that in Lyon, or in France in general, there are such funding for other religions, and public funding is available for their buildings, which is not the case of Zurich. In line with the republican tradition of laïcité and secularism, the score for religious diversity is lower in Lyon than in Zurich.

Cultural diversity can also be promoted via the media, by the promotion of cultural diversity and immigrants' integration. Recently in France, a policy of promotion of ethnic diversity in the media has been defined (HCI, 2009), but not in Switzerland. Moreover, in neither of the countries can programs for minorities or immigrants be found in public broadcasting.

The last indicator is related to group rights in the labor market. In other words, do different countries or cities define affirmative action for the integration of minorities in the labor market? The issue of integration and the fight against ethnic discrimination, especially in the labor market, has been a priority on the political agenda in the last several years in France. The ACSE (former FAS), a public organization intervening in the field of immigrants' integration, and the DPM (Migration and Population Department in the Ministry of employment and Social Affairs) have been key public actors in the domain. They have financed and developed various actions directed to private companies, organizations operating in the field of employment, and disadvantaged populations. The initiatives have been numerous and diverse, and have mainly been conducted through the signing of agreements between state and labour market actors. The objectives of such actions are to fight against ethnic discrimination and to favor cultural diversity inside private firms. But these actions have not conducted as true affirmative actions, such as the creation of ethnic quotas. The only existing affirmative action is based on a local and socio-economic criteria: in other words, they are directed towards persons disadvantaged areas. But immigrants and ethnic minorities are de facto the targets of these actions. The same approach has developed in the public sector, in which affirmative actions are based on socio-economic criteria Bozec (2007).

In Zurich, there are no such actions for the private sector. Nevertheless, there are some guidelines for abolishing barriers to employment of foreigners, specifically in the public sector, in which a settlement permit is required. However, the City of Zurich defined some programs to further the integration

of foreigners in the labor market. In the mission statement for integration, the local council identifies the problem of integration in the labor market of immigrants and more specifically the high unemployment rate of young immigrants and immigrants with low education levels. Different measures are implemented: integration programs for young unemployed immigrants, with a particular attention to the transition from school to the labor market, for young women, and for the promotion of independent work. In Lyon, there are no such programs and no well-developed policies. However, since foreigners and ethnic minorities represent in large part of the disadvantaged population, they are often the actual target of the policies conducted in the field of employment and vocational training. The creation of a new public service of welcome and integration in 2004 may pave the way to more developed policies in the field. Indeed, in addition to language and civic courses, newly arrived foreigners can get help to access different public services, such as health, social security, and public employment agencies. But the actions are very diverse from one local area to another and not well developed so far in Lyon.

Table 3.2: Collective group rights

	Lyon	Zurich
Cultural requirement to access community	0.3	0.3
Host-country language programs	1.0	1.0
Schooling	0.0	-0.3
Religion	-0.3	0.3
Media	-0.5	-1.0
Group-rights on the labour market	0.0	-0.3
Collective group rights	0.1	-0.1

3.3.3 Local institutional access

The last dimension of the specific institutional POS refers to local institutional access for migrants and their organizations. Indeed, since migrant associations are active on the local level and since communes have some political autonomy, their access to local political institutions may have an effect on their strategies for collective action and how they build alliances (the scores for local institutional access is summarized in table 3.3 on page 73).

Both cities were confronted very early with immigration and started comparatively early (compared with national political actors) to be concerned with the integration issue. Zurich wrote its first integration statement in the 90's (Mahnig, 2005b), and Lyon developed its integration measures in the 80's (Loch, 2005). Still, the cities have different degrees of autonomy in defining and implementing integration measures in both countries. The high degree of decentralization of Switzerland gives the competency to cantons and cities in many domains and also for integration. Before the ordinance of 2000 and the first national level mention of integration, integration was a local and cantonal competency. While the Swiss national law on foreigners now mentions integration and describes its broad objectives, the definition and the implementation of the policy still remains at the local level.

Consequently, Zurich has a clearly defined integration policy, and the target of this policy are foreigners. A department is devoted to integration, and the main objectives are integration into the labour market, transition from school to work for young immigrants, and language programs.

In France, the decentralization law of 1981 gives some autonomy to cities, mainly the biggest cities, such as Paris, Marseille, Lyon, and Strasbourg in some areas. The Politique de la Ville more specifically is decentralized and works at the levels of the departments, with the Prefet being the representatives of the central state, but also with mayors of single communes. Vaulx-en-Velin, and other East Lyon communes are privileged targets of the Politique de la Ville. While the Politique de la Ville is not directly a policy aimed at promoting immigrants' integration, because its target are disadvantaged areas and populations, immigrants are de facto the targets of these policies. Indeed, the cities that comprise the Politique de la Ville often have high concentrations of immigrants, high unemployment rates, poverty, and many other social disadvantages. The central idea of this policy is the contract that local communities agree on with the central state. These contracts define specific objectives in different areas, such as education, employment, housing, and discrimination, and are implemented at the local level. The Politique de la Ville is integrating local associations into the process. Relying on local associations, one of the objectives is to encourage citizens' participation, and in the long run, the emergence of an elite from the immigrant population. The main aspect of this policy in Lyon is urban renewal, which is much more developed than the social inclusion dimension of the

policy. Hence, integration policies are better developed in Zurich than in Lyon.

The political representation of immigrants is also different in both cities. Zurich created a consultative body of foreigners, which has recently been renewed. It can make proposals to the local authorities about integration and is also consulted by authorities on issues related to integration. Members of this body are selected on the basis of a call made by the city. The city council then selects the members to reflect the proportion of different immigrant groups in Zurich. Lyon has no specific institution aimed at representing immigrants. The Forum de la Ville (consultative bodies) are addressed to all citizens. Thus, no distinction is made on the basis of nationality or ethnicity. If the score is higher in Zurich, it is only because the city created a consultative body specifically for immigrants, which reflects the more differentialist approach in Zurich than in Lyon, where, according to the Republican principle, no distinction is made in terms of ethnicity or nationality.

As far as policies towards association are concerned, which also refers to funding of migrant associations, the difference between the two cities is rather small. The main difference lies in the fact that in Lyon, no specific policies are directed toward migrant associations, and migrant associations have no funding possibilities. In Zurich, migrant associations can get funds for specific projects. However, the budget is very low, and projects have to be developed with autochthonous associations. The low score for Lyon lies in the fact that no specific funding is foreseen for associations organized on an ethnic basis. Associations with constituencies composed mainly of migrants that are active in the areas of political or social inclusion have the possibility of getting subsidies from the state. Moreover, there is a specific department in Vaulx-en-Velin that informs associations about possibilities for funding and also provide assistance for applying for such subsidies.

Finally, the political audience of anti-immigrant parties is relatively high in both cities. At the last local elections, the share of the Swiss People's Party reached 19% and the Front National in Lyon over 15%.

3.4 Discursive opportunity structures

Institutional opportunities enlarge or restrict access to the political system for actors. Discursive opportunities refer to the main vision of national

Table 3.3: Specific POS

	Lyon	Zurich
Development of immigrants' integration	0.2	1.0
Political representation of immigrants	-0.3	1.0
Attitude towards minorities	-0.5	0.25
Attitude towards organizations integration field	-0.5	0
Political audience of anti-immigrant parties	-1.00	-1.00
Specific POS	-0.4	0.3

identity and consequently to the definition of who belongs to the national community and who does not. Discursive opportunities refer to the symbolic and cultural aspects of citizenship and reflect the saliency of the symbolic ethnic cleavage. In this respect, Lyon and Zurich have different approaches. These symbolic and cultural aspects of citizenship can be traced back to the formation of the nation-state (Brubaker, 1992) and the conception of national identity. The most common example of these discursive aspects is the very definition of immigrants in different European countries. While migrants are labeled "foreigners" (Ausländer, Etrangers, Stranieri) in Switzerland, in France they are referred to as immigrants (Immigrés).

Consequently, these symbolic and cultural opportunities are reflected in the public discourse on immigration. How are migrants categorized in the public debate in the field of immigration? Discursive opportunities are not independent from institutional opportunities; they are in constant interaction, and institutional opportunities are shaped partly by discursive opportunities and vice and versa. Furthermore, immigrants are not mere objects of these opportunities. With their claims and mobilization, they also participate in the formation of the changes of these opportunities. The best example is the beur movement in France and its claim to a "droit à la différence" and the public debate that followed (Wihtol de Wenden and Leveau, 2007). While the institutional POS has been shown to impact strategic choices of collective actors, the discursive aspect of POS is expected to have an effect on the collective identities of actors mobilizing in a specific field. Koopmans et al. (2005) and Cinalli and Giugni (2011) showed the importance of the discursive aspect of opportunities for mobilization and development of collective identities of immigrants for mobilization.

To examine the symbolic and cultural aspects of citizenship, we rely on political claims analysis. Political claims analysis draws on protest event analysis but extends it to all claims made in the public sphere. It records claims made by all actors intervening in the public sphere on a specific issue by drawing on newspaper articles. The main variables that are coded are the actor making the claim, the issue of the claim, the identity of the object of the claim, and the position of the claim. This allows us to assess the discursive opportunities in a given field.[5]

To see how migrants are defined in the public sphere, the identity of the object of claim is used as an indicator. As mentioned previously, the most common examples are the use of racial identities in Great Britain, and the definition as "foreigners" in Switzerland. Table 3.4 shows how immigrants are defined in the claims in the field of immigration in both cities and whether they are referred to as status groups (asylum seekers, “sans-papiers“, immigrants, or minorities) or as racial minorities, religious minorities, etc. Consistent with previous findings, the definition of migrants differs significantly between the two cities. In Lyon, the most important categories are “sans-papiers“ and Muslims. Immigrants are almost never referred to as racial minorities or as ethnic or national groups. In Zurich, immigrants are referred to as asylum seekers and foreigners. "Muslim" is used on both cities to a very similar extent. The reference to specific national groups is also higher in Zurich than in Lyon.

Discursive opportunities give signals to actors in a field about the legitimate collective identities. The results confirm previous findings on legitimate collective identities of immigrants in France and Switzerland and also on the access of minorities to the public sphere. In Lyon, immigrants are mainly referred to as immigrants, and racial minorities are almost absent from the debate on immigration, with the exception of religious minorities such as Muslims. But the reference to Muslims is not specific to the French context because it also occurs in Zurich. In Zurich, on the other hand, immigrants are mainly defined as foreigners and specific national groups. The prevalence of some identities over others might have an effect, as it has been already hypothesized and suggested by previous studies on migrants' mobilization and organizing processes, on the way migrants organize, how they define

[5]Section ?? in Appendix ?? on page ?? describes in more details political claims analysis and the data collection method.

Table 3.4: Identity of object of the claim

	Lyon	Zurich	Total
Extreme right	9.4	3.1	7.2
Foreigners/aliens	4.4	17.4	9.0
Minorities	.6	.5	.5
(Im)migrants	8.3	7.2	7.9
Asylum seekers	5.6	33.3	15.3
Ilegal aliens, sans-papiers	36.9	2.6	24.9
Other status groups	1.9	2.1	2.0
Racial minorities/groups	3.3	.5	2.3
Religious minorities/groups	.8	4.6	2.2
Muslim	15.8	10.8	14.1
Other religious minorities/groups	4.7	1.0	3.4
Ethnic minorities/groups	3.1	.0	2.0
Specific national or ethnic group	3.6	8.2	5.2
Migrants and minorities not specified	1.4	8.7	4.0
Total	100	100	100
N	360	195	555
Cramer's V			.605***

themselves, and, most importantly for our purpose, how they relate to each other.

3.4.1 What consequences for migrant organizational networks and political integration?

The discussion shows that Lyon and Zurich display different institutional and discursive POS in the field of immigration. Generally speaking, the context is less exclusive in Lyon than in Zurich. Access to the community is more favorable to migrants in Lyon since the conditions for entering the territory as well as access to naturalization are less restrictive. Moreover, migrants in Lyon benefit from easier access to the welfare state, and anti-discrimination rights are more developed. In Zurich, access to citizenship is very restricted (and remains one of the most restrictive policies of naturalization in Europe) as is access to the territory. Access to the labor market is less restrictive for migrants in Zurich than in Lyon. However, since entry to the territory is dependent on a work contract for most of the migrants in Switzerland, in practice access to the labor market is more restrictive in Zurich than in Lyon. Finally, anti-discriminations rights are less developed in Zurich.

As a consequence, migrants in Lyon benefit from greater individual rights. The differences between the cities on individual rights granted to migrants reflect different conceptions of citizenship. The results for Lyon are in line with the French conception of citizenship based on jus solis, that is, a civic territorial conception. Zurich follows a different approach, relying on an ethnic conception of citizenship.

The two cities show less differences in terms of collective group rights. However, migrants in Lyon also face a more open context on this dimension. The scores for cultural requirements to access the community and for host-country language programs are similar. In both cities, migrants are expected to assimilate into the majority culture. The existence of home-country language programs for pupils are left overs from the guest-worker period, when host countries were expecting migrants to stay only temporarily. The differences are mainly in the way both cities deal with religion and representation of minorities in the media. The laïcité principle in France does not allow any public expression of religious identities, while in Zurich, such regulations are inexistent. And while France has started to define policies aimed at fostering the presence of minorities in the media and the labor market, such policies do not exist in Zurich. On the collective group rights dimensions, both cities leave little space for the expression of cultural pluralism and expect migrants to assimilate into the majority culture. However, the request for assimilation follows two different logics. The French ideal is one of universalism, republicanism, stemming from the revolution (Giugni and Passy, 2006) and deeply anchored in its definition of the nation state. In contrast, Switzerland relies on an ethno-assimilationist approach of to citizenship.

On the last dimension of institutional POS, Zurich offers more open opportunities than Lyon. This dimension refers to integration policies developed at the local level and the local access of migrants and their organizations to institutional channels. However, the discussion showed that the overall higher score of Zurich on this dimension refers to its explicit mention of migrants as targets of integration programs. In Lyon, following the French republican model, targets of integration policies are disadvantaged populations and areas.

Finally, on the discursive dimension of the POS that expresses the symbolic ethnic cleavage, Lyon also displays a more favorable context for migrants. The symbolic ethnic cleavage is less salient in Lyon because migrants

are mostly referred to as migrants, whereas in Zurich, migrants are defined as foreigners or as specific national groups. In both cities, however, claims refer to a large extent to Muslims.

To conclude, these results show how migrants are embedded in different institutional and discursive POS and allow a better understanding of the collective conceptions of citizenship in both cities. On the cultural level, both countries require assimilation from migrants into the majority culture to access the national community. However, France relies on a universalist conception of the nation stemming from its revolution, and republican principles are at the center of the nation-state. As a consequence, France denies ethnic, religious, and regional identities in favor of a civic allegiance to the political community and tends toward a civic-assimilationist model of citizenship. Switzerland, has a differentialist conception of citizenship and an ethnic conception of the nation. Access to the national community is very exclusive, and citizenship is considered the last step of incorporation of migrants into the ethnic community. Switzerland is thus approaching an ethno-assimilationist model of citizenship. In France, citizenship is the first step towards incorporation of migrants into the national community. However, the relationship to particularistic identities is more supple in Zurich, and social categories based on particularistic identities are not denied (Giugni and Passy, 2006). The Swiss ethno-assimilationist approach excludes migrants from the public sphere, but at the same time allows them to keep their ethnic/national identities and to express them publicly (Giugni and Passy, 2006).

As a consequence, migrant associations face a more favorable context in Lyon than in Zurich, giving them more symbolic and material resources for collective action. As outlined in chapter 2, institutional and discursive POS in the field of immigrations are expected to shape network structures in the field. Discursive opportunities act as a symbolic cleavage, while institutional opportunities define the chances of access of migrant organizations to the political system.

These contextual aspects are expected to shape patterns of interaction by affecting the logic of inter-organizational linkages of resource exchange and boundary definition. The structure of the organizational network in the field of immigration and ethnic relations, and its level of integration depend upon the specific POS in this field. These contextual factors are expected to affect

on the modes of coordination of collective action, which in turn shape the global network structure. The combination of the institutional aspect of the specific POS in the field of immigration as part of opportunities of access of migrants to the political system and the cultural aspect of citizenship regimes, as part of a nation's symbolic cleavage structure are expected to affect the network structure of migrant organizations.

The first set of hypotheses outlined in chapter 2 refer to the relation, between POS and network structure (arrow 1 in figure 2.1 on page 17). How will these observed differences affect the network structure in the field of immigration? The institutional dimension of specific opportunities in the field of immigration defines the access of migrants to the political system. Specific POS determine whether migrants are recognized as legitimate actors and have access to the public sphere. The civic-assimilationist model in Lyon recognizes migrants as legitimate actors for intervening in the public space, via its inclusive access to citizenship. Since migrants can access institutional channels, migrant organizations also have access to resources and representation, as well as recognition. In this context, migrant associations are expected to concentrate their available resources on intervention in the political process. This might encourage the formation of professionalized and centralized associations in Lyon. Indeed, migrant organizations in Lyon, in the condition that their activities are related to social and political inclusion without any reference to particularistic identities, have, for example, access to public funding. Associations having fewer resources would invest in alliance-building with professionalized associations to indirectly access the political process. Moreover, because of the recognition of migrant organizations as legitimate actors, migrant associations in Lyon would have to rely less on strong collective identities for collective action and are thus expected to invest less in ties reflecting boundaries (mainly because of the costs involved in creating and maintaining such ties). As a consequence, migrant organizations in Lyon are expected to be mainly linked through ties of resource exchanges and to be embedded in organizational or coalitional modes of coordination of collective action, in which boundaries do not cut across single organizations. Therefore, the network in Lyon is expected to be hierarchical and dominated by a few specialized associations acting as brokers between the system and more grassroots organizations.

In contrast, in Zurich, resources for collective action are scarce since access to the political system is rather closed and migrant associations do not have the legitimacy to intervene in the public sphere. Ethno-assimilationist models of citizenship exclude migrants from the majority political community, and symbolic as well as material resources for collective action are scarce. While there are funding possibilities for migrant associations in Zurich, subsidies are granted on a project basis as opposed to Lyon, and amounts are very low. As a consequence, in Zurich, migrant associations have fewer opportunities to develop alliances that cut across ethnic origins and will have to rely mainly on their constituencies for collective action. Creating alliances with other associations in such a context is encouraged to mobilize as many adherents as possible. Therefore, associations are expected to develop collective identities cutting across single associations to increase the number of members they can mobilize. Organizations would thus invest more in ties reflecting processes of boundary definition. The higher dependence of associations on their members would prevent associations from forming alliances that would require a negotiation of their identity. The network of migrant associations in Zurich is expected to display higher densities of ties reflecting boundary definition. The differentialist context of Zurich, which allows to some extent the expression of ethnic identities, is expected to favor boundary definition on an ethnic/national basis. Therefore, the associations would be embedded in social movements or community modes of coordination of collective action based on ethnic identities. As a consequence, the network is expected to be more horizontal but also highly fragmented. Indeed, the high investment in ties reflecting boundaries is expected to favor a network with different highly interconnected clusters with distinct collective identities that are only slightly connected to one another.

Migrants and their organizations are also facing different discursive opportunities in both cities. Recall that specific opportunities are expected to shape migrants identities and patterns of organizations. Discursive opportunities have been defined as reflecting the salience of the symbolic ethnic cleavage. By defining the legitimacy, resonance and visibility of migrants in the host society the cleavage is expected to have an effect on the lines along which immigrants' organizational networks are segmented. In other words, discursive opportunities and the recognition of identities in the field

of immigration are expected to affect the fragmentation principle at work in the network of migrant organizations.

As previously mentioned, in the civic-assimilationist model that characterizes Lyon, migrants are recognized as legitimate when they mobilize and organize on a civic basis, that is, as citizens without any particularistic identity such as ethnicity. Consequently, the network of migrant organizations is expected to be fragmented along functional lines, on the basis of a division of labor in the field of immigration, because migrant organizations are expected to form alliances that cut across ethnicity. In other words, in Lyon, the network is expected to be fragmented along the type of activities migrant associations engage in. More precisely, since integration is framed in terms of social and political inclusion, collaborations will be found between associations with definitions and activities that are centered around these activities. In contrast, the saliency of the ethnic cleavage in Zurich, where migrants are defined on the basis of their national origin, is expected to fragment the network along ethnic lines.

To summarize, the hypotheses concerning the impact of political opportunity structure on the network structure are the following:

In Lyon, characterized by a civic-assimilationist model, the network of migrant organizations is expected to display organizational or coalitional modes of coordination, a hierarchical structure with a lower level of fragmentation. In Zurich, characterized by an ethnic-assimilationist model, the network of migrant organizations is expected to display social movements or community modes of coordination of collective action, a horizontal structure, and a high level of fragmentation.

In Zurich, where the symbolic ethnic cleavage is more salient as expressed by discursive opportunities, the network of migrant organizations is expected to be fragmented along ethnic lines. When this cleavage is less salient, as in Lyon, the network of migrant organizations is expected to be fragmented along functional lines.

The second set of hypotheses refers to the effect of the interaction of POS and network structure on the political inclusion of migrant associations (arrow 3 in figure 2.1 on page 17). As discussed in chapter2, similar network structures can be found in similar contexts. Still, the network structure in

Lyon and Zurich is hypothesized to vary, as the resources available to migrant associations for political inclusion deriving from the combination of the network structure and the POS. The combination of an ethno-assimilationsit context, in which the ethic cleavage is salient, and the network structure based on social movements or subcultural modes of coordination of collective action is expected to inhibit the political inclusion of migrant associations in Zurich. Social movement modes of coordination would be expected to favor political inclusion since the combinations of a collective identity with instrumental resources would give associations embedded in such contexts the resources to participate politically. In the ethno-assimilationist context of Zurich, however, these network structures would exclude migrants from the political sphere because their organization around ethnic identities is not recognized as legitimate for intervening in the public sphere. As a consequence, migrant organizations embedded in the latter context are expected to engage more in client-oriented activities (i.e., oriented toward their constituencies rather than towards the public sphere), show lower levels and more contentious forms of political activities, and finally have fewer contacts with political institutions.

As outlined previously, the network in Lyon is expected to display more hierarchical forms and organizational or coalitional modes of coordination of collective action. Moreover, the network will be fragmented along functional lines. In this context, migrants can access institutional channels as long as they do not organize on an ethnic basis. This institutional openness and the absence of a symbolic ethnic cleavage are expected to have a positive effect on political inclusion of migrant associations. The combination of POS and network structure is thus expected to have a positive effect on the political inclusion of migrant organizations. In such as configuration, migrant associations are expected to engage more in policy-oriented activities than in the ethno-assimilationist model. While associations are also expected to have more contacts with political institutions, their forms of participation will be less contentious.

To summarize, the hypotheses concerning the impact of the interaction of specific POS and network structures on political inclusion are:

In Zurich, the combination of an ethno-assmilationist model and social movements or subcultural modes of coordination of collective action is expected to favor more client-oriented activities, few contacts with

political institutions, but more contentious forms of political participation.

In Lyon, the combination of a civic-assimilationist model of citizenship and a hierarchical network based on coalitional or organizational modes of coordination is expected to favor engagement in policy-oriented activities, show higher levels but less contentious forms of political participation and have more contacts with political institutions.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the specific institutional and discursive POS in the field of immigration in Lyon and Zurich. It showed how migrants in Lyon are embedded in a civic-assimlationist model combined with a less salient ethnic cleavage. In Zurich, the citizenship regime is characterized by an ethno-assimilationist approach, and the symbolic ethnic cleavage is more salient, as reflected by the discursive POS. These variations in context have been hypothesized to affect the network structure in the field of immigration as well as the political inclusion of migrant organizations. The description of the political opportunities in both cities allowed us to articulate the hypothesis formulated in Chapter 2. Networks in the field of immigration and the consequences for political inclusion of migrant organizations are expected to vary according to the context. The next three chapters will test these hypotheses. Chapter 4 will focus on the modes of coordination of collective action and look at how resource exchange and ties reflecting boundary definitions are distributed within the networks in Lyon and Zurich. Chapter 5 will examine the fragmentation principles at work in the network. Finally, in chapter 6, the consequences of the interaction of POS and network structures for the political inclusion of migrant organizations will be analyzed.

Chapter 4

Resource exchanges and boundary definition

4.1 Introduction

The following two chapters test the hypotheses on the effect of the institutional and discursive POS on the network structure in the field of immigration in Lyon and in Zurich. Drawing on social movement studies, the network structure in the field of immigration is expected to vary according to the different political opportunity structures in which migrant associations are embedded. Two aspects of the networks are examined. While the next chapter analyzes the fragmentation principles at work in the networks in both cities and looks more deeply at the characteristics of associations, this chapter focuses on the modes of coordination of collective action. Two analytical dimensions will guide the analysis: resource exchange and boundary definition. First, the networks of resource exchange and boundary definition in the two cities are compared. The following section looks at the position of associations within the network of resource exchange. Then it analyzes the modes of collective action of immigrants' associations by examining the distribution of resource exchanges and ties reflecting boundary definition. Comparing the networks in two cities, it tests the hypothesis of the impact of POS on the logics of interactions of immigrants' organizations. The main argument is that the closed opportunities in Zurich favor a more segmented network and high investment in ties of boundary definition. In Lyon, the more open opportunities are expected to lead to a better integrated network

that is more hierarchical and based mainly in instrumental exchanges. Results show that the field of immigration displays different structures in Lyon and Zurich. The chapter concludes by discussing the results.

4.2 Measuring modes of coordination of collective action

Recall the hypothesis outlined in chapter 3:

> In Lyon, characterized by a civic-assimilationist model, the network of migrant organizations is expected to display organizational or coalitional modes of coordination, a hierarchical structure with a lower level of fragmentation. In Zurich, characterized by an ethnic-assimilationist model, the network of migrant organizations is expected to display social movement or community modes of coordination of collective action, a horizontal structure, and a high level of fragmentation.

This chapter focuses on the overall network structure and examines the modes of coordination of collective action in the field of immigration in Lyon and Zurich. The analysis of patterns of relationships of migrant associations draws on a typology of modes of coordination of collective action (Diani, 2009, 2011). As discussed in chapter 2, to examine the modes of coordination, two types of ties are considered: ties of resource exchange and ties reflecting processes of boundary definition (see figure 2.2 on page 24). Resource exchanges refer to ties such as exchange of information, collaborating on projects, or the exchange of any type of other resource. In other words, ties of resource exchanges present a pronounced instrumental dimension. Boundaries imply a symbolic definition of "us" and "them" and are thus a fundamentally relational concept (Melucci, 1996; Lamont and Molnar, 2002; Tilly, 2005). At the individual level, boundaries refer to networks of relationships resulting from individual acts of connecting and distancing (Wimmer, 2008). In the case of voluntary associations, what type of ties implies deeper bonds between alliance partners that go beyond specific initiatives or projects and also implies long-term mutual commitment, that is, a collective identity? Following a non-essentialist definition of identity based on processes and activities (de la Rúa, 2007), in the case of voluntary associations, links through core members and friendship ties can serve as a proxy

for ties reflecting boundary definition. Indeed, activists will tend to draw their acquaintances from milieus directly connected to the core group they belong to. As for shared core members, while business organizations shared core members may reflect mechanisms of control, the process is different in the case of voluntary associations drawing largely on solidarity incentives. Indeed, in this case, multiple involvements of members can serve as an indicator of whether they consider associations close enough to share their commitment between them. In other words, boundaries emerge when multiple membership and personal connections cut across organizational boundaries.

The combination of these different types of relationships between associations and the density of those ties yield different modes of collective action (Diani, 2009). Social movements are characterized by dense networks of resource exchange as well as a process of boundary definition, that is, a network of dense interpersonal networks and multiple affiliations cutting across organizational boundaries. Coalitional processes are defined by dense resource exchange, but no process of boundary definition is found in such networks. Indeed, resource exchanges may be read as mainly instrumental. The organizational process consists of modes of resource coordination and boundary definition that ignore interorganizational networking and take place within specific groups or organizations. In this configuration, there is no dense exchange of resources nor any boundary formation through identity ties. In this case, organizations work on their own, and identity boundaries are located within organizations. Finally, subcultures or communities are characterized by sparse interorganizational linkage combined with strong boundary definition in which actors share a distinctive sense of belongingness and norms.

To examine what modes of interaction are taking place in the networks of immigrant associations in Lyon and Zurich, the network of resource exchange and boundary definition between immigrant associations in both cities will be analyzed. Immigrants' associations were asked about different relationships with a closed list of other migrant organizations in the city.[1] In each city, and for each type of ties, a binary adjacency matrix was created (52 by 52 in Lyon and 39 by39 in Zurich). Migrant organizations were asked about different types of relationships. Indeed, actors in a network are more than likely involved simultaneously in different types of ties. They can be involved in exchange of information, exchange resources, or have more per-

[1] Question 53 in Appendix **??**

sonal relationships such as sharing core members or personal relationships between members. To identify resource exchange and processes of boundary definition, two matrices were created. The resource exchange matrix combines exchange of information, project collaboration, and exchange of resources. Two associations exchange resources if one type of relationship is present between them. The matrix of boundary definition combines sharing core members and friendship ties between members.[2]

To test the hypothesis, first the networks of resource exchange and boundary definition will be analyzed separately. The overall connectedness of the networks will be assessed by measuring the density of ties. In a second step, the network of resource exchange will be reduced in subgroups in order to identify subgroups of associations being embedded in similar patterns of interaction. To identify modes of coordination of collective action in the field of immigration, first the distribution of ties of resource exchange between and within these subgroups will be examined and will allow us to see where exchange of resources take place within the networks. The second step will consist of looking at how ties reflecting processes of boundary definition are distributed within and between the subgroups identified earlier. In the presence of a social movement mode of coordination, resource exchanges and ties of boundary definition overlap within a subgroup, that is, when actors are simultaneously involved in resource exchanges and boundary definition. In a subcultural mode of coordination, only ties reflecting boundaries will be observed. Organizational modes of coordination are present when neither boundary definition nor resource exchange take place in the field. And finally, in the presence of coalitional modes of coordination, organizations engage mainly in resource exchanges with others.

4.3 The network of immigrant association in Lyon and Zurich

Before looking at the modes of coordination of collective action, networks in both cities will first be described. Table 4.1 shows the densities of the networks of resource exchange and boundary definition in Lyon and Zurich. The density is a measure of cohesion and tells how well the network is connected

[2]For a description of the matrix construction see Section ?? in Appendix ?? on page ??

by measuring the proportion of all possible ties that are actually present. In all networks, the densities seem to be rather low at first sight. Indeed, the network of resource exchange in Lyon displays the highest density, with 8% of all possible ties being present. However, these densities lie in the range of those found in similar networks where densities range from .05 to .1 (Diani, 2003a; Ansell, 2003). Both networks in Lyon are better connected than the networks in Zurich. Indeed, in the resource exchange network in Zurich, less than 4% of the ties are present. Yet, in both cities a better connected network of resource exchange is found, while networks of boundary definition are rather sparse in both Lyon and Zurich.[3]

Table 4.1: Network densities in Lyon and Zurich

	Lyon	Zurich
Resource exchange	.0833	.0371
Boundary definition	.0211	.0169

In both cities, the network of resource exchange is more densely connected than the network of boundary definition. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the networks of resource exchanges in Lyon and Zurich. These figures give a better idea of the density of exchanges in both cities. The network in Lyon is better connected, and seems also better integrated. In Zurich, more associations are isolated from the network, but the figure also suggests that the network is highly fragmented. Indeed, while in Lyon we see one integrated graph, in Zurich, three regions can be identified that seem to be only weakly connected. Resource exchanges are denser in Lyon, where opportunities are more favorable for migrant associations, which points in the hypothesized direction.

The figures of the networks of boundary definition in both cities draw a first picture of the configuration of the field of immigration and also give a first insight about the fragmentation level of networks (figures 4.3 and 4.4). The boundary definition network in Lyon displays a different structure

[3] It has to be noted that the density of networks is dependent on the size of the network, a comparison of the densities of two networks from different sizes is thus problematic. To overcome this limitation, a test was run for each network comparing the observed density of the networks against a theoretical parameter of value 1 (a completely connected graph). Using a bootstrap method for constructing thousands of random graphs, it test wether the observed density is significantly different from the theoretical value. The test was significant for all networks (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). The test was run on UCINET 6 (Borgatti et al., 2002)



Figure 4.1: Resource exchange network in Lyon



Figure 4.2: Resource exchange network in Zurich

than the network for resource exchange. It is much sparser but also seems to display a center-periphery structure, with a few central nodes connecting many other unconnected nodes. In Zurich, the network of boundary definition follows the structure of the resource exchange network. However, it is totally disconnected. Many associations are isolated from the network, and the network is divided in three components. Associations in Zurich seem to draw boundaries within three different clusters that are totally disconnected.



Figure 4.3: Boundary definition ties in Lyon

The description of the networks in both cities suggests that they differ in their structure and their degree of integration/fragmentation. The densities and the figures point in the direction of the hypotheses, according to which the network in Zurich is expected to be more fragmented and to display higher levels of boundary definition and associations in Lyon are expected to be embedded in denser networks of resource exchanges. The following section will look more in depth at these networks and analyze the overall structure as well as the distribution of the different ties within networks and test the hypotheses about the modes of coordination of collective action.

4.4 Identifying network structures



Figure 4.4: Boundary definition ties in Zurich

One way to look at a network structure and to identify subgroups of actors embedded in similar patterns of interaction is to use structural equivalence. Structural equivalence is a widely used concept in social network analysis and draws on theories of roles and positions (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Two actors are structurally equivalent if they have identical ties to and from all actors in the network. Social network analysts have developed different procedures for analyzing structural similarities of actors and patterns of relationships in networks. The main objective of these procedures is to represent patterns in complex networks in simplified form to identify subsets of actors that are similarly embedded in a network of relations. They do so by partitioning actors into mutually exclusive classes of equivalent actors having similar patterns of relationships Borgatti and Everett (1992).

According to Lorrain and White's (1971) definition, actors are structurally equivalent if they are connected to the rest of the network in identical ways. Since it is unlikely that two actors will be exactly structurally equivalent, the measures of structural equivalence seek to locate and identify subsets of actors who are approximately structurally equivalent. Structural equivalence thus allows us to identify actors having the same patterns of relationships to other actors in the network. To identify structurally equiv-

alent actors, the CONCOR algorithm is used. Proposed by Breiger et al. (1975), CONCOR is a measure of structural equivalence based on Pearson's correlation product-moment. Although the CONCOR algorithm has been the target of criticism by some social network analysts (Borgatti and Everett, 1992; Faust, 1988; Wasserman and Faust, 1994), it is still widely used and fits the purpose of our analysis. One of the main criticisms relates to what CONCOR is actually measuring. The comparison of different equivalence measures and the discussion of the underlying assumption suggest that CONCOR does not measure only structural equivalence, but that it is also dependent on proximity (Borgatti and Everett, 1992; Faust, 1988). Yet, this is precisely the aim of our analysis. The focus is on factors that influence actors in their choices of their closest allies who have similar patterns of relationships to other actors in the network. Using CONCOR allows us to identify subsets of actors having similar neighborhoods and similar patterns of relationships. Moreover, this procedure tends to generate substantively interpretable results as opposed to other procedures such as hierarchical clustering (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982; Scott, 2000). The heuristic superiority of the procedure over other clustering methods has also been supported recently (Lincoln and Gerlach, 2004; Pavan, ress). Finally, CONCOR being an indirect measure of structural equivalence (Batagelj et al., 1992), the algorithm in itself does not provide a goodness of fit measure. Using blockmodels to identify the underlying structure of a network, the solution provided has to be tested to see whether it fits the actual data. Wasserman and Faust (1994) suggest using a measure that is constructed in terms of expected densities within and between blocks. A randomization test will thus be used to test the goodness of fit of the blockmodel.

4.4.1 Structural equivalence in Lyon: Chain structure

The structural equivalence analysis in Lyon gives four blocks.[4] Table 4.2 shows the densities of resource exchange of associations within and between the structural equivalent blocks. The overall density of the organizational

[4] The depth of split in Lyon was stopped at 2. One split and three splits didn't give any meaningful results. The goodness of fit of the blockmodel solution by CONCOR has been tested using a relational contingency table analysis in UCINET 6 Borgatti et al. (2002) The procedure is similar to a chi square test, but instead of using a chi square distribution the underlying distribution is constructed using a randomization distribution. The result is consistent with the blockmodeling solution and significant

network in Lyon is .0833. The composition of the blocks is shown in table 4.3.

Associations in block 1 are totally disconnected. They are similar in that they do not exchange with structurally equivalent actors, nor do they exchange with other blocks, since the density of outgoing ties to other blocks is lower than the overall density of the network.[5] The first block is a rather small one, composed of only ten associations. These associations are mainly charity and humanitarian associations. Moreover, most of them make an explicit reference of the ethnic origin of their members or their scope of activity. For example, associations include the Association of Chaldo-Assyrians in Lyon (AACL), the Franco-Moroccan Association of Vaulx-en-Velin (AFM), or the International Tamil Cultural Association (ACTM). Besides the humanitarian associations, three resident associations of mixed origin that are mainly active at the neighborhood level can be found (a joint-ownership association (ACRC), and two neighborhood associations (ALGB and Thé à la Menthe)).

The second block is mainly composed by isolates that not have organizational ties with associations in a similar position. In this block, associations tend not to be related to associations outside their own block. Associations in this cluster share some similarities with the first block. They also make explicit reference to their origin in their names and are primarily active in charity and sports. Moreover, the sports clubs are ethnic sports clubs (Sports and Cultural Association of Central Africans (ASCC) and the Franco-Malagasy Association).

Associations in block 3 are connected to one another, but the density of organizational exchanges within the block is rather low (.033). While associations in this structural position are related to all other blocks, the density of organizational ties is very low with the non-connected blocks (blocks 1 and 2). Associations in this equivalent class are characterized by sparse connections within the class but dense outgoing ties to another class, block 4. We still find associations with explicit mention of origin in the third block, but they represent only a third of the associations in the block (The Association for Portuguese Tradition (ACC Folklo) a Comoran association (Cercle) or

[5]Using the density as a cut off value can be problematic because of the problem of density and size of networks. To check for the robustness we also compared the densities within and between clusters using as a cut off value the overall density of the network plus one standard deviation. The pattern remains even using a more restrictive cut off value.

the Association for the Promotion of Somalis (APS)). Two sports associations are also found in this block. However, as opposed to the sports clubs in the second block, they are not ethnic associations but rather local clubs that happen to be composed mainly of migrants (Lyon Villeurbanne Rhône XIII, a rugby club (LVR13), and the Roller Olympique de Vaulx, a rink hockey club (ROCVV). The remaining associations in this block focus on social activities for the disabled (Collectif Handicap (Coll-Handicap)) or the elderly (Bâtir Ensemble (BE)). Others are mainly active on social inclusion (Canelle Solidarité (C-solidarité) Association d'entraide vaudaise (AVEC)) or after-school programs such as the Institut Méridien (Méridien).

Finally, block 4 is the most connected block. Not only are incumbents of this position densely interconnected, but associations within this block are also densely connected to block 1. It is involved in organizational exchange with block 1, but receives more ties than it sends. The third and the fourth blocks also share some similarities, but associations in these blocks differ from those in the first two blocks. The fourth and most interconnected block is composed of fifteen associations. In this block, only two associations refer explicitly the their origin in their names (Center for Arab and Mediterranean Culture (CCAM) and Horizon Solidaire Cameroun (HSC)). The specificity of this block is that the social centers are all part of it. These centers are offering social, recreational, and cultural activities for kids and youth (CS Peyri, Cs Reel, and CS Lévy). Other associations are active in similar domains such as Cultures-Elles (C-elles), which offers cultural and sports activities for girls. Two associations offer cultural activities (MJC and Vaulx-Premières Planches (VPP)), and finally, others are mainly active in education, such as Frameto, which is an after-school club, and the CGV, which is active in popular education.

In sum, the network of organizational ties in Lyon displays a chain structure. The chain begins with block 3, which shows a low level of interconnection and sends ties to block 4. Block four is the link in the middle of the chain and is also densely interconnected. The chain ends with block 1. Associations in this position are totally disconnected. Finally, block 2 is isolated from the whole network. Moreover, the brief desc-ription of the four blocks identified in Lyon gives an initial overview of how the field is organized and suggests some substantial differences between blocks. While the less connected and smaller blocks are organized around charity and humanitarian

work related to their country of origin, which is also explicitly referred to in the names of the associations, the two larger blocks focus mainly on social inclusion and integration.

Table 4.2: Density matrix of network of resource exchange in Lyon

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Block 4
Block 1	.000	.011	.006	.033
Block 2	.044	.000	.012	.000
Block 3	.056	.006	.033	.259
Block 4	.127	.000	.052	.400

Table 4.3: Associations in blocks Lyon

Block	Freq.	Members
1	10	LCA AACL ACTM ASEM A2NF FCAV AMR AFM ACRC ThéMenthe
2	9	AML ACFM Sifaka Oxygène AFV ALGB Comara ASCC GFC
3	18	ROCVV Cercle AMAFI BE Méridien Coll-Handicap ACC folklorique Aid Auto AVEC AAE Imazighen AVSS CDS.RA LOM CSR LVR XIII C-Solidarité APS
4	15	AA MJC CCAM EPI CS Peyri CS Lévy CS réel C-Elles Frameto HSC Futsal Centre Vie VPP CGV C&P

4.4.2 Structural equivalence in Zurich: Fragmented network

The network of resource exchange in Zurich displays a different structure than the network of immigrant associations in Lyon. The CONCOR algorithm with two splits (interactive: second split block 2 with 21 nodes, r square .083) gives three blocks (see table 4.4 and table 4.5 for the composition of the blocks). The network of resource exchange in Zurich has a density of .0371. In the first block, associations are structurally equivalent in that they tend to be tied to structurally equivalent others rather than to associations not holding the same position. The density of organizational links within this block (.098) is higher than the density of the whole network (.037). Furthermore, these associations tend not to be identified as organizational allies by associations in the other blocks. As opposed to Lyon, all associations

in the field explicitly mention their origin in their names. Associations in the first block are mainly Italian and Spanish associations. Two types of Italian associations can be found in this block. The first type is the regional associations, focusing mainly on cultural activities (FALS, CLZ, AVV, CT). The second type of Italian associations is mainly active in assisting migrants and defending their interests (FCLI, COMIT, ITAL). One association is a political party of second-generation migrants of mixed origins who defend migrants' interests (SPZ). Two associations are of Spanish origin and provide assistance and cultural activities (TE and CNZ). Religious associations are also to be found in this block, more precisely, religious associations from Spain and Italy (MCLI, MCLE and CELI). Finally, Tamil associations are also in this block, and they focus mainly on cultural and sports activities (TESS, TCCZ, and SLCCZ).

The second block is characterized by associations sending ties rather within their equivalent class (.051) rather than outside. As for the first block, these associations are structurally equivalent in that they do not receive ties from associations holding different positions. The second block is less homogeneous in terms of the origin of migrants. However, most of the associations in this block are associations from Eastern Europe and Turkey. Parents' associations from different origin can be found here, from Kosovo (LAPSH), Turkey (TEVS), or Kurdish (KS). They provide home-country language courses for pupils. Other associations engage mainly in cultural activities, such as the Slovak Association (VSS), the Croatians from Herzegovina (HKS), and a Turkish Library (MOZ). Finally, all associations from Kosovo are in this cluster (Studenti, LDA, AKV, and VABS).

The third block is the most densely interconnected (.232), but sends no ties to block 1 and does not receive ties from non-structurally equivalent associations. This block is more homogeneous than the second one, as it clusters mainly religious associations. Mainly Muslim and Christian Orthodox (from Russia (ROAK) and Serbia Montenegro (SOKG and SOKGZ)) associations are in this block, although they are of various origins. Four Muslim associations are to be found (SIGZ, TISS) and the federation of Muslim organization in Zurich (VIOZ) and a women's association (ZAHRA). To summarize, the organizational network in Zurich is characterized by a totally segmented structure, with three blocks internally interconnected.

Table 4.4: Density matrix of network of resource exchange in Lyon

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3
Block 1	.098	.000	.000
Block 2	.013	.051	.000
Block 3	.007	.000	.232

Table 4.5: Associations in blocks Zurich

Block	Freq.	Members
1	18	MCLI FALS CLZ ITAL MCLE TE CNZ VAF TESS TCCZ SPZ SLCCZ FCLI AVV GAIZ COMIT CT CELI
2	13	SPE VTJE FCGZ TEVS VSS HKS LDD LAPSH STUDENTI MOZ KS AKV VABS
3	8	SOKG VIOZ SIGZ ZAHRA SOKGZ KORAC TISS ROAK

Figure 4.5 summarizes these results by showing the image matrix of the blockmodels. The squares are the blocks, and the sizes of the squares represent the density within blocks. The arrows indicate whether there is a connection between blocks and the direction of the relationhip. These first results are consistent with the hypothesis of a more segmented network structure in Zurich than in Lyon. It suggests that associations in a more closed context tend to exchange resources only with associations in the same position. The difficulty of accessing the decision-making structures and the scarcity of resources for immigrant associations favor a concentration of exchanges with their closest allies holding the same position. In Lyon, the structure of the resource exchange network tends toward a hierarchical structure, as links between blocks go only in one direction, from the bottom of the chain to the top. Moreover, resource exchanges take place between different positions, with the exception of one block, the middle link of the chain. However, the analysis of structural equivalence only gives a first picture of the network structure. To see what modes of collective action immigrant associations display in the two cities, we need to look at how resource exchange and boundary definition processes are distributed between the different positions. This will be addressed in the next section.



Figure 4.5: Blocks in Lyon and Zurich

4.5 Modes of coordination of collective action

The analysis of blocks allows us to draw a general picture of structurally equivalent associations in the network but does not show how different types of relationships are distributed between positions of groups. The distribution of ties within and between blocks will show what type of collective action is prevalent in each context. To see how different type of relationships are distributed among the blocks, we run an analysis of variance of autocorrelation testing for variable homophily.[6] The analysis of variance will first be run on the network of resource exchange and then on the network of identity ties, that is, on the boundary definition network, to identify the modes of coordination. Associations that display a social movement mode of coordination will hold the same position and send resource exchange as well as boundary definition ties to structurally equivalent associations. In that case, we will find a positive relationship between the membership in block and the relationship. In other words, resource exchange and boundary definition will overlap. For an organizational mode of coordination, neither the resource

[6] The procedure tests wether a relation is patterned by a categorical attribute, in this case the membership of actors in a block. It is based upon the densities in each block and is similar to an analysis of variance. Variable homophily assumes that the tendency to homophily varies between different groups. It takes into consideration the fact that some groups might have a higher tendency to homophily than others and tests the model that ties within each group differ from all ties that are not within-group. The same procedure will be used in the following two chapters and for simplicity will be referred to as analysis of variance (Borgatti et al., 2002; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005)

Table 4.6: Analysis of variance for resource exchanges in Lyon

	Stdized Coeff	Sig.
Intercept	0.000000	0.9998
Group 1	-0.042148	0.0816
Group 2	-0.037831	0.1204
Group 3	-0.036593	0.2164
Group 4	0.327943	0.0000
Adj. R^2	.117	0.0000
N		2652

exchange network nor the boundary definition network will be related positively to membership in the block. If associations display a community mode of coordination, only the boundary definition network will be positively related to block membership. And finally, a coalitional mode of coordination will give a positive relationship for resource exchange but not for boundary definition.

4.5.1 Lyon

As hypothesized previously, in Lyon, the network is expected to display an organizational or coalitional mode of coordination. The results for Lyon on the network of resource exchange are shown in table 4.6. The coefficients show whether the associations in blocks tend to send organizational ties to similar others (to structurally equivalent associations). The coefficient of the intercept gives the probability of a tie between any two members of different groups. Although the explained variance is rather low, the model is significant.[7] The relationship is significant in block 1 (although only marginally) and in block 4.

Block 1 is the block at the top of the chain in Lyon. In this block, the probability of resource exchange between members of the block is lower than the probability of a tie between any two members of different groups. In other words, resource exchange in this block is not concentrated within the block, but rather with associations holding different positions. Block 4 shows a high tendency to exchange resources within the block. This block is the link in the middle of the chain, and incumbents of this position tend to exchange resources with similar others. These associations exchange more

[7] Low R square are common in this kind of analysis. See Mizruchi (1993)

resources between them than with other associations in the network; they show a strong tendency to homophily. Finally, we find no significant relationship in block 2 and 3. These results suggest an overlap of structural position and organizational exchange in block 4. Not only is block 4 the most interconnected block, but actors in this blocks also tend to have more organizational ties within the block.

Since modes of coordination of collective action are defined by the distribution and density of resource exchanges and boundary definition, we run the same analysis on the network of boundary definition. Indeed, this allows us to examine the type of collaboration process migrant associations are involved in. Do personal ties overlap with organizational ties? Are structurally equivalent actors also linked by personal ties? Results in table 4.7 show the tendency to homophily in the network of boundary definition within blocks. In Lyon, only associations in block 4 show a propensity to be tied by personal relationships. In the other blocks, there is no significant relationship between the structural position of an association and its propensity to boundary definition. Thus, associations in block 4 are not only more densely interconnected by resource exchange relationships but also by personal relationships. This suggest that associations holding this position tend to collaborate with one another but also that they share a collective identity. Organizational and personal ties are overlapping in this block. Furthermore this block, which is the central link of the chain, associations display a social movement mode of collective action. Indeed, dense resource exchange is overlapping with processes of boundary definition. The three other groups show little internal density in terms of resource exchange, nor do they send ties reflecting boundaries within their block. These blocks display coalitional mode of coordination, that is, associations tend to invest in resource exchange with other associations. These results suggest that immigrant associations in Lyon follow rather an organizational logic of interaction. Indeed, with the exception of the most central block, associations are only sparsely interconnected and do not share a collective identity. Thus, we find a combination of two modes of coordination in Lyon, an organizational one and a social movement.

To conclude, the network structure of immigrant associations in Lyon displays a chain structure. One subgroup is close to a social movement mode of collective action because it combines dense resource exchange with common

Table 4.7: Analysis of variance for boundary definition in Lyon

	Stdized Coeff	Sig.
Intercept	0.000000	0.9880
Group 1	-0.021692	0.2602
Group 2	-0.019470	0.3382
Group 3	0.019822	0.2400
Group 4	0.092862	0.0064
Adj. R^2	.010	0.0304
N		2652

boundaries. Associations in other blocks are closer to coalitional mode of coordination. The density of resource exchange and ties reflecting boundary definition is rather low. What accounts for this structure of immigrant associations' network? Opportunity structures are rather open in Lyon. The network is better integrated than in Zurich, since ties are not concentrated within blocks. The different clusters are connected to each other. The main component of the network is connected, resource exchanges cut across structural positions, but no deep bonds are involved. Although immigrant associations do not have access to funding as such, the political opportunity structure provides them with more resources than in Zurich. These results partly confirm our expectations of the network structure in Lyon. Then open institutional opportunities as well as the rather favorable discursive opportunities provide associations with material and symbolic resources. Boundary definitions seem to take place within organizations. However, one subgroup of associations concentrates resource exchanges and boundary definition ties with structurally equivalent associations.

4.5.2 Zurich

Looking at the network of immigrants' associations in Zurich, we find a totally different pattern of interaction. Table 4.8 shows the results for resource exchange within blocks. Associations in Zurich tend to exchange resources with associations holding the same positions in the network because all coefficients are significant and positive. All subgroups in Zurich exchange densely resources with associations in the same structural position. The network of resource exchange is much more segmented than in Lyon, because the position of associations within the network has an impact on the allies that

Table 4.8: Analysis of variance for resource exchange in Zurich

	Stdized Coeff	Sig.
Intercept	0.000000	0.9998
Group 1	0.201043	0.0000
Group 2	0.076518	0.0190
Group 3	0.229976	0.0000
Adj. R^2	.082	0.0000
N		1482

Table 4.9: Analysis of variance for boundary definition in Zurich

	Stdized Coeff	Sig.
Intercept	0.000000	0.9998
Group 1	0.127011	0.0000
Group 2	0.056160	0.0528
Group 3	0.155570	0.0010
R-square	.036	0.0002
N		1482

associations select for resource exchanges. Associations in Zurich concentrate their exchanges with structurally equivalent associations that do not cut across their position. The result is a highly fragmented network of resource exchanges.

What about boundary definition? Does it overlap with resource exchange, in which case we would observe a social movement mode of coordination within blocks? Table 4.9 shows the results for the network of ties reflecting boundary definitions. The probability of a personal tie being present between two associations is also higher within blocks than across blocks. As for resource exchange, this tendency is higher in the better interconnected blocks. Overall in Zurich, organizational as well as personal ties are concentrated within structurally equivalent blocks. The structural position of actors seems to be related to their networking strategies. Associations in Zurich that are tied by organizational relationships are also tied by personal relationships. This suggests a logic of interaction close to a social movement mode of coordination. The fragmentation of the network in Zurich take place not only through resource exchanges, but also through boundary definition.

These results seem to confirm the expectations about the network in Zurich, where the closed opportunities favor a social movement mode of coordination of collective action. Moreover, the network is highly fragmented, as expected. The closed opportunities favor strong boundaries because associations have to rely on their members for collective action. Moreover, although specific opportunities at the local level are more open than in Lyon, resources for immigrants associations remain scarce. Funding, for example, is only granted on the basis of specific projects. Immigrants' associations in Zurich seem thus to rely heavily on their members for collective action, and this has an effect on their networking strategies. Boundaries do not cut across clusters, neither do resource exchanges. Rather, they are concentrated within clusters of similar others.

The modes of coordination of collective action thus differ across cities and tend to confirm the hypotheses. In a more exclusive context, associations engage in dense resource exchanges that overlap with boundary definition. That is, associations only create alliances with associations they identify as similar and with whom they share a collective identity. As suggested by the social movement literature, closed opportunities favor strong collective identities. However, we do not find one collective identity; the fragmentation in the network suggests that there are three different subgroups sharing different collective identities. Thus, the network in the field of immigration in Zurich is not homogeneous, and consequently, mobilizing as "immigrants" seems rather difficult in such a closed context. However, these three subgroups displaying a social movement mode of coordination should have the resources to mobilize on their own. Nevertheless, this will depend greatly on the identities along which they are organized. If these identities are salient in the Zurich context, resources for mobilizing would be available, but if these identities are not publicly recognized, this mode of coordination could also have a negative effect on political inclusion. Thus, two scenarios are possible for the network of migrant associations in Zurich. In the first, the collective identities along which they are clustered are salient in the Zurich context, in which case they would be endowed with resources that would allow them to be politically active. If these identities are not salient, we would observe subgroups of migrant associations not only disconnected from each other, but also politically excluded. The brief overview of associations

in blocks suggests that their origin is organizing the field, which points in the direction of a low political inclusion.

The more open context in Lyon seems to favor a more integrated network. Migrant associations engage in denser resource exchanges than in Zurich, and these exchanges cut across structural positions in the network. Strong collective identities are only found in the middle link of the chain structure. The collective identity in this cluster does not seem to have the same exclusion potential as in Zurich, since associations sharing a collective identity are connected to other subgroups of the network. However, this will also depend on the identity around which this cluster is connected. The first description of associations suggests that in the context of Lyon, these identities are salient, since they make no reference to ethnic identities and are mainly engaging in activities recognized as legitimate by the system, namely social inclusion. Nevertheless, the open opportunities in Lyon seem to favor coalitional modes of coordination. Resource exchanges take place in this network, and to a greater extent than in Zurich, but these exchanges are not concentrated within structural equivalent groups. To fully understand the relational patterns that are taking place in the networks in both cities, the characteristics of associations holding different structural position have to be examined. This will give us a better idea of the collective identities along which associations are connected.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter looked at structural equivalence in both cities and at modes of coordination of collective action of immigrants' associations. Starting from the hypothesis that the more open context in Lyon would favor organizational or coalitional modes of coordination and that more closed opportunities in Zurich would favor social movement or community modes of coordination, the networks of resource exchange and boundary definition were analyzed. The results show that the network structure varies in both cities and that these different structures can be related to the political opportunity structure in the field of immigration. Networks of immigrants associations are not homogeneous across contexts nor within contexts. Indeed, in Lyon, immigrants' associations tend to display a coalitional mode of coordination. However, one block, the middle link of the chain structure, is closer to a so-

cial movement mode of interaction. In Zurich, immigrants' associations are embedded in highly delimited clusters. Resource exchanges and boundary definition take place within clusters, and associations do not build alliances outside their structural position. This suggests that associations in Zurich do not have the resources to invest in alliances outside the boundaries of the cluster in which they are embedded. The network in Zurich is highly fragmented compared to the one in Lyon. These results suggest that modes of incorporation of immigrants and that specific opportunities at the local level influence alliance strategies of immigrant associations. They are consistent with previous studies of immigrants' associations' networks in France and in Switzerland that suggested a more integrated network in France than in Switzerland (Ireland, 1994). However, to get a better idea of immigrants associations' networking strategies, we need to look at the composition of these blocks. Do associations holding the same structural position share similar characteristics, as hypothesized by theories of social roles positions? What distinguishes associations in different clusters? What fragmentation principle takes place within the network? Are the networks organized around specific interests of associations, that is, is the network fragmented along functional lines or along ethnicity or any other principle? In both cities, we find clusters displaying strong collective identities. What identities are salient? How do different identities and interests of associations shape relationships between associations? Answering these questions will be the task of the next chapter, in which we will look at the compositions of these blocks and the characteristics of associations holding the same positions within the network.

Chapter 5

Fragmentation principles

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the fragmentation principles at work in the networks of immigrant associations in Lyon and Zurich. In the previous chapter, the networks in both cities were found to display different modes of coordination of collective action related to their embeddedness in different political opportunity structures. Moreover, the network is less fragmented in Lyon than in Zurich. The aim of this chapter is to examine the lines along which the networks in both cities are fragmented. The first section summarizes the theoretical approach and recalls the hypothesis about network fragmentation lines. It discusses the link between specific political opportunity structures in the field of immigration and how these opportunities can shape the fragmentation of a network by defining the saliency of specific identities and interests of associations. It discusses how opportunities in Lyon are expected to favor boundaries based on interests, while the network in Zurich is expected to be fragmented along ethnic/national lines. The next section presents descriptive findings on the different fragmentation lines in both cities. It is followed by a test of the effect of the position of associations on their similarity on the previously defined boundaries. It concludes with a discussion of the results in light of the previous findings on different modes of coordination of collective action and the implications of these network structures for the inclusion potential of migrant organizations.

5.2 Political opportunity structures and boundary definition

Community power studies as well as social movements analysts examining network structure found not only different fragmentation degrees, but also different fragmentation lines. Community power structures found networks fragmented along functional area, i.e., around organizations' activities (Laumann and Pappi, 1976; Galaskiewicz, 1979; Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz, 1993). Social movement networks are found to be fragmented along different lines. For example, it can be fragmented along the generation to which associations belong, with more established ones clustered together and more recent ones in other blocks (Diani, 2003a). Other social movement networks are fragmented along ideological lines, such as the environmental movement in Milan in the 70's, in which ideological cleavages prevented collaboration between political ecology organizations and more conservationist organizations (Diani, 2003a). Networks of civic organizations have also been found to be fragmented along different principles, like shared interest and identity (Diani and Pilati, 2011). These few examples show how organizational networks, community elite networks, and social movement networks can be fragmented along different lines.

Why and under what circumstances are networks fragmented along ideology rather than, for instance, functional area? As pointed out by Knoke (1990), findings in studies of community power structures and policy networks suggest that network structures and fragmentation principles of networks differ in time and space and that the context in which these networks are embedded might have an effect on the structure as well as the fragmentation line of networks. In a similar vein, social movement analysts pointed to the role of the political context, and more specifically of cleavages, for network fragmentation (Diani, 2003a; Diani et al., 2010; Diani and Pilati, 2011). Indeed, salient cleavages may prevent actors located on different sides of the cleavage from collaborating. The discursive opportunities in the field of immigration may also have an effect on the fragmentation lines of networks of organizations. Defining legitimate identities in the public sphere can have an effect on the salience of identities and/or interests in shaping a network. Indeed, through the symbolic power of institutions in categorizing, some identities and areas of interests achieve public recognition (Okamoto, 2003).

This public recognition may have an effect on associations self-identification and on their alliance building strategies, i.e., how they are connecting to some actors and distancing themselves from others.

The ethnic boundaries approach (Wimmer, 2008) follows a similar reasoning, focusing not only on the categorical aspect of boundaries, but also on a behavioral dimension, that is, the relational dimension of boundaries. This approach also emphasizes the role of institutions for defining the saliency of boundaries. In this model, the institutional framework determines what boundaries are salient, whether ethnic or an other in a specific field. In the field of immigration, the discursive political opportunity structure defines what identities or interests are salient. By defining who belongs to the national community and who the others are, the POS in the field of immigration and ethnic relations provides incentives for drawing different boundaries at different levels, according the context. Discursive opportunities thus have an effect on the collective identities that migrant mobilize and consequently is expected to have an effect on the boundaries drawn within the network of migrant associations.

The discursive POS in Lyon, recognizes no particularistic identities, including ethnic identities. As a consequence integration of migrants is considered in a political and social way. Integration policies are oriented towards politically and socially excluded populations, not towards specific ethnic or national groups. The public recognition of issues of social and political exclusion in the field of immigration will favor the organization of migrants on this basis and may thus fragment the network along those lines. The network of immigrant associations is thus expected to be fragmented along functional areas, i.e., their activities. In other words, immigrant associations holding the same position in the network and being embedded in similar patterns of relationships are expected to be active in the same area of activity.

The Swiss ethno-assimilationist approach excludes migrants from the public sphere, but at the same time allows them to keep their ethnic/national identity and to express it publicly (Giugni and Passy, 2006). Migrants are thus expected to be organized on an ethnic/national basis, and the network of migrant associations is expected to be fragmented along those lines. Associations holding the same position in the network are thus expected to have the same origin.

To recall, the hypothesis in chapter 3 is formulated as follows:

In Zurich, where the symbolic ethnic cleavage is more salient as expressed by discursive opportunities, the network of migrant organizations is expected to be fragmented along ethnic lines. When this cleavage is less salient, as in Lyon, the network of migrant organizations is expected to be fragmented along functional lines.

5.3 Defining and measuring fragmentation principles

To look at the fragmentation principles in the networks in Lyon and Zurich, two aspects will be examined: the origin of associations and their area of activity. Two indicators are considered for associations' origins. The geographical origin of associations will be considered as will whether they report representing a specific group. The national/ethnic origin of associations is based on interviewers' definition after the interview based on the question of the origin of members.[1] Because of the numerous national/ethnic origins of associations, this variable was recoded in regional origins.

The second indicator examines whether associations represent a specific group of people. Associations were asked whether they represent a specific group of people, and if they said yes, they were asked to specify what group. Answers can be recoded in four categories: no specific group of people, a national/ethnic group, a religious group, or any other group.[2] Adding to the national origin of the associations the representation of a specific group allows us to explore whether associations in different clusters also work on behalf of migrants and thus wether the ethnic background of their constituency is also put forward in political activities.

The area of activities first considers activities in which associations were active in the two years preceding the interview.[3] Activities were recoded in broader areas based on a conception of civil society divided in three core sectors: a social or leisure sector, a politics sector, and a economic sector (Maloney and Roßteutscher, 2007). Family activities (child care, family, education and, parents), sports, and culture are activities in the social and

[1] QPOS3A in questionnaire. See also Tables ?? and ?? in Appendix ?? for national origins of interviewed associations.

[2] Q15 and Q15a in questionnaire.

[3] Q2101-q2134 in questionnaire.

leisure sector. The politics sector is composed of community concerns (community development, housing, crime, and neighborhood), politics, new politics (peace, human rights, women, and homosexuality), and the area related to immigration (ethnic group related activities, immigration, and discrimination). The economic sector regroups activities such as general welfare (charity, poverty, and humanitarian aid), groups' specific welfare (health, disabled, pensioners), and economic interest (business relations, labor relations, consumers' interest, and employment). Religion is a sector in itself, and finally, a residual category regroups all other activities (research, international cooperation, and other activities).

A second indicator measures the functional differentiation, namely self-definition of associations. [4] Self-definition also classifies associations along functional areas, but has to do with the associations' perception of their function. Activities of associations are limited to the two years preceding the interview. However, the area of activity of associations might vary over time and be only contingent. The self-definition of associations is a more stable aspect of their activity.

How are these characteristics of associations distributed across cities and the different blocks in the cities under study? Answering this question will be the task of the following two sections. Both first cross the characteristics with the city and then with block membership, to see how national origin and areas of activities are distributed in both cities. In a second step, an analysis of variance is run on the similarity of associations on the previously described characteristics. This will test the hypothesis according to which associations in the same cluster should show similarity in origin or activities.

5.4 Origin of associations

Where do the members of the migrant associations in Lyon and Zurich come from? Table 5.1 shows the distribution of origin of migrant associations in both cities. The origin of migrant associations differs significantly between the cities. Most of the associations in Lyon are from North Africa (almost 35 % of associations). The next most important group are of mixed origin (while more than half of the members have an immigration background, no dominant origin are to be found in these associations). Finally, the third most

[4] Q1301-q1329 in questionnaire.

important group comes from Subsaharan Africa, that is a the more recent wave of migrants to Lyon. In Zurich, most associations have a European origin, that is, the migrants are from the first immigration waves to Zurich. The second most important group is from Eastern Europe and arrived more recently. Finally, in Zurich we find a higher share of associations from Turkey and the Middle East than in Lyon but fewer associations with mixed origin.

Table 5.1: Regional origin of associations in Lyon and Zurich

	Lyon	Zurich	Total
China	.0	2.6	1.1
DOM	5.8	.0	3.3
EU-15 + EEA	1.9	38.5	17.6
Eastern Europe + Russia	.0	25.7	11.0
Indian Subcontinent	1.9	7.7	4.4
Maghreb	34.6	.0	19.8
Mixed	30.8	10.3	21.0
Sub-saharan Africa	21.2	2.6	13.2
Turkey and Middle East Muslim	3.9	12.8	7.7
Total	100	100	100
N	52	39	91
Fisher's			.000

Before comparing the distribution of associations across clusters in both cities, we first briefly recall how the networks are structured. The network structure and the modes of coordination of collective action of immigrant associations have been shown to vary in the two cities under study. In Lyon, the network is composed of four structurally equivalent blocks. The patterns of relationships between these blocks display a chain structure. One cluster is totally disconnected from the block (block 2). The three other blocks are connected but show different modes of collective action. The first link of the chain (block 3) shows a tendency to send resource exchange ties to the middle link of the chain (block 4). This block is characterized by dense resource exchange and high investment in boundary definition within the block. However, it is also connected to the third and last link of the chain, block 1. Associations in this block tend to send resource exchange ties outside the block. In sum, in Lyon the network displays a chain structure, with a middle link of the chain being densely interconnected in terms of resource exchange but also investing much in boundary definition ties.

In Zurich, the network is composed of three disconnected blocks. However, all three blocks show high levels of resource exchange within the block but also of ties reflecting boundary definition. To sum up, the network in Lyon is better integrated than the network in Zurich and displays an organizational mode of coordination of collective action. In Zurich, ties reflecting boundary definitions and resource exchange overlap in three disconnected clusters, which resembles a social movement mode of coordination.[5]

What are the characteristics of the clusters in which associations invest more in boundary definition, what characteristics do they share, and what differentiate them from others? How are origins of migrant associations and the areas of activities distributed among the clusters? Before testing the hypothesis of the effect of the structural position of associations on their links to similar others in origin and area of activity, we will first examine whether we find some differences across clusters. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the regional origin of associations in Lyon and in Zurich. While there is no significant difference across blocks in Lyon, the network in Zurich seems to be fragmented along regional lines. However, some differences across blocks can be observed in Lyon. Most of the associations in the first block are North African. In the second block, the most represented origins are Sub-saharan Africa, but mainly associations from mixed origins. The third and the fourth block are rather similar. Indeed, in both blocks associations are from mixed origins or from the Maghreb. In Zurich, associations from European origin are dominant in block 1. This block is mainly composed of migrants from the early immigration waves to Switzerland, that is, Italians and Spaniards, and Tamil . The second third blocks are mainly composed of associations from Eastern Europe, Turkey, and the Middle East. Migrants from these regions moved to Switzerland during later waves of immigration. These first results on the regional origin of associations suggest that the network in Zurich is rather fragmented along immigration waves than on national/ethnic origins, whereas in Lyon, no significant pattern in terms of origin is observed.

However, the domination of one specific regional origin in a block does not tell whether origin plays a role in fragmenting the network. Indeed, the fact that members of an association are predominantly from the same national origin does not necessarily mean that associations represent these members as migrants. One way to look at this is to examine whether associations

[5] See Figure 4.5 on page 97 for the image matrix of the blockmodeling solutions.

Table 5.2: Origin of associations by blocks in Lyon

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Block 4	Total
China	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0
DOM	20.0	.0	5.6	.0	5.8
EU-15 + EEA	.0	.0	5.6	.0	1.9
Eastern Europe + Russia	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0
Indian Subcontinent	10.0	.0	.0	.0	1.9
Maghreb	40.0	11.1	33.3	46.7	34.6
Mixed	10.0	33.3	33.3	40.0	30.8
Sub-saharan Africa	10.0	55.6	16.7	13.3	21.2
Turkey and Middle East Muslim	10.0	.0	5.6	.0	3.9
Total (N)	100 (10)	100 (9)	100 (18)	100(15)	100 (52)
Fisher's exact					.180

Table 5.3: Origin of associations by blocks in Zurich

	Bloc 1	Bloc 2	Bloc 3	Total
Africa	5.6	.0	.0	2.6
China	.0	7.7	.0	2.6
EU-15 + EEA	72.2	15.4	.0 l	38.5
East-Europe + Russia	.0	46.2	50.0	25.6
Indian Subcontinent	16.7	.0	.0	7.7
Mixed	5.6	.0	.0	
Turkey and Middle East Muslim	.0 l	30.8	50.0	20.5
Total (N)	100 (18)	100 (13)	100 (8)	
Fisher's exact				.000

define themselves as representing a specific group of people and whether this group is an ethnic/national group. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 report the results for the representation of a specific group across blocks. Consistent with the previous findings on origin, in Lyon, there is significant relation between the structural location of associations and the group they represent. Moreover, most of the associations in Lyon report that they do not represent any group. Block 1,2, and 3 however have a certain number of associations declaring representing migrants. Finally, no associations in Lyon represent a religious group.

Table 5.4: Representation of specific group in Lyon and Zurich

	Lyon	Zurich	Total
No one	65.4	28.2	49.5
Migrant group	23.1	51.3	35.2
Religious group	.0	18.0	7.7
Other	11.5	2.6	7.7
Total (N)	100 (52)	100 (39)	100 (91)
Fisher's			.000

Table 5.5: Represented group by blocks in Lyon

	Bloc 1	Bloc 2	Bloc 3	Bloc 4	Total
No one	50.0	44.4	66.7	86.7	65.4
Migrant group	40.0	33.3	22.2	6.7	23.1
Religious group	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0
Other	10.0	22.2	11.1	6.7	11.5
Total (N)	100 (10)	100 (9)	100 (18)	100 (15)	100 (52)
Fisher's exact					.289

In contrast, in Zurich, there is a difference between blocks and the group associations declare they represent. Associations in block 1, composed mainly of associations from the first immigration waves to Switzerland, tend to represent migrants, that is, a specific ethnic/national group. As opposed to origin, in which the second and the third block showed similar composition, we find here a difference in the groups they represent. While associations in the second block report mainly that they represent no specific group, those located in the third block represent a specific religious group. If we look more in detail at the associations in this block, we see that they are Muslim and Orthodox associations. The first cluster is dominated by European and

Tamil migrants from the first immigration wave. These associations also report representing immigrants. This block can thus be defined as a block of immigrant associations. In the second block, in which associations are from the more recent immigration waves, mainly from Eastern Europe (Kosovo and Serbia-Montenegro), associations do not represent any specific group, and when they do, they tend to represent immigrants. The third block is a block of religious associations, more precisely of Muslims and Orthodox. While these findings do not support the hypothesis of the fragmentation only along ethnic/national lines, they suggest that the origin, and the migrant group, plays a role in fragmenting the network. These categories are consistent with the categories used by actors in the field of immigration when making claims. Indeed, migrants are referred to as specific national or religious groups. Thus, in Zurich, it is rather the migration wave that differentiate clusters than the ethnic/national origin. Moreover, the more recent wave in divided in two clusters, a secular and a religious one.

Table 5.6: Represented group by blocks in Zurich

	Bloc 1	Bloc 2	Bloc 3	Total
No one	11.1	61.5	12.5	28.2
Migrant group	83.3	30.8	12.5	51.3
Religious group	5.6	.0	75.0	18.0
Other	.0	7.7	.0	2.6
Total (N)	100 (18)	100 (13)	100 (8)	100 (39)
Fisher's exact				.000

These results suggest that the length of settlement is fragmenting the network in Zurich but not in Lyon, where no significant relationship is found between origin and group representation and the different relational patterns in which associations are embedded. The bivariate analysis describes the compositions of the blocks in terms of origin and representation. However, it does not show whether ties are sent along those lines. Do associations in different relational patterns send ties to other associations that are similar in terms of origin or representation? To test for the hypothesis, we run an analysis of variance testing for variable homophily on similarity matrices constructed on the basis of these attributes of associations. [6] If associations embedded in different relational patterns (that is, holding different structural

[6] See Section ?? in Appendix ?? on page ?? for a description of similarity matrix construction.

positions) send ties to similar others in terms of origin of group representation, we will find a significant and positive relationship between blocks and similarity. In other words, if the network is fragmented along the migration wave or group representation of associations, the relationship between the position of associations, their block membership, should be positively related to similarity.[7] Indeed, the similarity matrix records similarity scores, the higher the score, the most similar are the associations on the attributes under study.

The results for Lyon on origin and group representation are reported in table 5.7. They confirm the previous findings. Associations in Lyon, whatever their location in the network, do not tend to send ties to similar others. Neither ethnic/national origin nor the represented group fragment the network of migrant associations in Lyon.

Table 5.7: Non-parametric estimates for fragmentation along origin in Lyon

	Origin		*Group representation*	
	Stdized Coeff	Sig.	Stdized Coeff.	Sig.
Intercept	0.00000	0.5670	0.00000	0.6536
Block 1	-0016383	0.3796	-0.030174	0.3786
Block 2	-0.017460	0.3632	-0.012630	0.5036
Block 3	0.043577	0.1280	0.083649	0.1118
Block 4	-0.019987	0.3340	-0.041542	0.2778
Adj. R^2	.003	0.6538	.010	0.4720
N				2652

In Zurich (table 5.8), we find a significant relationship between structural position of associations and their similarity in length of settlement. Associations located in the same position in the network also send ties to similar others in terms of migration wave. The network is fragmented along length of settlement, and religious and secular lines, since immigrant associations are more likely to be allied to associations from the same migration wave. Migrant Associations from the first migration waves have a higher tendency to send ties to similar others than to any other group. Religious associations are more likely to send ties to religious associations than to any other association. Thus, not only do we find a migrant groups from the same migration

[7] We use the same model as in the previous chapter. See section 4.5 on p.97 for a description of the model.

wave in each cluster in Zurich, but associations from the same wave are also more likely to send ties to associations from the same wave.

Table 5.8: Non-parametric estimates for fragmentation along origin in Zurich

	Origin		*Group representation*	
	Stdized Coeff.	Sig.	Stdized Coeff.	Sig.
Intercept	0.00000	0.9998	0.000000	0.9998
Block 1	0.368761	0.0000	0.390281	0.0000
Block 2	0.103658	0.0424	0.131539	0.0314
Block 3	0.129432	0.0208	0.121406	0.0204
R^2	.138	0.0002	.154	0.0000
N				1682

We find similar results for the representation of a specific group. Associations embedded in similar modes of coordination of collective action, also tend to represent the same group of people. In the first block, dominated by longer settled migrants, associations are more likely to send ties within the group but also to associations representing migrant groups. The second cluster is composed of associations representing no specific group that are also more likely to be tied to each other than to any other actor in the network. Finally, the third block is composed of religious associations from more recent waves, that claim to represent a specific religious group and who build alliances mainly with similar associations.

While the network in Zurich is not fragmented strictly along ethnic lines, the origin of migrants plays a role in the segmentation of the network. Boundaries are defined around specific immigrant groups, with religious associations interacting essentially with religious associations, migrants from the first wave mainly with migrants from the early waves of immigration, and finally migrants from Eastern Europe (mainly Kosovars and Turks). These results are consistent with findings on neighborhoods in different Swiss cities, where individual ties are not shaped along national lines, but where the network is segmented along “insiders“, and “outsiders“ (Wimmer, 2002, 2004). He finds that individual networks of migrants are fragmented along their length of residence and the degree of perceived assimilability in the system. Migrants from the first immigration waves were mainly connected to autochthonous residents and migrants from the same immigration waves who consider themselves as "insiders". Outsiders are immigrants from the more

recent immigration waves, such as Turks and Kosovars, who are excluded from the other networks. In contrast, in Lyon we find no such strong fragmentation based on origin. Associations embedded in similar relational patterns do not share the same origin and do not represent the same group of people.

5.5 Sector of activity and self-definition: Functional fragmentation

Contrary to the expectations, the network in Zurich is fragmented along the wave of immigration. However, ethno-national origin plays a role as it informs about the length of settlement of migrants as opposed to the network in Lyon in which origin of migrants does not play a role. This section will examine the second fragmentation principle, namely the area of activities of associations and their self-definitions. First, it will compare activities and self-definition across cities, and then it will look at how activities and self-definition of associations are distributed across blocks. It finally examines whether blocks are structured around associations' activities.

Table 6.10 shows the areas of activities of associations in both cities recoded on the basis of a list of thirty-four activities performed in the last twelve months preceding the interview. Migrant associations engage to a similar extent in activities such as sports, culture, new politics, and welfare in Lyon and Zurich. Associations in Lyon engage in community activities to a significantly higher extent than do associations in Zurich. The second most important areas in which associations in Lyon are active are general welfare and family. In Zurich, many associations are active in the family area, to a significantly higher extent than associations in Lyon. Migrant organizations in Zurich only differ from those in Lyon in areas such as economic interest, religious activities and immigration. While almost 80% of associations in Zurich are active in the area of immigration, only half of migrant organizations in Lyon do. While associations in Lyon engage much in the community area, in Zurich the most important areas are family, culture, and immigration.

Do associations occupying the same positions perform similar activities and define themselves in similar ways? Tables 5.10 and 5.11 show the distribution of areas of activity across blocks. In Lyon, out of the 12 broad areas

Table 5.9: Area of activity in Lyon and Zurich, percentage of yes

	Lyon	Zurich	Total	Fisher's
Family	59.6	79.5	68.1	.068
Sports	40.4	58.9	46.1	n.s.
Culture	61.5	71.8	65.9	n.s.
Community	73.1	43.6	60.4	.004
Politics	1.9	33.3	15.4	.000
New politics	44.2	53.9	48.4	n.s.
General welfare	59.6	71.8	64.8	n.s.
Group specific welfare	48.1	61.5	53.8	n.s.
Economic interest	32.7	53.9	41.8	.035
Religious	3.9	38.5	18.7	.000
Immigration	50.0	79.5	62.6	.003
Other	21.1	28.2	24.6	n.s.

of activities, five differentiate associations between clusters. Activities in the area of community are important for associations in all blocks. Although at some different levels, it is an important area for a large number of immigrant associations in Lyon. Associations in block 4, the middle link of the chain that displays a social movement mode of coordination (i.e., dense resource exchange and high investment in boundary definition) show high levels of activities in all areas except religion. However, they can be distinguished from associations embedded in other relational patterns by their high investment in family activities, group specific welfare, economic interest, and immigration. In contrast to this highly active cluster, the second block (isolated from the chain) shows very low levels of activity. Associations holding this position are mainly active in the area of general welfare, culture, and community, and in contrast to all other clusters, have not been active at all in the area of economic interest. To sum up, the three blocks forming the chain engage in more activities. However, the central link of the chain is the block that shows the highest level of activity.

In Zurich, associations in different locations are less distinguished in terms of areas of activities, differing only on community, culture, general welfare, and religion. While culture is an important area of activity for associations in the first two blocks, it is significantly less important for Muslim associations. Indeed, their activities focus mainly on religion (since most of them are religious associations reporting also that they represent a religious

Table 5.10: Area of activity in Lyon, percentage of yes

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Block 4	Total	Fisher's
Family	50.0	22.2	61.1	86.7	59.6	.016
Sports	40.0	22.2	44.4	46.7	40.4	n.s.
Culture	60.0	44.4	55.6	80.0	61.5	n.s.
Community	80.0	55.6	66.7	86.7	73.1	n.s.
Politics	.0	.0	.0	6.7	n.s.	
New politics	40.0	22.2	38.9	66.7	44.2	n.s.
General welfare	30.0	55.6	66.7	73.3	59.6	n.s.
Group specific welfare	30.0	11.1	50.0	80.0	48.1	.006
Economic interest	20.0	.0	33.3	60.0	32.7	.015
Religious	10.0	11.1	.0	.0	3.9	n.s.
Immigration	40.0	.0	61.1	73.3	50.0	.002
Other	10.0	.0	11.1	53.3	21.2	.006

group), all are active in the general welfare area, and they also invest much in the family area, which are typical religious associations' activities. The block of the first immigration wave is less active on religion. Its most important activity area is immigration, followed by welfare (general and group-specific), community, and sports. These associations invest a great deal in areas that help preserve their culture of origin. The welfare area is in this case focused on pensioners. Indeed, many migrants from the guest-workers' area are now retired and still live in Switzerland, so these associations are engaging more on issues related to retirement of migrants. Migrants from more recent waves, whose associations are concentrated in the second block, focus also on cultural activities, maintaining their origin cultures, but also on family and the immigration area. One of the most important areas of activity of associations in this block is oriented toward the integration of their constituency into Swiss society, but they also seek to maintain their homeland culture through the organization of homeland language courses for the second generation.

These results suggest that the network in Lyon is more differentiated along the areas of activity than in Zurich, since we find more differences across blocks in terms of activities in Lyon. However, rather than the area of activity, it is the level of activities that distinguishes blocks. But what about associations' self-definition? Looking at self-definition gives a more precise picture of the fragmentation principle at work in the networks. Indeed, we

Table 5.11: Area of activity in Zurich, percentage of yes

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Total	Fisher's
Family	66.7	92.3	87.5	79.5	n.s.
Sports	72.2	38.5	37.5	53.9	n.s.
Culture	77.8	84.6	37.5	71.8	.063
Community	55.6	15.4	62.5	43.6	.045
Politics	44.4	30.8	12.5	33.3	n.s.
New politics	50.0	61.5	50.0	53.9	n.s.
General welfare	72.2	53.9	100	71.8	.089
Group specific welfare	77.8	46.1	50.0	61.5	n.s.
Economic interest	61.1	38.5	62.5	53.9	n.s.
Religious	33.3	15.4	87.5	38.5	.004
Immigration	83.3	76.9	75.0	79.5	n.s.
Other	27.8	30.8	25.0	28.2	n.s.

might find associations that are active in different areas, but still defining themselves differently. It might be that self-definition is more important for the selection of allies than the area of activity. Indeed, the areas of activity might vary over time and can be more contingent than self-definition. An association can be active in an area for a short period of time (remember that the area of activity is limited to the last twelve months preceding the interview). Self-definition is a more stable aspect of an association that may impact the selection of allies. We might find clusters of associations in which self-definitions are similar, more specifically in the clusters characterized by high investment in boundary definition, because self-definition is part of self-identification and of the definition of others.

Before looking at self-definition across clusters, we will first compare self-definition in the two cities and see whether they differ. Table 5.12 reports the results of self-definition of associations. Migrant associations show different patterns of self-definition in Lyon and Zurich, and they differ significantly on several types of associations. The most frequent self-definitions in Zurich are as immigrant and cultural organizations. However, associations in Zurich define themselves more frequently as retired associations than in Lyon. The same goes for self-definitions as parents' associations and cultural associations. Moreover, we find more associations in Zurich defining themselves ethnic, or religious associations. Finally, in Lyon, the most frequent self-definitions are charity and cultural organizations, but associations define

Table 5.12: Self-definitions of associations in Lyon and Zurich percentage of yes

	Lyon	Zurich	Total	Fisher's
Sports club	21.2	18.0	19.8	n.s.
Youth	19.2	23.1	20.9	n.s.
Environmental	3.9	5.1	4.4	n.s.
Animal rights	.0	2.6	1.1	n.s.
Peace organization	7.7	15.4	11.0	n.s.
Humanitarian aid or human rights	25.0	35.9	29.7	n.s.
Charity or social welfare	36.5	35.9	36.3	n.s
Patient, illness, addiction	5.8	12.8	8.8	n.s.
Disabled	5.8	2.6	4.4	n.s.
Retired	3.9	15.4	8.8	.061
Lodge, service club	.0	.0	.0	n.s.
Political party	.0	2.6	1.1	n.s.
Trade union	.0	5.1	2.2	n.s.
Farmers'	.0	2.6	1.1	n.s.
Business or employers'	1.9	2.6	2.2	n.s
Professional	3.9	2.6	3.3	n.s.
Parents'	.15.4	30.8	22.0	.068
Cultural	34.6	59.0	45.1	.018
Other hobby	3.9	5.1	4.4	n.s.
Residents' housing	25.0	10.3	18.7	.063
Immigrants'	9.6	59.0	30.8	.000
Religious	.0	33.3	14.3	.000
Women's	9.6	15.4	12.1	n.s.
Anti-racism	17.3	18.0	17.6	n.s.
Direct action	.0	10.3	4.4	.031
Ethnic	9.6	25.6	16.5	.040

themselves to a significantly higher extent as residents'/housing associations than in Zurich.

Are some self-definitions dominant in some blocks? Self-definition does not seem to be differentiating clusters in Lyon (table 5.13). Almost no self-definition is dominant in one cluster, moreover, we find no dominating self-definition in the most interconnected cluster, block 4. Surprisingly, there is a difference across associations in different relational patterns for association defining themselves as ethnic associations. Block 1, the first link of the chain, differs from other blocks on this aspect as more associations in this block define themselves as ethnic associations. Thus associations defining

themselves as ethnic associations are concentrated in one cluster. However, with this exception, no self-definition is dominant in clusters.

In contrast, in Zurich, self-definition of associations seems to distinguish associations located in different structural positions. In the block of associations from the first migration wave, the share of associations defining themselves as retired associations is significantly higher than in other blocks. The block of religious associations, consistent with previous findings, defines themselves mainly as religious associations but significantly less than in other blocks, as cultural associations. The block of the most recent immigration wave is here again different in terms of self-definition than religious associations. Block 1 and 2 are most similar on their self-definition; cultural and immigrant associations are the most frequent self-definitions in these blocks. Block 3 defines itself mainly as religious associations or as humanitarian or human aid associations.

Table 5.13: Self definition, Lyon, percentage of yes

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Block 4	Total	Fisher's
Sport club	20.0	22.2	16.7	26.7	21.2	n.s
Youth	20.0	.0	16.7	33.3	19.2	n.s.
Envir	.0	.0	.0	.0	3.9	n.s.
Peace	10.0	.0	5.6	13.1	7.7	n.s.
Humanitarian	40.0	22.2	16.7	26.7	25.0	n.s.
Charity	40.0	11.1	33.3	53.3	36.5	n.s.
Patient illness	.0	11.1	.0	13.3	5.8	n.s.
Disabled	.0	11.1	.0	13.3	5.8	n.s.
Retired	10.0	.0	.0	6.7	3.9	n.s.
Trade union	.0	.0	.0	.0	0	n.s
Professional	10.0	.0	5.6	.0	3.9	n.s.
Parents	20.0	.0	11.1	26.7	15.4	n.s.
Cultural	40.0	33.3	22.2	46.7	34.6	n.s.
Other hobby	10.0	.0	5.6	.0	3.9	n.s.
Resident	40.0	22.2	16.7	26.7	25.0	n.s.
Immigrant	.0	.0	16.7	13.3	9.6	n.s.
Religious	.0	.0	.0	.0	0	n.s.
Women	.0	.0	5.6	26.7	9.6	n.s.
Anti-racism	20.0	11.1	11.1	26.7	17.3	n.s.
Direct act	.0	.0	.0	0	0	n.s.
Ethnic	30.0	.0	.0	13.3	9.6	.031

Table 5.14: Self definition, Zurich, percentage of yes

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Total	Fisher's
Sports club	27.8	7.7	12.5	18.0	n.s.
Youth association	22.2	30.8	12.5	23.1	n.s.
Environmental org	11.1	.0	.0	5.1	n.s.
Peace org	27.8	7.7	.0	15.4	n.s.
Humanitarian/human rights	50.0	23.1	25.0	35.9	n.s.
Charity or social welfare	50.0	30.8	12.5	35.9	n.s.
Patient illness or addiction	22.2	7.7	.0	12.8	n.s.
Disabled	5.6	.0	.0	2.6	n.s.
Retired	33.3	.0	.0	15.4	.025
Political party	.0	7.7	.0	2.6	n.s.
Trade union	11.1	.0	.0	5.1	n.s.
Business org	5.6	.0	.0	2.6	n.s.
Professional	.0	7.7	.0	2.6	n.s
Parents	38.9	38.5	.0	30.8	n.s.
Cultural, musical	72.2	69.2	12.5	59.0	.016
Other hobby	.0	7.7	12.5	5.1	n.s.
Resident housing or neighb	5.6	15.4	12.5	10.3	n.s.
Immigrant	72.2	46.2	50	59.0	n.s.
Religious	33.3	.0	87.5	33.3	.000
Women	16.7	15.4	12.5	15.4	n.s.
Anti-racism	22.2	23.1	.0	17.8	n.s.
Direct action group	11.1	15.4	.0	10.3	n.s.
Ethnic	33.3	23.1	12.5	25.6	n.s.

To sum up, activities of associations differ more across blocks in Lyon than in Zurich, as opposed to self-definition. Moreover, in Zurich, there seems to be an overlap between activities and self-definition, as opposed to Lyon. As for origin and representation, to see whether the network is fragmented along these lines, we still need to examine whether the structural location and different modes of coordination of collective action affect their similarity in the activities and self-definition of associations.

Table 5.15 shows the results for the network fragmentation in Lyon. The results show that the structural position is related to the area of activity of associations. Indeed, we find a significant relationship between structural location and similarity on activities. This relation is negative for the first and second block. Associations at the end of the chain and isolated associations from the network (block 2) are dissimilar in terms of activities. On the other hand, the first block of the chain shows a high similarity in terms of area of activity. In other words, associations in blocks 1 and 2 display a high diversity in terms of activities, while associations in block 3 tend to be similar in the activities associations engage in. Migrant organizations that display a social movement mode of coordination show no tendency toward similarity or dissimilarity. Although we expected a high similarity of associations in block 4, hypothesizing that their engagement in the same type of activities would be the basis for their collective identity, what we do not observe, the area of activity fragments the network in Lyon. Only one block (3) shows high similarity of associations in activities. Block 1 and 2 show significantly high dissimilarity. That is, the network is structured along the areas of activities in which associations engage, but not to the expected extent.

However, the more stable aspect, self-definition, does not structure the network in Lyon. Indeed, the model is not significant. These results are partly confirming what was expected about Lyon, namely that the network is structured around the areas of activity in which associations engage. Indeed, while we find some relationships between the structural position of associations and the area of activities, the result is not as strong as expected.

Table 5.16 shows the results for the fragmentation along areas of activities and self-definition in Zurich. As opposed to Lyon, the area of activity of migrant associations does not fragment the network. However, we find a significant relationship for self-definition. The more stable aspect of the area in which associations engage and which relates to their identity fragments

Table 5.15: Non-parametric estimates for activities and self-definition in Lyon

	Area of activity		*Self-defintion*	
	Stdized Coeff.	Sig.	Stdized Coeff.	Sig.
Intercept	0.00000	0.9928	0.000000	0.8108
Block 1	-0.1011032	0.0426	0.005641	0.3908
Block 2	-0.075573	0.0986	-0.058655	0.0954
Block 3	0.240442	0.0042	0.112120	0.0508
Block 4	0.045933	0.2706	-0.025835	0.3822
Adj. R^2	.077	0.0152	.017	0.2796
N				2652

the network of migrant associations in Zurich. Associations from the first immigration wave define themselves in similar ways and this self-definition is related to their structural location. However, self-definition corresponds to the identities found previously in the clusters and it only structures the third cluster.

Table 5.16: Non-parametric estimates for activities and self-definition in Zurich

	Area of activity		*Self-defintion*	
	Stdized Coeff.	Sig.	Stdized Coeff.	Sig.
Intercept	0.000000	0.8660	0.000000	0.9968
Block 1	0.105541	0.1660	0.254138	0.0090
Block 2	-0.062377	0.2634	-0.019136	0.4510
Block 3	0.039685	0.2718	-0.022441	0.4498
R^2	.017	0.5342	.067	.0554
N				1682

To conclude, networks of migrant associations differ in Lyon and Zurich as well as the line along which they are fragmented. The non-recognition of particularistic identities in Lyon seems to have an effect not only on the basis on which migrants organize (indeed, we found associations active mainly in the community area and defining themselves as charity/social welfare and residents' associations and only few defining themselves as immigrant or ethnic associations), but also in the way migrant associations relate to each other. Moreover, associations defining themselves as ethnic or migrant associations are mainly to be found in clusters embedded in organizational modes of coordination. The fact that in the field of immigration particular-

istic identities are not salient, but that integration of immigrants is conceived as social inclusion has a little effect on the fragmentation lines of the network. Indeed, rather than identities, issue agendas are salient. Associations in a social movement mode of coordination are not similar in the activities they engage in. Rather they display a high level of activities. This suggests a situation in which these associations monopolize the field. In Zurich, the ethno-assimilationist model allows migrants to keep their ethnic/national identity. This affects the identity on which they organize. Indeed, migrant associations are mainly active in the cultural area (aimed at maintaining their origin culture), but they also define themselves as ethnic, immigrant, or religious associations. The network is also fragmented along those lines on which migrant associations exchange resources and send ties reflecting boundaries to associations that are similar in terms of migration wave, as well as in what specific group they represent. These results thus suggest that the context in which migrant associations, more specifically the discursive political opportunity structures in which they are embedded, has an effect on their networking strategies.

5.6 Conclusion

The objective of the last chapter was to examine what fragmentation principles are at work in the network of migrant associations in Lyon and in Zurich. Different principles were hypothesized to fragment the network in both cities. While the network in Lyon was expected to be fragmented along areas of activities (functional fragmentation), in Zurich we expected the origin of associations to fragment the network (fragmentation along identity).

The findings partly support the hypothesis. In Zurich, the network is highly fragmented into three totally disconnected clusters along the migration wave. One block is composed of associations from the first migrant waves to Switzerland. Moreover, these associations report that they represent a specific ethnic group. Finally, they define themselves mainly as immigrant associations. A second block is composed of immigrants from the more recent waves of immigration from Eastern Europe. Although the associations do not represent any specific group, they define themselves mainly as cultural associations. Finally, a third block is composed by religious associations from recent waves, reporting to represent religious groups but also

defining themselves as religious associations. Moreover, in all three blocks, the structural position of associations is positively related to their similarity on length of settlement and group representation.

In Lyon, the picture is less straightforward. The origin of immigrants clearly does not segment the network, although we find some origins that are more represented in some blocks than in others. The results for Lyon suggest that the network is instead fragmented along the areas in which associations are active. While no block is active in one specific are of activities, it seems that the fragmentation is rather related to the level of activities. Indeed, the central link of the chain, which displays a social movement mode of coordination of collective action, is active in more areas than associations in other blocks. However, associations holding this position do not send more ties to similar others in terms of activities. Only associations in the first link of the chain are linked to similar associations in their activities.

These findings suggest that the discursive POS in the field of immigration have an effect on the way immigrant associations define themselves but also on how they relate to each other. Migrant associations from different waves are densely interconnected, but the context does not encourage alliance building cutting across this boundary. The field is fragmented between old established migrants and newly arrived. Interestingly, associations from the earlier migrations waves still define themselves as migrant associations but also declare to represent specific national groups. However, these migrants settled a long time ago, and the fact that associations still organize on the basis of their national origin and are tied mainly to associations from the same waves suggests that the context excludes migrant associations from the Swiss national community.

In Lyon, the discursive POS seems to favor a more integrated network. Ethnic/national identities do not segment the network as a result of the republican approach of citizenship. Moreover, the definition of immigrants' integration in terms of political and social inclusion affects the network. One cluster seems to monopolize the field, by engaging in a high number of activities. Other clusters, engaged in an organizational mode of coordination, engage in fewer activities.

But what are the consequences of these network structures on the political inclusion of migrant associations? Do they provide them with resources for political inclusion and making their voices heard? Are migrant asso-

ciations displaying social movement modes of collective action more active politically? Or does the context interact with the relational structure and affect the outcomes in terms of political inclusion? These questions will be addressed in the next chapter.

Chapter 6

Political inclusion

6.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the political inclusion of immigrants' associations in Lyon and Zurich. Drawing on the findings about the network structure in both cities, it looks at the effects of the POS and the structural location of associations on their level of political inclusion. It hypothesizes that the effect of the structural location of immigrant associations on their political involvement is context-dependent. More specifically, being embedded in similar types of relations will favor participation in one context, but discourage it in another. The first section of the chapter discusses the theoretical approach and the relationship between POS, network structure, and political inclusion, and recalls the hypotheses formulated in chapter 2. The following section describes political inclusion and its various dimensions. Indeed, political inclusion of associations refers not only their political activities, but is also related to their contacts with local and regional political institutions and administration. It then explores how associations embedded in different relational patterns are politically included in Lyon and Zurich. The hypotheses are then tested through variance analysis that explores the relationship between structural position and political inclusion. It concludes by discussing the link between network structures and political inclusion of migrant associations in different political settings.

6.2 Structural location of associations and political inclusion in different contexts

What are the consequences of the network structures found in Lyon and Zurich for the political inclusion of immigrants' associations? Do some structures provide associations with more resources for participation than others, as hypothesized by the social capital approach (Putnam, 1993; Lin, 2001)? Different network structures have been found in both cities, and migrant associations also display different modes of coordination of collective action. In Lyon, they are rather embedded in organizational modes of coordination, and one cluster shows a social movement mode of coordination. The network in Lyon is less fragmented than expected but the low fragmentation follows rather a functional principle, that is, around areas of activities. In Zurich, we found a totally fragmented network with three clusters displaying a social movement mode of coordination. The fragmentation principle is based on associations' wave of migration. What resources do these structures provide associations with for political inclusion?

In Lyon, associations embedded in resource exchange and ties reflecting boundary definition will have more resources for political participation and for making their voices heard. These associations are active on the issues recognized by public authorities as legitimate for immigrants, so their access to the public sphere as well as their contacts with authorities will be facilitated. Associations embedded in other clusters will lack the resources for political inclusion. In Zurich, associations are deeply embedded in clusters in which resource exchange overlaps with boundary definition ties. However, since they are linked around their identities as migrants, their access to the public sphere is limited. Their embeddedness in this type of relational patterns reinforces their exclusion from the public sphere. Thus, not only will immigrant associations in Zurich display lower levels of political inclusion than associations in Lyon, but we will find no differences among clusters in the level of political inclusion. Indeed, the presence of social capital, defined as dense ethnic civic communities by Fennema and Tillie (2001), is not sufficient for political inclusion. The social capital of migrants has to be mobilizable to play a positive role (Anthias, 2007).

In chapter 3 the hypothesis is formulated as follows:

In Zurich, the combination of an ethno-assmilationist model and social movements or subcultural modes of coordination of collective action is expected to favor more client-oriented activities, few contacts with political institutions, but more contentious forms of political participation.

In Lyon, the combination of a civic-assimilationist model of citizenship and a hierarchical network based on coalitional or organizational modes of coordination is expected to favor engagement in policy-oriented activities, show higher levels but less contentious forms of political participation and have more contacts with political institutions.

6.3 Defining and measuring political inclusion of migrant organizations

This section defines political inclusion of migrant associations and focuses on two dimensions. The first is related to the political activities of associations. First, the political function of associations is examined by distinguishing between policy- and member-oriented activities. Exploring the political function of associations allows us to assess the extent to which associations are oriented toward the public sphere. The second aspect of the activity dimension is related to the actual forms of political activities performed by associations. The second dimension refers to the contacts associations have with relevant institutions at the local and regional level to assess their potential impact on local political authorities.

6.3.1 Political function and participation

Voluntary associations can be active in various domains. While social movement organizations are usually considered primarily policy-oriented organizations, sports clubs or church-related organizations are rather member-oriented but can provide their members with civic skills (Putnam, 2000). However, associations with objectives that are not primarily political may be engaged in political activities. To assess the political function of associations, we will draw on the typology developed by Lelieveldt et al. (2007, p.82-85). Associations can engage in different types of activities and the

literature distinguishes between two general orientations of associations: instrumental activities, that is, the attainment of a specific goal and organizational maintenance. Instrumental activities are distinguished between policy- and client-oriented activities. While policy-oriented activities target political authorities, client-oriented activities focus on members of associations. The second dimension of the typology follows Kriesi (1996) in distinguishing between the actors who perform these actions. To attain the goals of the association, members can participate directly. In other cases, the constituency is not directly involved and the (professional) staff of associations performs these activities on behalf of their members. Thus, associations can perform five types of activities. One type is activities for the maintenance of associations, and the four other incorporate instrumental activities. Maintenance activities comprise recruiting members, fund-raising, and promoting volunteering. Representation is policy-oriented activities in which members do not participate directly (representation and lobby activities). Mobilization is when associations perform policy-oriented activities with the direct participation of the constituency (mobilizing members, advocacy activities). Activities that are client-oriented can be performed by members directly. In this case, these activities are defined as activation (socializing, recreational/sports, or self-help activities). If the constituency is not directly involved in client-oriented activities, these are service activities (services to members or to others, advisory activities, and social/local integration). Distinguishing the orientation of activities and between the actors performing these activities, we will be able to assess whether immigrant associations have a political function. Migrant organizations were asked whether they had performed these activities in the last twelve months.[1]

The second aspect of political inclusion of migrant organizations focuses directly on the forms of political engagement. Associations were asked about their frequency of performing different political activities. These activities range from conventional types, such as sending letters to authorities or collecting signatures for petitions, to more radical form of participation such as building occupation. The focus is on the last twelve months preceding the interview. We examine whether associations engaged in those activities.[2]

[1] Q22 in Questionnaire.
[2] Q25 in Questionnaire.

6.3.2 Contacts with local and regional institutions

The third dimension of political inclusion is the contacts migrant associations have with administrations and political institutions of the receiving country. Do associations have contacts with administration in their city, or are they excluded from institutions? This dimension relates to the potential political impact that migrant organizations have with local political institutions and whether they have access to public officials and consequently have their interest represented in decision-making (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008b). Migrants were asked about their contacts with different political institutions. We focus here on two types of institutions.[3] First, contacts with different departments at the city level are explored, such as the department related to immigration and welfare and another relevant department for migrant associations (the Department of City Development in Zurich and the Department for Associations in Lyon). Contacts with the local schools, local police, and local health centers are also considered. Finally, contacts with political institutions at the local and regional level are examined as well as with institutions of the country of origin.[4]

6.4 Resources of associations

Before looking at the political inclusion of migrant associations and their structural location, this section will look at the resources available to associations in both cities. While networks are one type of resource that can explain political inclusion (Fennema and Tillie, 2001; Pilati, 2011; Vermeulen and Berger, 2008), the availability of material resources, such as participants (Strömblad and Bengtsson, 2009) and funds is a crucial aspect for explaiing political inclusion of associations.

Voluntary associations rely on different type of resources for attaining their objectives. The resource mobilization theory defines different types of resources that need to be mobilized for collective action to occur: moral (legitimacy), cultural (conceptual tools or knowledge, newspapers, magazines), social-organizational (relationships, networks), human (labor), and material (money) resources (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004). We will first examine

[3] Q56 in questionnaire.

[4] See table ?? in Appendix ?? for the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this chapter.

how human and material resources are distributed across cities and then across clusters within the networks. For material resources, the share of state funding in the associations' budgets will be considered. For human resources, we will look at the number of members of associations. Both resources may increase the political inclusion of associations.

The discussion about the POS in both cities showed how associations in Lyon have better access to state funding than in Zurich (see Chapter 3). Indeed, although no specific funding is foreseen for migrant associations in Lyon, migrant organizations can receive funds from the state if they are active on issues related to the political and social inclusion of citizens. In Zurich, funding is project-related, and the budget of the city devoted to migrant organizations' projects is very low. Moreover, the relationship between state funding and political activities is ambivalent. An important argument in this regard is that associations that receive substantial subsidies from local or national political authorities tend to become more internally oriented towards their constituencies and abandon political activism. Another argument is that state funding increases political participation (Bloemraad, 2005).

Table 6.1 shows the distribution of state funding of associations across cities. The difference between cities is significant. The results confirm the access to resources for associations in both contexts. Indeed, associations in Lyon receive more subsidies than associations in Zurich. While around 50% of migrant associations in Lyon do not get any subsidies, over 80% of associations in Zurich do not get funded by the state. Moreover, no association in Zurich is entirely state-funded as opposed to Lyon, where some associations are entirely financed by the state.

Table 6.1: Source of funding of associations in Lyon and Zurich, percentage of state subsidies in total budget

	Lyon	Zurich	Total
No state funding	53.7	88.6	69.7
Up to 25%	7.3	8.6	7.9
Up to 50%	22.0	2.9	13.2
Up to 75%	7.3	.0	4.0
Up to 100%	9.8	.0	5.3
Total (N)	100 (41)	100 (35)	100 (76)
Fisher's			.002

To control for the effect of human and material resources on the political inclusion of associations, we now turn to the distribution of these resources within the networks of migrant associations in Lyon and in Zurich. Table 6.2 shows the share of state funding in associations' budgets by blocks in Lyon. There is a significant relationship between block membership and the share of state funding in associations' budgets. While almost 90% of associations in block 1 do not get any subsidies, only a few associations in block 3 do not get funds from the state. The first link of the chain, block 3, is the one in which associations get more subsidies. The isolated associations (block 2) are divided in the two extreme categories, receiving no state subsidies at all or having their budget entirely state-funded. Finally, in block 4, half of the associations get funds from the state and half of them do not.

Table 6.2: State funding by blocks, Lyon

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Block 4	Total
No state funding	88.9	71.4	28.6	45.5	53.7
Up to 25%	11.1	.0	24.3	.0	7.3
Up to 50%	.0	.0	35.7	36.4	22.0
Up to 75%	.0	.0	14.3	9.1	7.3
Up to 100%	.0	28.6	7.1	9.1	9.8
Total (N)	100 (9)	100 (7)	100 (14)	100(11)	100 (41)
Fisher's exact					.060

In Zurich, there is no difference across blocks in state financing (table 6.3). Only few associations are funded by the state; almost 90% of associations in each block do not get any funds from the state. These findings are consistent with the policies in terms of funding of migrant associations as described in chapter 3. Access to state funding is much easier for associations in Lyon than in Zurich. However, the access to subsidies varies with the structural location of associations in Lyon, but not in Zurich. Thus, if the financial resources of associations and their origin have an effect on political inclusion, we expect a difference in terms of political inclusion in Lyon across clusters but not in Zurich. Indeed, while the budgets of associations in Lyon are more state-dependent than associations in Zurich, state funding is concentrated in specific blocks in Lyon. In Zurich, no block seem to privileged in terms of state funding.

What about human resources? Associations in Zurich have more members than in Lyon (table 6.4). No association in Zurich has fewer than ten

Table 6.3: State funding by blocks Zurich

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Total
No state funding	88.2	90.0	87.5	88.6
Up to 25%	11.7	.0	12.5	8.9
Up to 50%	.0	10.0	.0	2.9
Up to 75%	.0	.0	.0	.0
Up to 100%	.0	.0	.0	.0
Total (N)	100 (17)	100 (10)	100 (8)	100 (35)
Fisher's exact				n.s.

members, and the share of associations with more than 500 members is higher than in Lyon.

Table 6.4: Number of members of associations in Lyon and Zurich

	Lyon	Zurich	Total
From 1-9	9.8	.0	5.8
From 10-29	15.7	2.8	10.3
From 30-99	31.4	22.2	27.6
From 100-499	19.6	36.1	26.4
500 or more	23.5	38.9	29.9
Total (N)	100 (51)	100 (36)	100 (87)
Fisher's			.021

Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the number of members of associations in different structural locations in both cities. While Lyon and Zurich differ in terms of the size of associations, there is no significant relationship between the number of members of associations and the structural location in any of the cities. The size of associations varies within blocks, and no block concentrates the biggest or the smallest associations.

Table 6.5: Members by blocks in Lyon

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Block 4	Total
From 1-9	.0	44.4	.0	6.7	9.8
From 10-29	20.0	.0	29.4	6.7	15.7
From 30-99	50.0	22.2	29.4	26.7	31.4
From 100-499	20.0	11.1	17.65	26.7	19.6
500 or more	10.0	22.2	23.5	33.3	23.5
Total (N)	100 (10)	100 (9)	100 (17)	100(15)	100 (51)
Fisher's exact					n.s.

Table 6.6: Members by blocks Zurich

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Total
From 1-9	.0	8.3	.0	2.8
From 10-29	18.8	33.3	12.5	22.2
From 30-99	37.5	33.3	37.5	36.1
From 100-499	43.8	25.0	50.0	38.9
500 or more				
Total (N)	100 (16)	100 (12)	100 (8)	100 (36)
Fisher's exact				.n.s.

Thus, while state funding differs across blocks in Lyon, no such difference is observed in Zurich. And the number of members of associations is not related to the structural location in both cities. State funding is concentrated in two blocks (3 and 4) in Lyon. The next section examines the political activities of associations.

6.5 Political activities of immigrant associations

This section focuses on the political function of associations as well as their forms of political engagement. While the political function distinguishes between activities that are oriented towards the constituency of associations or the public sphere, political participation refers to the forms of political activities of organizations. Indeed, although the function of associations can be oriented towards the constituency, they might nevertheless be politically active. Associations with a primary goal that is not political might also be engaged in political activities. Does the mode of coordination of collective action have an effect on the political function of associations and the type and level of political participation of associations?

6.5.1 Political participation in Lyon and Zurich

Associations can perform different forms of political activities, ranging from more conventional forms to more violent ones. Before analyzing how associations within cities differ, we first examine the political activities of associations between cities. Associations in Lyon and in Zurich display totally different political functions. With the exception of mobilization activities, migrant organizations differ on all political functions. Associations in Zurich generally show higher levels of activities than associations in Lyon. However,

if they differ in the frequency of different political functions, they engage in rather similar functions. The most important functions in both cities are related to service and activation. Thus, associations in both cities display a similar profile in terms of political function, concentrating on the service and activation areas and being less active in the policy-oriented activities.

Table 6.7: Political function of associations in Lyon and Zurich, percentage of yes

	Lyon	Zurich	Total	Fisher's
Maintenance				
Recruiting members/donors	11.5	51.3	28.6	.000
Fund raising	7.7	33.3	18.7	.002
Promoting volunteering	34.6	51.3	41.8	.084
Activation				
Socializing	57.7	76.9	65.9	.044
Recreation	34.6	51.3	41.8	.084
Self help	17.3	33.3	24.2	.065
Service				
Services to members	13.5	53.9	30.8	.000
Services to others	21.2	33.3	26.4	.144
Advisory activities	.0	59.0	25.3	.000
Social and local integration	38.5	59.0	47.3	.042
Representation				
Interest representation	9.6	43.6	24.2	.000
Lobby	7.7	25.6	15.4	.020
Contact media	17.3	43.6	28.6	.006
Mobilization				
Mobilizing members	32.7	43.6	37.4	n.s.
Advocacy	9.6	18.0	13.2	n.s.

Do we find any differences across blocks? Table **??** reports the percentages of yes responses for the activities related to the political function of associations in Lyon. Most of these functions in Lyon do not vary significantly among structural location of associations. Indeed, while associations in blocks vary on the type of activities in which they are active, the political function is rather similar across blocks. The first block, at the end of the chain structure is active in activities related to the activation area. Most associations in this block are proposing recreational activities, socializing, and services to their members. Associations in this block are mainly oriented towards services to their constituencies. Associations in the second block,

the isolated associations, also invest in services, but are also mobilizing their members to a high extent. Nevertheless, socializing seems to be the most important activity for these associations, which is also related to the activation function. The block at the beginning of the chain is investing more in the activation area, such as socializing, and focuses on social and local integration, but is also active on maintenance by promoting volunteering. Finally, block 4, the middle link of the chain, which is also characterized by high resource exchange and high investment in ties reflecting boundaries, is active in four areas: in activation, through providing services, socializing, social and local integration, and mobilization by mobilizing members and maintenance. Surprisingly, the level of mobilization is highest in the isolated block which shows a little higher investment in mobilization than associations embedded in a social movement mode of coordination. Associations in Lyon differ significantly only on providing services to their members, but associations in all structural locations are service organizations or focus on mobilization of their constituencies. Interest representation activities are less important and performed to a very small extent. This is consistent with the findings of chapter 5, showing that associations in Lyon claim to represent no specific group.

In Zurich, associations are more differentiated in their function across blocks (table 6.9). Associations from the first migration wave (block 1) focus their activities on services and activation, such as recreational activities, socializing, advisory activities, and social and local integration. Moreover, these associations differ significantly from other blocks on the mobilization of members or recruitment of members or donors. This suggests that they are mainly oriented toward their clients and have sufficient resources in terms of membership so they do not have to invest much in maintenance compared to associations in other blocks. Associations in the block of the most recent migration wave engage in more diverse functions. Indeed, they show higher investment than others in member mobilization and recruitment (mobilization and maintenance), in socializing activities, and in activities related to local and social integration (activation and service). While they invest much in one aspect of interest representation, they do not perform any advocacy activities as opposed to associations holding a different structural position. Finally, the block of religious associations shows significantly higher investment in activities than in all three political functions. They are mobilizing

Table 6.8: Political function of associations in Lyon

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Block 4	Total	Fisher's
Maintenance						
Recruiting members/donors	10.0	11.1	16.7	6.7	11.5	n.s.
Fund raising	10.0	.0	16.7	.0	7.7	n.s.
Promoting volunteering	30.0	11.1	44.4	40.0	34.6	n.s.
Activation						
Socializing	50.0	66.7	38.9	80.0	57.7	n.s.
Recreation	50.0	44.4	27.8	26.7	34.6	n.s.
Self help	20.0	11.1	11.1	26.7	17.3	n.s.
Service						
Services to members	40.0	11.1	5.6	6.7	13.5	.080
Services to others	30.0	22.2	5.6	33.3	21.2	n.s.
Advisory activities	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	n.s.
Social and local integration	30.0	11.1	44.4	53.3	38.5	n.s.
Representation						
Interest representation	20.0	11.1	11.1	.0	9.6	n.s.
Lobby	.0	.0	11.1	13.3	7.7	n.s.
Contact media	10.0	11.1	22.2	20.0	17.3	n.s.
Mobilization						
Mobilizing members	20.0	44.4	27.8	40.0	32.7	n.s.
Advocacy	.0	11.1	11.1	13.3	9.6	n.s.

members to a higher extent than associations in other blocks, they are also providing more services to their members, and finally they are very active on advocacy.

Table 6.9: Political function of associations in Zurich

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Total	Fisher's
Maintenance					
Recruiting members/donors	27.8	69.2	75.0	51.3	.025
Fundraising	33.3	23.1	50.0	33.3	n.s.
Promoting volunteering	50.0	30.8	87.5	51.3	.044
Activation					
Socializing	66.7	92.3	75.0	76.9	n.s.
Recreation	55.6	38.5	62.5	51.3	n.s.
Self help	16.7	46.15	50.0	33.3	n.s.
Service					
Services to members	44.4	46.2	87.5	53.9	.098
Services to others	33.3	23.1	50.0	33.3	n.s.
Advisory activities	55.6	53.9	75.0	59.0	n.s.
Social and local integration	55.6	69.2	50.0	59.0	n.s.
Representation					
Interest representation	27.8	61.5	50.0	43.6	n.s.
Lobby	22.2	30.8	25.0	25.6	n.s.
Contact media	33.3	53.9	50.0	43.6	n.s.
Mobilization					
Mobilizing members	22.2	61.5	62.5	43.6	.049
Advocacy	16.7	.0	50.0	18.0	.017

Migrant associations in both cities are showing rather similar patterns regarding their political functions. Associations are engaged more in client-oriented activities, since service and activation are the most mentioned functions. However, in Zurich, the political function is not absent, and associations in the blocks of more newly arrived immigrants (block 2 and 3) are engaging more than others in mobilization activities. On the contrary, associations in Lyon engage to a much smaller extent in mobilizations and representation activities.

However, policy-oriented activities are not absent from the spectrum of activities of migrant organizations. Table 6.10 reports the forms of political participation of migrant associations in Lyon and in Zurich. Associations show similar patterns of political engagement, differing only for the implementation and management of public policies. This result is quite consistent

with studies of collective claim-making, showing a similar presence of migrants in the public sphere in France and in Switzerland Giugni and Passy (2006). Migrant associations engage in similar forms but also to a similar extent in political activities. Do we find differences across structural positions of associations?

Table 6.10: Political activities of associations in Lyon and Zurich, percentage of yes

	Lyon	Zurich	Total	Fisher's
Send letters	57.7	59.0	58.2	n.s.
Organizing press conf	46.2	46.2	46.2	n.s
Impl and manag publ. pol.	11.5	51.3	28.6	.000
Influence public opinion	36.5	38.5	37.4	n.s.
Collect sig petition	28.9	33.3	30.8	n.s.
Org. public meeting	19.2	28.1	23.1	n.s.
Org boycott	3.9	.0	2.2	n.s.
Part. building occupation	1.9	.0	1.1	ns.
Part. local TV prog	36.5	46.1	40.7	n.s.

Table 6.11 shows the forms of political activities that migrant organizations perform in Lyon. The most performed activities are also the more conventional ones such as sending letters to authorities, organizing press conferences, and distributing material to influence the public opinion. Block 4, embedded in a social movement mode of coordination, is the most active politically. Moreover, only associations in this block engage in unconventional forms of political activities such as organizing boycotts or occupying a building. Associations in the third block show similar patterns of political participation as associations in block 4, with the exception of boycotting and building occupation. Block 1 and 2 show lower levels of political participation and mainly send letters to authorities or organize press conferences. As opposed to associations in block 3 and 4, they do not implement public policies. In sum, while we find no difference across cities, the political activities of associations vary according to the mode of coordination of collective action they display. The first two blocks of the chain are better integrated politically than the last link of the chain (block 1) and the isolated associations (block 2), which show lower levels of political participation.

The first striking result for the political participation of associations in Zurich (table 6.12) is that no association engages in less conventional forms

Table 6.11: Political activities in Lyon

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Block 4	Total	Fisher's
Send letters	50.0	55.6	61.1	60.0	42.3	n.s.
Press conf	40.0	33.3	44.4	60.0	46.2	n.s.
Impl public policies	.0	.0	11.1	26.7	11.5	n.s.
Distribution mat. influence pp	10.0	11.1	50.0	53.3	36.6	.036
Collect signature petition	20.0	11.1	22.2	53.3	28.9	n.s.
Organize public meeting	10.0	11.1	22.2	26.7	19.2	n.s.
Organize boycotts	.0	.0	.0	13.3	3.9	n.s.
Participation building occupation	.0	.0	.0	6.7	1.9	n.s.
Part. local TV progr.	30.0	11.1	38.9	53.3	36.5	n.s.

of participation. Indeed, no association reports having organized a boycott or occupied a building. While all three clusters display a social movement mode of coordination, associations do not engage in typical social movement forms of participation. However, on all other forms of political engagement, associations in Zurich show a little higher participation than in Lyon. Associations in block 3 (religious associations) are less engaged politically than associations in the other clusters, although they are the associations reporting engaging in policy-oriented activities to a larger extent than the others. However, they are highly engaged in the implementation of public policies and in organizing press conferences. The block of associations from the first migration wave (block 1) shows high levels of engagement in all activities except in implementing public policies. Finally, the cluster of associations from more recent migration waves (block 2) also implements public policies, and a high share of associations in this block send letters to authorities and organize public meetings.

In sum, while associations in Zurich are all embedded in social movement mode of coordination of collective action, they do not engage in activities such as boycotting or building occupation as opposed to associations in Lyon engaged in the same patterns of relationships. However, they display a little higher level of participation than associations in Lyon. In Lyon, associations embedded in the cluster of high resource exchange and ties reflecting boundary definition participate more and in a broader range of activities than associations in the other clusters. Thus, while participation is higher in Zurich, the spectrum of political activities of migrant associations is broader in Lyon. How are these patterns related to the network structure? Are po-

Table 6.12: Political activities in Zurich

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Total	Fisher's
Send letters	61.1	69.2	37.5	59.0	n.s.
Press conf	44.4	46.2	50.0	46.2	n.s.
Impl public policies	27.8	69.2	75.0	51.3	.025
Distribution mat. influence pp	55.6	23.1	25.0	38.5	n.s.
Collection signature petition	50.0	23.1	12.5	33.3	n.s.
Organize public meeting	38.9	30.8	.0	28.2	n.s.
Organize boycotts	.0	.0	.0	.0	n.s.
Participation building occupation	.0	.0	.0	.0	n.s.
Part. local TV progr.	50.0	38.5	50.0	46.2	n.s.

litical functions and activities of associations structuring the network? The next section will explore these questions by looking at the effect of the block membership of associations on their similarity.

6.5.2 Modes of coordination of collective action and similarity of participation

The analysis of political function and participation do not show strong differences across structural location, and the different functions of associations and forms of participations are not concentrated in one block. However, the characteristics of associations may affect their alliance-building strategy. To test for the effect of the different patterns of relations, in which associations are embedded, we run an analysis of variance on their similarity on political function and on political activities.[5] In other words, it tests whether the similarity of associations is patterned by their structural location. If the expectations on the relationship between POS and network structure are met, we will observe different results in the two cities under study. In Lyon, a significant relationship between the structural location of associations and their similarity in political functions and activities is expected. In Zurich, this relationship is expected not to be significant. Indeed, because associations in the three clusters in Zurich are embedded in similar relational patterns and are disconnected from each other, no division of labor in terms of political activities is expected. In Lyon, associations in different clusters are embedded in different types of relationships and consequently display different types of

[5] See Section 4.5 for a description of the model used for the analysis and table ?? in Appendix ?? for the construction of the similarity matrices.

political activities. Thus, the political inclusion of associations should vary across relational patterns in Lyon but not in Zurich.

Table 6.13 reports the results of the analysis of variance for political participation and political function of associations in Lyon. Both relationships are significant, which means that in Lyon, the embeddedness of associations in a specific relational pattern affects their similarity on political participation and political function. A positive coefficient indicates that associations in the cluster tend to be more similar, whereas a negative coefficient indicates that they tend to be dissimilar associations. The forms of political participation of associations structure the network in Lyon. But only associations in one block select associations that are more similar in terms of forms of participation as allies. Associations in block 3, which are embedded in an organizational type of relationship (in which organizations tend to act on their own), are engaged in similar forms of political participation. Associations in other blocks show no similarity in political participation.

The network is also structured by the political function in Lyon. Associations in the isolated block (block 2) and in the last link of the chain (block 1) display dissimilar political functions. In block 3, the first link of the chain, associations are highly similar, because the relationship is positive. These results show that the similarity of associations in the network is patterned by their embeddedness in different types of relations. While associations that are isolated from the network and those that are located in the last link of the chain are performing very different political activities and have also different political functions, associations in the first link of the chain (block 3) tend to be engaged in similar forms of political activities (mainly in sending letters, organizing press conferences, and distributing material to influence public opinion) but also have a similar political function. Associations in this block are mainly engaged in activities of maintenance of their organizations by promoting volunteering and service activities through social and local integration. Thus, as opposed to other clusters, associations in this block have a specific political function in the network. Block 4, which shows the higher levels of political participation but also the more diversity in forms of political participation, is not significantly similar or dissimilar in terms of political activities. No specific patterns emerge in this block. The same goes for the political function. Associations in this block are engaged

in activities of all types, as opposed to associations in other blocks, but no similarity or dissimilarity can be observed in this block.

Table 6.13: Analysis of variance for political participation and function Lyon

	Political participation		*Function of associations*	
	Stdized Coeff.	Sig	Stdized Coeff.	Sig
Intercept	0.000000	.9620	0.000000	.9994
Block 1	-0.0565574	.1888	-0.088084	.0424
Block 2	-0.067769	.1026	-0.083737	.0426
Block 3	0.233124	.0046	0.278249	.00100
Block 4	-0.026949	.4022	0.082864	.1456
Adj. R^2	.065	.0200	.099	.0028
N				2652

Table 6.14 show the results for Zurich. As expected, the similarity of associations is not patterned by their block membership. That is, in Zurich, no block displays specific forms of political participation or any specific political function. Forms of participation as well as functions of associations are distributed randomly within the network. SInce the network in Zurich is fragmented along identity lines, this is probably related to a division of labor within clusters rather as within the whole network. The similarity of blocks relies on their identities and not on their political activities or functions.

Table 6.14: Analysis of variance for political participation and function Zurich

	Political participation		*Function of associations*	
	Stdized Coeff.	Sig.	Stdized Coeff.	Sig.
Intercept	0.000000	.8696	0.0000000	.9304
Block 1	0.066293	.2376	0.134675	.1082
Block 2	0.025896	.3472	-0.038890	.3612
Block 3	-0.023020	.4252	0.007175	.4010
Adj. R^2	.004	.8070	.020	.4502
N				1682

In conclusion, the political inclusion of associations on the activity dimension varies in both cities. Associations in Zurich show slightly higher levels of more conventional forms of participation, but as opposed to Lyon, they do not perform contentious activities. Thus, the range of political activities that migrant organizations perform in Lyon is broader. In Lyon, the

block characterized by a social movement type of relationship also shows more diversity in political functions and activities. However, while political activities of migrant associations in Lyon are patterned by their structural location, we find no relationhip for the more active block. This might be due to the diversity of functions and activities that these associations engage in. While the forms of political activities and the political function of associations are patterned by the structural location in Lyon, no such relationship is found in Zurich. Associations in the same cluster share an identity rather than a function in Zurich. Finally, the division of political labor is found within the network in Lyon but within clusters in Zurich.

6.6 Political contacts of migrant organizations

The previous section examined the political activities that organizations report and their similarity across blocks. This section explores the political contacts of migrant organizations. Migrant organizations have been found to be politically active in both cities. However, while the type of political activities they perform describes their political participation, it gives no indication of their possibility to make their voices heard by local institutions. To assess migrant organizations' potential political impact, this section will look at the contacts associations have with local institutions. It first looks at the presence or absence of contacts with local departments and then at their contacts with political actors (local and regional executive, local legislative and political parties). It finally tests the hypothesis of similarity of contacts of associations with an analysis of variance.

6.6.1 Contacts of associations in Lyon and Zurich

The first indicator of organizations' potential political impact is their contacts with the local administration. Different departments with which migrant organizations' might be in contact have been selected: the local department related to immigration, the department related to welfare, another relevant department for migrant organizations (the Department for City Development in Zurich dealing with issues such as citizens' integration in the planning and implementation of city development and the Department for Social Development and Associational Life in Lyon), the local school, the

local police and finally the local health center. The focus here is not on the frequency of contacts, but on the presence or absence of such contacts.

We first look at the differences in political contacts of associations between the two cities under study. The results are reported in tables 6.15 and 6.16. Associations show different potential political impact across cities. The department associations have the most contact with is the department related to immigration in Zurich and the department for associations in Lyon. In Lyon, this department supports associations for project definition and coordinates social cohesion measures of the city. The department related to immigration is the department for integration of migrants. Associations in Lyon have more contacts with the schools and the local health center than associations in Zurich. This suggests that associations in Lyon are better connected than associations in Zurich that only show high levels of contacts with the department of integration.

Table 6.15: Contact with local administration in Lyon and Zurich, percentage of yes

	Lyon	Zurich	Total	Fisher's
Dpt immigration	53.9	82.1	67.8	.004
Dpt welfare	30.8	25.6	28.6	n.s.
Other relevant dpt	73.1	18.0	49.5	.000
Local school	34.6	18.0	27.5	.062
Local police	11.5	12.8	12.1	n.s.
Health center	30.8	10.3	22.0	.017

The contacts with political actors also differ across cities (table 6.16). Associations in Lyon have more contacts with the city council, the regional government, local parliamentarians, and local political parties than their counterparts in Zurich. They thus have more potential political impact. Having more contacts with local authorities, the possibility to have an effect on local politics is higher. Associations in Lyon seem to be better included politically than associations in Zurich. Indeed, they are better related to the local administration as well as to local political actors. Thus, while associations in Zurich show higher levels in engagement in political activities, they have less political contacts. However, these two aspects may be related. Indeed, the exclusion in terms of political contacts may encourage them to engage in more political activities, since this is an alternative channel for making their voices heard.

Table 6.16: Contact with local political authorities in Lyon and Zurich, percentage of yes

	Lyon	Zurich	Total	Fisher's
Local city council	51.9	23.1	39.6	.005
Regional gov	42.3	10.3	28.6	.001
Local parl	45.2	15.4	30.3	.002
Local pol part	25.0	10.3	17.7	.063

Associations in Lyon are better connected to local institutions, but do we observe any differences across modes of coordination? In Lyon, associations holding different structural positions show differences in their relationships to departments (table 6.17). As for political activities, associations in block 4 have more contacts with all departments than associations in other blocks. The most important contacts in block 4 (social movement mode of coordination) are with the department for social development and associational life, followed by the department related to immigration and the local schools. Block 3, the first link of the chain, is also in contact with the department related to immigration and to associations. We find a similar result as for political activities for blocks 1 and 2. Associations in this structural location have less contact with the different departments than associations in other blocks. Yet, while associations in the isolated block (2) have few contacts with all departments, associations in block 3 display a similar level of contact with the department of associations as the better connected blocks. In sum, in Lyon, associations can be divided in two categories in terms of contacts to the administration. The isolated block and the last link of the chain show low levels of contacts, whereas the first and middle links of the chain are very well connected to the local administration.

Table 6.17: Contact with departments in Lyon, percentage of yes

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Block 4	Total	Fisher's
Dpt immig	30.0	33.3	66.7	66.7	53.9	n.s
Dpt welfare	10.0	11.1	38.9	46.7	30.8	n.s.
Dpt associations	70.0	33.3	77.8	93.3	73.1	.015
Local school	30.0	11.1	22.2	66.7	34.6	.019
Local police	.0	.0	16.7	20.0	11.5	n.s.
Health center	10.0	11.1	33.3	53.3	30.8	.078

The structural location of associations in Zurich does not seem to have an effect on the level of contacts of associations with the local administration (see table 6.18). The department with which most of the associations in all clusters are connected is the department related to immigration. The share of associations having contacts with other departments is very low. Associations from the first migration wave (block 1) have more contacts with the department related to welfare than do associations in other blocks. The cluster of more recently arrived migrants shows higher levels of contacts with the local school and the department for city development than its counterparts. And finally, associations in the religious block are better connected to the local health center than other associations.

Table 6.18: Contact with departments in Zurich, percentage of yes

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Total	Fisher's
Dpt related immigration	83.3	84.6	75.0	82.1	n.s.
Dpt related welfare	33.3	15.4	25.0	25.6	n.s.
City devel	16.7	23.1	12.5	18.0	n.s.
Local school	11.1	30.8	12.5	18.0	n.s.
Local police	16.7	7.7	12.5	12.8	n.s.
Health center	5.6	7.7	25.0	10.3	n.s.

Results for the distribution of contacts within clusters show different patterns in Lyon and in Zurich. In Lyon, the contact to the local administration seems to be monopolized by one cluster. Indeed, associations in the middle link of the chain embedded in a social movement type of relationship are better connected to all departments than associations in other clusters. The first link of the chain also shows high levels of contacts. But blocks 1 and 2 are rather disconnected from the local administration. In Zurich, there is no such relationship between the structural location of associations and contacts to the local administration. All clusters are well connected to the department related to immigration, but show much lower levels of contacts with all other departments.

Turning to contacts with local political actors, we also find a difference between Lyon and Zurich. Tables 6.20 and 6.19 show the results for contacts with political institutions in Lyon and Zurich, respectively. In Zurich, the structural position of associations is not related to contacts with political institutions, whereas in Lyon, there are significant differences across blocks.

Indeed, we find similar results as those for contacts with the local administration. Two clusters are better connected to political actors. In blocks 3 and 4, the levels of contacts are rather similar. But in block 4, associations have more contacts with the local parliamentarians and local political parties, while associations in block 3 are better connected to the local city council and the regional government. The first link of the chain is not totally disconnected from political institutions, as 40% of associations in this cluster have contacts with the city council. Their contacts to other institutions are very low, as they are for associations in the isolated block (2).

Table 6.19: Contact with political actors in Lyon, percentage of yes

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Block 4	Total	Fisher's
Local city council	40.0	22.2	66.7	60.0	51.9	n.s.
Regional gov	10.0	22.2	61.1	53.3	42.3	.027
Local parl	20.0	22.2	55.6	66.7	45.2	.049
Local pol part	20.0	.0	22.2	46.7	25.0	.075

In Zurich, migrant associations show much lower levels of contacts to political institutions than in Lyon. Moreover, there is no significant difference across clusters. However, associations of the recent migration waves and Muslim associations have a little more contact to institutions than associations from the first migration wave. In all clusters, the most important contact of associations is the local city council. Associations in block 2 are better connected to local parliamentarians, and associations in block 3 have more contacts with local political parties. Nevertheless, migrant associations in Zurich are less connected to local and regional political institutions than in Lyon.

Table 6.20: Contacts with political institutions in Zurich, percentage of yes

	Block 1	Block 2	Block 3	Total	Fisher's
Local city council	16.7	30.8	25.0	23.1	n.s.
Regional government	5.6	15.4	12.5	10.3	n.s.
Local parliamentarians	11.1	23.1	12.5	15.4	n.s.
Local political parties	11.1	7.7	12.5	10.3	n.s.

The weight of migrant associations seems to be related to their structural position in Lyon, but not in Zurich. In Lyon, contacts with departments as well as with political institutions are concentrated in two blocks: the

first and middle links of the chain. In Zurich, first contacts to the local administration and political institutions are much lower than in Lyon, and we find no significant relationship between the structural position of associations and the political weight of associations. These findings suggest that migrant associations have more weight in Lyon than in Zurich, at least a part of them. But the low weight of associations is equally distributed across the network in Zurich, while in Lyon, the higher political weight is limited to specific organizations, more precisely to associations displaying a social movement mode of coordination.

6.6.2 Modes of coordination of collective action and political contacts

The potential political impact of migrant associations is unequally distributed among clusters in Lyon, but is the network structured along the political weight of associations? We run the same analysis as for the political activities of associations on the similarity matrices of contacts with the local administration and contacts with political institutions. The results for Lyon are presented in table 6.21. The findings show that similarity of associations in political contacts is patterned by their structural location in Lyon. For the isolated block (2) and the block at the end of the chain (1), the relationship is negative for contacts with the local administration. This means that associations in these blocks show low levels of similarity. In block 3, associations are highly similar in their contacts to the local administration. Finally, for block 4, there is no significant relationship.

Results are similar for contacts with political actors. Yet, the relation is only significant for blocks 1 and 3. In the latter, the block membership of associations is related to their similarity in contacts with political institutions.

Table 6.22 reports the results for the political weight of associations in Zurich. As for political activities, similarity in terms of contacts is not patterned by the block membership of associations. In all blocks, contacts to associations are rather low, and there is no significant difference in their contacts to political institutions.[6]

[6] The analysis of variance used in this chapter to test the hypothesis does not allow to control for other variables such as the size and the source of funding of associations for their political integration. To test for the effect of these variables and check the robustness

Table 6.21: Analysis of variance for political contacts in Lyon

	Departments		*Political*	
	Stdized Coeff.	Sig.	Stdized Coeff.	Sig.
Intercept	0.000000	.9984	0.000000	.9938
Block 1	-0.088206	.0590	-0.103373	.0042
Block 2	-0.101664	.0162	-0.035120	.3164
Block 3	0.248061	.0040	0.184953	.0138
Block 4	0.101798	.1090	0.084726	.1322
Adj. R^2	.090	.0060	.053	.0448
N				2652

Table 6.22: Analysis of variance for political contacts in Zurich

	Departments		*Political*	
	Stdized Coeff.	Sig.	Stdized Coeff.	Sig.
Intercept	0.000000	.5490	0.000000	.1010
Block 1	0.035017	.3082	-0.078107	.1168
Block 2	-0.025979	.4278	0.028038	.2592
Block 3	-0.041523	.2088	-0.035072	.2742
Adj. R^2	.003	.7692	.007	.4804
N				1682

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter explored the political inclusion of migrant organizations in Lyon and in Zurich. Starting from the idea that the same type of relations can provide migrants with different resources for political inclusion following the context, it examined the political inclusion of migrant organizations and its relation to the modes of coordination of collective action in both cities.

of the results in this chapter other analyses have been run. Using OLS models based on permutation for taking into account the interdependency of cases (Borgatti et al., 2002; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005) the effect of these variables has been tested. However, these analysis follow a somewhat different logic as it looks at the number of political activities performed by associations as well as the number of contacts instead of their similarity in political inclusion. Controlling for membership, source of funding, and budget it tests the effect of block membership of associations on all indicators of political inclusion used in this chapter. The results are consistent with those presented here. Membership and budget has no effect on the level of political inclusion, neither in Lyon nor in Zurich. In Zurich no relation is significant, whereas in Lyon we find a significant effect of state funding on the contact of political integration, and the effect of block membership remains even when controlling for those variables.

The political inclusion of migrant associations varies according to the mode of coordination in which associations are embedded. Furthermore, associations in similar modes of coordination in different contexts show different levels of political inclusion, particularly on the contact dimension. While associations show higher levels of political activities in Zurich, they are better connected to local institutions in Lyon. In Lyon, the level of political inclusion is higher in the block displaying a social movement mode of coordination and in its closely linked block (3). Associations in other blocks are excluded from the political process. Not only do they show low levels of political activities, but their range of activities is more restricted than for associations in the more active blocks. These associations also have less contact to political institutions as opposed to associations in the two other blocks. The same situation of monopoly appears as for activities. The block displaying a social movement mode of coordination is not only composed of associations being more active than associations in other blocks, it is also in this block that associations get more state subsidies. In chapter 4, we saw that this block is composed of the social centers providing cultural activities, but also after school assistance and being active in the welfare area. Moreover, as opposed to associations in other blocks, no associations in this block are referring to ethnicity in its name.

In Lyon, the cluster showing the higher level of political inclusion has access to the political institutions because the issues on which associations are active and which they share are publicly recognized as legitimate. Migrant organizations in Lyon are encouraged to mobilize on the basis of social and economical exclusion, which is specifically the case of associations in this cluster. Migrants in Lyon have access to the political process under the condition that they do not mobilize on an ethnic or any other particularistic identity basis. Thus, these associations in Lyon are adapting to the context and have more resources for political inclusion than associations excluded from that cluster. However, they monopolize the field of immigration. The monopoly of a small group of associations of the field has several implications. First, some associations are excluded from the field and from the political process. As a consequence, some interests might not be represented in the political process. The chain structure of the network suggests that some of the more peripheral associations send ties to the better integrated ones, seeking to access indirectly the resources of these associations. Despite

the efforts of local authorities in promoting associations for political and social inclusion, many associations remain excluded. This implies that some migrant groups but also some interests remain excluded from the political debate. Associations adapting to the context implement public policies in the field of immigration by providing para-municipal service, such as after school activities or health awareness campaigns. A negative consequence of such a configuration is that these associations are controlled by the municipality and that associations raising other issues than the publicly recognized, remain excluded. A similar pattern has been observed in other French cities (Garbaye, 2002).

In Zurich, all clusters display a social movement type of mode of coordination. But the three blocks are totally disconnected from each other, as opposed to Lyon. Being embedded in the same type of relations, the blocks in Zurich show no differences on political inclusion. Associations' level of political participation is rather low, they do not engage in less conventional forms of participation and they have few political contacts, with the exception of the department for integration. While in Lyon some associations have access the political process, in Zurich whatever their structural location, associations are excluded from it. In Zurich, although associations are all embedded in in a social movement mode of coordination, they have only limited contacts with local authorities. While they are politically active, their possibility to make their voice heard and to influence policy-making is rather limited. Recall that associations in Zurich mainly define as immigrant and cultural associations and that their cultural activities are mainly aimed at preserving their culture of origin. This might also hold true for political participation. Studies on collective claim-making of migrants in Switzerland show that they mobilize mainly on issues oriented to their homelands (Giugni and Passy, 2006). This may also hold true for migrant associations' participation. Finally, while differences in political contacts or participation could have been expected because of the length of settlement of different migrant groups, it does not seem to play a role for migrant associations' political inclusion. Thus, in Zurich the social movement type of relation in which associations are embedded do not provide associations with the necessary resources for mobilization. The POS in Zurich excludes migrants from the political process, at least for the contact dimension, and the relational patterns in which they are embedded reinforces this exclusion.

This results show that being embedded in dense relations with other associations does not necessarily favor political inclusion. The context interacts with the network structure in affecting political inclusion of migrant associations. Associations located in clusters where resource exchange overlaps with collective identity should have the resources to access the public sphere as hypothesized by social movement scholars. According to the typology of modes of coordination of collective action (Diani, 2011) associations in this mode of coordination should show higher levels of collective mobilization as they combine dense resource exchange with strong collective identities. While the social movement literature pointed to the importance of collective identity for mobilization, the saliency of identities and issue interest depends upon the political opportunity structure which has consequences for the mobilization potential of actors. As a consequence, actors embedded in relations combining dense resource exchange will get access to the political process only if their identities or the issues on which they mobilize are publicly recognized as legitimate. In sum, dense networks are not necessarily a precondition for political integration of migrants as hypothesized by Fennema and Tillie (1999).

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Political inclusion of migrants is at the heart of a contested scholarly and political debate. The increasing diversity of European democracies and the exclusion of a large part of the resident population from the political process raise questions about social cohesion and the quality of democracy. Governments are seeking to develop and implement policies fostering migrants' political inclusion. In this respect, migrants' associations are considered as central actors and governments are increasingly seeking to include them in the definition and the implementation of such policies (Morales and Ramiro, 2011). In the absence of voting rights for migrant residents, associations are considered as an alternative for voice, as they are representing migrants and defending their interests in the political process. Yet, the question of what policies do a better job in fostering the political inclusion of migrants' associations remains an open one. While scholars also addressing the political inclusion of migrants, a growing body of literature focuses on the role that migrants' associations play for political participation at both the individual and the community levels. However, little is known about the conditions favoring the political inclusion of migrants' associations.

Studies on migrants' associations tend to consider migrants' organizations as discrete units acting independently from each other. Yet, migrants' associations do not act in a vacuum and are embedded in webs of relations as well as in a wider political context. While the effect of the context has been analyzed with respect to the foundation and continuity of migrants' organizations and with respect of their mobilizing potential for individuals, only few studies looked at the network in which associations are embedded

and at their effects on political inclusion. The few available studies either focused on the network of one specific ethnic group in different contexts, or looked at the network of different migrant groups in one context. Yet, the findings suggest that not only different network structures provide migrants' organizations with different resources for political inclusion, but also that the same structure may have differentiated effects on political inclusion of migrants' associations in different context. The interaction between the politic opportunity structure and the relational structure has to be taken into consideration to get a better understanding of the conditions under which migrants' associations are politically engaged. Indeed, considering only one of the two structures might lead to wrong conclusions as to what favors the political inclusion of associations. The objective of this study was therefore twofold. First, it attempted to link two traditions in the social movement literature: the political opportunity theory and the relational approach. While the effect of the former on the latter has been implicitly acknowledged by social movement scholars, it remains understudied. Second, the study aimed at furthering our knowledge on the mechanisms linking the embeddedness of migrants' associations in an institutional and relational context with their political inclusion.

In this study, I drew on the social movement literature to account for the political inclusion of migrants' organizations. More specifically, I attempted to combine two approaches: the relational approach and the political opportunity theory. The relational approach provides useful tools for comparing networks across contexts. Indeed, it defines a typology aiming at distinguishing social movements from other forms of collective action. By defining collective action as activities in which actors engage for demanding and/or providing collective goods, it identifies different modes of coordination of collective action. Modes of coordination refer to the mechanisms through which resources are allocated within collectivities, but also to how collective representations are elaborated as well as collective identities (Diani, 2011).

To define the context in which organizations are embedded and to understand how it can affect network structures, I drew on the political opportunity theory. The political opportunity theory posits that the context, the political opportunity structures affects the action repertoire, the level of mobilization but also the outcomes of social movements. In the field of immigration, specific opportunities shape collective claim-making (Koopmans

et al., 2005). The specific opportunities in the field of immigration draw on the citizenship approaches of nation-states to define the opportunities in the field. Two dimensions of opportunities are defined: an institutional and a cultural dimension. The first refers to the rights and duties offered to immigrants and to the institutional channels available to them, providing access to institutional channels but also resources to actors acting in the field. The cultural dimension refers to the notions of citizenship and national identity that act as discursive opportunities and provide public recognition of different identities in the field.

The main argument of the present study was that the specific POS might provide actors in a field with different resources, and that it publicly recognizes different identities. Further, it might shape the way in which associations in a field exchange resources and define boundaries, i.e. define collective identities. The specific POS was also expected to affect the fragmentation of the network. Finally, as migrant associations are embedded in POS and in relational structures, we further claimed that these two structures interact to account for political inclusion of migrant associations.

In this concluding chapter, I will first summarize the main findings. Then I will discuss the broader implications of the study and finally I will suggest some directions for further research on migrants' political inclusion.

7.1 Main findings

Empirically, this study looked at migrants' organizational networks in two contexts: Lyon and Zurich, which are cities that offer different specific opportunities to migrants. Opportunities are more open in Lyon, through the combination of a civic approach of citizenship with a request for the assimilation of migrants. Zurich displays more closed opportunities, combining an ethnic conception of citizenship with an assimilationist approach. The two cities distinguish also by their discursive opportunities, as the symbolic ethnic cleavage is more salient in Zurich than in Lyon. As a consequence, integration policies in Lyon are defined in terms of political and social inclusion. They are not directed towards migrants but towards socially and economically excluded populations, which are de facto migrants. In Zurich, integration policies are specifically oriented towards foreigners. Thus, while both cities request assimilation of migrants, in Lyon no particularistic iden-

tities are recognized, while in Zurich migrants are defined on the basis of their national origin.

The hypotheses formulated in chapter 2 and specified in chapter 3 state that the above mentioned difference may affect not only the way migrants' associations create alliances in the field, but also in what type of modes of coordination of collective action they are embedded and in the fragmentation principles at work in the networks. In Zurich, the closed opportunities and the definition of migrants on the basis of their national origin were expected to favor a social movement mode of coordination. The network was also expected to be fragmented along national lines, because of the salience of national identities. Resource exchanges and boundary definition processes were expected to take place within subgroups of associations from the same origin. In Lyon, the more open opportunities were expected to favor organizational modes of coordination, with sparse resource exchange and little investment in boundary definition processes. As no particularistic identities are recognized in Lyon, and as the issue of integration is approached in terms of social inclusion, the network was expected to be fragmented along functional lines, that is along the activities in which association engage. Indeed, what is publicly recognized in the field of immigration in Lyon are areas of activities, not specific identities. Finally, the interaction between the political opportunity structure and the network structure were expected to affect the political inclusion of migrants' organizations, which was hypothesized to be favored if migrant associations are embedded in modes of coordination building on the legitimized categories in the field. Thus, similar patterns of relations were expected to produce different outcomes for political inclusion according to the context and the lines along which the network is organized.

The three empirical chapters (chapters 4, 5, and 6) reported the comparison between the network structure of migrant organizations in Lyon and in Zurich and their political inclusion. Three aspects were examined. The first empirical chapter provided analyses of the modes of coordination of collective action in both cities. The second empirical chapter focused on the fragmentation lines of the networks. And finally, the last empirical chapter, drew on the findings of the previous chapters and explored how the different modes of coordination in different contexts affect the political inclusion of migrants' organizations.

7.1.1 Modes of coordination in Lyon and Zurich

By comparing the overall network structures and the modes of coordination of collective action, I found that networks vary across contexts. Results show that in Lyon, the network is better integrated than in Zurich. A structural equivalence analysis was applied to reduce the information about the networks, and revealed three different patterns of interaction. The network is composed of four clusters and displays a chain structure. Three clusters are linked in a chain, and a fourth clusters is composed of mainly isolated associations. Three clusters display an organizational mode of coordination but the middle link of the chain displays a social movement mode of coordination. Moreover, results revealed differences in the characteristics of associations according to the mode of coordination in which they are embedded. Indeed, associations in an organizational mode of coordination are mainly ethnic associations. In these cluster, in contrast to associations embedded in a social movement mode of coordination, associations refer to ethnic origin in their names. Moreover, associations in the social movement mode are mainly active on socio-cultural activities and are composed of many social centers, providing assistance and activities for socially excluded, such as youth, elderly and disabled. As concerns Zurich, I found a network with lower density and a different structure than in Lyon. Three clusters were identified. These three clusters are totally disconnected from one another, but boundary definition ties overlap with resources exchanges within the blocks. In Zurich, associations are embedded in social movement modes of coordination and seem to be organized along the length of settlement of the different communities. Indeed, one cluster is composed of associations from Italian, Spanish and Tamil origin. The second block is formed by associations from more recent migration waves (mainly from Turkey and Kosovo), and the last cluster contains mainly religious associations, also from more recent migration waves.

7.1.2 Identity and function as fragmentation principles

Results of the present work revealed that the fragmentation principles at work in the network to vary. Looking at fragmentation along ethnic/national lines and along functional lines partly confirmed the role of the specific POS in explaining the fragmentation principles. In Lyon, specific areas of activity

are not concentrated in specific blocks, however, blocks differ in the the frequency of engaging in specific activities. Associations in the same mode of coordination are not engaging in similar activities. The fragmentation along functional line is not as clear as expected. However, activities of associations do, to some extent, fragment the network. Indeed, the block embedded in a social movement mode of coordination is engaging in more activities than associations embedded in other blocks. In Zurich, by contrast, the network is fragmented as it was expected. Associations from different migration waves are composing the blocks. I found one block composed mainly of associations from European origin and Tamil associations, another one with associations from more recent waves (mainly Turks and Kosovars) and finally a block of associations from similar migration waves as the second one, but organized on a religious basis. Moreover, the network is also along the specific group associations represent. While the network is not fragmented along strictly national lines, it is fragmented following the waves of migration to Switzerland.

7.1.3 The political inclusion of migrants organizations

By drawing on the findings about the network structure, I looked at the political inclusion of migrant organizations. Chapter 6 addressed the resources available to migrants' organizations to control for the effect on political inclusion. Political inclusion was analyzed following two dimensions: the activities associations engage in (whether they are policy- or client-oriented, and the forms of political activities they perform) and the political contacts of migrants' associations (the extent to which they are in contact with local authorities). Migrant associations display higher levels of political engagement in Zurich than in Lyon. However, Lyon and Zurich similarly focus on client-oriented activities and engage less in policy-oriented activities. Moreover, the engagement of migrants' organizations in Zurich is higher on the different forms of political participation than in Lyon, but the associations do not perform any contentious political activities. It can further be pointed out that results on political activities do not confirm the initial hypothesis, as very little difference is found between modes of coordination in both cities. Further, the interaction of the specific POS and modes of coordination plays a role in explaining the political contacts of associations. Indeed, associations in a social movement mode of coordination in Lyon have more contacts with

political institutions than associations in an organizational mode. In Zurich, by contrast, associations have only few contacts with political institutions, although all are embedded in a social movement mode of coordination.

These results show that the networks vary according to the context and that the specific opportunities in the field of immigration play a role in shaping the network. In Lyon, particularistic identities are not recognized and the issue of integration is framed in terms of social inclusion. Associations that engage in more diverse activities and forms of political participation are at the center of the network and serves as bridge between the different subgroups of associations. These associations have also more contacts with authorities than associations embedded in other clusters. This pattern suggests that the network is dominated by these associations and the other associations are rather excluded from the local political life.

In Zurich, the assimilationist approach excludes migrants from the political sphere. Moreover, it encourages organizations on an ethnic basis but these identities are not recognized as legitimate for intervening in the political process. The network of migrants' organizations tends to reinforce this exclusion, as migrants' associations from different migration waves are totally disconnected one form another. Moreover, their political impact is limited, as compared to that of the associations in Lyon.

Together, and by combining two approaches of social movement analysis, I identified the network structures in which migrants' organizations are embedded, and the implication of such structures for the political inclusion of organizations. Dense networks of relations do not necessarily favors political inclusion. Indeed, inclusion depends on the context. While associations in Lyon, embedded in dense webs of relations, show higher levels of political contacts than associations in other clusters but also than associations in Zurich, migrants' organizations embedded in the same pattern of relation in Zurich have only a limited political weight. Dense networks have a positive effect on political inclusion if the identity on which these networks are organized is salient in the context within which they are embedded. Migrants' organizations in Lyon that are not organizing and creating alliances on the basis of their ethnicity can draw resources from social movement modes of coordination. This pattern is opposed to the one found in Zurich, where a social movement mode of coordination based on ethnic identity tends to exclude migrants.

7.2 Broader implications of the study

What do these results tell us about the organizational field of immigration? Different conclusions can be drawn. First, it shows the importance of taking into account the relational and the political opportunity structures in which migrants' associations are embedded. Indeed, looking at the network in the field gives a better understanding, not only of the conditions favoring political inclusion of migrants' associations, but also of the mechanisms linking the relational and institutional contexts with political inclusion. Common mechanisms can be highlighted. Indeed, associations in both contexts adapt to the legitimate identities in the field in their networking strategies. Actors embedded in a field share definitions of social categories, and adapt in part to these definitions when creating alliances in the field. Not only do they organize along these identities, but they also create strong ties with similar associations in this respect. Thus, the modes of incorporating migrants shape the interaction patterns of associations in the field of immigration.

Studying the field of immigration, rather than selecting associations on the basis of the interest in specific issues, adds to our knowledge on the conditions under which migrants' associations are involved politically. Further, considering the relational aspect shows that being embedded in the same mode of coordination of collective action can have different consequences for migrants' associations as a function of the context. It remains that these outcomes can be related to similar mechanisms: associations in a field tend to adapt to the rules of the field and to the institutional definition of social categories in the field in their strategies of alliance-building.

The present study revealed that both the institutional and the discursive POS affect the network structure, but also the political inclusion of associations. Yet, it does not give a clearcut answer to the question of what is the best approach to foster the political inclusion of migrants' associations. Nevertheless, it shows that granting migrants some access to the political process as in Lyon, can have positive effects on their alliance strategies and on their political inclusion. It also shows that some associations remain excluded. Thus, the definition of policies aimed at encouraging political participation of migrants' associations should not only consider the way to favor their inclusion, but also how to avoid the exclusion of the political process of associations. This could be done by taking into account the interaction of

approaches of incorporating migrants and their effect on alliance strategies of associations.

The findings reported in this work also have implications for migrants' associations, as the alliances they build might have different outcomes according to the institutional and specific POS in which they are embedded. Associations willing to engage in the political process to defend their interests should consider their alliance strategies according to the context in which they are embedded. Indeed, in some contexts, some strategies are more effective, but the same strategy in another context may have negative consequences.

7.3 Further research

While this study showed the importance to consider the interaction of specific opportunity structures and the relational structure to better understand the political inclusion of migrants' associations, it raises several questions leading to suggestions about how studies of political inclusion of migrants can be developed.

First, this study focuses on the field of immigration by looking at the migrants' organizing processes and at the links between migrants' associations. However, the field could be broadened to include also autochthonous associations linked to migrants' associations. Indeed, in an ethno-assimilationist context, autochthonous associations may serve as bridges between migrants' organizations and political authorities. In a civic assimilationist view, these associations may also serve as bridges on issues related to the ethnic and racial origin of migrants, as for example in issues related to discrimination. A recent study pointed to the role that autochthonous associations play in an ethno-assimilationist city, and it showed how autochthonous associations serve as bridges for ethnic associations in accessing the political process (Pilati, 2011).

Second, the present study shows that associations embedded in similar position also share some characteristics, such as the type of activities in which they are embedded or their political inclusion. However, what we do not know is whether associations are similar because they are related to each other, or because they send ties to actors they consider as similar. In other words, what explains the similarity of associations in similar positions? Is

it due to a diffusion mechanism, in which similar behaviors would diffuse between associations, or is it due to a selection mechanism? For example, do associations show similar patterns of political inclusion because the practice is diffusing within the network, or do they collaborate because of similar patterns of political inclusion? Disentangling diffusion from selection is certainly a difficult task since it requires a longitudinal approach. However, comparing network of migrants' associations over time can contribute to a better understanding of mechanisms of political inclusion of associations.

Third, while the present study focused on the forms of participation of associations and on their political contacts, the question of their influence in the political process remains open. To what extent are migrants' associations engaging in political activities and trying to defend their interests efficient in making their voice heard? Previous studies examined the political weight of migrants' associations (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a), but they did not consider the interaction of POS and the relational structure in affecting associations' chances of success. Since this interaction affects their political inclusion, it might also determine the extent to which they are heard.

These are only a few suggestions for further research. Migrant associations are embedded in complex structures that are interacting in affecting their political inclusion and this study is a first attempt in trying to identify some mechanisms linking these structures which calls for further research, which indeed demonstrated the necessity of taking into account these various linkages.

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Appendix

Appendix A

Indicators of institutional political opportunity structure

A.1 Collection of institutional POS indicators

Data for the institutional indicators of the political opportunity structure were collected on the basis of the national (and local legislation) on immigration and citizenship. It has been collected in 2006. For Switzerland it is based Information was retrieved through the analysis of national legislation on immigration and citizenship. The indicators refer to the legislations in 2006. For comparative purposes, a 3-level scoring has been used for each indicator, in addition to the narrative presentation of the indicator. The score "-1" refers to the most restrictive situation that can be envisaged, the score "1" corresponds to the most open configuration and the score "0" applies to intermediary potential situations.

A.2 List of institutional POS indicators

Table A.1: Indicators of political opportunity structure

	Lyon	Zurich
Individual rights		
Access to the community		
continued on next page		

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

	Lyon	Zurich
Short-term permits		
Automatic acquisition of the permit if mother or father of a national minor child	1	-1
Automatic acquisition of the permit if marriage with a national	1	1
Economic resources requirement	1	1
Link between work regime and permit regime	1	1
Grounds for withdrawal	0	-1
Overall score short-term permit	0.8	0.2
Long-term permits		
Automatic acquisition of the permit if mother or father of a national minor child	1	-1
Automatic acquisition of the permit if marriage with a national	1	-1
Required minimum time of habitual residence	1	0
Economic resources requirement	1	0
Grounds for withdrawal	0	0
Expulsion precluded	0	-1
Overall score long-term permits	0.7	-.05
Nationality		
Eligibility for second and third generation immigrants (jus soli)	0	-1
Marriage with a national	0	0
Required minimum time of habitual residence	1	-1
Economic resources requirement for naturalization (first generation immigrants)	-1	0
Grounds for withdrawing status	-1	0
Overall score nationality	-0.2	-0.4
FAMILY REUNION		

continued on next page

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

	Lyon	Zurich
Eligibility for legal residents	0	1
Economic resources requirement	-1	-1
Duration of validity of permit	1	-1
Grounds for withdrawal	1	0
Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority	1	0
Overall score family reunion	0.4	-0.2
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS		
Labor market access		
Short-term permits		
Access to employment	-1	0
Termination of a foreigner's work contract is a reason for revoking or refusing to renew his/her permit of stay	1	1
Long-term permits		
Access to employment	-1	1
Unemployment is a reason for revoking or refusing to renew his/her permit of stay	1	0
Overall score labor market access	0	0.5
Welfare state access		
Access to social security, social assistance and healthcare for illegal immigrants	1	0
Access to social security, social assistance and healthcare for non-nationals with short-term permits	0	-1
Access to social security, social assistance and healthcare for non-nationals with long-term permits	1	0
Overall score welfare state access	0.7	-0.3
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION RIGHTS		
Legislation against ethnic discriminations	1	1

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Table A.1 – continued from previous page

	Lyon	Zurich
Types of sanctions in case of racially discriminatory hiring	1	0
Public structures dealing with ethnic discriminations	1	0
Overall score anti-discrimination	1	0
POLITICAL RIGHTS		
Right to vote in local elections	-1	-1
Right to stand for elections	-1	-1
Overall score political rights	-1	-1
Individual rights score	0.3	-0.2
CULTURAL/GROUP RIGHTS		
CULTURAL REQUIREMENT ACCESS COMMUNITY		
Cultural requirements for obtaining short-term permits	1	1
Cultural requirements for obtaining long-term residence permits (duration of validity 5 years)	1	1
Cultural requirements for naturalization (first generation immigrants)	-1	-1
Overall score	0.3	0.3
LANGUAGE PROGRAMS		
Host-country language programs for immigrant adults	1	1
Host-country language programs for immigrant children	1	1
Overall score	1.0	1.0
SCHOOLING		
Possibility of public funding for Muslim private-owned schools (full time schools)	1	0

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Table A.1 – continued from previous page

	Lyon	Zurich
Possibility of public funding for other minority group private-owned schools (full time schools)	1	0
Number of public-funded minority group schools (full-time schools)	-1	-1
Cultural/language courses for pupils of minority groups inside public schools (courses on their original language and/or culture)	1	0
Changes in public schools' curriculum to take into account the cultural diversity of society	-1	0
Overall score	0.0	-0.3
RELIGION		
Religious education in public schools	0	0
Islamic religious signs in the public sector	0	1
Islamic religious signs in the private sector	0 0	
Islamic breaks for praying	0	0
Cemeteries and burial according to Islamic rite	0	1
Local public budget for mosques (building and managing)	-1	0
Overall score	-0.3	0.3
MEDIA		
Islamic religious programs in public and state-subsidized private broadcasting (not including cable and satellite)	0	-1
Programs in public and state-subsidized private broadcasting (not including cable and satellite) for other minority groups or for the whole immigrant population	0	-1
Overall score	-0.5	-1

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Table A.1 – continued from previous page

	Lyon	Zurich
LABOR MARKET: GROUP RIGHTS		
Affirmative actions for ethnic minorities in the private sector	0	-1
Affirmative actions for ethnic minorities in the public sector	0	-1
Measures to further the integration of foreigners into the labour market	0	1
Overall score	0	-0.3
Cultural/group rights score	0.1	-0.1
LOCAL SPECIFIC POS		
Main responsibility for immigrants ' integration policies	-1	1
Public information and support services for immigrants at the local level (which inform them about their rights, the institutions to which they can address, etc.)	-1	1
Which institution (s) has(ve) the leading role in the field of immigrants' integration? – Local Level	1	1
Policies related to immigrants' integration at the local level	0	1
Is there a specific department in the local council devoted to immigrants' integration policies?	-1	1
Council/board/assembly that represents immigrants/minority groups (for example, in France, the Parisian Council of Non-Eu foreigners)	-1	1
Involvement of minority/immigrant organizations in the definition of local policies	-1	0
Involvement of minority/immigrant organizations in the implementation of local policies	-1	0

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Table A.1 – continued from previous page

	Lyon	Zurich
Involvement of organizations specialized in immigration/integration issues in the definition of local policies	-1	0
Involvement of organizations specialized in immigration/integration issues in the implementation of local policies	-1	0
Involvement of organizations playing a relevant role for immigrants' integration (such as Human rights organizations) in the definition of local policies	-1	0
Involvement of the local power in the funding of minority/immigrants organizations	-1	0
Requirements to be able to apply for subsidies	1	1
Party arrangements to favor the presence of persons with ethnic minority background in the leadership of the party – Local level	-1	1
Party arrangements to favor the presence of persons with ethnic minority background in the party (rank-and-file members)– Local level	-1	1
Share of radical right and anti-immigrant parties in the electoral vote – National level: general elections Mean over the 10 past years (raw percentage)	-1	-1
Share of radical right and anti-immigrant parties in the electoral vote – Local level: general elections	-1	-1
Share of radical right and anti-immigrant parties in the electoral vote – Local elections (city council)	-1	-1

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Table A.1 – continued from previous page

	Lyon	Zurich
Local specific POS score	-0.85	0.3
Overall POS score		

A.3 Collection of discursive opportunities data

Political claims analysis extends protest event analysis by including speech acts and public discourse variables (Koopmans et al., 2005). All forms of public claim-making are collected, this includes statements, judicial acts, press releases, conferences, publications but also forms of protest. Moreover, all actors are included. Any claim made in the field of immigration and ethnic-relation is recorded, regardless of the actor making the claim (social movement groups, NGOs, interest groups, but also political parties, governmental or state actors). For each claim the following elements have been coded: location of the claim, actor making the claim, the form of the claim, the addressee of the claim, the issue of the claim, but also the identity of the object of the claim. Claims at the national as well as at the local level have been recorded. Al claims reported in the Monday, Wednesday, and Friday issues of Le Progrès in Lyon and Neue Zürcher Zeitung in Zurich. These newspapers have been selected on the basis of their quality but also because they contain a local section.

Appendix B

List of associations

B.1 List of interviewed immigrant associations in Lyon and Zurich

Table B.1: Interviewed migrant associations in Lyon

Name	Origin	Acronym
Nkam Nkam de France	Cameroun	A2NF
Ailleurs et autrement	Mixed origin	AA
Association des Assyro Chaldéens de Lyon	Assyrian Chaldeans	AACL
Amicale des Algériens en Europe	Algeria	AAE
Association culturelle folklorique portugaise Estellas Do Minho	Portugal	ACC Folklo
Amicale Club Franco-Malgache	Madagascar	ACFM
Association de la copropriété Cervelière	Mixed, Algeria	ACRC
Association culturelle tamoule internationale	Tamil	ACTM
Association Franco-Marocaine de Vaulx-en-Velin	Morocco	AFM
Algériens futur Vaudais	Algeria	AFV
Aid Auto 69	Mixed Maghreb	AidAuto

continued on next page

Table B.1 – continued from previous page

Name	Origin	Acronym
Association des locataires du Grand Bois	Mixed	ALGB
Association amitié Afrique France Internationale	Sub-Saharan Africa	AMAFI
Alliance Morony Lyon	Comoros	AML
Association des Mahorais du Rhône	Mayotte	AMR
Association de promotion des Somaliens en France	Somalia	APS
Association sportive et culturelle centrafricaine	Central Africa	ASCC
Association de solidarité et d'entraide Metouillenne	Tunisia	ASEM
Association vaudaise d'entraide dans la cité	Mixed Maghreb	AVEC
Association vaudaise solidaire	Mixed Maghreb	AVSS
Bâtir ensemble	Mixed Africa	BE
Cultures-Elles	Mixed	C-elles
Canelle Solidarité	Algeria	C-solidarité
Canelle et Piment	Mixed	C&P
Centre des cultures arabes et méditarranéennes	Algeria	CCAM
Clics et déclics services	Algeria	CDS.RA
Association des commerçants Centre Vie	Mixed	Centre vie
Le collectif d'entraide et des rassemblement des comoriens de Lyon et environs	Comoros	Cercle
Association pour la gestion du Grand Vire	Mixed	CGV
Collectif Handicap Vaulx-en-Velin	Mixed	Coll-Handicap
Confluence Maroc Rhône Alpes	Morocco	COMARA
Centre social Georges Lévy	Mixed Maghreb	CS Lévy

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Table B.1 – continued from previous page

Name	Origin	Acronym
Centre social et culturel Jean et Joséphine Peyri	Mixed	CS Peyri
Centre social le monde réel réussite échange expériences locales	Mixed	CS Réel
Cercle la Soie Rayonne	Mixed	CSR
Espace projets interassociatifs	Algeria	EPI
Football club antillais de Villeurbanne Vaulx	Antillean	FCAV
Association Frameto	Mixed	Frameto
Futsal de Vaulx	Maghreb	Futsal
Groupement Franco-comorien d'action solidaire en direction de la Ville d'Iconi	Comoros	GFC
Horizons solidarités Cameroun	Sub-saharan Africa	HSC
Association Imazighen Idhourar	Algeria	Imazighen
La case africaine	Mixed	LCA
Lyon Outre Mer	Antillean	LOM
Lyon Villeurbanne Rhône XII	Mixed	LVR13
Institut Méridien	Turkey	Méridien
Maison de la jeunesse et de la culture de Vaulx-en-Velin	Mixed	MJC
Oxygène 120	Mixed	Oxygène
Roller Olympique club de Vaulx-en-Velin	Mixed	ROCVV
Sifaka Folklore	Madagascar	Sifaka
Thé à la menthe	Algeria	ThéMenthe
Vaulx premières planches	Mixed	VPP

Table B.2: Interviewed migrant associations in Zurich

Name	Origin	
Albanisches Kulturzentrum	Kosovo	AKV
Associazione Valtellinesi e Valchiavenaschi	Italy	GVVZ
Chiesa Evangelica di Lingua Italiana	Italy	CELI
Circolo Lucano di Zurigo	Italy	CLZ
Casa Nostra de Zurich	Spain	CNZ
Comitato degli Italiani all'estero	Italy	COMIT
Circolo Trentino nel Mondo	Italy	CT
Federazione delle associazioni Lucane in Svizzera	Italy	FALS
FC Galatasaray Zurich	Turkey	FCGZ
Federazione delle Colonie Libere Italiane in Svizzera	Italy	FCLI
Gruppo Alpinistico Italiano Zurigo	Italy	GAIZ
Herzegowiner Kroaten in der Schweiz	Croatia	HKS
Istituto Tutela Assistenza Lavoratori Italiani	Italy	ITAL
Basketball Club Zurch Korac	Serbia Montenegro	KORAC
Kurdiswiss	Turkey	KS
Albanischer Lehrer und Elternverband	Kosovo	LAPSH
Demokratisch Dardanische Liga	Kosovo	LDD
Mision Catolica de Lengua Espagnola en Zurich	Spain	MCLE
Missione Cattolica di Lingua Italiana	Italy	MCLI
Mozaik Bibliotek und Begegnungsort	Turkey	MOZ
Russisch-orthodoxe Auferstehungskirche	Russia	ROAL
Stiftung Islamische Gemeinschaft Zurich	Mixed Muslim	SIGZ
Sri Lankan Cricket Club of Zurich	Sri Lanka	SLCCZ
Serbisch-orthodoxe Kirchgemeinde in Belgrad	Serbia Montenegro	SOKG
Serbisch-ortodoxe Kirchgemeinde der Diozese für Mitteleuropa	Serbia Montenegro	SOKGZ
Scuola Professionale Emigrati	Italy	SPE

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Table B.2 – continued from previous page

Name	Origin	
Secondos Plus Schweiz	Mixed	SPZ
Albanischer Studentenverein	Kosovo	STUDENTI
Swiss Tamil Kulturzentrum Zurich	Sri Lanka	TCCZ
Telefono de la Esperanza	Spain	TE
Tamil Education Service Zurich	Sri Lanka	TESS
Türkischer Elternverein Sihlfeld	Turkey	TEVS
Türkische Islamische Stiftung für die Schweiz	Turkey	TISS
Verein Albanische Bibliothek in der Schweiz	Kosovo	VABS
Verein Africa Freedom	Sub-saharan Africa	VAF
Vereinigung der Islamischen Organisationen in der Schweiz	Mixed Muslim	VIOZ
Vereinigung der Slowaken in der Schweiz	Slovakia	VSS
Verein Tibeter Jugend in der Schweiz	China	VTJE
Frauenverein Fatima az Zahra	Mixed Muslim	ZAHRA

B.2 Associations in blocks

Table B.3: Associations in blocks Lyon

Block	Freq.	Members
1	10	LCA AACL ACTM ASEM A2NF FCAV AMR AFM ACRC ThéMenthe
2	9	AML ACFM Sifaka Oxygène AFV ALGB Comara ASCC GFC
3	18	ROCVV Cercle AMAFI BE Méridien Coll-Handicap ACC folklorique Aid Auto AVEC AAE Imazighen AVSS CDS.RA LOM CSR LVR XIII C-Solidarité APS
4	15	AA MJC CCAM EPI CS Peyri CS Lévy CS réel C-Elles Frameto HSC Futsal Centre Vie VPP CGV C&P

Table B.4: Associations in blocks Zurich

Block	Freq.	Members
1	18	MCLI FALS CLZ ITAL MCLE TE CNZ VAF TESS TCCZ SPZ SLCCZ FCLI AVV GAIZ COMIT CT CELI
2	13	SPE VTJE FCGZ TEVS VSS HKS LDD LAPSH STUDENTI MOZ KS AKV VABS
3	8	SOKG VIOZ SIGZ ZAHRA SOKGZ KORAC TISS ROAK

Appendix C

Networks and similarity matrices

C.1 Matrix construction

Different matrices are constructed for the analysis of the field of immigration. Migrant organizations were asked different questions about their links to other organizations. First they were asked about their relationships to a closed list of autochthonous organizations (Question 52, see Appendix **??**) and then about their relationships to a closed list of migrant organizations identified through the mapping procedure (Question 53). For each type of actors, migrant organizations were asked about 5 types of relationships: exchange of information, project collaboration, resource exchange, shared core members and friendship ties. The networks of resource exchange combine ties of information exchange, project collaboration, and resource exchange and record whether one of these relations is present. Boundary definition ties combine shared core members and friendship ties and also records the presence and absence of any of these ties.

To analyze the network of relations between immigrants' associations for each city a matrix of resource exchange and one matrix of ties reflecting boundary definition were constructed. These are binary adjacency matrices of 52X52 in Lyon and 39X39 in Zurich. These matrices are constructed on the basis of the question on relations to a closed list of immigrant associations (see Q53 in Appendix **??**). A first incidence matrix of NxM was created, where N=the interviewed associations and M=the mentioned associations.

Some of the mentioned associations couldn't be interviewed for different reasons. While some were not existing anymore, others could not be reached. These associations were dropped from the matrix, so as to keep only the interviewed associations. While this may seem to reduce the representativity of the networks in both cities, with the exception of two associations in Zurich, none of these associations had a higher indegree than 1 (the indegree measures the number of times an actor receives a tie from another actor), which means that none of these associations were considered as important actors in the network by the interviewed associations.

C.2 Similarity matrices

To look at the relation between modes of cooperation of immigrants' associations (their structural location) and different characteristics of immigrant associations similarity matrices are constructed. A similarity matrix tells whether two actors in a network are similar on selected dummy variables. To construct a similarity matrix, we start from an incidence matrix NxM, where N are the actors (the migrant associations) and M the variables. We then construct the transpose of the matrix, which is created by interchanging the rows and the columns of the original matrix (i.e. MxN). The original matrix (NxM) is then multiplied by its transpose (MxN) to get a similarity matrix of NxN. The values in the cells of the similarity matrix indicate the degree of similarity of actors on the variables used for creating the original matrix. The higher the value in the cell, the higher the similarity between two actors on the selected variables. Table **??** lists the variables used for the similarity matrices in Chapters 5 and 6.

Table C.1: Variables in similarity matrices

Matrix	Variables	Used in table
Origin of associations	Africa, yes=1, no=0	5.7 and 5.8
	China, yes=1, no=0	
	EU-15 + EEA, yes=1, no=0	
	East-Europe and Russia, yes=1, no=0	
	Indian subcontinent, yes=1, no=0	

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Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Matrix	Variables	Used in table
	Mixed, yes=1, no=0	
	Muslim, yes=1,no=0	
	Turkey and Middle East Muslim, yes=1, no=0	
Representation of group	No specific group, yes=1, no=0	?? and ??
	National/ethnic group, yes=1, no=0	
	Religious group, yes=1, no=0	
	Other group, yes=1, no=0	
Area of activity	Family, yes=1, no=0	5.15 and 5.16
	Sports, yes=1, no=0	
	Culture, yes=1, no=0	
	Community, yes=1, no=0	
	Politics, yes=1, no=0	
	New politics, yes=1, no=0	
	General welfare, yes=1, no=0	
	Group specific welfare, yes=1, no=0	
	Economic interest, yes=1, no=0	
	Religious, yes=1, no=0	
	Immigration, yes=1, no=0	
	Other, yes=1, no=0	
Self-definition	Sport club, yes=1,no=0	?? and ??
	Youth, yes=1,no=0	
	Environmental, yes=1,no=0	
	Peace, yes=1,no=0	
	Humanitarian, yes=1,no=0	
	Charity, yes=1,no=0	
	Patient illness, yes=1,no=0	
	Disabled, yes=1,no=0	
	Retired, yes=1,no=0	
	Trade union, yes=1,no=0	
	Professional, yes=1,no=0	
	Parents, yes=1,no=0	

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Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Matrix	Variables	Used in table
	Cultural, yes=1,no=0	
	Other hobby, yes=1,no=0	
	Resident, yes=1,no=0	
	Immigrant, yes=1,no=0	
	Religious, yes=1,no=0	
	Women, yes=1,no=0	
	Anti-racism, yes=1,no=0	
	Direct action, yes=1,no=0	
	Ethnic, yes=1,no=0	
Political function	Recruiting members/donors, yes=1, no=0	6.13 and 6.14
	Fundraising, yes=1, no=0	
	Promoting volunteering, yes=1, no=0	
	Socializing, yes=1, no=0	
	Recreation, yes=1, no=0	
	Self help, yes=1, no=0	
	Services to members, yes=1, no=0	
	Services to others, yes=1, no=0	
	Advisory activities, yes=1, no=0	
	Social and local integration, yes=1, no=0	
	Interest representation, yes=1, no=0	
	Lobby, yes=1, no=0	
	Contact media, yes=1, no=0	
	Mobilizing members, yes=1, no=0	
	Advocacy, yes=1, no=0	
Political activities	Send letters, yes=1, no=0	6.13 and 6.14
	Press conference, yes=1, no=0	
	Implementation public policy, yes=1, no=0	
	Mat. influence public opinion, yes=1, no=0	
	Collection signature petition, yes=1, no=0	
	Organize public meeting, yes=1, no=0	

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Table C.1 – continued from previous page

Matrix	Variables	Used in table
	Organize boycotts, yes=1, no=0	
	Building occupation, yes=1, no=0	
	Local T.V. program, yes=1, no=0	
Contact with departments	Dpt related to immigration, yes=1, no=0	6.21 and 6.22
	Dpt related to welfare, yes=1, no=0	
	Other relevant dpt, yes=1, no=0	
	Local school, yes=1, no=0	
	Local police, yes=1, no=0	
	Local health center, yes=1, no=0	
Contact with political institutions	Local City Council, yes=1, no=0	6.21 and 6.22
	Regional government, yes=1, no=0	
	Local parliamentarians, yes=1, no=0	
	Local political parties, yes=1, no=0	

Appendix D

Descriptive statistics of variables used

Table D.1: Descriptive statistics of all variables used

	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max	Observations
Network resource Lyon	0.038	0.276	0	1	2652
Network boundary Lyon	0.021	0.144	0	1	2652
Network resource Zurich	0.037	0.189	0	1	1482
Network boundary Zurich	0.017	0.129	0	1	1482
Chapter 5					
Area of activity					
Family	0.681	0.468	0	1	91
Sports	0.461	0.501	0	1	91
Culture	0.659	0.476	0	1	91
Community	0.604	0.491	0	1	91
Politics	0.153	0.362	0	1	91
New politics	0.483	0.502	0	1	91
General welfare	0.648	0.480	0	1	91
Group specific welfare	0.538	0.501	0	1	91
Economic interest	0.415	0.495	0	1	91
Religious	0.186	0.391	0	1	91
Immigration	0.626	0.486	0	1	91
Other	0.241	0.431	0	1	91

continued on next page

Table D.1 – continued from previous page

	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max	Observations
Self-definition					
Sports club/outdoor	0.197	0.401	0	1	91
Youth	0.208	0.408	0	1	91
Environmental	0.044	0.206	0	1	91
Animal rights	0.010	0.104	0	1	91
Peace organization	0.109	0.314	0	1	91
Humanitarian/human aid	0.296	0.459	0	1	91
Charity/social welfare	0.362	0.483	0	1	91
Patient/illness/addiction	0.087	0.284	0	1	91
For disabled	0.043	0.206	0	1	91
Retired	0.087	0.284	0	1	91
Lodge, service club	0.010	0.104	0	1	91
Political party	0.010	0.104	0	1	91
Trade union	0.021	0.147	0	1	91
Farmers'	0.010	0.104	0	1	91
Business/employers'	0.021	0.147	0	1	91
Professional	0.032	0.179	0	1	91
Parents'	0.219	0.416	0	1	91
Cultural	0.450	0.500	0	1	91
Other hobby	0.043	0.206	0	1	91
Residents'/housing	0.186	0.391	0	1	91
Immigrants'	0.307	0.464	0	1	91
Religious	0.142	0.351	0	1	91
Women's	0.120	0.327	0	1	91
Anti-racism	0.175	0.382	0	1	91
Direct action	0.043	0.206	0	1	91
Ethnic	0.164	0.373	0	1	91
Chapter 6					
State funding	.671	1.179	0	4	76
Members	3.643	1.181	1	5	87
Political function					
Recruiting members/donors	0.285	0.454	0	1	91
Fundraising	0.186	0.391	0	1	91

continued on next page

Table D.1 – continued from previous page

	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max	Observations
Promoting volunteering	0.417	0.495	0	1	91
Socializing	0.659	0.476	0	1	91
Recreation/sport	0.417	0.485	0	1	91
Self help	0.241	0.431	0	1	91
Service to members	0.307	0.464	0	1	91
Service to others	0.263	0.443	0	1	91
Advisory	0.252	0.436	0	1	91
Social or local integration	0.472	0.502	0	1	91
Interest representation	0.241	0.430	0	1	91
Lobby	0.153	0.362	0	1	91
Contacts with media	0.285	0.454	0	1	91
Mobilizing members	0.376	0.486	0	1	91
Advocacy	0.131	0.340	0	1	91
Political activities					
Send letters	0.582	0.495	0	1	91
Organize press conf	0.461	0.501	0	1	91
Implementation p. policy	0.285	0.454	0	1	91
Influence public opinion	0.376	0.486	0	1	91
Collect sig petition	0.307	0.464	0	1	91
Org. public meeting	0.230	0.423	0	1	91
Org. boycott	0.021	0.147	0	1	91
Part. building occupation	0.010	0.104	0	1	91
Part. local TV prog	0.406	0.493	0	1	91
Contact					
Dpt immigration	0.659	0.476	0	1	91
Dpt related to welfare	0.285	0.454	0	1	91
Other relevant dpt	0.494	0.502	0	1	91
Local school	0.274	0.448	0	1	91
Local police	0.120	0.327	0	1	91
Health center	0.219	0.416	0	1	91
Local city council	0.395	0.491	0	1	91
Regional government	0.285	0.454	0	1	91
Local parl	0.329	0.472	0	1	91

continued on next page

Table D.1 – continued from previous page

	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max	Observations
Local parties		0.186	0.391	0	1	91

Appendix E

Questionnaire

Common Core Organisational Questionnaire

LOCALMULTIDEM PROJECT
Based on the questionnaire designed by the Multicultural Democracy in Europe (MDE) network

Final Version (27 May. 07)
Incorporates comments made by ALL teams[1]

I1. Questionnaire ID number (ES):	
I2. Questionnaire version date (ES):	
I3. Interviewer name or ID number (ES):	

[1] THIS VERSION SIGNALS WHICH QUESTIONS ARE IDENTICAL TO THE MDE-NETWORK COMMON CORE (MDE), WHICH COME FROM THE SPANISH PILOT STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE (ES), WHICH FROM THE ITALIAN PILOT STUDY (IT), AND WHICH ARE COMPLETELY NEW (NEW).

ADMINISTRATIVE VARIABLES (TO BE PRE-CODED BEFORE INTERVIEW BY FIELDWORK COORDINATOR) [MDE]

Pre1. Date of interview (dd/mm format) : ……

Pre2. Year of interview (yyyy format): ……

Pre3: City of interview: ……

Pre4: Mapping method for this organisation:
1. Official/institutional list
2. Informal snowball

Pre5. Classification of main ethnic group of association (country-specific variable evaluated before interview according to document on definitions):2
1. Autochtonous (country of residence)
2. Ethnic group 1 (e.g. Turkish)
3. Ethnic group 2 (e.g. Moroccan)
4. Ethnic group 3 (e.g. Ecuadorean)
5. Etc. (e.g. "mixed" autochtonous-general migrants; "mixed" autochtonous-group X, "mixed" specific category of regional-origin migrants/ethnic minority)

Pre6. Classification of association as suggested by the name (use list in q13 and enter category number): ……

Pre7. Time interview starts (hh:mm format): _ _ : _ _

INTRODUCTION[3]

My research institute (Institute name) is conducting a research on different kinds of organisations in (city name). The project is part of a larger research project, undertaken in several European cities.
In this project the universities of six European countries are all participating. At the moment, we are specifically looking at (ethnic group name) organisations, and organisations which often cooperate with members of the (ethnic group name) community.
We are especially interested in learning more about the way in which (ethnic group name) organisations in (city name) cooperate and organise themselves in order to achieve their goals. We are, of course, also interested in your organisation and that is why we have contacted you.
The results of the study will be used for scientific publications. Information that is provided will be treated confidential.
Although we will be asking very precise questions on your organisation, we want to stress we are not specifically focussing on your organisation alone. It is the general picture, which interests us. But to get a good general picture, we need good information on individual organisations as well. Are you willing to participate?

---

[2] THIS QUESTION IS COUNTRY-SPECIFIC, BUT SHOULD BE MEASURING ONLY ONE DIMENSION (ETHNIC HETERO-DEFINITION) AND NOT SEVERAL. THUS, WE CAN PERFECTLY ACCOMMODATE "MIXED" CATEGORIES FROM AN ETHNIC POINT OF VIEW, BUT NOT "CATEGORICAL" OR "SECTORIAL" (E.G. REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS, ETC.) DEFINITIONS BECAUSE THIS IS NOT THE MAIN FOCUS OF THIS PARTICULAR ITEM. RATHER, THE POINT IS TO CHECK HOW EXTERNAL (E.G. OUR) PERCEPTIONS OF THE ETHNIC IDENTITY OF THE GROUP MATCH OR NOT WITH SELF-DEFINITIONS OF THEIR ETHNIC IDENTITY.

[3] THIS INTRODUCTION CAN BE READ EITHER BEFORE DOING THE QUESTIONNAIRE OR WHEN THE ORGANISATION IS CONTACTED DURING THE MAPPING PROCESS, WHEN WE REQUEST AN INTERVIEW (USUALLY BY PHONE).

TYPE OF ORGANISATION

1. What is the exact and full name of your organization?[MDE]

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.....

.....

.....

2. Is there an acronym/short version of this name? [MDE]
1. Yes
2. No → Go to question 3

2a.What is this acronym?

.....

.....

3. In which year was your organisation founded? (yyyy format) [MDE]

3a. Year of original foundation: .....
3b. (Only if different) Year of official registration/foundation .....

4. Did this organisation exist previously with a different name or with a different organisational composition? [MDE]
1. Yes
2. No → Go to question 5

4a.What was the name of this previous organisation? [MDE]

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4b. What was the year of foundation of this previous organisation? (yyyy format) [MDE]

.....

.....

5. Is your association registered in any official register? [NEW]
1. Yes
2. No → Go to q6

5a. In which register? *(Interviewer: Write down. More than one possible)* ***[NEW]***
……
……

5b. What is the legal form under which your organisation has registered?[4][NEW]

1. General association
2. Foundation
3. Sport club
4. Political party
5. Religious organisation

[4] EACH COUNTRY IS ABLE TO EXPAND THIS LIST TO ADAPT IT BETTER TO ITS LEGAL REGULATIONS, BUT SHOULD BE ABLE TO RECODE ALL THE LIST INTO THE COMMON CATEGORIES FOR COMMON ANALYSES. SEE DOCUMENT ON DEFINITIONS ABOUT INCLUSION IN THE STUDY ONLY IF “MEMBERSHIP-BASED”.

6. Trade union
7. Commerce chamber or professional guild
8. Another, which? _____

6. What is the official address of your organisation? [MDE]

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.....

7. Is your association/group an umbrella organisation (e.g. a federation or confederation)? [MDE]

1. Yes
2. No → Go to question 8

7a. How many associations or groups are affiliated to your organisation? [MDE]

.....

.....

7b. What are the names of these organisations? *[To be asked as documentation at the end if does not know by heart]* ***[MDE]***

1. .....
2. .....
3. .....
4. .....
5. .....
6. .....
7. .....
8. .....
9. .....
10. .....

8. Is your organisation a member of a regional organisation or federation? [MDE]

1. Yes
2. No → Go to question 9

8a. To which? (More than 1 possible) [MDE]

1. .....
2. .....
3. .....
4. .....
5. .....

9. Is your organisation a member of a national organisation or federation? [MDE]

1. Yes
2. No → Go to question 10

9a. To which? (More than 1 possible) [MDE]

1. .....
2. .....
3. .....
4. .....
5. .....

10. Is your organisation a member of an international organisation or federation? [MDE]

1. Yes
2. No → Go to question 11

10a. To which? (More than 1 possible) [MDE]

1. .....
2. .....
3. .....
4. .....
5. .....

11. Is your organisation a member of a network (or platform) of organisations? (E.g. horizontally-related network) [ES& IT]

1. Yes
2. No → Go to q12

11a. To which? (More than 1 possible) [ES & IT]

1. .....
2. .....
3. .....
4. .....
5. .....

12. In which of these areas is your association/group active [multiple responses possible]:
[Interviewer: by active we mean that the organisation pursues its goals at that geographical level]
[MDE]

1. only in a part of (CITY) → 1a. which part?: ……..……
   1b. only in the local neighbourhood
   1c. other: ……..……..…..
2. in (CITY) in general
3. in the (WIDER REGION/PROVINCE)
4. in the whole (COUNTRY)
5. in other COUNTRIES → 5a. Which countries?: ……
6. at the European Union level

SHOW CARD 1

13. I will now read you a list of types of associations. For each type, can you tell me if your organisation can be defined as such? [MDE modified]

[Coding instructions: before coding an organisation as "other club or association", please check that it does not fit with any other category.]

		YES	NO
1	Sports club or outdoor activities club	1	0
2	Youth association (for example, scouts, youth clubs)	1	0
3	Environmental organisation	1	0
4	Association for animal rights /protection	1	0
5	Peace organisation	1	0
6	Humanitarian aid or human rights organisation	1	0
7	Charity or social-welfare organisation	1	0
8	Association for medical patients, specific illnesses or addictions	1	0
9	Association for disabled	1	0
10	Pensioners' or retired persons' organisation	1	0
11	Lodge or service clubs	1	0
12	Political party	1	0

		YES	NO
13	Trade Union	1	0
14	Farmers' organisation	1	0
15	Business or employers' organisation	1	0
16	Professional organisation	1	0
17	Consumer association	1	0
18	Parents' association	1	0
19	Cultural, musical, dancing or theatre society	1	0
20	Other hobby club/society	1	0
21	Residents', housing or neighbourhood association	1	0
22	Immigrants' organisation	1	0
23	Religious or church organisation	1	0
24	Women's organisation	1	0
25	Association for war, victims, veterans, or ex-servicemen	1	0
26	Anti-racism organization	1	0
27	Direct action group [but difficult translation to other languages]	1	0
28	Ethnic association	1	0
29	Other club or association (describe:) …….....	1	0

[Note to the interviewer: IF MORE THAN ONE GO TO Q13A, OTHERWISE GO TO Q14]

13a. And, of these that you have mentioned, which of the following categories best describes your organisation? *[Interviewer: We only accept one, and please assure that always one is given]* ***[NEW]***

[Write number in previous list]: _____

14. Is there an official mission statement of your organisation? It might be that you have this on paper. [MDE]

1. Yes
2. No → Go to question 15

14a. What is this official mission statement [MDE]

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

15. Do you see your organisation as representing any particular group of people?
[Note to the interviewer: If the interviewee does not understand what we mean with "representing", please explain that we mean organising activities for and/or defending the interests or views of a specific collective or of a certain group of people] ***[MDE]***

1. Yes
2. No → Go to question 16

15a. What group of people does it represent? [MDE]

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

16. Does your organisation feel close to any social or political movements? For example, the peace movement, the environmental movement, the feminist movement, etc. [IT]

1. Yes
2. No → go to Q17

16a. (If yes) To which social or political movements do you feel close?
[Open-ended question, several responses possible. Code up to five]. ***[IT]***

1. ……
2. ……
3. ……
4. ……
5. ……

17. Does your organisation feel close to religious organisations or groups? [IT]

1. Yes
2. No → go to Q18

17a. (If yes) To which religious organisations or groups do you feel close?
[Open-ended question, several responses possible. Code up to five]. ***[IT]***

1. ……
2. ……
3. ……
4. ……
5. ……

18. Does your organisation feel close to any (COUNTRY) political party? [IT]

1. Yes
2. No → go to Q19

18a. (If yes) To which political party(ies)?
[Open-ended question, several responses possible. Code up to five]. ***[IT]***

1. ……
2. ……
3. ……
4. ……
5. ……

19. I will now read you a list of contacts that may be considered important for an association in order to achieve its own goals. Can you please tell me if, for your organisation, each of these contacts are very, somewhat, not very, or not at all important? [IT]

		(1) Very important	(2) Somewhat important	(3) Not very imp.	(4) Not at all imp.	(99) DK/NA
1	With immigrants' associations	1	2	3	4	99
2	With (country) associations pro-immigrants	1	2	3	4	99
3	With associations of another country	1	2	3	4	99
4	With organisations or groups that share the same religion	1	2	3	4	99
5	With local political parties	1	2	3	4	99
6	With national political parties	1	2	3	4	99

7	With local trade unions	1	2	3	4	99
8	With national trade unions	1	2	3	4	99
9	With the national Government	1	2	3	4	99
10	With the local government	1	2	3	4	99
11	(When relevant) with the regional government	1	2	3	4	99
12	With EU institutions	1	2	3	4	99

20. I will now read you a list of social issues. Can you tell me if your organisation would support events or activities organised around each of these issues? Would your organisation certainly support, maybe support, or would not support it? [IT]

		(1) Certainly support	(2) Maybe support	(3) Would not support	(99) DK/NA
1.	In favour of equal opportunities for women	1	2	3	99
2.	In favour of unmarried couples (living together without being married)	1	2	3	99
3.	In favour of further rights for homosexual individuals	1	2	3	99
4.	In favour of the legalisation of the personal use of drugs	1	2	3	99
5.	In favour of euthanasia	1	2	3	99
6.	Against censorship of news in TV or newspapers	1	2	3	99
7.	Against the death penalty	1	2	3	99
8.	In favour of assisted reproduction	1	2	3	99

ACTIVITIES

SHOW CARD 2

21. Please tell me in which sectors or areas has your association/group been active during the last 12 months: (Interviewer: several possible) [MDE]

		YES	NO
1	Charity /welfare	1	0
2	Health	1	0
3	Disabled	1	0
4	Pensioners, elderly	1	0
5	Discrimination issues	1	0
6	Religious activities	1	0
7	Education	1	0
8	Poverty	1	0
9	(ethnic: to be substituted by group name) concerns	1	0
10	Sports	1	0
11	Youth, children	1	0
12	Parents	1	0
13	Culture, music, theatre, …	1	0
14	Hobbies	1	0
15	Research	1	0
16	Peace	1	0
17	Humanitarian aid	1	0
18	Women	1	0
19	Human rights	1	0
20	Child care/other children's services	1	0
21	Community development	1	0
22	Politics	1	0
23	Business relations	1	0
24	Labour relation	1	0
25	Consumers' interests	1	0
26	Family	1	0
27	Employment and training	1	0
28	Housing	1	0
29	Crime	1	0
30	(Hhomosexuality) optional	1	0
31	Issues related to immigration	1	0
32	International cooperation	1	0
33	Neighbourhood or local demands	1	0
34	Other: which? ……	1	0

[If more than one category, ask q21a, if not go to q22]

21a. Which sector has been most important? [MDE]
[Please note the number of the sector (e.g. note '10' if sports has been the most important sector) Please press the informant to choose 1 and only 1 sector.]

Write number: ____

SHOW CARD 3

22. I will now show you a card with a list of activities, can you please tell me which have been the most relevant activities that your organisation/group has done in the past 12 months. [ES]

1. Lobby activities	7. Services to members	13. Promoting volunteering
2. Interest representation	8. Services to others (individuals or organisations)	14. Advocacy
3. Mobilizing members	9. Advisory activities	15. Contacts with media
4. self-help	10. Social or local integration	16. Other _____
5. Recreation or sport activities	11. Fund-raising	
6. Socializing	12. Recruiting members or donors	

[If more than one activity, ask q22a, if just one go to q23:]

22a. Which activity has been the most important? [ES]
[Write down the number of the activity (e.g. if 'lobby', write 1). Please ask respondent to choose only one.]

.....

SHOW CARD 4 (RESPONSE CATEGORIES)

23. How frequently has your organisation engaged in the following activities in the last 2 years? [MDE modified]

		Weekly	Monthly	2-5 times a year	Yearly	Less frequently or never	DK/NA
1	Organise cultural events (concerts, exhibitions, performances, etc.)	1	2	3	4	5	99
2	Organise social events (parties, meals, fairs, dances, trips, etc.)	1	2	3	4	5	99
3	Organise intellectual events (lectures, debates, conferences, etc.)	1	2	3	4	5	99
4	Organise political events (lobbying, demonstrations, public meetings, strikes, etc.)	1	2	3	4	5	99
5	Organise educational activities (language courses, visits to museums, other courses, etc.)	1	2	3	4	5	99
6	Organise sport and leisure activities (competitions, fitness courses, etc.)	1	2	3	4	5	99
7	Organise religious activities (peregrinations, collective prayers, bible discussion/koran reading, catechesis, etc.)	1	2	3	4	5	99

[CONTINUE WITH CARD 4]
24. And how frequently has your organisation provided any of the following services in the last 2 years? [NEW]

		Weekly	Monthly	2-5 times a year	Yearly	Less frequently or never	DK/NA
1	Legal representation of	1	2	3	4	5	99

	immigrants						
2	Providing assistance in connection with the immigration process (legal, administrative help)	1	2	3	4	5	99
3	Providing information on other laws and institutions of [host country]	1	2	3	4	5	99
4	Providing assistance in housing	1	2	3	4	5	99
5	Providing assistance in employment seeking	1	2	3	4	5	99
6	Providing assistance in access to the [host country] welfare system: health care, education	1	2	3	4	5	99
7	Providing financial support	1	2	3	4	5	99
8	Providing in-kind support (e.g. meals, accommodation, clothes, etc.)	1	2	3	4	5	99
9	Providing translation or interpretation	1	2	3	4	5	99

24a. Are there any other activities you frequently organise? [write down verbatim] [NEW]

SHOW CARD 5 (RESPONSE CATEGORIES)
25. During the last <u>12 months</u>, how frequently has your organisation done any of the following? [mark all that applies] [MDE modified]

		Never	1 - 3 times	4 - 6 times	7 times or more	DK/NA
1	Send letters or writings to the authorities (allegations, appeals, petitions, denunciations, etc.)	1	2	3	4	99
2	Press conferences or press releases	1	2	3	4	99
3	Management or implementation of public programs (social, educational, cultural, etc.)	1	2	3	4	99
4	Distribution of newsletter, information notes or other written materials to influence public opinion	1	2	3	4	99
5	Collect signatures for a petition	1	2	3	4	99
6	Organise or collaborate in the organisation of demonstrations and public meetings	1	2	3	4	99
7	Organise boycotts to products, institutions or countries	1	2	3	4	99
8	Organise or participate in the occupation of a building or in a “lock-up”	1	2	3	4	99
9	Participate in local radio or TV programmes (If yes, ask in which language: …….....)	1	2	3	4	99
10	Participate in national radio or TV programmes (if yes, ask in which language: …….....)	1	2	3	4	99

26. In the last 2 years, has your organisation taken part in protest action or demonstrations on any of the following issues? [Mark all that applies] [MDE]

		YES	NO
1	Housing	1	0
2	War / defence	1	0
3	International politics	1	0
4	Political development in other countries	1	0
5	Defence of minorities' traditional lifestyles	1	0
6	Quality of or access to education	1	0
7	Racial harassment / discrimination	1	0
8	Citizenship rights	1	0
9	Asylum	1	0
10	(Un) employment issues	1	0
11	Poverty	1	0
12	Fighting crime in local neighbourhood	1	0
13	Fighting drugs	1	0
14	Religious rights	1	0
15	Police behaviour	1	0
16	Homelessness	1	0
17	Immigration policies	1	0
18	Other: which? ……..	1	0

[If yes to any protest or demonstration, go to Q27, if none mentioned go to Q28]

27. Could you please mention the 3 most important protest actions or demonstrations related with any of these issues in which your organisation has participated in the last 2 years? [NEW]
(*Interviewer: When one event is mentioned ask*:)
27a. Did your association only participate in this event or did you contribute to its organization? [NEW]

	27a.	
27. Name of event (write verbatim and try to get also date)	*Only particip.*	*Also organised*
1.	1	2
2.	1	2
3.	1	2

28. Does your organisation publish any of the following? [*Mark all that applies. If answer is yes, ask****:]***
28a. And in what language? [MDE]

		NO	YES		28a. Language
1.	Newsletter/newspaper	0	1	→	
2.	Website	0	1	→	
3.	Journal/review/magazine	0	1	→	
4.	Books	0	1	→	
5.	Local radio/television programme	0	1	→	
6.	National radio/television programme	0	1	→	

29. In the last 2 years, has your organisation assisted members in:
[MDE modified]

	Yes	No
1. Contacts with landlords?	1	0

2.	Personal contacts with the police and the judicial system?	1	0
3.	Personal contacts with local authorities?	1	0
4.	Writing letters to authorities?	1	0
5.	Contacts with employers?	1	0

SHOW CARD 6 (RESPONSE CATEGORIES)

30. How often does your organization call upon <u>ordinary members</u> to make any of the following types of contributions?: [MDE]

		Never	rarely	sometimes	regularly	DK/NA
1	to contact government officials on behalf of the [org.name]	1	2	3	4	99
2	to write letters to newspapers or magazines	1	2	3	4	99
3	to sign a petition	1	2	3	4	99
4	to boycott certain products or organisations	1	2	3	4	99
5	to participate in demonstrations or picketings	1	2	3	4	99
6	to participate in a strike	1	2	3	4	99
7	to work in political candidates' campaigns	1	2	3	4	99

31. During the latest <u>general elections,</u> did your association organise or take part in any campaign to increase the election turnout (or to promote inscriptions in the electoral register)? [MDE modified]

1. Yes
2. No

32. And during the latest <u>local elections</u>, did your association organise or take part in any campaign to increase the election turnout (or to promote inscriptions in the electoral register)? [NEW]

1. Yes
2. No

33. Has anyone in your organisation ever stood as a candidate in elections? [MDE]

1. Yes
2. No → Go to question 35 (MEMBERSHIP)

33a. At which level? [MDE]

	Yes	No
1. Local	1	0
2. Regional	1	0
3. National	1	0
4. (Country of origin)	1	0

33b. For what party/ies or coalition/s? (Multiple responses possible) [MDE]

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.....

.....

34. Has anyone in your organisation ever been elected? [MDE]

1 Yes
2 No → Go to question 35 (MEMBERSHIP)

34a. At which level? [MDE]

	Yes	No
1. Local	1	0
2. Regional	1	0
3. National	1	0
4. (Country of origin)	1	0

34b. For what party/ies or coalition/s? (Multiple responses possible) [MDE]

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

MEMBERSHIP COMPOSITION

35. SHOW CARD 7 (CATEGORIES IN ROWS) AND, IF NECESSARY, 7A (Q35B CATEGORIES)

Please indicate for each category below how many persons are there in your association/ group. If you are the local or regional branch of a larger association we are only interested in your own branch and not in the larger organization. If you do not have precise figures feel free to use informed estimates.
[Note to interviewer: If the organisation is a federation or confederation of other associations/organisations, or a foundation and does not have individual members code as –1 in column 35 and 35c]
[Note to interviewer: if interviewee is unable to give an estimate in any of the rows (1-8) of Q35, please show card 7A and ask which category describes best (Q35b)]

35c. Please also indicate the percentage of women each category consists of. [MDE modified]

		35.	**35b. If unable to give an estimate, which category describes best?**					**Refuses to provide any answer to 35 and 35b**	**35c**
		Write figures here	1 to 9	10 to 29	30 to 99	100 to 499	500 or more		% Women
1	Total number of members		1	2	3	4	5	-9	
2	Active members (formal members who frequently participate in the activities of your organisation)		1	2	3	4	5	-9	
3	Non-member participants (individuals taking part in the activities of your organisation without being a formal or informal member)		1	2	3	4	5	-9	
4	Paid staff, full-time (approx. 30 hours/week or more)		1	2	3	4	5	-9	
5	Paid staff, part-time (less than 30 hours/week)		1	2	3	4	5	-9	
6	Volunteers working 3 hours or less per week		1	2	3	4	5	-9	
7	Volunteers working more than 3 hrs. per week		1	2	3	4	5	-9	
8	Clients (individuals who benefit directly from the activities or services of your organisation without being members)		1	2	3	4	5	-9	

→ Interviewer: If TOTAL number of members = 0 or -1, go to Q40

36. Do you keep a record over members? [MDE]

1. Yes
2. No

37. How many of your members pay a membership fee? [MDE]

1. All of them or almost all of them
2. Some of them
3. Very few or nobody
4. We don't have a membership fee

38. How many members have joined the association in the last 12 months? Estimations are also valid. [MDE]
[Note to interviewer: if interviewee is unable to give an estimate code as –9]

39. How many members have left the association in the last 12 months? Estimations are also valid. [MDE]
[Note to interviewer: if interviewee is unable to give an estimate code as –9]

[Note to interviewer: Ask only if organisation has volunteers in Q35/Q35b, otherwise go to Q42]

40. What about volunteers, how many volunteers have joined the association in the last 12 months? Estimations are also valid. [NEW]
[Note to interviewer: if interviewee is unable to give an estimate code as –9]

41. And how many volunteers have left the association in the last 12 months? Estimations are also valid. [NEW]
[Note to interviewer: if interviewee is unable to give an estimate code as –9]

42. What was the activity organized by your organization in the last 12 months, that attracted the highest number of participants? How many people attended? [MDE]

43. Suppose your organization has a very important activity, to which maximum participation would be essential, how many people could you expect to participate? [MDE]

44. How many children or young persons under 18 years would you estimate take part in your daily activities? [MDE]

SHOW CARD 8 (RESPONSE CATEGORIES)

45. Of all your members, what percentage is part of each of these social groups? [MDE modified]

		None	More than 0 but less than 10%	More than 10% but less than 50%	About 50%	Between 50 and 80%	Almost all members	DK / NA
1	Children or young persons under 16	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
2	Young people (16-30)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
3	Mature adults (31-64)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
4	Retired people (or 65 years +)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
5	(Ethnic group 1)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
6	(Ethnic group 2)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
7	(Ethnic group 3)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
8	(country nationals)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
9	(main religious group in survey country)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
10	(main religious group of ethnic group)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
11	Newcomers to the country (last 5 years)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99

[Note to interviewer: Ask Q46 only if organisation has paid staff in Q35/Q35b, otherwise go to Q47]

46. And what about your paid staff, of all your paid staff, what percentage is part of each of these social groups? [NEW]

		None	More than 0 but less than 10%	More than 10% but less than 50%	About 50%	Between 50 and 80%	Almost all members	DK / NA
1	Children or young persons under 16	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
2	Young people (16-30)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
3	Mature adults (31-64)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
4	Retired people (or 65 years +)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
5	(Ethnic group 1)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
6	(Ethnic group 2)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
7	(Ethnic group 3)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
8	(country nationals)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
9	(main religious group in survey country)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
10	(main religious group of ethnic group)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99
11	Newcomers to the country (last 5 years)	1	2	3	4	5	6	99

[Note to interviewer: don't ask question 47 to interviewee, reply yourself and then follow instructions]

47. Interviewer: is ethnic group language different to country language? [MDE]

1. Yes → Go to question 48
2. No → Go to question 51 (SECTION NETWORKS)

SHOW CARD 9 (RESPONSE CATEGORIES)
48. In what language do you generally conduct the following activities of the association? [MDE]

		Only in (country language)	Mostly in (country language)	About half in (country language) and half in (ethnic group language)	Mostly in (ethnic group language)	Only in (ethnic group language)	DK / NA
1	Regular activities	1	2	3	4	5	99
2	Membership meetings	1	2	3	4	5	99
3	Correspondence with members or participants	1	2	3	4	5	99
4	Correspondence with external contacts	1	2	3	4	5	99
5	Board meetings	1	2	3	4	5	99
6	Announcement of activities	1	2	3	4	5	99
7	Publications	1	2	3	4	5	99

49. How many of the participants in your activities cannot speak (the language of the country of residence)? Could you give a percentage? [MDE]

.....

.....

[Note to interviewer: Ask Q50 only if organisation has paid staff in Q35, otherwise go to Q51]

50. And how many of the the members of your paid staff cannot speak (the language of the country of residence)? Could you give a percentage? [NEW]

.....

.....

RELATIONS TO OTHER ORGANISATIONS, ETHNIC AND NON-ETHNIC

51. Could you tell me the name of the local (country of residence) and (ethnic/immigrants/nationality/etc.) associations you have had most frequent contact with in the last 2 years? [MDE]
(Interviewer: up to 10 names are possible)

1 .....
2 .....
3 .....
4 .....
5 .....
6 .....
7 .....
8 .....
9 .....
10 .....

SHOW CARD 10 (LIST OF ORGANISATIONS)
(Specific list designed within national teams. For each row, national teams will have to add 2-5 specific organisations that suit the general category of the row.)

I would like to present you now a list of other (country of residence) associations and organisations that work in this city.

52a. First, could you tell me with which of these have you had any meetings, consultations or exchange of information in the last 2 years? [MDE modified]

52b. Secondly, could you tell me with which of these have you collaborated in projects or events in the last 2 years? [MDE modified & IT]

52c. Thirdly, do you share resources (meeting spaces, postal address, phone, fax, etc.) with any of these organisations? [MDE modified & IT] [5]

52d. Does your organisation have personal links with any of these organisations through individual members? [IT]

52e. And do you share leaders with any of these organisations? [IT]

52f. Finally, with regard to this list, could you tell me with which of these would you say that your organisation has major disagreements?[NEW]

		52a. Meetings /Consultation /exchange of information	52b. Collaboration in projects or events	52c. Sharing of resources	52d. Personal links through individual members	52e. Sharing of leaders	52f. Disagreements
1	Main political parties in city, with and without representation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

[5] QUESTIONS 52B & 52C ARE MEANT TO BE A SPECIFICATION OF THE "COOPERATION" CATEGORY OF THE ORIGINAL MDE VERSION.

		52a. Meetings /Consultation /exchange of information	52b. Collaboration in projects or events	52c. Sharing of resources	52d. Personal links through individual members	52e. Sharing of leaders	52f. Disagreements
2	Main trade unions in city	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3	Main environmental organisations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4	Main peace organisations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5	Main human rights organisations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6	Main anti-racism organisations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7	Main NGOs and humanitarian aid associations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8	Main charities	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9	Main neighbourhood associations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10	Main educational associations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11	Main religious associations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12	Sufficient space for the informant to add other associations not included in the list	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

SHOW CARD 11 (LIST OF ORGANISATIONS)
(Specific list designed within national teams.)

I would like to present you now a list of other [ethnic/immigrant/nationality] associations and organisations that work in this city.

53a. First, could you tell me with which of these have you had any meetings, consultations or exchange of information in the last 2 years? [MDE modified]

53b. Secondly, could you tell me with which of these have you collaborated in projects or events in the last 2 years? [MDE modified & IT]

53c. Thirdly, do you share resources (meeting spaces, postal address, phone, fax, etc.) with any of these organisations? [MDE modified & IT]

53d. Does your organisation have personal links with any of these organisations through individual members? [IT]

53e. And do you share leaders with any of these organisations? [IT]

53f. Finally, with regard to this list, could you tell me with which of these would you say that your organisation has major disagreements?

		53a. Meetings /Consultation /exchange of information	**53b. Collaboration in projects or events**	**53c. Sharing of resources**	**53d. Personal links through individual members**	**53e. Sharing of leaders**	**53f. Disagreements**
1	(Fill in with all the organisations detected through the mapping process)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ETC.		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

54. Do you have any contacts with organisations that are based and operate in [homeland country]? What are the names of these organisations? (Up to 5 possible) [MDE modified]

1.	
2.	
3.	
4.	
5.	

55. Do you have any contacts with organisations that operate on an international level? What are the names of these organisations? (Up to 5 possible) [MDE modified]
[If respondent asks we are interested in knowing about any organisation operating outside of (host country) and of (homeland country)]

1.	
2.	
3.	
4.	
5.	

CONTACTS WITH POLITICIANS AND AUTHORITIES

The next set of questions is about contacts of your organisation with public administrations and/or politicians.

SHOW CARD 12 (with list only)
(Specific list designed within national teams. For each row, national teams will have to add the names of the institutions that suit the general category of the row.)

56. During the last 2 years, did your association/group have contact with any of these institutions and representatives?
[When interviewee mentions one, ask:] Was this contact occasional or regular? [MDE]

	No contact at all	Occassional contact	Regular contact	DK / NA
Municipal administration or local officials of:				
- [institution 1: department related to immigrants issues]	0	1	2	9
- [institution 2: department related to welfare issues]	0	1	2	9
- [institution 3: other department relevant]	0	1	2	9
- Local school	0	1	2	9
- Local police	0	1	2	9
- Local health centre	0	1	2	9
The city council [executive body] or members of the council	0	1	2	9
Local parliament/assembly or local parliamentarians of:				
- [Parliamentarians of X party]	0	1	2	9
- [Parliamentarians of Y party]	0	1	2	9
- [Parliamentarians of Z party] (fill in as many as needed)	0	1	2	9
Local political parties or politicians of:				
- Party 1	0	1	2	9
- Party 2	0	1	2	9
- Party 3 (fill in as many as needed)	0	1	2	9
Provincial administration [if it exists] or officials of:				
- [institution 1]	0	1	2	9
- [institution 2]	0	1	2	9
- [institution 3]	0	1	2	9
Regional administration [if it exists] or officials of:				
- [institution 1]	0	1	2	9
- [institution 2]	0	1	2	9
- [institution 3]	0	1	2	9
Regional government or members of the regional government	0	1	2	9
Regional assembly or regional MPs of:				
- [Parliamentarians of X party]	0	1	2	9
- [Parliamentarians of Y party]	0	1	2	9
- [Parliamentarians of Z party] (fill in as many as needed)	0	1	2	9
Regional political parties or politicians of:				

	No contact at all	Occassional contact	Regular contact	DK / NA
- [X party]	0	1	2	9
- [Y party]	0	1	2	9
- [Z party] (fill in as many as needed)	0	1	2	9
National administration or officials of:				
- [institution 1]	0	1	2	9
- [institution 2]	0	1	2	9
- [institution 3]	0	1	2	9
National government or members of the national government	0	1	2	9
National parliament (Lower Chamber) or national MPs of:				
- [Parliamentarians of X party]	0	1	2	9
- [Parliamentarians of Y party]	0	1	2	9
- [Parliamentarians of Z party] (fill in as many as needed)	0	1	2	9
National political parties or politicians of:				
- [X party]	0	1	2	9
- [Y party]	0	1	2	9
- [Z party] (fill in as many as needed)	0	1	2	9
National or regional Trade unions	0	1	2	9
European institutions	0	1	2	9
Administration or officials of (country of origin)	0	1	2	9
Political parties or politicians of (country of origin)	0	1	2	9

SHOW CARD 13 (with list only)
57. In the <u>last 2 years</u>, has your organisation been called to participate in decision-making processes in any of the following ways?
57a. [Interviewer: Only when interviewee mentions one, ask:] Did your organisation finally participate? [MDE]

		57. Has been called		57a. Has participated	
		YES	NO	YES	NO
	Local level				
1	As a permanent member of the district or neighbourhood council	1	0	1	0
2	As a permanent member of a municipal council on specific issues (social services, women, education, etc.)	1	0	1	0
3	An occasional invitation to participate in a municipal committee to solve a specific problem	1	0	1	0
4	To join a municipal consultation committee or group for a specific policy or issue	1	0	1	0
	Regional level (when applicable)				
5	As a permanent member of a regional council on specific issues social services, women, education, etc.)	1	0	1	0
6	An occasional invitation to participate in a regional committee to solve a specific problem	1	0	1	0
7	To join a regional consultation committee or group for	1	0	1	0

		57. Has been called		57a. Has participated	
		YES	**NO**	**YES**	**NO**
	a specific policy or issue				
	National level				
8	As a permanent member of a national council on specific issues (social services, women, education, etc.)	1	0	1	0
9	An occasional invitation to participate in a national committee to solve a specific problem	1	0	1	0
10	To join a national consultation committee or group for a specific policy or issue	1	0	1	0

[SHOW CARD 14]

58. Regardless of whether you ever get invitations to participate in decision-making processes, does your organisation get official information concerning the decision-making processes on questions relevant for your organisation from any of these authorities? [NEW]

		Yes, through mailing lists	Yes, informed through personal contacts	No, not systematically informed
1.	District or neighbourhood council or government	1	2	3
2.	Local/municipality council or government	1	2	3
3.	Regional council or government	1	2	3
4.	National parliament or government	1	2	3

SHOW CARD 15 (with list only)

59. Has your organisation in the <u>last 2 years</u> had contact with any of these representatives of public authorities and institutions? [MDE]
59a. Would, if necessary and urgent, someone of your organisation be able to arrange a meeting with any of these types of people <u>within two or three days</u>? [MDE modified]
59b. Has anyone in your organisation arranged a meeting with any of these types of people <u>within two or three days</u>? [MDE modified]

		59. Had contact	59a. Could arrange meeting	59b. Have arranged meeting
1	Office of mayor	☐ 1	☐ 1	☐ 1
2	(Office responsible) of police	☐ 1	☐ 1	☐ 1
3	Ambassador or consul of (country of origin)	☐ 1	☐ 1	☐ 1
4	Highest representatives of your religion at city	☐ 1	☐ 1	☐ 1
5	TV-journalist from local TV	☐ 1	☐ 1	☐ 1
6	TV-journalist from national TV	☐ 1	☐ 1	☐ 1
7	TV-journalist from homeland TV	☐ 1	☐ 1	☐ 1
8	Journalist of local newspaper	☐ 1	☐ 1	☐ 1
9	Journalist of national newpaper	☐ 1	☐ 1	☐ 1
10	Journalist of homeland newpaper	☐ 1	☐ 1	☐ 1

SIZE AND FACILITIES

60. What space does your organisation use as an office? [MDE]

60a. Is it shared with other organisations? [MDE]

1. Yes → Which? _____
2. No

60b. Does your organisation own it? [MDE]

1. Yes → Go to Q61
2. No

60c. Whose property is it? [Interviewer: if private owner, ask 44d:] [MDE]

60d. Do you rent it? [MDE]

1. Yes
2. No

61. Does your organisation use a different space for its regular activities? [MDE]

1. Yes
2. No → Go to Q62

61a. What space does your organisation use for its activities? [MDE]

61b. Is it shared with other organisations? [MDE]

1. Yes → Which? _____
2. No

61c. Does your organisation own it? [MDE]

1. Yes → Go to Q62
2. No

61d. Whose property is it? [Interviewer: if private owner, ask 45d:] [MDE]

61e. Do you rent it? [MDE]

1. Yes
2. No

62. Which of the following does your organisation have? (Mark all that applies) [MDE]

	No	Yes	(If Yes)
1. Its own phone number	0	1	→ Which? _____
2. Its own postal address	0	1	
3. Its own computers	0	1	
4. Its own internet connection	0	1	
5. Its own email address	0	1	→ Which? _____
6. Its own fax machine and fax number	0	1	
7. Its own website	0	1	→ Which? _____

BOARD COMPOSITION

63. Does your association have…? *(Interviewer: Read out rows)*
63a. [If yes in 1 and/or 5 ask :] How often does it meet? SHOW CARD 16 (FREQUENCY CATEGORIES of 63a FOR 1 & 5 ONLY)
[MDE]

	No	Yes		63a. How often does it meet?				
				Weekly	Monthly	Several times a year	Once a year	Less frequently
1. A board	0	1	→	1	2	3	4	5
2. A chair person	0	1						
3. A secretary	0	1						
4. A treasurer	0	1						
5. A general assembly	0	1	→	1	2	3	4	5
6. A written constitution (ask copy)	0	1						
7. Committees or work groups for specific issues	0	1						

[INTERVIEWER: If organisation does not have a general assembly → Go to question 65]

64. How many members attended your latest general assembly? [MDE]

[INTERVIEWER: If oganisation does not have a board → Go to next section on FINANCES]

65. How are board members appointed? [MDE]

66. How many members form the board? [MDE]

66a. (Ask only if category applicable in Country): How many deputy members are there in the board? [MDE]

67. How many of the board members are women? [MDE]

67a. (Ask only if category applicable in Country): And, how many deputy board members are women? [MDE]

68. How many of the board members were born in [country of residence]? [MDE]

68a. (Ask only if category applicable in Country): And, how many deputy board members were born in [country of residence]? [MDE]

.....

.....

69. How many were born in [country of origin]? [MDE]

.....

.....

69a. (Ask only if category applicable in Country): And, how many deputy board members were born in [country of origin]? [MDE]

.....

.....

70. Is your chairperson a man or a woman? [MDE]

1. Man
2. Woman

FINANCES

71. Could you please tell me what the annual operating budget of your association is? [MDE]

[Interviewer: If refusal to respond code as –9, if he/she doesn't know code as –8. In Both cases, ask Q71a]

SHOW CARD 17
71a. If you don't know the precise budget, do you know in what range it is? [6] [MDE]

1. Less than € 1,000
2. Between € 1,000 and € 2,499
3. Between € 2,500 and € 4,999
4. Between € 5,000 and € 9,999
5. Between € 10,000 and € 49,999
6. Between € 50,000 and € 99,999
7. Between €100,000 and € 149,999
8. Between € 150,000 and € 199,999
9. More than € 200,000
88. DK
99. REFUSAL

SHOW CARD 18

72. Could you tell us what your budget is made of? If possible, please give me the approximate figure in (EURO). [MDE]
(If DK or REFUSAL in Q72) 72a. Could you provide us, at least, with an estimation of the share of each category in your overall budget. [MDE]
[Interviewer: for percentages, please make sure that the sum of all categories mentioned adds up to 100%]

		72. EURO		72a. % of total budget	
		Gives figures (write)	**DK / REF.**	**Gives figures (write)**	**DK / REF.**
1	Returns from the sales of goods or services		-9 →		-9
2	Returns from events or campaigns for funds raising		-9 →		-9
3	Membership fees		-9 →		-9
4	Donations from individuals		-9 →		-9
5	Sponsoring from companies/firms		-9 →		-9
6	Finance from federation or umbrella organization		-9 →		-9
7	Grant from city district		-9 →		-9
8	Grant from municipality		-9 →		-9
9	Grant from regional government		-9 →		-9
10	Grant from national government		-9 →		-9
11	Grant from European Union		-9 →		-9

[6] TEAMS WITH CURRENCY DIFFERENT TO EURO, SHOULD USE THEIR OWN CURRENCY BUT IN RANGES STRICTLY EQUIVALENT TO THESE ONCE THE EXCHANGE RATE IS APPLIED.

12	Grant from (country of origin) government		-9 →		-9
13	Other sources		-9 →		-9

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND COLLABORATION.

End of questionnaire

POS1. Time questionnaire ends (hh:mm format): _ _ : _ _ ***[MDE]***

Materials to obtain just after the questionnaire interview:

1. If informant answered in question 8 that this is a umbrella organisation, ask for the list of organisations that are members of this federation/confederation and fill in question 8.
2. Written constitution/statutes/regulation
3. Names of board members (for interlocking directorates analysis)

POS2. Time complete interview ends (hh:mm format): _ _ : _ _ ***[MDE]***

FINAL SECTION, questions to the interviewer

This section is to be filled in by the interviewer inmediately after he/she has left the place where the interview has taken place.

POS3. Gender of interviewer [MDE]
1. Male
2. Female

POS4. Ethnic origin of interviewer [MDE]
……..

POS5. Language of interview [MDE]
……

POS6. Please describe the attitude of the informant during the interview [MDE]
……..

POS7. Has the informant used written materials and documentation to answer questions 1 to 72? [MDE]
1. Yes
2. No

POS8. Is the informant the person we wanted to interview originally? [MDE]
1. Yes
2. No

POS9. Please rate the level of informedness of the informant [MDE]
1. Very well informed
2. Fairly informed
3. Not very well informed
4. Very badly informed

POS10. Did the way the informant answered change during the interview? [MDE]
1. Yes
2. No

POS11. Where there any serious distractions to the informant during the interview? [MDE]
1. Yes
2. No

POS12. Could you please provide a general evaluation of how the informant's responses match what you could see during the course of the interview? [MDE]
1. Responses by the informant were generally in accordance with what I could observe
2. Responses were sometimes in accordance and sometimes not
3. Responses were generally in disagreement with what I could observe

POS13. Classification of main ethnic group of association (evaluated after interview according to document on definitions): [7] [MDE]
1. Autochtonous (country of residence)
2. Turkish
3. Ethnic group 2 (e.g. Moroccan)
4. Ethnic group 3 (e.g. Ecuatorian)
5. Etc

[7] USE THE SAME CATEGORIES THAN FOR QUESTION PRE5 AT THE BEGINNING OF QUESTIONNAIRE.